

states would band together to form IGOs rather than the conditions under which states will join existing IGOs or the conditions under which new accessions are allowed (for exceptions, see Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1998).

We believe that this final figure could also provide support for the argument of Kahler (1992), who suggested that multilateralism does not have to suffer from collective action problems. Kahler argued that institutional design, among other mechanisms, can serve to blunt the free-rider problem and allow larger multilateral institutions to be effective. Presumably, if the growth in IGO size were a hindrance to the performance of the organization, one would see a plateau effect in the average size of IGOs, yet Figure 1.6 shows this is not the case. Of course, given our data, we cannot speculate on whether institutional design is the explanation for this increasing size of IGOs. We can say, however, that the size of universal organizations continues to rise, while the number of universal IGOs continues a steady, if slow, increase (see Figure 1.5).

Scholars are also increasingly aware of the fact that the web of IGOs is composed of institutions that are quite heterogeneous. For example, IGOs have different institutional structures, different levels of autonomy from the member states, and different purposes as defined by issue area. This issue is especially important as we move toward theorizing about the amount of influence IGOs have on state behavior. If we hypothesize that now all IGOs are equally likely to affect international relations, then an appropriate test of these positions requires data that differentiate among these formal institutions.

Notes

1. Each UIA yearbook contains a classification system of IGOs with 12 categories. One of these categories (IGO-E) is composed of IGOs that are considered emanations of other IGOs.
2. The UIA only allows one classification code per organization. Thus, once an organization dies it becomes a type "H," regardless of its prior classification.
3. Independent emanations are coded beginning from their date of independence. The UIA yearbook notes when these shifts from emanation to independent organization take place.
4. To ensure that these were not artifacts of UIA coding procedures, we double-checked the status of these deceased organizations in post-2000 UIA *Yearbooks*.
5. We add a caveat to our discussion of IGO growth rates and the decline in the number of IGOs by reminding the reader that we have excluded emanations. Given that most new IGOs are those created by other IGOs (see Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996) and are not included in our data set, it is possible that what Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate is the changing institutional form of IGOs rather than any fundamental trends concerning their existence. Still, such an answer would not explain the decrease in the IGO population unless one assumes the functions of state-created IGOs and emanations are substitutable. That is, if the number of ema-

nations continues to rise while IGOs decline, this suggests that IGOs themselves are making comparatively more decisions than nation-states concerning what institutions will be formed.

6. For discussions of IGO birth places, see Feld and Jordan (1994, 16–21) and Archer (1992, 15–33).
7. We followed the COW classifications for regions with one slight modification: Oceania was combined into the Asian region.
8. For example, Africa has seen a number of competing economic blocs emerge, such as the Economic Community of West African States, Central African Economic and Monetary Union, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Common Market, and the Southern African Customs Union.
9. There have been multiple attempts to create an African Common Market, but these have been largely symbolic. To date, no substantial integration of the competing blocs has been achieved.
10. Examples include the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMA), and the European Astronaut Centre (EAC).
11. Another explanation for the expansion of these organizations could lie in changing definitions of the regions themselves. While we have chosen to define regions from a strictly geographic perspective, Katzenstein and Hemmer (2002) reminded us that conceptions of regions need not be fixed in time. They argued that regions are social and cognitive constructions that vary according to the perspective of the actors. Thus, one explanation for the rise of cross-regional organizations is that states may reconceptualize their home "region," which may not comport with their physical region (see Polelle, 1999).
12. Only states that are system members in 1965 and 2000 are considered in this table.

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reflects two distinct phenomena. First is the position of new states in the world system. Recently independent states are rarely "born" with a series of IGO memberships. Many of the states in Table 1.3, therefore, were recently independent at the time of observation. For example, in the 2000 sample, Palau, Nauru, and Tuvalu were all within two years of joining the United Nations as internationally identified states. The same can be said of St. Kitts and Nevis (1983) in 1985 and of Gambia and the Maldives, both of which were independent as of 1965. The second reason for inclusion in Table 1.3 is status as a pariah or controversial state. Taiwan, whose independence is hotly contested in diplomatic circles, has been denied entry to many international organizations, while North Korea has refused to join many IGOs.

Table 1.4 lists the states that have experienced the largest amount of change in their IGO membership portfolio in the past thirty-five years.¹² States on the left side of the table, many of which fall into the "pariah/controversial" category, are those gaining the fewest memberships. Most of these states start with few memberships and end with few memberships, suggesting that the international community (or at least influential actors in the international community) has attempted to keep these states on the sidelines. Only one of these states, Yugoslavia, greatly increased its membership portfolio, only to suffer a reversal. Prior to the Bosnia war, Yugoslavia was a member of fifty-five IGOs, but by the mid-1990s, this number had dropped into the thirties. Several states in the "high change" category of Table 1.4 have attempted at various points to become active in the international community. Zimbabwe, Algeria, Russia, and China each joined a host of international organizations to no doubt signal new domestic policies or to gain international legitimacy after a regime change at home. Finland's position as the biggest "joiner" over this period (and to a lesser extent Spain's presence in the list) is somewhat anomalous since its IGO activity

Table 1.4 Changes in IGO Memberships, 1965–2000

Low change	High change
Taiwan (+3)	Finland (+57)
Yugoslavia (+4)	Cameroon (+54)
Laos (+14)	Zimbabwe (+54)
Afghanistan (+15)	China (+52)
Vietnam (+16)	Russia (+50)
Burma (+16)	Togo (+50)
	Spain (+50)
	Venezuela (+50)
	Algeria (+50)


Note: Mean change = +37.

shifted from moderate to high (note its presence in the 2000 List of Most Integrated States).

The final snapshot of the IGO data we present examines a mix of the state- and IGO-level data by examining trends in the size of IGOs over the period of observation. Figure 1.6 shows the number of state members in IGOs, with and without universal IGOs included in the data. What this figure makes quite clear is that not only are there increasing numbers of organizations in the world system, but those organizations are progressively larger. Whether one examines all organizations or nonuniversal ones only, the trend is quite strong: the average number of members has climbed steadily since 1965. This trend is expected for universal organizations since, as the number of states in the system increases, so do the number of eligible members of these organizations. This finding is more surprising for regional and cross-regional organizations, however. If one purpose of creating a regional organization (versus joining a large, universal organization) is to keep transactions costs lower, one would expect regional organizations to stay relatively small in size. Yet the average IGO size continues to creep higher.

This graph also provides some insight concerning the declining growth rate of IGOs. Note that at the same time that more states entered the international system, the average size of IGOs rose, suggesting that rather than creating new organizations, new states joined existing organizations. Surprisingly, most theories of international organizations discuss why in

Figure 1.6 Average Size of IGOs, 1815–2000



Notes

1. See J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "International Government Organizations and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1964," *International Organization* 24 (1970): 520-547.
2. For a definitive comparison, see Leland Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United Nations," *International Organization* 1(1947): 3-21.
3. Ernst Haas, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organization* 20 (1966): 36-379.
4. Harold Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence*, 2nd edition (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 11-13.

1

International Governmental Organizations

*Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom,
and Kevin Warnke*

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have become an increasingly ubiquitous part of international relations. Regardless of one's beliefs regarding the efficacy of IGOs, their presence cannot be ignored in the modern international system. Whether in the halls of the policy community or the academy, IGOs are often a focal point of discussion and debate. . . .

In this article we preview a new data set of IGO data that extends the previous Correlates of War (COW) IGO data from 1965 to 2000. In combination with the existing COW data, this new data set will capture state membership in individual IGOs from 1815 to 2000. This article is not meant to analyze any particular theoretical debate within international relations, but rather to familiarize the reader with the [international organizations] as well as to highlight some of the major descriptive trends in the data. . . .

Defining an IGO

The broadest understanding of what constitutes an IGO is that the organization (1) is a formal entity, (2) has states as members, and (3) possesses a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or permanent staff. The first component of this definition simply posits that IGOs must be formed by an internationally recognized

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treaty. The second and third elements of the definition exist to help distinguish IGOs from other forms of international institutions. IGOs are differentiated from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) based on the fact that the latter organizations' memberships are composed of individual persons, interest groups, or businesses. The existence of a secretariat or permanent bureaucracy helps distinguish IGOs from ad hoc conferences. . . .

This broad definition creates two additional issues for any researcher attempting to identify the population of IGOs in the international system. One issue is *how many* states must be involved in order to qualify an institution as an IGO. Many sources, including the Union of International Associations' (UIA) *Yearbook International Organizations*, require at least three state members (also see Feld and Jordan, 1994; Luard, 1988; Archer, 1992) to qualify as an IGO. . . . Because much of the literature on IGOs has converged to the three-state definition, we have adopted this convention as well. In our search for new IGOs, moreover, we found very few bilateral IGOs that met the other criteria. Thus, this coding decision should have very little impact on the content of the data set.


A second important issue arises when attempting to identify the population of IGOs, namely, the manner in which an IGO is created. The basic definition offered above states that an IGO must begin with a treaty signed by the member countries. Most new IGOs in the post-1965 period, however, were not formed by the treaty process. Many IGOs—known as emanations—are formed by extant IGOs as opposed to being formed by states. This issue was addressed by Wallace and Singer (1970) when they argued for the exclusion of confederations of IGOs and treaties administered by other IGOs. Wallace and Singer primarily based their argument on the idea that emanations are not independent of the IGOs that created them. . . . We agree with this assessment.

In general, we relied on the UIA's classification of which IGOs were emanations.¹ We altered the UIA coding of an emanation in three types of cases. In the first set of cases, we found that a number of IGOs classified as "international financial institutions" by the UIA are actually emanations (for example, the Commonwealth Equity Fund or the Nordic Project Fund). A second set of IGOs excluded as emanations were previously classified as "deceased" organizations by the UIA.² A final set of IGOs were included if they began as an emanation but eventually gained their independence from their parent organization.³ These coding criteria yield state membership data for 495 international governmental organizations for the 1815 to 2000 time period.

The Data

We begin our overview of the data with several systemic examinations of the population of IGOs from the 1815 to 2000 period. Figure 1.1 presents

Figure 1.1 IGOs in the World System, 1815–2000



the time series of the total number of IGOs in the world system. Beginning around 1865, the growth rate of IGOs in the world system has been fairly steady. According to this view of IGOs there have only been three downturns in IGO growth rates: The period of World War II, the 1960–1965 period, and the current post-1996 period. The first downturn is easily explained: during World War II, many IGOs failed to meet the criteria for inclusion, since Germany had occupied most of the organizations' members. Some organizations ceased operations during this period as well.

The 1960–1965 downturn results from a combination of two factors. First a number of IGOs died during this period because of decolonization. Several African organizations that were populated by European colonial powers came to an end after African states gained their independence and chose not to continue the organizations (e.g., the African Postal and Telecommunications Union). The second factor is an increase in missing data in 1965. We were unable to find 1965 membership information for some IGOs in the original COW sample, yet in later years we could confidently code their membership. This increase in missing IGO data also accounts for part of the downturn in IGO numbers for this period.

The final downturn is surprising. In the late 1990s, the termination rate for IGOs rose quite markedly. We can find no systematic explanation for this downturn in the growth rate. The deceased IGOs vary widely by region, issue area, and state membership. IGOs ranging from the Nordic Economic Research Council to the African Petroleum Producers Association to the Arab Centre for Medical Literature met their demise in

the 1996–2000 period.⁴ One possibility is that many IGOs were deemed to be ineffective and thus were disbanded (Feld and Jordan, 1994), yet this begs the question of what explains the timing of this disbanding. Why is there a reason to believe that IGO deaths will not be randomly distributed over time? We return to this issue below.

The general growth trend in IGOs is similar to Wallace and Singer's findings from their earlier investigation of the data. Their own conclusion was that the growth of IGOs followed an exponential distribution (Wallace and Singer, 1970, 280–281). This was based on an initial slow increase in the birth rate of IGOs, then a precipitous increase in the post-World War II period. Wallace and Singer designated four distinct periods of IGO growth: 1815–1874, 1875–1914, 1915–1944, and 1945–1964.

In Table 1.1, we replicate the Wallace and Singer growth rates with the new version of the data, adding two periods: 1965–1989 and 1990–2000. We calculate rates of change over five-year periods in order to directly compare our data with Wallace and Singer's findings. The resulting numbers indicate the average number of IGO births over each five-year interval within the period. There are slight changes in our values versus Wallace and Singer since we dropped some of their IGOs in the new data set.

If one examines the 1815–1989 period, the Wallace and Singer conclusion of an exponential rate of increase holds true. Between 1965 and 1989, the rate of increase in the number of IGOs continued to climb from an average of nearly twenty-six every five years to an average of over thirty every five years. This increase drops precipitously to fourteen by the end of the data set.

This decline is an especially interesting puzzle not only because the rate of increase has slowed, but also because the number of IGOs is actually declining. Wallace and Singer (1970, 284) predicted such a downturn in the growth rate of international organizations over thirty years ago: "The most reasonable forecast might be for a decreasing rate of growth into the

Table 1.1 Average Rates of IGO Creation

Period	Wallace and Singer [version 1.1]	Version 2.0
1815–1874	0.58	0.36
1875–1914	4.89	4.22
1915–1944	6.20	4.14
1945–1964	27.50	25.75
1965–1989 ^a	—	30.40
1990–2000 ^a	—	14.00

Notes: a. Measured in five-year increments, except for 1985–1989


1980s and a nearly total cessation of growth by the early 21st century." While the declining growth rate of IGOs did not materialize until the early 1990s, their general prediction proved quite prophetic.

In their prediction of a declining IGO growth rate, Wallace and Singer (1970, 282) contended that the decline in the number of new nation-states would place a ceiling on the expansion of IGOs in the world system since "unless there is a sharp upsurge in successful secessionist movements, the system's size is unlikely to exceed 160."

Figure 1.2 shows this trend in the number of states juxtaposed against the time series of the number of IGOs in the international system. In the post-1965 era, the number of IGOs has risen far faster than the number of states. While the population of states has experienced a steady, moderate increase, IGOs have increased exponentially. These trends suggest that while Wallace and Singer correctly predicted the downturn in the IGO growth rate, one of their explanations may not be accurate. Because states have continued to join the international system, one would expect the trendline for IGOs to continue to increase as well. Yet, the downturn in the number of IGOs in the late 1990s belies this prediction.

In addition, it is clear that for most of the post-1965 era, the state-to-IGO rate increased. Wallace and Singer certainly presumed that given the pre-1965 ratio of new states to new IGOs, a slowing of state growth would lead to a large slowing of IGO growth, yet at the increasing post-1965 ratio, the slowing of IGO growth would be far more gradual. This last

Figure 1.2 States and IGOs in the World System, 1815–2000




point, in fact, makes the downturn of IGOs in the late 1990s even more anomalous. In the end, what we can be sure of is that there are other factors that account for current trends in the number of IGOs besides the number of nation-states in the world system.⁵

Figure 1.3 provides another snapshot of the rate of change for IGOs in the world system. Note that the relatively smooth, secular increase in the number of IGOs masks a surprising amount of variance in the birth and death rate of IGOs. This point was first noted by Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1996) in their two-panel (1981, 1992) investigation of IGOs, yet this larger data set allows us to make this point more forcefully. For example, examining yearly birth and death rates from 1965 to 2000 shows that, on average, slightly over two IGOs died each year, while over seven IGOs were created each year. Clearly, a tremendous amount of variance exists below the aggregate picture presented in Figure 1.1.

One can identify several phases of birth and death during this period.⁶ The turn of the century brought a spike in the number of IGO creations, mostly to deal with interstate financial issues (Feld and Jordan, 1994, 6–17). Likewise, the end of World War I saw the creation of many IGOs concerning postwar settlements and the management of colonial resources. A number of IGOs failed in this period as well. A number of institutions died in the initial years of World War I as well as in the later years of the interwar period, as European cooperation broke down on a variety of issues.

These first surges in the population of IGOs, however, are relatively

Figure 1.3 Birth and Death Rates of IGOs, 1815–2000



small compared to the explosion in IGO population in the immediate post-World War II period. These post-World War II institutions were formed by a wide variety of actors, including Western financial, trade, and security institutions and mirror-image Soviet-bloc institutions. In addition, many metropolises set up regional institutions for their colonial holdings in the immediate postwar years in Africa, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. Interestingly, these institutions partially account for the large number of IGO deaths and births in the 1960s. As decolonization progressed, these institutions were often cast aside, but in many cases re-formed independently of the colonizers. Many of the births and deaths of 1960 can be attributed to this dynamic.

Finally, the birth rate of IGOs in the post-1965 period is fairly steady until the mid-1990s, when it drops to only a small handful per year. The small surge in IGO births in the early 1990s is the result of former Eastern bloc states re-forming smaller IGOs to replace Soviet-led institutions. The death rate stayed quite low until the end of the Cold War, when the decline of the Soviet bloc institutions clearly increased the number of failed IGOs. This failure rate persisted, however, into the 1990s and thus accounts for the downturn in the overall number of IGOs in the final years of the data set. Again, we leave this question of the increasing death rate of IGOs for further research.


Although there are a host of various classifications to devise for different types of IGOs, a common system is to code the geographic scope of their membership. For example, Nierop (1994), Nye (1987), and Feld and Jordan (1994) classified organizations largely based on their member states region (see also Keohane, 1990). To this end, we have coded each IGO according to a three-part criteria based on its membership: universal, regional, or cross-regional. Although Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1996) created a different three-category criteria (regional, universal, issue-oriented), because these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive (one can find issue-oriented regional organizations such as the Desert Locust Control Organization of East Africa), we alter their classification system.

Regional organizations were classified as such if *all* of their members were from a particular geographic region.⁷ Universal organizations were coded as those IGOs placing no geographic or other restrictions on membership. The final category, cross-regional, consists of interregional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and commodity cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as well as social and political organizations limited to certain types of states (e.g., the NonAligned Movement and the Commonwealth). Nye (1987, 7) has described these types of organizations as “quasi-regional,” yet because of their ubiquity in the post-1965 period, we treat them as a separate category.

When examining only the regional organizations, interesting patterns emerge when comparing IGO populations across regions. Figure 1.4 shows IGO patterns in five geographic regions. Given the highly interdependent and integrated nature of European society, one would expect Europe to lead the way in total number of IGOs. In fact, some empirical studies have noted that Europe contains the most shared linkages via organizations (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998, 443). The data shows a different pattern of regional IGO growth, however. While Europe does contain the most IGOs for many of the early years of the data (owing to the fact that the vast majority of independent nation-states in this period were European), as of the early 20th century, the Americas surpass Europe in this regard. With the downturn in European IGOs during the World War II period, the Americas continue to lead in the number of organizations. This is due largely to the high number of independent inter-American organizations that later are absorbed by the Organization of American States.

From 1965 to the early 1970s, Europe again maintains the highest number of IGOs of any region, yet surprisingly, Africa surpasses Europe in the early 1970s. For the remainder of the time period, Africa maintains the most international organizations of any region. This is counterintuitive given past research that has shown that high levels of literacy rates and per capita income are good predictors of state membership in IGOs (see Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996; Pevehouse, 2003). Moreover, while major wars may be relatively rare in Africa, widespread cooperation seems

Figure 1.4 Regional IGOs, 1815–2000



relatively uncommon (see Clapham, 1996). Still, why does Africa seem to contradict the empirical pattern previously established concerning memberships in IGOs?

There are several possibilities. First, because there are more nation-states in Africa during much of the post-1965 period, there are simply more opportunities for IGOs to form, while simultaneously allowing for smaller organizations. Thus, African states may individually belong to fewer organizations, yet the higher number of states allows for more organizations to exist at the regional level. A second, related cause could be that there are more competing blocs within Africa. Again, this leads to more organizations, each with a smaller number of members.⁸ There is little cooperation between these blocs and few prospects for them to converge into a single economic community.⁹ The implication is that more IGOs exist, yet without cooperation and overlap between African IGOs, states will have fewer individual memberships in organizations. A third possible factor driving this finding may be found in the realm of African domestic politics. Research on African foreign policy has suggested that because many African states have weak institutional structures, African leaders feel they must cooperate at an interstate level in attempting to achieve their goals (Clapham, 1996). The final possible explanation returns to the previous discussion of our treatment of emanations. Many of the emanations not coded in our data are European organizations with ties to the European Union, Council of Europe, or the European Free Trade Association.¹⁰ Once the IGO data set includes emanations, one could develop a definitive answer to this question.

Finally, we note that the Asian and Middle East regions are relatively sparse in their IGO levels compared to the other three geographic regions. Although both regions experienced significant gains in the number of IGOs over the past thirty years, they still lag significantly behind Europe, Latin America, and Africa. The lack of IGOs in Asia has received some attention in the scholarly literature, but there is no agreed-upon reasoning about the lack of multilateral institutions in that region. For example, in his review of multilateral security institutions, Friedberg (1993) noted that, unlike Europe, Asia is quite heterogeneous in terms of regime type. If common regime types are more likely to join regional institutions, this is one explanation for the lack of IGOs in the region (for evidence on regime type, see Russett and Oneal, 2001, 214–216, and Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002). In addition, Friedberg (1993, 19–21) noted that Asia has lower levels of trade interdependence due to differing development policies, regional disputes, and in some instances, fear of Japanese dominance in the trade realm. This slower growth of regional integration and unsettled territorial disputes has no doubt slowed the growth of regional institutions.

The final two geographic classifications are universal and cross-


regional organizations. Figure 1.5 compares these two types of non-region-specific IGOs. In the post-World War II era, the number of cross-regional IGOs grew dramatically. In many cases, these were natural resource-related groups and commodity cartels such as the Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries or the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. With the rise of cross-border and cross-regional trade, monetary, and environmental issues, these organizations have expanded dramatically.¹¹

Unlike cross-regional organizations, however, the pattern of universal IGOs seems to have reached a plateau. While the number of large, multilateral organizations has expanded throughout the period of observation, the growth rate has slowed to a crawl since the end of World War II, especially compared to other regionally oriented organizations. Given the enormous expense and transaction costs of supporting universal organizations, it is possible that states prefer to form and support smaller regional or cross-regional organizations. Since the possibility of free-riding is less likely in smaller organizations, states could be hesitant to launch large, universal organizations. We return to the size issue below.

State Membership in IGOs

So far, we have examined the data from a systemic perspective, treating IGOs as the unit of analysis. Our data also allows one to view state-level

Figure 1.5 Universal and Cross-Regional IGOs, 1815–2000



trends concerning IGO membership. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the least and most integrated states in IGOs across three different years of the new data. Interestingly, European states lead the way in their membership in IGOs, with France consistently maintaining membership in the most organizations. Data such as these are likely the cause for the perception that European states are enmeshed in the densest web of IGOs. This finding, in combination with Figure 1.4 (showing Africa with the highest number of organizations), adds credence to our previous hypothesis that the nature of competing organizations in Africa has given rise to a large number of organizations with little in the way of overlapping membership. In short, African states seem to need more organizations than Europe to accomplish their goals. For Europe, although there are fewer organizations, states there are very active "joiners," as is evidenced by Table 1.2.

Table 1.3 lists those states that are the least integrated in the world system of international organizations. This list contains more variation, as it

Table 1.2 Most Integrated States, 1965, 1985, 2000

1965	1985	2000
France (79)	France (110)	France (128)
Netherlands (73)	West Germany (97)	Germany (108)
Belgium (70)	Netherlands (96)	Italy (106)
United Kingdom (69)	United Kingdom (95)	Netherlands (106)
Italy (68)	Belgium (95)	Belgium (105)
West Germany (67)	Denmark (92)	Spain (104)
Denmark (58)	Italy (90)	United Kingdom (102)
USA (57)	Sweden (86)	Denmark (102)
Norway (55)	Spain (86)	Sweden (102)
Sweden (55)	Norway (85)	Finland (101)

Table 1.3 Least Integrated States, 1965, 1985, 2000

1965	1985	2000
North Korea (2)	Taiwan (7)	Taiwan (7)
Maldives (3)	North Korea (13)	Palau (12)
Taiwan (4)	Albania (13)	Andorra (13)
Zimbabwe (6)	Brunei (14)	San Marino (16)
North Yemen (9)	St. Kitts and Nevis (15)	Tuvalu (16)
Gambia (9)	W. Samoa (16)	Nauru (17)
Mongolia (11)	Bhutan (16)	Kiribati (19)
Singapore (11)	Mongolia (17)	Liechtenstein (20)
Nepal (13)	Solomon Islands (18)	Marshall Islands (20)
Albania (13)	Vanuatu (20)	Micronesia (22)