

CSE 410 Fall 2026  
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies

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Lecture 4: Protecting Data at Rest II  
Symmetric Encryption

# Recap

We are looking into realizing **secure and efficient encryption**

This is realized by means of a **block cipher**

The current encryption standard is **AES**

# Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

In 1997 NIST made a call for an **unclassified publicly disclosed encryption algorithm available worldwide and royalty-free**

- the goal was to replace DES with a new standard called AES
- the algorithm must be a symmetric block cipher
- the algorithm must support (at a minimum) 128-bit blocks and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits

The **evaluation criteria** were:

- security
- speed and memory requirements
- algorithm and implementation characteristics

# AES

In 1998 15 candidate AES algorithms were announced

They were narrowed to 5 in 1999: MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish

- all five were thought to be secure

In 2001 **Rijndael** was adopted as the AES standard

- invented by Belgian researchers **Daemen and Rijmen**
- designed to be simple and efficient in both hardware and software on a wide range of platforms
- supports different block sizes (128, 192, and 256 bits)
- supports keys of different length (128, 192, and 256 bits)
- uses a variable number of rounds (10, 12, or 14)

# Rijndael Design

Rijndael doesn't have a Feistel structure

- 2 out of 5 AES candidates (including Rijndael) don't use Feistel structure
- they process the entire block in parallel during each round

The operations are (3 substitution and 1 permutation operations):


- **SubBytes**: byte-by-byte substitution using an S-box
- **ShiftRows**: a simple permutation
- **MixColumns**: a substitution using mod  $2^8$  arithmetics
- **AddRoundKey**: a simple XOR of the current state with a portion of the expanded key

# Rijndael Design

- AddRoundKey is the only operation that uses key
  - that's why it is applied at the beginning and at the end
- all operations are reversible
- the decryption algorithm uses the expanded key in the reverse order
- the decryption algorithm, however, is not identical to the encryption algorithm


# SubBytes

- The operation maps each byte of the state to a new byte using S-box
  - the S-box is a  $16 \times 16$  byte matrix computed using a formula
  - it was designed to resist known cryptanalytic attacks



# ShiftRows

- The operation performs circular left shift on state rows
  - 2nd row is shifted by 1 byte
  - 3rd row is shifted by 2 bytes
  - 4th row is shifted by 3 bytes



- Important because other operations operate on a single cell

# MixColumns

The operation multiplies the state by a fixed matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0} & s_{0,1} & s_{0,2} & s_{0,3} \\ s_{1,0} & s_{1,1} & s_{1,2} & s_{1,3} \\ s_{2,0} & s_{2,1} & s_{2,2} & s_{2,3} \\ s_{3,0} & s_{3,1} & s_{3,2} & s_{3,3} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} s'_{0,0} & s'_{0,1} & s'_{0,2} & s'_{0,3} \\ s'_{1,0} & s'_{1,1} & s'_{1,2} & s'_{1,3} \\ s'_{2,0} & s'_{2,1} & s'_{2,2} & s'_{2,3} \\ s'_{3,0} & s'_{3,1} & s'_{3,2} & s'_{3,3} \end{bmatrix}$$

- was designed to ensure good mixing among the bytes of each column
- small coefficients 01, 02, and 03 are for implementation efficiency

# Other Operations

## Decryption:

- inverse S-box is used in SubBytes
- inverse shifts are performed in ShiftRows
- inverse multiplication matrix is used in MixColumns

## Key expansion:

- was designed to resist known attacks and be efficient
- knowledge of a part of the key or round key doesn't enable calculation of other key bits
- round-dependent values are used in key expansion

# Summary of Rijndael design

- Simple design but resistant to known attacks
- Very efficient on a variety of platforms including 8-bit and 64-bit platforms
- Highly parallelizable
- Had the highest throughput in hardware among all AES candidates
- Well suited for restricted-space environments (very low RAM and ROM requirements)
- Optimized for encryption (decryption is slower)

# AES Hardware Implementation

- It's been long known that hardware implementations of AES are extremely fast
  - the speed of encryption is compared with the speed of disk read
- Hardware implementations were initially inaccessible to the average user
- Intel introduced new AES instruction set (AES-NI) in its commodity processors
  - other processor manufacturers support it now as well
  - hardware acceleration can be easily used on many platforms

# Secure Encryption

Using a strong block cipher is not enough for secure encryption

- If you are to send more than 1 block (16 bytes) over the key lifetime, applying plain block cipher to the message as

$$\text{Enc}_k(b_1), \text{Enc}_k(b_2), \dots$$

will fail even weak definitions of secure encryption


- No deterministic encryption can be secure if multiple blocks are sent

# Encryption Modes

- Encryption modes indicate how messages longer than one block are encrypted and decrypted
- 4 modes of operation were standardized in 1980 for Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
  - can be used with any block cipher
  - electronic codebook mode (ECB), cipher feedback mode (CFB), cipher block chaining mode (CBC), and output feedback mode (OFB)
- 5 modes were specified with the current standard Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001
  - the 4 above and counter mode

## Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode

- Divide the message  $m$  into blocks  $m_1 m_2 \dots m_\ell$  of size  $n$  each
- Encipher each block separately: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  
 $c_i = E_k(m_i)$ , where  $E$  denotes block cipher encryption
- The resulting ciphertext is  $c = c_1 c_2 \dots c_\ell$




# ECB Mode

ECB is a plain invocation of the block cipher

- Identical plaintext blocks result in identical ciphertexts (under the same key)
- This mode doesn't result in secure encryption
- It allows the block cipher to be used in other, more complex cryptographic constructions

# Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode

- Set  $c_0 = IV \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n$  (initialization vector)
- Encryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $c_i = E_k(m_i \oplus c_{i-1})$
- Decryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $m_i = c_{i-1} \oplus D_k(c_i)$ , where  $D$  is block cipher decryption




# CBC Mode

## Properties of the CBC mode:

- this mode is CPA-secure (has a formal proof) if the block cipher can be assumed to produce pseudorandom output
- a ciphertext block depends on all preceding plaintext blocks
- sequential encryption, cannot use parallel hardware
- $IV$  must be random and communicated intact
  - if the  $IV$  is not random, security quickly degrades
  - if someone can fool the receiver into using a different  $IV$ , security issues arise

## Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode

- The message is XORed with the encryption of the feedback from the previous block
- Generate random  $IV$  and set initial input  $I_1 = IV$
- Encryption:  $c_i = E_k(I_i) \oplus m_i; I_{i+1} = c_i$
- Decryption:  $m_i = c_i \oplus E_k(I_i)$




# CFB Mode

## Properties of the CFB mode:

- the mode is CPA-secure (under the same assumption that the block cipher is strong)
- similar to CBC, a ciphertext block depends on all previous plaintext blocks


## Output Feedback (OFB) Mode



- the feedback is independent of the message
- the mode is CPA-secure

## Counter (CTR) Mode

- A counter is encrypted and XORed with a plaintext block
- No feedback into the encryption function
- Initially set  $\text{ctr} = IV \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^n$



# CTR Mode

## Counter (CRT) mode

- encryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $c_i = E_k(\text{ctr} + i) \oplus m_i$
- decryption: for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $m_i = E_k(\text{ctr} + i) \oplus c_i$

## Properties:

- there is no need to pad the last block to full block size
- if the last plaintext block is incomplete, we just truncate the last cipherblock and transmit it

# CTR Mode

## Advantages of the counter mode

- Hardware and software efficiency: multiple blocks can be encrypted or decrypted in parallel
- Preprocessing: encryption can be done in advance; the rest is only XOR
- Random access:  $i$ th block of plaintext or ciphertext can be processed independently of others
- Security: at least as secure as other modes (i.e., CPA-secure)
- Simplicity: doesn't require decryption or decryption key scheduling

The counter can't be reused

# Randomness Generation

All cryptographic constructions that are non-deterministic or produce key material require **randomness**

- key generation for any type of cryptographic tool
- drawing randomness during probabilistic encryption

What do we expect from a **random bit sequence**?

- **uniform distribution**: all possible values are equally likely
- **independence**: no part of the sequence depends on its other parts

Where do we find randomness?

# Randomness Generations

Randomness can be gathered from **physical, unpredictable processes**

Example **sources of true randomness**

- least significant bits of time between key strokes
- noise from a mouse, video camera, and microphone
- variation in response times of raw read requests from a disk

Amount of required randomness may not be small

- example: choosing a 1024-bit prime

Instead of a **true randomness** we can use a **pseudo-random generator (PRG)**

# Pseudo-Random Generators

A **pseudo-random generator** is an algorithm that

- takes a short value, called a **seed**, as its input
- produces a long string that is statistically close to a uniformly chosen random string
- the bitlength of a seed is based on a security parameter

The **security requirement** is that

- a computationally bounded adversary cannot tell the output of a PRG apart from a truly random string of the same size
- in practice, a number of statistical tests are used to test the strength of a PRG

# Pseudo-Random Generators

## PRGs are deterministic

- the output is always the same on the same seed
- for cryptographic purposes, it is crucial that the seed is hard to guess
  - i.e., use strong true randomness to generate a seed

## Example of a PRG

- symmetric block ciphers, such as AES, can be used as PRGs
- given a key  $k$  (seed), produce a stream as  $\text{Enc}_k(0), \text{Enc}_k(1), \dots$ , where  $\text{Enc}$  is block cipher encryption

# Randomness in Implementations

- Regardless of how randomness was produced, it is absolutely **crucial that you use good randomness**
  - insufficient amount of randomness leads to predictable keys
  - this is especially dangerous for long-term signing keys
- **Examples of poor randomness** in cryptographic applications
  - CVE-2006-1833: Intel RNG Driver in NetBSD may always generate the same random number, Apr. 2006
  - CVE-2007-2453: Random number feature in Linux kernel does not properly seed pools when there is no entropy, Jun. 2007
  - CVE-2008-0166: OpenSSL on Debian-based operating systems uses a random number generator that generates predictable numbers, Jan. 2008

## Putting It All Together

- **AES** is the current block cipher standard for symmetric encryption
  - it offers strong security and fast performance
- Secure encryption requires the use of a **secure encryption mode**
  - any mode except ECB is acceptable
  - the counter mode has attractive properties
- **Strong randomness** is required for cryptographic purposes
  - key generation, IV generation, etc.
- **Implementing** cryptographic constructions is hard
  - bugs exist even in well-known cryptographic libraries

# Putting It All Together

When we store data encrypted, what do we do with the **key**?

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When we store data encrypted, what do we do with the **key**?

What about **integrity** of the encrypted storage?