
Introduction to Logical Reasoning

Lecture #22

Further (ategorical Inferences

Professor David Emmanuel Gray

Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar Northwestern University in Qatar



Further (ategorical Inferences—Introduction to Logical Reasoning—Professor Gray

Consider the following categorical statement:

No students are lazy people.

Suppose that this statement is *true*. What can we then logically infer about the claim that "No lazy people are students"? Is it true, false, or its truth/falsity unknown?

Consider the following categorical statement:

Some students are lazy people.


Suppose that this statement is *true*. What can we then logically infer about the claim that "Some lazy people are students"? Is it true, false, or its truth/falsity unknown?


The **conversion** of a categorical statement swaps its subject (S) and predicate (P) terms to create a new categorical statement.

In some instances, the new statement will be logically equivalent to the original one. For example, the statement "No students are lazy people" (\mathbf{E} : No *S* is *P*) is logically the same as "No lazy people are students" (\mathbf{E} : No *P* is *S*).

Note: To keep things constant, we fix the categories *S* and *P* using the first statement (S = students, P = lazy people), even though in the second statement *S* is the predicate term and *P* is the subject term.

In general, any **E** statement and its conversion are logically the same.






E's Conversion: No P is S.

Note: Even though S and P are the same in both statements, the Venn diagram of the second statement (like all diagrams) has its left circle represent the statement's subject (now P) and its right circle represent the statement's predicate (now S).

Similarly, any I statement and its conversion are logically the same.

D



Statement: Some S is P.

I's Conversion: Some P is S.

X


S

Consider the following categorical statement:


Some students are not lazy people.

Suppose that this statement is *true*. What can we then logically infer about the claim that "Some lazy people are not students"? Is it true, false, or its truth/falsity unknown?

In general, any **O** statement and its conversion are *not* logically the same.








 \mathbf{O} 's Conversion: Some *P* is not *S*.

Look closely and you will see that the dox-*x* is actually *not* in the same place in both diagrams.

Similarly, any **A** statement and its conversion are *not* logically the same.

P





A's Conversion: All P is S.

Look closely and you will see that the shaded area is actually *not* the same in both diagrams.

S

Complement

Recall that for any subject (*S*) or predicate (*P*) term in a categorical statement, we may consider its **complement**. The complement of a category consists of everything *not* in that category. The complement of the subject term *S* is denoted as non-*S*; the complement of the predicate term *P* is denoted by non-*P*.

Consider the following categorical statement:


All students are lazy people.

Suppose that this statement is *true*. What can we then logically infer about the claim that "No students are non-lazy people"? Is it true, false, or its truth/falsity unknown?


The **obversion** of a categorical statement comes from flipping its quality and replacing the predicate (P) with that predicate's complement (non-P).

It turns out that the obversion of each of the standard four categorical statements is logically equivalent to the original statement. So, for instance, "All students are lazy people" (**A**: All *S* is *P*) is logically equivalent to its obversion: "No students are non-lazy people" (**E**: No *S* is non-*P*).

In general, any **A** statement and its obversion (an **E** statement) are logically the same.




A Statement: All S is P.




A's Obversion (E Statement): No S is non-P.

Similarly, any **E** statement and its obversion (an **A** statement) are logically the same.




E Statement: No S is P.




E's Obversion (**A** Statement): All S is non-P.

And so for any I statement and its obversion (an O statement).




Statement: Some S is P.




I's Obversion (O Statement): Some S is not non-P.

And finally for any **O** statement and its obversion (an **I** statement).



• Statement: Some S is not P.







According to **contraposition**, a categorical statement is changed by (I) replacing its subject (S) term with that subject's complement (non-S), (2) replacing its predicate (P) term with that predicate's complement (non-P), and (3) swapping the new subject and new predicate.

In *some* instances, the new statement will be logically equivalent to the original one. For example, the proposition "All students are lazy people" (\mathbf{A} : All *S* is *P*) is logically the same as "All non-lazy people are non-students" (\mathbf{A} : All non-*P* is non-*S*).

In general, any A statement and its contrapositive are logically the same.









A's Contrapositive: All non-P is non-S.

Look closely and you will see that the shaded area is actually the same in both diagrams.

Similarly, any **O** statement and its contrapositive are logically the same.




• Statement: Some S is not P.




 \mathbf{O} 's Contrapositive: Some non-P is not non-S.

Look closely and you will see that the dox-*x* is actually in the same place in both diagrams.

However, any I statement and its contrapositive are *not* logically the same.




Statement: Some S is P.




I's Contrapositive: Some non-P is non-S.

Similarly, any **E** statement and its contrapositive are *not* logically the same.



E Statement: No S is P.



E's Contrapositive: No non-*P* is non-*S*.

Categorical Inferences

Do not let all of this overwhelm you. Never forget: if you ever get lost, just make a Venn diagram.

From that simple diagram, you should be able assess any inference.



Further (ategorical Inferences—Introduction to Logical Reasoning—Professor Gray

Next Class...

We will have a workshop on using Venn diagrams for making inferences from one categorical statement to another.

Also, please do not forget to turn in your response to the Lecture #22 Questionnaire on your way out.