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Scott Soames. 2002. *Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. i-ix, 379. ISBN 0-19-514528-3. \$35.00.

This excellent book is aptly titled, for in it Scott Soames systematically discusses and greatly extends the semantic views that Saul Kripke presented in *Naming and Necessity*. As Soames does this, he touches on a wide variety of semantic topics, all of which he treats with his characteristically high degree of clarity, depth, and precision. Anyone who is interested in the semantic issues raised by *Naming and Necessity*, or in more recent work on proper names, attitude ascriptions, and natural kind terms, will find this book indispensable.

1. Summary

Kripke criticized descriptivist theories of proper names in the first lecture of his *Naming and Necessity*. Soames begins his book by discussing descriptivist responses to Kripke's criticisms. Kripke argued that if descriptivist theories were correct, then certain modal sentences would be true, when, in fact, they are not. For example, if 'Aristotle' meant the same as 'the teacher of Alexander', then 'Necessarily, if there was exactly one teacher of Alexander, then Aristotle taught Alexander' would be true, though, in fact, it is false. In response, descriptivists formulated two new theories. The first, the *wide scope* theory, holds that proper names are synonymous with definite descriptions that always take wide scope over modal operators and quantifiers over possible worlds. The second, the *rigidified description* theory, holds that proper

names are synonymous with definite descriptions that contain the rigidifying operator ‘actually’: for instance, ‘Aristotle’ means the same as ‘the thing that is *actually* teacher of Alexander’. Both responses would enable descriptivists to escape Kripke’s modal objections (though not his epistemic and semantic objections). In response to the wide scope theory, Soames argues that certain valid arguments containing proper names turn out to be invalid on that theory, simply because the name always takes wide scope. In response to the rigidified description theory, Soames claims that many agents in other worlds believe what we believe when we sincerely assert ‘Aristotle was a philosopher’. But on the rigidified descriptivist view, when we sincerely assert this sentence, we express our belief in a proposition about world A_w , the world that is actual for us. So, on this view, an agent in another world believes what we do only if she believes a proposition about A_w . But this would be exceedingly difficult for her to do. Soames concludes that, contrary to the rigidified descriptivist theory, we do not express belief in a proposition about A_w when we sincerely assert ‘Aristotle was a philosopher’.

The most obvious alternative to descriptivist theories of proper names is the theory that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent. This theory is commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill. Kripke noted the connection between his arguments and Millianism, but he did not endorse that theory. Indeed, as Soames points out (and as Salmon [1986] did before him), some of Kripke’s claims about necessary *a posteriori* truths are inconsistent with Millianism. Soames uses his third chapter, titled “The Meaning of Proper Names,” to argue in favor of Millianism. It is perhaps the heart of the book.

Soames assumes that the goal of semantic theorizing is to specify the semantic contents of expressions with respect to contexts. He assumes that the semantic content of a sentence, with

respect to a context, is a Russellian structured proposition. These propositions have as constituents the semantic contents of the sentence's semantically significant parts. These contents include individuals, relations, and other propositions. A proposition that has an individual as a constituent is a *singular* proposition. Within this framework, Soames argues for Millianism indirectly, by first discussing the semantic contents of unambiguous, context-insensitive sentences containing proper names. Soames distinguishes between (i) the semantic contents of such sentences and (ii) the propositions that speakers assert and convey by uttering such sentences. Consider, for instance, the sentence 'Susan is tall and Bob is short'. A speaker who assertively utters this sentence asserts the proposition that Susan is tall and Bob is short, but she also asserts at least two other propositions, the proposition that Susan is tall and the proposition that Bob is short. The first proposition is a plausible candidate for being the semantic content of the sentence, but the latter two are not.

Soames argues that speakers who utter sentences containing proper names always assert at least a Russellian singular proposition about the referent of the name. But they usually also assert and convey various *descriptive* propositions. Consider, for instance, a speaker who utters (1).

1. Carl Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton.

Such a speaker asserts the Russellian singular proposition that Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton; the sole constituents of this proposition are Hempel himself and the property of having lived on Lake Lane in Princeton. However, a speaker who utters (1) usually also asserts and conveys a richer descriptive proposition, for instance, the proposition that *the philosopher of science*, Carl Hempel, lived on Lake Lane in Princeton. The descriptive propositions that

speakers assert and convey with utterances of (1) differ from speaker to speaker and occasion to occasion. One reason for this is that there are no properties that a speaker must associate with 'Carl Hempel' in order to be competent with that name (except perhaps for some very general property, such as *being sentient*). If no such association is required to be competent with the name, then there is no particular descriptive proposition that a competent speaker always asserts when she utters (1).

What, if anything, does this show about the semantic content of (1)? Soames proposes roughly the following analysis of the notion of semantic content for an unambiguous, context-insensitive sentence *S*: proposition *P* is the semantic content of *S* iff *P* is the proposition that all competent speakers assert and convey with all utterances of (1). (I here ignore qualifications that Soames adds in order to handle certain complications; these are irrelevant to what follows below.) This notion of semantic content, Soames says, coincides closely with much of our ordinary conception of linguistic meaning and with the notion of meaning assumed by most theorists. But the singular, Russellian proposition that Carl Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton is the only proposition that is asserted in all assertive utterances of (1). Thus, Soames concludes that the semantic content of (1) is the singular, Russellian proposition that Carl Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton. Therefore, the semantic content of the name 'Carl Hempel' is Hempel himself, just as Millianism says.

On Soames's Millian-Russellian theory, the semantic content of (2) is the same as that of (1), because the identity sentence (3) is true.

2. Peter Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton.
3. Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel.

Similarly, the semantic content of (3) is the same as that of (4).

4. Carl Hempel was Carl Hempel.

This leads Soames to consider the following objection. According to Soames's Millian-Russellian theory, sentences (3) and (4) have the same semantic content. But if they did have the same semantic content, then competent speakers who understood (3) and (4) would judge that they mean the same thing. But ordinary speakers don't. Therefore, the Millian-Russellian theory is not true. In reply, Soames argues that ordinary speakers do not usually think about the rather theoretical notion of semantic content when they make judgments about sameness and difference in meaning. To judge accurately whether (3) and (4) have the same semantic content, one must consider whether the proposition that is *invariantly* asserted in all utterances of (3), and the proposition that is *invariantly* asserted in all utterances of (4), are the same proposition. Ordinary speakers do not do this, when asked to judge whether (3) and (4) mean the same thing. Instead, they consider whether (3) and (4) could be used to assert and convey different descriptive propositions. They correctly judge that the sentences could be so used. Therefore, they judge that the sentences do not mean the same thing, even though the sentences do have the same semantic content.

After discussing ambiguity and indexicality in the Millian-Russellian theory, Soames considers what he calls 'partially descriptive names', which include expressions like 'Justice Antonin Scalia', 'Professor Saul Kripke', and 'Princeton, New Jersey'. He claims that the semantic contents of these are roughly the same as the semantic contents of certain definite descriptions. For instance, the semantic content of the first is roughly the same as that of 'the thing that is a Justice and is identical with x', under an assignment of Antonin Scalia to the

variable 'x'. Soames argues that simple proper names are not analyzable as partially descriptive names whose semantic contents include *contingent* properties of their referents. For instance, the semantic content of 'Hesperus' does not include the property *being a heavenly body visible in the evening*. Soames does not, however, rule out the possibility that the semantic content of a name might include some very general property that is *essential* to the referent. For instance, Soames does not try to rule out the possibility that the semantic content of 'Carl Hempel' is the same as that of 'the thing that is a sentient being and is identical with z', under an assignment of Hempel to the variable 'z'. (More on this below.)

Soames next considers propositional attitude ascriptions. He points out that, on the most straightforward extension of the Millian-Russellian view to attitude ascriptions, the following sentences attribute to Edward belief in the same singular, Russellian proposition.

5. Edward believes that Carl Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton.
6. Edward believes that Peter Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton.

So (5) and (6) have the same semantic content, and the same truth value. Soames admits that this consequence is counterintuitive, but thinks it is correct.

To defend his view, Soames first criticizes the two theories that he takes to be the best alternatives to his theory, namely the theory advocated by Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow and the theory advocated by Mark Richard. Both theories say that agents bear attitudes towards *linguistically enhanced propositions*, which are (roughly) amalgams of Russellian propositions with words. For example, on these views, (5) says that Edward stands in the believing relation to a proposition that has both Hempel himself and the name 'Carl Hempel' as constituents. Soames thinks that Larson and Ludlow's theory is open to various interpretations. On its most plausible

interpretation, Soames says, it incorrectly entails that any two belief attributions that differ in wording in any respect can differ in truth value: for example, ‘Maria believes that John speaks Spanish’ and ‘Maria cree que John habla español’ (in Spanish). Soames provides long, detailed, and sometimes very technical criticisms of Richard’s theory, but he seemingly places considerable weight on a simple, non-technical objection. On Richard’s theory, speakers use ‘that’-clauses of belief ascriptions to translate the language and mental representations of the believers whom they are describing. Thus, on Richard’s theory, when speakers use belief ascriptions, they think about, and intend to express propositions about, the language and mental representations of believers. But Soames thinks that ordinary speakers rarely think about believers’ language and mental representations, and almost never intend to use belief ascriptions to express information about these matters.

Soames next attempts to explain away ordinary judgments that (5) and (6) can differ in truth value. Soames maintains that the simple sentences embedded in (5) and (6), namely sentences (1) and (2), have the same semantic content; thus (5) and (6) have the same semantic content. But (1) and (2) can be used to *assert* descriptive propositions. Consequently, a speaker can use (5) to *assert* that Edward believes one of the descriptive propositions that an utterance of (1) can be used to assert. For instance, an utterance of (5) can be used to assert the semantic content of (7) below, though (5) does not have the same semantic content as (7).

7. Edward believes that the philosopher of science, Carl Hempel, lived on Lake Lane in Princeton.

Similarly, (6) can be used to assert the semantic content of (8), and thus to ascribe to Edward belief in a different descriptive proposition.

8. Edward believes that the elderly gentleman of his acquaintance, Peter Hempel, lived on Lake Lane in Princeton.

The semantic contents of (7) and (8) are distinct propositions that really can differ in truth value. Ordinary speakers do not clearly distinguish between the semantic content of (5) and (6) and the propositions that those sentences can be used to assert. Thus they may mistakenly think that (5) and (6) themselves differ in meaning, and that they can differ in truth value.

Soames next turns to natural kind terms. Kripke claimed that natural kind terms are rigid designators. Soames points out that this claim is much more problematic than many of Kripke's readers realize. Natural kind terms (Soames argues) often function as predicates, even in the examples of theoretical identities that Kripke discusses, such as 'Tigers are mammals'. Yet it is unclear what it means for a predicate to be a rigid designator—certainly Kripke never defines the notion of rigidity for predicates. Soames dispenses with several different possible definitions of rigid designation for predicates and concludes that there is no useful notion to be found. He hypothesizes that, when Kripke claimed that kind terms are rigid, he primarily had in mind the (correct) claim that they are non-descriptive. Soames argues that the necessity of Kripkean theoretical identities are a consequence of (i) their non-descriptiveness and (ii) the semantic presuppositions of persons who introduce and use the terms. Soames suggests that kinds are intensions (functions from possible worlds to extensions). The semantic content of a *simple* kind term, like 'water', is the kind itself, which is also what the term designates. The semantic content of a semantically *complex* kind term, like 'H₂O', is a property that determines the kind (the intension) that the term designates. Thus, even though the predicates 'water' and 'H₂O' designate the same kind, they have different semantic contents, and so the sentence 'Water is

H₂O' can semantically express a proposition that is both necessary and knowable only *a posteriori*. Soames concludes his book with a refutation of an argument by Mark Johnston against the identity of water with H₂O.

2. Some Criticisms

The above summary hardly begins to describe the wealth of material contained in this rich book. Nevertheless, I shall now turn to a couple of critical points concerning Soames's claims about proper names. My first comment will consider Soames's view that some simple proper names might be partially descriptive. My second comment will consider whether Soames can defend his Millian-Russellian theory from a certain well-known, traditional objection.

As I mentioned above, Soames argues that simple proper names are not analyzable as partially descriptive names whose semantic contents include *contingent* properties of their referents. However, he leaves open the possibility that the semantic content of a name might include some very general property that is *essential* to the referent. For instance, he leaves open the possibility that the semantic content of 'Carl Hempel' is (roughly) the same as that of 'the thing that is sentient and is identical with z', under an assignment of Hempel to the variable 'z'. I believe that he should reject this possibility, because a competent speaker who is horribly misinformed about Carl Hempel's properties may still use the name to assert singular propositions about him.

Suppose that Alice keeps oysters as pets. She gives them first and last names that are phonologically like standard human names, and frequently talks about her oysters with her friends. Suppose that Betty knows all of this about Alice. Suppose further that Betty has never

heard of Carl Hempel, but that Carl Hempel is one of Alice's neighbors. Suppose that Alice utters 'Carl Hempel is ill' during a conversation with her friends about her neighbor. As Betty walks by, she overhears Alice's remark, but not the surrounding conversation, and assumes that Alice is (yet again) speaking of her pet oysters. Betty then assertively utters (9).

9. Carl Hempel is one of Alice's pet oysters.

In doing so, Betty intends to use 'Carl Hempel' to refer to the same object that Alice does when she uses 'Carl Hempel'. Thus, Betty asserts a false proposition about Carl Hempel. If Betty is convinced that oysters are *not* sentient, then, when she utters (9), she does *not* assert that the *sentient being*, Carl Hempel, is one of Alice's pet oysters. Thus not every utterance of a sentence containing 'Carl Hempel' by a competent speaker is used to assert or convey a proposition that ascribes sentience to Hempel. Therefore, by the Soamesian principles mentioned earlier, the semantic content of 'Carl Hempel' does not include the property of being sentient. (A somewhat different example, leading to the same conclusion, could be constructed around a philosophical speaker who believes that Carl Hempel is human, but also believes that no human is sentient.)

The above example is like several that Soames considers (p. 64), and is a simple variant on some of Kripke's examples in *Naming and Necessity* (p. 115 n. 58). Why, then, does Soames leave open the possibility that the content of 'Carl Hempel' includes the property of being sentient? Perhaps he is being cautious. More likely, Soames thinks that examples like these do not support the conclusion that I draw. He might claim that Betty does not assert a singular proposition about Hempel when she utters (9). But notice that if Alice hears Betty's utterance of (9), Alice can correctly say, 'No, that's false, Carl Hempel is my human neighbor'. Perhaps

Soames thinks that a speaker like Betty is not competent with the name ‘Carl Hempel’, and so her utterances are irrelevant to determining the semantic content of (9). But the view about competence that Soames most often favors in his book implies that Betty is competent with the name if (i) she intends to use the name to refer to the same thing as did the person from whom she picked up the name, and (ii) she realizes that to utter (9) is to say, of Carl Hempel, that he is one of Alice’s pet oysters. Betty satisfies these conditions. Soames sometimes considers strengthening these conditions to include the requirement that a competent speaker associate the right sortal property with the name (p. 105, note 2). I believe that these strengthened competence conditions are too strong. More importantly, I think we should reject the claim that an utterance helps determine the semantic content of a sentence only if it is produced by a speaker who satisfies these stronger competence conditions. Speakers who satisfy the earlier, weaker conditions for competence, like Betty, can use sentences containing the name to assert singular propositions. Thus it’s reasonable to think that the assertions of such weakly competent speakers are as important to determining the semantic content of (9) as are the assertions of speakers who satisfy the stronger competence conditions. Moreover, the notion of semantic content one gets by retaining the weaker competence conditions is at least as important, and at least as central, to semantic theory as the notion of semantic content one gets by switching to the stronger competence conditions.

I turn now to considering whether Soames can defend his Millian-Russellian theory from traditional objections. I think that Soames’s reply to the earlier objection, concerning ordinary speakers’ judgments about meaning, is adequate. But there is another well-known objection to Soames’s Millian-Russellian theory that he does not address, and which (I believe) he does not

present the means to answer in his book. The objection concerns speakers who understand both (3) and (4), but think that (4) is true and (3) is false.

3. Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel.
4. Carl Hempel was Carl Hempel.

On Soames's view, the semantic contents of these sentences are the same. So, it seems, someone who understands (4), and thinks that (4) is true, actually believes the semantic content of (3). Thus, if such a person understands (3), then she should believe that (3) is true. So how, on Soames's theory, could such a person think that (3) is false? Let's consider a more explicit version of the objection. Let Jill be a rational, competent speaker who understands (3) and (4), and thinks that (3) is false and (4) is true. Let 'MR' refer to Soames's Millian-Russellian theory and let the phrase 'the proposition that *S* semantically expresses' mean the same as 'the semantic content of *S*'.

10. a. Jill is a rational, competent speaker who understands (4) and believes that (4) is true.
- b. If Jill is a rational, competent speaker who understands (4) and believes that (4) is true, then she believes the proposition that (4) semantically expresses.
- c. Therefore, Jill believes the proposition that (4) semantically expresses.
[from a, b]
- d. If MR is true, then (3) and (4) semantically express the same proposition.
- e. Therefore, if MR is true, then Jill believes the proposition that (3) semantically expresses. [from c, d]

- f. Jill is a rational, competent speaker who understands (3).
- g. If Jill is a rational, competent speaker who understands (3), and she believes the proposition that (3) semantically expresses, then she believes that (3) is true.
- h. Therefore, if MR is true, then Jill believes that (3) is true. [from e, f, g]
- i. Jill does not believe that (3) is true.
- j. Therefore, MR is not true. [from h, i]

Notice that this objection does *not* make any claim about ordinary speakers' judgments about sameness of meaning. It appeals merely to Jill's judgments about truth value. Thus Soames's reply to the earlier objection from ordinary speakers' judgments about meaning is not directly applicable to argument (10).

I believe that an advocate of the Millian-Russellian theory has little choice but to deny (10g): he must say that Jill is a rational, competent speaker who understands (3) and believes the proposition that (3) semantically expresses, but she (nevertheless) does not think that (3) is true. The main problem for the defender of Millian-Russellianism is to explain how Jill could be in such a state. If such a theorist restricts himself to the resources that Soames provides in this book, then (it seems) he would have to attribute Jill's mistake to some kind of confusion between semantic content and asserted/conveyed propositions. The best reply along these lines that I can think of goes as follows. Jill believes that (3) is false because she confuses the singular, Russellian proposition that (3) semantically expresses with the various descriptive propositions that she could use (3) to assert and convey, or that would be conveyed to her by assertive utterances of (3), for instance, the proposition semantically expressed by (11).

11. The elderly gentleman who lived in Princeton, Peter Hempel, was the philosopher of science, Carl Hempel.

Jill fails to believe these descriptive propositions. In fact, she believes the negations of these descriptive propositions. That is why she thinks that (3) is false.

This is the strongest reply to argument (10) that I can think of, when I restrict myself to the notions that Soames mentions in his book. (As I said, Soames himself does not consider this objection.) But I see at least two problems with it. The first problem arises if Jill is an expert in semantics. (The objection that follows is similar to one that Salmon [1986] presents against a related theory.) Suppose that Jill has been rigorously trained in Soamesian semantics, and that she, like Soames, always distinguishes carefully between the singular, Russellian semantic content of (3) and the descriptive propositions that it can be used to assert and convey. Nevertheless, even experts in semantics can think that a true identity sentence is false, and so Jill could still believe that (3) is false. But then Jill's belief that (3) is false could not be explained by her confusion between semantic content and asserted propositions.

The second problem is that, on Soames's theory, the descriptive propositions that Jill might use (3) to assert, such as the proposition semantically expressed by (11), may follow trivially from other propositions that Jill believes. Thus, if Jill is given suitable reminders, it's difficult to see how she could avoid believing these descriptive propositions. To see this, let's suppose (for simplicity) that the only descriptive proposition that Jill would assert and convey with (3), and the only descriptive proposition that an utterance of (3) would convey to her, is the proposition semantically expressed by (11). Let's also suppose that Jill would assent to (12), and so believes the proposition semantically expressed by (12): that is why she thinks that she could

use (3) to assert the proposition expressed by (11), and why an assertive utterance of (3) might convey this proposition to her.

12. Carl Hempel was the philosopher of science, Carl Hempel.

But, on Soames's theory, if she believes the proposition semantically expressed by (12), then she also believes the proposition expressed by (13), for "they" are one and the same proposition.

13. Peter Hempel was the philosopher of science, Carl Hempel.

Similarly, suppose Jill would assent to (14), and believes the proposition that it expresses, and so believes the proposition expressed by (15).

14. Peter Hempel was the elderly gentleman who lived in Princeton, Peter Hempel.

15. Carl Hempel was the elderly gentleman who lived in Princeton, Peter Hempel.

Sentence (11) follows directly, and trivially, from sentences (12) and (15). Moreover, the *proposition* semantically expressed by (11) also follows directly, and trivially, from the *propositions* semantically expressed by (12) and (15). But Jill believes the propositions semantically expressed by (12) and (15). Therefore, Soames's theory strongly suggests that, if Jill thinks a bit, she is very likely to come to believe the proposition semantically expressed by (11). To help her make the inference, we could remind her of these propositions, by displaying sentences (12), (15), and (11), and asking her to consider whether sentences (12) and (15) entail sentence (11). Thus, on Soames's theory, it seems that Jill really should believe the proposition semantically expressed by (11), at least after being given suitable reminders.

Yet, clearly, Jill could continue to think that (3) is false, despite her belief in the propositions expressed by (12) and (14), and despite the above sort of reminding and coaching. But if she continues to think that (3) is false, then the Soamesian reply to argument (10) requires

that Jill *not* believe the descriptive proposition semantically expressed by (11). In fact, the reply requires that Jill believe the *negation* of this descriptive proposition. But how could Jill fail to believe the proposition semantically expressed by (11), under the above conditions? How, on Soames's theory, could she fail to infer it from the propositions expressed by (12) and (14), which she already believes? The above reply does not answer these questions. I conclude that it is either incorrect or incomplete. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, this is the best reply to argument (10) that I can think of, when I restrict myself to the resources that Soames provides in this book.

Advocates of the Millian-Russellian theory can avail themselves of a more powerful reply to the argument, but to do so they must accept certain views that Soames does not mention in the present book. This more powerful reply begins with the idea that the belief relation between agents and propositions is mediated by a third entity, such as a sentence, mental state, or mental representation. On this view, an agent believes a proposition by accepting a sentence, or by being in a certain sort of mental state, or by having a mental representation function in her mind in a certain way. These mediators are *propositional guises* or *ways of taking propositions*. A Millian-Russellian who accepts this idea might respond to argument (10) along the following lines. A rational agent can believe the singular Russellian proposition that Hempel is Hempel in various ways, for instance, by accepting either sentence (3) or (4), or by having corresponding mental representations function in her mind in a belief-like way. For convenience, let's assume that propositional guises are mental representations and that mental representations are just sentences of English. Then a rational person, like Jill, could believe the singular proposition that Hempel is Hempel by having either (3) or (4) functioning in her mind in the right way--for short, by having either one *in her belief box*. She could, however, have (4) but not (3) in her belief

box, for there is no syntactic way to derive the one sentence from the other. In fact, Jill could have (4) and the *negation* of (3) in her belief box, for there is no syntactic inconsistency between them. If Jill were in this condition, then she would think that sentence (4) is true and sentence (3) is false. Thus, this reply says that premise (10g) is false. Jill believes the proposition semantically expressed by (3), but only in a “(4)-ish” way. She also believes the negation of the proposition semantically expressed by (3), in a “not-(3)-ish” way, and that’s why thinks that (3) is false. Call this the *Propositional Guise Reply*.

Soames himself endorsed something like the Propositional Guise Reply in his earlier work (see Soames [1988]). The existence of propositional guises is consistent with the views that Soames expresses in the present book. Indeed, propositional guises could be used to explain why Jill fails to believe the proposition expressed by (11), though she believes the propositions expressed by (12) and (14). Yet Soames never mentions propositional guises in this book. Why not? My best guess is that Soames thinks that his distinction between semantic content and asserted propositions will, by itself, enable him to deal with all traditional objections to his Millian-Russellian theory. I am dubious.

However, I have no doubt that Soames has written an excellent book that contains a wealth of interesting and insightful material, including a strong case in favor of his Millian-Russellian theory. His book should be mandatory reading for all advocates and critics of Millianism, and for all semanticists interested in proper names, attitude ascriptions, and kind terms. I strongly recommend it.¹

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Notes

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