Continental Philosophy

Schopenhauer's Theory of the Will

Primary Sources:

Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I (WWR I), book 2
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation II (WWR II), chapters 18, 19
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, sections 16, 17, 19

Secondary Sources:

C. Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, chapter 8
Sheeks, "The Intellect-Will Problem," in M. Fox (ed.), Schopenhauer
D.W. Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, chapter 5
B. Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, chapter 7
P. Gardiner, Schopenhauer, chapter 4

Questions:

Why does Schopenhauer think that the will is the thing in thing in itself? Is his conclusion from analogy (cf. WWR I 19) valid? What exactly are the two sides of the analogy? Is it an essential element of the analogy that bodily action is willing, rather than an effect of willing, and that our body is will? Is such a claim defensible?
Is Schopenhauer's claim that the thing in itself is knowable consistent with his idealism? In WWR I Schopenhauer seems to say that we have immediate knowledge of ourselves as will (cf. section 21), whereas in WWR II he says of that knowledge that it is mediate through the intellect (cf. chapter 18, also Janaway pp. 195ff). Which position is more plausible; are they both consistent with his idealism? Perhaps Schopenhauer showed that the will is known in a special way - different from our normal representational knowledge - but does it follow from this that the will is the thing in itself (cf. Hamlyn)?
Why can there be only one thing in itself? Is the will simply energy (cf. Magee)?
If the subject of knowledge can never be known itself, how can it know that it is identical with the subject as will (cf. Janaway pp. 194ff)?

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