CHAPTER 2

The Concept of a Normal Vote

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In interpreting mass voting patterns, great importance is given to any signs of change that current balloting may betray. Patterns established in the past, even though they may nearly determine the outcome of the election, tend to be taken for granted, while results are eagerly scanned for departures from these patterns. These departures are then taken to represent the unique "meaning" of the electoral message or the beginnings of significant secular trends in partisanship for some segment of the population. Thus, for example, a minority party may lose an election but show "strong gains" in the popular vote. In many contexts, such gains are taken to define the flavor of the election more clearly than the identity of the winning party. Although it remains historically important that the majority party did carry the election, the primary message of the voting may reasonably be construed as a rebuke to the party in power, if not indeed a trend indicating the future rejuvenation of the minority party.

Although such fascination with change is entirely to be commended, it is more difficult to specify, in any particular situation, the actual character of the change. Such a specification presumes some sort of baseline against which the change is registered, and conclusions about the change vary according to the choice of baselines. This ambiguity is a constant source of comfort to official party spokesmen after an election, for a "moral victory" can be claimed on the basis of a rather wide variety of results.

When aggregate statistics are analyzed on some geographic basis, it is customary to choose as a measuring stick for change the *most*

recent prior election which is at all comparable to the current voting in turnout, level of office contested, and the like. This criterion of recency has both virtues and shortcomings. Most notable among its shortcomings, perhaps, is its insensitivity to the possibility that the most recent prior election was itself rather unusual. In that event, any observed change between the two elections may represent not so much a vital new reaction to the partisan scene as an absence of the peculiar forces which had characterized the benchmark election.

The obvious remedy for this shortcoming of a recency criterion in ecological studies is to establish baselines with a more extended time series of election results, through some averaging process. However, when the population is defined geographically, such extended series encounter severe problems because of population movement. Although geographical redistribution of partisans can be of extreme interest from the point of view of local politics, it is a confounding factor when the focus is on the changing reaction of individuals over time in a broader setting. If certain constituencies in Florida have shown dramatic secular trends toward the Republicans in recent years, it is important to determine whether this progression means some fundamental drift in sentiment on the part of native Floridians, or simply the influx of elderly and well-to-do Republicans from the North. In the latter case, the observed change in partisanship would not be an indication of any genuine re-evaluation of the parties; it would, in fact, indicate the stability of the evaluations of both groups over time.[1]

It has been documented that partisan preferences of individuals do tend to survive changes in residence very admirably, even when the voter migrates into strongholds of the opposition.[2] This fact, coupled with high American rates of residential mobility (particularly of the "short-hop" variety),[3] poses a severe dilemma for ecological

[1] Many observers have noted that the partisan vote division in most constituencies most of the time tends to shift back and forth between the parties in phase with national shifts in partisanship. This was the thesis developed by Louis H. Bean in *How to Predict Elections* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). See also V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,* Fourth Edition (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958, pp. 215–217). When a constituency departs dramatically from such a pattern over a substantial period of time, it is very often found to be a constituency undergoing unusual rates of emigration or immigration.

[2] A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, *The American Voter,* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960, Chap. 16, pp. 441 ff.

[3] The Census Bureau estimates that some 20 per cent of the current American population moves from one address to another in the course of a year. However, relatively few of these moves carry out of the area, state or region completely.

analysis. On one hand, there is pressure to work with the smallest geographical units possible, in order to isolate populations that are sufficiently homogeneous to be unlikely to mask real partisan change by compensating internal shifts in preference. On the other hand, the prevalence of short-distance residential changes means that the finer the geographical subdivisions, the greater the personnel turnover of a district between elections. For example, we feel it is necessary to distinguish between central cities and expanding suburbs in aggregate analyses, but such distinctions run afoul of the movement problem in the most distressing fashion. If we are interested in individual change and wish to extract baselines from long time series, we would be on much more solid ground to treat the metropolitan area as a whole, thereby keeping a very large part of the residential movement within the unit of analysis.

Complementary shortcomings are suffered by sample survey techniques. Here the problem of locating homogeneous groupings at differing points in time is relatively minor. If the universe is the nation as a whole, we can locate the set of people of white-collar occupations born in the 1920's in a succession of national samples, regardless of how they may have been geographically redistributed in the interim. On the other hand, sample surveys of the single cross-section variety provide much less reliable historical depth than district voting records, simply because of the unreliability of individual recall of past behavior.

Nonetheless, certain properties observable in data from the lengthening sequence of election studies conducted by the Survey Research Center lend themselves to the development of an operational construct of a "normal" vote, which may be estimated for any segment of the population on the basis of single-wave, cross-section survey data. Such a construct is, of course, primarily an analytic tool rather than a theory or a set of substantive findings. It suggests a means of splitting the actual vote cast by any part of the electorate into two components: (1) the normal or "baseline" vote division to be expected from a group, other things being equal; and (2) the current deviation from that norm, which occurs as a function of the immediate circumstances of the specific election. At the same time, the construct is an integral part of the theoretical view of the electoral process which we have been developing, and it makes possible a number of interesting deductions about the operating characteristics of the process in the current American period. In the following pages we shall first consider the conceptual underpinnings of the construct, and then discuss in nontechnical terms

the characteristics of the data which encourage this type of treatment.[4] Finally, we shall illustrate the empirical use of the construct.

Theoretical and Empirical Backgrounds

The voting record of the American public in the last decade has shown unusual partisan fluctuation. If we examine the national division of the two-party vote as measured biennially (the presidential vote and alternately, in off-year elections, the accumulated votes for Congress), we find oscillation which is as strong as any in the past century. Indeed, the movement in a single two-year span from a 42 per cent Democratic vote for President (1956) to a vote for congressional candidates approaching 57 per cent Democratic (1958) almost defines the limits of the range of variation in the national two-party vote division observable in two-party races over the entire last century.

This picture of dramatic short-term variation becomes even more interesting as we discover, in sequences of sample surveys across precisely the same period, a serene stability in the distribution of party loyalties expressed by the same public (Table 2-1). Furthermore, this is not the sort of net stability which conceals gross turnover of individual partisanship over time. "Panel" studies, which involve the reinterview of a national cross-section sample after intervals of two and four years, confirm a remarkable individual stability in party identification, even in this period of extravagant vote change.[5] It is clear that the electoral outcomes of the 1950's were shaped not simply by Americans who shifted their partisanship, but also by large numbers who indulged in what was, from their own point of view, "crossing party lines."

Indeed, the proportion of conscious defectors in our samples since 1952 supplies the numbers necessary in each election to account for partisan swings of the vote. That is, in 1952 and 1956, masses of Democrats expressed themselves as voting "this time" for Eisenhower; in 1956 in particular, the majority showed their continuing Democratic allegiance by returning to the Democratic column after they had made their choice for President. Similarly, Republican defections in 1958 outweighed Democratic defections in the same year, thereby creating

[4] For those interested in details, an extended technical note is presented in the Methodological Note at the end of this chapter.

[5] A panel study conducted by the Survey Research Center which involved interviews in 1956, 1958, and 1960 was supported by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation. Materials from this extended study will be treated in a forthcoming book.

TABLE 2-1

The Distribution of Party Identification in the United States, 1952–1964

	Oct. 1952	Sept. 1953	Oct. 1954	April 1956	Oct. 1956	Nov. 1957	Oct. 1958	Oct. 1960	Oct. 1961	May 1962	Aug. 1962	May 1964
Strong Democrat	22%	22%	22%	19%	21%	21%	23%	21%	26%	25%	23%	24%
Weak Democrat	25	23	25	24	23	26	24	25	21	24	24	22
Independent Democrat	10	8	9	6	7	7	7	8	9	7	7	7
Independent	5	4	7	3	9	8	8	8	10	9	11	10
Independent Republican	7	6	6	6	8	6	4	7	5	4	5	5
Weak Republican	14	15	14	18	14	16	16	13	13	15	16	17
Strong Republican	13	15	13	14	15	10	13	14	11	11	11	11
Apolitical (do not know)	4	7	4	10	3	6	5	4	5	5	3	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	1,614	1,023	1,139	1,731	1,772	1,488	1,269	3,021	1,474	1,299	1,317	1,465

the vast shift in the two-party vote division between 1956 and 1958. Once again, what is important to the current argument is not the shifting of the vote itself, but the fact that large-scale, and essentially unidirectional, defections occur while the participants continue to think of themselves as adherents to the original party.

Such facts make it useful to consider any particular vote cast by any particular group—the nation as a whole or some subpopulation—as consisting of a long-term and a short-term component. The long-term component is a simple reflection of the distribution of underlying party loyalties, a distribution that is stable over substantial periods of time. In any specific election the population may be influenced by short-term forces associated with peculiarities of that election (for example, a candidate of extreme attractiveness or a recent failure of party representatives in government) to shift its vote now toward the Republicans, now toward the Democrats. Therefore, although we start with a single variable (the vote itself) to be explained in any situation, we now commission two variables: the "normal" partisan division of the vote for the group over a long period of time, and the deviation of the group's vote from that norm in a specific election.

It is easy to see this stable central tendency to group voting patterns, as well as the short-term oscillation of actual votes around this central tendency, in many empirical situations. That is, if we erect time series of votes cast at a national level by politically interesting groups, such as organized labor, Negroes, the aged, and the like, we tend to find with monotonous regularity that sequences of the Democratic portion of the two-party vote behave as follows:

	Election				
	1	2	3	4	5
Group A	78%	70%	72%	82%	74%
Group B	48%	40%	42%	52%	44%
Group C	58%	50%	52%	62%	54%

This is, to be sure, an idealized pattern. Yet the degree to which large masses of empirical data on the votes of social groups approximate this idealized pattern is striking.[6] And such a pattern underscores the

[6] Most departures from such a pattern which can be observed for groups traditionally studied are too slight to be distinguished reliably from sampling error. The most dramatic exception came in 1960 when the Protestant and Catholic votes,

importance of distinguishing between long-term and short-term components, for it is clear in such cases that two radically different explanatory chores are involved. The first has to do with how the partisanship of Group A came to be established in the 70 per cent range rather than in the 40 per cent range of Group B. The second has to do with the dynamics of short-term variations shared across all three groups. The roots of the first phenomenon lie so deep in the past that it is doubtful if the data gathered can help to explain them. The second phenomenon is notable primarily because it lacks continuity with the past; the explanations lie clearly in the present. Other differences between Groups A, B, and C in an earlier day are likely to have some bearing on the first phenomenon, but they are likely to be entirely irrelevant in understanding the second.

The election outcome in the population or subpopulations, then, may be construed as the result of short-term forces acting upon a certain distribution of party loyalties which have characterized the population. For the moment we shall not try to paint in any specific content for these forces, save to observe a general distinction between *forces of stimulation* (which act to increase turnout) and *partisan forces* (which are pro-Democratic or pro-Republican in varying degrees of strength).[7] The hallmark of the short-term partisan force is, of course, that it induces defections across party lines, yet defections which are unaccompanied by any underlying revision of party loyalty. The model does not preclude the possibility that the distribution of underlying loyalties itself may change over time for a population, and the initial phases of such a change might well be marked by defections not yet accompanied by partisan conversion.[8] However, it is empirically clear that in the lengthening period of our observation, vote shifts have not been accompanied by conversion but rather have been followed routinely by actual return to the party of original choice.

Let us imagine that we have subdivided a population on the basis of a continuum of party identification, running from strong Democrats through Independents to strong Republicans. A subdivision of this sort has been common practice in all of our recent election studies.[9] If the distribution of the population in these classes remains

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after a decade of motion in tandem, diverged sharply. Such an exception, however, poses no theoretical problems; it is encompassed easily in the model which is compelled by the total series of our observations.

[7] For a fuller discussion of such forces see Chapter 3.

[8] For an expanded discussion of these points see Chapter 4.

[9] The primary party identification question is "Generally speaking, do you think

stable over time, large-scale shifts in the vote from election to election must arise from shifting proportions of votes cast within each class of party identifier. Actually, such motion could occur in a number of patterns to produce any given vote. Most of these, however, are rather fanciful. Empirical data over a series of elections suggest that this motion takes a very straightforward form. This key pattern is shown, in a form only slightly idealized from empirical data, in Figure 2-1.

Several broad observations can be made. First, the strains introduced in the behaviors of identifiers of differing party and strength (Figures 2-1*a* and 2-1*b*) fairly plead to be quantified in terms of direction and strength, according to the slope of the arrows. This leads immediately to the concept of net short-term partisan forces. As in other realms, the net force cannot be directly measured; rather, it is posited and measured in terms of its observed effects. In this case, the observable effects have to do with the defection rates of classes of party identifiers.

Second, to the degree that empirical data collected over time and under a variety of net forces (pro-Republican and pro-Democratic as well as differing degrees of strength) conform to such regular patterns, it is more a mechanical than an intuitive matter to estimate the characteristics of a "normal" vote, conceived as one in which the behaviors of Republicans and Democrats of differing strengths show no distortion toward either party. The regularity of the patterns means that they may be readily formalized in a limited set of rules. If, for example, we are told that strong Democrats in a particular election turned out to vote in certain proportions and defected at certain rates, we can deduce from this limited information the properties of the two basic sets of forces operating in the election, and thence we can predict with quite gratifying reliability the turnout and defection rates characterizing each of the other classes of identifiers. By interpolation a normal vote can be located within this pattern as one in which the net balance of partisan forces is zero (either because of an absence of short-term forces or because existing partisan forces are in perfect equilibrium), even though within a limited range of time an actual "normal vote" is

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of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Those who classify themselves as Republicans or Democrats are then asked, "Would you call yourself a strong (Republican, Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican, Democrat)?" Those who classified themselves as Independent were asked this additional question, "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?" Thus a maximum of seven classes are distinguished. These are often collapsed, as in this article, to five or three classes, in response to needs for greater case numbers per class, or under certain circumstances to assure monotonicity.



Figure 2-1. Varying strains induced on party loyalties by short-term net partisan forces. (*a*) Strong pro-Republican forces. (*b*) Mild pro-Democratic forces. (*c*) No forces; balance of forces.

never cast.[10] With some oversimplification, this is essentially the situation illustrated by Figure 2-1*c*.[11]

Finally, our stress on short-term forces should not obscure the fact that the normal vote associated with any population depends entirely on the underlying distribution of party loyalties, and that the actual vote in any election, although influenced by short-term forces, still is largely determined by that distribution. For example, a very Democratic grouping which casts a normal vote of 75 per cent Democratic may, under extreme pro-Republican forces, cast an actual vote only 60 per cent Democratic. Yet such a vote would remain much more Democratic than an actual vote generated by a grouping of predominantly Republican identifiers, even if the latter grouping were responding to extreme pro-Democratic forces.[12]

Operationalizing the Normal Vote Concept

We have now discussed at a rather general level a number of the conceptual and empirical considerations that encourage us to operationalize the construct of a normal vote for a population. In so doing, we have suggested that the behavior of classes of party identifiers varies

[10] In the simplest of all possible worlds, the vote at this zero-point might be generated by all self-confessed Republicans voting Republican, whatever the strength of their loyalty, and all self-confessed Democrats voting Democratic, with the limited handful of pure Independents split evenly between the parties. However, it is clear empirically that voters undergo a tremendous range of idiosyncratic influences on their votes, many of which (such as a husband requiring his wife to vote with him and not against him) lead to persistent pressures toward defection. The probability that any individual will succumb to such pressures is a simple function of the strength of felt loyalty. Thus, as Figure 2-1*c* suggests, even in a normal vote strong identifiers will vote in a more solid bloc than weak identifiers.

[11] The simplifications in the figure are several. Quite notably, classes of identifiers are arrayed in even spaces along the party identification continuum. We have no assurance that our measure discriminates such equal intervals. In fact, there is reason to believe that it does not. Without such a property, however, there is a severe problem in judging when, in the terms of Figure 2-1*c*, the arrows are indeed vertical. However, the figure is presented to convey the intuitive notion intended by the "normal vote."

[12] The underlying distribution of party identifications has a strong bearing not only on the partisanship of the actual vote, but upon the amplitude of the deviation which a given short-term force can produce. A grouping such as a cohort of elderly people is likely to have a U-shaped distribution, since party identifications strengthen with age, and is likely to be pushed less far by short-term forces of a given magnitude than a cohort of the very young, which shows a much more bell-shaped distribution of identifications, with few strong identifiers and many weaker ones.

systematically as a function of the level of stimulation accompanying a given election, and as a function of the short-term net partisan forces created by the election. We have suggested further that the normal vote represents nothing more than an interpolation within this patterned variation. To arrive at criteria for this interpolation we must first establish what the more general patterns are.

Short-term stimulation and turnout. It can be shown that in some instances strong partisan forces affect the turnout of different classes of identifiers, increasing the turnout of the advantaged party and depressing the turnout among its opponents. However, these instances are rarer than is commonly assumed, and it is a convenience to treat patterns of turnout as a function of short-term stimulation independently of partisan variation.

We cannot measure the level of stimulation directly. Nonetheless, the overall turnout figure for an election may be taken as a surrogate measure. Thus the relatively high turnout in presidential elections reflects high stimulation, whereas the sharp reduction in overall turnout in off-year congressional elections shows the greatly reduced stimulation. From this point of view, the most cursory inspection of turnout rates produced by different classes of identifiers over the range of elections that we have observed reveals a very clear pattern. When overall turnout is at a peak, as in 1960, Independents and weak identifiers are only moderately less likely to vote than are those who are strongly identified with a party. Thus a graph of the proportion turning out at each step across the party identification spectrum shows almost a straight line under conditions of very high stimulation (Figure 4-4). As we move to elections where turnout has been lower, however, we find that although strong identifiers are somewhat less likely to vote, Independents and weak identifiers are *much* less likely to vote. Hence as turnout declines, our graph shifts from a shallow slope to a V, and the V deepens as turnout declines still further (Figure 4-1). In other words:

> (1) *responsiveness of the turnout rate to the level of stimulation varies inversely with the mean strength of party identification.*

This "responsiveness" may be quantified quite congenially. Instead of erecting a graph election by election for all classes of identifiers, let us graph the variation in turnout for each class of identifier across five elections, as a function of the overall turnout in each election. Since this amounts to a part-whole correlation, it is of somewhat limited interest that these several graphs (five or seven, depending on the number of classes of identifiers we wish to distinguish) all strongly

suggest linear relationships.[13] What is important is that the slope of the linear function varies systematically with the strength of identification, being steeper for the least partisan and shallower for the most partisan, as the V-phenomenon would necessitate. Thus the slope of the function estimated for each class of identifier (least squares method) can be seen as a representation of the "responsiveness" of the class to short-term stimulation. And in view of the systematic variation in slope as a function of identification strength, the degree of fit of the empirical observations for each class to its own characteristic linear function is quite remarkable.[14]

Figure 2-2 gathers up the estimated functions for the several classes of identifier in a single graph, illustrating the covariation of slope and strength of partisanship.[15] We note as well that at each level of partisan commitment, Republicans are less responsive than Democrats to the degree of immediate stimulation surrounding the election. Thus the V, which characterizes low-turnout elections, is not per-

[13] It is somewhat more interesting to note that if we set aside the South as a special case, the Southern observations for each class of identifier across elections extend beautifully, in a lower domain of turnout, the line of observations pertaining to the non-South. The degree of fit of all observations to a simple linear function is so excellent where underlying case numbers are at all numerous that isolation of the South and addition of its observations separately to give ten data points for five elections does little to change the optimal function. Indeed, the linear function for each class of identifier has been estimated on the basis of ten observations rather than five among Democrats and Independents.

[14] The fit is poorest where case numbers are fewest (among Republicans), although it remains sufficiently good that one hardly hesitates to estimate an underlying linear function. Among both types of Democrats and Independents, where the South can be represented separately and the total range of variation in the independent variable is about 40 per cent, the observed turnout of the specific identification class departs from that predicted by its linear equation on the basis of overall turnout by less than 0.5 per cent in about one-quarter of the comparisons, and by less than 2.5 per cent in more than two-thirds of the comparisons. Given the known sampling error which must be attached to the observations despite the part-whole structure of the relationship, this degree of fit to the characteristic slope of each class of identifier leaves little to be desired.

[15] The several functions converge quite well upon the point (100,100). The character of the functions toward the opposite extreme is less clear, and we have extended each function only as far as observed values warrant. While we can imagine that Independents might drop completely out of the electorate in elections of 10 to 20 per cent participation, the part-whole character of the relations represented requires as well that the functions for strong partisans "warp" to meet the point (0,0). Within the range of observed variation, however, such warping is not foreshadowed. For the moment, then, we must remain ignorant of patterns of variation when turnout is extremely low.



Figure 2-2. Turnout within classes of party identifiers as a function of overall turnout in five national elections.

fectly symmetrical across the party identification continuum: the arm of the V toward the Democratic pole tends to sag (lower Democratic turnout). This lack of symmetry is of both theoretical and practical importance. We shall consider it more systematically in a moment.

Short-term partisan forces and defection rates. Where partisanship and rates of defection are concerned, we have already constructed Figure 2-1 so that it reveals in advance that parallel patterns of variation occur. That is, under the influence of short-term partisan forces, movement toward the advantaged party tends to be slightly sharper (by a percentage metric) in the center of the party identification continuum than it is at the extremes.

Thus it follows that:

> (2) *responsiveness of the vote division to short-term partisan forces varies inversely with the mean strength of party identification.*

Because underlying party loyalties in the nation as a whole have remained essentially constant in the last decade, we can take the national division of the two-party vote as an indicator of net short-term

partisan forces as they have varied from election to election and plot as we did in the turnout case the dependent variation in the vote division within each class of identifier.[16] Once again, the variation in slope across classes of identifiers commands our initial attention, and we find that these slopes correlate very highly with the set of slopes having to do with change in turnout (Figure 2-2). It is natural to reformulate propositions (1) and (2) more generally:

(3) *responsiveness to short-term forces varies inversely with strength of party identification.*

As was the case with the turnout slopes, the partisan slopes are asymmetrical across the party continuum, with Republicans of a given strength of party identification showing less susceptibility to change than comparable Democrats. Now, susceptibility to change, or what we have called "responsiveness to short-term forces," has been classically associated with low political involvement (the floating voter hypothesis); furthermore we know that although there is some direct correlation between strength of party identification and political involvement, Democrats of a given level of party identification tend to show less political involvement than Republicans of the same partisan commitment, even if the South is excluded from consideration. If we take stock of these partisan differences in involvement, we find that they match almost perfectly the turnout and partisanship slopes for the different classes of identifiers (Table 2-2).[17] It is hard to imagine that these measures are not reflecting a certain unitary underlying property which affects voting behavior and which, incidentally, leads to some asymmetry between the parties in the current period. We may suggest, then, that:

(4) *responsiveness to short-term forces varies inversely with the level of political involvement.*

The relationship between propositions (3) and (4) needs some further comment. We tend to view them as relatively independent

[16] The data points in the partisanship case fit linear functions a little more loosely than in the turnout case, indicating both greater scatter and, as will become clear later, an incipient departure from linearity. Nonetheless, the fit remains sufficiently good that estimation of functions requires little apology.

[17] Pearson correlation coefficients computed on the basis of five pairs of observations are not very useful. However, it gives some crude indication of the mutual fit of this triad of measures to note that over the five observations the correlation of turnout and partisan slopes is .97; that of turnout slopes with involvement means is −.98; and that of partisanship slopes with involvement means is −.97.

TABLE 2-2

Some Basic Characteristics of Classes of Party Identifiers Bearing on Responsiveness to Short-Term Forces

	Turnout * Slope	Partisanship † Slope	Mean ‡ Involvement
Strong Democrats	0.76	0.57	0.81
Weak Democrats	1.05	1.09	−0.01
Independents	1.29	1.21	−0.23
Weak Republicans	0.98	0.75	0.16
Strong Republicans	0.52	0.29	1.18

* Let x be the overall turnout in a specified election, and let y be the turnout of the indicated class of identifier in that election. For five elections (10 observations including South and non-South) the linear function $y = mx + b$ is estimated. The slopes recorded are the m's. A slope exceeding 1.00 means that the change in turnout of the indicated class as a function of election stimulation exceeds that recorded by the population as a whole; a slope less than 1.00 means that change in turnout is less than that of the population as a whole.

† Let x be the national two-party division of the vote in a specified election, and let y be the two-party vote division of the indicated class of identifier in that election. The partisanship slope is the m computed for the least-squares solution of the equation $y = mx + b$.

‡ The mean involvement is based on an index of two questions, in which positions are assigned and a simple integer scoring employed to extract means. The values themselves convey no ready intuitive meaning. While the general ordering of classes of identifiers in terms of mean involvement remains constant from election to election, the measure does show some responsiveness itself to party fortunes. Therefore the means presented are those summed across several elections.

propositions. That is, both political involvement and partisan identification can contribute independently to a reduced responsiveness to short-term forces. It is certainly true that political involvement and strong party commitment tend to occur in combination, and it is likely that the emergence of either in an individual facilitates the development of the other. However, the correlation is mild indeed, and it currently seems fruitful to assume two correlated entities rather than one underlying entity that we happen to be measuring by two rather imperfect means.

Similarly, it seems useful to view the asymmetrical distribution of involvement between the two partisan camps as a mere coincidence of the current period, albeit one which demands empirical recognition. That is, we do not conceive Democrats as less politically involved because the Democratic Party is in any direct way a less stimulating object of affection. The stream of events which led the South to become a one-party Democratic region is of another order entirely. Yet this piece of history is partially responsible for the current asymmetry. Outside the South, the asymmetry stems from the fact that the Democratic Party tends to attract people of lower education on the grounds of the self-interest of "the common man," and since education is quite sharply correlated with political involvement for a totally different set of reasons, this biasing of the Democratic group toward the less-educated brings in its train a less politically involved group. To the degree that we can erect a model in which these involvement differences between the parties are taken into account (perhaps simply in the scale scores assigned to classes of identifiers), we can at the same time succeed in representing these empirical differences between the parties in the current period, at the same time providing a structure to encompass future situations in which these involvement differences favoring the Republicans may be ironed out or even become reversed.

In sum, then, we find that observations from five national elections reveal relatively simple patterns of variation in turnout and partisanship as a function of short-term forces.[18] The key operational question which remains is one of locating, within the pattern of partisan varia-

[18] Since we have come to see responsiveness to short-term partisan forces and forces of stimulation as related to strength of party commitment in identical ways, the next logical step might be to unify our turnout and partisanship equations, thereby simplifying and generalizing the exposition. We shall not perform this step for several reasons, both conceptual and empirical. Our data indicate that it is useful to distinguish between nonvoting which occurs because the potential voter has failed to pass the various registration hurdles imposed by state law, or is sick or unexpectedly out of town on election day, and more "dynamic" sources of nonvoting, such as disgust with the alternatives proffered by the parties. If most nonvoting were of the dynamic variety, as is often thought, then it would be important to take joint account of turnout and partisanship. Instead, it seems that the frequency of "dynamic" nonvoting is negligible in high-turnout presidential elections, and becomes important if at all in low-stimulation off-year elections. In the same vein, there is evidence that the character of partisan forces "contaminates" turnout only among the weakest of partisans in elections of lowest stimulation, seen as more "optional" by the citizen. In short, we have ascertained with some care that we commit no violation on the current data by setting turnout aside as an independent problem.

tion, the "zero-point" that represents the rates of defection of the varying classes of identifiers which would be expected under a perfect balance of short-term partisan forces.

Interpolation of the normal vote. Intuitively, we might suppose that a normal vote would be located where comparable classes of identifiers from the two partisan camps show equal defection rates. That is, when there are strong pro-Republican forces, strong Republicans are much less likely to defect than strong Democrats. Similarly, in the election of 1958, when there was reason to suppose that net forces were somewhat pro-Democratic, strong Democrats were less likely to defect than strong Republicans. Hence a perfectly natural point of interpolation for the normal vote is that point at which the defection rates of strong Republicans and strong Democrats (or weak Republicans and weak Democrats) are exactly equal.[19]

In effect, we do pursue this stratagem. The matter becomes somewhat complicated, since the asymmetry of involvement between comparable identifiers of the two partisan camps leaves Democrats slightly more susceptible to defection than Republicans, even when identification strength and strength of partisan forces are equated. However, we shall leave consideration of this complication to a methodological appendix, and shall treat only the idealized case here.

The linear partisanship equations were useful in indicating the fundamental regularity of some of these phenomena, pointing up at the same time the annoyance of partisan asymmetry in involvement. As we have already observed, however, the fit of the empirical partisanship observations to the linear functions was slightly poorer than in the turnout case. And despite the coherence of slope differentials, extrapolation of these functions to extreme values made no particular theoretical sense, as it had in the turnout case. Another mode of organizing the partisanship data provides functions which make sense at extreme values, which produce a better fit with the observations, and which, happily, leave little doubt about an objective location for the normal vote.

Since we have become interested in the relative balance of defection

[19] There is less clarity as to what level of turnout should be presumed "underneath" the normal partisan division. Where the balance of short-term partisan forces truly represents an absence of forces, we should probably expect at best a low average turnout for the type of election being conducted. Indeed, we shall reserve the term "normal vote" for the situation in which turnout is to the low side of average for a presidential election in the current period. Fortunately, as we shall see below, this choice turns out to matter very little save in the instance of extremely Republican or Democratic subpopulations and extreme variation in turnout.

rates for Republicans and Democrats of comparable identification strength under varying short-term forces, let us simply plot this association for our sequence of elections. The new graph, once involvement complications are removed, lends itself to the simple formalization shown in Figure 2-3. The figure is less formidable than it may appear. Suppose we wish to know how different classes of identifiers would behave under moderately strong pro-Republican short-term forces. We need merely follow the appropriate ray from the origin (labeled simply "pro-Republican"), noting the points at which the ellipses for strong and weak identifiers are intercepted. Thus, under these partisan forces, we see that about 3 per cent of strong Republicans will defect as opposed to 6 per cent of strong Democrats, whereas about 12 per cent of weak Republicans as against 27 per cent of weak Democrats will defect. If we wish to reverse the partisanship of the forces, but maintain the same moderate strength, we find the same points mirrored above the natural midline of the figure (labeled $x = y$), for the figure is symmetrical around this midline.

The involvement problem disturbs the symmetry of the actual empirical functions which underlie Figure 2-3. However, this disturbance is slight, and it may be shown to reasonable satisfaction that correction for partisan differences in involvement restores the observations to



Figure 2-3. Defection rates as a function of short-term partisan forces.

symmetry (see Methodological Note at the end of this chapter). This disturbance aside, the "fit" of the empirical observations to the idealization in Figure 2-3 is exceptionally good. And, of course, to the degree that this presentation "accounts" for all of our data points under differing degrees and directions of short-term forces, there is no possible doubt about the location of the normal vote, which must of course lie along the midline ($x=y$) of the figure.

From this point it is a simple mechanical matter to establish the actual norms which are used in computing a normal vote. Assuming a presidential election with a turnout somewhat below recent average, the data suggest the following:

	Expected Proportion Voting		Expected Proportion of Two-Party Vote Democratic
	Non-South	South	
Strong Democrats	0.79	0.59	0.957
Weak Democrats	0.71	0.43	0.818
Independents	0.62	0.28	0.492
Weak Republicans	0.76	0.50	0.162
Strong Republicans	0.86	0.72	0.037

The vote division to be expected in the normal case from any particular population group can be computed by applying these norms to the proportions of different classes of identifiers represented in the group. If we take the recent American electorate into consideration in these terms, for example, we find that the sample estimates of the normal vote characterizing the population from 1952 to 1960 have centered closely around 54 per cent Democratic. It is, of course, no coincidence that this figure is a little more than 1 per cent higher than the average national congressional vote for the five elections of this period and is almost identical with such an average if the two elections in which Eisenhower headed the ticket are excluded.

Some Illustrative Applications

Ultimately, of course, our interest lies less in the technical characteristics of the normal vote construct than in the new information which it permits us to extract from our data. We turn, therefore, to a

brief illustration of the new types of substantive question which the construct encourages. We shall focus first upon the partisan implications of turnout variation when partisan forces are held constant at the zero or normal point, and second upon the information to be gained by dissecting the actual vote of a subpopulation into its long-term and short-term components.

Turnout variation. It has long been a matter of controversy as to whether the Republican or the Democratic Party tends to profit on balance from a general "non-partisan" campaign to stimulate turnout. If there has been a majority opinion, it has undoubtedly been that high turnout tends to favor the Democrats. Although this would seem on the surface to be a direct implication of our model as well, the matter turns out to be much more complex than appears at first glance. This is certainly true where changes in the strength or direction of short-term partisan forces are overlaid in systematic patterns on changes in the forces of stimulation, as is regularly the case in the alternation between presidential elections and off-year congressional elections. But it is true as well when we rule partisan forces out of the picture entirely.

Table 2-3 is constructed to represent this case. Rates of partisan defection established for the normal case have been applied to a range of levels of overall turnout, in accord with the equations underlying Figure 2-2. Hence the consequences of the differential turnout slopes

TABLE 2-3

Variation in Partisanship of Normal Vote as a Function of Changes in Turnout

	Overall Turnout *				
Hypothetical Population	25%	40%	55%	70%	85%
Preponderantly Democratic	74.7%†	72.8%	71.7%	71.3%	71.1%
Relative Partisan Balance	52.5%	53.4%	53.9%	54.2%	54.4%
Preponderantly Republican	14.3%	20.3%	23.6%	25.2%	26.5%

* The turnout proportion entered has been roughly equated with the proportions usually cited for elections where the base is the "number of eligible adults over 21."

† The cell entry is the per cent Democratic of the expected two-party vote when partisan forces are balanced, for the specified subpopulation and turnout level.

may be examined for three subpopulations of varying partisan coloration.

It is obvious that two dynamic components of the model will come into play as the turnout level declines: (1) "Independent" voters move out of the electorate more readily; and (2) Democrats are more likely to drop out than comparable Republicans. Table 2-3 illustrates the fact that of these two components, the first is notably more powerful than the second. The first component has the effect of strengthening any majority as turnout declines, whether that majority be Republican or Democratic. A subpopulation with a strong Democratic coloration, for example, is made up typically of a large number of identifying Democrats, a lesser number of Independents, and a still smaller number of identifying Republicans. In a high-turnout election, therefore, a substantial proportion of the total Republican votes cast by such a population come not from hard-core Republicans but rather from Independents, even though as a class these Independents are splitting their votes approximately equally between the parties. As turnout declines and these Independents drop out, the Republicans in such a case would suffer *proportionally* heavier losses than the Democrats. Hence low turnout would increase the Democratic majority.

The other component—lesser Democratic involvement—has some effect as well, with Democrats losing strength more rapidly than Republicans as turnout declines. This second effect is, however, much weaker than the first. The Democratic losses with declining turnout become notable only where the Democrats are in a small minority (the Republican subpopulation), and much of this loss is due rather to the first component—the general penalizing effects of low turnout on the minority party. Where this penalty hurts the Republicans instead (the Democratic subpopulation), the effect of lesser Democratic involvement is quite eclipsed, and majority Democrats gain ground despite declining turnout. In the middle, where the majority factor is nearly ruled out, the Democrats do lose ground with declining turnout, but remarkably little.

Perhaps more striking than these differential shifts in partisanship is the general insensitivity of partisanship to large changes in turnout. Partisan change quickens in the ranges where turnout is relatively weak, and it is undoubtedly true that bizarre effects occur quite readily in certain municipal elections where turnout may be as low as 10 to 20 per cent. But where presidential elections involving two national parties in some rough numerical balance are concerned, we see that shifts of 20 to 30 per cent in turnout scarcely make a per cent difference in expected outcome, provided that short-term partisan forces

remain in balance.[20] This latter clause is important, of course, since empirically it may well be that higher-turnout elections tend to be characterized by stronger partisan forces. However, it remains of some interest to see that turnout variation unaccompanied by shifts in partisan forces produces little partisan change, save at the most feeble levels of turnout. And although our data do suggest that Democrats are slightly penalized by low turnout *all other things equal,* it is not surprising that practical politicians in some areas swear that quite the opposite is true.

Long-term and short-term partisan components of the vote. As a second illustrative application, let us consider the increase in information which our data may yield if we employ the normal vote construct to break up any particular actual vote into its long-term and short-term components. We are particularly interested in those cases where some independent variable is thought to be correlated with only one of these two components. In any such instance, empirical correlations between the independent variable and the vote may be lacklustre due to the confounding influence of the other component, unless the vote itself has been broken into its components first.[21]

In some cases, of course, we may not know exactly what to expect of the relationship between the independent variable and the two components of the vote. When doubt arises, we may ultimately learn from the data what the contrasting correlations are, provided that we have gained some prior confidence in our analytic tools through work with situations in which theoretical expectations are quite clear. To create this confidence, we shall consider two instances in which our differential expectations are indeed so clear as to be almost trivial, at least from the point of view of the technician accustomed to data of this sort.

First, let us consider a case in which the religion of the voter is related in fair degree to the long-term component of the vote, but is not at all related to the short-term component. Such a situation might have been expected in 1952, when indignation at Democratic corruption, aggravation at the Korean War, and the attractiveness of the

[20] Hence our note above that the choice of turnout level for the normal vote, within the rather large range of turnouts presidential elections have produced, was not particularly critical.

[21] Since the long-term component of the vote (prior party identification) is always the more powerful of the two terms, predicted relationships are less strongly confounded when the independent variable related to an actual vote has reason to be related only to the long-term component, than when the independent variable has reason to be related only to the short-term component.

Eisenhower candidacy were primary among the short-term forces having strong pro-Republican impact. None of these elements has any obvious religious relevance in the strong sense that Kennedy's Catholicism had in 1960.[22] In short, then, although we know that there are abiding differences in partisanship between Protestants and Catholics, particularly if the South is excepted from consideration, there was little reason to expect that the short-term influences in 1952 would have much differential impact by religious category. And indeed, when the 1952 vote is divided into its components, we find that Catholic-Protestant differences did lie entirely in the long-term component:

	Long-Term	Short-Term
Non-South	Expected Proportion Democratic, Normal Vote	Deviation of 1952 Vote from Expected Vote
Protestants	44%	−13% *
Catholics	64%	−13%

* A negative deviation means a vote more Republican than normal.

In such situations, we may severely question the typical effort to "explain" the Protestant swing to the Republicans in one set of terms relevant to Protestantism, and then to search for another set of terms peculiar to Catholics to explain why the Catholic voters changed in a Republican direction as well. Obviously two groups can move in the same direction at the same time for different reasons, and this possibility must be kept open. Yet when evidence is strong that a certain configuration of forces produced the shift, and when these forces can only be given religious relevance, if at all, through somewhat subtle academic argument, it seems more reasonable to consider that religion was probably irrelevant to the dynamics of the particular vote. The long-term religious differences do indeed require explanation, but the fact that they turn up in the long-term component and not in the short is itself assurance that they have in no sense been caused by the specific features of the 1952 election.

[22] To be sure, analysts interested in predicting the voting trends among sociological groups in 1952 had surmised that Catholics, being more sharply anti-Communist, would evaluate the Korean War in a different light from that of Protestants, or that Stevenson's divorce would cause more Catholic than Protestant indignation. But as usual where hypotheses get somewhat subtle and indirect, the evidence for differential perceptions of this sort by religious category in 1952 is poor indeed.

It is equally easy to find illustrations of the opposite case, in which an independent variable is correlated with the effects of short-term forces, but is not correlated with the long-term component of the vote. We may continue with religious attitudes as independent variables, for we know that short-term forces in the 1960 election had unquestionable religious relevance. However, since Protestant-Catholic differences are "built into" the long-term component of the vote in the current period, we shall set aside Catholics entirely, restricting our attention to Protestants. Among Protestants, we argue, there is little theoretical expectation of correlation between attitudes toward Catholics and the long-term partisan component, but strong expectation of a marked correlation between such attitudes and the *short-term* component of the 1960 vote.

In 1956 we asked our respondents a battery of items having to do with their trust or distrust of political recommendations made by a variety of interest groupings in the population, including both "Protestant groups" and "Catholic groups." Responses to the two groupings can be ordered on an a priori basis to provide a scale of political anti-Catholicism, by placing individuals who distrusted Catholics and trusted Protestants at one extreme, and those who trusted Catholics and distrusted Protestants at the other extreme. For Protestants, of course, the latter extreme is vacant, although there is a fair range of variation from the anti-Catholic extreme through the neutral point to slightly pro-Catholic views (would distrust Protestants, but not Catholics, or would trust Catholics, would not distrust Protestants).

There is no systematic correlation between Protestants arrayed in this fashion and 1956 party preference. Furthermore, if we attempt to relate this 1956 measure to the vote cast by the same respondents in the 1960 election, we again find no regular differences in the predicted direction, despite the strong religious short-term forces in the latter year. The Democratic percentage of the 1960 presidential vote for these respondents reads:

Anti-Catholic				Slightly pro-Catholic
25%	40%	34%	36%	25%

If, however, we compute a normal vote for each category and then a 1960 deviation from this vote, thereby isolating the short-term component, we find a perfectly monotonic and rather close relationship:

Anti-Catholic				Slightly pro-Catholic
−23%	−18%	−12%	−11%	+3%

where a negative deviation means a vote more Republican than normal, and a positive deviation means a more Democratic vote. Hence this rather obvious hypothesis shows no results until the dependent variable is broken into components. Then the influence of prior anti-Catholicism among Protestants becomes quite clear.

The important point for our current purposes, of course, is not so much the immediate substance of these data as the utility of the normal vote construct in sharpening our analyses of the meaning of voting change. If citizens approached each new election tabula rasa, then there would be no point in analyzing long-term components of the vote. The stability of party identifications, along with the apparent functional autonomy they gain for many individuals over time, however, has been amply documented. On the other hand, if all channels of political communication were to be shut off, so that citizens were obliged to go to the polls with no new political information to evaluate, there would be no short-term component to analyze.[23] In reality, voting decisions involve a blend of these components, and it is illuminating to be able to split them analytically. The normal vote construct enjoys a theoretical rationale and a sound operational base for this task. And, as is perhaps the true proof of the pudding, when put to use it leads to empirical findings of clear theoretical intelligibility.

Conclusion

For all of these reasons, then, the concept of a "normal vote" which may be expected of some subgroup in the American population, or of the American population as a whole, has increasingly become an integral part of our thinking about the flow of the vote registered across the history of American elections. Within the recent period for which sample survey measurements are available, the actual computation of normal votes under differing circumstances provides baselines which become crucial in assessing the meaning of electoral change, as we shall see most notably in Chapter 5. But even for the prehistory of survey research, where normal vote divisions can at best be crudely esti-

[23] We will consider this contingency in Chapter 8.

mated from the general cast of election returns, the *concept* of an underlying normal vote remains crucial in finding new meaning in old statistics. It is to some of these insights that we now turn.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The problem of asymmetry of involvement. The asymmetry of involvement between comparable identifiers of the two partisan camps means that the empirical "balance point" in defection rates does not represent too accurately what we conceive as the location of the normal vote. One further logical step beyond points made in the text is required to understand why this is so. The fact that turnout varies more sharply among the weakly involved as a function of level of stimulation than it does among voters of stronger political involvement does not of itself assure us that at an individual level involvement is positively correlated with turnout in any specific election. It is quite apparent, both on common-sense grounds and empirically, however, that this is the case. Although it is slightly less apparent on the face of the matter, there is also reason to believe that there is a parallel positive relationship between involvement and party fidelity. This observation, coupled with the partisan asymmetry in involvement, means that if strength of party identification and strength of short-term partisan forces are held constant, Democrats are slightly more likely to defect than are Republicans.

Hence the normal vote cannot be simply conceived as one in which defection rates of comparable identifiers "balance"; rather, this empirical balance point must be expected to be one in which there is already a sufficiently strong pro-Democratic net force to make up for some small involvement-based delinquency in the Democratic camp. Or, correlatively, the normal vote will be one in which, for example, weak Republican identifiers remain slightly more faithful to their party than do weak Democratic identifiers.

Where Figure 2-3 (see text) is concerned, this means geometrically that the hyperbolic tracks best fitting the empirical observations should be slightly displaced from their symmetrical position about the axis ($x = y$). Actually, the displacement of the track for strong identifiers is imperceptible, and the symmetrical equation

$$xy = 15.6$$

seems a perfectly adequate fit. The heavy segment of this track near the origin represents the range which our empirical observations cover.[1] The track sug-

[1] The character of the range covered by the elections we have studied has some implications for the partisanship slopes of Table 2-2. That is, for any of the sym-

gested by the data for the pairing of weak partisan identifiers does indeed seem somewhat askew in the direction expected, however (fewer Republican defectors than the proportion of Democratic identifiers would lead us to predict if symmetry is assumed). It is possible to test the source of this asymmetry by controlling differences in involvement between the two sets of partisans, to see what defection rates would be were involvement levels equated. The data points corrected in this fashion do shift in the plane to a good fit with the symmetrical equation

$$xy = 336$$

and this track is represented by the heavy curve farther away from the origin.[2] All of these circumstances contribute to our confidence that involvement differences do account for much of any systematic asymmetry. They also suggest that quite in the spirit of some of our previous generalizations, the effects of involvement differences upon partisan defection are negligible where partisanship is strong, and become notable only among weaker partisans.

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metrical hyperbolas of Figure 2-3, $dy/dx = -c/x^2$. Therefore, where $x > y$, $\frac{dy}{dx} > -1$. Now if the symmetrical case pertained, and if we took a large enough sample of elections to arrive at a set of partisan forces averaging to zero, then $\frac{dy}{dx}$ would equal -1, meaning that the rates of change in partisanship with respect to changes in partisan forces would be equal between Democrats and Republicans. In this light, we can see that some of the discrepancy in slope between partisans of comparable identification strength in Table 2-2 is an artifact of our sampling of elections, in that we have oversampled cases in which $x > y$ and $\frac{dy}{dx} > -1$. It is our contention, however, that these partisan discrepancies are not entirely due to the biased set of elections we have observed. That is, while a more balanced sample of elections would reduce the partisan discrepancies materially, they would not erase them completely, due to the underlying differences in involvement.

[2] A comparable correction of involvement differences for strong partisans generates points which differ very little from the original points, and certainly suggests no systematic correction of the original equation. The correction does improve the fit of the observations to the function slightly, however. In general, we might note that the fit of the observed data to the equations is excellent in both cases. If the least distances (nonrectilinear) between the data points and the functions are computed, they average 0.7 per cent for the strong identifiers without any involvement correction, and 0.6 per cent after the involvement correction is made. The matter is less clear for the weak identifiers, where it is evident that the empirical observations require an asymmetrical function. A simple assumption as to the fashion in which involvement-based partisan asymmetry varies as a function of the strength of partisan forces produces an asymmetrical function which fits these skewed points very well. For our immediate purposes, however, it may be noted that the average deviation of weak identifiers from the *symmetrical* function which is optimal when involvement is not corrected is 1.4 per cent. This declines to an average deviation of 0.6 per cent relative to the new optimal symmetrical function when the involvement correction is applied.

Nevertheless, the intrusion of the involvement problem undermines the most mechanical location of the normal vote suggested by Figure 2-3: along the axis $x = y$. The proper normal vote configuration must lie on a ray from the origin $y = mx$, where m is slightly less than unity. There is no very compelling mechanical method, given the paucity of data points, for determining just how much less than unity m should be. Hence an element of the arbitrary or indeterminate cannot be avoided. However, the range of indeterminacy involved is narrow by any lights. That is, if Figure 2-3 has any merit, the available data would make it appear entirely unreasonable to choose an m which lies outside the bounds

$$0.8 < m < 1.0$$

And while there are no clear criteria for locating m within this zone, a shift in m from one of these bounds to the other only produces a shift of 1.2 per cent in the estimation of an expected vote for a representative distribution of party identifiers with turnout level held constant. Such indeterminacy is hardly grave.

To establish the norms presented in the text, we have chosen an m in the middle of this zone. From these data we extrapolated to locate a cutting point which is comparable on the linear partisan equation for Independents.

Computation of a normal vote for a specific population. Once the turnout proportions are applied to the five classes of identifiers in the relative numbers characteristic of the specific population, then these five new proportions may be considered a row vector x, with the column headed "Expected Proportion of Two-Party Vote Democratic" (text) being taken as a five-component column vector y. The normal vote for the group is then simply the vector product xy. A somewhat less cumbersome method gives a very good approximation of the normal vote where the distribution of partisanship is not extremely skewed to one side or the other. Let V be the proportion Democratic of the expected vote; let M be a "mean party identification" for the distribution, where scale scores $(+2, +1, 0, -1, -2)$ have been assigned to the five classes from Strong Democrats to Strong Republicans, respectively. Then

$$V = 0.268M + 0.483$$

the approximation being good to roughly ± 1 per cent, where $M < |\, 0.8 \,|$.

Other sources of indeterminacy. Before concluding our technical observations, it is important to point out that our measurement of party identification is adequate to the model but is not perfect. That is, there is a tiny handful of people in any cross-section of the American population whose professions of general party loyalty largely reflect their current vote intention or most recent vote. While it may be an empirical reality that they have no "general" loyalty, their claims of loyalty, shifting with their actual votes, makes the trend of the

division of underlying loyalties shift very faintly over time in periods of Republican or Democratic popularity. In other words it cannot be said that the division of party loyalties has been perfectly stable in the past decade, but only that it has been highly stable relative to the amplitude of variation shown by the actual vote.

Such respondents are so few in the population that the minor undulations which they produce in the division of party loyalties can never be reliably distinguished from sampling error. That is, if we compute an expected vote for each of our eight party identification readings between 1952 and 1960, we find that all of the readings lie within a band of about 4 per cent, although five of those eight readings lie in a narrow 1½ per cent range. Even the extremes of such variation could very reasonably be attributed to sampling error. The fact remains, however, that the most Republican of the eight readings was taken shortly before the Eisenhower landslide of 1956, while the most Democratic reading arose at the time of the 1958 Democratic sweep of Congress. This is probably more than accidental: the undulations do move slightly in phase with current partisan forces, as would occur if a handful of respondents in each year gave as a general loyalty a current vote intention. However, this undulation effect is slight at best, and its main influence in practice is to make for some little underestimation of the impact of short-term forces.

A second source of indeterminacy is of greater substantive interest. Far more often than not, it seems that cues from the world of politics which set up short-term partisan forces have a common valence, an "across-the-board impact" throughout the electorate. Thus, for example, there are not two sides to corruption as a political cue. Adherents of the erring party may defend against such a perception in a variety of ways, attempting to localize it in a wayward individual or maintaining some doubt that charges against the party are true. But the impact of the cue, individual partisanship aside, is unidirectional, favoring one party and disfavoring the other. Essentially the same may be said for a figure like Dwight Eisenhower, who failed to carry a positive valence only among the most extreme Democratic partisans resisting him on party grounds.

From time to time, however, there is an important political cue in an election which by its very nature has an opposite partisan impact for two different segments of the population. The Catholicism of Kennedy in 1960 provides a classic case: this basic cue set up strong pro-Republican forces for Protestants and strong pro-Democratic cues for Catholics at one and the same time. Now the basic model which we have laid out in order to locate a normal vote rests on data which reflect averaging processes at two levels: that of the individual weighing forces and deciding upon a vote, and the necessary averaging across individuals to arrive at aggregated data. Our question is whether, in the two-group conflict case, the cumulation of data across the two groups would still

yield a summary data point fitting the model, assuming of course that data from each of the two groups taken separately fit the model initially.

One can readily see that the cumulative estimate of forces operating in the case where two groups experience equal but opposite forces will depend very directly upon the relative size of the two groups. This is the sort of averaging across individuals which is a perfectly satisfactory implication of the model. At the same time, since the cumulation of results from two conflicting groups is a linear combination, one can see as well that if a point P on a hyperbolic track of Figure 2-3 represents the position of (e.g.) weak identifiers within Group A, while data from Group B produce a point Q on the opposite side of the axis $x = y$, the cumulation of the two sets of observations will give a data point which falls not at some intermediary point on the hyperbola, but rather on the chord PQ of the hyperbola. Thus the overall rate of defection summed over the two groups would be slightly higher than what one would have predicted if one had failed to recognize the conflict lines underlying the cumulation. And the possibility is open of somewhat slighter distortion in the estimate of the partisan balance of those forces.

Actually, the location of the data points fitting Figure 2-3 which would be cumulated in the conflict case are a complex function not only of the relative size of the groups, but of the degree of symmetry of the opposing forces around the zero point, the polarization of the forces, the correlation of the differential partisan forces with differences in prior partisanship between the two groups, and the like. Each of these factors, if given extreme values which are totally implausible from an empirical point of view, could introduce some distortion in the location of the cumulated data point; if all of these factors conspired at once in the proper extreme patterns, the distortion would be quite large indeed, representing an indeterminacy up to one part in four for the total likely range of variation in net partisan forces. Within the range of configurations which seem empirically plausible, however, the indeterminacy can be considered less than one part in fifty.

Discrepancies between the predicted and observed levels of defection in such combining problems are greater than are the shifts in the estimation of the net balance of forces on the cumulated groups. That is, factors which affect the location of the cumulated data point most strongly are factors which move the point toward or away from the origin more than "sideways" in a circle around the origin. The defection rate, for example, is most dramatically affected by the correlation of current partisan forces with prior partisan differences between the conflicting groups. That is, if a set of strong partisan forces had differential impact for groups A and B, where A is a Democratic group and B a Republican group, then other things equal the summed defection rates will be high if Group A is being pushed in a Republican direction while

Group B is being pushed in a Democratic direction; the rates will be lower than expected if the short-term forces coincide with prior partisan differences between the groups. But the estimate of the actual net partisan forces is not greatly affected unless other conditions are extreme.

The 1960 data provide a fine example of the good fit of the practical case despite mathematically possible indeterminacy. We have suggested that we would expect a cumulated data point for a given pairing of identifiers in Figure 2-3 based on results from two conflicting groups to fall on the appropriate chord of the hyperbola, and not on the hyperbola itself. However, this is true only if there is no correlation between the partisanship of the force to which the groups are subject and prior differences of party coloration between them. Other things constant, the cumulated data point shifts from the chord toward the hyperbola as some positive prior correlation of this sort is introduced. The point arrives at the hyperbola when the prior correlation is about .20. This is precisely the situation which pertained in 1960 between Catholics and Protestants, and it may not be too much to suggest that this is very likely to be the background situation in any case where cues have broad-scale, short-term "cleavage" impact. Thus the 1960 points, despite their clear base in the summation across conflicting groups, do indeed fit the model perfectly even when cumulated, in spite of the fact that the model had been largely formalized before the 1960 election had occurred.

Hence while there is mathematical room for indeterminacy in such combining problems, the practical effects we are likely to encounter are very limited indeed. This is particularly true if we restrict our use of the model, as in this paper, to a formalization which permits estimation of behaviors which would arise in a hypothetical normal case. For distortions in the estimates of net forces as a result of most of these sources of indeterminacy are at their minima when forces balance to the null case. If our use of the model does not extend to attempts at precise quantification of forces in particular extreme instances, then, the dangers of misleading distortions are slight indeed.