23. Prevalence, antecedents and consequences of actual–desired attitude discrepancies

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Understanding the nature of people's evaluations of products has been a central focus of consumer behavior research since its inception. Consumers evaluate brands and products with some degree of favor or disfavor. For example, some people like Scotch, whereas others dislike it. Research has primarily focused on what we label people's actual attitudes, that is, the attitudes that reflect a person's explicitly and honestly held attitudes toward a target, such as scotch. In some cases, however, people want to hold evaluations other than those they actually hold, something we call desired attitudes. For example, a given person may like Scotch, but wish that they liked it less, perhaps because of its expense or its effects on productivity the next morning. Alternatively, a given person may dislike Scotch, but wish that they liked it more in order to claim an identity that they are a sophisticated person. When people have different actual and desired attitudes, they have what we label actual–desired attitude discrepancies.

Desired attitudes can stem from many different sources, but one source of desired attitudes is people's identities. For example, a Catholic might want to be more negative towards legalized abortion, a Texan might want to like brisket more, and a parent might want to enjoy watching piano recitals more. The wide range of identities that we aspire to, groups with which we align ourselves, and roles we adopt frequently have typical associated attitudes. These attitudes might be explicitly prescribed for members of a group, such as the Catholic above; they might be commonly expected of an identity, such as the Texan above; or they might be related to tasks one must do as part of a role with which one identifies, such as the parent above. Hence, identities can be one among many potential sources of desired attitudes. Although we focus our discussion in this chapter on how actual–desired attitude discrepancies can result from identity constraints, we note that this represents only a subset of such discrepancies. We first discuss desired attitudes, how they are measured and why people may have actual–desired attitude discrepancies. We then discuss consequences of desired attitudes and actual–desired attitude discrepancies.

MEASUREMENT OF DESIRED ATTITUDES

The measurement of actual and desired attitudes follows closely from related work on self-guides (e.g., Higgins 1989). Specifically, participants are instructed that:

> Sometimes the attitudes we have are different from the attitudes we ideally would like to have or the attitudes we feel we should hold, and sometimes these attitudes are the same. For your opinion of issue X, please indicate the attitude you ACTUALLY have, the attitude you WOULD LIKE to have, and the attitude you feel you SHOULD or OUGHT to have using the separate scales provided.

These instructions are designed both to define the constructs of ideal and ought attitudes for the participants, but also to make clear that people may in many cases not have discrepancies, thereby reducing demand for participants to indicate having discrepancies when they in fact do not. After reading the prompt, participants report their actual, ideal and ought attitudes on standard attitude semantic differential scales, such as those anchored by "negative" and "positive." Ideal and ought attitudes frequently operate in equivalent ways, and when they do, they are typically averaged to create a "desired" attitude. In other cases, to simplify analyses and computation, participants are simply asked to indicate their "desired" attitude in lieu of reporting ideal and ought attitudes separately. We have operationalized actual–desired attitude discrepancies as the absolute difference between actual attitudes and desired attitudes.

We have also used a branching method to assess actual and desired attitudes. In this method, people initially report their attitudes and are then given a prompt similar to that above, indicating that sometimes people may wish to feel more positively or negatively than they actually do, but other times they may not (see DeMarree et al. 2014 for more detail). They are then asked whether they would like a different attitude, and if so, how much more positively or negatively they would like to feel. The absolute magnitude of this latter value is used as a measure of actual–desired attitude discrepancy. An advantage of this method is that it avoids potential multicollinearity between the desired and actual attitude measures, potential ceiling or floor effects on attitude discrepancies for extremely positive or negative attitudes, and potential issues associated with arbitrary metrics (e.g., Blanton and Jaccard 2006). Preliminary research suggests that this measurement method may be more predictive of downstream outcomes than the self-guides method, though more research is needed to establish whether this finding is robust.

DESIRED ATTITUDES AND THEIR PREVALENCE

Frankfurt (1971) suggests that humans are unique in their ability to reflect on their attitudes and to desire an attitude other than that which they actually hold. As he writes, "Besides wanting and choosing and being moved *to do* this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are" (ibid., p. 7). People can know how they feel about a given object and at the same time wish that they felt differently, something we call an actual–desired attitude discrepancy (see also Maio and Thomas 2007). In some cases, discrepancies can come about because the attitudes implied by people's identities conflict with their genuine evaluations of attitude objects. In other cases, conflicting identities may each suggest different attitudinal responses, even though only one attitude feels like one's genuine (that is, actual) attitude.

The reader may wonder how common it is that people hold discrepant actual and desired attitudes. We have asked people their actual and desired attitudes about a wide variety of attitude objects, including brands (for example, Wal-Mart, Microsoft), people (for example, Donald Trump, African Americans), behaviors (for example, drinking alcohol, exercising), political issues (for example, abortion, nuclear power), and the self. Though the prevalence of discrepancies in our samples differs across objects, from those with prevalent discrepancies (for example, exam attitudes held by college students, 77 percent) to those with less prevalent discrepancies (for example, attitudes toward nudity, 16 percent), the median discrepancy level we have measured is nearly 50 percent. That is, for a typical attitude object in our studies, nearly half of people want an attitude that is either more positive or negative than the one that they hold.[1]

SOURCES OF ACTUAL–DESIRED ATTITUDE DISCREPANCIES

Given the wide prevalence of discrepancies, it is natural to speculate about the basis for discrepancies; that is, given that attitudes are just a mental construct, why don't people just form the attitudes they want to have? Although research on desired attitudes is in its nascent stages, we speculate

[1] Actual–desired attitude discrepancies should not be confused with Wilson et al.'s (2000) notion of "dual attitudes." In their formulation, two attitudes (one implicit and one explicit) can coexist and influence behavior under different circumstances. Both actual and desired attitudes, in our formulation, are explicit attitudes.

that constraints posed by the attitude object itself (something we call "reality constraints") and constraints posed by the surrounding cognitive structures (for example, identities, beliefs, values, and so on; something we call "structural constraints") can give rise to actual–desired attitude discrepancies.

Reality Constraints

In many cases, the attitude object is as it is, and there is little one can do to change it. If a consumer dislikes some features of a product or the associations of its brand, they are often unable to alter it. Of course, there are some cases in which people can alter the attitude object, or at least their perceptions of it, and doing so may be a particularly effective way to achieve one's desired attitudes (Lu et al. 2015). For example, many people dislike exercise when they begin exercising, but eventually learn to enjoy it, because they alter the attitude object to make it more pleasing (for example, by exercising with a friend or watching an enjoyable show while on the treadmill), or by altering their sensory experience with the object (for example, through adaptation to difficult exercise or through the release of endorphins), or by learning to perceive it differently (for example, by convincing themself that the unpleasant physical sensations of exercise are something to take pride in). Absent such alterations in the attitude object or one's perceptions of it, however, the attitude object as it is fixed, and therefore there are limits to how much actual attitudes can shift. Put another way, if one hates the taste of Marmite or loves the taste of cake, it can be difficult to convince one's sensory organs otherwise.

Structural Constraints

Structural constraints are constraints imposed by identities, beliefs, values, motivations and attitudes that exist in one's cognitive structure. For example, classical theories of persuasion emphasize that people like to be consistent in their beliefs and attitudes (e.g., Heider 1946; Festinger 1957). Inconsistencies in one's cognitive representations can create discomfort and tension. People may attempt to reduce inconsistencies, but they are constrained by the general structure of the network. That is, because attitudes exist in a large network of interrelated evaluation-relevant content, it may sometimes be impossible to reconcile all of the elements in a harmonious way. When the content in the existing evaluative structure implies conflicting evaluations, or when the network imposes a desired attitude that is inconsistent with the properties of the attitude object, it can create actual–desired attitude discrepancies.

For example, imagine that a cheese-loving consumer who highly values animal welfare encounters a bad-tasting vegan cheese. In this case, the combined identities of "cheese lover" and "animal rights advocate" could create a positive desired attitude toward the cheese. However, the undeniably bad taste of the cheese (that is, the reality constraint) could prevent the consumer from generating an actual attitude that matches the desired attitude. Hence, one's identities, values, beliefs and motivations can create desires to like or dislike an attitude target, but these constructs and the properties of the target (or at least, one's perceptions of it) can prevent the actual attitude from matching the desired attitude.

In other cases, discrepancies can result solely from structural constraints, such as when different identities have conflicting attitudinal implications. For example, a liberal Catholic's political and religious identities could provide competing constraints for more favorable (liberal) and more unfavorable (Catholic) attitudes towards legalized abortion. No matter what attitude this person actually holds, one of their identities could lead them to want a different attitude. A person's actual and desired attitudes both exist in relationship to a variety of constraints, and so one reason people might fail to close these discrepancies is that doing so would necessitate creating other imbalances or discrepancies.

PREDICTION OF EVALUATIVE RESPONSES

The utility of the desired attitude construct can be found in the extent to which it can predict variance in evaluative responses above and beyond that accounted for by people's actual attitudes. Perhaps the most widely studied evaluative response concerns people's actual behavior and choices. Prior research has shown that people's attitudes can sometimes predict their behavior. For example, one's attitudes toward political candidates are highly predictive of eventual voting (e.g., Fishbein and Coombs 1974). Of course, attitudes vary in the extent to which they predict behavior, and some of this variation is accounted for by things such as correspondence between the measured attitude and the subsequent behavior (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1977) and the strength of the attitude itself (e.g., Petty and Krosnick 1995). However, even under optimal conditions, there is still unexplained variance, and some of this variance could plausibly be attributed to desired attitudes.

To test this idea, we ran experiments assessing whether desired attitudes could predict behavioral intentions and actual behavior beyond actual attitudes. In one study (DeMarree et al. 2017, study 1), participants indicated their actual, ought and ideal attitudes toward McDonald's. They then

indicated their intentions to eat at McDonald's over the next month. In a simultaneous regression, actual attitudes significantly predicted behavioral intentions, but so too did ideal attitudes. Research shows that desired attitudes can sometimes predict behavior even better than actual attitudes (e.g., DeMarree et al. 2017, study 2), though the unique variance explained by desired attitudes varies across samples, attitude objects and outcomes. Other labs have also shown unique prediction by desired attitudes, and these effects appear more likely to emerge when people are in a relatively abstract mindset (Carrera et al. 2017).

Of course, people's behavioral intentions may not reflect their actual behavior, and given that behavioral intentions can sometimes reflect social desirability or people's naïve beliefs about how they will behave, it could be that people just inflated their behavioral intentions to more closely approximate their desired attitudes. To examine this, in another study, we examined whether people's desired attitudes would predict their actual behavior (that is, coffee consumption). We additionally examined whether people would alter the attitude object, as described above, so as to facilitate behaving in line with their desired attitudes.[2]

In this study (DeMarree et al. 2017, study 4), we told participants that they would be evaluating a brand of coffee. They were then shown a page with pictures and descriptions of various additives (that is, natural and artificial sweeteners, and dairy and non-dairy creamers) and asked to indicate how many of each type of additive they would like added to their coffee before tasting it. While the experimenter prepared the coffee (standardized using a Keurig machine), participants reported their actual and desired attitudes toward drinking coffee. We also asked how committed participants were to pursuing their actual and desired attitudes, with the expectation that each type of attitude would be particularly predictive among those participants who were highly committed. While participants completed the questionnaire (and filler questionnaires to take up time as participants consumed their coffee), they were given the coffee prepared with their requested additives. Last, participants evaluated the coffee, to maintain consistency with the cover story.

We first examined the number of additives participants asked to have added to the coffee before they drank it. Not surprisingly, the more people actually liked coffee the fewer additives they requested. By contrast, the more participants desired to like coffee the more additives they requested,

[2] Although we did not specifically examine identity in this study, positive desired attitudes toward coffee could stem from identity motivations. If so, drinking more coffee and using additives to make it more appealing would be consistent with the idea of identity reinforcement (Reed and Forehand 2016).

particularly if they were committed to their desired attitude. This is in line with the idea that those who actually like coffee do not feel the need to modify the attitude object, but those who want to like coffee more than they do will modify the coffee in such a way as to make it more palatable to them. At the end of the study, the amount of coffee participants consumed was assessed. The predicted desired attitude x commitment interaction was marginally significant, such that among those people who were committed to their desired attitude, wanting to like coffee more predicted increased consumption of the coffee. This study suggests that wanting to like something more can lead people to modify that attitude object to make it more appealing to them and make them more likely to engage in behavior consistent with actually liking it (a potential "fake it until you make it" strategy).

Another type of classic finding in the attitudes literature is that attitudes predict various information processing tendencies. Specifically, people often seek and process information in ways that promote maintenance of their current attitude, such as exposing themselves more to attitude-consistent information (Frey 1986) and evaluating attitude-consistent information more favorably (Lord et al. 1979). The framework presented here suggests that people may sometimes process information in ways that support their desired attitude, even at the expense of their actual attitudes. That is, because actual and desired attitudes can differ, desired attitudes might predict biased information processing above and beyond that of actual attitudes. To test this idea, we took classic paradigms from the attitudes literature and tested whether desired attitudes could predict those findings over actual attitudes.

In one experiment (DeMarree et al. 2017, study 3), we used a biased information evaluation paradigm (Lord et al. 1979) in which participants are provided with conflicting attitude-relevant information to assess whether people evaluate attitude-consistent information more favorably. Specifically, in this study, participants indicated their actual and desired attitudes toward the death penalty (as well as their commitment to their desired attitude) before reading about ostensibly real (but fictional) studies regarding the efficacy of the death penalty in reducing crime. Participants then indicated how well-conducted and convincing they found each study. Results indicated that as people desired to have a pro-death penalty attitude more, they evaluated the study supporting the efficacy of the death penalty as more convincing, particularly when they were committed to their desired attitude. In fact, as commitment to their desired attitudes increased, participants demonstrated a non-significant tendency to find more compelling information inconsistent with their actual attitude. Although preliminary, this shows an intriguing pattern whereby, when

highly committed to their desired attitude, people will actively undermine their actual attitude in order to bring it more in line with their desired attitude. Given that death penalty attitudes are often related to people's political identities, it is easy to imagine how these processes could occur in the service of people's actual or desired political identities.

DOWNSTREAM CONSEQUENCES

Whereas previous research had focused on the extent to which people's actual attitudes guide behavior and information processing, the studies we have just described demonstrate that people's desired attitudes can predict these outcomes as well. When actual and desired attitudes are congruent, this will typically result in actual and desired attitudes pushing people's responses in the same direction (for example, towards purchase or consumption of a product, towards a particular interpretation of a candidate's message, and so on). However, as the discrepancy between one's actual and desired attitudes increases, these could predict conflicting evaluative responses. If a person's actual attitude towards eating broccoli is negative but their desired attitude is positive, they could simultaneously experience behavioral tendencies to eat and to reject a plate of broccoli. These conflicting reactions could lead the person in question to experience a state of subjective ambivalence.

Subjective ambivalence refers to the psychological experience of conflict, indecision and mixed feelings toward an attitude object (Priester and Petty 1996). Subjective ambivalence can lead people to rely less on their ambivalent attitudes as a guide to behavior, to attempt to reduce the ambivalence (for example, by seeking additional attitude-relevant information), and to change their attitudes more readily (for a review, see van Harreveld et al. 2015).

Subjective ambivalence has been hypothesized to result from objective ambivalence (Priester and Petty 1996; Thompson et al. 1995). Objective ambivalence refers to holding both positive and negative thoughts and feelings toward an attitude object. For example, someone might believe that a car has both positive features (for example, it looks good and gets good gas mileage) and negative features (for example, it has poor safety ratings and slow acceleration) at the same time. Hence, whereas subjective ambivalence refers to the experience or feeling of evaluative conflict, objective ambivalence refers to the mere presence of conflicting (that is, both positive and negative) attitude object-relevant information in memory. Although objective and subjective ambivalence are clearly related, they are not identical constructs. For example, if a person has mixed information

about an attitude object, that conflicting information might not create the subjective experience of conflict if both positive and negative information are not simultaneously accessible (Newby-Clark et al. 2002).

There are other potential predictors of evaluative conflict besides believing an attitude object has both positive and negative features, however. For example, if someone's attitude differs from the attitude of a close other, they may feel conflicted in their attitude (Priester and Petty 2001). Additionally, as suggested above, the conflicting pull that discrepant actual and desired attitudes exert on people's evaluative responses could be another predictor of subjective ambivalence.

We have explored this new potential source of subjective ambivalence in a large number of published (DeMarree et al. 2014) and unpublished studies and have found remarkably consistent support for this hypothesis. In a typical study, participants report their actual and desired attitudes towards one or more attitude objects as well as their objective and subjective ambivalence towards the same objects. Across a wide range of issues, including brands (for example, Walmart, Microsoft), political issues (for example, abortion, gay marriage), politicians (for example, Hillary Clinton, John McCain), and health behaviors (for example, using condoms, eating broccoli), we have found that people experience more subjective ambivalence when their actual and desired attitudes are discrepant. That is, actual–desired attitude discrepancies maximize ambivalence when people's actual and desired attitudes are maximally distinct, such as when someone's actual attitude is of one valence (for example, relatively negative towards a politician) and their desired attitude is of a different valence (for example, relatively positive towards the politician).

The above results – more discrepant participants reporting higher levels of subjective ambivalence – held after controlling for objective ambivalence. That is, actual–desired attitude discrepancies are not reducible to one's separate positive and negative reactions towards an object. As a hypothetical example, one could primarily dislike the city where one lives and have many more negative than positive feelings about it, but still desire to like it more. This desire to like it more does not indicate that one actually has lots of positive feelings, but rather that one wants to have positive feelings.

In addition, we have also demonstrated that actual–desired attitude discrepancies can predict subjective ambivalence above and beyond interpersonal sources of ambivalence as well. In the relevant study (DeMarree et al. 2014, study 3), participants reported on the same measures described above with respect to practicing safe sex. In this study, however, they also reported the attitude that their current or most recent romantic partner had towards the issue. Obviously, disagreeing with one's romantic partner

in the evaluation of safe-sex practices is a potential source of interpersonal conflict, but it is also a potential source of intra-psychic conflict (that is, subjective ambivalence). Congruent with previous research on interpersonal ambivalence (Priester and Petty 2001), we found that discrepancies between one's own and one's partner's attitudes predicted feelings of subjective ambivalence, as did objective ambivalence. Critically, however, discrepancies between one's actual and desired attitudes significantly predicted subjective ambivalence over these influences.

Most of the studies examining actual–desired attitude discrepancies have been correlational, which raises questions concerning the direction of causality. For example, it is possible that someone's experience of subjective ambivalence could lead them to want a different attitude – one that is unambivalent (cf. van Harreveld et al. 2009). However, at least two studies have manipulated participants' actual–desired attitude discrepancies to establish the causal priority of actual–desired attitude discrepancies in predicting subjective ambivalence (DeMarree et al. 2014, study 4; DeMarree and Rios 2014; study 3). In these studies, after reporting their initial attitudes, participants were provided with false feedback indicating that either their current attitude was desirable (low discrepancy condition) or an attitude of the opposite valence was desirable (high discrepancy condition). Experimentally manipulated discrepancies predicted subjective ambivalence, offering support for a causal role of actual–desired attitude discrepancies. Note that although these findings provide evidence that discrepancies can cause subjective ambivalence, this does not rule out that the reverse causal path could also operate under some circumstances.

As noted above, understanding the antecedents of subjective ambivalence is important because ambivalent attitudes are thought to be less useful guides to action and may elicit attempts to resolve the ambivalence. We have conducted several initial studies that have examined these potential consequences of actual–desired attitude discrepancies. For example, in one study (DeMarree et al. 2014, study 5), we found that attitudes toward exercising predicted behavior less strongly among people who had actual–desired attitude discrepancies compared with people who reported actual–desired attitude congruence. Further, this effect held when controlling for the moderating role that objective ambivalence also had, and both of these effects were mediated by subjective ambivalence. That is, actual–desired attitude discrepancies on the topic of exercising led people to feel conflicted in their attitude towards exercising, which led their attitude to be less predictive of exercising intentions. In another study (DeMarree et al. 2014, study 6), we instead examined people's interest in information that could help to resolve their ambivalence. Congruent with predictions, we

found that actual–desired discrepancies predicted subjective ambivalence, which in turn predicted increased interest in attitude-relevant information.

The amount of subjective evaluative conflict stemming from actual–desired attitude discrepancies could depend on the salience of their constituent components. For example, when identities create actual–desired attitude discrepancies, the resulting subjective ambivalence could depend on the salience of those identities, an idea consistent with the identity conflict principle (Reed et al. 2012). To illustrate, if a liberal Catholic is generally in favor of legalized abortion, they may only experience conflict when their religious identity is currently accessible. If they only occasionally attend mass, then they may go through life with relatively few instances of conflict from the desired attitude that their religion might prescribe. However, if their religious identity is more frequently activated (for example, from regular attendance at mass), a negative desired attitude towards legalized abortion could enter their mind more frequently and ultimately be the attitude to which they become more committed.

RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER CONSTRUCTS

As should be clear, desired attitudes affect a wide range of attitude-relevant processes. They predict people's evaluative responses, including their information processing and behavior. Because of this, when people's actual attitudes are discrepant from their desired attitudes, the conflicting pulls that each play on people's evaluative responses leads people to feel conflicted in their attitude. Further, the resultant experience of conflict is consequential, predicting reduced attitude–behavior correspondence and increased information interest. One might wonder, however, whether these are truly effects of "desired attitudes" or whether these effects might already be captured by existing constructs in the literature.

For example, the work on desired attitudes guiding behavior and information processing shares similarities to work on motivated reasoning. However, in work on motivated reasoning, people often wish for a belief or a reality to be a particular way (for example, to believe that one is healthy or intelligent; for example, Ditto and Lopez 1992), whereas in our work people often wish to evaluate an attitude object a particular way. For example, imagine a person who wants to become a doctor, but who gets a grade C in their organic chemistry class. Traditional motivated reasoning processes would predict that the person would deny the validity of the grade (for example, the professor was incompetent) and deny the importance of the grade (for example, I can still get into medical school with one bad grade) in the service of pursuing the doctor identity.

However, our work might instead focus on how people might try to shift their evaluations, potentially of those activities that would support the existing goal (for example, wanting to like studying more, to foster future success in their coursework) or of the relevant end states themselves (for example, wanting to evaluate being a doctor less favorably, and being an accountant more favorably). The former would allow people to continue to pursue their initial emerging identity (that is, doctor), whereas the latter would actually involve a potential shift in the identities that a person is attempting to develop.

This brings us to another related literature: goal pursuit. As seen in the example above, some desired attitudes can arise because people have goals (for example, identity goals), and goals frequently imply aiming to change from one's current state. Because evaluations are often relevant to goal pursuit, goals could give rise to desired attitudes. For example, people might desire to like goal-facilitating objects more than they do, such as when a dieter tries to develop a taste for salads. Successful goal pursuit can sometimes be indicated by success in making one's actual attitudes congruent with one's goals (for example, Ferguson 2008). Viewed through another lens, a desired attitude could itself be viewed as a goal. This is because discrepant desired attitudes create the motivation to reduce the actual–desired attitude discrepancy, as described above.

Last, the studies described above show that actual–desired attitude discrepancies are related to ambivalence. Given this relationship, it is reasonable to wonder whether some version of objective ambivalence could actually capture people's desired attitudes. In our studies, we have consistently shown that actual–desired attitude discrepancies significantly account for variance in outcomes beyond that of objective ambivalence. Nevertheless, because objective ambivalence represents a type of evaluative inconsistency, it has some conceptual overlap with actual–desired attitude discrepancies. One key difference is that ambivalence is about evaluative conflict within an attitude object (for example, believing a target has both pros and cons), whereas actual–desired attitude discrepancies reflect conflict between two attitudes. For example, a person who is trying an unfamiliar restaurant for the first time may initially have a relatively neutral attitude toward the restaurant (because they have not yet tried it or heard much about it) but may desire a very positive attitude. This type of inconsistency is not the result of ambivalence, but rather a difference between an unambivalent actual attitude and an unambivalent desired attitude. Hence, the desire for a different attitude need not be caused by intra-attitudinal conflict (that is, ambivalence). Of course, as noted above, ambivalence could under some circumstances lead to specific desired attitudes (for example, a person who has mixed feelings may prefer to be

unambivalently positive or negative), but in other cases it may not (for example, among people who have low preference for consistency, Cialdini et al. 1995; or among people actively cultivating ambivalent attitudes, Reich and Wheeler 2016).

CONCLUSION

The properties of an attitude object, the physiological and psychological make-up of the individual, their values, beliefs, and roles and identities, all create forces that shape how people evaluate targets. These forces result in an actual evaluation – how the person truly views the target with favor or disfavor – but also frequently cause desired evaluations that can differ and cause evaluative conflict. Whether related to goal pursuit, acquired tastes, guilty pleasures, or one's roles and identities, people often desire to evaluate things differently from how they actually do. Understanding this uniquely human capacity has the potential to add significantly to our ability to predict people's behavior from their attitudes, as well as to provide a substantially richer understanding of the formation and change of evaluations.

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