

## INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

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Perhaps the most important change in American Politics in recent years has been the reform of the delegate-selection process of the political parties. Much has been written about the effects of reform on the individual parties; however, the impact of reform on the party system is largely unexplored territory. The purpose of this article is to explore the consequences of intra-party reform for inter-party competition. More specifically, this article examines the thesis that a more open and democratic nomination process increases the risk of unpopular Presidential nominations especially for the majority party thereby disproportionately weakening that party's support in the electorate and increasing the likelihood of greater competition between the parties at the subpresidential as well as the Presidential levels.

To understand the possible consequences of reform for party competition, it is necessary first to examine the level and causes of party competition in recent years.

Like free-market economics, the performance of democratic politics depends on competition. As the theory goes, political competition pushes producer-politicians to their limits and presents consumer-citizens with the best available choices. Sev-

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eral theories of political parties and political coalitions contend that competition between parties is part of the "natural" political order. Analyzing coalition behavior from the parties' perspective, Anthony Downs in his Economic Theory of Democracy argued that under usual circumstances each party in pursuing its separate electoral interests should battle the other party for the support of the median voter on the political spectrum, dividing the electorate into two parties of nearly equal strength (Downs, 1957; Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970 and Robertson, 1976). From the perspective of the groups within the parties' coalitions, William Riker arrived at a similar conclusion (Riker, 1962). Riker concluded that it is in the interest of any member of a coalition to keep the coalition to a size that is just large enough to win -- no smaller, no larger. Stokes and Iverson, in their article "On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition," listed a number of other reasons for party competition (Stokes and Iverson, 1962). Among these reasons are the tendency of voters to notice and remember an administration's weaknesses and failures rather than its strengths and successes, the tendency toward discord within the governing party, and the tendency for the public's sentiments to alternate between the left and the right.

While all of the forces discussed by Downs, Riker, and Stokes and Iverson may well be at work, what is most striking about American party politics in this century is not the presence of competition between the parties, but rather the lack of competition. Setting aside the 1980 elections for the moment, the Democratic party has dominated American politics for nearly fifty years. The ineffectiveness of the Republicans to compete successfully with the Democrats is apparent from any of the four indicators of Republican strength charted over the last fifty years in Table 1. And as the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in different age groups

demonstrates (see Table 2), the imbalance between the parties is not limited to just the New Deal generation.

TABLE 1  
INDICATORS OF REPUBLICAN PARTY STRENGTH

DECADE	1930 - 1980			David's Index of Party Strength**
	Percent of Republican Membership of the House	Percent of Republican Membership of the Senate	Percent of Partisans who are Republicans*	
1930's	32%	31%	n.a.	39%
1940's	45%	41%	n.a.	42%
1950's	45%	46%	38%	42%
1960's	40%	36%	36%	45%
1970's	<u>38%</u>	<u>40%</u>	<u>36%</u>	<u>44%</u>
Median over all years (based on individual years)	40%	39%	37%	42%

\*Percentages are based on data from the Center for Political Studies. They are the percentage of strong and weak Republican identifiers of all strong and weak party identifiers.

\*\*Index is Paul David's composite B that averages the Republican party vote received in Gubernatorial, Senate and House races (David, 1972; 1976; and 1978). The figure for 1978 was not available.

TABLE 2  
RATIO OF DEMOCRATIC TO REPUBLICAN PARTY IDENTIFIERS

Age Group	BY AGE GROUP IN 1976	
	Ratio of Democrats to Republicans	
18-30	1.7 : 1 (267)	
31-40	1.2 : 1 (189)	
41-60	1.9 : 1 (385)	
61+	1.5 : 1 (353)	

Source: Recomputed from Table 2.5 in Crotty and Jacobson (1980). The data are originally from the 1976 Center for Political Studies survey. The ratio is the ratio of strong and weak Democratic Party Identifiers to strong and weak Republican Party Identifiers. The number in parentheses is the N.

Of course one can argue that the parties have been quite competitive if presidential rather than subpresidential elections are used to measure party competition. After all, Republican presidential candidates have won five of the nine post-World War II presidential elections. However, though these elections have been highly competitive, evidence of electoral competition is not necessarily evidence of party competition. Electoral results are the products of many considerations other than those involving the parties. Election returns may be evenly divided despite the level of party competition, because of the level of party competition or, for that matter, regardless of the level of party competition. While there is a problem in using any electoral data as evidence of party competition, the problem of using electoral data from presidential contests is especially serious.<sup>1</sup> Compared to subpresidential elections, voters in the more information-rich environment of presidential elections respond more to "short-term" factors and less to "long-term" factors such as partisanship (Stokes and Miller, 1962; Campbell, 1960; Hinckley, Hofstetter and Kessel, 1974 and Hinckley, 1981). Thus, we might well concur with Everett Carl Ladd's judgment that "outside contests for the presidency and a handful of other highly visible offices which have become, increasingly, media-bounded responses to individual candidates, and not partisan affairs, the GOP no longer can provide reasonably close, sustained competition" (Ladd, 1978: 3).

The relative strength of the Democratic party and the weakness of the Republican party is hardly news, but in light of all of the forces that should be fostering competition between the parties, we might well ask -- what's gone wrong? Why have the parties remained so out of balance for so long?

To be sure, the inertia of parties and voters has played its part in maintaining the imbalance between the parties. Parties and candidates are only able and

may only be willing to adapt their appeals gradually to the public's mood. For the voter's part, their partisan attachments are not taken lightly and so are not severed and transferred easily.

Change requires time, but there has been time. Something more is at work. There are cycles of victory and defeat that work against the forces restoring competition described by Downs, Riker, and Stokes and Iverson. The net effect of the push and pull to and away from party competition is a peculiar equilibrium in which the party system neither deteriorates into one-party rule nor develops into consistent and close two-party competition.<sup>2</sup>

Two advantages of the majority party over the minority party have offset, at least partially, the forces restoring party competition. First, the majority party has an advantage in the quality of candidates it can recruit and nominate. Because the majority party can swing more votes to its candidates in the general election, prospective candidates should be drawn by their ambitions to the stronger party and partisans who are potential candidates should feel encouraged to seek the nomination knowing that they stand a good chance of election if they gain the party's endorsement. As a result, the nominations should be more hotly contested (Key, 1958: 416). Conversely, a potential candidate's ambitions direct the candidate away from the weaker party and partisans contemplating candidacy have reason to be discouraged by the handicap of running under the weaker party's banner in the general election.

The second advantage of the majority party is, in effect, the incumbency advantage as applied to parties. Most obviously, since more members of the majority party are elected, the majority party benefits more from the incumbency advantages available to individual office-holders -- name recognition, familiarity, credit for particularized government ben-

efits, a more thorough knowledge of government, the experience of previous campaigns, the aura of legitimacy and respect accorded office-holder, and so forth (Mayhew, 1974 and Hinckley, 1980).<sup>3</sup> While these advantages are certainly substantial, the majority party also enjoys an incumbency advantage beyond the accumulation of these individual incumbency rewards.

The additional incumbency advantage of the majority party is derived from its ability to claim credit for general governmental benefits and the political skills and orientations developed by the party's office-holders in the process of governing. Because the majority party is commonly in control of the government, its members are regularly called upon to moderate and compromise their views so that the party can govern effectively. The party's office-holders are likely to develop greater political sensitivities, more "professional" political skills and orientations, because of this experience in governing.

The minority party usually has the unenviable duty of articulating views in opposition to the majority party so that the electorate is supplied with reasons for ousting the majority party from office and replacing them with the minority. The emphasis that the minority must place on articulating the differences between the parties unfortunately encourages ideological and "amateur-style" politics and provides little experience at compromise and "professional-style" politics (Wilson, 1962). Moreover, the party's office holders who are more interested in "professional" politics and in governing -- rather than opposing -- are frustrated in office and by their party. Ambitious and successful "professional" politicians cannot help but feel somewhat frustrated upon reaching the pinnacle of their careers only to be on the outside looking in at their colleagues in the majority controlling the reins of government. Is it

any wonder that many minority party politicians with a "professional" approach to politics adapt to the "amateur-style" and strategy of their brethren, reduce their political activities or retire completely from political life? As Charles O. Jones has observed in his study of The Minority Party in Congress, "there is a rather strong pull toward the 'minority party mentality'" (Jones, 1970).

The tilt of the party system towards the majority party is in part unavoidable. The majority party simply cultivates and reaps the fruits of victory — from individual office-holders claiming credit for particularized benefits to the party generally slanting policy towards the interests of its constituencies. But the minority's status as a permanent minority — permanent at least until some catastrophe realigns the electorate's "standing decision" — to no small extent is due also to the leadership of the minority party. It is ill-suited and ill-prepared to lead its party against the entrenched majority. As long as the destinies of the parties are left largely in the hands of the parties' elected office-holders, the minority party's status as a minority is likely to be reinforced.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, it not only explains the imbalance between the Democratic and Republican parties throughout much of this century, but may provide a clue to the future of competition between the parties.

#### Party Reform and Party Competition

In recent years the parties have undergone considerable change. Beginning with the McGovern-Fraser delegate-selection reforms of the Democratic Party in the late 1960's, the parties' internal operations have been significantly democratized.<sup>4</sup> This democratization took a number of forms but the most visible and probably the most important form was the

new dependence of the parties on a long series of primaries for the selection of national convention delegates -- an increase from seventeen primaries in 1968 to thirty-three in 1980. Although democratization of the parties may be desirable for its own sake, it has not been achieved without significant costs. By several estimates, "opening" the parties has had the unintended and unforeseen consequence of weakening or causing further deterioration of the parties -- a decline in the influence of the parties' organizations and leaders and an accompanying decline in the abilities of the parties to attract voters and to command their loyalties. As Jeane Kirkpatrick has persuasively argued, "the most important sources of party decomposition are the decisions taken by persons attempting to reform the parties" (Kirkpatrick, 1978: 2).<sup>5</sup> In choosing to open their internal processes, the parties made a tradeoff. They gained participation by party supporters at the expense of the political savvy and direction of the parties' office-holders and pols.


The impact of party reforms on the overall strength of the parties, though considerable, may not have been their only effect on the party system.<sup>6</sup> If democratization has weakened the parties, as it apparently has; it has not necessarily weakened each party equally. Reforms have weakened both of the parties in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense, the Republican party may have been weakened less than the Democratic party. In effect, while party reforms were unintentionally accelerating the decline of the parties, they also may have unintentionally increased the opportunity for greater party competition. The suspected relationships among intra-party democratization and strength and inter-party competition are presented in Figure 1.

The unequal impact of democratization is partly a consequence of the unequal political skills and the



Figure 1

The Suspected Relationships Among Party Democratization, Party Strength and Party Competition



different political orientations of the leadership of the two parties. The Democratic party can no longer count on direction from an experienced and very politically astute group of leaders as it once could. The influence of the Republican leadership within their party was also diluted; but, because of their status as a minority party, the Republican leadership was less experienced, professional in orientation and politically astute than their Democratic counterparts. Thus, in reform, both parties to some degree lost the benefits of their leadership's political acumen, but this loss should prove to be greater to the Democrats than to the Republicans.

Beyond their likely effect of diminishing the competitive edge of leadership enjoyed by the Democrats in the unreformed party system, reforms have set in place structures that should systematically work against a majority party, for a minority party and, therefore, for greater party competition.<sup>7</sup> On the Democratic side, opening the doors to the party accomplishes little in terms of building a stable winning coalition. In fact, reforms ought to make the maintenance of a stable coalition quite difficult. Openness violates the cardinal rule of practical politics for a majority party: if the voters' standing decision is in your favor, don't give them any reason to deviate from that decision. In the words of Chicago Democratic Committeeman Bernard Neistein, "don't make no waves" (Rakove, 1975: 211). Unfortunately, the waves of party discord are difficult to control in an open system.<sup>8</sup> On the Republican side, opening the party is a significant step toward building a strong coalition. Unlike the Democrats, the Republicans are in no position to place great value on the stability of their coalition. In the present party system, a perfectly stable Republican coalition in a normal election year is still a losing coalition. They need numbers, simple numbers, and it is precisely for the task of collecting numbers of supporters that the open party structures are best suited.

Of course, the internal processes of the parties are not the sole or even the most important cause of the parties' successes and failures. Parties do not live or die, thrive or wither, because of their structures and procedures. The ideas and the people of the parties are their staples and the ultimate reasons for their strength or weakness. But the rules do make a difference. They create an environment that can make it easier or more difficult for the parties' people to function and the parties' ideas to be expressed effectively. If the majority party holds a great advantage in the quality of their activists,

leaders and ideas, the party's dominance may be preserved despite the discord that might be unleashed by democratization. Conversely, the minority party will not solve its "numbers" problem just by opening its doors — potential supporters must be invited in and made to feel at home in the party. If the minority party lacks the quality of people and ideas to attract potential supporters, the party's rooms may remain empty even though the doors have been thrown open. This is to say that there is nothing inevitable about the effect of party democratization on party competition, but, whatever the distribution of political raw materials between the parties, party democratization presents an obstacle to continued dominance by the majority party and an opportunity for a revival of the minority party.

#### The Evidence: The Parties' Mistakes

The thesis that intra-party democratization facilitates inter-party competition is difficult to prove since it suggests an increased opportunity for competition rather than a necessary increase in actual competition. Despite this difficulty, some supporting evidence for the democratization-competition thesis can be drawn from the recent history of presidential nominations.

A party's competitive position is preserved by avoiding mistakes and embarrassments and, more specifically, by avoiding the nomination of highly unpopular candidates especially for the Presidency. True, as Ladd says, contests for the Presidency are at least as much matters of candidate images and policy issues as they are of parties. However, though a Presidential candidate's electoral success may poorly reflect his party's strength, it may affect both directly and indirectly the party's public image and, consequently, the party's future strength. Voters know parties by the candidates they nominate, particularly the candidates they nominate for President

(Trilling, 1976 and Fairlie, 1978: 18). In effect, presidential candidates may have generalized and enduring "coattails" for their parties. To the extent that a nomination process is more prone to making "mistaken" nominations in the majority party than in the minority party, it encourages party competition. Thus, by comparing the "mistaken" nominations of the parties under the unreformed and reformed nomination processes, we can infer the effect of reform on party competition. We can learn from the parties' mistakes, even if they do not.

The two clearest cases of "mistaken" Presidential nominations in recent party history are the nominations of Senator Barry Goldwater in 1964 by the Republican Party and of Senator George McGovern in 1972 by the Democratic Party. Goldwater received only 38% of the popular vote and 10% of the electoral vote. McGovern received only 38% of the popular vote and 3% of the electoral vote. Although both Goldwater and McGovern were spectacularly unsuccessful nominees, their nominations were achieved in very different ways. Consistent with the democratization-competition thesis, the Goldwater nomination can be traced to the leadership of the minority party and the McGovern nomination can be attributed to the opening of the majority party's nomination process.

The Goldwater and McGovern nominations differ in two important respects. First, the nomination process of the Republican party in 1964 was significantly different from the nomination process of the Democratic party in 1972. Compared to the nomination process that produced Goldwater, the system that produced the McGovern mistake was relatively open. Whereas the Republicans held seventeen primaries and selected 41% of their national convention delegates through the primaries in 1964, the Democrats conducted twenty-three primaries selecting 62% of their 1972 national

convention delegates. Moreover, the non-primary delegate-selection systems had been transformed between 1964 and 1972. So, even the 38% of the 1972 Democratic delegates selected through state conventions and caucuses were the products of a more open process than the 59% of the 1964 Republican delegates selected outside the primaries.

Secondly, the Goldwater and McGovern candidacies drew their support from very different parts of their respective nomination processes. This is evident in the candidate preferences of primary selected delegates and non-primary selected delegates presented in Table 3. Whereas Goldwater won his nomination despite the primaries, McGovern captured the Democratic nomination because of his success in the primaries.

The strength of the Goldwater candidacy rested on the support of the party's leaders. In a March 1964 Gallup poll, 48% of Republican county chairmen indicated their preference for Goldwater -- more than twice the support of his closest rival. Despite his popularity among party leaders, Goldwater was unable to attract widespread support among his party's rank-and-file. This fact was repeatedly demonstrated by weak showings in the polls and unimpressive primary performances. Writing shortly after the 1964 election, Clausen, Converse and Miller wondered "whether any presidential aspirant has ever contested so many primaries with as disastrous a showing and still captured the nomination of his party's convention" (Clausen, Converse and Miller, 1965: 325). The lack of rank-and-file support was confirmed by the polls. Goldwater ended the primary season as he had begun it -- with the support of about a quarter of Republican voters, little more than any of his three closest rivals (Keech and Matthews, 1976: 140).

McGovern developed his support in a very different way. Unlike Goldwater, McGovern was

Table 3

Delegate-Selection Mode by Delegate Preferences for the  
1964 Republican and 1972 Democratic Presidential Nominations

1964 Republican Delegate Preference	Delegate-Selection Mode*	
	Primary	Non-Primary
Goldwater	38%	68%
Others	62%	32%
	100% (541)	100% (767)
	chi-square equals 8.9 (significant at .01 level)	

1972 Democratic Delegate Preference	Delegate-Selection Mode**	
	Primary	Non-Primary
McGovern	65%	42%
Others	35%	58%
	100% (1875)	100% (1141)
	chi-square equals 5.1 (significant at .05 level)	

\*Source-The total number of primary and non-primary delegates were determined for Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President and Vice-President of the United States, compiled under direction of Felton M. Johnson, Secretary of the Senate, by Richard D. Hupman and Eiler C. Raunholt together with Robert L. Tienken (Washington: Government Printing Office, January, 1964). The preferences of the delegates are taken from the delegate count of U.S. News and World Report, (July 20, 1964): 36; before many of the pre-convention bandwagon effects had occurred.

\*\*Source-The total number of primary and non-primary delegates were determined from Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President of the United States, compiled by Richard D. Hupman and Robert L. Thornton under the direction of Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1972). The preferences of the delegates are those of the first ballot at the convention before shifts. National Party Conventions 1831-1972, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1976): 173

hardly a favorite of his party's leaders. In a May 1972 Gallup poll of Democratic county chairmen, just 8% named McGovern as their preferred candidate -- a far distant fourth place. But, also in contrast to Goldwater, McGovern was fairly successful in the primaries -- finishing first in eight of the fifteen he entered and performing well enough in others to attract essential public and media attention. Moreover, he was extremely successful in converting votes into delegates under the reformed and generally more proportional rules for awarding delegates (Lengle and Shafer, 1976).

Two nominations, of course, do not establish a pattern. It may be purely accidental that the leaders of the minority party nominated a Goldwater while the leaders of the majority party resisted a McGovern. However, given the rarity of nomination "mistakes" on the Goldwater-McGovern order and the great difference in the way these nominations were made, it may be more than mere accident that these "mistakes" fit the pattern suggested by the democratization-competition thesis.

It may be rightly noted that the nomination systems in question produced successful candidates as well as "mistakes." The more closed system nominated an Eisenhower for the Republicans in 1952 and the more open system nominated a Carter for the Democrats in 1976. It is not suggested that these nominations were in any way aberrations. Indeed, as has been stated previously, the system's impact is limited. Winners and losers may emerge from either system of either party. The point is simply this: the odds of nominating a successful candidate and avoiding a "mistake" have shifted favorably for the minority party with the opening of the nomination process thereby increasing the likelihood of greater inter-party competition.

## A Note on the 1980 Elections

I would be remiss if I did not consider the relevance of the 1980 election for the theory proposed here. Of course any single election is the product of a wide variety of factors, only one of which is the nature of intra-party processes. Thus it is difficult to say with much certainty whether an election fits a pattern or is an aberration. However, with this caveat in mind, the outcome of the 1980 elections seem to lend some confirmation to the preceding theory at some points and to have unclear implications at other points.

First, the 1980 election seemed to signal a resurgence of the minority party. Not only was the President elected from the minority party but more importantly, from the standpoint of the theory, the minority party made significant gains in the Congress and many state and local level offices. Moreover, the Republican National Committee and the party's Congressional Campaign Committees were very active. While some would consider 1980 an aberration and others would interpret it as the early stages of a realignment, the theory presented here interprets it as the beginning of closer competition between the parties. A decade of greater intra-party democracy may now be exhibiting its impact on inter-party competition.

A second facet of the 1980 election that is more troublesome to interpret is the Republican nomination of Reagan. Some may claim this nomination to be a mistake, though he ultimately was elected President. Certainly one may argue that the Reagan nomination was a greater gamble than the Republicans had to make. However, Reagan's eventual victory undermines the notion that his nomination was a mistake on the same proportions as the McGovern or Goldwater defeats. Moreover, even if Reagan's nomination were considered to be such a



mistake, the implications for the theory are unclear. The theory suggests only that the gap between majority party and minority party mistakes will narrow in a democratized system, not that the minority party's nominations will be error-free.

### Conclusion

The political reforms of the 1970's have significantly affected the fortunes of candidates, the parties and the political system in general. In particular, the opening of the Presidential nomination process, in the opinion of a number of political observers, has had the unintended and unanticipated consequence of contributing to the decline of the parties. Democratization of the nomination process has cost the parties much of the leadership influence required to adapt partisan appeals to suit public moods. And, as Scammon and Wattenberg have aptly noted, "politics in a democracy is the ultimate Darwinian activity: adapt or die" (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1980: 2).

The main argument of this article has been that the democratization of the parties may have unintended and unanticipated consequences beyond the weakening of individual parties. As well as affecting each party separately, democratization may affect the relationship between the parties. Because democratization dilutes leadership's influence in party affairs and magnifies the voices of ideological and candidate enthusiasts, the majority party's advantage of leadership is diminished; its ability to maintain peace within the party is impaired; and the likelihood of "mistaken," party-weakening nominations is thereby significantly heightened. The net result for the party system: greater prospects for close party competition. Although it is certainly premature to say with much confidence, the gains of the Republican party in the 1980 national elections may signal the beginning of this heightened competition.

If intra-party democratization facilitates increased inter-party competition as the thesis suggests, party reforms may atone at least partially for the damage they have done to the parties. If increased party competition can engender hope in a frustrated minority party and fear in a self-satisfied majority party, both party organizations may be moved to assert themselves more vigorously (Key, 1956: 132). The consequences of more assertive party organizations may be greater partisanship and greater partisan loyalty in the electorate than would otherwise be the case. Such invigorated parties still are susceptible to the damage of "mistaken" nominations, but are better able to weather these failures than complacent parties in similar circumstances.

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<sup>1</sup>Ideally, party competition would be measured by electoral data with all short-term forces removed, as in the "normal vote" (Converse, 1966), as well as all non-party related long-term forces such as ideology.

<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of the basic idea of equilibrium in the party system, see Sellers (1965).

<sup>3</sup>While incumbency generally offers advantages, it can quite possibly offer disadvantages if constituents become disgruntled with the incumbent's performance or general circumstances, even if beyond the control of the incumbent.

<sup>4</sup>For research pertaining to the various aspects of the reforms see, Crotty, 1979; Center, 1974; Pressman and Sullivan, 1974; Ranney, 1975; Ceaser, 1979 and Goldwin, 1980.

<sup>5</sup>Others who have drawn the connection be-

tween party reform and the decline of the parties include: Ranney (1979), Banfield (1980) and Ladd (1977). The relationship between party democratization and party strength is probably a good deal more complex than either the reformers or their critics would suggest. It would seem to be the case that democratization strengthens a party to the point that it cements citizens' attachments to the party without unduly interfering with the stewardship of party leaders. Shifting from a caucus to a convention nominating system may have strengthened parties in this way. But once democratization reaches the point that a party relies on oftentimes erratic citizen sentiment for direction, parties can lose their "character," as Henry Fairlie puts it, and citizens may thereby lose their reasons for loyalty. In short, the relationship between democratization and party strength is probably curvilinear.

<sup>6</sup>References to "party reforms" should not be construed narrowly to mean only those reforms made directly by the Democratic Party's delegate-selection commissions. Many reforms, most notably the expanded use of presidential primaries, are the indirect consequences of these reforms or the direct consequence of the same views that spawned and directed the reform commissions. The specific sources of democratizing reforms is not important to the argument of this essay.

<sup>7</sup>Key has offered a counter-thesis: that party democracy tends to discourage inter-party competition; that diminished leadership control of the party is a greater loss to the minority party than to the majority party (1956: 195). According to this thesis, intra-party democracy causes leadership in the minority party to atrophy since an important attraction for leadership, participation in the nomination process, has been removed. Leadership in the majority party, on the other hand, can be maintained in the

face of party democracy because of the rewards of holding public office.

<sup>8</sup>All ways of democratizing or "opening" the parties do not necessarily have an equal impact on the strength of the parties or on their competitive standings. The present fragmented and open system that gives the media a large role in structuring choices and greatly advantages "outsider" candidates at the expense of "insider" party office-holders is probably significantly more damaging to the parties than, for instance, a less fragmented though equally open regional primary system.

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