

CSE 410 Fall 2025
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies

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Lecture 6: Protecting Data at Rest IV:
Working with Passwords

Big Picture of Data Protection

The components we discussed:

- encryption (confidentiality protection)
- integrity protection
- key generation
- randomness generation

Big Picture of Data Protection

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- integrity protection
- key generation
- randomness generation

The piece that remains:

- managing keys


Password-Based Key Derivation

- In some applications, **passwords** may be **the only required input** for users eligible to access protected data
- **Passwords have low entropy and poor randomness** and are not suitable as cryptographic keys
- The solution is to use **password-based key derivation**
 - NIST recommendation is available as special publication SP 800-132

Key Derivation Function

- A **key derivation function** (KDF) derives key material from password, passphrase, key, etc.
 - it creates a master key mk , from which we derive data protection keys
 - **password-based key derivation function** (PBKDF) takes a string of characters (password or passphrase) chosen by a user
- With PBKDF, we also specify
 - the length of a key to produce $klen$ (≈ 128)
 - hash function H (e.g., SHA-256)
 - iteration count c (e.g., 100,000)

PBKDF



- the salt needs to be pseudo-random (≥ 128 bits)
- the hash function H (to be used with HMAC) has to be strong
- let $hlen$ be the hash function output length

PBKDF Algorithm

- If $klen \leq hlen$, we compute
 1. $t = 0$
 2. $u_0 = s || 1$
 3. for ($j = 1$ to c)
 4. $u_j = \text{HMAC}(p, u_{j-1})$
 5. $t = t \oplus u_j$
 6. return $t[0 \dots hlen - 1]$

PBKDF Algorithm

■ Full algorithm:

1. $len = \lceil klen/hlen \rceil$
2. $r = klen - (len - 1) \cdot hlen$
3. for ($i = 1$ to len)
4. $t_i = 0$
5. $u_0 = s || i$
6. for ($j = 1$ to c)
7. $u_j = \text{HMAC}(p, u_{j-1})$
8. $t_i = t_i \oplus u_j$
9. return $mk = t_1 || t_2 || \dots || t_{len}[0 \dots r - 1]$

Password-Based Key Derivation

- One or more **data protection keys** (DPK) can be computed from the derived mk
 - a DPK can be a portion of the master key
 - a DPK can be computed from mk using a KDF
- A challenge is that the supplied password can be incorrect
 - there is a need to verify the validity of the generated DPK
 - **option 1**: add a fixed prefix to the data being decrypted
 - **option 2**: store the DPK protected (using authenticated encryption) with another key derived from mk

Password-Based Authentication

- Passwords are a simple mechanism for authenticating users
- A password serves the purpose of a shared secret between the user and the system
- A (userid, password) pair is associated with a user
 - userid identifies the user
 - password provides the necessary evidence that the user possesses the secret
- During authentication, the system compares user-supplied information with what it has stored
- Passwords are a weak form of authentication as they are prone to replay attacks

Password Storage

- Passwords are typically **not stored in the clear**
 - any data breach, insider attack makes all users vulnerable

Password Storage

- Passwords are typically **not stored in the clear**
 - any data breach, insider attack makes all users vulnerable
- Typically **we hash a password using a one-way hash function** and store the hash
 - stored information can look like

$$uid_1, H(pwd_1)$$
$$uid_2, H(pwd_2)$$

- the password itself cannot be recovered, but there are other concerns

Attacks on (Hashed) Passwords

- **Exhaustive search:** an attacker attempts to guess a user password by trying all possible strings
 - this is most effective if the attacker has the password file
 - can be infeasible if the password space is large (but can exhaust all short passwords)
- **Dictionary attack:** an attacker tries to guess a password using words from a dictionary and variations thereof
 - can have a high probability of success
 - dictionary attacks are now sophisticated

Password Storage

One of the measures to decrease the vulnerability of the system is **password salting**

- this technique makes guessing attacks less effective
- a password is augmented with a random string, called salt, prior to hashing
- the salt is stored in cleartext in the password file

$$uid_1, salt_1, H(salt_1 || pwd_1)$$
$$uid_2, salt_2, H(salt_2 || pwd_2)$$

- how does it improve security?

Summary

- We extensively examined protecting data at rest
- Next, we turn to protecting data in transit