

## **STRUCTURE, POLITICS, AND ACTION: AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF NATIONALIST PROTEST AND REBELLION**

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*This article presents an integrated model of contentious nationalist activity, with structure, politics, and action assuming equal roles in an interdependent causal system. The model is tested using simultaneous equation systems on 130 ethno-nationalist groups from 1990 to 1998. The results confirm the vital, indirect role of grievances and group identity on protest and the powerful direct and indirect effects of political opportunity structure variables on protest and rebellion. Repression is shown to have a particularly escalatory impact on the conflict process.*

Ethnic nationalism is undoubtedly a powerful and destructive sentiment. At its most violent, nationalism has resulted in the disintegration of multi-ethnic unions like Yugoslavia and incited terrorism in such diverse places as Brittany, Sri Lanka, and the Basque Country. At its least violent, nationalism has disrupted the central authorities of myriad states, causing the end of Belgian consociationalism, the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and lasting economic and political uncertainty in Quebec.

What can account for the great diversity in levels of non-violent protest and violent rebellion among ethnonational communities? This article helps answer the question by testing the ability of an integrated model of contentious nationalist politics to account for the variation in levels of protest and rebellion in 130 ethnonational communities throughout the globe in the 1990s. Building on the developments of a core group of social movement and conflict processes scholars, we argue that our

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comprehension of nationalist phenomena can be considerably enhanced by viewing both violent and non-violent outbreaks of nationalism as the related products of a conjunction of broad socio-demographic and economic structural conditions on the one hand, and political processes on the other. Our over-arching premise is that structure, politics, and action are interactive in the generation of ethnonationalist conflict. While a set of economic and socio-demographic structural conditions deliver the identity, resources, and motivation necessary for successful group mobilization, political opportunities act as a filter for the transformation of structurally induced mobilization into political action. These political opportunity structures are then themselves transformed by the nature of political action that takes place.

This article further suggests that violent and non-violent contention, though conceptually distinct phenomena, are the products of a fundamentally similar set of factors. Whether one is dealing with non-violent protest or violent rebellion, the following five explanans—*mobilizational resources*, *grievances*, *group identity*, *organizational mobilization*, and *political opportunity structures*—are shown to be fundamental components of the conflict process. The difference between violent and non-violent action forms comes in the precise impact of each of these explanatory factors on contention.

How does the application of this synthesis of the literatures on social movements and nationalism enhance our understanding of ethnonationalist contention? The implications of the study are substantial. The findings show that, contrary to a growing conventional wisdom, structurally induced “root causes” are not irrelevant; they in fact play a vital indirect role in the waxing and waning of ethnonationalist conflict. The findings further shed light on the community-level structural factors that undergird the “substitution effect”<sup>1</sup> hypothesized to take place in individual organizations. Similarly, a number of powerful relationships obtain with the individual elements of the political opportunity structure. First, as Davenport<sup>2</sup> would expect, the results confirm the reciprocal nature of the repression—conflict nexus; at the same time, the findings build on prior research by mapping the array of highly robust—and uniformly negative—impacts that repression brings to bear on the conflict process. Democracy, conversely, is shown to exert a primarily positive impact on contention. More open regimes, in the end, are less likely to resort to repression,

to exacerbate existing conflicts, and to generate conditions that might lead to a “cycle of violence.”<sup>3</sup> Democratization, in contrast, has a mixed effect: while democratic regime change is associated with open mobilization, it is related to decreased levels of non-violent protest and militant mobilization and does not appear to exacerbate levels of rebellion. In a similar manner, the level of autonomy afforded the group by the central government has no apparent impact on either violent or non-violent conflict.

### Theoretical Foundations

Much of the literature pertinent to aggregate protest activity within ethno-national communities,<sup>4</sup> especially that by scholars of nationalism, has focused on large-scale economic and socio-demographic structural conditions. In competition with this group are those researchers, working mainly in the rational choice and political process traditions, who focus on political and institutional explanations.

#### *Structural and Group-Centric Analyses*

A first branch of research on nationalism concentrates on aggregate characteristics of the national community. Primary theses within this tradition focus on the mobilizational resources afforded the group as a result of, *inter alia*, “social mobilization;”<sup>5</sup> on the mobilizational capacity of claims-making groups;<sup>6</sup> on the importance of cultural markers (especially language) and boundary-formation in the generation of movement strength;<sup>7</sup> on the role of cultural attributes unique to each community;<sup>8</sup> and on the unique, powerful psychological pull of appeals to the national group identity.<sup>9</sup>

A second group of research is built around Gurr’s groundbreaking supposition of a “politicization and activation of discontent” resulting from relative deprivation.<sup>10</sup> The range of posited grievances runs the gamut from political to cultural to institutional to economic. Some of the most popular hypotheses focus on nationalism as the product of state suppression of minority cultural expression;<sup>11</sup> of the supposed economic benefits of political independence;<sup>12</sup> of the combination of international forces and discriminatory domestic economic policy that results

in “internal colonialism;”<sup>13</sup> and of the negative consequences of ethnic competition and divisions in the labor market.<sup>14</sup>

All of the above literature, however, suffers from fundamental shortcomings in terms of predictive utility. When we try to predict the occurrence of nationalist protest based solely on the existence of favorable structural pre-determinants, we are frequently at a loss. In the United Kingdom, for instance, we can see that Scottish nationalism is consistently stronger than Welsh nationalism, though from a structural-linguistic basis the reverse should be true. In France, we can see that the strongest—and most violent—nationalist movements have arisen in the areas (Brittany and Corsica) with the *lowest* levels of social mobilization. And in Spain, instead of nationalism occurring in the peripheral areas with the least economic advantages, we see that nationalism is strongest in Catalonia and the Basque Country—the two *richest* regions of the country. There is more to the story, it seems, than simply the existence of large, coherent, industrialized and aggrieved linguistic and cultural communities at the periphery translating directly into politically relevant outbursts of nationalism.

#### *Political and Institutional Analyses*

In response, a core group of social movement researchers has recently returned to political and institutional explanations of nationalist and social movement protest. This research often has at its heart the notion of “political opportunity structures” (POS), which McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly characterize as “the formal organizations of government and public politics, authorities’ facilitation and repression of claims-making by challenging groups, and the presence of potential allies, rivals, or enemies.”<sup>15</sup> The primary hypothesis is that these relatively stable features of the political environment fundamentally condition political behavior, and thus “significantly affect any polity’s patterns of contention.”<sup>16</sup> In recent tests applying this framework to the study of violent and non-violent nationalist contention, a strong role has been found for the impact of government repression, regime type, regional autonomy, and electoral systems.<sup>17</sup>

At the same time, researchers working in the rational choice tradition have begun to focus on the role that state structures and actions play in tactical group choices.<sup>18</sup> These studies have great

promise for increasing our comprehension of what pushes groups to choose between violent and non-violent approaches (e.g., Lichbach's "substitution effect"). Their focus is not, however, well suited to increasing our understanding of the overall magnitude of mobilization within a particular ethnic or national community. This points to a commonality in political-institutional studies thus far. Although the results provide insights into the effects of certain variations of regime type or institutional design, only with difficulty are we able to utilize their findings to predict variation in aggregate levels of ethnonationalist contention.

### **An Integrated Model of Ethnonationalist Contention**

In sum, both the structural grievance and group theories of the nationalism scholars and the political-institutional theories of the POS and rational choice scholars are by themselves inadequate as explanations of ethnonationalist conflict. The structural theories, on the one hand, are not very good at predicting the *form* of contention; the politics-centered analyses, on the other, are not well suited to predicting *levels* of nationalist activity. In other words, politics without structure is unable to explain why nationalism is present at a given level in any one community, while structure without politics cannot explain why the members of a community would favor non-conventional over conventional activity, or why, once non-conventional contention is adopted, violent versus non-violent action forms become predominant.

In effect, what is needed is a theoretical approach that can integrate these core factors by bridging the gaps among the literatures on social movements, domestic conflict processes, and nationalism. Such attempts have traditionally been rare, despite the fact that one of the fundamental reasons for which nationalist phenomena remain inscrutable is the failure of researchers to connect the relevant literatures.<sup>19</sup> Fortunately, in the 1990s a number of authors attempted to build a consolidated approach to domestic ethnopolitical conflict. Ground-breaking works by Gurr, then McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, and then Lichbach<sup>20</sup> provided important theoretical advances: the first via a synthesis of the relative deprivation and resource mobilization approaches, the second via an expanded, more all-encompassing political opportunity structure theory, and the last via an exploration of potential

syntheses between the rational actor and political opportunity structure approaches.

What these studies suggest is that the grievances and incentives of the deprivation school,<sup>21</sup> the community-level mobilizational capacity of the resource mobilization approach,<sup>22</sup> the opportunities of structural political opportunity theory,<sup>23</sup> and the identity of the nationalism literature<sup>24</sup> all play a critical part in the generation of ethnopolitical conflict.

This integrated approach proposes to address three key shortcomings in the literature. First, care must be taken to integrate political factors with the structural determinants fundamental to the rise of nationalism. It is precisely those socio-demographic and group factors, we argue, that drive the mobilization of the national community: a shared ethno-linguistic identity provides the foundation, community mobilizational resources furnish the means, and grievances lend the reason. In an integrated model, politics then becomes crucial in conditioning the political behavior of the mobilized groups.

We cannot stop there, however. An attempt to integrate structure and politics should also take into account the indirect or interdependent nature of several of the key variables. The above socio-structural features, for example, are only indirectly influential to contention via mobilization.<sup>25</sup> It is the conjunction of organizational mobilization and political opportunity structures that, in turn, directly impacts levels of violent and non-violent contention. Subsequently, the opportunity structures are themselves transformed by the nature of the contention that takes place. These relationships have nevertheless been obscured by a heavy reliance in the literature on single-equation, unidirectional OLS and MLE regression techniques. We would be better served by expanding our methodological repertoire to include the approach of those works<sup>26</sup> that have experimented with structural equation models to operationalize interactive explanations of ethnopolitical conflict processes.


Finally, our studies would yield greater understanding were researchers to look at the entire spectrum of non-conventional protest activities as being the products of a fundamentally similar set of factors. In so arguing, this study dissents from the program of research running back to Sharp<sup>27</sup> predicated on the fundamental distinctions between violent and non-violent

behavior. This study instead allies with the growing number of scholars<sup>28</sup> who have put faith in the theory-building potential of exploring the core similarities of violent and non-violent action. Though identical neither in form nor causal process, there are substantial similarities in the generation of both types of action.<sup>29</sup> The conceptual umbrella under which both action forms can be subsumed is the generic term “contentious politics,” which Tarrow takes to mean “collective activity on the part of claimants—or those who claim to represent them—relying at least in part on noninstitutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state.”<sup>30</sup> This term is favored, rather than “the familiar triad ‘social movements, revolutions, and collective action,’ not simply for economy of action, but because each of these terms connects closely with a specific subfield representing only part of the [relevant] scholarly terrain.”<sup>31</sup>

In sum, a growing body of research suggests an integrated approach toward nationalist contentious politics in which structure, politics, and action assume equal roles in an interdependent causal system. In this system, a powerful shared identity is seen as giving groups of people the *basis* for organizational mobilization. Mobilizational resources provide the *means* for such mobilization, grievances provide the *reason*, and political factors structure the *opportunities* of the mobilized groups to contend in a conventional, non-violent, or violent manner. At the same time, the political and contention variables are interdependent.<sup>32</sup>

These relationships are portrayed graphically in Figure 1. Each arrow in the figure represents an empirically tested hypothesis. To estimate this complete system of relationships concurrently, we utilize a three-stage least squares (3SLS) procedure. As depicted, the model contains four endogenous variables—mobilization, repression, regime change and contention. In the system estimated via 3SLS, each of these variables becomes the dependent variable in its own structural equation. All four equations (detailed in full below) are treated as integral components of an interactive system and are estimated simultaneously.

Consistent with our earlier arguments concerning the nature of “contentious politics,” the same set of determinants affects both violent and non-violent conflict, albeit in potentially different causal directions. For this reason, violent and non-violent contention will be tested separately.<sup>33</sup> Only by separating violent



**FIGURE 1** Integrated Causal Model of Nationalist Contention.

from non-violent activity can we test, for example, the different motivational impact of repression or regime type on protest or rebellion. Accordingly, there will be one system of structural equations with non-violent protest in the contention equation, and one with violent rebellion in that equation, as depicted in Figure 2.

### Data and Methods

To operationalize our theoretical reconciliation of the nationalism and social movement literatures, we utilize data on 130 ethno-national communities from 1990 to 1998 derived from the

	Protest System	Rebellion System
	Dependent variable	Dependent variable
Structural Equation 1	Open Mobilization	Militant Mobilization
Structural Equation 2	Repression	Repression
Structural Equation 3	Protest	Rebellion
Structural Equation 4	Regime change	Regime change

**FIGURE 2** Summary of systems and equations.



*Minorities at Risk* (MAR) and *Polity IV* data sets. Until recently, one of the essential limitations on theory building in prior research had been the paucity of appropriate data at the community level.<sup>34</sup> MAR has helped fill this void by providing cross-temporal group and conflict data on 275 ethnic and national communities throughout the world.<sup>35</sup> Because we are interested here in the determinants of contentious activity by mobilized groups of *nations*—a fundamentally different *political* animal than an ethnic group—in the present study we have restricted the analysis to those groups that are considered “national peoples.”<sup>36</sup>

### Equations

Below are the specifications of the four model equations in the protest and rebellion systems. Consistent with earlier-stated hypotheses, with the exception of minor differences in the contention equations, equations 3(a) and 3(b), the four equations are essentially the same for both systems.<sup>37</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Mobilization} = & \alpha + \beta\text{POP.} + \beta\text{SPATIAL CONCENTRATION} + \beta\text{COHESION} \\
 & + \beta\text{CULTURAL RESTRICTIONS} + \beta\text{LOST AUTONOMY} \\
 & + \beta\text{ECON/POL DIFFERENTIALS} + \beta\text{REPRESSION} \\
 & + \beta\text{REGIME CHANGE} + \varepsilon
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Repression} = & \alpha + \beta\text{PROTEST} + \beta\text{REBELLION} - \beta\text{REGIME TYPE} \\
 & - \beta\text{REGIME DURABILITY} + \varepsilon
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Protest} = & \alpha + \beta\text{OPENMOB} + \beta\text{REPRESSION} - \beta\text{AUTONOMY} \\
 & + \beta\text{REGIME TYPE} + \beta\text{REGIME CHANGE} \\
 & + \beta\text{PROTEST}_{t-1} + \varepsilon
 \end{aligned} \tag{3a}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Rebellion} = & \alpha + \beta\text{MILMOB} + \beta\text{REPRESSION} - \beta\text{AUTONOMY} \\
 & - \beta\text{REGIME TYPE} - \beta\text{REGIME CHANGE} \\
 & + \beta\text{REBELLION}_{t-1} + \varepsilon
 \end{aligned} \tag{3b}$$

$$\textit{Regime Change} = \alpha + \beta\text{PROTEST} - \beta\text{REBELLION} + \varepsilon \tag{4}$$

*Equation 1: Mobilization (OpenMob and MilMob)*

We have posited that mobilization into nationalist organizations is greatest in those ethnonational communities with the strongest identities, the most extensive levels of mobilizational resources, and the most intense grievances.<sup>38</sup> Two ordinal scales developed by the MAR team have been used to measure organizational mobilization: for the protest system, *OpenMob* taps community mobilization into legal, open organizations; while for rebellion, *MilMob* taps mobilization into militant, illegal organizations (see Appendix I for further elaboration of measurement techniques for all model variables).

Gurr has argued that, “the greater a people’s dissimilarity from groups with which they interact regularly, the more salient their identity is likely to be.”<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, we measure the strength of the ethno-national community’s group identity with *Cohesion*, an index (*ethdifxx* in the MAR data set) that measures the extent of differences based on language, custom, belief, and race between each minority community and the dominant ethnic group in the country. Though the literature posits a strong positive relationship between identity and mobilization, the results have been mixed in prior tests: Gurr and Moore found evidence of a positive impact of group identity on militant group mobilization, but Lindström and Moore, who used the variable in a composite index, found it had a negative impact on militant mobilization and no impact on open mobilization.<sup>40</sup>

Two MAR variables have been used to tap the second concept, community-level mobilizational resources: *Relpop* gauges the size of the national community relative to that of the overall country population, and *Spatial concentration* taps the geographical concentration of the national community. We should expect that, the larger and more spatially concentrated a community is—that is, the more extensive its mobilizational resources—the better able it will be to mobilize and organize its members.<sup>41</sup>

Effectively, the extent of mobilizational resources indicates a community’s generic “mobilization potential”—its capacity to mobilize community members in any social movement issue area. And when a community’s resources are viewed in conjunction with the strength of its identity, we acquire a good sense of its potential to organize specifically around nationalist issues. In

short, the conjunction of resources plus identity in a community represents its *nationalist* mobilization potential.

When this mobilization potential is activated by a heightened sense of collective grievances about lost autonomy, political and economic inequalities, cultural restrictions, and repressive government activities,<sup>42</sup> active mobilization into open or militant organizations is likely to occur. We have operationalized the first of these grievances with *Lost autonomy*, a seven-point ordinal scale in MAR that taps whether and to what extent the group has lost historical political autonomy privileges in the past. Scores on this composite index reflect the extent of historical privileges, the magnitude of the change in privileges, and the length of time since the privileges were revoked. *Cultural restrictions*, in turn, operationalizes restrictions on the group's apolitical cultural activities with a 12-point ordinal index based on the magnitude of policy restrictions in eight distinct cultural areas (education, etc.). Third, we utilized a composite variable, *Econ/pol.differentials*, that was derived from MAR indicators of inter-group inequalities in both the political and economic realms.<sup>43</sup>

*Repression*, meanwhile, is a composite indicator in MAR coded from a series of variables that measure restrictions on nine specific political activities of the ethno-national group. There is substantial evidence that regime responses to collective action—especially the mix of accommodation and repression—can ameliorate or exacerbate domestic and ethno-political conflict and incite mobilization among previously unmobilized populations.<sup>44</sup> There are, nevertheless, important nuances to these arguments. Tilly has proposed that repression will have a negative impact on mobilization insofar as it raises the costs of collective action.<sup>45</sup> Following Lichbach and others, we argue that repression will only have a negative effect on *open* mobilization. Not only will repressive measures tend to push activists away from open forms of mobilization towards more militant forms, but “repression will have a positive impact on the mobilization of groups already committed to a strategy of rebellion rather than protest.”<sup>46</sup>

Finally, there is now a sizable literature that explores the potential inflammatory impact of *regime change* (measured as the change in *regime type* score from the previous year) on the conflict process. One argument is that regime liberalization can appease contentious groups, hence lessening the motive for both

open and militant mobilization. Still, the counter-argument has received greater attention in the literature; namely, that political instability or regime change in any direction can engender the manipulation of ethnic and national identities by “ethnic entrepreneurs” and increase the likelihood of ethnic “outbidding” and “security dilemmas.”<sup>47</sup> In extreme cases, such as in the former Yugoslavia, these processes can lead to large-scale mobilization and conflict. In a more nuanced argument, Gurr posits that the instability and insecurity engendered by *democratic* regime change in particular can create a substantial transient increase in the opportunities for group mobilization.<sup>48</sup>

### Equation 2: Repression

In this equation we are concerned with the sources of state *Repression* (as described above) of the national group’s political activities. First, democracy has been found to be a major factor in states’ reliance on repressive measures. Overall, democratic states are less likely to utilize coercive techniques as a primary policy response to internal challenges.<sup>49</sup> *Regime type*, an indicator of the relative openness of the regime using Polity’s popular democracy-autocracy index, should therefore obtain a strong negative relationship with repression.

In addition, we suggest that consolidated states with established rules for contention and conciliation should be less likely to employ repressive measures against nationalist groups than newly established states. Accordingly, we expect a negative relationship between *regime durability* (a measure of the number of years since the last substantive change in regime type) and repression. Lastly, we posit that the state will be more likely to apply coercive means of social control in those regions with elevated levels of protest and rebellion. This hypothesis is in line with research in the past decade that has found a connection between levels of repressive activities and the internal challenges a states faces in the form of nonviolent dissent, ethnopolitical rebellion, and civil wars.<sup>50</sup>

Overall, this equation highlights the benefits of utilizing an interactive approach to examine contention. In fact, the repression—contention nexus is not uni-directional. Not only is repression a prime determinant of both mobilization and contention, but there is a feedback effect in which levels of

repression are themselves determined by existing levels of protest and rebellion.

*Equation 3: Contention (Protest and Rebellion)*

Ordinal-level indicators for *Protest* and *Rebellion* in the MAR data set are coded annually for each ethno-national group “based on actions initiated by members of the group on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those who claim to exercise authority over the group.”<sup>51</sup> In general, the *protest* indicator can be thought of as tapping non-violent activity, while the *rebellion* indicator taps violent activity. The one exception to this rule is with rioting, which is coded under *protest* due to the fact that the violence is not premeditated.

As depicted in Figure 1, we hypothesize that—in addition to the indirect and interdependent effects of the endogenous variables—levels of violent and non-violent contention are directly determined by a combination of mobilization and political opportunity structures. The literature points to a variety of ways of operationalizing those domestic political factors that expand the opportunities of groups to engage in ethnopolitical protest and rebellion.<sup>52</sup> Four discrete POS indicators are used here, several of which have a distinct impact on violent and non-violent contention, respectively.

First, there is an indicator of *regime type*, described above. The relationship between democratic institutions and contention is well established (see Powell<sup>53</sup> for an early discussion). As Gurr notes, the considerable “empirical comparisons made in the Minorities at Risk study show that national and minority peoples in contemporary industrial democracies face few political barriers to participation and are more likely to use the tactics of protest than of rebellion.”<sup>54</sup> Still, there is some suspicion that democracy is “a proxy variable for state preferences for policies of accommodation vs. repression”<sup>55</sup> and that, after controlling for the latter, the effects of democracy on rebellion will disappear. We argue, in contrast, that regime type has a direct impact on levels of protest and rebellion above and beyond its indirect impact via repression. A central tenet of POS theory, in fact, is that disparate political structures favor distinct forms of political behavior. In a democratic regime, social movement protest is often “normalized.”<sup>56</sup>

Claims-making is effectively channeled towards conventional and non-violent unconventional forms of expression. The opposite is true of autocratic societies, where societal pressures—to the extent they are not suppressed—are more likely to be expressed violently. *Regime type* should thus, as Rummel argues and Lindström and Moore found,<sup>57</sup> obtain a positive relationship with *protest* and a negative relationship with *rebellion*.

A counter-claim has been offered by a group of scholars<sup>58</sup> who argue that conflict is often higher in democratic states as a result of “ethnic outbidding.” According to this argument, electoral competition between elites for the support of members of the same ethnic community can result in attempts to outbid each other with inflammatory appeals to ethnicity, which can eventually lead to the weakening of democratic institutions and violent confrontations.

Repression also plays a central role in the generation of nationalist conflict. In the mobilization equation, we posited that repression leads to lower levels of open mobilization but higher levels of militant mobilization, as government coercion propels activists towards more covert forms of organization. For groups that are already mobilized, however, repressive government actions will only have the equal and opposite reaction of increased resistance—in the form of violent and non-violent contention.<sup>59</sup> *Repression* should thus obtain a positive relationship with both protest and rebellion.

*Regime change* has also been posited to affect contention in several ways. First, international relations-based rational choice scholars argue that radical change or instability in any direction in multiethnic states can result in an “ethnic security dilemma,”<sup>60</sup> wherein pre-emptive attacks result from the tendency of nationalist groups to view one another’s mobilization as threatening. Others have noted that it is particularly regime openings that appear to be associated with heightened ethnic and nationalist conflict.<sup>61</sup> A common qualification is that, because democratic regimes are better able to channel the increased opportunities for contention onto the path of non-violence,<sup>62</sup> regime openings should be associated with increases in non-violent but decreases in violent contention.

Fourth, the dichotomous variable *Autonomy* measures whether or not an ethno-national community officially has

political control over its defined territory. In a federal polity, such as Canada or Spain, the central governments have devolved a high degree of power to the political units controlled by regional ethno-national communities (like Québécois in Canada; Catalans and Basques in Spain). In these states, the communities' demands are at least partially incorporated into the conventional political systems; for this reason, non-conventional claims-making in the form of protest and rebellion should be reduced.<sup>63</sup> At the same time, there is some evidence for the counter-claim that autonomous federal arrangements increase nationalist conflict. Nordlinger, Snyder, and Roeder have each argued that, in a process similar to ethnic outbidding, the devolution of power can have the counter-intuitive effect of increasing demands for further autonomy by rendering it rational for politicians to make contentious appeals to nationality.<sup>64</sup> This is especially dangerous with "incongruent federalism," where the boundaries of the sub-federal political unit and an ethnic minority coincide.<sup>65</sup> In such cases, the existence of an autonomous region effectively provides a ready-made template for secession.

Finally, to control for potential temporal dependence, we have included a lagged version of protest and rebellion in the contention equation of the protest and rebellion system, respectively.

#### *Equation 4: Regime Change*

As with *repression*, the role of *regime change* is much better represented by a multi-directional 3SLS model than by standard uni-directional OLS models. Regime change, in short, is both a product of and producer of contention. The degree to which a regime opens or closes in any given year is posited as dependent on the amount of *Protest* and *Rebellion* that takes place. The precise nature of the relationship between contention and regime change is heavily debated. First, there is evidence that, far from being a negative development, protest and rebellion can in certain circumstances spur an authoritarian regime to democratize. Tilly<sup>66</sup> contends that confrontation is in fact one of the key "recurrent circumstances" that have throughout history led to the emergence of democratization—especially when it ends a mobilization–repression–bargaining cycle by facilitating the incorporation of excluded political actors. The findings of

Bratton and van de Walle on protest and reform in 16 African states support Tilly's hypothesis: "In some cases, governments are willing to embark on meaningful constitutional reforms only after protesters have proven the capacity to continue to press, and escalate, their demands."<sup>67</sup> Ekiert and Kubik<sup>68</sup> similarly found that mass mobilization and protest was a key determinant in the decision of Communist elites in Poland to initiate the democratization process.

There is a further set of arguments centered on the impact of protest and rebellion on the post-transition *consolidation* of democracy. On the one hand, there is the argument<sup>69</sup> that all political challenges must be channeled through the budding conventional democratic institutions if consolidation is to be successful. On the other, there is evidence from Eastern Europe that large-scale protest and mobilization was not a threat to democratic consolidation and that, in certain countries, it may have even fortified and accelerated the process.<sup>70</sup>

In the end, we posit distinct effects for protest and rebellion. While levels of non-violent protest will not adversely impact—and could possibly promote—regime liberalization, violent rebellion is more likely to have a negative, destabilizing impact on democratizing regimes. What's more, as hypothesized in the interactive model, it is possible that a "vicious cycle" could erupt, with rebellion leading to regime closings, regime closings leading to more rebellion, ad infinitum.

## Results

### *Three-Stage Least Squares Estimations*

Table 1 reports the results of the 3SLS estimations of the protest and rebellion systems of structural equations.<sup>71</sup> Within the protest system, only three, and in the rebellion system only five of the 20 right-hand-side variables in the four equations failed to produce statistically significant parameter estimates. These results present substantial initial confirmation of the theoretical model. Before summarizing the two systems as a whole, we will first examine the four equations individually for direct effects and then move on to discuss the most important indirect and total effects of the independent variables on protest and rebellion.



**TABLE 1** Structural Equation Models: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimations of Protest and Rebellion Systems

	Protest system (n = 1122)		Rebellion system (n = 1123)	
	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error
<b>Mobilization Equation</b>				
Repression	-0.58***	0.16	0.36***	0.09
Cohesion	0.14***	0.03	-0.02	0.02
RelPop	4.62***	0.76	1.47***	0.43
Spatial Concentration	0.36***	0.09	0.17***	0.05
Lost Autonomy	-0.72***	0.11	0.48***	0.06
Econ/Political Diff.	0.06*	0.03	0.12***	0.02
Cultural Restrictions	-0.08	0.11	-0.14**	0.06
Regime Change	2.53***	0.26	-0.69***	0.14
_cons	2.01***	0.40	-0.59***	0.22
<b>Repression Equation</b>				
Protest	0.93***	0.06	0.48***	0.03
Rebellion	-0.01	0.02	0.15***	0.02
Regime Type	-0.13***	0.01	-0.10***	0.01
Regime Durability	-0.004***	0.00	-0.004***	0.00
_cons	0.04	0.11	0.55***	0.08
<b>Contention Equation</b>				
Mobilization	-0.04*	0.02	0.05	0.08
Repression	0.51***	0.03	0.18***	0.03
Regime Type	0.10***	0.01	0.01	0.01
Autonomy	-0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06
Regime Change	-0.36***	0.09	-0.07	0.10
Contention <sub>t-1</sub>	0.37***	0.03	0.80***	0.04
_cons	0.52***	0.08	-0.09	0.07
<b>Regime Change Equation</b>				
Protest	0.38***	0.05	0.08*	0.05
Rebellion	-0.18***	0.02	-0.31***	0.03
_cons	-0.15	0.11	0.58***	0.10

\* p ≤ 0.1.

\*\* p ≤ 0.05.

\*\*\* p ≤ 0.01.

*Mobilization Equation*

The first equation in the model deals with mobilization. The results in Table 1 support the hypothesis of militant and open mobilization being the product of a conjunction of grievances, repression, and group structural and identity characteristics. They

also highlight that two distinct conglomerations of variables lead to open and militant mobilization, respectively.

In the open mobilization equation (protest system), first of all, we can see that all three of the group identity and mobilizational resource variables achieve significance in the hypothesized direction. Substantively, a one-unit increase in group identity leads to a 0.14 unit increase in mobilization, a one-point increase in a group's proportion of the population leads to a 4.62 unit increase in mobilization, and a one-unit increase in spatial concentration leads to a .36 unit increase in mobilization. What is immediately apparent is the relatively weak impact of cohesion and spatial concentration on mobilization as compared to relative group size. For example, a group must increase its level of cohesion seven points on a nine-point scale and increase three out of four possible points on the spatial concentration scale to effect a one-unit increase in the level of open mobilization. In contrast, ethnonationalist groups with populations one percentage point above the sample average of 8.3% of their state's relative population—such as the Catalans in Spain, the Kurds in both Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinians in Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Quebecois in Canada—are associated with medium- to high-level mobilization as compared to low mobilization (i.e., on average a move from approximately 3 to approximately 8 on the 12-point open mobilization scale).

Three of the four grievance variables similarly exhibit a significant impact on open mobilization. As expected, political and economic differentials are positively, if weakly, associated with mobilization for protest. *Repression*, meanwhile, showed a strong, negative relationship with open mobilization, where a one-unit increase on the eight-point repression scale is associated with a .58 unit decrease in mobilization. This pattern is as expected. Like political and economic inequities, repression creates a sense of grievance that incites greater mobilization. However, illustrative of its additional role as a central component of the POS, state repression often directs this increased mobilization potential towards more violent forms of mobilization. It is also plausible that an analogous form of "substitution effect" is at work with the *lost autonomy* variable, which unexpectedly obtains a strong, negative relationship to open mobilization (a one-unit increase on the

six-point lost autonomy scale is related to a .72 point decrease in mobilization). In effect, besides genocide or expulsion, a loss of autonomy is the strongest grievance that can be wrought on a national group. It would thus not be surprising if groups stripped of their autonomy would resort, not to open mobilization, but to mobilization for violent rebellion (*milmob*) in their quest to regain lost political rights. Lastly, we see that Gurr's prediction of a positive relationship between regime change and mobilization is correct. This test shows that the greater the extent of democratic regime change in any one year, the greater the mobilization for protest.

Turning to the militant mobilization equation (the rebellion system), we can see that a distinct pattern of relationships emerges compared to the protest model. As expected, the measure of relative group size (*relpop*) is positively associated with militant mobilization. However, the relationship between population and mobilization in the rebellion system is shown to be much weaker than in the protest system, even given the smaller range of the militant mobilization scale. Next, the positive parameter estimate for *spatial concentration* shows that, the more concentrated a group is geographically, the greater its association with mobilization for rebellion. If a group is dispersed, it is much more difficult to mobilize for either protest or rebellion. Interestingly, the indicator of the strength of group identity (*cohesion*) is not significantly associated with militant mobilization. Despite frequent popular arguments that ethnic distinctiveness should be one of the most powerful determinants of ethnonationalist political behavior, the results here instead suggest—bolstered by recent evidence<sup>72</sup> that ethnic distinctiveness was unrelated to secessionist and irredentist claims-making—that the “primordialist” accounts of ethnonationalist behavior may not be so strong as commonly thought. In addition, when both the size of the coefficients as well as the relative ranges of the mobilization variables are taken into account, it becomes apparent that all of the group structure and mobilizational variables exhibit weaker relationships with militant (i.e., rebellious mobilization) than with open mobilization (i.e., protest mobilization).

On the other hand, grievances such as lost autonomy and economic and political differentials performed equally or more

strongly in the rebellion system, and *repression* had the expected incendiary and equally strong effect upon militant mobilization. These findings support our hypothesis that aggrieved national communities will have a higher disposition to organize for militant contentious actions. Of the grievance variables, only *cultural restrictions* failed to achieve a positive relationship. When viewed with this variable's non-significant results in the protest system, it seems possible that such restrictions do not generate sufficient feelings of resentment to incite a national community to either overt protest or covert militant activities. Finally, *regime change* shows an ameliorative impact—the more a state democratizes in any given year, the less likely it is to generate militant mobilization among its ethnonational minorities. Specifically, each one-unit increase on the 21-point democracy scale is associated with a 0.69 unit decrease in mobilization for rebellion.

In sum, the results strongly support the hypothesis that both militant and open forms of mobilization are the products of a conjunction of regime change, mobilizational resources, repression, and grievances. Just as important, however, is the finding that each of these key factors has a distinct impact on the generation of militant and open mobilization, respectively. While *militant* mobilization is more likely to occur in states moving away from democracy by larger, geographically concentrated national communities that suffer lower levels of cultural restrictions but higher levels of political repression, lost autonomy, and economic and political inequalities, *open* mobilization is more prevalent within democratizing states by larger, more ethnically distinct, geographically concentrated communities that suffer economic and political inequalities but low levels of repression and lost autonomy. In effect, there are potentially “substitution effects” at play with three different factors—repression, lost autonomy, and regime change. On the one hand, higher levels of repression (the usual subject of “substitution effect” arguments) and lost autonomy lead to greater militant but less open mobilization. On the other hand, greater levels of democratization fuel increased open mobilization but decreased militant mobilization. These findings point to an interesting set of plausible relationships. Specific designs to test these potential effects in subsequent investigations would prove interesting.

*Repression Equation*

The findings for this equation are particularly robust. In both models, political repression is associated with higher levels of protest and autocracy and lower levels of regime durability. Furthermore, higher levels of rebellion are related to higher levels of repression. The results hence support theoretical expectations: contention generally breeds repression; at the same time, more durable and more democratic regimes are somewhat less likely to resort to repressive measures in dealing with ethnonationalist conflict. However, this effect is weaker than expected, with an eight- to ten-point jump in the democracy scale and 250 years of regime durability being associated with a one-unit decrease in repression. In essence, the limited magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the impact of regime is a matter of kind rather than degree—only ethnonationalist groups in the most durable states and strongest democracies can expect to see markedly decreased levels of repression.

*Contention Equation (Protest and Rebellion)*

The protest and rebellion equations model contention as a function of mobilization and political opportunity structures. As with the mobilization equations, the results indicate important differences between protest and rebellion. *Protest*, first of all, is impacted by both *repression* and *regime type* in a positive direction. These results lend ample support to the POS thesis. Repression creates a strong incentive for mobilized groups to contend (a two-point increase on the repression scale leads to a full-point increase in protest). In addition, strongly democratic regimes are shown to be more “open” to non-violent protest. This is why we observe higher levels of openly contested, non-violent protest among nationalist communities that suffer repression in democratic regimes.

The results are surprising with the next two variables in the equation. *Autonomy* was found to be insignificant while *mobilization* has a negative, significant relationship with *protest*. With autonomy, it is plausible that group incorporation

into the conventional political system does little to mitigate ethnopolitical contention. For mobilization, however, the finding is curious, and there is no immediate explanation other than the obvious one that much of the non-violent contention could be spontaneous.<sup>73</sup> The findings for regime change also did not conform to expectations, though in a more fortunate way. In contrast to predictions, democratizing regimes are less likely to generate greater levels of protest. In effect, though regime change plays a very important role in leading to greater mobilization of ethnonational communities, it does not necessarily directly lead to increased nonconventional protest by those communities.

Turning to the rebellion model, the results once again demonstrate the key role of political repression, along with an absence of significance for the other POS and mobilization indicators. The repression of militant activities, it seems, is only likely to make the problem worse. The pernicious impact of repression is even more apparent when its overall role in the model is examined. In both the violent and non-violent systems, repression is highly robust: it consistently generates greater protest and rebellion, has a significant impact in increasing militant mobilization, and is itself the product of protest, rebellion, autocracy, and regime fragility.

Mobilization, especially when accompanied by high levels of repression, should be more likely to result in rebellious contention. Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that mobilization is not a significant indicator of levels of violent contention. Levels of autonomy were likewise found to lack an association with rebellion. Consequently, it remains unclear whether political devolution ultimately ameliorates or exacerbates<sup>74</sup> the conflict process.

Similarly, in a direct manner both *regime change* and *regime type* were found to be insignificant. With regards to regime change, it may be suggested that openings do not guarantee that a rebellious group's demands will be met. Once a group turns to violent rebellion, it takes much more than a relaxing of political authority to appease the insurgents. With regime type, on the other hand, we expected a strong negative relationship with rebellion (i.e., the more democratic, the less rebellion). Instead, the relationship was found to be insignificant.

*Regime Change Equation*

In the theoretical model the extent and direction of regime change is a direct product of the magnitude of violent and non-violent contention. The results demonstrate that, far from being a destructive political force, primarily non-violent protest activities are associated with regime openings. This is especially the case in the protest system where, for example, a move from the average level of symbolic resistance to large demonstrations is associated with a one-unit increase in the level of democracy. These findings thus lend ample support to arguments<sup>75</sup> that large-scale mobilization is not necessarily detrimental to successful democratization. The opposite is true, however, of violent rebellion. Rebellious activities are associated with moves toward autocracy. Violence is unlikely, in other words, to be the spark that ignites a process of democratization.

*Indirect and Total Effects*

In addition to the direct effects described above, there are several important indirect relationships in the protest and rebellion systems that need to be considered before this model of ethnonationalist contention can be fully understood. Of special importance in the protest system are the direct and indirect roles that repression and regime change play in affecting contention. In addition to its important direct effect (0.51), repression affects protest indirectly through mobilization (0.023). While this indirect effect is minor, the total effects (direct + indirect) of repression on protest (0.53) clearly point to its role as the most important inflammatory variable in the system.<sup>76</sup> The indirect role of regime change through mobilization is also noteworthy (-0.101), contributing to a total -0.46 unit dampening effect of democratization on protest.

For the rebellion system, repression also clearly plays the strongest direct role in provoking contention. In addition, regime type plays an important *indirect* role in mitigating rebellion. At first glance, the lack of a significant *direct* effect of regime type on rebellion seems puzzling. However, we suggest that this lack of a relationship with rebellion makes theoretical sense—and supports the POS argument—for several reasons. First of all, when

viewed in conjunction with the results of the above repression equation (where regime type had a strong negative association with repression), this finding lends support to the hypothesis that regime type is a proxy for repression. However, we argued for a more nuanced interpretation of the association of regime type to contention. Unlike with protest, democracies are *not* more open to violent rebellious activities than autocracies. Rebellion will be equally anathema to democracies as it is to autocracies. All regimes, therefore, will attempt to discourage rebellious activities. With rebellion, the crucial difference between democracies and autocracies comes in the *response* to rebellion: the latter are more likely to resort to repressive measures. For this reason, the *indirect* relationship between regime type and contention (via repression) obtains. Indeed, when the effects of regime type are filtered *through* repression, we find that a one-unit increase in regime type is associated with a slight (0.018 unit) decrease in rebellion. At the same time, since democracies are more open to non-violent protest activities, regime type is also *directly* linked to levels of protest activity. This is an important finding. In the future, scholars should consider this possible distinction between violent and non-violent contention when investigating the democracy-contention connection.

### Implications and Conclusions

The significance of the overwhelming majority of the variables in each of the two systems illustrates that structure, politics, and ethnonationalist contention are as predicted three fundamental components of an interdependent causal system. The results thus lend strong support to the integrated approach. This paper posited that group cohesion, grievances, and socio-demographic and economic structural conditions are vitally important to the development of ethnonationalist protest, but indirectly via mobilization. The direct and indirect determinants of protest and rebellion are a conjunction of political opportunity structure variables. In brief, a shared ethno-linguistic identity gives groups of people the *basis* for organizational mobilization; mobilizational resources give them the *means* for such mobilization (especially with regard to protest); grievances provide the *reason* to mobilize; and a series of political factors structure the *opportunities* of



the groups to contend in a conventional, violent or non-violent manner. Furthermore, in a manner that would be impossible to demonstrate using single-equation regressions, the findings confirm that the relationships among structure, politics, and action are interactive in determining both violent and non-violent protest activity.

The results also support the hypothesis that, though violent and non-violent contention derive from distinct processes, they are the products of a fundamentally similar set of determinants. Indeed, whether one is interested in protest or in rebellion, these five factors should be considered: *grievances*, *mobilizational resources*, *group identity*, *organizational mobilization*, and *political opportunity structures*. As the above results show, key elements of each of these five explanans play a significant role in the generation of either one or both forms of contentious behavior. In effect, the generic factors that determine whether ethno-national communities are host to violent or non-violent action are often the same. The difference comes in the precise mechanism by which the variables affect protest versus rebellion.

In short, the results further substantiate our belief that violent and non-violent ethnonationalist behavior can be theoretically and empirically linked by an all-inclusive framework of “contentious politics.” When contention is viewed via this overarching lens, we acquire a better sense of the overall causal picture of contention in ethno-national communities—not only in terms of *levels* of action, but also in terms of *forms*. For example, the model sheds light on the community-level structural factors that undergird the “substitution effect” hypothesized to take place in individual organizations. Though not directly tested, the evidence suggests that, as the contextual factors surrounding a community change, organizations acting within that community may begin to substitute violent for non-violent forms of behavior, or vice versa. The end result, for the community as a whole, would be a transformation in its overall ratio of violent to non-violent behavior.

Previous literature has failed to adequately point out these linkages between violent and non-violent forms of political contention. What we have effectively presented herein is a theoretical framework that allows for a better understanding of the causes of and connections between aggregate levels of violent and

non-violent behavior in ethno-national communities. The result is a synthesis of the literatures on nationalism, conflict processes, and social movements that will aid in the comprehension of ethnonationalist protest politics.

An integral component of this synthesis was the notion of political opportunity structures, which were shown to play a significant direct and indirect role in the generation of ethnonationalist conflict. As we have argued, POS is not a single concept that can be labeled “open” or “closed.” It is instead a cluster concept that comprises several distinct features of the political environment. In this study we have operationalized five POS variables—repression, regime type, regime change, regime durability, and group autonomy—four of which have a unique and important impact on political behavior.

To begin with, repression exhibited an array of highly robust direct and indirect impacts on both the violent and non-violent conflict processes. Beyond its direct positive relationship with both protest and rebellion, repression also intensifies and conditions political behavior by leading to lower levels of open mobilization yet higher levels of militant mobilization. This is to be expected: if open contention becomes restricted, group members have but two choices—acquiescence or going “underground.” It is natural that groups often choose the latter.

The results were equally engaging with regards to regime type. One of the most encouraging discoveries is that democratic regimes are more successful in mitigating the worst effects of nationalist conflict. While democracies generally contain higher levels of non-violent conflict, they do not bear witness to increased rebellion. The most substantial benefit, however, is indirect: democracies are less likely to resort to repressive measures of social control than are autocracies. Considering the strong positive relationship that repression has with both violent and non-violent contentious activity, it is clear that democratic states are less likely to generate conditions that lead to a “cycle of violence.”

The proposition that regime type has both a direct and indirect effect on contention has thus been substantiated, with one crucial modification: regime type is not directly relevant to rebellious activities. Instead, it has merely an indirect impact via repression. What could explain this difference between protest and rebellion? POS theory provides a compelling reason:

democratic regimes are by their nature more open to legal and semi-legal *non-violent* unconventional protest. For this very reason, contentious groups in democratic societies will be more likely to engage in non-violent activities in the first place. At the same time, neither democracies nor autocracies are open to violent contention. There should hence be no direct relationship between regime type and rebellion.

The results were equally engaging with regime change. Though democratization is associated with increased levels of open organizational mobilization, democratic regime change does not impact levels of violent rebellion and is associated with decreased militant mobilization and lower levels of protest activity. Neither regime openings nor closings, ostensibly, incite large-scale contention among peripheral national groups. This is encouraging for transitional societies—they evidently have less to fear from political liberalization than previously thought. When viewed together with the findings for regime type, we have evidence that, over time, the positive effects of democracy on conflict should more than outweigh the partially negative, yet transitory, impact of transition to democracy. Autocratic states should for this reason be strongly encouraged to liberalize their regimes.

Governments might also seek to ameliorate conflict via policies directed at the core grievances of contentious communities, which indirectly drive protest. In confirming the interdependent nature of regime change and contention, the findings further suggest that liberalizing governments should make every effort to avert the development of violent rebellion within their borders. The reason is clear: rebellious ethnonationalist contention is associated with regime closings. Non-violent protest, conversely, is not—lending credence to the belief that protest has become normalized in today's post-industrial, "social movement societies."<sup>77</sup>

In the end, given such an array of indirect and interdependent relationships, any government would be wise to consider the far-reaching and unintended consequences of its actions. Nowhere is this clearer than with repression, the effects of which—uniformly negative—are felt throughout the conflict process. Repression is first and foremost associated with higher levels of both non-violent protest and violent rebellion. And since rebellion is associated with regime closings, governments should recognize that repression is indirectly associated with moves

towards autocracy. It is plausible that coercive state measures could inadvertently activate a “vicious cycle,” with repression inciting mobilization and rebellion, rebellion leading to regime closings, with authoritarian regimes leading to more repression, *ad infinitum*. States wishing a peaceful resolution to their troubles should therefore think twice before resorting to repression—or they may just find themselves victims of such a pernicious, yet “unintended” spiral of violence.

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### Notes

1. Mark I. Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 31 (1987), pp. 266–97. See also Will H. Moore “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42 (1998), pp. 851–73 and Will H. Moore, “The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44 (2000), pp. 107–27.
2. Christian Davenport, “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1995), pp. 683–713.
3. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
4. As noted, the analytical focus is on the level of contentious activity within entire national *communities* (or groups), such as the Basques, rather than on the activities of specific nationalist *organizations* (e.g., ETA) acting within those communities. A national community is not a homogeneous entity; there can be numerous organizations—each with distinct strategies and goals—operating on behalf of the community at any given time. The community-level study conducted here focuses on the determinants of the aggregate of these organizations’ contentious actions.

5. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1954).
6. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
7. See, among others, Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969), Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition (New York: Verso, 1991), Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), and Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 19 (1993), pp. 211–39.
8. For example, see Joseba Zulaika, *Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1988).
9. Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 16 (1993), pp. 370–89.
10. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1970).
11. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). See also Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond."
12. Milica Zarkovic Bookman, *The Economics of Secession* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
13. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975).
14. See among others, Joane Nagel, "The Ethnic Revolution: The Emergence of Ethnic Nationalism in Modern States," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1984), pp. 497–520; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; and Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
15. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "To Map Contentious Politics," *Mobilization*, Vol. 1 (1996), p. 24.
16. *Ibid.*
17. See, among others, Kurt Schock, "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40 (1996), pp. 98–133, Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Stephen M. Saideman, David Lanoue, Michael Campenni and Samuel Stanton, "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis from 1985–1998," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2002), pp. 103–29.
18. Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation?" See also Moore, "Repression and Dissent" and Moore, "The Repression of Dissent."
19. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, "To Map Contentious Politics."
20. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly; and Mark I. Lichbach, "Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the Structure-Action

- Problem of Social Order,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 401–24.
21. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*.
  22. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.
  23. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
  24. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.
  25. For example, Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). See also Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41 (1997), pp. 1079–1103.
  26. Ronald A. Francisco, “The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39 (1995), pp. 263–82; Ronny Lindström and Will H. Moore, “Deprived, Rational or Both? ‘Why Minorities Rebel’ Revisited,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 23, (Winter 1995), pp. 167–90; Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion.”
  27. Gene Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston, MA: P. Sargent, 1973).
  28. See, among others, Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation,” Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion, and Moore, “The Repression of Dissent.”
  29. See Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*.
  30. Sidney Tarrow, “Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90 (1996), p. 874.
  31. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics,” p. 17.
  32. The theoretical model presented in this article is derived from the first author’s work. A test of nationalist conflict in Spain (Gregory D. Saxton, “Structure, Politics, and Ethno-Nationalist Convention in Post-Franco Spain: An Integrated Model,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41 (2004), pp. 25–46) is based on a similar model.
  33. This is consistent with much MAR-based research (e.g., Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni and Stanton) and Gurr’s original expectations: “Both forms or strategies of action are assumed to be driven by the same general processes, but it is anticipated that independent variables will have somewhat different influences on each. This implies . . . estimating the parameters of each separately” (in Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion,” p. 1089).
  34. Much of the large-N research on nationalism has used data sets (particularly the *World Handbook*) in which the conflict variables are secondary and the unit of analysis is the country, not the ethnonational community. This is particularly inefficient in those countries—such as Spain—where there is more than one ethnonational community.
  35. *Minorities at Risk* provides outstanding coverage of the universe of politically mobilized ethnic and national communities. MAR could not possibly catalogue, on the other hand, the almost infinite number of always changing “potential” groups throughout the world—that is, those that have not undergone at least some initial politicization of their social identities or

- taken minimal steps towards recognizing or acting on their ethnicity. This means, for example, that Quebecois in Canada and Hawaiians in the United States are included, but “Newfoundlanders” and “Southerners” are not. In effect, the data set is designed to test hypotheses connected to ethnic and national groups that are already politically mobilized.
36. MAR includes information on 275 communities divided into one of six categories: (1) ethnonationalists, (2) national minorities, (3) indigenous peoples, (4) religious sects, (5) ethno-classes, and (6) communal contenders. In *Peoples versus States*, Gurr considers “the most basic distinction” to be between the first three types, which he calls “national peoples” (n = 152), and the last three, which he refers to as “minority peoples” or “ethnic groups” (n = 123). We included all 130 national peoples (in 76 different countries) for which complete data were available. In order to allay concerns about the validity of the MAR categorizations, we also ran the analyses with all 275 groups included. There was no substantial change in the results and, in fact, overall findings were slightly more positive for the theoretical model. Our decision to exclude the 123 ethnic groups is, nevertheless, unchanged. We created the model to deal specifically with national peoples, and we agree with Calhoun in “Nationalism and Ethnicity” and Gurr in *Peoples versus States* that there are fundamental differences between national and ethnic minority communities, not only concerning size, primacy, and territoriality, but more importantly with regards to political legitimacy, state policy responses, and political goals, tactics and strategies. A more generalized explanation of racial, ethnic and nationalist conflict would require modifications to the theoretical model.
  37. As a convention, when we refer to the “protest system,” we are referring to the system of four structural equations that are associated with protest. When we refer to the “protest equation,” we are referring only to the protest equation within the protest system. The same convention applies to rebellion.
  38. See Lindström and Moore, “Deprived, Rational or Both?,” and Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion,” and Gurr, *Peoples versus States*, among others.
  39. Gurr, *Peoples versus States*, p. 68.
  40. See Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion,” and Lindström and Moore, “Deprived, Rational or Both?”
  41. Gurr, in *Peoples versus States*, also cites these variables as two of the primary factors influencing group capacity for mobilization. Lindström and Moore found that a composite measure comprising group size and spatial concentration obtained positive relationships with both open and militant mobilization. Saideman and Ayres (Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, “Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 62 (2000), pp. 1126–1144), meanwhile, found that group population and spatial concentration had positive relationships with secessionist (but not irredentist) claims-making by ethnopolitical groups in the 1980s.
  42. See Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Gurr, *Peoples versus States*; Lindström and Moore, “Deprived, Rational or Both?” and Gurr and Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion,” among others. *Repression* acts as one of the most important grievances

- of nationalist groups and, on account of its ability to constrain and condition political behavior, as a central component of the political opportunity structure. Restrictions on cultural activity, on the other hand, do not serve this dual purpose. Instead of constraining the formulation or expression of political demands, *cultural restrictions* merely create a grievance that can potentially be exploited in the mobilization of group members.
43. The two indicators measure two distinct concepts, yet were—most surprisingly—highly correlated (Pearson's  $r = 0.59$ ). Rather than exclude one of the measures (or include them both and risk having them cancel each other out), we have included the composite variable, *Econ/Pol Differentials*, created by summing a group's scores on the political and economic differentials indices in the MAR data set.
  44. For example, see the following: Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation;" Francisco, "Coercion and Protest;" Gurr and Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion;" Moore, "Repression and Dissent;" Moore, "The Repression of Dissent;" Beissinger; Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Gurr, *Peoples versus States*; and Matthew Krain, "Contemporary Democracies Revisited: Democracy, Political Violence, and Event Count Models," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1998), pp. 139–64.
  45. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.
  46. Gurr and Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion," p. 1084.
  47. For an overview, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization*, Vol. 54 (2000), pp. 845–77. See also Phillip Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics*, Vol. 43 (1991), pp. 196—232, Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol. 35 (1993), pp. 27–47, and Susan Olzak and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, "Status in the World System and Ethnic Mobilization," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42 (1998), pp. 691–720.
  48. Gurr, *Peoples versus States*.
  49. See especially Dipak K. Gupta., Harinder Singh and Tom Sprague, "Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1993), pp. 301–39, Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (1994), pp. 853–72, Davenport, "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression," and Sabine C. Zanger, "A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977–93," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2000), pp. 213–33.
  50. See the following: Davenport; Francisco; Gurr and Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion;" Moore, "The Repression of Dissent;" Poe and Tate; and Zanger.
  51. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk Dataset* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 1999).
  52. In an early overview, Tarrow (Sidney Tarrow, "National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 14 (1988), pp. 421–40, found that the most common POS variables were (1) regime type and capacity, (2) regime stability, (3) elite divisiveness,



- (4) repression, and (5) the presence of enemies and allies in the social movement sector. The last of these has proven difficult to operationalize in quantitative studies. The other four concepts have been successfully incorporated into the present analysis: the first via *regime type*, the second (and indirectly the third) via *regime change* and *regime durability*, and the fourth via *repression*. In addition, we have included a POS variable used in recent studies (Beissinger; Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni and Stanton) that is specifically relevant to nationalist political behavior—the extent to which regional nationalist actors have political autonomy.
53. G. Bingham Powell, *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982).
  54. Gurr, *Peoples versus States*, p. 84.
  55. Gurr and Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion," p. 1082.
  56. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century* (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
  57. Rudolph J. Rummel, *Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Lindström and Moore, "Deprived, Rational or Both?"
  58. See A. Rabushka and K.A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1972), Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," *International Security*, Vol. 21 (1996), pp. 108–38, and B. Pfaffenberger, "Ethnic Conflict and Youth Insurgency in Sri Lanka: The Social Origins of Tamil Separatism," in J. Montville (ed.), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1991), pp. 241–58.
  59. See, for example, David R. Davis and Michael Ward, "They Dance Alone: Deaths and the Disappeared in Contemporary Chile," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1990), pp. 449–75, Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, and Krain, "Contemporary Democracies Revisited."
  60. Posen, "The Security Dilemma." See also Stephen M. Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secession and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1998), pp. 127–50.
  61. See especially Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1993), pp. 18–38, and Jack Snyder, *When Voting Leads to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York, NY: Norton Books, 1999).
  62. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*; Meyer and Tarrow, *The Social Movement Society*; Gurr, *Peoples versus States*.
  63. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).
  64. For example, see Snyder or Roeder. See also Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 29. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972).

65. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
66. Charles Tilly, "Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization," *CIAO Working Papers* (Lazarsfeld Center, Columbia University, 1999), <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/tic12/index.html>.
67. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1992), p. 420.
68. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1999).
69. For example, see Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski, *Economic Reforms in New Democracies* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
70. See Ekiert and Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society*, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, "Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989–93," *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (1998), pp. 547–81, and John K. Glenn, "Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown: The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia," *Social Forces*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (1999), pp. 187–211.
71. The order conditions for identification of the protest and rebellion systems are met and suggest that all of the individual equations, and consequently both of the systems, are overidentified. In addition, within the protest and rebellion systems, the rank of the mobilization equation is 6, the rank of the repression equation is 10, the rank of the contention equation is 13, and the rank of the regime change equation is 8. Since each of these ranks is greater than the minimum rank necessary for identification (i.e., 3), we find that the system is also rank identified. Proof of order and rank conditions is available upon request.
72. Saideman and Ayres, "Determining the Causes of Irredentism."
73. Two previous studies (Lindström and Moore, "Deprived, Rational or Both?" and Gurr and Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion") had found a positive association between mobilization and contention, though only the former tested nonviolent protest.
74. Lijphart, in *Democracy in Plural Societies*, argues that political devolution ameliorates the conflict process, while Nordlinger, as well as Snyder, argue that it can engender the opposite effect.
75. See, among others, Ekiert and Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society*, Ekiert and Kubik, "Contentious Politics in New Democracies," Glenn, "Competing Challengers" and Tilly, "Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization."
76. The interpretation of the coefficients (i.e., the direct effects) in the individual equations is the same as with OLS, where a one-unit increase in X corresponds to a coefficient change in Y. With 3SLS analyses we can also derive the indirect effects and the net total effects (i.e., direct plus indirect impacts) of the endogenous variables. For example, in Table 1, the equation for deriving the net total effects of repression on protest is  $0.53 = (0.51) + (-0.58) \times (-0.04)$ , with the first term the direct effect and the second the indirect effect through mobilization.

77. Meyer and Tarrow, *The Social Movement Society*.
78. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk Dataset*.
79. *Opmob* and *Milmob* were measured in the MAR data set at two points—once for the 1980s, and once for the 1990s (1990–1995). We have extended the 1990s scores of these variables to 1998. While levels of mobilization will fluctuate to a certain extent over time, they should be considerably more stable than rates of contention, for instance. As a precautionary measure, the entire analysis was run restricting the data to the 1990–1995 period. Only two minor differences appeared. In the protest system, *culres* was an insignificant determinant of mobilization; and in the rebellion system, *protest* was found to be an insignificant predictor of regime change. All other variables were the same in terms of both sign and significance to what is reported in Table 1.
80. Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Dataset* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2002).

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## Appendix I: Measurement of Variables

Except where otherwise noted, all variables were constructed from information available in the MAR data set.

### Group Structure and Mobilizational Resources

#### *Relative Group Size* (Rel pop)

*Rel pop* (*gpro98* in MAR) measures a group's size as a proportion of the total country's population (1998 estimate). Though the data set contains population estimates for 1990, 1995, and 1998, the principal investigators feel that "the 1995 and 1998 estimates

should be considered more reliable.”<sup>78</sup> On account of the proximity of the two reliable indicators, only the latest and most valid is used here.

#### *Group Spatial Concentration* (Spatial Concentration)

*Spatial concentration* (*groupcon* in the MAR data set) is a measure of a group’s spatial distribution. Values range from 0 (“widely dispersed” group) to 3 (a group that is “concentrated in one region”). MAR coders provided, in 1999, one score for each group for the entire range of the analysis (1990–98).

#### *Strength of Group Identity* (Cohesion)

*Cohesion* (*ethdifxx* in MAR) is an index that measures the extent of differences based on language, custom, belief, and race between the ethno-national community and the dominant ethnic group in the country. Ranges from 3 to 11.

### **Grievances**

#### *Lost Autonomy*

*Lost autonomy* (*autlost* in MAR) is an index of potential grievances based on the loss of historical political privileges. Measured annually. If a group has never lost autonomous political rights or undergone a transfer of control from one state to another, then its value is 0 (“no historical autonomy”). For all other groups, a score from 1 to 6 is given taking into consideration the following factors: (1) the extent of prior autonomy, (2) the magnitude of the loss of autonomy, and (3) the time elapsed since the loss. For all groups in this test that experienced such a loss, the loss occurred in the past. All values are therefore constants over the time period under investigation.

#### *Political and Economic Differentials* (Econ/Pol Differentials)

*Econ/pol differentials* was created by summing scores on two MAR variables, *poldifxx* and *ecdifxx*. The first of these, *poldifxx* (Political Differentials Index) is a seven-category scale with values from -2 (“advantaged group”) to +4 (“extreme differentials”) that

measures inter-group differentials in political status and positions. *Ecdifxx* is analogous, except it pertains to the group differentials in the economic arena. MAR coders provided, ex post facto, one score for each group for the entire range of the analysis (1990–98).

#### *Extent of Cultural Restrictions* (Cultural Restrictions)

*Cultural restrictions* (*culres* in MAR) is a composite index derived from scores on eight discrete indicators concerning the extent of policy restrictions on the group's activities in the following areas: (1) religious observance; (2) language instruction; (3) speaking and publishing in the group language; (4) cultural events (celebration of group holidays, ceremonies, etc.); (5) dress, appearance, or behavior; (6) marriage and/or family life; (7) organizations that promote the group's cultural interests; and (8) all other types of cultural restrictions. *Cultural restrictions* is coded biennially for the period 1990–95 (i.e., MAR coders measured *culres* once for the period 1990–91, once for 1992–93, and once for 1994–95), and annually from 1996 to 1998. Values range from 0 to 8.

### **Mobilization**

#### *Open and Militant Mobilization* (Open Mob & Mil Mob)

*OpMob* and *MilMob* were coded twice for each group in the MAR data set.<sup>79</sup> *Opmob* ranges from 0 to 12; *Milmob* from 0 to 8. Higher values indicate greater levels of mobilization into open and militant organizations, respectively.

### **Political Opportunity Structures**

#### *Regime Type*

*Democracy–Autocracy* from the Polity IV data set.<sup>80</sup> This indicator measures the relative openness of political competition. Calculated annually from 1990 to 1998. The range is from –10 to +10.

### *Regime Change*

This variable measures the extent of regime change from one year to the next. It is derived from the *regime type* variable described above, using the following formula:

$$\text{Regime Change} = \text{Regime Type}_{[t]} - \text{Regime Type}_{[t-1]}$$

The possible range of values is from  $-20$  to  $+20$ ; the actual range is from an extreme closing of  $-14$  for Niger in 1996 (i.e., 1996 compared to 1995) and Sudan in 1989, to an extreme opening of  $+16$  for Panama in 1990.

### *Regime Durability*

This variable ( *durable* in the Polity IV data set) is a running count of the number of years since abrupt regime change, as measured by a 3-point change or greater in the country's *Regime Type* score.

### *Autonomy*

This indicator is based on two variables from the Minorities at Risk data set. If a group has attained some measure of political autonomy (in the form of federalism, etc.) then the year it was granted that autonomy is coded in *autgain*, while the extent of that autonomy is coded in *autpow*. To create *autonomy* (measured annually), we combined these two variables by giving a group a score of 0 for each year it had yet to attain any amount of autonomy, and a score of 1 for each year it was at least partially autonomous. By the beginning of the period under investigation (1990), 44 out of 152 groups had achieved some measure of autonomy; this increased to 57 groups by 1998. This means that the remaining 95 groups receive a score of 0 for each year from 1990 to 1998.

### *Repression*

The source for this variable is the political restrictions index (*polres*) contained in the MAR data set. The calculation of the variable was performed biennially from 1990 to 1995 (see *cultural*

*restrictions* for coding rules) and annually from 1996 to 1998. The index was created by summing scores on nine other indicators that tapped political restrictions on: (1) freedom of expression; (2) freedom of movement; (3) rights in judicial proceedings; (4) organizing; (5) voting rights; (6) police and military recruitment; (7) civil service access; (8) access to higher office; and (9) other restrictions not included above. Values in each of these nine indicators ranged from 0 (“not significantly restricted for any group members”) to 2 (“activity prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all group members”). Values for *repression* range from 0 to 8, with higher values indicative of higher levels of restrictions on political activity.

### **Dependent Variables: Protest and Rebellion**

#### *Contention (Protest and Rebellion)*

The MAR data set includes ordinal-level scales for the protest (*prot*) and rebellious (*rebel*) activities of all ethno-national communities. Values are coded based on the highest observed level of protest and rebellion in each year from 1990 to 1998 and are not cumulative.

*Protest:* (0) none reported; (1) verbal opposition; (2) symbolic resistance; (3) small demonstrations (demonstration, rally, strike, and/or riot, with less than 10,000 people participating); (4) medium demonstrations (same categories as “3,” with participation less than 100,000); and (5) large demonstrations (more than 100,000 people).

*Rebellion:* (0) none reported; (1) banditry, scattered terrorism; (2) terrorist campaigns; (3) local rebellions; (4) small-scale insurgency; (5) medium-scale insurgency; (6) large-scale insurgency; (7) protracted civil war.