Selected Readings for PSC 504

 

         

*  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2000). Principles of International Politics, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, Chapter 5.

 

*  Anatol Rapoport (1958). “Various Meanings of ‘Theory.’” American Political Science Review, 52: 972 – 88.

 

*  Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory. 3rd. ed. New York: Allyn & Bacon, 1999, pp. 55 – 93.

 

*  Stephen M. Walt (1999). “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies.” International Security, 23: 5 – 48.

 

*  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow (1999). “Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions.” International Security, 24: 56 – 73.

 

*  Lisa L. Martin (1999). “The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism.” International Security, 24: 74 – 83.

 

*  Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter Ordeshook (1999). “Return of the Luddites.” International Security, 24: 84 – 96.

 

*  Robert Powell (1999). The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies. International Security, 24: 97 – 106.

 

*  Frank C. Zagare (1999). “All Mortis, No Rigor.” International Security, 24: 107 – 114.

 

*  Stephen M. Walt (1999). “A Model Disagreement.” International Security, 24: 115 – 130.

 

*  Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcik (1999). “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security, 24: 5 – 55.

 

*  John A. Vasquez (1997). “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition.” American Political Science Review, 91: 899 – 912.

 

*  Kenneth N. Waltz (1997). “Evaluating Theories.” American Political Science Review, 91: 913 – 917.

 

*  Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder (1997). “Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances.” American Political Science Review, 91: 919 –  922.

 

*  Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (1997). “Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez.” American Political Science Review, 91: 923 – 26.

 

*  Randall L. Schweller (1997).  “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition.” American Political Science Review, 91: 927 – 30.

 

*  Stephen M. Walt (1997). “The Progressive Power of Realism.” American Political Science Review, 91: 931 –  35.

 

*  Steve Smith (1997). “New Approaches to International Theory.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds. The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 165  – 190. 

 

*  Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1969). “The Decision-Making Approach to International Politics,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 199 – 206.

 

*  David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindbloom (1969). “Types of Decision-Making” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 207 – 216.

 

*  Sidney Verba (1969).  “Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 217 – 231.

 

*  Glenn D. Paige (1969). “The Korean Decision,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 461 – 472.

 

*  Graham Allison (1969). “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” American Political Science Review, 63: 689 – 718.

 

*  James E. Campbell (2000). “The Referendum that Didn’t Happen: The Forecasts of the 2000 Presidential Election.” PS, 35: 33 – 38.

 

*  James N. Rosenau (1967). “The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis.” In James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis. New York: Free Press, 1967.

 

*  Greg Cashman, What Causes War? New York: Lexington Books, 1993, pp. 36 – 49.

 

*  Greg Cashman, What Causes War? New York: Lexington Books, 1993, pp. 49 – 76.

 

*  Greg Cashman, What Causes War? New York: Lexington Books, 1993, Ch 2.

 

*  Alexander and Juliette George (1963). Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, in Nelson Polsby, R. Dentler and P. Smith,  Politics and Social Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,  pp. 192 – 208.

 

*  William Freidman (1994). “Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House and Political Psychobiography,” Political Psychology, 15: 35 –  60

 

*  Joseph de Rivera (1976). The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, in William Vocke, American Foreign Policy. (New York: Free Press, pp. 38 – 63.

 

*  Peter Aranson (1981). “Presidential Personality and Presidential Decision-Making,” in Peter Aranson, American Government. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop,  pp. 434 – 38.

 

*  Brad Verhulst, Lindon J. Eaves and Peter K. Hatemi, (2012). “Correlation not Causation: The Relationship between Personality Traits and Political Ideologies.” American Journal of Political Science, 56: 34 – 51. 

 

*  Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann (1969). An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 622 – 639.

 

*  Mark Crescenzi, Rebecca Best and Bo Ram Kwon (2010). “Reciprocity in International Studies,” in Robert A. Denemark et al., [eds.], The International Studies Encyclopedia. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

 

*  Janice Gross Stein, “Psychological Explanations of International Conflict” in Walter Carlsaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002, pp. 292 – 308.

 

*  Jack S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 253 – 84.

 

*  David G. Winter, “Personality and Political Behavior” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 110 – 45.

 

*  Ole R. Holsti (1969). “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 543 – 550.

 

*  Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, and Robert C. North (1969). “Measuring Affect and Action in International Relations Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 679 – 697.

 

*  David M. Lampton, (1973). “The U.S. Image of Peking in Three International Crises.” The Western Political Quarterly, 26: 28 – 49.

 

*  Urie Bronfenbrenner (1986). “The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations.” Journal of Social Issues, 16: 45 – 56.  Excerpt from Ralph K. White, Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War. New York, NYU Press,  pp. 71 – 81.

 

*  Renshon, Jonathan (2008). “Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 52 (number 6): 820 – 849.

 

*  Richard K. Hermann, “Image Theory and Strategic Interaction in International Relations” in Sears, David O., Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 285 – 314.

 

*  Stephen G. Walker (2003). “Operational Code Analysis as a Scientific Research Program: A Cautionary Tale,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. Progress in International Relations Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

 

*  Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer (1998). “Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations,” Mershon International Studies Review, 42: 63 – 96.

 

*  Daniel  Ellsberg (1975). “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” in Oran Young, Bargaining. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 343 – 63.

 

*  Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1966, Chapter 2.

 

*  Gibbons, Robert (1997). “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11: 127 – 49.

 

*  Myerson, Roger B. (2007). Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence.

 

*  Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito (1984). “Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28: 63 – 84.

 

*  Christopher H. Achen, and Duncan Snidal (1989). “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies.” World Politics, 41: 143 – 69.

 

*  Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, (1989). “Deterrence and Foreign Policy.” World Politics, 41: 170 – 82.

 

*  Robert  Jervis, (1989). “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.” World Politics, 41: 183 – 207.

 

*  Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1989). “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter.” World Politics, 41: 208 – 224.

 

*  George W. Downs, (1989). “The Rational Deterrence Debate.” World Politics, 41: 225 – 37.

 

*  Stephen L. Quackenbush (2010). “General Deterrence and International Conflict.” International Interactions, 36: 60 – 85.

 

*  George Downs, David Rocke and Randolph Siverson (1985). “Arms Races and Competition,” World Politics,  38,118 – 146.

 

*  Randolph Siverson and Paul Diehl (1989). “Arms Races, the Conflict Spiral, and the Onset of War.”  In Manus Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies, Boston: Unwin Hyman: 195 – 218.*

 

*  Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2006). “Doing a Literature Review.” PS: Political Science and Politics, 40: 127 – 132.

 

*  McMenamin, Iain (2006). “Process and Text: Teaching Students to Review the Literature.” PS: Political Science and Politics, 40: 132 – 146.

 

*  Jerel A. Rosati (1995) “A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy,” in Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey and Patrick Haney, eds. Foreign Policy Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 49 – 70.

 

*  Waltz, Kenneth (2012). “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability.” Foreign Affairs 91 (2012): 2–5.

 

*  Kugler, Jacek (2012). “A World beyond Waltz: Neither Iran nor Israel Should Have the Bomb.”

 

*  Jonathan M. DiCicco (2018). “Power Transition Theory and the Essence of Revisionism.” Oxford Encyclopedia of Politics.