PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS IN SENATE ELECTIONS

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Despite the diminished importance of partisanship, greater split-ticket voting, and a growth in Senate campaign spending, a party's presidential vote in the states remains positively related to its Senate vote in recent elections. We investigate to what extent presidential coattails are responsible for this association. State election returns for Senate and presidential contests are examined in presidential election years from 1972 to 1988. The analysis indicates that (1) presidential coattails exert a modest but significant influence on the Senate vote, probably affecting the election outcomes in twelve cases, and (2) partisanship remains a significant linkage between presidential and Senate elections.

Only presidential elections are better financed, are more competitive, involve more experienced and well-known candidates, and receive more media and public attention than U.S. Senate elections. As Abramowitz (1988, 385) aptly summarized, "The relatively small number of senators, the size and political importance of Senate constituencies, the length of Senate terms, and the special constitutional responsibilities of the Senate all contribute to the political visibility of individual senators." Much the same can be said for the visibility of Senate *candidates* generally.

The salience of Senate elections is evidenced in a comparison with House elections. Senate candidates are generally more familiar to the public than House candidates (Hinckley 1980, 446; Hinckley 1981, 23; Jacobson 1987, 111; Stokes and Miller 1982). They also spend much more on their campaigns. In 1986 the typical Senate candidate spent nearly 10 times what the typical House candidate spent. Senate seats are also generally more competitive than House elections. Fewer Senate incumbents go unchallenged; the rate of incumbent reelection is lower in the Senate than in the House (75% vs. 94% from 1968 to 1986); and the reelection vote margin of incumbents in the Senate is lower than in the House. From 1968 to 1986, nearly three-quarters of House incumbents were reelected with 60% or more of the vote while less than half of reelected senators won by that margin (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1987, 59–60).

The salience of Senate elections is also indicated by their ability to draw voters to the polls. By Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko's (1985, 505) estimates, a concurrent Senate election typically boosts turnout by about six percentage points. Although this is roughly half the turnout boost provided by a presidential race, it is, nevertheless, substantial and reflects the considerable importance attached to Senate elections by the electorate.

The salience attached to Senate elections raises an interesting question about

potential presidential coattail effects. Are Senate campaigns, like contests for the House and offices of lesser salience, subject to the influence of presidential coattails? Or are they free of coattail effects because of their greater public salience, financing, and visibility and the prominence of the candidates?

While significant presidential coattails have been found in House and state legislative elections (J. Campbell 1986a, 1986b; Born 1984; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983), research on presidential coattails in Senate elections has been relatively meager. Key (1958, 592–99) found that parties were able to hold or win a greater share of seats in states in which the presidential candidate ran well. Hinckley (1970), examining Senate contests in 34 competitive states from 1956 to 1966, found that deviations of the presidential and Senate votes from the states' simulated base party vote were positively correlated ($r = .70$). Deviations from the base vote were examined as a rough control for state partisanship. More recently, Stewart (1987) examined a general model of Senate voting, considering the vote-drawing powers or turnout effects of incumbents and challengers separately. He found that presidential coattails significantly affected the numbers of voters turning out to vote for both incumbents and challengers. The most comprehensive study of Senate elections to date (Abramowitz 1988), however, did not explicitly specify any presidential coattail effects.[1]

Of course, it is possible that presidential coattails do not extend to Senate candidates. While evidence of presidential coattail effects have been found below the level of Senate elections, these coattail effects may have diminished somewhat in recent years (Campbell 1986b; Ferejohn and Calvert 1984). Moreover, Senate races may have become so visible and candidate-centered that the association of a Senate candidate with a presidential candidate now conveys little new information to voters. Partisan associations linking candidates to each other as well as framing the public's view of campaigns may also have weakened sufficiently to further trim coattails.

Whatever relationship might exist between the presidential and Senate votes may also be the result of common causes rather than presidential coattails. Both votes ought to be affected by long-term partisan and ideological divisions. A party's presidential and Senate candidates ought to do better in states hospitable to the party and more poorly in states hostile to it.

This research attempts to determine to what extent and how presidential and Senate voting are related. More specifically, to what extent, if any, do presidential candidates offer coattails to Senate candidates?

Data and Variables

The data are from individual Senate elections held in presidential election years from 1972 to 1988. The starting point of 1972 is dictated by the lack of campaign finance data for earlier Senate elections. A total of 164 separate Senate elections were held in these five presidential election years. After excluding six seats uncontested in either the current or prior election, six races for which no comparable state partisanship data are available (Hawaii and Alaska), and two cases in which the state had cast a substantial presidential vote in a prior election for a third-party candidate, a total of 150 elections are left in the analysis. Of these 150 contests, Democratic incumbents defended their seats in 62 cases, Republican incumbents ran in 56 cases, and the remaining 32 cases were open seats.

Abramowitz (1988), Stewart (1987), and others have identified a number of influences on the Senate vote. These will be taken into account in examining for presi-

dential coattail effects. These variables are of two types: those suspected of influencing both the presidential and Senate votes and those suspected of influencing only the Senate vote.[2] Three variables are specified as common causes of the presidential and Senate votes: the state's partisanship, its ideology, and the general trend of greater support for Republican candidates throughout this period.[3] Four variables are presumed to influence only the Senate vote: incumbency, the prior vote for the Senate seat, the relative campaign spending of the candidates, and the divisiveness of the Senate primary elections.

Presumably, more Democratic and more liberal state electorates should cast a greater share of votes for both Democratic and presidential and senatorial candidates. On the Senate side, Abramowitz (1988) found significant partisanship and ideological effects. On the presidential side, the impact of partisanship on the presidential vote is writ in stone (A. Campbell et. al. 1960; Converse 1966; Rosenstone 1983, 46) and Rabinowitz, Gurian, and McDonald (1984) found the state-level presidential vote from 1944 to 1980 to be structured by both partisanship and ideology. The measures of both partisanship and ideology are taken from Wright, Erikson, and McIver's (1985) analysis of CBS-*New York Times* poll data in the states (their unweighted measure of the active elaborate).[4] The state Democratic partisanship measure is constructed from their state distributions of partisans. It is the percentage of Democratic identifiers in the state plus one-half of the independents and nonrespondents. The ideological tendencies of the states are measured as the percentage of a state's sampled population that claimed a liberal political orientation. Since both state partisanship and ideology are measured as constants for each state across this period, their effects on the Senate vote are specified as indirect —through the presidential vote, the prior Senate vote, and campaign finance advantages—as well as direct.

The presidential and Senate votes may also be related by a common trend. Bullock (1988), Petrocik (1987), Stanley (1988) and others have concluded that a secular realignment, most evident in southern states, has been underway throughout this period. This may be partly reflected in the string of Republican presidential victories since 1968, broken only by Carter's narrow win in 1976, following Watergate. It is also evident in congressional elections, despite the fact that the Democrats have controlled the House throughout this entire period and the Senate for most of it. The nationwide Democratic vote for the House exhibits a noticeable downward tendency throughout this period. The correlation between the election year and the national Democratic House vote for the eight congressional elections from 1972 to 1986 was quite strongly negative ($r = -.46$ and $-.72$ from 1974 to 1986). Of course, the trend favoring the Republican party may be accounted for in different terms. The Republicans, as the minority party, should be helped by a dealigning of the party system as well as by its realignment. The majority party has more to lose in the general weakening or breaking of party ties in a dealignment. For present purposes, it is enough to note that whether by realignment, dealignment, or both, the Republican party has enjoyed an electoral trend in its favor. However caused, a significant trend affecting both presidential and Senate votes may be responsible for some part of the correlation between the two votes and therefore must be taken into account. The trend variable in this analysis is simply a two-digit coding of the election year (e.g., 1972 = 72).

Abramowitz (1988), Kostroski (1973), and others have found that the wide variety of advantages and resources available to Senate incumbents has a con-

siderable impact on Senate elections. Based on these prior estimates of incumbency advantage, the Democratic vote should be greater for seats defended by Democratic incumbents and lower for seats defended by Republican incumbents. The incumbency variable is +1 when a Democrat incumbent is seeking reelection, −1 when a Republican incumbent is seeking reelection, and zero in open seat contests.[5]

A Senate vote may also be influenced by the vote in the previous election for that seat. Democrats may be expected to do well where they did well in the past and poorly where they did poorly in the past. In all but the few cases requiring special elections, the prior Senate vote was the statewide Democratic Senate vote six years before the current election year.

There is little question that the relative campaign spending of Senate candidates affects the Senate vote. The measure of campaign spending advantage used here is the difference between Democratic and Republican spending as a proportion of the total campaign spending by both major party candidates. Values range from +1 when all spending is by the Democrat to −1 when all spending is by the Republican.[6]

This measure has several virtues.

1. It directly compares one candidate's spending to his opponent's. The absolute value of a dollar spent in behalf of a candidate is presumed to be the same as a dollar spent in opposition to that candidate.

2. It controls for the expense of campaigns in various states and under varying circumstances; that is, it is undoubtedly more expensive to run a typical Senate campaign in New York than in Wyoming. The question is, How much more expensive is it to run a comparable campaign? The total spending of the two candidates, the index's denominator, should take this difference into account.

3. Since the numerator and the denonimator are in terms of the same dollars, there is no need to adjust for inflation. The index has the same value whether nominal or constant dollars are used.

4. It incorporates the notion of diminishing returns (Jacobson 1980, 40), without resorting to various curvilinear functions (e.g., natural logarithms, squared terms) that are less readily interpretable. As total spending increases, the impact of each additional dollar in either candidate's campaign should make less of a difference and this is reflected in the campaign spending advantage index.

The comparative campaign spending advantage is specified as having both an additive and an interactive effect. As Abramowitz (1988, 393), Jacobson (1978, 41), and others have shown, campaign finances are more important to challengers than to incumbents, since challengers must compensate for many advantages (e.g., voter recognition) that incumbents enjoy by virtue of having previously sought, won, and served in office. Given the coding of Democratic incumbents (1), the interaction of incumbency status and the campaign spending advantage index is expected to have a negative effect on the Democratic Senate vote.

If candidates face serious opposition in obtaining their party's nomination, they may be weakened in their general election bid. Divisive primary battles may deplete resources that would have otherwise been available for the general election campaign; create negative impressions about the eventual nominee (perhaps given greater credence since the attacks come from within the nominee's own party); and leave many of the party identifiers of the eventual nominee's party disappointed that their first choice failed to win the nomination (Southwell 1986). Previous research on divisive primaries has been inconclusive. Several studies conclude that divisiveness does no harm to a candidate's general election performance (Hacker 1965; Kenney 1988; Miller, Jewell, and Sigelman 1988; Piereson and Smith 1975). Others, however, find evidence that divisive primaries, as expected, weaken the candidate in the general election (Bernstein 1977; Born 1981; Kenney and Rice 1987; Lengle 1980). Given the inconclusive nature of

this research, it is appropriate to entertain the possibility of divisive primary effects.

Of course, all primary challengers are not equally damaging to, or indicative of, a candidate's general election prospects. Some challenges present only token opposition, indicate no real weakness of the eventual nominee, and arguably may strengthen the nominee's image as a viable candidate. Thus, the mere fact of a primary challenge does not measure the severity of the challenge. The severity of the challenge is measured as the winning candidate's margin over the closest rival. Following the logic of comparative advantage used in devising the campaign spending index and the previous work of Kenney and Rice (1987, 35), an index of the primary divisiveness advantage is computed as the difference between the Democratic nominee's primary margin and the Republican nominee's primary margin. Unchallenged nominees are scored as having a margin of 100 percentage points. The divisiveness advantage measure ranges from 100 (when the Democrat is unchallenged for the nomination and the Republican very narrowly wins nomination) to −100 when the Democrat squeaks by and the Republican goes unchallenged. If primary divisiveness is harmful to candidates, it should be reflected in significant positive effects of the variable as constructed.

Findings

The Presidential and Senate Votes

Are the presidential and Senate votes positively associated? Is there a relationship to explain? The two votes are, in fact, positively correlated over this period ($r = .37$; $b = .59$ with the Senate vote as the dependent variable).[7] The average Democratic Senate vote is about 53% in states carried by the Democratic presidential candidate. The typical Democratic Senate vote is a good bit lower in states where the party lost badly in the presidential race. Where Democrats received 40% or less of the presidential vote, the average Democratic Senate vote was less than 45%. Although the presidential and Senate votes are far from identical, they are nevertheless related. The question of how they are related can now be addressed.

Coattails

The regression results are presented in Table 1. These findings indicate that *presidential coattails do affect the vote for Senate.*[8] While not strong, presidential coattails are also not inconsequential. The presidential vote coefficient, as expected, is positive and statistically significant. A 10-percentage-point gain in a party's presidential vote in a state, according to this estimate, adds about two percentage points to the vote for its Senate candidate. Put differently, about 18% of the presidential vote carries over to the Senate vote.

The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimate of Table 1 assumes that the Senate vote does affect the presidential vote, that there are no "reverse" coattails. However, given the salience of Senate elections, this may not be an entirely safe assumption. Allowing for the possibility of Senate coattails in presidential contests, an overidentified Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) nonrecursive analysis was also conducted (J. Campbell and Summers 1989). The 2SLS results confirm the OLS findings. The 2SLS estimates of presidential coattails ($b = .16$, $t = 1.62$) are nearly equal to the OLS estimates and yield no evidence of Senate coattails in presidential races ($b = .02$, $t = .46$).

How much of a difference do presidential coattails make in Senate elections? The answer to this question depends in part on the magnitude of the presidential vote coefficient, but it also depends on the

Table 1. OLS Regression Coefficient Estimates for the Democratic Senate Vote

Variable	Coefficient	Standardized Beta	t-score
Constant	45.13	—	3.99*
Presidential vote	.18	.11	1.89*
Prior Senate vote	.23	.21	3.05*
Senate incumbency advantage	1.09	.08	.99
Senate spending advantage	13.85	.57	8.21*
Spending interaction with incumbency	-1.34	-.04	.82
Senate primary divisiveness	.01	.06	.96
Trend (year counter)	-.19	-.09	1.74*
State partisanship	-.04	-.02	.33
State liberalism	.16	.05	.86
Number of cases		150	
R^2		.69	
Adjusted R^2		.67	
Standard error		7.13	

Note: The dependent variable is the Democratic percentage of the U.S. Senate vote by state. All variables except the trend and interaction variables are constructed so that more positive scores are favorable to Democrats.

*$p \leq .05$, one-tailed test.

variability of the presidential vote and the baseline from which the variation is measured. The natural baseline for the two-party presidential vote, given the inclusion in the model of controls for the normal partisan state vote, is the 50% mark. Presidential candidates who win more than 50% of a state's two-party presidential vote can help their party's Senate candidate. In the elections examined here, the mean absolute presidential vote deviation from an even split of the vote was 8.6 percentage points. Given the estimate of coattail effects (b = .18), this translates into a mean coattail effect of 1.5 percentage points of the Senate vote. While typically modest in magnitude, presidential coattails are more sizable in some elections. In 18 of the 150 elections examined presidential coattails made more than a three-percentage-point difference to the Senate vote.

Of course, the ultimate "difference" is in affecting an election outcome. By the above estimate of coattail effects, coattails seem to have made the difference between winning and losing in 12 cases (8% of total).[9] In these 12 Senate elections, the winning candidate's margin of victory was less than the help he apparently received from presidential coattails. These 12 cases, the estimated effects of coattails, and the Senate election margins are presented in Table 2.

Not surprisingly, given the success of Republican presidential candidates in this period, each of the Senate candidates apparently owing his or her election to presidential coattails is a Republican. Most of these Senate victories attributable to coattails came in two years, in Nixon's 1972 landslide victory over McGovern and in Reagan's 1980 defeat of Carter. The four Senate seats won with Reagan's 1980 coattails were especially important. These gains gave Republicans a majority in the Senate for the first time since 1954, a majority they lost when these Senate seats were next contested in 1986. Given the magnitude of Reagan's 1984 landslide, it is

Table 2. Presidential Coattail Effects on Senate Election Outcomes

Year	State	Winning Senate Candidate	Presidential Coattail Effect (%)	Winning Senate Vote (%)
1988	Florida	Mack (R)	2.0 (R)	50
1988	Wyoming	Wallop (R)	2.0 (R)	50
1984	Kentucky	McConnell (R)	1.9 (R)	50
1984	North Carolina	Helms (R)	2.2 (R)	52
1980	Arizona	Goldwater (R)	3.3 (R)	51
1980	Idaho	Symms (R)	4.0 (R)	50
1980	New Hampshire	Rudman (R)	3.1 (R)	52
1980	North Carolina	East (R)	.2 (R)	50
1972	Idaho	McClure (R)	3.8 (R)	53
1972	Nebraska	Curtis (R)	3.7 (R)	53
1972	Oklahoma	Bartlett (R)	4.6 (R)	52
1972	Virginia	Scott (R)	3.5 (R)	53

Note: The winning Senate vote is the percentage of the two-party vote for the winning candidate. The presidential coattail effects are calculated based on the estimated coattail effect of .18 per percentage point of the presidential vote (see Table 1) and a baseline of 50% of the presidential vote. The coattail effect = .18 × (presidential vote% − 50%).

somewhat surprising that his coattails were only long enough to carry two Republican Senate candidates into office. Most recently, Bush's coattails helped Mack win an open seat contest in Florida by a narrow margin and helped incumbent Wallop fend off an unexpectedly hard challenge in Wyoming. Not surprisingly, the close presidential race of 1976 apparently failed to swing a single Senate race one way or the other.

Another way of assessing coattail effects in Senate elections is to compare them to coattail influences in House contests. As might be expected, given the prominence of Senate elections, presidential coattails for Senate candidates are not as ample as those for candidates for the House. According to estimates of presidential coattails in House elections (Born 1984; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1985, 107), a ten-percentage-point increase in a party's presidential vote adds about four percentage points to its House vote. This suggests that presidential coattails for Senate candidates are about half as long as those provided to House candidates.

Common Causes

While presidential coattails link the Senate and presidential votes, the association appears to be more of a result of common cause. Recall that the bivariate estimate of presidential vote's association with the Senate coattails was .59 (r = .37) while the multivariate nonrecursive estimate of its actual effect is just .16 (beta = .10). This suggests that presidential coattails account for about one-quarter (27%) of the overall association between the two votes. Factors affecting both the presidential and Senate votes must account for the remaining association between the presidential and senatorial votes. The effects of these common causes can be assessed by the estimated paths of the full model presented in Figure 1.

Of these common causes, a common partisan electorate is most responsible for much of the association between the presidential and Senate votes beyond coattails. The general ideological composition of a state is related to the presidential vote but is only weakly related to the Senate vote.

Figure 1. Causal Model of Presidential Coattails and the Senate Vote



And while there is a minor partisan trend over this period favoring Republican Senate candidates, there is no such trend at the presidential level (the presidential shift may have taken place before 1972).

Only state partisanship seems to affect both votes significantly. Not surprisingly, Democratic presidential candidates tend to do better in Democratic states and less well in Republican states. In terms of the Senate vote a state's partisan composition affects previous Senate votes, and there is some continuity to that vote. Moreover, the stronger party in a state is more likely to have installed its candidate as an incumbent and may enjoy those advantages in future elections. Finally, the more popular party in a state generally finds it easier to raise more campaign funds than the opposition, and this campaign-spending advantage is the single strongest direct influence on the Senate vote.[9]

Conclusion

There are two major findings of this analysis. First, even in the recent period of weakened mass partisanship and the rise of more highly financed Senate contests, presidential candidates have coattails that affect the Senate vote. This concurs with the findings of Hinckley (1970), Key (1958), and Stewart (1987). While the impact of presidential coattails is not dominant, it is significant and in a number of elections may have been decisive. The fact that presidential coattails are significant in a time of dealignment and for an office whose candidates and campaigns have perhaps made it least likely to be subject to presidential coattail influence testifies to the power of presidential candidates to organize and to influence the electorate beyond its vote for the presidency alone. Second—despite partisan dealignment

and the rise in ticket splitting—the partisanship of a state's electorate still makes a difference in both presidential and Senate contests. A good deal of the association between the Senate and presidential votes is a result of both votes coming from the same partisan electorate. Even in its weakened state, partisanship apparently still provides a strong cue for many voters deciding how to cast their Senate as well as their presidential votes.

Apart from affecting the immediate Senate election results, presidential coattails may have other consequences. They may influence future Senate elections. All things being equal, some portion of the Senate vote resulting from presidential coattails is likely to be lost when the seat is contested six years later in a midterm election, when those coattails are no longer available. Of course, as the effects of the prior Senate vote in the model suggest, Senate candidates may not lose all of the prior presidential coattail vote. Once voters have voted for a candidate, that candidate stands a good chance of holding their support and generally running a stronger campaign in the next election. If the direct and indirect effects of the prior Senate vote on the subsequent Senate vote in presidential years are any indication, Senate candidates should be able to hold more than half of their presidential coattail votes in their next election.[10]

Coattails may also affect Senate support for presidential proposals. From one perspective, senators in states carried by the winning presidential candidate may listen more closely to the president because their constituents, by their votes, have indicated their approval of the president. But beyond a desire to represent constituents, Senate candidates receiving coattail votes may be a bit more positively disposed, out of gratitude, to side with a president who had helped in their election. And even if modest in magnitude, coattail help, unlike state partisanship, is not a constant that can be taken for granted. Moreover, in addition to influencing the perspectives of some senators, coattails may on occasion determine which party wins the Senate seat; and this certainly has an impact on Senate decision making (Bullock and Brady 1983).

Of course, it is also possible that coattails are inconsequential in persuading senators to support the president. Presidential coattail effects are fairly modest and therefore may not buy much support. Also, Senate candidates can benefit from coattails whether presidential candidates do anything actively on their behalf or not. Thus, if senators regard coattails as an unintended spillover effect of the presidential candidate's personal campaign, they may not think presidential candidates deserve any extra credit. Finally, given the sequence of elections and limits on presidential terms, senators can be ingrates without fear of presidential reprisal in future elections.

Notes

1. Abramowitz (1988) did include public assessments of "party competence." In that analysis, the party competence measure may have accounted for some part of the Senate vote variance actually explained by presidential coattails.

2. The presidential vote percentages are from Scammon and McGillivry (1988). The Senate vote percentages are from Erenhalt 1983, 1985, and 1987 and Congressional Quarterly's weekly reports.

3. Short-term forces are also a possible common cause of the presidential and Senate votes. Wright and Berkman (1986) have shown that issue considerations do affect the Senate vote and these same issues may enter into the presidential vote. Presumably, partisanship and ideology effects incorporate a substantial portion of these issue effects, at least insofar as they affect both presidential and senatorial candidates. The state of the economy was also considered as a possible common cause (Fair 1988; Hibbing and Alford 1982; Radcliff 1988). Initial analysis of pre-1988 economic data, however, indicated that the inclusion of economic effects did not appreciably alter the regression estimates. It may be that economic effects are more national in nature and are filtered through reactions to the presidential candidates.

4. As in the original Wright, Erikson, and McIver

(1985) study, both partisanship and ideological scores for Nevada are adjusted to the more Republican and conservative simulated scores. See n. 5 in that study for the rationale and procedures involved in the adjustment.

5. Seats that were vacated since the last election and filled by appointment are coded as open seats, whether the appointed senator was seeking election to the seat or not. While in some respects an appointed senator has incumbent advantages of an elected senator, in other respects he does not. Most importantly, unlike the elected senator, he has not demonstrated to voters, contributors, and potential opponents that he can win the seat in an election.

6. Campaign spending data from 1972 to 1984 are extracted from *The Almanac of American Politics* (Barone and Ujifusa 1981; Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1975, 1979) and Ehrenhalt 1983, 1985, 1987. Data for 1988 are directly from a U.S. Federal Election Commission press release, "$458 Million Spent by 1988 Congressional Campaigns," 24 February 1989. Examining only the effects of campaign spending, the comparative spending measure accounted for more variance in the Senate vote (adj. R^2 = .61) than the natural log of both Democratic and Republican spending (adj. R^2 = .54).

7. The overall fit of the regression seems quite good. Insofar as the R^2 indicates goodness of fit, the Senate vote equation fits about as well as Abramowitz' equations. His open seat equation explained 55% of the variance (std. error = 7.4) and his incumbency equation explained 75% of the variance (std. error = 5.0). These figures are only suggestive and are not directly comparable since the analysis was structured differently (e.g., in terms of the incumbent's party) and covers both Senate elections held in midterms as well as presidential election years. Also, the Abramowitz analysis includes several significant but fairly subjective variables like scandal, controversy, and health problems.

8. Coattail effects are qualified by *seem to* because they are point estimates around which one may want to draw confidence intervals. Also, a second baseline of the normal vote was considered. However, since the effects of state partisanship or its normal vote have been included in the general model (Figure 1), using the normal vote as a baseline would seem to be controlling twice its effects.

9. The effect of the campaign spending advantage on the Senate vote may be a bit misleading. Undoubtedly, a financial advantage of one candidate over his opponent, if well exploited, yields some votes for the better financed candidate. However, some part of the effects attributed to the campaign spending advantage reflect the comparative qualities of the candidates themselves rather than the impact of money per se (Green and Krasno 1988, 889).

10. The unstandardized direct and indirect effects of the prior Senate vote on the subsequent vote is about .65. This indicates that 65% of the prior vote is carried over to the next election. Of course, this effect may be different for votes received on the basis of presidential coattails rather than partisanship, ideology, and the voters' past assessment of the incumbent. We might expect greater attrition of coattail votes. Also, presidential home state advantage and incumbency effects on the presidential vote were specified in Figure 1; but since neither influenced the Senate vote, they are not shown. Both were significant.

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