The Origins of Socially and Politically Hostile Attitudes toward Immigrants and Outgroups: Economics, Ideology, or National Context?

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Analyses of the determinants of anti-immigrant hostility remain underdeveloped in the literature. Current research is diminished by competing claims over the primacy of economic, ideological, contextual, or sociodemographic factors. To consolidate past research and work towards a more coherent theory of attitudinal hostility, we argue that it is first necessary to disaggregate the broad notion of hostility into "social" and "policy" hostility. We use the 30th Eurobarometer on Immigrants and Outgroups *to test the ability of the economic vulnerability, ideology, and national context arguments to explain levels of socially and politically hostile attitudes to immigrants in five countries of the European Union. The results confirm that not only are social and policy hostility distinct, but ideological factors—both new and old—provide a more cogent account of hostility than either economics or national context. The study finds that attitudinal hostility fundamentally derives from a conjunction of low levels of education and a powerful form of "ideological hostility" that encompasses old-fashioned racism, traditional right-wing ideology, and materialist value orientations.*

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The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a wave of ugly anti-immigrant backlashes in Western Europe. Coming as they did after a decade of high unemployment and working-class insecurity, many popular analysts reached the conclusion that "hard times breed hard thoughts." Whatever the association, parties of the "new radical right" (Kitschelt 1995), such as Belgium's *Vlaams Blok,* France's *Front National* and Germany's *Republikaner,* have been able to parlay the confluence of economic insecurity and anti-foreigner sentiment into a viable electoral message.

Some (e.g., Dalton 1990) argue that such hostile attitudes are inextricable concomitants of the economic and social transformations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. They argue that in the postindustrial economy there are a large and growing number of individuals in insecure social and economic positions; ipso facto, there will be a large and growing hostility to the presence of "foreigners" in the domestic economy and society. The argument has strong intuitive appeal. Still, others have persuasively argued that either ideological predispositions (Hoskin 1985, 1991; Pettigrew 1998) or nation-specific factors (Kitschelt 1995; Lahav 1997; Legge 1996; Schmitter 1983; Studlar 1977) are the primary determinants of hostile attitudes to immigrant "outsiders" in the European Union.

Which explanation is most powerful? We attempt to provide an answer by testing and comparing the ability of the economic vulnerability, ideology, and national context arguments to explain levels of attitudinal hostility in five of the most developed nations of Western Europe. Using data derived from the German, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch sections of Eurobarometer 30 (Reif and Melich 1991), that focused on the issue of immigrants and outgroups, we demonstrate, first, that attitudinal hostility can be usefully disaggregated into distinct "social" and "policy" dimensions. Results from multiple regression analyses

on social and policy hostility then show that ideology, in conjunction with education, offers a more powerful explanation of hostility than either economic vulnerability or national context.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The countries of Western Europe have never considered themselves "immigrant" nations (Pettigrew 1998). Instead, they were historically "emigrant" nations—filling the cities of North America with their opportunity-hungry masses. Because of this perception, these countries lacked a sense that immigration was normal (Pettigrew 1998). After World War II, however, levels of immigration in northern Europe (especially in France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) steadily increased as migrants from former colonial countries began to arrive in large numbers. Around the same time, beginning in the 1950s, the post-war economic boom left the countries of northern Europe with looming labor shortages. The call went out for workers from the south of Europe (and, later, from the Maghreb and Turkey) to migrate north and temporarily fill the positions needed to keep the boom going.

Significant problems with such arrangements first surfaced in the 1970s, when the oil shocks led to high rates of inflation, decreased economic growth, and persistent high unemployment rates. By the early 1980s, most of the rich states of northern and Western Europe awoke to the realization that they had become immigrant societies. It became exceedingly clear that neither the ex-colonial immigrants nor the guestworkers (nor, later on, the refugees) were going home. Lacking both an immigrant tradition and a popular "melting pot" metaphor directed at the assimilation of foreign-born groups (Pettigrew 1998), tensions began to escalate while political solutions were debated.

Scholars have responded by focusing on the hardships faced by the foreign-born migrants in integrating themselves into the

new immigrant societies of Western Europe (e.g., Castles and Kosack 1985; Hoskin 1991; Hollifield 1992). One of the most troubling developments to receive attention has been the rise of hostility to these "new Europeans" (Pettigrew 1998). Though the range of concepts covered under the rubric of "hostility" in these studies is quite broad, most of the literature can be associated with one of three primary forms of hostility: (1) physical, (2) electoral, and (3) attitudinal.

Forms of Hostility

Physical Hostility. We are all familiar with such repugnant images as young neo-Nazi thugs thrashing Turkish immigrants in German marketplaces. Because of the severity and sensationalism of the actions of this relatively small core of right-wing extremists, physical hostility has garnered a large portion of the attention in both the popular and academic literature (e.g., Bjorgo and Witte 1993; Koopmans 1995; Willems 1995; Witte 1995). Though some of these studies focus on the impact of physical and psychological hardship resulting from economic distress (e.g., McLaren 1999), the majority take anomie and the lack of social capital among disaffected youth as central explanatory variables (e.g., Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke 1995).

Electoral Hostility. There is also a relatively large literature dealing with the causes of electoral manifestations of hostility as seen in the rising vote for the new radical right parties in most West European countries (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Pettigrew 1998; von Beyme 1988). Many of these studies have focused on the correlations between hostile attitudes and physical hostility and votes for anti-immigrant political parties. For example, von Beyme (1988, 14) found that there is a disparity between right-wing voting and right-wing attitudes. Another study on the rise of the far right in the former West Germany revealed the basic similarity between certain *Republikaner* and Christian Democ-

ratic voters, who in turn are both quite distinct from the voters for the extreme neo-Nazi German National Democratic Party (Kuechler 1990, 160).

Attitudinal Hostility. Other examinations focus on that presumably large minority of the citizenry who hold hostile attitudes towards foreigners. These citizens are likely behind the rise of the new radical right parties, and many may even tacitly support the actions of the physically violent extremists. In effect, attitudinal hostility is often presumed to be a precondition for both physical and electoral hostility. Attitudinal hostility, however, is itself so broad that—in the interests of theory building—it is essential to further delineate the concept.

Categories of Hostile Attitudes

Racism. In general, there are three main categories of hostile attitudes. Racism (feelings of cultural, ethnic, or racial superiority) is the first, and the basest, of the hostile sentiments. It is, presumably, a fundamental pre-determinant of both electoral and physical hostility. We posit that it is also an antecedent condition for other forms of attitudinal hostility; preliminary evidence by Pettigrew (1998) corroborates this. A great deal of research has been conducted on the determinants of this traditional form of prejudice (e.g., Meertens and Pettigrew 1997), especially in the American context (for a good overview, see Sniderman and Piazza 1993).

Social Hostility. A second sub-category of hostile attitudes is the negative affect that people may have towards societal outgroups in their community. One of the primary manifestations of such hostility is negative opinions regarding the impact that immigrants have on the host society. Because of the hostility to the societal impact of a minority group's presence, we refer to this as "social" hostility. Measures designed to tap such negative assessments (for good examples, see Hoskin 1985 and Quillian

1995) are often based on responses to the following types of survey instruments: "Having Turks in your neighborhood lowers your property value"; "Turks exploit social security benefits;" and "Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and violence."

Policy Hostility. While social hostility taps hostile assessments of immigrants' value to or impact on society, policy hostility taps support for hostile actions towards those immigrants in the policy arena. Such hostility manifests itself primarily through support for government policies designed to curtail the political or economic rights of the immigrant and outgroup minorities. Policy hostility measures attitudes concerning the proper political treatment of Europe's millions of non-permanent residents; such feelings are, consequently, relevant for this study.

There would seem to be a connection between negative assessments of a minority's impact on society and support for hostile immigration policies. However, are the determinants of social and policy hostility really the same? Neiman and Fernandez (1998), used surveys tapping attitudes towards the growing legal and illegal immigrant communities in California to show that the answer is "not necessarily." In California, at least, there is a significant difference between respondents' assessments of an immigrant group's general impact on society and respondents' preferences for state policies directed at that group (e.g., California's Proposition 187). One form of hostility does not automatically translate into the other.

Both social and policy hostility would, ostensibly, also be highly correlated with the first form of attitudinal hostility, racism. We posit that social and policy hostility is shaped by racist attitudes.[1] The relationships are not deterministic, however. Nei-

[1] Evidence of the connection between prejudice and attitudes regarding immigrants' rights is provided by Meertens and Pettigrew (1997).

ther social nor policy hostility is fully dependent on hostile racist attitudes. If, for example, one agrees with the statement that property values go down when minorities move into the neighborhood (indicative of socially hostile attitudes), it could simply be an acknowledgment of other peoples' prejudices. Similarly, hostile policy preferences are not necessarily the direct product of blind prejudice (and, in fact, are even further removed from such sentiments than social hostility). In the United States, for example, there are many Hispanic Americans among the supporters of clampdowns on illegal immigration. Consequently, racism is construed as one of many antecedent conditions of social and policy hostility.

In short, we have identified two forms of attitudinal hostility that are worthy of individual attention. Nevertheless, despite the fact that socially and politically hostile attitudes are highly relevant to the day-to-day quality of life of millions of EU residents without secure citizenship status, the extant literature remains underdeveloped. The present study aims to help correct this deficit through an in-depth examination of the determinants of social and policy hostility.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ATTITUDINAL HOSTILITY

There are three main approaches to explaining cross-national differences in attitudinal hostility: (1) national context, (2) economics, and (3) ideology.

National Context

Explanations that focus on non-economic nation-specific factors come in two varieties. The first variety is primarily idiographic; it searches for the roots of hostility in the particular psychology, history, or political culture of a nation. Such studies are frequently directed at Germany, where analysts argue that xenophobic attitudes are attributable to "German identity"

(Legge 1996), to renewed manifestations of "authoritarian" German personality traits,[2] to a lack of support for the current system,[3] or to expressions of a "latent" German racism. While such may have been the case in the past, these arguments now seem rather tenuous: there is a plethora of counter-evidence outlining the strength of German support for democratic institutions and the comparability of such support with other West European and North American nations (e.g., von Beyme 1988; Dalton 1990).

A second type of nation-specific explanation looks to the more readily comparable social, legal, economic, political, or demographic factors apparent in a given nation for answers to the quandary of attitudinal hostility. For example, Donley Studlar (1977) found a reasonable explanation of hostility in Great Britain using his notion of "social context," which Studlar took to be the conjunction of spatial proximity, employment levels, and housing shortages. Subsequently, myriad country-specific studies have focused on Germany, where the emphasis is usually on such features as the asylum law, the unresolved status of the Gastarbeiter, the size of the refugee flows, or inadequate housing, *inter alia* (for an overview, see Schmitter 1983).

The contextual factors explored in such studies are amenable to cross-national examination. Scholars have met with varying degrees of success investigating the cause of the differences in anti-immigrant hostility among "host" West European nations by comparing institutions, political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1995), refugee laws, political party affiliations and systems (La-

[2] For instance, Kuechler (1990, 159): "I assert that the emergence of the *Republikaner* signifies the continued—though long latent—prevalence of authoritarian belief systems in significant parts of the German public."

[3] The classic example of this comes from Almond and Verba (1963, 429): "Though there is relatively widespread satisfaction with political output, this is not matched by more general system affect."

hav 1997), economic conditions (Quillian 1995), employment levels, and the relative size of immigrant populations (Quillian 1995).

Admittedly, it is plausible that the national context has a relevance to and impact on manifestations of hostility. Nevertheless, *a priori* theoretical expectations for this explanation are low: we predict that prime causality is not due to conditions—whether political or cultural—that are peculiarly "German," "French," or "Dutch." The fact that hostility is endemic to the states of northern and Western Europe at comparable levels suggests that better answers to the problem are found in more universal conditions.

Economic Vulnerability

One of the key universal conditions affecting Western European countries in the 1980s and 1990s was the increasing insecurity of individuals employed in traditional economic sectors. Hans-Georg Betz argues that the rapid modernization and globalization of domestic industries in those two decades led to the creation of a "two-thirds society" in which the prosperity and security of a large majority in certain core industries came at the expense of a "marginalized periphery" with insecure and underpaid positions (1990, 48). Accompanying the economic transformation was the creation of new sets of social forces divided along the "two-thirds" dichotomy. On the one hand, much of the majority of the population has moved beyond economic concerns and come to embrace "postmaterial," quality-of-life issues (Inglehart 1997). On the other hand, the *Modernisierungsverlierer* ("losers of modernization")—the young, the elderly, the uneducated, farmers, and unskilled and semi-skilled workers—have purportedly turned *en masse* to the parties of the new radical right in an "expression of protest over unrepresented political demands" (Dalton 1990, 174). A variation on this theme attributes the hostility of these groups more explicitly to economic

self-interest and inter-group competition, arguing that it is the endemic population who are most likely to face direct job competition from foreign and immigrant labor (e.g., Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Bonacich 1972; Bobo 1983; see Sears and Funk 1991 for an overview). From either the economic competition or industrial modernization perspectives, however, those workers in the most vulnerable economic positions are posited to manifest the highest level of hostility to foreign and immigrant labor.

Economic vulnerability arguments have found significant support in the literature. For example, in their study on class and guestworkers in Western Europe, Castles and Kosack (1985) concluded that working-class hostility towards guestworkers in Western Europe was a product of the need to protect social and economic interests threatened by the presence of foreign workers in the marketplace. As early as the late 1960s, Butler and Stokes (1974) found that concerns with unemployment were highly correlated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. More recent studies have similarly found elevated levels of hostility among individuals with less optimistic assessments of their economic situation (Hoskin 1985; *Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft* 1987; Legge 1996; Pettigrew 1998). These studies are consistent with studies conducted in the American context that have shown a strong connection between hostility and perceptions of the economy (Harwood 1983; Simon 1987).

The literature suggests that there are two general types of economic vulnerability connected to anti-immigrant hostility. The first—the "losers of modernization" vulnerability—reflects individual positions that are vulnerable from an objective standpoint. The second kind of vulnerability deals with subjective assessments of individual insecurity and vulnerability. Since there is not necessarily a connection between structure and attitudes, these two indicators can be considered both operationally and conceptually distinct. To determine their relative importance and

their particular effect on hostility, both forms of economic vulnerability are used in the present study.

Ideology and Value Orientation

The findings on economic vulnerability have been contradicted by other studies that have found economic variables to be relatively insignificant. For example, Quillian (1995, 587-588) argues that, "The empirical evidence on prejudice…demonstrates only a weak link between individual interests and prejudice…[economic] self-interest theories cannot explain the existence of prejudice among individuals whose interests are not directly in conflict with the subordinate group." Many of the studies that question the economics-hostility connection place heavy emphasis on a variety of forms of ideological attributes. To begin with, there are those who look to traditional left-right identification for explanations of a willingness to accept immigrants and other minorities. Hoskin (1985), Meertens and Pettigrew (1997), and Pettigrew (1998), for example, all found that the more prejudiced against immigrants in Europe tended to be more conservative politically, while Lahav (1997) discovered that party affiliations and traditional ideological orientations were the most important determinants of attitudes towards the immigration issue, at least among elites.

Sill others have postulated that new forms of value orientation, especially Inglehart's (1997) "postmaterialism" thesis, are better at explaining a range of attitudinal attributes, including hostility to outsiders. Hoskin (1985, 194), for one, has posited that attitudinal hostility is "unrelated to personal economic situation [or]…to traditional political factors such as partisanship or ideological position." Instead, hostility to or acceptance of guest-

workers is a subset of the "New Politics"[4] that cuts across party, class, and interest lines. Hoskin's initial findings in Germany (1985)—confirmed in other surveys she conducted in the mid-1980s in Britain, Canada, Germany, and the United States (1991)—for the most part support her New Politics thesis: weak associations of the economic variables were consistently overshadowed by value orientation in the creation of anti-immigrant attitudes. Our study helps to evaluate the competing claims: the "new" and "old" ideology hypotheses are directly pitted both against each other and against the competing economic and national context arguments.

Socio-Demographic Factors

In addition to the above theoretical explanations, a sizable body of research has evolved that highlights the role that age and education play in the determination of hostile attitudes to outsiders. In general, these studies have shown that more prejudiced Europeans tend to be older and less educated (e.g., Adorno *et al*. 1982; Hoskin 1985, 1991; Billiet and Carton 1991; Pettigrew 1998).

DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Our study relies on data gathered in the fall of 1988 for Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for the Eurobarometer Survey 30.[5] The Barometer included

[4] According to the "New Politics" hypothesis, traditional political fault lines are gradually being overshadowed by a new set of divisions, the most important of which involves materialist-postmaterialist value orientations.

[5] In selecting cases for the analysis, the most important determinant was to use states in which immigration patterns (in terms of periods and levels) and income levels were relatively similar. The criterion excludes Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, which were in the past either considerably poorer than the other countries of the EU, the primary *sources* of immigrants and guestworkers to other countries, or both. For this reason, our Note continues

a series of questions relating to attitudes towards immigrants and "outgroups"[6] in the member states of the European Union.

Independent Variables

The Eurobarometer 30 data includes ample content for operationalizing a wide range of economic, socio-demographic, and ideological variables. Descriptive statistics for all variables are available in Appendix A. The first theoretical alternative, national context, was operationalized through dummy variables for each of the five countries.

Six indicators were used to test the subjective and objective economic vulnerability hypotheses. First, income, social class, and occupation were used to operationalize the notion of objective economic vulnerability. Income is a four-category variable (with values from 1 to 4) based on respondents' self-placement in one of four income quartiles, from lowest to highest. Higher scores equal higher incomes. Similarly, Social Class is derived from an indicator that asked respondents to place themselves in one of five categories: (1) working class, (2) lower middle class, (3) middle class, (4) upper middle class, or (5) upper class.[7] Occupation was operationalized by reconfiguring the categories in the Eurobarometer's occupation variable to reflect more accurately vulnerability in the postindustrial economy. Professional

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analysis is limited to the northwestern states of the EU. We have chosen to analyze the largest of these cases. The total sample is representative of the populations at large over the age of 15 of the five countries.

[6] The "out-groups" in the surveys are country-specific. They refer to those groups that have traditionally been least accepted in each of the states. In West Germany the outgroup is the Turks; in France, North Africans and Southeast Asians; in Netherlands, Surinamers and Turks; in Belgium, North Africans and Turks; and in Great Britain, West Indians and South Asians.

[7] Although this self-placement is by definition "subjective," the result is more an indicator of a respondent's objective position in the social order than of the individual's psychologically driven, subjective assessment of personal vulnerability.

workers (those originally coded as "professionals" and "skilled laborers") were re-coded as "not vulnerable" (value = 0); unskilled workers (those coded as "manual labor," "unskilled manual," or "unskilled office") were re-coded as "vulnerable" (value = 1); and the unemployed were re-coded as "most vulnerable" (value = 2), reflecting their even greater degree of occupational insecurity.

Three discrete variables were likewise used to tap subjective economic vulnerability. All three of these variables are coded such that higher values indicate greater vulnerability and insecurity. The first, General Economic Assessment, is derived from an item that asks respondents, "How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?" Responses to this question are coded as (1) "got a lot better," (2) "got a little better," (3) "stayed the same," (4) "got a little worse," and (5) "got a lot worse." The second variable, Economic Pessimism, is based on a survey item that queried respondents, "So far as you are concerned, do you think that next year will be better or worse than this year?" Those who responded "better" were assigned a value of "1," those who responded "the same" were given a score of "2," and those who answered "worse" were assigned a score of "3." Finally, Household Economic Situation is based on an item that tapped change in household income over the past twelve months using the question: "How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?" The response codes and values are the same as those used for the General Economic Assessment: (1) "got a lot better," (2) "got a little better," (3) "stayed the same," (4) "got a little worse," and (5) "got a lot worse." Together, these

three variables provide a good overall assessment of an individual's subjective economic vulnerability.[8]

For the ideological variables, "traditional" political ideology is measured through the Barometer's collapsed left-right self-placement variable using the following five categories: 1 = extreme left, 2 = left, 3 = center, 4 = right, and 5 = extreme right. "New" ideology, in turn, is measured through the survey's three-category Value Orientation variable (1 = "materialist," 2 = "mixed," and 3 = "postmaterialist"). Racism is measured by an index based on respondents' reactions to two statements detailing possible "reasons for why the outgroup community [i.e., Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, etc.] does not do as well as nationals [i.e., Germans in Germany]":

1. "[The outgroup members] come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most [German] people."

2. "The cultures of the home countries of [outgroup members] are less well developed than that of [Germany]."

For each statement, respondents could choose from the following list of responses: 1 = "disagree strongly," 2 = "disagree somewhat," 3 = "agree somewhat," and 4 = "agree strongly." A racism score was created by combining respondents' answers on the two items. Values thus range from 2 to 8, with higher values indicating more racist attitudes towards outgroups. The racism

[8] The relatively low correlations among these variables suggest that they are capturing different segments of an individual's subjective economic assessment (*Economic Pessimism* and *General Economic Assessment* correlate at $r = 0.20$, *Economic Pessimism* and *Household Economic Situation* correlate at $r = 0.26$, while *General Economic Assessment* and *Household Economic Situation* correlate at $r = 0.26$).

variable is a reliable summated scale[9] and will play an important role in the multivariate regressions, given that we are interested in the extent to which social and policy hostility operate beyond racist attitudes.

Control Variables

Three socio-demographic control variables are employed in this study—age, education, and ethnicity. Both Age and Education are measured using the collapsed four-category items included in the Barometer. Age is coded as "1" = 24 years and younger, "2" = 25 to 39 years, "3" = 40 to 54 years, and "4" = 55 years and older. Education is coded according to the age of respondents when they finished their full-time education: "1" = 15 years of age or younger, "2" = 16 to 19 years year of age, "3" = 20 years of age or older, and "4" = still studying. Ethnicity uses a pre-designed measure meant to tap the respondent's ethnic origins with the question, "Is anyone in your immediate family, including yourself, of foreign national origins?" Values are coded as "1" = "outgroup origin," "2" = "other foreign origin," and "3" = "not of foreign origin."

Dependent Variables

The broad range of items on attitudes towards immigrants and guestworkers in Eurobarometer 30 presents the opportunity for constructing sophisticated scales for the two dependent variables. The desire for a conceptually nuanced analysis led us to choose to look at hostility in two distinct manifestations. The first, re-

[9] While this index has a great deal of face validity, we also assessed its suitability as a summated rating scale by calculating Cronbach's α reliability coefficient. Nunally (1978) suggests that α coefficients should be around 0.70 for a scale to demonstrate internal consistency. Our scale obtained an α of 0.67. This is an acceptable score given the relatively low number of items on our scale, and the tendency for α to increase with higher item numbers (Spector 1982). Consequently, we are confident that our scale is a valid index of racist attitudes.

ferred to as "social hostility," focuses on respondents' assessments of the effect of outsiders on society; the second, referred to as "policy hostility," is based on the respondents' attitudes about the appropriate political status of those outsiders.

The Barometer contained eight items that were thought *prima facie* to tap social hostility, and three that were thought to measure policy hostility. In order to corroborate the face validity of these assumptions, all eleven items were entered into a factor analysis, which confirmed the existence of two distinct factors.[10]

The social hostility indicator is based on a series of eight items that ask for respondents' opinions about the outgroup members' effect on various aspects of society. In particular, respondents were asked whether each of the following statements applied to people of the outgroup nationality residing in the respondent's nation:

- "If there are a lot of their children in a school it reduces the level of education."
- "They exploit social security benefits."
- "Their customs are difficult to understand."
- "Their presence in our country increases unemployment for [nationals]."
- "Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and violence."
- "Marriage into one of these groups always ends badly."
- "To have people of another nationality as neighbors creates problems."
- "The presence of people of another nationality as neighbors modifies the prices of property."

[10] A Varimax rotated factor analysis provided two easily identifiable separate factors. The first factor included component loadings no lower than 0.516 for the eight items used on the *Social Hostility* scale (see above) while the three *Policy Hostility* items (see below) loaded at no higher than 0.217. For the second factor, all three *Policy Hostility* items loaded no lower than 0.690 while the eight *Social Hostility* items loaded no higher than 0.321.

Respondents were permitted to give either "yes" or "no" responses to all eight questions. Positive responses to each of these questions are considered hostile and given a score of "1." Negative responses, in turn, are not hostile; each negative response comes with a score of "0." To create the composite measure of Social Hostility, respondents' scores on the eight items were summed. The social hostility variable thus ranges from "0" (not hostile) to "8" (highly socially hostile). The Cronbach's α of 0.78 indicates that the scale is highly reliable (Nunnally 1978; Spector 1982).

Policy Hostility taps a stronger sentiment. It refers to feelings of aversion towards the presence of foreigners in the five nations under consideration. Specifically, it refers to a desire for the circumscription of the foreigners' rights, their expulsion, or both. Three items are used to construct the policy hostility scale. They asked respondents their opinions about the number of immigrants in the country, whether their presence was beneficial, and whether their rights should be circumscribed. The three questions were recoded to provide equal weight for similar responses. The politically hostile questions, with their respective range of answers, are the following:

- "Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of people of another nationality living in our country: Are there too many [recoded value = "3"], a lot but not too many [value = "1"], or not many [value = "0"]?"
- [Talking about people living in our country who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the European Community] "Do you think we should: extend their rights [value = "0"], restrict their rights [value = "3"], or leave things as they are [value = "1"]?"
- [Talking about people living in our country who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the European Community] "Do you think that their presence here is a good thing [value = "0"], good to some extent [value = "1"], bad to some extent [value = "2"], or a bad thing for the future of our country [value = "3"]?"

To create the composite measure of Policy Hostility, respondents' scores on the three items were summed. The scale has a Cronbach's α reliability coefficient of .718, indicating a reliable scale. Values range from "0" (not hostile) to "9" (high policy hostility).

RESULTS

To facilitate preliminary visual comparisons between the two forms of hostility, we temporarily created collapsed versions of the two scales for use in Tables 1 and 2. For social hostility, respondents were placed into one of three recoded categories: those with scores between "0" and "2" on the social hostility scale were recoded as "not hostile;" those with scores between "3" and "5" were labeled "partially hostile;" and those with scores between "6" and "8" were recoded as "hostile." The collapsed policy hostility variable was recoded for those with a score between "0" and "2" (i.e., with no or very minor levels of hostility) as "not hostile;" those with scores between "3" and "5" as "partially hostile;" and those with scores between "6" and "9" as "hostile."

The results in Table 1 lend empirical credence to the distinctiveness of social and policy hostility. Most optimistically, only 6% of the respondents are socially hostile, and more than three-quarters are not hostile. These figures are in sharp contrast to the results for policy hostility. Surprisingly, 37% of the respondents in the survey are politically hostile to the presence of the outsiders,[11] while only 22% can be classified as not hostile.

The disparity between social and policy hostility may lead to questions whether prevailing social mores have prevented some

[11] As a convention, both "policy hostility" and "politically hostile" refer to the same phenomenon.

TABLE 1
ATTITUDE FREQUENCIES FOR
COLLAPSED SOCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY VARIABLES

	Social		Policy	
Attitude	**Percent**	**N**	**Percent**	**N**
Not Hostile	77.9	4212	21.9	929
Partially Hostile	16.3	881	40.9	1735
Hostile	5.8	312	37.2	1579
Total N =		5405		4243

Source: Data derived from Eurobarometer 30
Note: Pearson Correlation between the two scales is .31 ($p < .01$).

individuals from responding to the social hostility items in a manner that reflected their true feelings. That is, a type of "social correctness" may have suppressed "inappropriate" responses and obscured accurate results. Such is, in fact, the hypothesis of the "new" or "symbolic" racism scholars.[12] Some may also wonder if policy hostility is merely an uncensored version of social hostility. An ANOVA test of the social and policy hostility scales on racism, however, allows us to dismiss any such concerns.[13] This

[12] For an introduction to such hypotheses in the American context, see McConahay and Hough (1976). Their primary hypothesis is that because of the social undesirability of racial prejudice, people favor disguised, indirect ways to express it. We are not so interested here in how people may *hide* their prejudices; rather, we are concerned with *overt* manifestations of socially and politically hostile attitudes.

[13] To complete this test, a separate variable combining values for the social and policy hostility scales was created. The variable included five categories: (1) those who were "not hostile" on both hostility scales, (2) those who were "partially hostile" on one or both of the dependent variables, (3) those who were "hostile" on the social hostility scale but "not hostile" on the policy hostility scale, (4) those who were politically "hostile" but socially "not hostile," and (5) those who were "hostile" on both scales. Since there were only four "only socially hostile" cases, these were counted as missing values. The composite variable was then used in an ANOVA test as an independent variable with the *racism* variable dependent. In order to make a claim that an expression of policy hostility
Note continues

test suggested that, in terms of racism, the distinction between social and policy hostility is well founded: those who were "hostile" on both hostility scales were significantly more racist than those who were "hostile" only on the policy hostility scale. The implication is that policy hostility is not merely a "disguised" version of social hostility.

The analysis can now turn to testing the three competing hypotheses: economic situation, ideology, and national context. Table 2 presents the results from a cross-tabulation of the collapsed versions of both dependent variables by country. The comparison allows us to ascertain whether there is any connection between nation and levels of hostility. The data reveal a general similarity among countries with only minor deviations. Specifically, the same overall pattern of a high proportion of "not hostile" in terms of social hostility and a low proportion of "not hostile" in terms of policy hostility that was seen in Table 1 is duplicated in Table 2. The most noteworthy of the deviations is the relatively low levels of social hostility in the Netherlands and Germany, and that of the Netherlands concerning policy hostility. Also surprising is the finding that while Germany is one of the least socially hostile of the five countries, at the same time it is the second-most hostile country in the policy sense. Overall, though, there is only minor variation across nations. It is unlikely that specific national context provides the best explanation. To

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is not merely a disguised way of expressing the more socially unacceptable view of social hostility, the results should demonstrate statistically significant differences in the *racism* scores of the different values of the composite hostility variable (especially between the "only politically hostile" and the "hostile" categories). In fact, there was a significant difference between the scores of *all* the categories, with $F = 135.00$ ($p \leq 0.000$). In addition, there is a pattern of increasing racism all the way from the "not hostile" category to the "hostile" category. Most importantly, "socially and politically hostile" respondents were significantly more racist than "only politically hostile" respondents were. In short, there were statistically significant mean differences of racism between *all* of the hostility categories, with mean racism levels increasing for subsequent levels of the combined hostility scale.

TABLE 2
COLLAPSED SOCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY SCALES BY NATION
(in percents)

Hostility	France	Belgium	Nether-lands	Germany	UK
Social					
Not Hostile	73.9	72.9	83.5	83.4	76.4
Partially Hostile	20.1	16.7	14.7	13.3	16.7
Hostile	6.0	10.4	1.9	3.3	6.9
N =	1001	1024	1006	1051	1323
Policy					
Not Hostile	26.5	18.0	30.9	14.7	19.6
Partially Hostile	32.4	35.8	48.4	43.3	43.8
Hostile	41.1	46.2	20.7	42.0	36.6
N =	807	801	825	809	1001

Source: Data derived from Eurobarometer 30

demonstrate this more conclusively, though, all three explanations are explored simultaneously.

Table 3 presents Pearson correlations of all the independent variables with the non-collapsed social hostility scale (values from 0 to 8) and policy hostility scale (values from 0 to 9). The correlations allow an initial comparison of the three competing explanations for hostility. What emerges is the clear dominance of the "ideology" explanation of hostility and the relatively weaker performance of both the "national context" and "economic situation" explanations.

The two highest correlations with social hostility (and the only two, besides education, with a correlation greater than 0.10) are value orientation (-0.17) and racism (0.25). Materialist orientations and racist attitudes are thus highly associated with socially hostile attitudes. The "old" ideology variable has a

TABLE 3
SOCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY WITH IDEOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, NATION, AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
(Pearson Correlations)

Predictors	Social	Policy
Ideology		
Ideology (left-right self-placement)	0.087‡	0.234‡
Value Orientation	-0.168‡	-0.287‡
Racism	0.250†	0.376‡
Economic Situation		
General Economic Assessment	0.067‡	0.042‡
Economic Pessimism	0.065‡	0.090‡
Household Economic Situation	0.074‡	0.082‡
Income	-0.049‡	-0.066‡
Social Class	-0.083‡	-0.111‡
Occupation	0.017	0.024
Nation		
France	0.058‡	0.020
Germany	-0.087‡	0.045‡
Belgium	0.088‡	0.109‡
Netherlands	-0.056‡	-0.135‡
Britain	-0.002	-0.035†
Socio-demographic		
Education	-0.141‡	-0.242‡
Age	0.086‡	0.139‡
Ethnicity	0.071‡	0.134‡

†$p \leq 0.05$ (two-tailed)
‡$p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed)

correlation of only 0.09, indicating that right-wing orientations are positively related to hostile attitudes. Correlations for the nation dummy variables, in contrast, range from a low of -0.002 (not significant) for Britain to an absolute high of 0.09 for Belgium and Germany. In these bivariate analyses, the preliminary evidence suggests that the national context hypothesis is not as powerful as the ideological hypothesis. Moreover, the strength of

the economic vulnerability thesis appears to be on par with the national context argument. Although the "subjective" vulnerability variables are slightly more highly correlated with social hostility than the "objective" variables, neither obtains correlations as strong as the ideological variables. Correlations range from a low of 0.02 (not significant) for the occupation variable to a high of -0.08 for social class. Rounding out the analysis, ethnicity and age obtain moderate correlations of 0.07 and 0.09, respectively.

A similar pattern obtains with policy hostility, except that the results are even more favorable for the ideological arguments than they were with social hostility. The three strongest variables, in fact, are racism (0.38), value orientation (-0.29), and traditional left-right ideology (0.23).

The three socio-demographic variables—education (-0.24), age (0.14), and ethnicity (0.13)—obtain generally more important correlations with policy hostility. Among the economic predictors, the only variable with a Pearson correlation over 0.10 is social class (-0.11), while among the nation variables, only the Netherlands (-0.14) and Belgium (0.11) obtain such a correlation.

The data show that—without the benefit of controls—neither national context nor economic situation offers a convincing explanation of social and policy hostility towards immigrants. Instead, education and ideology seem to hold the keys to this puzzle. Moreover, racism might be expected to be a more powerful explicator than value orientation, and value orientation should in turn be more powerful than traditional left-right ideology. In order to determine the relative importance of the three competing explanations, however, the analysis must turn to the multiple regression results for social and policy hostility.

Table 4 reports the results from multiple regressions on the non-collapsed social and policy hostility scales.[14] The Beta weights (standardized coefficients) included in the table allow us to determine the relative impact of each of the independent variables. In general, the results show the same patterns evident in the uncontrolled bivariate correlations of Table 3: the ideological variables are better predictors of levels of hostility than are national or economic factors.[15]

For social hostility, the two strongest predictors are racism and value orientation, respectively. One of the nation variables, France, does have a significant, positive relationship with social hostility: it is the third most powerful variable in the equation. The results show no statistically significant differences between Great Britain, Germany, and Holland, however. After racism, value orientation, and France, six other variables obtain statistical significance with roughly equivalent explanatory value. The traditional ideology variable, as expected, is positively associated with hostility. Three economic variables obtain significance: general economic assessment, household economic situation, and social class. Of the socio-demographic indicators, education displays a negative relationship with socially hostile attitudes, and ethnicity is positively related to social hostility. Those who are of

[14] A Pearson correlation matrix showed that inter-predictor collinearity was not problematic. The two strongest inter-correlations were between education and age (-.44), and between education and social class (.35).

[15] The items used to construct the racism variable were not asked in Belgium. Because of the importance of the variable to the test, we decided to run the multivariate regressions without the Belgian respondents. As a precaution, regressions on social and policy hostility were also run with the racism variable excluded. The only difference in the results on the social hostility equation was that Germany obtains a significant negative relationship, while the only differences in the policy hostility equation are that *income* becomes insignificant and *occupation* attains a significant positive relationship ($p = .01$). The relative importance of all other variables in the two equations remained unchanged. In short, the general pattern of results was similar.

foreign origins, and those who are more educated, are less likely to possess hostile attitudes towards immigrants.

As indicated by the adjusted R^2 of .11, approximately 11% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the combined effect of the 15 independent variables. By all accounts, one

TABLE 4
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF SOCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY

	Social Hostility Adj. $R^2 = 0.11$		**Policy Hostility** Adj. $R^2 = 0.28$	
	Beta	Std. Error	Beta	Std. Error
Ideology				
Ideology	0.043†	0.037	0.192‡	0.048
Value Orientation	-0.112‡	0.059	-0.175‡	0.077
Racism	0.195‡	0.022	0.262‡	0.030
Economic Situation				
General Economic Assessment	0.060‡	0.041	0.024	0.053
Economic Pessimism	0.012	0.055	0.065‡	0.072
Household Economic Situation	0.045†	0.043	0.031	0.056
Income	0.01	0.035	0.043†	0.047
Social Class	-0.047†	0.039	-0.046†	0.052
Occupation	0.002	0.064	0.028	0.085
Nation				
France	0.111‡	0.113	0.122‡	0.148
Germany	-0.010	0.109	0.134‡	0.145
Holland	0.030	0.113	-0.003	0.147
Socio-demographic				
Education	-0.059†	0.050	-0.120‡	0.066
Age	-0.003	0.041	-0.003	0.054
Ethnicity	0.052†	0.092	0.049†	0.121
Constant	-0.014	0.445	1.533	0.588‡

Source: Base data derived from Eurobarometer 30 (Social Hostility: n = 2322; Policy Hostility: n = 1968). As the base category, the UK dummy variable was excluded. All coefficients (except for the constant) are standardized.
†$p \leq 0.05$ (two-tailed)
‡$p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed)

should expect better results when using such normally powerful predictors as ideology, education, and racism. Plausibly, the results are an indication that the issue cuts across traditional lines; this would lend credence to the "New Politics" hypothesis. As in Table 3, the strength of the associations with the policy hostility scale is greater. Once again, ideology offers a stronger explanation of hostility than either economic situation or national context. These results parallel the findings of the bivariate correlations. In total, 10 of 15 variables attained statistical significance in this model. Comparing Beta weights, the three most powerful are racism, traditional left-right ideology, and value orientation. Racism offers the most cogent explanation of the three. More relevant is the finding that value orientation and left-right ideology carry roughly equal explanatory weight with regard to levels of policy hostility. This finding may have an important implication: the political battle over the future of the guestworkers is neither merely a matter of "New Politics" nor is it solely a reflection of a split along traditional ideological lines.

Two of the nation dummy variables, Germany and France, are the fourth- and fifth-most powerful variables in the equation. Residing in either of these two countries makes a respondent more likely to hold hostile policy attitudes towards immigrants. Education closely follows these two variables, with ethnicity not far behind. Age does not appear to play a significant part in either socially or politically hostile attitudes. The statistical unimportance of age is counter to many theoretical arguments. According to Legge (1996) "while some research has found a positive relationship between age and ethnocentrism…one might expect a negative relationship as well" (522). In the German context, Legge maintains that "the elderly have a higher probability of being satisfied economically; in turn, a greater economic satisfaction should result in less anxiety towards non-Germans" (522). At the same time, older Europeans are more likely to be

less educated, more conservative ideologically, and hold more materialist value orientations. We believe that it is understandable that age drops out of the causal picture, when controlling for education, ideology, postmaterialist value orientations, and economic competition. Thus, the non-significant coefficient for the age variable is likely because of multicollinearity. While age does not highly correlate individually with any of the other independent variables, an auxiliary regression illustrates that the combined effects of the independent variables have an important dampening effect on the impact of age on both Social and Policy Hostility.[16]

As in the social hostility equation, three economic variables obtain significant relationships with policy hostility: economic pessimism, income, and social class. Although we expected the economic variables to correlate with levels of attitudinal hostility, the findings do not support those expectations. The results do not correspond to those studies that claim economic variables are the most important determinants of hostile attitudes.[17]

[16] Klein's rule of thumb suggests that if the R^2 from an auxiliary regression is greater than the overall R^2, then multicollinearity is likely a problem (Gujarati 1995). Indeed, the R^2 for the auxiliary regression of *Age* is 0.29, as compared to the overall R^2 of 0.11 for the *Social Hostility Regression* and an R^2 of 0.28 for the *Policy Hostility* regression. No such evidence was found for the *Occupation* variable (auxiliary $R^2 = 0.11$). While mulicollinearity reduces the significance of affected variables, it does not adversely affect the estimated coefficients in other ways.

[17] Both models were also estimated using Huber/White corrected standard errors to control for the possibility of heteroscedasticity. The results are not presented in this article. However, there was no difference in the significance of statistics for the *Policy Hostility* model with corrected standard errors. The only difference in the *Social Hostility* model is that ideology drops to $p = 0.065$ from $p = 0.044$ for a two-tailed significance test. Consequently, the uncorrected standard errors are presented in Table 4.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

We posited the existence of two distinct forms of attitudinal hostility towards immigrant "outsiders" in the developed West. The first, social hostility, encompasses hostile assessments of the immigrants' impact on the host society. The second, policy hostility, entails support for anti-immigrant public policies. The results show that not only are social and policy hostility distinct, but that neither is simply a disguised form of racism.

We tested three competing explanations of social and policy hostility: national context, economic vulnerability, and ideology. Theoretical expectations were low for the national context accounts of attitudinal hostility. The data suggest that the answer to attitudinal hostility does not lie purely in factors peculiar to the individual nation-states of the European Union. Not only did an examination of the raw data reveal a basic similarity in patterns of both social and policy hostility across nations, but also the controlled multivariate regressions confirmed that the overall strength of the relationship between nation and hostility is relatively weak.

There is a large body of literature suggesting that economic vulnerability should prove to be the most powerful determinant of hostile attitudes. Our data do not support this assumption. Despite the fact that conceptualizations of both subjective and objective economic vulnerability were used to test these variables, neither was shown to offer a more significant account of variation in levels of hostility than ideology and education. At the same time, the results offer partial confirmation of the economic competition and economic vulnerability arguments. Though the picture is mixed, there is a general relationship between an individual holding less optimistic evaluations of the economy and that individual holding hostile attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, two "objective" indicators of economic vulnerability, income, and social class, obtain significance in one or both of the

multivariate regressions. These figures show that as both the economic vulnerability and economic competition arguments suggest, those with higher incomes and those at the higher strata of society are less likely to possess hostile attitudes.

The three socio-demographic variables—age, ethnicity, and education—have likewise been posited as both fundamental aspects of vulnerability and essential determinants of hostility. As expected, ethnicity was shown to be an important predictor of hostility, and education was repeatedly one of the strongest overall determinants of hostile attitudes. This is consistent with a wide array of literature on the power of education.[18]

The findings further suggest that education appears to be a key ingredient in the *Modernisierungsverlierer's* (the young, the elderly, unskilled and semiskilled workers, farmers, and those with low levels of education) purported hostility to outsiders. The present study found no significant relationships between hostility and either age or occupation. However, the insignificant finding for age was likely due to multicollinearity from the combined effects of the remaining independent variables. On the whole, given the effects of education and social class, only partial support was found for the objective economic vulnerability, or "losers of modernization," explanation of hostility.

Our study suggests that the most compelling explanation of hostility is ideology. The troika of racism, value orientation, and left-right ideology holds greater explanatory utility than either economics or national context. Racism, predictably, was found to be the most important determinant of hostile social and political attitudes towards immigrants. Both traditional left-right ideology

[18] Education is, in fact, partially an "economic" variable, since it determines future income, but it is related to so many other (attitudinal, social, cultural, ideological) factors that it should be assumed unique. Hyman, Wright, and Reed (1975) were among the first to document, as their book title suggests, the *Enduring Effects of Education*.

and value orientation have a significant impact on hostility beyond the effects of racism. Traditional left-right ideology was the second-strongest predictor of politically hostile attitudes, while value orientation was the second or third most powerful predictor variable for both forms of hostility. Controlling for racism, the more materialist the value orientation and the more right wing the ideology, the more hostile the attitudes.

The connection between ideology and hostility is paralleled in the United States. According to some analysts, racial politics in the United States during the pre-Civil Rights era were simple conflicts between lofty American ideals and lowly prejudice: whites' responses to race issues could be reduced to how they felt about blacks. In contemporary American politics, however, one cannot infer that attitudes towards any particular policy issue can be construed as a "litmus test" of whites' feelings about blacks. The majority of whites are for direct government assistance (e.g., the Head Start program) and anti-discrimination laws, yet against bussing and affirmative action. Sniderman and Piazza (1993, 16) refer to this diversity of opinion as "issue pluralism." Ideology effectively mediates the presence or absence of prejudice in such policy-relevant attitudes. It is plausible that analogous forces are at work in the EU.

These findings also lend credence to the "New Politics" hypothesis that Europe is undergoing a shift towards a political split along the materialist-postmaterialist fault line.[19] Value orientation indeed proved to be a robust predictor of attitudinal hostility. At the same time, the evidence shows the value-orientation cleavage supplements—but in no way supplants—traditional

[19] The New Politics hypothesis refers only to the *policy* arena. Social attitudes, as manifest here in social hostility, are not affected by the same process. Our results suggest that value orientation trumps traditional ideology as a primary determinant of socially hostile attitudes.

political dividing lines. Deep-rooted prejudices and left-right ideology remain powerful determinants of hostility in the policy arena.

In the end, our results show that attitudinal hostility derives from the conjunction of low levels of education and a powerful form of "ideological hostility" encompassing old-fashioned racist attitudes, traditional right-wing ideology, and materialist value orientations. The issue of immigration in Europe has become firmly embedded in ideology. Neither economics nor national context offers as convincing an explanation of the genesis of hostile attitudes.

APPENDIX A
SUMMARY STATISTICS—ALL VARIABLES*

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Policy Hostility	4208	7.567	2.482	0	9
Social Hostility	5405	1.425	1.881	0	8
Ideology	4856	2.990	1.050	1	5
Value Orientation	5108	1.961	0.654	1	3
Racism	2536	3.863	1.733	2	8
General Economic Assessment	5264	2.893	0.932	1	5
Economic Pessimism	5143	1.815	0.697	1	3
Household Economic Situation	5291	3.024	0.899	1	5
Income	4399	2.466	1.125	1	4
Social Class	5020	2.336	1.116	1	5
Occupation	5319	1.355	0.608	1	3
France	5405	0.185	0.388	0	1
Germany	5405	0.194	0.396	0	1
Belgium	5405	0.189	0.392	0	1
Holland	5405	0.186	0.389	0	1
Britain	5405	0.245	0.430	0	1
Education	5405	2.086	0.921	1	4
Age	5395	2.586	1.078	1	4
Ethnicity	4028	2.760	0.481	1	3

*The summary statistics for these variables are derived from all available data in the Eurobarometer 30 data set.

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