
Introduction to Logical Reasoning (ategorical Inferences


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
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Categorical Statements


Recall the four standard forms of categorical propositions:







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


The **conversion** of a categorical statement swaps the subject and predicate to create a new categorical statement.

In some instances, the new statement will be logically equivalent to the original one. For example, the statement "No students are lazy" (E) is logically the same as "No lazy persons are students" (E).




The Venn diagrams for **E** and its conversion confirm that they are logically the same.





Similarly, the Venn diagrams for I and its conversion confirm that they are also logically the same.






What about "Some students are not lazy" (**O**)? Is this logically the same as its conversion: "Some lazy people are not students" (**O**)?




The Venn diagrams for **O** and its conversion reveal that they are *not* logically the same.





Similarly, the Venn diagrams for **A** and its conversion reveal that they are not logically the same either.



Complement


For any subject (S) or predicate (P) in a categorical statement, we may consider its **complement**. The The complement of the subject is denoted as non-S, which refers to anything that is not in category S. The complement of the predicate is denoted by non-P, which refers to anything that is not in P.

In English, for example, the complement of "students" is "non-students", while the complement of "lazy [people]" is "non-lazy [people]". The **obversion** of a categorical statement comes from flipping its quality and replacing the predicate with that predicate's complement.

It turns out that the obversion of each of the standard four categorical statements is logically equivalent to the original statement. So, for instance, "All students are lazy" (**A**) is logically equivalent to its obversion: "No students are non-lazy" (**E**).




The Venn diagrams for **A** and its obversion (an **E** statement) reveal that they are logically the same.






Similarly, **E** and its obversion (an **A** statement) are also logically the same.






And so for I and its obversion (an O statement).






And finally for **O** and its obversion (an **I** statement).





According to contraposition, a categorical statement is changed by (1) replacing its subject with that subject's complement, (2) replacing its predicate with that predicate's complement, and (3) swapping this new subject and new predicate. In some instances, the new statement will be logically equivalent to the original one. For example, the proposition "All students are lazy" (A) is logically the same as "All non-lazy people are non-students" (A).

The Venn diagrams for **A** and its contrapositive confirm that they are logically the same.



Similarly, the diagrams for **O** and its contrapositive confirm that they are also logically the same.







O's Contrapositive (Some non-*P* is not non-*S*)

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However, the Venn diagrams for **I** and its contraposition are *not* logically the same.



Similarly, the diagrams for **E** and its contraposition reveal that they are not logically the same either.



Categorical Inferences

Don't let this table overwhelm you. Never forget, if you get lost, make a Venn diagram. From this simple picture, you should be able verify any of these inferences.



We will do a workshop on creating Venn diagrams for categorical statements and then using them to check categorical inferences.