Comparative Party Models: Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy

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The objective of this essay is to develop the two basic party models mentioned in the introduction to this section: the Rational-Efficient model and the Party Democracy model. These are two extreme, polar-opposite formulations found in the literature on political parties; they may be considered as endpoints of a continuum along which real-world political parties range. (Figure 1 suggests how several actual political parties might be located along this continuum. The objective of this essay is, however, theory and not a characterization of specific parties.) It is well worth the effort involved in enumerating the sharply differing attributes of these two party models, since scholars of political parties usually operate from one or the other (often implicitly rather than explicitly). Seldom are alternative models identified and systematically contrasted.¹ Futhermore, both models involve potent value premises concerning what political parties should be like which significantly affect the research and analysis that is done.² Thus a discussion of

¹The most notable exception to this generalization is the contrast between the professional and amateur organizational models in James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Also helpful was the comparison of the cadre and mass parties in Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), Chapters 3 and 9. See also John D. May, “Democracy, Party ‘Evolution,’” Duverger,” Comparative Political Studies, 2 (July, 1969), 216-48.

²Schlesinger admits: “How one defines party organization depends as much upon one’s value judgments about the function of parties as upon formal definitions.” Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 204.
the attributes of these competing party models in terms of a common set of factors serves several purposes by: (1) systematically comparing and contrasting the two, thus hopefully aiding comparative analysis of political parties; (2) exposing the underlying value premises of each model; (3) linking the attributes of each model together in an integrated whole; and (4) indicating why proponents of each model are so critical of the opposing model.

The Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models will be systematically contrasted in terms of a common set of factors which are grouped into the following broad classes: (1) the role of parties in the political system or their system functions; (2) the manifest functions of political parties; (3) the salient structural properties of parties; (4) internal party processes; and (5) evaluative criteria. A table giving the specific attributes under each of the above factors will be presented at the beginning of each section. Pertinent quota-

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The geographical compartmentalization noted by Schlesinger (although he does not use our terms for the two party models) has been referred to in the Introduction to this section of the reader. See Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 765-66. See also Leon D. Epstein, "The Comparison of Western Political Parties," in Political Research and Political Theory, ed. Oliver Garceau (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 167-71. The proponents of the Rational-Efficient model tend to be American, and the Party Democracy model, European social scientists — with some exceptions. As can be seen clearly from Wilson’s treatment of the amateur Democrats, the club-movement party — the closest American equivalent of the European mass-membership party — is based on the Party Democracy model. The Responsible Party school or party reformers among American political scientists approach the Party Democracy model to varying degrees. On the other hand, Robert T. McKenzie may be considered a proponent of the Rational-Efficient model. See Robert T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1955). Nevertheless, the geographical-theoretical cleavage is still a sharp and enduring one, and one which hinders the comparative analysis of political parties.
tions and references illustrating most of the specific characteristics of the two party models have been drawn from the works of prominent proponents of each model. For the Rational Efficient model, these proponents include James Q. Wilson and Leon D. Epstein (in terms of their own orientations), Anthony Downs, and Joseph A. Schlesinger.4 Advocates of the Party Democracy model include Sigmund Neumann and Maurice Duverger. Illustrations of the Party Democracy Model are drawn from Wilson’s analysis of amateur Democrats and Epstein’s comments on the mass-membership party.5 The books by Wilson and Epstein are particularly central to this essay since we have here two Rational-Efficient theorists treating and critically evaluating party phenomena based on the Party Democracy model.

1. System Functions

It is essential to begin with a general consideration of the role assigned parties in the political system and their functions within the system, since it is at this point that a number of value judgments are made — often implicitly — from which specific party attributes derive. Involved here are one’s general conception of democracy and the importance of political parties in the political system.6 Epstein labels the two main conceptions of democratic theory the pluralist and majoritarian views, and he indicates how sharply different conceptions of party (in our terms, the Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models) derive from each:

What may be less clear is the relation of the loosely organized, unprogrammatic, and less cohesive American parties to democratic theory. The point is that these very characteristics allow parties to function in accord with a pluralistic conception of democracy. The characteristics are deplorable only from the standpoint of a majoritarian theory, which is at the heart of the preference, so


6Wilson, for example, raises questions about the desirability and feasibility of intraparty democracy and programmatic parties — a crucial differentiation between the Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models — and states: “The answers to these questions depend on one’s conception of the nature of democracy generally.” Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 342.
Table 1

Political System Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Attributes</th>
<th>Rational-Efficient Model</th>
<th>Party Democracy Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Basic conception of democracy</td>
<td><em>Pluralistic</em> — Party only one type of political actor.</td>
<td><em>Majoritarian</em> — primacy of party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Goal definition function</td>
<td><em>Instrumentalist view</em>: party not a main goal-definer; party defines goals to win elections.</td>
<td><em>Purposive view</em>: party a main goal-definer; party wins elections in order to implement goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Linkage function</td>
<td>Party only one of a number of linkage mechanisms.</td>
<td>Party is primary linkage institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Representative function</td>
<td><em>Brokerage role</em> of party. Division of labor: interest groups articulate interests, parties aggregate interests; affirmative view of interest groups.</td>
<td><em>Representational role of party</em>: parties both represent (articulate) and aggregate interests; hostile view of interest groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Governing function</td>
<td>Less extensive role of party.</td>
<td>Extensive, even dominant role of party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conflict resolution</td>
<td>Conflict viewed as disruptive; integrative, consensus-building role of party.</td>
<td>Conflict (within limits) viewed as creative; expressive role of party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Political change</td>
<td><em>Centrist</em> view of party as supporting status quo of moderate, consensual change.</td>
<td><em>Reformist</em> role of party as promoting more extensive change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Role of party in democratizing political system</td>
<td>Parties democratized by competition with each other and externally.</td>
<td>Internally democratic parties play primary role in democratizing political system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

often expressed by political scientists, for a large and strong party organization able to mobilize electoral support for programmatic policies to be enacted by a party serving as a governing agency.7

The Rational-Efficient model is thus consistent with a pluralistic conception of democracy, in which party is "downgraded" to be only one of a variety of competing political actors including inter-

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7 Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 351. (Emphasis added.)
est groups and the like. Epstein for example, is an admitted pluralist and is rather defensive about writing a book on political parties, which he considers important, but not vitally so. Epstein also supplies an excellent statement of the compatibility of the pluralist conception of democracy and what we have termed the Rational-Efficient party model—a characterization of the brokerage party which includes a number of the attributes of this model:

The pluralist’s party norm involves more than the avoidance of class consciousness in the older European socialist sense. It also involves a generally non-programmatic character, a leadership capable of responding to diverse electoral considerations, and a transactional or brokerage view of political activity. A party may still be associated with particular policies and interests, presumably in accord with habitual voting patterns of large portions of the electorate, but it preserves, in theory as in practice, a loose and accommodating character. Such a party, while having had patronage-seeking memberships in the past, does not usually have large numbers of program-committed members. The brokerage party, by its nature, is unattractive to members of this kind. And it does not have the need of a majoritarian party to legitimize, through mass-membership participation, any program or policies. For electoral purposes, which are of prime importance, a cadre organization suffices.

It is important to note that the leading proponents of the Rational-Efficient party model (Epstein, Wilson, Downs, Schlesinger, and Schumpeter) base their pluralist conceptions of democracy and the brokerage party on an economic analogy. The emphasis is on the competitive struggle in the political market-

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8This point is illustrated by Epstein's view of party activism (member participation): "But parties are only one kind of possible political participation, and by no means the most significant, especially in the United States... It is hard to say that these other forms of political participation [e.g., voluntary associations and nonpartisan community activity] are less functional in a democratic political system than purely party membership and party activism." Epstein, Party Politics in Western Democracies, pp. 357-58. (Emphasis added.)

9"On the contrary, it will be plain in much of this book that the pluralist conception of democracy is essential if there is to be a happy acceptance of my main interpretations of party development." Epstein, Party Politics in Western Democracies, p. 18.

10"What I have sought is a middle ground [between exaltation and condemnation] on which parties can be viewed as important but not overwhelmingly important political agencies." Epstein, Party Politics in Western Democracies, p. 8.

11Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 357. (Emphasis added.)
place, with political leaders viewed as entrepreneurs. Candidates for public office are the commodity, voters are the political consumers, and votes and influence are the medium of exchange. Issue positions and policy stands are part of the packaging, voter surveys are the equivalent of market research, and advertising and public relations techniques perform the same function in both the business and political arenas. Furthermore, politicians appear to hold voters in as low esteem as businessmen do consumers.\(^{13}\)

Schumpeter denies that political parties are—or need be—ideologically distinctive “for all parties will, of course, at any given time, provide themselves with a stock of principles or planks and these principles or planks may be as characteristic of the party that adopts them and as important for its success as the brands of goods a department store sells are characteristic of it and important for its success. But the department store cannot be defined in terms of its brands and a party cannot be defined in terms of its principles.”\(^{14}\)

Anthony Downs systematically adapts and applies economic theory to political parties;

Our main thesis is that parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. So as to attain their private ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products they believe will gain the most profits for the same reason.\(^{15}\)

Crucial to the application of the economic analogy to political behavior is the adoption of the “self-interest axiom”—i.e., winning office or other material gain is for the politician what the profit motive is for the businessman. Downs states: “Thus, whenever we speak of rational behavior, we always mean rational behavior directed primarily towards selfish ends. . . . Therefore we accept the self-interest axiom as the cornerstone of our analysis.”\(^{16}\)

\(^{12}\)If Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon consider the consumer a member of the firm, so do the voters, who stand in the same relationship to the candidates as do the consumers to the firm, may be considered participants in the election.” David M. Olson, “The Structure of Electoral Politics,” Journal of Politics, 29 (May, 1967), 360.

\(^{13}\)“The ignorance of voters is what makes party government possible.” Wilson, op. cit., p. 357. Even more candid expressions of contempt by the campaign technicians—advertising and media specialists—are found in Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident, 1969).


\(^{15}\)Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 295. See especially his first chapter, in which he states: “Thus our model could be described as a study of political rationality from an economic point of view” (p. 14).

In another classic formulation of the economic analogy, Wilson also applies the self-interest axiom; if anything, he goes further than Downs in differentiating between motivations or incentives for individual action and the social ends that these actions serve:

This [amateur] approach stands in sharp contrast to the actions of professional politicians who behave as if they believed that politics, like other forms of human activity, only occurs when individuals can realize their private aims and maximize their self-interest. Public policies are the by-product of political self-seeking just as the distribution of goods and services is the by-product of economic self-seeking. In both cases, the incentive for individual action is not the same as the ends served by the system as a whole. The social function of human action is not the reason that action was undertaken.\(^{17}\)

The value judgments contained in this conception of democracy and the functions of political parties — anti-policy, anti-member participation, and anti-intraparty democracy — are fundamental to a differentiation of the Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models. The above formulation of the Rational-Efficient model is undoubtedly more “realistic” as far as the actual behavior of most practicing politicians is concerned, but it suffers from a blind spot in the extreme pragmatic view that whatever works is good, that the ends justify the means.\(^{18}\)

Because of the important implications for a conception of party that follow from the pluralist conception of democracy, especially when based on an economic analogy, this formulation has received considerable stress. The competing conception of democracy upon which the Party Democracy model is based is less clear and explicit. Epstein terms this the majoritarian conception: “The first [model] is the majority rule theory. According to it, more than one-half of a community’s electorate may be mobilized to support a policy or set

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\(^{17}\)Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, p. 20. Wilson cites Schumpeter in support and notes that Downs makes a concession in his “social welfare function.” The concern involved in differentiating between individual motives and social (community welfare-public interest) ends is to make politicians seem not too crassly opportunistic, materialistic, and selfish by denying that the one (individual motives) is incompatible with the other (social ends), thus reversing the old adage to read: “Doing good by doing well.” Schlesinger also subscribes to the self-interest axiom: “The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician’s behavior is a response to his office goals.” Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics*, p. 6.

\(^{18}\)Wilson defensively addresses himself to this point: “It is easy to criticize the notion that ‘the ends justify the means’; but if the *ends* do not justify the means, it is difficult to imagine what else can.” Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, p. 348. (Original emphasis.)
of policies, and the majority thus mobilized ought to have the means to enact its policy. The means are to be provided by an organized party." There are several crucial differences between these two conceptions of democracy as far as parties are concerned. First, the primacy of party among competing political actors is advocated in the Party Democracy model: "It is the major function of the party to keep these lines of communication [between leaders and followers] open and clear. Such a task makes the parties, if not the rulers, at least the controlling agencies of government in a representative democracy." Other important implications are that parties are expected to be highly organized and cohesive, programmatic (policy-oriented or ideological), to play a crucial governing role, and to encourage member participation and intraparty democracy. These attributes will be discussed below.

One of the most important functions of the political system is what has been variously termed societal goal-definition, or the policy function broadly considered. Mitchell, employing a Parsonian framework, names as the first function of the political system, "the authoritative specification of societal goals." The two party models differ sharply in the role assigned political parties in this important political function. In the Rational-Efficient model, parties are not assigned a vital role; this is due partly to the pluralistic conception of democracy (e.g., competition from other sources), but even more to the instrumentalist view of party, in which policy is viewed as a tactical means to an end. Downs states as the "fundamental hypothesis" of his model: "Parties formulate policies in

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19 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 15. Epstein further notes that while "the responsible-party advocacy is not quite the American version of the Duverger model," the party reformers do hold, "in common with the believer in the socialist working-class party, a majoritarian theory of party behavior. There is the same underlying idea that the majority should control government through the agency of a political party representing it" (pp. 355-356).

20 Neumann, Modern Political Parties, p. 397. (Emphasis added.) In his introductory essay to the same volume, Neumann refers to political parties as "the lifeline of modern politics" (p. 1), "critically significant" (p. 1), and "the main agents of public affairs" (p. 4). Schattschneider, a proponent of some aspects of the Party Democracy model, states as the thesis of his book: "... that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties ... The parties are not therefore merely appendages of modern government; they are at the center of it and play a determinative and creative role in it." E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), p. 1. Later Schattschneider states: "The parties are the most important instrumentalities of democratic government" (p. 59, emphasis added).

order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies.”

Epstein expresses a similar view of party: “Ideological, principle, program, and policy, if they exist at all, are equally instrumental at every organizational level. There is a strictly business arrangement, rational and efficient, for the narrow purpose at hand [i.e., winning elections].” This instrumentalist, non-ideological conception of party is also held by Wilson, who states in describing the professional model: “Issues will be avoided except in the most general terms or if the party is confident that a majority supports its position. Should a contrary position on the same issue seem best suited for winning a majority at the next election, the party will try to change or at least mute its position.”

From the primacy of party among political actors in the general conception of democracy on which the Party Democracy model is based, it follows that the party is considered the main goal-definer and policy-formulator in the political system. This kind of party, unlike the Rational-Efficient party, is expected to stand for something and seeks power in order to implement goals and policies: “At the root of the belief in programmatic parties is the assumption that parties should be primarily policy-makers ... [Policies], and the program from which they come, are the party’s raison d’etre. Elections are won in order to carry them out.” Similarly, Wilson stresses this difference between the two party models: “Amateur politicians thus seek to alter fundamentally the way in which the functions of parties are carried out. Instead of serving as neutral agents which mobilize majorities for whatever candidates and programs seem best suited to capturing the public fancy, the parties would become the sources of program and the agents of social change.”

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22Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 28.
23Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 104. (Emphasis added.) Epstein further notes: “Why should parties assume the kind of coherent policy-making that being programmatic implies? In particular, why should parties so function when, as is thought to be the case for American parties, coherent policy-making might interfere with successful election campaigns by narrowing political appeals? I do not raise the question cynically” (p. 265).
24Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, pp. 17-18. Similarly, Downs expresses the tactical view of ideology: “Each party realizes that some citizens vote by means of ideologies rather than policies; hence it fashions an ideology which it believes will attract the greatest number of votes.” Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 100. Downs further contends that to view ideology as an end and office, the means, is “irrational” (p. 112).
25Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 264.
26Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, pp. 18-19.
The different conceptions of democracy and the status assigned the political party in these two models also accounts for sharply differing judgments as to the role that political parties play as intermediaries linking citizens with government. In the pluralist conception of democracy which underlies the Rational-Efficient model, the political party is only one among a number of institutions (others being interest groups and the mass media) which compete in performing this linkage function. In the Party Democracy model, on the other hand, the political party is considered the primary linkage between citizens and government, and the primacy thus accorded political parties in large part accounts for the important role assigned parties vis-à-vis other groups in the political system generally. For Sigmund Neumann, party “is the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action in the larger political community.”

One of the most important systems functions of party is that of representing “the connecting link between government and public opinion.”

Two vital “input” functions of all political systems, as listed by Gabriel Almond, are interest articulation and interest aggregation. In the Rational-Efficient model, again as a result of the pluralist conception of democracy, there is a sharp division of labor between the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation. Interest groups represent or articulate interests, while political parties, serving as interest brokers, combine or aggregate competing interests and demands into a more manageable number of broader policy alternatives in a kind of electoral calculus. Interest groups offer their electoral support to competing parties in exchange for favorable consideration of policy stands benefitting the group, while parties seek to win the support of competing groups without binding themselves to specific policies. This division of labor between parties and interest groups in the political marketplace found in the Rational-Efficient model entails an affirmative view of interest groups and an appreciation of their performance of this vital func-

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27Neumann, Modern Political Parties, p. 396.
28Neumann, Modern Political Parties, p. 397. Leiserson also stresses the role of party in the linkage function: “The political party, or party system, provides the major connective linkage between people and government, between separate formal agencies and officials of government, and between official and non-official (extra-governmental) holders of power.” Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 35.
tion; parties and interest groups are friendly colleagues. Epstein, for example, clearly assigns to interest groups the function of interest representation: “It is hard to deny that specialized interest groups provide the most suitable means for policy preferences to be represented in a complex modern society.”

He also expresses an affirmative view of interest groups and the division of labor between interest groups and political parties—a view based on his electoral, non-ideological conception of party:

Yet even in the United States some scholars have been reluctant to concede the legitimacy of representation through interest groups. One reason for this reluctance can be traced to the tendency to think of interest groups as rivals that parties must overcome. But there is such a rivalry only if parties are considered as policymakers. If, instead, they are seen in more exclusively electoral terms, as mobilizers of candidates and not directly for policies, then the function of interest groups in promoting policies is no more than a sensible division of labor that frees parties for the task of mobilizing majorities to elect candidates.

Much less of a division of labor between parties and interest groups exists in the Party Democracy model; political parties represent as well as articulate interests. Epstein uses the term interest group-parties, defined as “parties combining some of the functions of interest groups and of electoral parties,” found particularly as “single-interest” parties in multiparty systems: “So when political competition is between several parties each based mainly on an interest, the agencies performing the aggregative functions are not differentiated from the interest-articulation agencies. They tend to

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30Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 279.
31Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, pp. 280-81. (Emphasis added). He further elaborates this view: “The winning party is the more successful aggregator. Closely enough defined, this aggregative function is compatible with the division of labor between parties and interest groups.... Parties responding to their environments by attempting to be very broadly aggregative cannot even seem programmatic. Instead they have to be admired, if they are at all, for their pragmatic, compromising spirit” (p. 283). (Original emphasis.)

32Valen and Katz discuss the somewhat antithetical and opposed functions of interest representation and compromise-integration (interest aggregation). Whereas American parties emphasize the latter function, Norwegian parties “address themselves seriously to the task of representing their major ideological or interest base as well as to the coalition function of including diverse groups under the same party umbrella.” Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, Political Parties in Norway: A Community Study (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), p. 50. (Emphasis added.)
33Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, pp. 118-19.
be the same."\textsuperscript{34} The primacy accorded parties in the political system by the Party Democracy model entails a more hostile view of interest groups, which are considered as representing special interests rather than majority or public interests, as lacking democratic legitimacy since they usually do not operate in a public and democratic manner, and as being manipulative.\textsuperscript{35} Neumann hints at the idea that parties outrank interest groups in the Party Democracy model: "It is, indeed, through the network of political parties that the place and responsibilities of pressure groups must be circumscribed if the modern society is not to deteriorate into a neofeudalism of powerful interest groups."\textsuperscript{36}

It follows from the general conceptions of democracy and the importance of party, especially with regard to the policy function, that there are sharp differences in the role that political parties are supposed to play in government. In the Rational-Efficient model, the governing role of party is not stressed. Epstein states that emphasis on the governing function of party "is a particular normative view of party functions to which this work does not subscribe;"\textsuperscript{37} while "modern parties may also perform governing functions," it is not a necessary party function: "Vote-structuring, however, is their minimum modern function."\textsuperscript{38} In the Party Democracy model, modern democratic government is viewed as party government, thus testifying to the extensive, even dominant role that party is expected to play as the main motor of government.\textsuperscript{39}

In concluding this discussion of the role of parties in the political system and of the sharply differing implications derived from the two party models, a few other systems factors should be mentioned briefly. Two related processes are social conflict and political change.

\textsuperscript{34}Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 73. (Emphasis added.)

\textsuperscript{35}Lohmar makes a further distinction between West German political parties and interest groups: parties are part of the constitutional order whereas interest groups are not. Ulrich Lohmar Innenparteiliche Demokratie (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1963), p. 92.

\textsuperscript{36}Neumann, Modern Political Parties, p. 413. Lohmar warns of dangers of "external control" of political parties by interest groups. Lohmar, Innenparteiliche Demokratie, pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{37}Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 315.

\textsuperscript{38}Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 77. Epstein contends that "the largely nongoverning party may be functional in the American constitutional system. And it may be so in any system founded on the separation of powers," p. 349.

\textsuperscript{39}Valen and Katz, for example, note that "Compared with the party systems of many other countries, e.g., the United States, the Norwegian parties play a dominating role in the political process." Valen and Katz, Political Parties in Norway, p. 50.
Social conflict may be viewed as the raw material of politics. A main function of the political system shared by other institutions as well is that of conflict resolution, which is related to the goal-definition or policy function. Societal goals are defined and policies formulated in order to reduce conflict. Basic normative judgments concerning conflict have significant implications for the role that political parties are supposed to play with regard to political change. In the Rational-Efficient model, conflict is viewed as disruptive and the integrative role of party in conflict resolution is emphasized; political parties mute conflict by promoting compromise and consensus-building. This view of party determines one’s stance with regard to political change: the Rational-Efficient party is oriented toward either preserving the status quo or toward promoting gradual, consensual change. Consensus politics is a familiar term intimately associated with the Rational-Efficient party. Such politics avoids extreme or controversial positions out of a fear of alienating potential supporters. In the Party Democracy model, because social conflict—within limits—is viewed as creative, parties tend to be reformist, advocating more extensive political change.

See, for example, Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

Weiner and LaPalombara identify two types of parties based on different orientations to political change: “In the contemporary scene a distinction is often made between the mobilist party and other kinds of parties. The term ‘mobilization’ is frequently used to refer to the use of the party as an instrument for affecting attitudinal and behavioral change in a society. The mobilist party can be contrasted to the adaptive party whose primary concern is its adaptation to the attitudes of the public in its quest for electoral support…. In short, while the goal of the adaptive party is victory, the goal of the mobilist party is social reconstruction.” Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, “The Impact of Political Parties on Political Development,” in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 424-25. (Emphasis added.) The Rational-Efficient party is an adaptive party par excellence and the Party Democracy type tends to resemble the mobilist party.

With regard to the conflict management function, Weiner and LaPalombara contend that “it is reasonable to suggest that ideological parties are less able than pragmatic or ‘brokerage’ parties to handle conflict effectively.” LaPalombara and Weiner, “The Impact of Political Parties on Political Development,” p. 418.

Epstein expresses the orientation of his book in this regard: “Admittedly, however, the emphasis here, compared with that of party reformers, does reduce the relevance of parties as agents for political change. Indeed, that is the intention.” Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 9.

For a statement of the view that conflict—within limits—can be creative, see Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict.

See the factor of “relationship to the status quo” in Sorauf’s table comparing the cadre and mass-membership parties. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 161.
and serving to express, rather than supress, conflict. The term confrontation politics is more compatible with this party model.

Another systems factor to be noted is the role that is attributed to political parties in democratizing the political system. Several viewpoints are represented, some of which link up with the notion of intraparty democracy which is discussed below. The classic statement of one position is that given by European socialists and based on the Party Democracy model: the party plays the major role in democratizing the political system and needs therefore to practice internal democracy in order to serve as an exemplary model for other institutions. A second view derives from the Rational-Efficient model: political parties make a contribution to democracy in their competitive struggle with opposing parties; they need not be internally democratic to do so. Wilson notes these opposing viewpoints: “The amateurs believe that America’s governing institutions are best served if there is democracy within the political parties as well as between them; the adherents of the alternative view argue that while interparty democracy is essential, intraparty democracy is not and, indeed, that the success of the former is reduced by the extent of the latter.”

Involved in this brief consideration of the role of parties in effecting political change and in democratizing the political system is the question of whether or not to consider political parties as causal agents, as primarily independent or dependent variables. Epstein accuses European political scientists (e.g., Duverger) and the responsible-party school of American political scientists of holding “a belief in a nearly overwhelming importance of parties in the modern political process,” and counters with his own view: “This more limited way of looking at political parties means that they are not regarded as primarily causal.” He considers parties a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy, as dependent or intervening rather than independent variables.

A final factor which deserves mention relates not to the political system generally but to types of party systems and their compati-

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46 Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, pp. 343-44. (Original emphasis.) Involved here is the question of whether or not the subunits (e.g., political parties) of a democratic political system must themselves be democratic. Some political scientists, including adherents of the Party Democracy model, give an affirmative answer. Barnes denies that this is necessarily a logical implication: “If the polity is considered the unit of analysis, then democracy within the polity may not be facilitated by democracy within its subunits,” Samuel H. Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 250.

47 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 7.

50 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 8.
bility with the two party models. The party system is a particularly important aspect of the political system environment within which political parties operate. Although no neat logical one-to-one correspondence between types of party systems and party models can be drawn, the two-party system is especially congenial to the broadly-based, pragmatic Rational-Efficient party, while the multi-party system allows more leeway to the Party Democracy type. In a multi-party system the ideological party can be electorally successful without being broadly aggregative which is difficult for this type of party. The Party Democracy type tends to be handicapped in a two-party system in which it must get a majority of the votes for attaining a majority usually means appealing to a diversity of social groups in the electorate. The free-wheeling Rational-Efficient party has less difficulty in appealing successfully to diverse interests, since it uses policy stands in a tactical fashion.

Conceptions of democracy and the role of parties in this political system have been discussed in some detail because of the important consequences that basic normative judgments have for more specific party attributes. The outlines of the Rational-Efficient model as the loosely organized, electorally oriented, moderate-pragmatic brokerage party and of the Party Democracy model as highly organized, policy-oriented, ideological, more cohesive, and internally democratic party already have been sketched. These attributes will be discussed below.

2. Party Functions

Sorauf distinguishes between the manifest functions of political parties — the more overt, immediate, and consciously performed tasks — and their latent functions — the more indirect and remote contributions that parties make to the operation of the political system.\textsuperscript{49} In the first section of this essay, some of the systems functions of parties have been discussed; here, we turn more explicitly to the party’s manifest functions. The two party models differ sharply with regard to their manifest functions and functional characteristics. The Rational-Efficient model is characterized by a narrow range of functions; pre-dominant — even exclusive — emphasis is placed on the party’s electoral function. Epstein defines

\textsuperscript{49}“To put the matter in another way, the party performs certain tasks (the manifest ones) that ensure its own successful functioning, at the same time performing others (the latent ones) that contribute to the functioning of the entire political system.” Sorauf, \textit{Political Parties in the American System}, p. 9.
Table 2
Party Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Characteristics</th>
<th>Rational-Efficient Model</th>
<th>Party Democracy Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Manifest functions</td>
<td>Narrow range of functions: almost exclusive emphasis on electoral function; any other functions subordinate.</td>
<td>Broad range of functions: ideological, electoral, and governing; other functions subordinated to ideological function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Activities</td>
<td>Limited and intermittent, geared to election cycle.</td>
<td>Extensive and continuous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Prime beneficiary</td>
<td>Voters (actually elected public officials)</td>
<td>Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Organizational incentives</td>
<td>Material (patronage)</td>
<td>Purposive (especially policy-ideological)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Operational style</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political party in terms of this single function: “The single criterion is the functional one: seeking votes for a labelled candidate or candidates.”[50] In Epstein’s view, although parties may perform other functions, these are to be subordinated to the party’s main function: “Organization in one degree or another always exists for this electoral purpose. It may have other purposes as well and still be regarded as that of a party, provided that the electoral purpose is prominent, if not dominant.”[51] Other adherents of the Rational-Efficient model present similar views. Wilson, for example, does not even mention the ideological or programmatic function of political parties; in his view, the parties function only to “recruit candidates, mobilize voters, and assimilate power within the formal government.”[52] Schlesinger adds to this statement a candid admission of the value judgment involved in this view: “The writer’s analysis of party organization accepts the assumption that party organizations in democracies are dominated by their office drives. The decision to view parties narrowly is due to a value preference which derives from the logic of democracy.”[53]

[50] Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 11.
[51] Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 98. (Emphasis added.) Epstein notes the functional difference in the two party models: “The cadre type characterized, from the start, parties with primarily and almost entirely electoral functions. The mass-membership party of the socialists... began as movements concerned with other functions....” (p. 99).
In the Rational-Efficient model, the ideological or policy-clarification and goal definition function is rejected, the interest representation function turned over to interest groups, and the party’s governing role de-emphasized in order to allow single-minded concentration on the party’s basic electoral or vote-mobilization function.\footnote{With regard to the above-mentioned division of labor between parties and interest groups, Epstein states that, “in one respect, it affords parties a more limited range of functions.” Epstein, \textit{Political Parties in Western Democracies}, p. 218. As far as the policy-making function is concerned, “parties, given their electoral functions, are not especially well qualified to assume the additional functions of policy-making ”(p. 269).} If this functional view of the political party is held, one is unable to comprehend and understand parties based on the Party Democracy model which is characterized by a broad range of functions — ideological, electoral, and governing. The electoral function, although important and even crucial, is viewed not as an end-in-itself but as a means to an end. This type of party is expected to stand for something — principles, programs, policies — and it seeks political power via the electoral process in order to implement these. Strictly speaking, the ideological-policy or programmatic function becomes then the dominant function and both winning power (the electoral function) and exercising power (the governing function) are subordinated to it. Neumann lists first among the functions of parties: “. . . the primary task of political parties is to organize the chaotic public will. . . . They are brokers of ideas, constantly clarifying, systematizing, and expounding the party’s doctrine.”\footnote{Neumann, \textit{Modern Political Parties}, p. 396. Neumann lists the electoral function (termed leader selection by him) last in his list of party functions. So does Kirchheimer in his list of “the functions which European parties exercised during earlier decades (late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries).” What we have called the ideological function, Kirchheimer terms the “expressive function.” Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” in \textit{Political Parties and Political Development}, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 189.} Epstein acknowledges that “basically different conceptions of party functions, it is plain, are involved when policy-making is urged on parties. They are asked to subordinate vote-getting to programmatic considerations. Winning and holding office is a means to another end.”\footnote{Epstein, \textit{Political Parties in Western Democracies}, p. 267.} We have here a fundamental distinction between the two party models, and one which has a number of significant implications for other party attributes.

These differences in manifest party functions yield two sharply different patterns of party activities. Given the preoccupation with the electoral function by the Rational-Efficient party, it follows log-
ically that party activities are limited in scope and intermittent, geared to the election cycle. The typical party organization of this type tends to awaken from a dormant state come campaign time, and to revert to this state during the interim period between elections. The multi-functional Party Democracy type, in contrast, is characterized by extensive, varied, and continuous activities with periodic election campaigns representing a heightened phase of party activity. Campaigning is something else for the party organization to do, in addition to policy discussion and political education activities. Neumann cites cities as the second function of the political party that of “educating the private citizen to political responsibility.” Valen and Katz note the importance of policy discussion and political education activities of Norwegian parties: “All parties place heavy emphasis upon educational activities for members and leaders.”

There are two similar ways of classifying types of organizations that are related to the functions of an organization. The first of these is the Blau and Scott organizational typology based on the criterion of prime beneficiary, “the criterion of ‘who benefits’ from an organization’s activities.” Although Anderson contends that while “typologies such as these are useful in locating party organizations relative to other types, they are of limited value when it comes to analyzing differences among party organizations,” Schlesinger fruitfully applies the Blau-Scott typology in differentiating what we have termed the Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models:

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57 Sorauf characterizes the cadre party by “only periodic activity,” and the mass-membership party by “year-around activity.” Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 161. For a conceptualization of the “cyclical, recurring character” of party activities, see David M. Olson, “Toward a Typology of County Party Organizations,” The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 48 (March, 1968), especially his discussion of the “electoral-policy cycle” (pp. 563-55).
58 Neumann, Modern Political Parties, p. 397.
59 Valen and Katz, Political Parties in Norway, p. 55. They draw an explicit comparison with American parties: “In comparison with the United States, however, the Norwegian local party organization spends much more time in discussion of the issues and proposals for the party platform. The typical meeting of the local unit of the American party is heavily concentrated upon problems of organization and administration” (p. 64).
“Cutting through all of these distinctions is the issue of ‘Whose party is it?’, an issue of great practical and analytical importance. ... For the party analyst, the answer he gives to this question colors the remainder of his work. If he decides a party belongs to its members, he assumes its need to be responsive to their interests. If he sees the party as an organization aimed at winning elections, he sees it as responsive primarily to the electorate.}

Schlesinger notes that “the weight of the continental tradition is clearly on the side of parties as organizations to further the interests of their members, particularly in class or economic terms.” The weight of the American tradition, in contrast, is to view the party as responsive to the electorate and thus largely “to ignore the problem of organization.” In our view, however, it is logically more consistent with the attributes — especially the “self-interest axiom” — of the Rational-Efficient model to resolve the issue of prime beneficiary in favor of the party’s elected public officials rather than the electorate.

The party members are the prime beneficiaries in the Party Democracy model. This type of party has a formal membership which, given the stress on the norm of intraparty democracy, plays an important role in the party. It follows logically that this type of party has a special interest in, and obligation to, its members. It should be noted that the Party Democracy type thus has a problem that the Rational-Efficient party largely — although not entirely — manages to avoid. This problem arises out of tensions produced by a “dual constituency” for elected public officials; conflict arises out of allegiance to members and activists of their party on the one hand, and to the electorate on the other. (There are important consequences for the relationship between the party organization and the governmental party, discussed below.) Although the assumption is made in the Party Democracy model that the politically interested citizen will join and actively participate in the political party closest to his ideological convictions, in practice party membership is usually a small proportion of the electorate, even of party

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63Schlesinger, “Political Party Organization,” p. 765. This is, Schlesinger admits, an issue settled “by value judgments as well as an assessment of the facts” (p. 766).
66Take, for example, the nomination of a “real Republican” — Barry Goldwater — in 1964. The Republican Party returned to its rational and efficient ways in seeking “a winner” in 1968.
supporters (identifiers) in the electorate. Furthermore, party activists represent a distinct minority of the party membership. To the extent that it seriously seeks electoral success, the Party Democracy type must seek in an often difficult task to appeal to sufficiently large numbers of voters without alienating its members — especially the activists.

A second classification is also related to functions performed by organizations. Wilson differentiates two sharply contrasting party types, the “professional” and the “amateur,” terms applicable to both individuals and party organizations; these types correspond to the Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models, respectively. “Professional” and “amateur” refer to distinctive political styles; Wilson’s use of these terms is somewhat confusing, since he gives these familiar labels a specialized meaning. He means by “professional” something other than merely whether or not one makes his living from politics; rather, the basic distinction is whether politics is viewed as the end-in-itself of winning, or power, as is the case with the professional, or instead as a means to the end of fulfillment of the public interest, as is the case with the amateur. The goal of the professional is power; the amateur’s goal is principle. The core element of these distinctions is incentive, defined as the means used by the leadership to get individuals to work for an organization and the material or symbolic rewards and satisfactions that motivate these individuals. Elsewhere, Clark and Wilson develop a typology of organizations based on the incentive criterion. They differentiate essentially three types of organizations, based on different kinds of incentives: the utilitarian organization,

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68See Duverger’s discussion of membership, supporter, and militancy ratios, whereby these three groups in mass-membership parties may be statistically compared with each other, and with the electorate. Duverger, Political Parties, Chapter 3.

69Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 297. See his first chapter for a discussion of the terms “amateur” and “professional.”

70Sorauf expresses the notion of incentives used by party organizations in terms of an explicit economic analogy: “If the party is to continue functioning as an organization it must make ‘payments’ in an acceptable ‘political currency’ adequate to motivate and allocate the labors of its workers. To continue with analogy to economic organization, each party worker or participant will continue his participation in the party organization only as long as the utility of the incentives to him exceeds the cost to him of the labors the party expects in return.” Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 81. Sorauf adds a further note, in similar terms: “Individuals pursue their own aims and goals through work in the political party. The party ‘management,’ however, seeks to regulate and control the ‘payment’ of the incentives in order to achieve the goals of the party” (p. 87).

built on material incentives such as money or patronage; organizations based on solidary incentives, defined by Epstein as including "the intangible values of socializing, congeniality, sense of group membership, conviviality, and general enjoyment"; and organizations based on purposive incentives which "also intangible, derive from the stated goals of an association, such as enactment of reform legislation, rather than from the simple act of association itself."  

Wilson illustrates these three types by referring to organizational variants within American parties. Typical of the utilitarian-material organization is the strong patronage-based local organization, with a high degree of control and high motivation of the workers; the solidary organization is illustrated by the old-line, decaying regular party club in which the activities are mainly social, and the organization is characterized by low motivation and low degree of control; the best example of the purposive party organization is the amateur, club-movement party typified by the California Democratic Council (CDC), which is based on policy-ideology incentives, and characterized by high motivation, but a low degree of control. Wilson’s main contrast, however, is between the professional (patronage) and the amateur (purposive) party organizations. Patronage is the main reward of the professional: "Broadly speaking, patronage refers to any benefit with some material value which a government official can reward at his discretion: a job, a contract, a charter, or a franchise, or even ‘inside information’ which the recipient can use to his advantage in private dealings." The beauty of material rewards such as patronage, from the standpoint of organizational leaders, is expressed by Sorauf: "As long as it lasted, and for the type of party organization it augmented, patronage was almost the ideal incentive. Its lure was so great . . . that it produced continuous activity. The machine enjoyed complete control over it, the party could deliver the pay-off with almost 100 per cent regularity; and it could in many cases freely revoke it." Wilson expresses a similar view: "Patronage at the disposal of party leaders places those who hold the jobs under an obligation to the leaders. Such an obligation prevents a free expression of opinion and renders intraparty democracy

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72Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 101-02.
73Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 102.
74Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, pp. 315-16. Sorauf applies a more differentiated typology of incentives to party activists; his incentive categories include: patronage, preferments, political career, economic rewards, personal (social and psychological) rewards, policy and ideology incentives, and organizational loyalty. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, pp. 82-87.
75Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 200.
76Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 90.
impossible." The "rationality" of this kind of arrangement is cited by Epstein, and Downs clearly draws this implication from the self-interest axiom which is basic to the Rational-Efficient model:

From the self-interest axiom springs our view of what motivates the political actions of party members. We assume that they act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which comes from being in office. Thus politicians in our model never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office *per se*. They treat policies purely as a means to the attainment of their private ends, which they can reach only by being elected.

Purposive incentives, policy-ideology in particular, rather than material incentives, are basic to the Party Democracy model. Epstein states that "in the absence of large-scale patronage, but not necessarily because of only that absence, many European parties developed membership organizations based largely on nonmaterial incentives." As far as the American representatives of the Party Democracy model are concerned, Wilson observes that "generally speaking, clubs of amateur politicians are examples of purposive organizations," and, more specifically, that "concern for principles is a crucial incentive for clubs politics." The Party Democracy activist needs a cause to believe in: "A programmatic party, or what is more commonly called an ideological party, is undoubtedly asso-

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78 "Really the arrangement was quite rational from the standpoint of the party and its workers. Jobs were simply exchanged for party votes." Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 109. Epstein also notes that "only the old large-scale American-style distribution of the spoils of office provide the *material* incentive for any large amount of rank-and-file party work" (p. 101, original emphasis). Sorauf states: "No party system has so systematically depended on patronage as the American." Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System*, p. 82. Greenstein, discussing the old-style urban machine, concluded: "Patronage is the classical lubricant of party organization." Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 42.
80 Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 111.
82 Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, p. 29. Sorauf concurs: "The new club movement builds on personal rewards and policy and ideological incentives." Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System*, p. 91. Wilson points out that amateur club activists are not only policy-oriented, but very much antipatronage: "More generally, the amateur believes that political parties ought to be programmatic, internally democratic, and largely or entirely free of a reliance on material incentives such as patronage...." Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, p. 340.
associated with mass-membership organization. The relation is reciprocal . . . The volunteer activist associated with a dues-paying organization needs to have a cause. . . . Belief in a cause is the substitute for material interest.” Sorauf points out: “Of all the incentives only those of ideology appear to be independent of electoral success.” Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 90.

Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 182. Sorauf makes the same point—namely that the party organization “may foster solidarity by admitting party workers into the decision-making processes of the party . . . intraparty democracy may perform a useful function for the party as an organization.” Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 92. Sorauf does note that the use of ideological incentives by party leaders may reach a “point of diminishing returns” when the costs in voters alienated exceed the efforts “purchased” from party workers (p. 92).

Wilson contrasts the ideological (amateur) and pragmatic (professional) styles: While, “in effect, the amateur asserts that principle, rather than interest, ought to be both the end and motive of political action” (The Amateur Democrat, p. 19), in the professional (Rational-Efficient) model, “parties can be regarded as mechanisms for resolving disagreements in ways which reduce to a minimum the number of commitments elective officials must make to policy positions, many of which perfuse would be unattainable, unwise, or contradictory” (p. 357). Rather, agreement in this model is produced “by trading issue-free resources” (p. 358). Schlesinger contends that “policy-oriented activists” introduce the “danger of rigidity”; while they must be allowed to participate in party decision-making, “they must be imbued with the primacy of the office goal if the party is to retain its flexibility.” Schlesinger, “Political Party Organization,” p. 771.

3. Party Structure

The above functional requirements and characteristics have significant implications not only for specific structural attributes, but also for the general importance of organization. In the Party Democracy model, organization is of crucial importance; in the Rational-
### Table 3
**Structural Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Characteristics</th>
<th>Rational-Efficient Model</th>
<th>Party Democracy Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Organizational requirements</td>
<td>Strictly utilitarian view of organization: depends on situational requirements.</td>
<td>Need for extensive, highly integrated structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Membership</td>
<td>Informal; electoral needs determine organizational size.</td>
<td>Formal membership criteria; many members and strong grass roots organization required for democratic legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Basic organizational form (structural unit)</td>
<td>Cadre party (committees, cliques of leaders)</td>
<td>Mass membership party (branches or sections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Allocation of authority</td>
<td>Centralization within decentralization (autonomy of sub-units)</td>
<td>Decentralization within centralization (integrated overall structure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Leadership recruitment and career patterns</td>
<td>Open, career pluralism; leaders often recruited from outside party organization or self-recruited.</td>
<td>Institutionalized career patterns; leaders recruited from within.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Organizational style</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Amateur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Efficient model, organization is of much less importance. Schlesinger pinpoints the sharp differences in the two party models in this regard. Using Michels as representative of the continental tradition of viewing the membership as the prime beneficiary of the political party, he states: “For Michels, concern with the responsiveness of the party to its membership led to a concern for structure, membership forms, relations among party units, especially those between party members and elected office-holders. His entire analysis flows logically from his original perception of the party as the instrument of its members.”\(^{86}\) In the American tradition of the Rational-Efficient model (e.g., Schumpeter and Downs), on the other hand, “analysts who have assumed that the electorate is the prime beneficiary of party have found the question of structure secondary to that of the party’s relation to government. ... Here there is the tendency to ignore the problem of organization. ...”\(^{87}\)

\(^{86}\)Schlesinger, “Political Party Organization,” p. 766.

\(^{87}\)Schlesinger, “Political Party Organization,” p. 766.
tional-Efficient model, as has already been noted, a strictly utilitarian view of organization is taken; organization is functional only to the extent that it facilitates vote mobilization tasks and promotes electoral success. If votes can be mobilized effectively without the benefit of large-scale organization, then so much the better. Epstein clearly subscribes to this view: as a consequence of developments in the mass media (especially television) and other modern campaign techniques, "an organizational apparatus intervening between candidates and voters may be less necessary, or at any rate less efficient, as a vote-getting device. . . . Parties, it may be argued, successfully win votes, perhaps more votes, with fewer organizational members. The new campaign techniques at least facilitate the electoral task."\(^{58}\) (Just how this perspective leads Epstein to view party members and activists will be shown below.) In the Rational-Efficient model, organizational characteristics are geared to situational requirements: parties may be highly or weakly organized, centralized or de-centralized, strongly or weakly articulated, depending upon the particular situation in the political environment. In contrast, for reasons discussed below, given the nature of its functions and activities, extensive, highly organized and integrated structure is essential to the Party Democracy model.

The structural feature which most visibly differentiates the two party models is the general absence of a formal membership in the Rational-Efficient party and the presence of such in the Party Democracy type. What the Rational-Efficient party has in the way of organization tends to be small and informal; there are usually no formal membership criteria and the size of the organization depends on electoral requirements (i.e., the number of workers needed to get out the vote). The Rational-Efficient organization tends to consist of committees or cliques of leaders.\(^{59}\) Epstein provides numerous illustrations of these structural characteristics, combined with a critical reaction to the Party Democracy model: "There is a strictly business arrangement, rational and efficient, for the narrow purpose at hand [i.e., winning elections]. Organizational membership in any formal sense can be kept fairly small. . . . Size, it must be emphasized, is not an object of an organization of this type. Only enough 'members' are needed for efficient vote-getting. Mass followers are not organized as members. Party work is done by the leaders—little

\(^{58}\) Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, pp. 233, 253.

\(^{59}\) In his table comparing the cadre and mass-membership parties, Sorauf characterizes the structural unit of the former as "informal cliques and committees." Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 161.
bosses at the neighborhood level and big bosses higher up.\footnote{Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 104. (Emphasis added.)} Coupled with the anti-organization bias in the Rational-Efficient model is the judgment that formal and extensive membership, characteristic of the Party Democracy model, is largely "dysfunctional," a conclusion that has implications for Rational-Efficient theorists' view on the matter of intraparty democracy (see below). Epstein assesses the value and effect of members in canvassing and contends: "This does not settle the question about the net value of mass-membership organizations. There is still the unresolved question of whether the number of votes the workers obtain are sufficient to justify the considerable professional efforts to organize the workers — which might better be spent on reaching voters directly through the mass media. More particularly, there is the question of whether it would not be more efficient to recruit volunteer workers for each campaign, without the trouble of maintaining membership organizations between campaigns."\footnote{Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 116.} 

On the other hand, Epstein admits that the need for a mass membership is a logical consequence of the functions of the Party Democracy model: "A programmatic party, or what is more commonly called an ideological party, is undoubtedly associated with mass-membership organization. The relation is reciprocal."\footnote{Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 261. He also refers to the American variant of the mass-membership party: "Loosely speaking, the basis is ideological or policy-oriented . . . The mark of the new amateur parties is their regularized dues-paying membership, which sets them apart from the numerous committees created for particular campaigns and candidates" (p. 123).} A prime distinguishing feature of the Party Democracy model is the existence of formal membership criteria for formally enrolled, active, dues-paying members.\footnote{Duverger states that "The concept of membership is linked with a particular notion of political party that was born at the beginning of the twentieth century along with Socialist parties and that has subsequently been imitated by others . . . The concept of membership is a result of the evolution which led from the cadre to the mass party." Duverger, Political Parties, p. 63; see pp. 71-78 for a description of the formal requirements of membership.} A strong grass-roots organization is essential not only for the performance of electoral tasks but, more importantly, to provide democratic legitimacy for the party. In this view, a political party must be more than merely an electoral machine; it must have a visible and democratic structure which provides the primary channel of political participation for interested citizens. Since the party stresses the important system function of linking
citizens with government, it must be broadly established and responsive at the grass-roots level. This type of party cannot be comprehended except in terms of the role of the members'ship; as Duverger states, "The members are therefore the very substance of the party, the stuff of its activity. Without members, the party would be like a teacher without pupils."  

The basic organizational form of the two party models is the cadre party (the Rational-Efficient model) and the mass-membership party (the Party Democracy model). These terms, which have been widely used in the political parties literature, derive from Duverger, who based his party typology on the basic organizational unit (see Introduction to Section One). The terms cadre party and mass party may be applied to the Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy models respectively; the argument made here is that the latter terms are more useful, in that they are based on multiple criteria that better get at the underlying functional distinctions which give rise to differing structural requirements. The cadre party is a committee style of organization with all leaders and no members while the basic organizational unit of the mass-membership party is the branch or section, composed of the party members who live in the area (usually neighborhood); the party branches are thus roughly equivalent in jurisdiction — although not in structure and function — to the precinct organization of American parties.

The two party models differ in authority structure with regard to both clarity of allocation of power and actual locus of authority. In the Rational-Efficient model, the allocation of authority and control is often unclear and far from obvious, and power tends to be decentralized. Party organization is decentralized to the extent required and consistent with political or governmental structure — which means in the United States highly decentralized. But authority in this model is ideally centralized within organizational subunits, in the interest of organizational rationality and efficiency. The pattern is thus one of centralization within an overall pattern of decentralization. In contrast, in the Party Democracy model, authority is more clearly allocated and visible; organizational integration and effective intra-organizational channels of communication require a more centralized overall structure, but norms of intraparty democracy require decentralization of decision-making authority within

94Duverger, Political Parties, p. 63.
95See, for example, Sorauf's differentiation of these two types of parties, including his table of contrasting characteristics. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 161.
this overall structure. The pattern is thus one of decentralization within centralization. Sorauf characterizes the cadre party as "tends to be decentralized," and the mass-membership party as "tends to be centralized" in terms of their "internal distribution of power." Political Parties in the American System, p. 161. Wilson contrasts the centralized distribution of power in the professional model with the decentralized distribution of power in the amateur model. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, pp. 232-39. Duverger differentiates between centralization-decentralization of authority and degree of articulation — i.e., the strength of linkages among organizational units (horizontal and vertical organizational integration). These two dimensions or factors, Duverger cautions, should not be confused: "Strong articulation must not be confused with democratic structure. It is, of course, true that weak articulation is not democratic . . . But the contrary is not true: a rigid system of articulation may or may not be democratic." Duverger, Political Parties, p. 44. Duverger sees a correlation between "the nature of the basic elements which compose the party" and "the strength or weakness of party articulation" (p. 46). The caucus-based party is weakly articulated; the branch-based party, strongly articulated; and the cell or militia-based party, very strongly articulated. Similarly, these three types of party are, respectively, decentralized, centralized, and highly centralized.

97 Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 46-47. Valen and Katz assert: "The membership organization in the Norwegian parties has a clear authority structure. The legislative process in the party is a form of representative democracy . . . In this process the source of power is at the base of the pyramid. The executive process is also hierarchical but in this case the exercise of authority in implementing party decisions is from the top down." Valen and Katz, Political Parties in Norway, p. 84. Wilson contrasts the decentralization of authority in the amateur model with the centralization of authority in the professional model; see Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, pp. 232-39.
characterized by career pluralism, rather than highly institutionalized career patterns.98

In the Party Democracy model, on the other hand, career patterns are more highly institutionalized and leaders tend to be recruited and promoted from within the organization. Norms of loyalty and service to the organization are important. Leaders must gain and retain the loyalty of the members, as well as appeal to voters as representatives of the party. These patterns are made possible by the more highly organized structure and party control over the nomination of candidates for public office in the Party Democracy model.

It follows clearly from our discussion of these two party models that the organizational style of the Rational-Efficient party is professional, while the amateur style is more in keeping with the Party Democracy type.99 Just as was the case with the distinctions between the cadre and mass-membership parties, the contrasting professional and amateur styles or models — in Wilson's terminology — are generally equivalent to our Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy types respectively. The same justification for preference for the latter terminology holds.

4. Party Processes

Organizational processes are intimately related to organizational structure. As was the case of structure, organizational processes are of little importance in the Rational-Efficient model; this applies especially to the policy-making process since the party organization is usually — except in the case of city machines — denied any policy role, consistent with its treatment as a service organization by the elected officials as party leaders. As far as the topic of the policy process is concerned, Epstein contends that "the United States

98See Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), Chapter 7; see also Selection 1.3 in this reader. An exception to this generalization about American parties is the more hierarchical, urban machine form; see Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment and Representation," American Political Science Review, 60 (September, 1966), 627-39.

99This statement by Wilson referred to American circumstances. The pre-1933 German Social Democratic Party (SPD), a classic prototype of the Party Democracy model, had an extensive and highly developed corps of party "bureaucrats" (salaried party employees). For a discussion of this professionalization of party work and the problems posed for the practice of intraparty democracy, see Michels, Political Parties; Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954); and Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy 1918-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
## Table 4
### Party Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Attributes</th>
<th>Rational-Efficient Model</th>
<th>Party Democracy Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General relevance</td>
<td>Of little importance</td>
<td>Highly important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Policy-making process</td>
<td>Largely ignored</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intraparty democracy</td>
<td>Little emphasis; member participation tends to be considered dysfunctional.</td>
<td>Strong emphasis on norms of intraparty democracy and encouragement of member participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Policy role of party organization and governmental party</td>
<td>Autonomy of governmental party; party organization has only service functions.</td>
<td>Inter-dependence in policy-making; norm of strong influence of party organization on governmental party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

provides virtually no illustrative material. . . More to the point, there has been no nationally organized membership to claim policymaking power."\(^{100}\) Internal organizational processes generally, and the policy-making process in particular, are of vital importance in the Party Democracy model. Epstein, writing of the European socialist working-class party, the prototype of the Party Democracy model, observes: "Its commitment to organizational policy-making was part of its broader distinctiveness";\(^{101}\) within this type of party (the programmatic party) there is "a special concern with policymaking."\(^{102}\)

What makes the policy-making process of such great concern in the Party Democracy model is not merely the important policy role claimed by the party in the political system, but the special character of this process, given the commitment to the norm of intraparty democracy. More than even the above-mentioned basic

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\(^{100}\) Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 305.

\(^{101}\) Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 314.

\(^{102}\) Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, p. 289. (Original emphasis.) Epstein contends that only the assumption that the party represents a majority of the electorate (e.g., as made by European socialist parties) "can lend democratic credibility to an organized membership's claim to policymaking authority. Otherwise, its credentials seem much less legitimate than those of public office-holders whose policies are tailored to the electorate. The membership must itself be conceived as representing the majority of the population before it can be regarded as any more than another interest group seeking to fashion policy" (p. 314). See Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat*, for an account of the importance of the policy process in amateur Democratic clubs.
functional and structural distinctions, the strong emphasis on intraparty democracy in the Party Democracy model and the absence thereof in the Rational-Efficient model most sharply differentiates these two party models and gives the former its name. Although there are some exceptions,¹⁰³ advocacy of programmatic parties is usually coupled with demands for intraparty democracy.

Intraparty democracy is both a simple and a complex term. It includes several elements, one of the most general of which is the responsiveness of the party to its members. This element has several implications, as Wilson notes: “In order to insure that party leaders are responsive to the rank and file, the parties would be internally democratic, with party members choosing party leaders and holding them accountable. Candidates for public office and platforms would be ratified, after some meaningful debate and with real opportunities for choice, by the membership.”¹⁰⁴ Members expect to have their voices heard in party policy-making and a commitment to intraparty democracy has several important functional and structural implications: the creation of the requisite structural conditions — especially strong grass-roots organization and extensive two-way channels of communication upwards and downwards in the party structure — and the provision of extensive opportunities for policy discussion and debate within party units. (On these points, see the Introduction to Section Five.) Intraparty democracy exists when the upward flow of ideas and policy views is not completely dominated by the downward flow of views and decisions by party leaders.¹⁰⁵

It is difficult to exaggerate the centrality of the idea of intraparty democracy in the Party Democracy model. Epstein states: “Intra-

¹⁰³ Schattschneider, for example, favors more programmatic and cohesive American parties, but does not advocate intraparty democracy: “Democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties.” E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), p. 60. (Original emphasis.) It should be noted that Schattschneider erroneously regards partisan voters (party identifiers) as the equivalent of “members.” Although clearly not an advocate of ideological parties, Epstein contends: “There is no need, despite some precedents, to posit an improbable degree of intra-party democracy as a necessity for a programmatic party.” Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 264.

¹⁰⁴ Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 341. “Democratizing the party machinery means making the party leaders responsible to party members... The general theme is maximum citizen participation in the party” (pp. 129-30).

¹⁰⁵ Valen and Katz contend that the structure of Norwegian parties is democratic: “Though the dominant pattern of communication does follow vertical lines, it is of crucial importance to realize that the flow is not just one-way.” Valen and Katz, Political Parties in Norway, p. 95.
party democracy appeared as a nearly essential means for social democrats as it has for the party reformers in the United States. In neither instance has an organized membership in and of itself been the main purpose. Its existence provides a basis for the principled and programmatic policy-making that American reformers, like European socialists, have often wanted.”

Writing of the amateur Democrats, Wilson emphasizes that “intraparty democracy is not merely a tactically expedient slogan, it is an inherent feature of amateur politics and represents a fundamental break with the professional style. Mass participation and intraparty democracy are crucial to the nature of amateur politics for both theoretical and practical reasons.”

For Duverger, the issue is simple. Since democracy is the dominant twentieth century doctrine of legitimacy, “parties must in consequence take the greatest care to provide themselves with leadership that is democratic in appearance. . . . Democratic principles demand that leadership at all levels be elective, that it be frequently renewed, collective in character, weak in authority.” According to Duverger, only “where there is coincidence in orientation” between leaders and members, only where the leaders are representative of the members, can a party be called democratic.

Mayntz supports Duverger’s notion in drawing implications for parties from broad conceptions of democracy: “The ideal model of a functioning democratic system stipulates not only certain outcomes—e.g., selection of qualified candidates, statement of salient issues—but also certain modes for achieving these outcomes—e.g., not by arbitrary decisions of an oligarchic ruling group, but through democratic processes involving the whole membership.” It clearly follows that party functions must be performed in a democratic manner. The importance of norms of intraparty democracy is anchored not only in

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106 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 306.
107 Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 181. The stress is not merely on theory but on practice: “In the majority of the reform clubs, intraparty democracy is not only advocated but practiced” (p. 131).
108 Duverger, Political Parties, p. 134. For Duverger, this general notion has further implications for type of party. The mass-membership party is more democratic, and therefore more legitimate, given the general legitimizing norm of democracy: “The branch constitutes the ‘legitimate’ structure of parties, in the sociological sense of the term: an institution is legitimate when it corresponds to the dominant doctrines of a period, to the most widely held beliefs on the nature and form of power” (p. 26).
109 Duverger, Political Parties, p. 91.
democratic theory but finds expression in party statutes,\textsuperscript{111} and — at least in the case of West Germany — in the constitution.\textsuperscript{112}

The opposite side of the coin should be presented — i.e., Rational-Efficient theorists’ assessment of member participation and intra-party democracy. It has been pointed out above that these theorists view party membership solely in terms of the performance of electoral, vote-mobilization tasks. Epstein admits the implications of this basic premise:

This assumes that the principal electoral relevance of a party membership is to provide campaign workers. It leaves aside membership as a source of dues on the ground that there are easier ways of collecting campaign funds (except perhaps for a new working-class party without trade-union support). It also leaves aside membership as a means for programmatic communications between leaders and followers on the ground that this is not a strictly electoral function. The basic assumption is that the effort to sustain a mass membership is justified primarily by vote-getting considerations. If other purposes are served, as is likely, they are bound to be of secondary interest to party leaders and candidates who want to win elections.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{111}Valen and Katz write of Norwegian parties (especially the Labor Party): “It should be emphasized that the organization of the party not only permits such [policy] discussions at local levels but actually prescribes it.” Valen and Katz, Political Parties in Norway, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{112}Article 21, Section 1, of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany states: “The parties participate in the forming of the political will of the people. They can be freely formed. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for the sources of their funds.” Aronld J. Zurcher (ed.), Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II (New York: New York University Press, 1955; second ed. revised), p. 294. (Emphasis added.) The Party Law Commission appointed by the Federal Minister of the Interior interpreted this article in the following manner: “Democratic order in the sense of Article 21 of the Basic Law means . . . basing the organization and internal party policy decisions on the expressions of the will of the party members or of the representative bodies which are elected in stages by them. This presupposes a policy-making process which operates ‘from the bottom to the top’ within the party and stands opposed to authoritarian principles of organization and leadership of the party. The elimination or removal of an active and determinative influence on the part of the party members, a policy-making process controlled ‘from above’ or ‘from outside’ the party are contradictory to this goal of the Basic Law,” Rechtliche Ordnung des Parteiwesens: Probleme eines Parteiengesetzes (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1957), p. 157.

\textsuperscript{113}Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, pp. 113-14. (Emphasis added.) In the same context, Epstein admits: “This harsh efficiency-minded analysis neglects the possibility that a few local activists might want lots of members for their own non-electoral purposes” (p. 117). (Emphasis added.)
There is a strong tendency for Rational-Efficient theorists to regard membership participation as dysfunctional: “Most of the members, then, are not functional in an electoral sense. They may even be dysfunctional, since the time spent by local activists in recruiting them might be better used soliciting votes...”

Rational-Efficient theorists are thus critical of the notion of party membership; they are even more critical of the idea of intraparty democracy and of efforts by party members and activists to influence party policy, which they regard as the exclusive domain of elected public officials. Wilson contends that “internal democracy and a commitment to substantive programs would be as irrelevant to the selection of candidates and issues by a party as they would be to the choice of merchandise and sales programs by department stores.” He doubts that the main objectives of amateur Democrats — intraparty democracy and programmatic orientation — are “either desirable or feasible” for American parties. He does admit, however, that one’s views on this matter depend on “one’s conception of the nature of democracy generally.” Wilson attacks the notion of intraparty democracy on a broad front; in his view, it gives strategic advantage to the enemy; it leads to outbidding one another in the effort to prove their ideological purity.” It also leads the party organization further away from “that crucial middle ground on which all parties must stand if they are to appeal successfully for those crucial votes which are not committed to either extreme.” The attending publicity “can deprive such organizations of essential resources,” such as funds if public disclosure is required. Intraparty democracy hinders party discipline. Finally, in the United States, parties which practiced intraparty democracy would not effectively appeal to the lower classes and minority groups, reflecting the view of Wilson and Epstein that this type of American party is not only middle-class in actual composition but

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114Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 116. Epstein discounts the electoral utility of amateur clubs: “The clubs might even get in the way, as suggested earlier, by seeking less ‘marketable’ policies and candidates” (pp. 125-126).
115Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 344.
116Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 342. Wilson goes on to claim: “If the party is to be a competitor for votes, then the requirements of that competition will be, in most cases, the opposite of party democracy.... Internal democracy is harmless — and meaningless — when the interparty contest is hopeless” (p. 347). In his discussion of New York amateur Democrats, Wilson contends: “What is surprising is not that intraparty democracy is ‘inefficient,’ but that it is not a greater problem than it is” (p. 132).
a middle to upper-middle class organizational type of party. Schlesinger further illustrates this hostility to intraparty democracy by noting that American parties use a number of ingenious methods to ward off policy-oriented participants: "There are a number of methods whereby American party organizations have reduced the tensions which come from policy-oriented participants. Techniques of repulsion and insulation are both used."121

Questions concerning the role of the party membership in policymaking culminate in a discussion of the relation between the party (membership) organization and the governmental party (elected public officials) and the relative claims to policy influence by each.122 Epstein contends that the character of this relationship poses a fundamental question:

In many respects, this controversial point is at the heart of theorizing about the place of a party in a democratic political system. Two conflicting theories of representation are involved. In the older and more traditional one, elected public office-holders, individually and collectively, decide policy.... In the second theory, however, the office-holder is considered the agent, although he may be a leader, of an organized following that determines policy.... Thus the essence of the second theory of representation is not that it makes for policy agreement among a party's office-holders, but that it makes for this agreement as the result of decisions of an organized party membership.123

120Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 253; see also Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, pp. 122-26. Wilson takes the view of democracy expressed by Schumpeter (and other Rational-Efficient theorists) — a conception based on "the choice of leaders rather than policies." The political process is viewed from the perspective of elected public officials, who should be freer "from the vetoes of uninformed opinion"; opposed is "a system which will have enlarged powers for imposing vetoes on the judgment of elected officials" — officials who "will find a programmatic party a burdensome constraint." Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, p. 346.

121These include telling the would-be participants that "parties and government deal with matters of little importance," spreading the "notion that politics is unsavory," and isolating them in their own organizations, in order to "keep people with policy motives from invading the parties." Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," p. 772. Elsewhere, Schlesinger warns of the inflexibility which he sees associated with ideology: "How can a party, responsible for government, retain the flexibility necessary to respond effectively to complex international and domestic problems if it is controlled by men with strong ideological convictions?" Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p. 208.

122"So there are at least two possible foci of policy-making in a party with a mass membership attracted by the party program: the public office-holders, actual or potential, and the organized membership." Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 290.

123Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 292.
Duverger discusses three stages in the evolution of this relationship between the party organization and the governmental party, along with related variations in basic organizational units and control structure. The first pattern is that of policy dominance by the governmental party, as represented by the Rational-Efficient model of a decentralized cadre party; in this model, the party organization, which serves in a service capacity to elected public officials and which is subordinate to them, makes no claim for a role in party policymaking. This pattern is based on the first-mentioned theory of representation noted by Epstein. The second pattern is that represented by the Party Democracy model: it is based on the second theory of representation noted by Epstein. The second pattern exhibits a state of rivalry and tension between the membership organization and the governmental party. In the Party Democracy model, there are separate and potentially conflicting bases of power, and the membership does stake a claim to influence in policy-making:

If the membership is not always accorded an actual policy-making role, it is nevertheless certain that it is a potential claimant to the role. It could hardly be otherwise with a group whose organized existence owes so much to a programmatic commitment. The problem of how policy is made in a programmatic party revolves around the part to be played by the organized membership.

The membership organization, in theory if not always in practice, is accorded a strong influence on “their” elected representatives in public office. Valen and Katz, in discussing Norwegian parties, assert that “in other words the formal structure enables party members to have a very effective voice in determining the line which leaders of the governmental party will take, but whether members

124 “There exists a state of tension, if not of equilibrium, between the internal leaders and the parliamentary representatives.” Duverger, Political Parties, p. 190. The third pattern, that of party organization dominance in policy making, is represented by the cell-based, highly centralized party typified by the Communist parties.

125 “Yet the point remains that the public office-holders and the organized membership have inherently separate bases for claiming policy-making authority, and these separate bases can conflict.” Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 290.

126 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 290. Epstein admits that party members and activists, “it must be stressed, have certain democratic credentials for challenging the claims of the party’s public officeholders. These credentials do not exist in a cadre or skeletal party, where there is no substantial membership to provide the numerical basis for a democratic claim. ... It is such a basis that a dues-paying mass membership clearly provides” (pp. 290-91).
take advantage of their opportunities is up to them.”

5. Evaluative Criteria

The effectiveness of these two types of parties is judged in terms of different sets of criteria; the sole test of the effectiveness of the Rational-Efficient party is effective vote mobilization and electoral success. It is not how you play the game that counts, but whether you win or lose that is all-important. Although electoral success is important in the Party Democracy model in order to give party leaders power to accomplish established policy objectives, the main criteria are the effectiveness of policy clarification and intraparty democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
<th>Evaluative Criteria</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluative Criteria</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rational-Efficient Model</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Party effectiveness (criteria)</td>
<td>Sole criterion is electoral success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. View of opposite model</td>
<td>PD model viewed as inefficient in vote mobilization and inflexible.</td>
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Included in each model is a sharply hostile view of its opposite number, evidence of which can be seen throughout this essay. In terms of the Rational-Efficient model, the Party Democracy type is viewed as inflexible and unadaptable, often extremist, and inefficient in vote mobilization. Its greatest sins are its principled or

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127 Valen and Katz, *Political Parties in Norway*, pp. 89-90. “In Norway, however, party decisions are definitely the result of a mutual process of influence between the two subsystems”: the governmental party and the membership organization (p. 88). Which has greater influence on policy? “The formal structure of the party gives the decisive weight to the membership organization” (p. 89). This is particularly true of the parties of the Left: “The Communist and Labor Parties explicitly state that the party organization shall decide the party policies, and that the elected representatives have to follow these decisions. Similar provisions are not included in the statutes of the other parties. They have, however, established cooperation between party caucuses and membership organizations” (p. 66).
programmatic orientation, generally, and its allowing the membership to have a voice in policy-formulation, in particular. From the standpoint of the Party Democracy model, the Rational-Efficient party is considered to be too opportunistic, manipulative, merely an "electoral machine," and as lacking in "democratic legitimacy"—i.e., as lacking a large membership to participate in and thereby legitimize decisions, and as lacking internally democratic procedures.

No summary of the attributes of the two party models is really needed here. Each party model has its own frame of reference and internal logic. Each model rests firmly upon fundamental value premises; each model has potent built-in biases, including a rejection of the opposing model. This fact goes a long way toward explaining the biases of Duverger, who operates from the Party Democracy model, against American parties; and reverse biases of Epstein, who operates from the Rational-Efficient model, in favor of American parties and against the mass-membership party; and the criticisms of Wilson as a Rational-Efficient advocate of the amateur Democratic club parties, the closest American equivalent of the Party Democracy model. It is hoped that this attempt to portray systematically the attributes of these two party models has adequately illuminated the basic reasons for the lack of communication among scholars which has greatly hindered the comparative analysis of political parties.