Review: [untitled]
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21.25: *casus* with the genitive of identity (cf. 26.29, etc.) is too common in this text to be emended away here.

22.3: *quam* is difficult to construe.

25.5–6: *quasi pius* = “as a pious man”; no need to import *impius* from RC.

27.7: what is the construction of *te* in *quomodo te*?

32.6: *Tarsia* {*domina*}—but cf. *domina Tarsia* 21.27, 27.4.

32.7–8: S. follows F (as often) and RB in deleting *et horum omnia*, but the reading of P is satisfactory.

32.17: Again, the reading of F seems inferior: the metaphor in *naufragia* is unexplained, and *castitate* has no obvious function. Retain P’s *naufragium castitatis*.

33.9–10: *quandoque si* = “if at any time” (*quandoque* adverbial), not *et si quando* (S. in app. crit.); strong punctuation before *quandoque* (so Riese).

35.11: S.’s *innoxius* for *innocens* brings the solution into line with the riddle (so too S. at 35.20 *unco*, 36.7 *vincia*) but eliminates what may be deliberate variation; the invulnerability of the pure at heart to flames is traditional.

38.22: *squalore luctus* (gen.) is a common construction (S. emends to *squalore luctuoso*); in either case, the gender of the following *quod* in unexplained.

42.2: *hoc* is intelligible as the object of *testatur*; the insertion of *pro* from RB is no improvement.

42.7: *quantum ad suam malignitatem*! is odd as an exclamation; Riese’s punctuation seems preferable.

42.14: P’s *debitis tormentis* will construe (cf. our Bryn Mawr commentary), and should perhaps be retained.

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Remember the days when we could use terms like ‘history’, ‘literature’, and ‘criticism’ and be reasonably assured of understanding and agreement? No more. What history is, what a literary text is and how it works, and what procedures are legitimately embraced by the term ‘criticism’ are tough questions we cannot dodge, with answers no longer obvious. What is worse, many of us classicists are not even yet quite able to articulate our disagreement about
them. In such a climate, undertaking a history of the criticism of literary texts—a text about texts about texts!—is a considerable act of courage. (Any reviewer, obviously, must find himself in an even more precarious condition, attempting a text about a text about texts about texts! Readers will not need to be reminded that this review, as will shortly become clear, represents only one of several different kinds of taste when it comes to literary history.) It is a bit strange then that, in the present volume, the first of nine projected under the general editorship of Peter Brooks, H. B. Nisbet and Claude Rawson, the complex problematics of history, textuality and criticism are all but overlooked. What one looks for are a few words by the general editors on the problematics of their undertaking to forestall a possible charge of ingenuousness or nonchalance. As close as we get to that is a carefully guarded promise, not in the book itself but on its dust jacket, of a history that, notwithstanding a general non–partisan perspective, "will, where appropriate, address controversial issues of current critical debate without evasion or pretense of neutrality." George Kennedy's sane preface—near compensation for the general editors' silence—does show awareness of the needs a theoretically sophisticated reader may bring to the book, suggesting something he works out a bit more amply in a recent AJP editorial (Fall 1989), the extent of classical anticipations of twentieth–century developments in semiotics, hermeneutics, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and reader–response criticism. But readers should not expect to find much of that kind of thing in the rest of the volume, for as Kennedy circumspectly observes, contributors "have thought it best to expound the ancient critics in their own terms rather than to recast their thought in alien concepts" (xii), a commendable but no longer unproblematical undertaking.

Contributors to the volume and the chapters for which they were responsible are Gregory Nagy on early Greek views of poets and poetry; Kennedy a chapter each on language and meaning in Archaic and Classical Greece, the evolution of a theory of artistic prose, Hellenistic literary and philosophical scholarship, and Christianity and criticism; G. R. F. Ferrari on Plato's attitude toward poetry; Stephen Halliwell on Aristotle's Poetics; Elaine Fantham a chapter each on the growth of literature and criticism in Rome to the Augustan age, and Latin criticism in the early Empire; Doreen C. Innes on Augustan critics (and on Philodemus in the chapter on Hellenistic scholarship); and Donald A. Russell on Greek criticism of the Empire.

The collection opens with a striking deviation from what we have been conditioned to expect from histories of classical literary criticism. In the past, chapters dealing with the earliest period of Greek poetry, lean as it was in the kind of discursive and theoretical thought we associate with criticism, tended to be brief and cautious, satisfied to cite, with little speculation, the few texts where aoidoi are depicted and where lyric poets reflect on their work. But Nagy's essay here is by far the longest (77 pages), the most intellectually venturesome, and the most provocative. It is also the most difficult, all the more for the many non–classicists who will read this volume, inasmuch as those 77 pages
represent the compression of an argument that is a challenging and intricate ordeal even at book-length in the author’s *The Best of the Achaians* (1979) and *Pindar’s Homer* (1990). Readers of those volumes will recognize its most salient ideas: that all Greek literature originates in *kleos*, the act of praising famous deeds, this seen in its most undiluted form in Pindaric epinician poetry, which compensates for victory in athletic games, just as the latter compensates for the eternally important proto-ordeal of a hero’s death. Nagy’s view thus overturns the traditional one by concluding that an ancient form of this lyric praise poetry was the parent form not only of the epinician style attested in Pindar, but also of epic, and that monodic song develops out of choral performance, not vice versa.

Moving to Kennedy’s essays from Nagy is to move from exuberance, complexity and innovation to austerity, simplicity and caution. One may consider this a virtue here and elsewhere in the volume where Kennedy’s subject is the development and practice of rhetoric. But the discussion of the presocratics, given their significance for the climate of critical thought in which this volume appears, may strike some as unduly thin. This should probably not be overstated. There will be many readers who prefer their histories and handbooks to fall safely on the encyclopedic side; they will doubtless prefer Kennedy’s interpretative reserve to Nagy’s daring.

The other contributors in this volume join Kennedy on the encyclopedic side, but for Nagy and two other noteworthy exceptions: Ferrari on Plato’s *Republic* and Halliwell on Aristotle’s *Poetics*. These two exceptions, the most interesting pieces in the collection in this reviewer’s judgment, fall somewhere in the middle, scrupulously guiding readers (especially non-specialists) through the argument, but in a direction and with emphases clearly shaped in the arena of contemporary theoretical discussion, supplying not only the “what” of the texts but also the “why.” The platonic misgivings about (especially dramatic) poetry, arguably the most important texts in this segment of any history of literary criticism, have not had many energetic defenders, at least not in handbooks and literary histories of this kind. Plato got a scant three pages in George Saintsbury’s turn-of-the-century three-volume *History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe*, and since then, with but a few exceptions, the mood has varied between open hostility and timid paraphrase. But in a critical climate that no longer permits us honestly to ignore the relationship between artistic production and its social effect or blithely to invoke the notion of so-called aesthetic distance, the platonic argument has found in Ferrari a sympathetic and powerful explicator. At the core of this argument, Ferrari insists, is a consistent refusal to allow the ‘aesthetic’ to appropriate “a zone of pleasure divorced in principle from ethical consequences.” This means in effect that

if we grant [this premise] its consequence, and wish either to controvert or to bolster the conclusion, we would have no option but to widen the focus from poetry to the entire ethos of Plato’s ideal society. The implication of Socrates’ conclusion (that poetic imitation brings about in our souls the rule of the low-
est, appetitive part and so corrupts and makes us wretched, 606d4–7) is that we thereby start on the degeneration towards the tyrannical personality, in whom the rule of the lowest part has become unshakeable and whose life is the most wretched possible.

“Plato banishes tragedy from the stage,” Ferrari concludes, “for fear that it will prevent us coping with the drama of life” (141).

Halliwell’s essay on Aristotle’s Poetics (Kennedy handles the Rhetoric and the relevant parts of his logical treatises) is a good companion piece to Ferrari’s, for it identifies a source of tension in the work in the imperfect attempt to demarcate the art of poetry analytically from the art of social conduct, and yet at the same time to insist that tragedy (for Aristotle the poetic art par excellence) is the representation of a morally serious action. Aristotle’s preoccupation with intelligibility and his virtual rejection of any central role for religious modes of understanding or explanation lead to a “virtual obsession with the integrated structure” of represented action based on probability and necessity, and ultimately to the exclusion of the ethically pre–eminent agent from tragedy, for the suffering of such an agent would be irrational and unintelligible, the product of accidental factors. In the end, Halliwell insists,

the Poetics as a whole presses the related principles of unity and intelligibility to an extreme which makes them inimical to the full imaginative freedom of poetry, at least to the extent that such freedom may carry the level of poetic significance beyond the range of the rational probability which Aristotle himself would be predisposed to accept. In the case of tragedy, the rationalizing thrust of the theory brings it into implicit conflict with the religious assumptions of the genre’s mythical material.

In conclusion it may be said that this volume is a quite respectable beginning to a project fraught with difficulty. The main question in literary history is whether to give greater weight to description or to explanation. Classics as a discipline is still less than fully comfortable with such questions, its members for the most part ill–equipped by their training to deal with them, and in some sectors a firm belief still persists that no crisis in literary historiography exists at all. On balance and with the exceptions noted, this volume will give greater pleasure to those who favor description over explanation.

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