

CSE 410/565 Computer Security

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Lecture 7: Authentication

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Lecture Outline

- Definition of entity authentication
- Solutions
 - password-based authentication
 - token-based authentication
 - biometric-based authentication
- Stronger forms of secure authentication

Entity Authentication

- **Authentication** is a broad term and is normally referred to mechanisms of ensuring that
 - entities are who they claim to be
 - data has not been manipulated by unauthorized parties
- **Entity authentication** or **identification** refers to the means of verifying user identity
 - if such verification is successful, the user is granted appropriate privileges
- The need for user authentication in early computer systems arose once it became possible to support multi-user environments

Entity Authentication

- During an authentication protocol:
 - one party, the **verifier**, gathers evidence that the identity of another party, the **claimant**, is as claimed
- **Goals of authentication protocols:**
 - honest parties should be able to successfully finish the protocol with their identity accepted as authentic
 - it should be difficult for dishonest parties to impersonate an identity of another user
 - impersonation must remain difficult even after observing a large number of successful authentications by other parties
- User **registration** is required prior to an authentication protocol

Entity Authentication

- Identification mechanisms are often divided into 3 types based on how the identity evidence is gathered
 - user knows a secret
 - examples include passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs), secret keys, mother's maiden name, etc.
 - user possesses a token
 - these are normally hardware tokens such as magnetic-striped cards or custom-designed devices for time-variant passwords
 - user has a physical attribute
 - characteristics inherent to the user such as biometrics, handwritten signatures, keystroke dynamics, facial and hand geometries, voice, etc.

Entity Authentication

- Often, different types can be combined together
 - e.g., PIN-based authentication is often used with a physical device (user ID, credit card)
 - biometric-based authentication is often used in combination with a password or a physical token
- Many identification mechanisms used in practice are not secure
 - calling cards
 - credit card purchases
 - passwords
- Ideally we want solutions against which replay attacks don't work

Password-Based Authentication

- A **password** is a string of (normally 8 or more) characters associated with a certain user
 - it serves the purpose of a shared secret between the user and the system
- During the identification protocol:
 - a user sends (*userid*, *password*) pair
 - *userid* identifies the user
 - *password* provides the necessary evidence that the user possesses the secret
 - the system compares that information with its has stored
 - if the check succeeds, access is granted

Password-Based Authentication

- Storage of passwords
 - the most straightforward way of storing passwords is in clear text
 - there is a problem with such approach
 - to mitigate it, most systems apply a one-way hash function to a password and store the hash
 - the password itself cannot be recovered, but there are other concerns
- Attacks on passwords
 - replay of passwords: an attacker reuses a captured password
 - an attacker can capture a password by seeing a user type it, using a keylogger program or obtaining it in transit

Password-Based Authentication

- **Attacks on passwords** (cont.)
 - **exhaustive search**: an attacker attempts to guess a user password by trying all possible strings
 - this can be done on the verifier itself or by obtaining a copy of the password file and performing the attack off-line
 - often the attack is infeasible if the password space is large enough
 - but it is still possible to exhaust all short passwords
 - **dictionary attack**: an attacker tries to guess a password using words from a dictionary and variations thereof
 - can have a high probability of success
 - dictionary attacks become increasingly sophisticated

Password-Based Authentication

- Is there a way to decrease the vulnerability of the system to such attacks?
- **Additional measures** are normally employed, some of which are:

- salting passwords

- this technique makes guessing attacks less effective
- a password is augmented with a random string, called salt, prior to hashing
- the salt is stored in cleartext in the password file

$$uid_1, salt_1, h(salt_1 || pwd_1)$$
$$uid_2, salt_2, h(salt_2 || pwd_2)$$

- how does it improve security?

Password-Based Authentication

- **Measures for improving security** of passwords (cont.)
 - **slowing down password verification**
 - the hash function for password verification is made more computationally extensive
 - this can be done, e.g., by iterating the computation n times
 - what is its drawback?
 - **limiting the number of unsuccessful password guesses**
 - a user account is locked after the number of successive unsuccessful authentication attempts exceeds the threshold
 - **employing password rules**
 - additional rules on password choices are imposed
 - this often strengthens password choices but limits the search space

Password-Based Authentication

- **Measures for improving security** of passwords (cont.)
 - preventing direct access to password file
 - the file/database with hashed passwords is kept inaccessible by ordinary users
- Another technique that aims at improving security of passwords is called **password aging**
- It is always a challenge to find a balance between **memorability of passwords** and their **resistance to dictionary attacks**
 - do users make acceptable password choices?
 - can we help them with choosing strong passwords?

Password-Based Authentication

- Password strength has been studied since 1990s
 - a significant portion of used passwords is guessable
 - passwords of short length can be cracked using brute force search
 - account-related or dictionary-derived passwords are common
 - password crackers today are increasingly complex
- How can we help users to select stronger passwords?
 - systems are much better at helping users than before
 - a variety of tools exist

Password-Based Authentication

- Tools for choosing stronger passwords
 - computer-generated passwords
 - selecting less predictable passwords which users can remember can be done by using computer-generated pronounceable passwords
 - for example: heloberi, hoparmah, ulensoev, atonitim
 - password checking
 - a proactive password checker rates password strength at the time of password selection
 - other types of passwords
 - techniques for using images and graphical interfaces for authentication have been developed

Password-Based Authentication

- Tools for choosing stronger passwords (cont.)
 - image-based passwords and graphical interfaces
 - displaying a sequence of images
 - drawing patterns on a grid
 - choosing points using an image
 - their unpredictability is often not as great as desired
- Unpredictability and usability of passwords is hard to achieve simultaneously
 - passwords can provide only a weak form of security

Best Password Practices

- NIST's Special Publication 800-63 provides **authentication guidelines** for organizations including password-based authentication
 - the latest version is dated by June 2017
- In general, you want to
 - use strong passwords
 - not reuse passwords across different services
 - not share your passwords with anyone else
- **Password managers** are of great help in dealing with password explosion

Remote Authentication

- Now assume we want to use passwords for **remote authentication**
 - will it work?
- Passwords observed on the network are trivially susceptible to **replay**
 - initially remote login and file transfer programs, such as `telnet`, communicated passwords in the clear
 - now encryption is used (`ssh`, `scp`, etc.)
- Authentication based on **time-invariant passwords** is therefore a **weak form of authentication**
 - this form of authentication is nevertheless the most common
- A natural way to improve security is to use **one-time passwords**

One-Time Passwords

- In authentication based on **one-time passwords** each password is used only once
- Such authentication can be realized in the following ways:
 - the user and the system initially **agree on a sequence of passwords**
 - simple solution but requires maintenance of the shared list
 - the **user updates her password** with each instance of the authentication protocol
 - e.g., the user might send the new password encrypted under a key derived from the current password
 - this method crucially relies on the correct communication of the new password to the system

One-Time Passwords

- **One-time password** authentication mechanisms (cont.)
 - the **new password is derived** with each instance of the authentication protocol using a one-way hash function
 - the system based on hash chains is called **S/Key** and is due to Lamport
 - a user begins with secret k and produces a sequence of values $k, h(k), h(h(k)), \dots, h^t(k)$
 - password for i th identification session is $k_i = h^{t-i}(k)$
 - when user authenticates $(i + 1)$ st time with k_{i+1} , the server checks whether $h(k_{i+1}) = k_i$
 - if h is infeasible to invert, this convinces the server that the user is legitimate

One-Time Passwords

- Example of S/Key
 - suppose $t = 5$
 - at setup stage
 - user chooses k and computes $h(k), h(h(k)), h^3(k), h^4(k), h^5(k)$
 - user gives $h^5(k)$ to the verifier
 - during authentication
 - at session 1:
 - at session 2:
 - at session 5:

Entity Authentication

- An even **stronger form of authentication** is one where the user doesn't have to send the secret to the verifier
 - ideally you want to convince the verifier without leaking information about your secret
 - such solutions exist and often involve the verifier sending a random **challenge** to the claimant
 - the claimant uses the challenge and the secret to compute the **response**
 - anyone who monitors the channel, cannot deduce information about the secret

Challenge-Response Techniques

- The goal of **challenge-response techniques** is to
 - use a single secret for authentication
 - provide evidence of the secret without leaking information about it
 - proving possession of a secret without leaking information about it is called a **zero-knowledge proof of knowledge**
- **Challenge-response protocols can be built**
 - from simple cryptographic primitives (e.g, MACs and signature schemes)
 - from scratch (Schnorr, Okamoto, and Guillou-Quisquater schemes)

Challenge-Response Techniques

- The basic form of such protocols is normally as follows:
 - suppose Alice is authenticating to Bob
 - Alice has a secret s and Bob has a verification value v
 - Bob sends to Alice a challenge c (chosen or computed anew)
 - Alice computes a response $r = f(s, c)$ and sends it to Bob
 - Bob verifies r using c and v
- Building a secure challenge-response protocol is non-trivial
 - must be secure against **active adversaries**
 - parallel session attack
 - man-in-the-middle attack

Authentication based on Secrets

- If passwords are such a poor way of authenticating, why are they so popular?

Token-Based Authentication

- **Authentication based on what you possess** can be done using different types of tokens
 - **memory cards**
 - data is passively stored on a medium
 - a card reader can retrieve information stored on the card
 - e.g., magnetic stripe credit cards, ATM cards, hotel keys
 - memory cards provide a limited level of security (i.e., card contents can be read by any reader and copied to another card)
 - memory cards are often combined with a password or PIN
 - using memory cards with computers requires special readers

Token-Based Authentication

- **Types of authentication tokens** (cont.)
 - smart cards
 - such cards have a built-in microprocessor, programmable read-only memory and random-access memory (RAM)
 - they can engage in different types of authentication protocols including challenge-response
 - such tokens can also be used to generate dynamic passwords
 - each minute the device generates a new password
 - the device and the verifier must be synchronized
 - tamper-resistance of such tokens must be addressed
 - it's been shown in the past that key material can be recovered with relatively inexpensive equipment

Token-Based Authentication

- **Types of authentication tokens (cont.)**
 - **USB dongle**
 - USB tokens can also be used for authentication
 - they can store static data as well as code
 - recent dongles also include non-volatile memory
 - no additional hardware such a special-purpose reader is necessary
 - USB dongles are commonly used for copy protection of copyrighted material
 - dongle products often don't provide enough security to be used in rigid security requirement environments

Biometric Authentication

- **Biometric authentication systems** authenticate an individual based her physical characteristic
- Types of biometric used in authentication
 - face
 - palm geometry
 - fingerprint
 - iris
 - signature
 - voice
- Most common uses of biometric authentication is for specific applications rather than computer authentication

Biometric Authentication

- Like other authentication mechanisms, biometric authentication includes an enrollment phase during which a biometric is captured
 - the initial reading is often called a **template**
 - at authentication time, a new biometric reading is performed and is compared to the stored template
- Unlike other authentication mechanisms, biometric **matching is approximate**
 - each reading can be influenced by a variety of factors
 - e.g., light conditions, facial expressions, hair style, glasses, etc. for face recognition
 - some types of biometrics can match more accurately than others
 - e.g., iris vs. face or palm

Biometric Authentication

- Biometric matching can be used to perform
 - verification
 - user's biometric scan is used to match her own template only
 - identification
 - user's biometric scan is used to match a database of templates
- Identification might not always be possible
- Biometric systems attempt to minimize
 - false reject rate: authentic biometric is rejected
 - false accept rate: imposter biometric is accepted
- Depending on the environment, minimizing one of them might be more important than minimizing both

Biometric Authentication

- **New types of biometrics** are being explored
 - brain waves, heart beats, etc.
- Many forms of traditional biometrics can be stolen
- Static biometrics can be replayed

Biometric Authentication

- Current research direction: **biometric key generation**
 - the idea: a biometric can be used to generate a cryptographic key
 - the key can be reproduced using another biometric close enough to the original
 - no need to remember any information such as a password
 - the key can be used for authentication or encryption
 - key generation algorithm produces a helper data that can later aid in recovering the same key from a noisy version of the biometric
 - security requirements are strict
 - the helper data must leak minimal information about the biometric
 - compromise of the key must not lead to recovery of the biometric

Summary

- **Entity authentication** is an important topic with the main application in access control
- **Various techniques exist** ranging from time-invariant passwords to provably secure identification schemes
- Despite the weak security password-base authentication provides, it is the **most widely used authentication mechanism**
 - ease of use, user familiarity, no infrastructure requirements
- **Next time**
 - access control mechanisms