In his practical philosophy [which this reading talks about],
Kant argues that human reason is an autonomous source of principles
of conduct, immune from the blandishments of sensual inclination in
both its determinations of value and its decisions to act, and indeed
that human autonomy is the highest value and the limiting condition
of all other values.
Traditionally, Kant has been seen as an ethical formalist, according
to whom all judgments on the values of ends must be subordinated to
the obligatory universality of a moral law derived from the very concept
of rationality itself [that is, we ought to choose our actions
based on moral rules that our reason dictates – this will become
clear in the reading]. The larger argument of Kant's practical
philosophy is that rationality itself is so valuable precisely because
it is the means to freedom or autonomy. Kant expressed this in his classroom
lectures on ethics, when he said that “the inherent value of the
world, the [the greatest good], is freedom in accordance with a will
which is not necessitated to action”, and even more clearly in
lectures on natural right given in the autumn of 1784, the very time
he was writing the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,
where he said that “If only rational beings can be ends in themselves,
that is not because they have reason, but because they have freedom.
Reason is merely a means”. Kant makes the same point in the Groundwork
when he says that the incomparable dignity of human beings derives from
the fact that they are “free with regard to all laws of nature,
obeying only those laws which” they make themselves.