sense: terms are undefined and there is not a shred of evidence. If foreign areas studies indeed need more planning, funding, and monitoring, both the justification for the centralized policy and its eventual implementation must be based on principles that can pass intellectual scrutiny and can evoke a fair degree of consensus. The Lambert Report fails to provide them: "national interest" will not do.

The alternative to centralized policy is usually justified in terms such as commitment to truth, quality of ideas, pursuit of excellence and so forth. This language is absent from the report, and one is led to assume that the reason is that neither the federal government, the foundations, nor private corporations would be willing to support activities justified in such terms. Thus, ultimately, the Lambert Report may be seen by many as a reasonable compromise between pure science and the repeated attempts to militarize foreign area research. Yet I am persuaded that several specific recommendations would be counter-productive to the very goals set by the authors and the sponsors of the report. Moreover, I believe that the terms of discourse imposed by the report constitute a threat to the continuing advancement of social sciences in the United States and to the international flow of ideas and data.

Forecasting the 1986 Midterm Elections to the House of Representatives

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Predicting midterm election results is in one respect a pretty easy business. The track record is about as clear as it gets. The president's party will lose seats in the House of Representatives in 1986 as they have in 30 of the last 31 midterms extending back to the Civil War—the sole exception being the 1934 midterm, the first midterm of the New Deal era. The trick then is not in forecasting whether the president's party will win or lose seats, it will surely lose seats, but in estimating how many seats will be lost.



James E. Campbell

A simple starting point for predicting the extent of seat losses is the average seat loss. In the ten midterms from 1946 to 1982, the president's party has lost an average of 30 seats. Of course, there are averages and averages. Some may wish to consult averages of subgroups of midterms. Historically the president's party has suffered especially heavy losses in an administration's second midterm. In looking toward the 1986 midterm, Congressional Quarterly's Rhodes Cook, Alan Ehrenhalt and Tom Watson have already speculated about a "six-year jinx," noting that the president's party has lost an average of 52 seats and has lost no fewer than 43 seats in second midterms since the mid-1930s (Cook, 1985; Ehrenhalt, 1985; Watson, 1985).

Referenda Models

Of course we ought to be able to produce predictions that are a lot more accurate than a simple average. After all, seat losses have varied tremendously around the average, from a loss of 54 seats in 1946 to just 4 in 1962. Over the last decade a number of models have been developed to predict more accurately both the presidential party's loss of votes and seats. These models generally are based on the premise that midterms are referenda on the president's job performance. Edward Tufte (1975, 1978)

formulated the initial referenda model. The Tufte model explains the standardized vote loss of president's party as a function of the president's job performance approval ratings, as measured at the midterm by Gallup, and the annual change in the real disposable income per capita. This model has been subsequently refined by Jacobson and Kernell (1981, 1982) and modified by Hibbs (1982). Although these models directly predict the congressional vote, they regularly have been used also to forecast seat losses.

The recent record of referenda forecasts has not been very impressive.

The recent record of referenda forecasts, however, has not been very impressive. In reviewing their 1982 predictions, Evans Witt (1983) put it more bluntly: "the academic models were wrong" (p. 47). The standard referenda model, based on the president's popularity and changes in the economic conditions indicated a 1982 Republican loss of anywhere from 50 seats (Witt, 1984: 48) to 59 seats (Mann and Ornstein, 1983: 140). The Republicans actually lost just 26 seats in that election, 24 to 33 seats fewer than predicted by the standard referenda model. Hibbs' model was a bit more accurate, but still missed by 14 seats. Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984) have since further refined the standard referenda model so that it provides an earlier and direct forecast of seat losses. This revision also seems to be somewhat more accurate in its predictions than earlier versions, by my calculations accounting for about 58 percent of the variance in midterm seat losses since 1950. In 1982 it missed by only three seats. Still, the Lewis-Beck and Rice model's predictions have missed the mark on average by eight seats since 1950 and have missed particular elections in this period by as many as 19 seats. There is room for improvement.

A Coattail and Referenda Model

In attempting to improve upon the predictions generated by referenda models, I turned, as any good conservative would, to the past. Before the referenda perspective became the accepted wisdom, seat losses at the midterm had been viewed as repercussions of the prior presidential election. Louis Bean (1948, 1950) accounted for midterm election results partially as the removal of presidential coattails. Angus Campbell (1966) offered a more complex theory of "surge-and-decline" that also focused on the presidential election in its account of midterm losses. At the aggregate level both Bean and Campbell viewed most congressional candidates of the winning presidential party as having an advantage in the presidential election and losing that advantage as politics returned to normal at the midterm. The fact that most congressional candidates of the president's party have an advantage in the presidential election and lose it at the midterm accounts for the constancy of presidential party losses at the midterm. More importantly from our standpoint, the variance in the advantage held and lost may well account for the variance in the extent of presidential party losses at the midterm. The bigger the advantage in the presidential election; the bigger the loss in the midterm. If so, midterm seat losses should be inversely proportional to the prior presidential vote, a measure of the initial advantage of the president's party. In reanalyzing midterms from 1946 to 1982, I have found substantial support for the presidential election view of midterm losses (Campbell, 1985). The presidential vote alone, evident two years before the midterm, accounts for 60 percent of the variance in seat losses over the last ten midterms. Although this is a strong and simple model, a much stronger model is produced by merging the presidential election and referenda models. This merged model is presented in Table 1. The model predicts midterm losses on the basis of the prior presidential vote and the president's approval rating at the time of the election. The president's party can expect to lose slightly more than three seats at the midterm for every additional percentage point of the two-party presidential vote won in the prior election (beta = $-.76$). This corresponds quite closely to the positive presi-

TABLE 1
Midterm Seat Loss Equation

General Equation:

SEATLOSS = 75.17 − 3.13 PRESVOTE** + .79 PRESPOP** + .40 MIDTERM* + e R^2 = .92
Adj. R^2 = .88
N = 10

Equation Applied to 1986 Midterm:

SEATLOSS'86 = −75.10 + .79 PRESPOP'86 + e

Where

SEATLOSS	is the difference in the number of seats held by the president's party after the midterm election.
PRESVOTE	is the percentage of the two-party popular vote won by the president in the previous presidential election.
PRESPOP	is the Gallup approval rating of the president at the time of the midterm.
MIDTERM	is a trend correction counter variable using the last two-digits of the midterm year (e.g., 1986=86).

*p < .05.
**p < .01.

dential coattail effects that I have found in presidential elections (b = −3.22) (Campbell, 1986). In addition, the president's party can expect to save nearly one seat for every percentage point added to the president's approval ratings at the midterm (beta = .47). This corresponds quite closely to Lewis-Beck and Rice's estimate of presidential popularity's impact (b = .84). The third variable in the equation, MIDTERM, is simply a counter variable to correct for the increased insulation of congressional elections.[1] The change in real disposable income per capita variable commonly found in pure referenda models proved not to have a statistically significant direct effect.

Just how well does this model forecast midterm seat losses? By the six criteria of election forecasting models identified by Lewis-Beck (1985: 60-61) the model fares quite well. It is certainly understandable, easily usable, clear and parsimonious. The model is also quite accurate and offers predictions long before the actual election, the two criteria considered by Lewis-Beck to be most important.

In terms of accuracy, the model fits previous midterm losses very closely. It accounts for 92 percent of the variance in the ten midterms examined. The average error in these ten cases is just slightly more than four seats and the model has never been more than eight seats in error. In 1982 the model missed by five seats, predicting a 31-seat loss for the Republicans.

In terms of lead time or the earliness of the forecast, the merged model offers an advantage over the referenda models. Whereas the referenda models offer no clue about the midterm results until within a year of the election, the merged model provides a forecast, at least in a conditional form, two full years before the midterm. Since the presidential vote and the trend correction values are known two years before a midterm, the general equation can be simplified for a particular midterm. The simplified equation has only one remaining unknown term: the president's popularity. By inserting the mean presidential approval ratings at the midterm (52 percent) into

[1]A simple dummy variable (pre-1964 = 0, post-1964 = 1) was also examined as a trend correction term. The equation using this correction term instead of the counter variable produces slightly higher predictions of Republican losses in 1986. For details see Campbell (1985).

TABLE 2
Predicted Midterm Losses in the 1986 Election

President Reagan's Popularity	Predicted Republican Seat Loss
68%	-21
65%	-24
62%	-26
59%	-28
56%	-31
53%	-33
50%	-36
47%	-38
44%	-40
41%	-43
38%	-45

this equation we can obtain a generally good forecast of the midterm loss. The average error of these forecasts, again generated two years before the midterm, is a little more than six seats. However, in the three midterms in which the president's approval rating deviated substantially from the norm, the forecasts missed by 12 to 20 seats. A more conservative approach is to generate a series of conditional forecasts by substituting various approval ratings into the simplified equation.

The 1986 Forecast

What does the model forecast for 1986? The conditional predictions for the 1986 midterm are presented in Table 2. Forecasts are made at three percentage point increments of presidential popularity. They are based on the simplified equation for 1986 presented in Table 1.

The 1986 midterm forecast begins to take form with the 1984 presidential election. The single most important fact to know in forecasting Republican seat losses in 1986 is that Reagan won by a landslide in 1984. Given that Reagan received 59 percent of the two-party vote in 1984, Democrats could look forward to 1986 with the expectation of winning back a large number of seats as politics returned to a more "normal" partisan balance. Many Republican congressional candidates in 1984 were helped by having President Reagan at the top of the ticket. True, the Republicans gained a net of only 14 seats in that election, but perhaps as many as 20 incumbent Republicans were also able to hold on to their seats with Reagan's help (Campbell, 1986). Without this help in 1986, a number needing the extra margin provided by presidential coattails will go down to defeat. Immediately following the 1984 election, Republicans could have looked to 1986 expecting to lose about 34 seats, assuming Reagan received an average midterm approval rating of 52 percent.

At a somewhat closer distance to the 1986 midterm, prospects do not appear quite as gloomy for the Republicans. As of this writing, Reagan enjoys an approval rating that is considerably above average. About 65 percent of the public say they approve of his job performance. This is 13 percentage points better than the average midterm presidential rating and nearly 19 percentage points better than the average midterm rating of recent second term presidents (whose low ratings partially account for the so-called "six-year jinx"). Although presidential popularity ratings are notoriously volatile, if Reagan's marks are at current levels next fall, the Republicans should be able to cut their losses to around 24 seats. For Republicans, this may sound like nothing to celebrate. However, as the conditional predictions in Table 2 suggest, the forecast could have been much worse.

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On Being an Editor Twice

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A panel at the recent APSA Meeting in New Orleans brought together a number of editors who were new to their present editing jobs. I attended as the Congress editor of the *Legislative Studies Quarterly.* Earlier, from 1977 to 1981, I served as managing editor of another journal—*The American Political Science Review.* Naturally comparisons between the two jobs were invited at the panel, and I have been asked here to comment on editing two very different journals.

Before taking the job, I had puzzled why the title was that of "*managing* editor of the *APSR.*" It did not take long to find out. It truly is a sizeable management responsibility. Speaking for myself, I simply was incapable of *editing* the journal. The discipline it serves is too diverse in terms of subject matter and research methods. It was essential, therefore, that I create processes by which editorial decisions could be made. Being editor of the Association's official journal is a humbling experience. But humility won't get the pages printed. One needs a reliable network of advisers, a system for recovering from the inevitable mistakes, an efficient and effective internal structure for moving paper, and enough protection to allow the work to proceed. Of course, it also helps to have skilled staff assistants. I had the best. In fact, the APSA still owes Mrs. Kendall Stanley, the editorial assistant during my tenure, more than it can possibly repay.

One thing an *APSR* editor soon learns is that lots of people have opinions about the journal and its management. And, of course, they have every right to those opinions, as well as to the expectations upon which they are based. The journal belongs to the membership, directly as a function of payment of dues, indirectly through the governing body of the Association. The editor is directly answerable to the Council. My goal with regard to this official relationship was simple: keep the *APSR* off the top of the agenda. It was my good fortune to realize considerable success in that regard—particularly after the first few meetings.

The authors, manuscript reviewers, and readers constitute highly diverse groups for the editor to relate to and serve. Many editors have commented on the problems and rewards in working with these groups. Suffice to say that the overwhelming majority in each set is reasonable if treated fairly. But you can understand, I trust, that fair treatment is itself a management problem of some proportion when you are dealing with many hundreds of professional scholars.

The problem of balance among the subdisciplines is a worry of all *APSR* editors—truly it is. Unfortunately, it is not altogether clear what can be done to assure balance. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the editor to create research