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positive gain ($t = .26$, $df = 5$, $p > .05$). It is quite indicative that the subjects, while agreeing with rather positive statements, endorsed fewer items on the post-test. This probably illustrates that they had developed more realistic attitudes toward the teaching of Latin. The implication might be that all students aspiring to the teaching profession be given the opportunity to determine at an early point whether or not they are to like teaching; this may preclude heartbreaks or traumas during the regular student teaching period that all must undergo in order to be certified by the State Department of Education or Public Instruction.

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The Justice of Zeus ("Sather Classical Lectures," #41.) By HUGH LLOYD-JONES. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. xi + 246. \$8.50.

Lloyd-Jones here considers, in its general character, the outlook of early Greek religion from the Homeric poems to the end of the fifth century, through an analysis of what he takes to be its central constituent, the concept of *Dike*. The "justice of Zeus" turns out to be two things, the first basic, the second subsidiary: (1) something like natural law or "the divinely appointed order of the universe," an order not always or even usually open to human scrutiny, and (2) *moral* law, a concession to the insignificant creatures of a day that men are, whereby Zeus "punishes, late or soon, a man who has done injustice to another, either in his own person or in that of his descendants." Because Lloyd-Jones sees the first and basic notion of *Dike* as the prerequisite of the later rational speculation to which it led (smoothly and without violent discontinuities, as he claims), his book assumes the dimensions of *Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands*, and becomes the latest in a small but distinguished list of works with similarly broad scope: Jaeger's *Paideia*, Snell's *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, Fraenkel's *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, Dodd's *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Adkins' *Merit and Responsibility* and *From the Many to the One*, and Havelock's *Preface to Plato*. But whether it supercedes its predecessors, or even adds anything of comparable significance to them, is another matter. To be sure, he is right to reexamine the evidence from a point of view quite at variance with that of the scholars just mentioned, "to direct attention to what has remained static over a long period," to challenge with Walter Otto the *Entwicklungsbegriff* derived from anthropology, ethnopsychology, and ultimately biology, which tends to underestimate if not to efface the continuities in Greek intellectual history. But it appears that in his justifiable zeal to correct, Lloyd-Jones has erred in the opposite extreme, and this by combining singularly dubious interpretations with terse appeals to authority ungraced by argument. Not that he is always necessarily wrong; just frequently unconvincing.

The strength or weakness of the book hinges largely on its critical first

chapter, the author's reading of the *Iliad*, for he must constantly refer us back to it in ensuing chapters to demonstrate the continuity of later Greek thought with the earliest literary document in its history. Dodds, Chantraine, and Adkins had all argued with varying degrees of emphasis that Zeus' interest in distributive justice as such is insignificant at best, that little of what happens in the *Iliad* can be said to happen because it is right, and that in the human personnel of the poem an adequate concept of moral responsibility is hard to find. Lloyd-Jones contests this. His analysis does not stop at moral terminology but goes on to consider moral behavior, situation, and attitude. *Dike*, he argues, meaning preservation of the established order, required that each god and man be accorded his proper *τιμή*. The gods punish violations of their *τιμή*. Human kings, responsible as they are for safeguarding order, arbitrate disputes over *τιμαί*, a power they derive from Zeus, and punish offenders. A violation of the *τιμή* of those who live outside settled communities is punished by Zeus *Xenios* and *Hikesios* as a violation of his own *τιμή*. Further, if men suffer for other than moral offenses which disrupt the established order, it is simply because suffering is their "portion," their particular allotment in the general *moira* which. Lloyd-Jones contends, "is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus," and which does not cease to exist just for being at times painfully discordant with human desire.

So far as the action of the *Iliad* is concerned, Zeus' will is that Troy should fall for Paris' violation of justice, and that Agamemnon and Achilles receive rough justice, the one for failure to respect the *τιμή* of an indispensable subordinate, the other for obduracy in the face of just compensation and the requirement of loyalty to one's friends. But when we realize that it is Zeus himself who both induces the *ἄτη* which causes a man to act wrongly, and then punishes him for so acting, a severe problem of moral responsibility arises. "A wrong decision," according to Lloyd-Jones, "occurs when the decider's passions prevent his *θυμός* from functioning correctly; his passions have been set in motion by the action of a god." But this, he claims, in no way diminishes a man's responsibility for the decision. By this account of Homeric man as at once divinely compelled and free, Lloyd-Jones hopes to strike a mean between two opposing views of moral action in Homer, the older one, defended by Nilsson and Mazon, which considers divine influence as a mere *façon de parler*, the other, articulated by Fränkel and Snell, which finds in Homer's language no sense of psychic wholeness sufficient to describe an experience of autonomous action or decision. His position, if correct, would tend to discredit those who find in the *Iliad* no very strong association between religion and morality, and to weaken both Dodds' classification of Homeric Greece as a "shame-culture," and even the general distinction between "shame-cultures" and "guilt-cultures."

Chapter two opens with a short discussion of the difference in theology and moral outlook between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Lloyd-Jones assigns "strictly limited significance" to the Odyssean modification that the gods do not inspire men to wrong action, and considers it the result not of a more advanced stage in "the moral education of Zeus," as Dodds would have it, but of "a difference between the artistic purposes aimed at in the two epics." This is not the only place, it should be noted, where the expression "artistic purposes" operates like a magic formula to charm away unmanageable data. The claim of Jaeger, Wilamowitz and others that Hesiod introduced the ideal of justice is discountenanced; it is, again, difference of artistic purpose, as

well as the poet's special socio-economic position, which causes him, particularly in his stress on man's miserable status and on justice as a supererogatory gift of Zeus, to assume an altered perspective toward what still remains in essence the Homeric view of justice. Nor will seekers after evidence for moral evolution find it in the early lyric poets, Lloyd-Jones says, not even in Archilochus or Sappho, so often considered rebels against traditional values. Archilochus is shown not only to have depended upon Homeric language, but to have exercised his craft "within the framework of Homer's beliefs and attitudes." Less felicitously, if correctly, Lloyd-Jones writes of Sappho: "She is a woman and her spiritual world is narrow; but so far as it extends, it coincides with a part of the spiritual world described by Homer." Their difference in attitude toward the old epic belief, the heightened sense of *ἀμηχανία* we find in them, must be attributed in the final analysis to that characteristic which largely distinguishes the lyric genre from the epic, the expression of *personal* emotion, rather than to any change in *Weltanschauung*. The Delphic Oracle, which reaches its position of authority in the seventh century, does nothing then or later to alter significantly the poets' view of divine justice and the pessimistic view of human life. And if Solon strikes a new chord, it is only in the application of the Homeric doctrine to the current political situation.

In *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Dodds had called the movement from the Homeric age to the archaic age a transition from "shame-culture" to "guilt-culture," characterized for the most part by the emergence of, or insistence on, the idea of divine *φθόνος*, and belief in infectious and hereditary pollution requiring purification. Lloyd-Jones addresses himself to these two phenomena in chapter three. He concludes that both are in essence already present as early as the *Iliad* (e.g., Niobe's fatal boast in book 24, the plague and purification in book one, Hector's remarks about the stoning of a culprit to avert communal calamity in book three), that neither is permitted to contravene the theology of Zeus-enforced justice, and that if these darker aspects of divinity loom larger in the late archaic age it is for largely accidental reasons again reducible to genre differences: what was more "artistically convenient to stress" in tragedy would have been considered by the Homeric poets, with their more direct, less mysterious presentation of divine action, to "ill cohere with the imaginative picture of reality which they present," even though it was not unknown to them. Lloyd-Jones further demonstrates how neatly Herodotus fits into the continuity of the old belief, and discounts Dodds' cautious Freudian hypothesis that the relaxation of family bonds during the period in question produced a chain reaction of father-son conflict, unacknowledged feelings of hatred on the son's part, guilt, and in the end the projection of ambiguous feelings about one's own father into Zeus, "father of gods and men."

Chapter four carries the argument to the presocratics and Aeschylus. Lloyd-Jones argues that the move towards impersonal monotheism in the presocratic thinkers and their stress on the universal operation of causal laws is only an articulation of Homer's unitary universe under the sway of Zeus' *Dike*. Despite Xenophanes' strictures of Homer and Hesiod, his conception of divinity is already present in embryo in Homer, where Zeus occupies a special category, superior to the other gods, determining the course of events, and where divinity affects human life more by mental prompting than by physical interference. Heraclitus, another ardent critic of the tradition, does

not basically depart from it; his psychology and social values are Homeric; his *Logos*, though it conflicts with the polytheistic and anthropomorphic conceptions of the poets, "is in a sense identical with Zeus" as regulator of the universal order; his ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων strikes Lloyd-Jones as no singular advance on the Homeric notion of human responsibility despite divine influence. In Aeschylus he sees little of the demythologizing tendencies of the presocratics, and proceeds to demonstrate the consistency between his work—most obviously the *Persians*—and the doctrine of Zeus and *Dike* found in Homer, but in the peculiar form familiar in Hesiod and Solon. He sees the *Oresteia* ending with little that is new; the Areopagus is instituted "not to replace, but to assist the Erinyes," and the punitive element in both cosmic and state government, the "violent grace" of the *Agamemnon* is reaffirmed. Moral development in the Zeus of the *Prometheia* is vigorously denied though a "change of attitude" is admitted. That change resulted in a settlement with Prometheus involving not only the titan's release, but probably also the gift of justice to men, in a manner reminiscent of the myth in Plato's *Protagoras*: in the kind of suggestion that shows us the author at his best and about which he is unduly defensive, Lloyd-Jones follows Fraenkel in assigning to the *Women of Aetna* the speech of *Dike* in *Pap. Oxy.* 2256 fr. 9a (=fr. 282 in the author's appendix to the Loeb *Aeschylus*), where she claims to have been sent to earth by Zeus as a benefit; he then proposes the *Women of Aetna* as the final play of the *Prometheia*, the whole trilogy composed for production in Sicily. Incidentally but not less cleverly, he makes more sense of the Apollodoran account of the myth (which no doubt followed Aeschylus) by suggesting as a translation of ἀντιδόντος Διὶ Προμηθέως τὸν ἀντ' γενησόμενον ἀθάνατον οὕτως ἀπέθανεν (2.5.4): ". . . when Prometheus gave Zeus an immortal to take his, i.e., his own, place," instead of the traditional ". . . when Prometheus gave Zeus someone to become immortal [meaning, presumably, Heracles, not Chiron] in his place."

In Sophocles, the subject of the next chapter, Lloyd-Jones again discovers the old Homeric view, except that *Dike*, "the order of the universe," seems to loom larger as natural than as moral law. Still, he refuses to follow Dodds' conclusion "that Sophocles did not believe, or did not always believe the gods are in any human sense 'just.'" The moral element is there, operating largely through the family curse, a scandal no doubt to modern, especially Christian, notions of justice because of the long time lag between cause and punishment, and "the complex interweaving within human history of different causal chains of injustice followed by chastisement." Claiming that the kidnapping of Chrysis was the ἀρχὴ κακῶν of Aeschylus' Theban trilogy, Lloyd-Jones proceeds to revive Perrotta's thesis that Sophocles closely followed the form of the legend used by his predecessor in making the crime of Laius an essential presupposition of the *OT* ("for artistic reasons" underplayed), and the just cause of Oedipus' suffering. In point of fact, he generalizes, there was far less creative alteration of traditional myth and legend by the dramatists than it has been the custom to assume. A crucial example is the end of the *Trachiniae*: the apotheosis of Heracles, "a legend which was beyond all question universally known in Sophocles' time," is an essential presupposition subtly alluded to in Hyllus' refusal to light his father's pyre, a presupposition which balances out Hyllus' protest against the gods' injustice and permits the audience a less limited view of divine purposes than the one possessed by the *dramatis personae*.

In chapter six, Lloyd-Jones sides with Popper (called at one point [p. 201], with apposite Freudian slippage, "Proper"!) in disputing the reverence rendered Plato at the sophists' expense, and regards the empirical theory of justice in Protagoras and Democritus as closer to the traditional Homeric view than Plato's "metaphysical and theological dogmatism." He insists that the chauvanism of fifth-century Athenian imperialists was the product neither of sophistic influence nor of the imperfections Adkins finds in the traditional, largely competitive standard of morality. He accepts the thesis of Hermann Strasburger which challenges the notion of Thucydides as *Realpolitiker*, but he recognizes as equally distorted the view of his work as "a cautionary tale to warn against imperialism." In the end, he says Thucydides' work is a tragic history, which, though it does not represent divine agency as such, is not inconsistent with the epic attitude in its portrayal of *arete*, *hybris*, delusion, and flawed judgment. Lloyd-Jones is equally determined to undermine the nineteenth-century image of Euripides as "a 'committed' poet, an enemy of traditional religion, a pioneer of female emancipation and a protester against the brutalities of his own country's imperialism"—what he calls "Murray's Shavian Euripides," derived from the "Ibsenian Euripides of Wilamowitz." Despite echoes of contemporary rational speculation and techniques conditioned by sophistic rhetoric, Lloyd-Jones' Homeric Euripides is of a piece with the epic portrayal of the processes of decision and of personal responsibility despite divine influence (e.g., *Med.*, *Hipp.*, *Tr.*), the need for resignation (*HF*), punishment ensuing on neglect or refusal of divine honor (*Hipp.*, *Andr.*, *Bacch.*); the altered perspective on Orestes' matricide in *Or.* and *El.* results from different dramatic circumstances, not new moral standards. Justice in Euripides is, if more terrible, still traditional, and his *dei ex machina*, far from being meaningless makeshifts to resolve tragic impasse, are brought forward, as Andreas Spira argued, to unveil the wider purpose of the gods, and to restore that order which is the basic meaning of *Dike*.

In his brief concluding chapter, Lloyd-Jones' strictures on undiscriminating treatment of Greek culture as "primitive" are indeed well taken. So also is his protest against the fashion of devaluing early Greek religion in comparison with dogmatic philosophy, Christianity, or rationalism. "Whether or not a belief in a plurality of higher powers is reasonable," he says, "it might be said . . . to tend to minimize the dangerous consequences of undue repression of powerful emotions." He concludes, with an abruptness sure to raise the hackles on Platonist necks, that the traditional presentation of moral error on the tragic stage has always been more convincing to common sense than what he calls "the paradoxical ingenuities of Socratic intellectualism" and the Platonic "failure of nerve" whose ultimate sources are, "in all probability," non-Greek.

One must of course, keep in mind that these are lectures, and as such do not easily allow for the full range of systematic exposition. But since the thesis is based largely on the interpretation of complicated details, it will not be out of place to raise doubt concerning the simplism with which Lloyd-Jones has treated some of these details, without necessarily disputing the overall thesis. Perhaps the most critical of these matters is human responsibility and divine influence on the *Iliad*. Lloyd-Jones too quickly dismisses the view that some of the language of divine influence may be a *façon de parler*. Dodds, with more caution, had been willing to admit that the

formulaic style easily lent itself to what he called "semasiological degeneration which ends by creating a *façon de parler*." But before any serious discussion of this issue can take place we must face the difficult task of formulating a more precise typology of divine influence in Homer. Such a typology will require more scepticism than Lloyd-Jones and others have been prepared to exercise when they take, say, Agamemnon's apology in *Il.* 19 at face value. On that passage Eric Voegelin (*World of the Polis* [1957] 106) is far more intellectually satisfying, if less conclusive than either Lloyd-Jones or Dodds; I quote him at length because his manner of questioning the text is programmatic for the typology I have in mind:

The self-interpretation of Agamemnon in his apology to Achilles is perhaps not the last word of Homer in this matter. A wary psychologist will ask himself the question how 'true' Agamemnon's story about his temporary blindness really is. Does a man, even in anger, not know in some corner of his mind that just now he is doing something which he ought not to do? Is there really a time interval between blindness and seeing? Is man really at one time a passionate self, blinded, and at a later time a true self horrified at the deeds of his passionate self? Homer certainly asked himself such questions. The proof is the scene of Paris in the chamber. There is the case of the elegant rotter who, in excellent self-analysis, informs Helen that his mind is obsessed by Eros, and then pleasantly proceeds to act not on the 'seeing' of his analysis, but on the 'blindness' of his passion. The case of Paris shows the simultaneity of blindness and seeing.

Voegelin's caution suggests that we must be prepared to deal with critical differences among the following kinds of situations at least: (a) the divine influence a character may claim in his own case, without its ever being dramatized in the narrative (like Agamemnon and Paris, or even, with a good deal more self-reproach, Achilles after Patroclus' death); (b) the divine influence which one character may attribute to the situation of another (like Priam of Helen at *Il.* 3.164, or Penelope of Helen at *Od.* 23.218-224, or Nestor of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus at *Od.* 3.269); (c) that which the gods declare (as Zeus of Aegisthus at *Od.* 1.35-43); (d) that which the narrator asserts by way of comment on the action (as of Patroclus' folly at *Il.* 16.685-691, or of the suitors' folly at *Od.* 1.7); (e) that which is dramatically represented without comment—a category capable of still further significant subdivisions, as, for example, psychological events (like Aphrodite's threat to Helen at *Il.* 3.413-416), divinely motivated "natural" events (like Zeus snapping Teucer's bowstring to save Hector at *Il.* 15.461ff.), and divinely motivated miraculous or "fabulous" events (like Aphrodite rescuing Paris from the duel in *Il.* 3).

We would have to take yet another factor into consideration, one given scant heed by Lloyd-Jones: the uneasy discrepancy which may exist in any culture between the real personal experience of compulsion or fatality and the pragmatic public depreciation of it, born of society's need to discourage acts which threaten order. It is, in other words, difficult to conceive how any society could exist in which the plea of involuntariness was universally countenanced. Furthermore, we must suspect some notion of individual autonomy to exist in any culture where a man, in any way implicated with damage to

social order, is exhorted to change, or warned, or insulted, rather than simply killed or expelled. Another elementary consideration: not every statement in the indicative mood by a dramatic character is necessarily a statement of fact or even a firm belief of the speaker. When Lloyd-Jones refers (p. 7) to "the certainty of Menelaus that Zeus Xenios will punish the abduction of his wife" (*Il.* 13.620ff.) and "the certainty of Agamemnon that Zeus Horkios will punish the treacherous breaking of the truce by Pandarus" (4.158ff.), he fails to note that in both speeches there shortly follow statements which so severely qualify them as to make them appear more like expressions of precarious hope than assertions of certitude: in Menelaus' case, a strong complaint, addressed to Zeus himself, about the way he gives *χάρις* to men of *hybris* like the Trojans, and in Agamemnon's case, a consideration of the possibility that Menelaus may in fact die and Troy survive.

One of the net results of Lloyd-Jones' failure to make some of these distinctions is a serious misrepresentation of the character of Agamemnon, whose ungenerous if not avaricious reaction to Chryses' appeal, without any evidence of divine influence, is the true *ἀρχὴ κακῶν* and not, as Lloyd-Jones implies, "Zeus' purpose that many should perish." (His treatment of Aeschylus' Agamemnon is similar—noble yet prone to *ἄτη*, mainly because of the hereditary curse; I shall not repeat my own arguments against this view, which fails to distinguish Agamemnon [and Clytemnestra] from Orestes in their moral responsibility [see *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 237-263]). To attribute a nearly providential overriding purpose to Zeus will take some doing, for the *Iliad* presents us with a picture, not of universal order under Zeus, but of disruption of order, human *and divine*, which does not leave Zeus himself unscathed. There is something strange about a "universal order" whose presumed dispenser is himself subject to delusion at the hands of recalcitrant powers.

Some other details:

P. 31: In discussing the relatively simple, "black-and-white" morality of the *Odyssey*, Lloyd-Jones gives Amphinomus, Phemius, and Medon "intermediate status." But why the last two, whose business with the suitors is unambiguously unconsenting? And why has the most obviously "intermediate" of the suitors been omitted, Leodes, who is killed like the rest despite what the poet says of him: *ἀτασθαλῖαι δέ οἱ οἴω / ἐχθραὶ ἔσαν, πᾶσιν δὲ νεμέσσα μνηστήρεσσιν* (21.146f.)?

P. 83: On Heraclitus 64: "All is steered by the thunder" should, of course, read "thunderbolt" or "lightning." This and other fragments mentioned are generally handled with disheartening literalism.

P. 115: Not everyone will be convinced that the family curse plays so prominent a role in the *Antigone* as Lloyd-Jones would have it do, largely on the evidence of selected statements of dramatic characters. He would have done well to heed his own note of caution apropos of the *Sisyphus*-fragment (p. 133; and again later on Euripides p. 146) about speeches by dramatic characters, advice he promptly forgets on the same page when he refers to "the inquisitorial methods recommended by Plato" rather than ". . . by a character in the *Laws*."

P. 120: On the possible guilt of Laius and an ensuing hereditary curse to be assumed in the *OT*: "All that we know of Aeschylus indicates that Laius cannot have been punished for nothing." But was he indeed punished? If

Apollo told him not to have children, it may have been simply a warning, not necessarily a punishment.

P. 122: Looking for textual evidence of a curse in the *OT*, Lloyd-Jones cites 1184 (. . . ὅστις πέφασμαι φύς τ'ἀφ'ὧν οὐ χρῆν) and argues incredibly: "Why should Laius and Jocasta not have begotten Oedipus? The words have far more point if we recognize that Laius was warned beforehand." But if that is the case, *how did Oedipus come to know about the warning?* Lloyd-Jones himself had, after all, noted on p. 120 that the presumed forewarning was omitted from Jocasta's account of the oracle. Surely 1184 means nothing more than "I wish I had never been born."

From the standpoint of physical production, the University of California Press has cause to blush for this book. If there is a world record for typographical errata, poor proofreading, and slipshod compilation of notes, here is a major contender. I noted 57 errata, as many as 12 on one page, and four in a single line!¹

But in a way hastiness in production is here only the physical counterpart of the argument: generally respectable, but disappointing in particulars. In the final analysis, if one is willing to strip away enough differences, or indulge in analogies sufficiently broad, continuity of the kind Lloyd-Jones discovers is bound to emerge. But to dishonor differences is to risk the charge of triviality. Before we can agree, for example, that the crimes of the Trojans, of the crew of Odysseus, and of the suitors are all conceived after the fashion of physical pollution (p. 75), we must surely drain that concept of all specifying, significant content. And of what value to Greek cultural history are anemic conclusions like the following (p. 135)?

If according to Protagoras the notion of justice exists only in the human mind, that is not to say that it is not Zeus who has implanted it. In a sense, therefore, Protagoras' theory is close to the traditional Greek view.

Dodds, quoted in Lloyd-Jones' preface, was perhaps too polite when he said, "We are both of us right, though both of us at times exaggerate the partial truth we are stressing." *The Justice of Zeus* makes it clear that we are still far from an approach to the problem as Schelling expresses it (*Philosophie der Mythologie*):

Hier fragt es sich nicht, wie muss das Phänomen gewendet, gedreht, vereinseitigt oder verkümmert werden, um aus Grundsätzen, die wir uns einmal vorgesetzt nicht zu überschreiten, noch allenfalls erklärbar zu sein, sondern: wohin müssen *unsere* Gedanken sich erweitern, um mit dem Phänomen in Verhältnis zu stehen.

The dust jacket of Lloyd-Jones' book shows the firm-footed, bronze god of Artemisium; more appropriate might have been Procrustes' bed.

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¹Errata: pages 3, 28, 57, 102, 113, 121, 123, 147, 168(8), 174(3), 176(2), 177, 183, 186(2), 187, 189(5), 191(3), 193, 200(12), 201, 203(5), 209, 215(2), 229.