Epistemology Syllabus

PHI 634: Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

Spring 2008

Course Meeting Time: Tues., 3:00-4:50pm

Instructor: James Beebe, Ph.D.

Office hours: TTh 10:30-11:30am in 118 Park Hall; or by appointment

Office phone: 645-2444, ext. 118

Mailbox: 138 Park Hall

Email address: beebejames@yahoo.com

Course requirements:

Research Paper 75%

Class Participation 20%

Paper Topic 5%

Facts About Research Paper:

·You must write a paper on a topic in contemporary epistemology. If it’s not contemporary or it’s not epistemology, it is not permitted.

·Your paper topic must be approved by me. Written paper topic descriptions are due Mar. 18^th.

·Research papers are due May 6^th.

·Research papers must be at least 15 pages in length.

·I will employ the following penalty system for late assignments: Every day your assignment is late, you will lose one partial letter grade. E.g., if your grade would have been an A, it will be an A- after being one day late, a B+ after two, etc.

·I strongly encourage you to team up with someone else in the class and to read each other’s rough drafts, offering comments and suggestions.

Schedule of Topics

Jan. 15^th Introduction to Course

Jan. 22^nd Epistemic Internalism and Externalism I

Jan. 29^th Epistemic Internalism and Externalism II

Feb. 5^th Puzzles for Fallibilism

Feb. 12^th Skeptical Challenges

Feb. 19^th The Contextualist Approach to Fallibilism and Skepticism

Feb. 26^th Modal Illusions (presentation by Leigh Duffy)

Mar. 4^th Phenomenal Conservatism (presentation by Andrew Cullison, SUNY-Fredonia)

Mar. 11^th Spring Break

Mar. 18^th Epistemic Possibility

Mar. 25^th Knowledge and Assertion

Apr. 8^th Mathematical Skepticism

Apr. 15^th Epistemic Value

Apr. 22^nd Utilitarian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge (presentation by Steve

Petersen, Niagara University)

Readings

Epistemic Internalism and Externalism I

Required reading:

Laurence BonJour (1980), “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge” (photocopy from Midwest Studies)

Alvin Goldman (1980), “The Internalist Conception of Justification” (photocopy from Kornblith antho.)

Helpful background surveys:

Ted Poston (forthcoming), “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Stephen Hetherington (2005), “Gettier Problems” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/g/gettier.htm)

Jim Pryor (2001) “Highlights of Recent Epistemology” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52:95-124 (http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/52/1/95.pdf)

Other relevant articles:

Edmund L. Gettier (1963), “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23:121-123

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00032638/sp050129/06x0825s/0?frame=noframe&userID=80cdf735@buffalo.edu/01c0a8486400507eb3b&dpi=3&config=jstor)

James Beebe (2004), “Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties” (http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jbeebe2/Beebe%20Truetemp%20New%20Perceptual%20Faculties%202004.pdf)

James Beebe (2007), “Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth” (http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jbeebe2/Beebe%20Erke.pdf)

Epistemic Internalism and Externalism II

Required reading:

Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2001), “Internalism Defended” in Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Blackwell), pp. 231-260

(http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~feldman/papers/intdef.html)

William P. Alston (1993), “Epistemic Desiderata” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (http://www.jstor.org/view/00318205/di975041/97p00542/0)

Other relevant work:

Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (1985), “Evidentialism” Philosophical Studies 48:15-34

William P. Alston (2005), Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (Cornell University Press)

New approaches to epistemic externalism have been developed by John Greco, Ernest Sosa, Tim Black, Sherrilynn Roush, Michael Bergmann, and Duncan Pritchard, among others

Puzzles for Fallibilism

Required reading:

Linda Zagzebski (1994), “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems” Philosophical Quarterly 44:65-73 (http://www.jstor.org/view/00318094/di983090/98p0341g/0)

Daniel & Frances Howard-Snyder & Neil Feit (2003), “Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:304-327 (http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2003/00000066/00000002/art00003)

Other relevant articles:

Roy Sorensen (2006), “Epistemic Paradoxes” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [§3 only]

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/#LotLotPar)

Trenton Merricks (1995), “Warrant Entails Truth” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:841-855

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00318205/di975050/97p0304h/0?frame=noframe&userID=80cdf743@buffalo.edu/01cc99331600501c750bb&dpi=3&config=jstor)

Fred Dretske (1981), “The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge” Philosophical Studies 40:363-78

Baron Reed (2002), “How to Think About Fallibilism” Philosophical Studies 107:143-157.

Skeptical Challenges

Required reading:

Anthony Brueckner (1994), “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:827-835

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00318205/di975046/97p01954/0)

Keith DeRose (1999), “Responding to Skepticism” in Keith DeRose & Ted. A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford, OUP) (http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/derose_keith/responding_to_skepticism.pdf)

Other relevant articles:

Stewart Cohen (1998), “Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:143-159

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00318205/di014959/01p0008e/0)

Duncan Pritchard (2005), “The Structure of Sceptical Arguments” Philosophical Quarterly 55:37-52

(http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/documents/StructureOfScepticismProof.pdf)

Duncan Pritchard (2002), “Recent Work on Radical Scepticism” American Philosophical Quarterly 39:215-257

(http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/documents/RecentWorkonSkepticism.PDF)

The Contextualist Approach to Fallibilism and Skepticism

Required reading:

Keith DeRose (1992), “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:913-929

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00318205/di975038/97p0459c/0)

Stewart Cohen (1999), “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons” Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00294624/di020180/02p00304/0)

Other relevant articles:

Keith DeRose (1998), “Simple ‘Might’s, Indicative Possibilities and the Open Future” Philosophical Quarterly 48:67-82

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00318094/di015188/01p0006w/0)

Keith DeRose (1999), “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” Philosophical Perspectives 13:385-413

(http://www.jstor.org/view/00294624/di020180/02p00442/0)

Knowledge and Assertion

Required reading:

Timothy Williamson (1996), “Knowing and Asserting” Philosophical Review 105:489-523 (http://www.jstor.org/view/00318108/di007404/00p0005z/0)

Keith DeRose (1995), “Solving the Skeptical Problem” Philosophical Review 104:1-52 (http://www.jstor.org/view/00318108/di981358/98p03027/0) [§§15-16 only]

Keith DeRose (2002), “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context” Philosophical Review 111:167-203 (http://www.jstor.org/view/00318108/sp040003/04x0046t/0)

Other relevant articles:

Matt Weiner (2005), “Must We Know What We Say?” Philosophical Review 114:227-251 (http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/114/2/227)

Jennifer Lackey (2007), “Norms of Assertion” Noûs 41:594-626

(http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.x)

Helpful background surveys:

Matt Weiner (2007), “Norms of Assertion” Philosophy Compass 2:187-195 (http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00065.x)

Peter Pagin (2007), “Assertion” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/assertion/)

Wayne Davis (2005), “Implicature” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/)

Kepa Korta & John Perry (2006), “Pragmatics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatics/)

Mathematical Skepticism

Required reading:

Luciano Floridi (2000), “Mathematical Scepticism: the Cartesian Approach” in A. Kanamori (ed.) Analytic Philosophy and Logic (Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University), pp. 217-265

(http://www.philosophyofinformation.net/pdf/mscv.pdf)

Alan Baker (forthcoming), “Mathematical Skepticism”