Selected
Publications
Books Articles Chapters Reviews Other
Books
Game
Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019.
The Games
of July: Explaining the Great War. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2011,
pp. x + 214.
Perfect
Deterrence. [with D. Marc Kilgour]. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000, pp. xxii + 414.
Modeling International Conflict. [Edited]. London: Gordon & Breach, 1990, pp. 1 – 167.
The
Dynamics of Deterrence.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. xiv + 194.
Exploring the Stability of Deterrence. [Edited with Jacek Kugler]. University
of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World
Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987,
pp. viii + 168.
Game
Theory: Concepts and Applications. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the
Social Sciences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984, pp.1-96. (Korean
edition, trans. Sooyoun Hwang. Pusan, Korea: Kyungsung University Press, 2004, pp. 1 – 159.
Articles
“Two
Against One: Deterrence in the Triad,” Peace Economics, Peace Science
and Public Policy, (2024), pp. 1 –
25.
“Modeling Threats and Promises,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], Journal of Peace Research, 60, number 4, (2023), pp. 661 – 74. Appendix.
“The Carrot and Stick Approach to
Coercive Diplomacy,” International Journal of
Development and Conflict, 10, number 1, (2020), pp. 105 – 15.
“Explaining
the Long-Peace: Why von Neumann (and Schelling) Got it Wrong,” International Studies Review, 20, (2018), pp. 422 – 37.
“A
General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Journal of Peace Economics and Peace Science, 1,
number 1, (2016), pp. 81 – 118.
“Reflections on the Great War,”
Review of History and Political Science,
3, number 2, (2015), pp. 1 – 5.
“The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 – 1906: An Analytic Narrative,”
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21, number 3, (August 2015), pp. 327 – 50.
“A Game-Theoretic
History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Economies,
2, number 1, (2014), pp. 20 – 44.
“Deterrence
Theory, Then and Now: There Is No Going Back,” St Antony’s International Review, 9, number 1, (May 2013), pp.
157 – 67.
“After Sarajevo: Explaining the Blank Check,” International Interactions, 35, Number
1, (January 2009), pp. 106 – 27.
“Explaining the 1914 War in
Europe: An Analytic Narrative,” Journal
of Theoretical Politics, 21, number 1 (January 2009), pp. 63 – 95.
“Toward
a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict,” International Interactions, 33, number 3, (July – September 2007),
pp. 305 – 27.
“Explaining Limited
Conflicts,” [with D. Marc Kilgour],
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2, number 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 65 –
82.
“The
Deterrence-vs.-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British
Policy in 1914,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], International Studies Review, 8, number 4 (December 2006), pp. 623
– 41. Appendix.
“Deterrence is Dead. Long Live
Deterrence,” Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 23, number 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 115 – 20.
“Reconciling
Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of
Deterrence Theory,” Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 16, number 2 (April 2004) pp. 107 – 141.
“Alignment
Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis”
[with D. Marc Kilgour], International
Studies Quarterly, 47 (December 2003), pp. 587 – 615.
“The
Impact of Conventional Force Reductions on Strategic Deterrence” [with D.
Marc Kilgour], Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 7, number
2 (Spring 2001), pp. 59 – 82.
“All Mortis, No
Rigor,” International Security, 24, number 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 107 –
14. Reprinted in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and
Steven E. Miller [eds.], Rational Choice and Security Studies.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
“Deterrence
Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited” [with D. Marc Kilgour], Journal
of Theoretical Politics, 10, number 1 (January 1998), pp. 66 – 87.
“Classical
Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment.” International Interactions,
21, number 4, (1996), pp. 365 – 387.
“Assessing
Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of ‘Flexible Response’”
[with D. Marc Kilgour], World Politics, 47, number 3 (April 1995), pp.
373 – 417.
“Uncertainty
and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence” [with D. Marc Kilgour], Synthese, 100, number 3 (September 1994), pp. 379 –
412.
“Modeling
Massive Retaliation” [with D. Marc Kilgour], Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 13, number 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 61 – 86.
“Asymmetric
Deterrence” [with D. Marc Kilgour], International Studies Quarterly,
37, number 1 (March 1993), pp. 1 – 27.
“NATO,
Rational Escalation and Flexible Response,” Journal of Peace Research,
29, number 4 (November 1992), pp. 435 – 54.
“Credibility,
Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], American Journal
of Political Science, 35, number 2 (May 1991), pp. 305 – 334.
“Rationality
and Deterrence,” World Politics, 42, number 2 (January 1990), pp.
238 – 260.
“The Dynamics of
Escalation,” Information and Decision Technologies, 16, number 3
(1990), pp. 249 – 261.
“Rational
Choice Models and International Relations Research,” International
Interactions, 15, numbers 3 and 4 (1990), pp. 197 – 201.
“The Long-Term
Stability of Deterrence,” [with Jacek Kugler], International
Interactions, 15, numbers 3 and 4 (1990), pp. 255 – 278.
“The Logic of
Deterrence,” Analyse & Kritik,
9 (October 1987), pp. 47 – 61.
“Holding
Power in Sequential Games,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], International
Interactions, 13, number 2 (1987), pp. 91 – 114.
“Toward
a Reformulation of the Theory of Mutual Deterrence,” International
Studies Quarterly, 29, number 2 (June 1985), pp. 155 – 169.
“Limited-Move
Equilibria in 2 x 2 Games,” Theory and Decision, 16, number 1
(January 1984), pp. 1–19.
“A
Game-Theoretic Evaluation of the Cease-Fire Alert Decision of 1973,” Journal
of Peace Research, 20, number 1 (March 1983), pp. 73 – 86.
“Competing
Game-Theoretic Explanations: The Geneva Conference of 1954,” International
Studies Quarterly, 26, number 1 (March 1982), pp. 141 – 146.
“Nonmyopic
Equilibria and the Middle East Crisis of 1967,” Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 5, number 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 139 – 162.
“Double Deception: Two
Against One in Three-Person Games,” [with Steven J. Brams], Theory and
Decision, 13, number 1 (March 1981), pp. 81 – 91.
“The
Geneva Conference of 1954: A Case of Tacit Deception,” International
Studies Quarterly, 23, number 3 (September 1979), pp. 390 – 411.
“A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Vietnam Negotiations: Preferences and
Strategies, 1968-1973,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, number 4
(December 1977), pp. 663 – 84. Reprinted in I. William Zartman [ed.], The
Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1978.
“Deception
in Simple Voting Games,” [with Steven J. Brams], Social Science Research,
6, number 3 (September 1977), pp. 257 – 72.
Back to Top
Chapters
“Multilateral Arms Races,” in Manas
Chatterji [ed.], New Frontiers in Conflict Management
and Peace Economics, Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and
Development. Bingley, UK:
Emerald
Group,
vol.29, vol. 29, pp. 15 – 25.
“Perfect
Deterrence Theory,” in William Thompson [ed.], The Oxford Encyclopedia of
Empirical International Relations Theory. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018.
“Modern Deterrence Theory:
Research Trends, Policy Debates, and Methodological Controversies,” [with
Stephen L. Quackenbush], in Desmond King, [ed.], Oxford Handbooks Online. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
“Deterrence
Theory,” in David Armstrong [ed.], Oxford
Bibliographies in International Relations. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013.
“Analytic Narratives,
Game Theory, and Peace Science,” in Manas Chatterji [ed.] “Analytic
Narratives, Game Theory, and Peace Science,” in Manas Chatterji [ed.] Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace
Science, Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development.
Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2011, vol. 16, pp. 19 – 35.
“Game Theory and
Other Modeling Approaches,” [with Branislav L. Slantchev], in Robert A. Denemark et
al., [eds.], The International Studies Encyclopedia. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010, vol. IV, pp. 2591 – 2610. Revised
version published in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Paul F. Diehl, and James D.
Morrow, [eds.], Guide to the Scientific
Study of International Processes. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012,
46 – 86.
“Game
Theory and Security Studies,” in Paul D. Williams [ed.], Security Studies: An Introduction.
London: Routledge, 2008: 44 – 58.
“A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the
War in Kosovo,” [with Stephen L. Quackenbush], in Jennifer Sterling-Folker,
[ed.], Making Sense of IR Theory.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006: 98 –
114.
“The Rites of Passage:
Parity, Nuclear Deterrence and Power Transitions,” in Jacek Kugler
and Douglas Lemke [eds.], Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of 'The
War Ledger.” Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 249 –
68.
“A
Stability Analysis of the US-USSR Strategic Relationship,” in Kugler and Zagare
[eds.], Exploring the Stability of Deterrence. University of Denver
Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, pp. 123
– 150.
“Risk,
Deterrence, and War” [with Jacek Kugler], in Kugler and Zagare [eds.], Exploring
the Stability of Deterrence. University of Denver Graduate School of
International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, pp. 67 – 89.
“Introduction”
[with Jacek Kugler], in Kugler and Zagare [eds.], Exploring the Stability of
Deterrence. University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph
Series in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1987, pp. 1 – 11.
“Recent Advances in Game Theory and Political Science,”
in Samuel Long [ed.], Annual Review of Political Science. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1986, pp. 60 – 90.
“The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence,”
in Urs Luterbacher and
Michael D. Ward [eds.], Dynamic Models of International Conflict.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985, pp. 52 –
75.
Reviews
Leo J.
Blanken, L., Rational
Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012), in Global
Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied
Contemporary Thought, 3:1 (2013), pp. 197 – 201.
Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), American Political Science Review, 87
(September 1993).
William
H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A
Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1982), American Political Science Review,
77 (September 1983).
Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1981), American Political Science Review, 76
(September 1982).
James
Mayall and Cornelia Navari [eds.], The End of
the Post-War Era: Documents on Great Power Relations 1968-1975.
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Journal of Politics,
(February 1982).
Other
“The Deterrence Project”. Qualitative Data Repository. QDR Main Collection. V1, 2018.
“Assessing
the Stability of Interstate Relationships Using Game Theory,” in Perspectives on Political and Social
Regional Stability Impacted by Global Crises - A Social Science Context.
Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Research and
Development Directorate, January 2010, pp. 242 – 46.
“Deterrence
Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited” (with D. Marc Kilgour). [Abstract.] Peace
Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 4 (Fall and Winter 1996).
“Crisis,
Escalation and Extended Deterrence’” (with D. Marc Kilgour). [Abstract.] Peace
Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 3 (Winter 1996).
“Game Theory.” The World Book Encyclopedia.
Chicago: World Book Publishing, 1996.
“Modeling
‘Massive Retaliation’” (with D. Marc Kilgour). [Abstract.] Peace Economics,
Peace Science, and Public Policy, 1 (Fall 1993).
“Uncertainty
and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence” (with D. Marc Kilgour).
[Abstract.] Conflict Management and Peace Science, 12 (Spring 1993).
The Mathematics of Conflict. Lexington, MA: Consortium for Mathematics and Its
Application, 1986, pp. viii + 38.