Continental Philosophy

Schopenhauer's Theory of Morals and Self-Renunciation

Primary Sources:

Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I (WWR I), book 4
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation II (WWR II), chapters 46, 49
Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, section 16

Secondary Sources:

D.W. Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, chapter 7
M. Knox, "Schopenhauer on Death, Suicide, and Self-Renunciation," in M. Knox (ed.), Schopenhauer
B. Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, chapters 9 and 10
J.P. Young, Willing and Unwilling, chapters 9 and 10
C. Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, pp. 271 - 275, 279 - 285
J.E. Atwell, Schopenhauer: The Human Character, part II, chapter 8; part III, chapters 4 - 6
R. Taylor, "On the Basis of Morality," in M. Knox (ed.), Schopenhauer
P. Gardiner, Schopenhauer, chapter 6

Questions:

Explain the general principle behind Schopenhauer's theory of morals and how he proceeds from there to the doctrine of self-renunciation. Can Schopenhauer's ethics be maintained without his "will metaphysics"? Is it true that compassion makes a person moral? Can, for Schopenhauer, one care for something other than oneself (or is the moral attitude perhaps just a special kind of egoism)? Is it true that humans have only three basic drives: malice, egoism, and compassion? Velle non discitur, but knowledge seems to be what make one a moral person; is there a contradiction? Is Schopenhauer's pessimism a necessary consequence of his metaphysics (cf. Janaway and Young)? Is the doctrine of self-renunciation compatible with Schopenhauer's deterministic account of human agency? Is the saint still willing anything (cf. Atwell)? What is the relation between the will as thing in itself and an individual's self-renunciation? Who does the renunciating? What effect does it have on the will as thing in itself? Does it make the world disappear (cf. Hamlyn)? Other important issues in the fourth book: Schopenhauer's theory of the free will and character. What is the difference between intelligible, empirical, and acquired character (cf. WWR I 55, Atwell II 8)? Is the notion of an acquired character compatible with Schopenhauer's determinism?

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