

# Moving Up and Down the Ladder of Contention: Explaining the Intensity of Ethno-Nationalist Conflict

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## **Abstract**

The political expression of ethnopolitical communities spans three primary forms—electoral party politics, social movement protest behavior, and violent rebellion. Previous literature, however, has studied these three strategies in isolation from one another. We posit that the three forms constitute a scale of increasingly contentious activity; where politically feasible, communities that give rise to the most intense forms of political behavior will also tend to be engaged in lower levels of activity. Using a new, Guttman-scaled dependent variable and original data from the 17 autonomous communities of Spain, we test the ability of the predominant model of ethnopolitical conflict (Gurr 1993a, 1993b, 2000) to account for the full range of nationalist political behavior. This design effectively permits us to ask a central question: what incites nations to move up the “ladder of contention?” The findings show that there are crucial differences in what accounts for the movement along this ladder.

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Why do some national communities, such as Europe’s Roma or the Murcians of Spain, remain politically quiescent, while others, such as the Scottish or Québécois, undergo a “Quiet Revolution” that gives rise to a purely conventional electoral claims-making strategy or a non-violent social movement approach; while others still, such as the Corsicans or Basques, supplement those approaches with violent rebellious tactics? Moreover, why do certain groups, such as the South Tyrolians or the Catalans, flirt with violent rebellion before ultimately renouncing it, while others, like the Tamils or the Chechens, escalate to rebellion and don’t look back? To begin to answer these questions, we must address three separate issues. First, what impels a particular ethnonational group to begin contending in the first place? Second, when a group does choose to contend, why does it choose to employ conventional versus non-conventional forms of contention? And third, under what circumstances does a group choose to intensify—or, conversely, to moderate—its contentious behavior?

Previous theory-building on this subject has been constrained by the almost exclusive use of dependent variables that focus on only one form of nationalist political expression—voting, protest, or rebellion—in isolation from the others. The problem is that the impact of key theoretical variables cannot be compared and contrasted if these forms of contention are viewed in isolation from one another, nor can the connections among the diverse forms of political expression be ascertained if the actions themselves are examined independently. We posit that ethnonationalist actions should be viewed as a “ladder of contention,” with “no action” serving as the ground, electoral action as the first rung, protest as the second rung, and rebellion as the third. Those groups that make it to the third rung on the ladder of contention, we argue, will overwhelmingly have also used the second and first rungs on the ladder. We further posit that the pathways by which actors move up and down the ladder of contention are at least as if not more interesting than a group’s static placement on the ladder at any given point in time. The use of previously established dependent variables, however, makes the examination of these pathways an impossibility.

Consequently, we develop a new, integrated dependent variable that taps the intensity of the three primary strategic forms of contention in a single scale. Using multinomial logit on original data from the 17 autonomous communities of Spain over a 20-year period, we test the ability of the predominant model

of ethnopolitical conflict (Gurr 1993a, 1993b, 2000) to predict the various paths of action measured by this variable. In so doing, we gain something that prevailing tests of ethnopolitical conflict had not been capturing: the dynamic movement of nationalist actors along the pathway of contention. By employing the four primary factors in Gurr's model—identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities—in conjunction with our framework and new dependent variable, we are able to acquire a better understanding of which features of a group's environment tend to have an “escalatory” impact on contention (especially repression and contagion), and which others have a generally “ameliorative” effect (e.g., economic transfers). We find that there are crucial differences in what accounts for a community's shifts among electoral, protest, and rebellious political behavior. The results further intimate a process of the contagion of conflict intensity across both space and time.

### **Interpreting Nationalist Claims-Making—Electoral Politics, Protest and Rebellion**

Previous studies on the political expression of nationalist demands center on explanations of voting patterns, of non-violent social movement protest, or of violent anti-state rebellion. One of the most limiting features of existing research is, in fact, this almost exclusive focus on only one strategic form of political activity in isolation from the others.<sup>1</sup> The majority of the conflict processes literature focuses on the intensity of either nationalist protest or rebellion or, alternatively, on the move from no action to action. The nationalism literature, in turn, tends to concentrate on case studies of violent and non-violent behavior or on the likelihood or intensity of electoral participation. The resultant constraint on theory-building, and in turn on our understanding of nationalism writ large, is considerable.

Our studies would yield greater understanding were we to theoretically link the diverse political activities of nationalist actors. The conceptual umbrella that permits such a connection is the notion of

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<sup>1</sup> Exceptions include some recent work on why movements escalate from non-violent or violent contentious politics to civil war (e.g., Sambanis and Zinn 2004; Lichbach, Davenport, and Armstrong 2003).

*contentious politics*,<sup>2</sup> which Tarrow defines as “collective activity on the part of claimants—or those who claim to represent them—relying at least in part on noninstitutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state” (1996: 874). According to this idea, there is no essential discontinuity between institutional and noninstitutional politics; in fact, protest, rebellion, and conventional electoral politics should each be viewed as “one strategic choice among others” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996: 27). Working through the notion of contentious politics, our solution is thus to view protest, rebellion, and conventional electoral politics as strategic choices of differing intensity whose ultimate selection is dependent on the identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities of each ethnopolitical community.

The literature also contains useful prototypes of more appropriate empirical and methodological referents. We could in particular learn from the example of researchers in the domestic conflict processes field who have in the past attempted to integrate either different forms or levels of conflict. Most notably, the “potential for political violence” scale, the “aggressive behavior index,” and the “aggressive” and “democratic” participation scales of Muller and various co-authors (Muller 1972, 1979; Muller and Godwin 1984; Muller and Opp 1986) measure the varying *intensity* of violent and nonviolent political protest activity in a single variable. Davenport (1995), meanwhile, has developed a measure that taps the *strategic variety* of political activity (encompassing antigovernment demonstrations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, and riots) without ordering the intensity of that activity. And more recently, Benson and Rochon (2004) have developed an indicator of the intensity of conventional and nonconventional protest behavior in a cross-national setting. In short, the conflict processes literature contains important examples of efforts to integrate either the forms or intensity of political behavior. Unfortunately, such approaches have not crossed over to the study of nationalism.

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<sup>2</sup> This term is favored over “...the familiar triad ‘social movements, revolutions, and collective action,’ not simply for economy of action, but because each of these terms connects closely with a specific subfield representing only part of the [relevant] scholarly terrain...” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996: 17).

For this reason, instead of following past practice by examining in isolation levels of electoral contention, the extent of rebellion, or the magnitude of protest, we are interested here in something new—the development and testing of a syncretic methodological and theoretical framework that will allow us to examine the continuities and discontinuities among the three primary forms of political expression. When we apply this framework concurrently to the study of the full range of political behavior of nationalist groups—the participation in electoral politics, the engagement in social movement protest activities, and the violent rebellious actions of covert organizations—we can address the fluctuating, multifaceted relationships among institutional and non-institutional politics. We can in the process examine whether what motivates groups to engage in electoral politics is the same as what motivates them to engage in protest or rebellion. We can, furthermore, address the fundamental question of what incites nations to intensify or moderate their claims-making behavior.

### **Data and Specification**

To test our hypotheses, we utilize data gathered from a variety of sources on the 17 regions in Spain over a 20-year period (1977-1996). The unit of analysis is the *region/year*: data for all variables (except the three Spanish regime-level variables *democracy*, *democratization*, and *democratic durability*, which vary temporally) are coded individually for each region each year, for a total of 340 observations.<sup>3</sup> The analysis begins as the democratic transition (1975-1982) was in its initial stages and ends after the democratization process had been firmly entrenched, thereby affording ample variation in the regime-level opportunity factors central to the theoretical model. At the same time, the Spanish state contains a number of important ethno-political movements that vary in terms of strength, the use of violence, and outcomes.<sup>4</sup> In order to get a more realistic view of how nationalism does—or does not—develop, we must

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<sup>3</sup> Since three of our variables are lagged, 323 observations are used to estimate the coefficients.

<sup>4</sup> Yet, rarely do studies of nationalism in Spain take advantage of this multitude of cases. Most look separately at Basque or Catalan nationalism or, at best, compare the two.

account for this variation without sampling on the dependent variable.<sup>5</sup> The present design avoids this problem by measuring contention in all 17 historic regions of the country.

### **Dependent Variable: The Intensity of Nationalist Political Expression**

Since we are interested in what moves communities between more and less contentious forms of political behavior,<sup>6</sup> we operationalize the dependent variable, *Nationalist political expression*, as a scale of increasing militance. To create this measure, we first had to establish when nationalists in each of the 17 communities had engaged in contentious electoral, protest, or rebellious activities. To measure electoral strategies, we examined data on all regional elections in the post-Franco era.<sup>7</sup> Whenever the regional vote for nationalist political parties—such as the Basque Nationalist Party in the Basque Country or the Valencian Nationalist Bloc in Valencia—exceeded Spain’s five-percent threshold for political party

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<sup>5</sup> This has been a concern with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set, for example. Although MAR represents an excellent resource for testing an array of ethnopolitical phenomena, the data do not adequately incorporate weak or “potential” cases of nationalism (Fearon and Laitin 1997).

<sup>6</sup> As noted, the analytical focus is on the level of contentious activity within entire national *communities* (or groups), such as the Basques, rather than on the activities of specific nationalist *organizations* (e.g., ETA) acting within those communities. A national community is not a homogeneous entity; there can be numerous organizations—each with distinct strategies and goals—operating on behalf of it at any given time. The community-level study conducted here focuses on the determinants of the aggregate of these organizations’ contentious actions. Sambanis and Milanovic (2004) similarly employ the regional level of analysis in their study of post-WWII secessionist movements.

<sup>7</sup> These elections were held in 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995 in all regions except Galicia, Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country, which individually set the timing for their own elections. To increase the accuracy of the early scores, vote data from the national elections of 1977 and 1979 were also used. For years in between elections, scores were interpolated (Source: *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982 – 1996).

representation (i.e., when the vote was sufficient for a nationalist party to acquire a seat in the regional parliament), we considered that community to have generated an “electoral” strategy.

To measure the occurrence of protest and rebellion strategies, we utilized an ethnonationalist contentious event data set derived from a non-sampled investigation of the annual indices to the Spanish daily *El País* from 1977 – 1996.<sup>8</sup> These indices contain categorized summary reports of all articles appearing in the print version, and each summary report includes information on the time, place, actions, actors, and incidents surrounding each episode. Throughout Spain over the 20-year time frame of the study, information was recorded on 4,267 nationalist contentious events. Using the same classificatory scheme for each event as the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, non-violent events were coded as “protest” and violent events as “rebellion.”<sup>9</sup> Concurrently, each event was assigned a “region” label according to which of the 17 Spanish regions forms the basis of support for the ethno-political action. That is, protest demonstrations undertaken by “Galician” ethno-political actors were counted as “Galician” protest events, wherever the action took place.<sup>10</sup> We then considered an ethnonational community to have used a “protest” strategy for each year it generated two or greater protest events, and a “rebellious” strategy whenever it generated at least two rebellious events.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> An appendix on the replication site ([www.journalofpolitics.org](http://www.journalofpolitics.org)) contains further information on contentious event analysis, the sources used, and specific data-gathering and data-verification techniques.

<sup>9</sup> In MAR, violent events are generally coded as *rebellion*, non-violent events as *protest*. The exception is rioting, coded under *protest* due to the fact that the violence is not premeditated.

<sup>10</sup> In this data set, the region on behalf of which an organization struggles is almost invariably the same region in which the event takes place. The primary exception is ETA, which carried out violent ethno-political actions throughout Spain. These bombings are counted as “Basque” events.

<sup>11</sup> This threshold ensures the group uses protest or rebellion as a regular policy tool. Annual aggregation matches prior studies (Gupta et al. 1993; Davenport 1995; Ekiert and Kubik 1998; Krain 1998).

In examining the raw data, we find that there is a great deal of variation in the form of expression of nationalist demands both across time and across cases.<sup>12</sup> Immediately striking is that rebellion is not used exclusively by Basque separatists. Rebellious tactics are used at some point in time by organizations working on behalf of six of the 17 autonomous communities. Electoral and protest activity are more diffuse: each is manifest in 12 of the regions over the course of the study. Only three regions—Murcia, Madrid, and Castilla-La Mancha—fail to generate any form of nationalist contention from 1977–1996.

We utilize the above data to create an integrated scale of nationalist political expression.<sup>13</sup> Using a Guttman scaling procedure similar to that employed by Muller (1972, 1979), Barnes and Kaase (1979), and Benson and Rochon (2004), for each year we assign every ethnonational community one of the following scores depending on the highest level of political expression that takes place:

0. no claims-making
1. electoral expression
2. protest
3. rebellion

We posit that this scale is, essentially, cumulative in nature, where communities that contain rebellious behavior also tend to contain protest, and those that contain protest will also utilize electoral forms of expression. We find this assumption is strongly supported by the empirical evidence, which illustrates that of our 340 observations, there were only 21 “scale errors,” or instances in which a community coded as “3” on the *expression* scale did not also contain both protest and electoral nationalism, or in which a community coded as “2” on the *expression* scale did not also contain electoral expression of nationalism.

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<sup>12</sup> An appendix on the replication site ([www.journalofpolitics.org](http://www.journalofpolitics.org)) shows the presence of electoral, protest, and rebellion strategies in each of the 17 regions by year from 1977-1996.

<sup>13</sup> Summary statistics are available for all variables on the replication site ([www.journalofpolitics.org](http://www.journalofpolitics.org)).

This gives the scale a coefficient of reproducibility of .938.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, we find strong support for the proposition that ethnonationalist expression can be viewed as a “ladder of contention,” whereby a group’s placement on a higher rung of the ladder implies the use of previous rungs.

### **Accounting for Intensity of Expression: Identity, Incentives, Capacity and Opportunities**

The theoretical model we employ to explain the intensification of contentious nationalist behavior is the now predominant model of ethno-political conflict developed by Ted Gurr in two widely read books on the subject (1993a, 2000). Using the leading model will help us see both what is missing in prior tests of ethnonationalist political behavior as well as what is gained through our enhanced framework and research design. At the core of Gurr’s model is a theoretical synthesis of the central concepts of the three main approaches to understanding civil conflict—mobilizational capacity from resource mobilization<sup>15</sup> (Tilly 1978), incentives (primarily grievances) from relative deprivation<sup>16</sup> (Gurr 1970), and opportunities from structural political opportunity theory<sup>17</sup> (McAdam 1982). The chief theoretical adaptation to the model supplied by the nationalism literature (see especially Horowitz 1985) is the importance placed on

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<sup>14</sup> In addition, a  $\Lambda_2$  coefficient for reliability of .67 provides a “respectable” score. Guttman (1945) and DeVellis (1991) suggest that Lambda is actually a conservative estimate of scale reliability and that the true reliability is greater than the highest Lambda coefficient. We therefore deemed it unnecessary to use similar, but more complicated, scaling techniques such as a probabilistic Mokken procedure.

<sup>15</sup> Specific interest is placed on groups’ capacity to mobilize members in support of collective action.

<sup>16</sup> The central premise is that conflict will result when relative inter-group inequities generate grievances that give groups the incentive to rebel.

<sup>17</sup> The primary hypothesis is that there are certain relatively stable features of the political environment, such as “...the formal organizations of government and public politics, authorities’ facilitation and repression of claims-making by challenging groups, and the presence of potential allies, rivals or enemies” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996: 24) that fundamentally condition political behavior and thereby transform “any polity’s pattern of contention.”

group identity and cohesion in facilitating ethno-political mobilization and rebellion.<sup>18</sup> In short, Gurr posits that ethno-political protest and rebellion is more likely to develop within those groups that have the strongest, most cohesive *identities*; the greatest extent of grievances supplying the *incentive* to organize; the most elaborate networks and leadership capabilities that give them the *capacity* to successfully mobilize; and a set of external political factors furnishing the *opportunities* to mobilize against the state.

### ***Identity***

The cohesiveness of the ethno-political group's identity has proven difficult to operationalize on an aggregate basis (Gurr 2000). Our focus on a single country allows for a better approach—the use of subjective, survey-based group cohesion measures derived from the social psychology literature (Bollen and Hoyle 1990). Specifically, we utilize a survey-based indicator (*Identity*) that reflects the percentage of each region's population that believes their region to be a distinct “nation” rather than a mere “region” of Spain.<sup>19</sup> The greater the number of people with such a strong subjective adherence to the regional national identity, the easier it will be for nationalist movement organizations to mobilize the community at large.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to this subjective indicator of identity, we have one “objective” indicator, *Castile*. This dichotomous variable codes the five autonomous communities that comprise the historic Castilian “center” of Spain—Cantabria, La Rioja, Castilla y León, Madrid, and Castilla-La Mancha—as “1” and

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<sup>18</sup> This literature has long noted the importance of cultural markers and boundary-formation in ethno-political struggles (Barth 1969; Anderson 1991; Brass 1991; Calhoun 1993; Laitin 1998) as well as the distinctive, powerful psychological pull of appeals to the national group identity (Connor 1993).

<sup>19</sup> Surveys done in 1990, 1992, and 1996; values represent the average for each community in the three surveys (Source: Moral 1998). Values range from 1 for Murcia and La Rioja to 37.33 for Catalonia.

<sup>20</sup> Not only does this approach offer greater validity than anything possible in a large-N cross-national test (Bollen and Diez Medrano 1998), but the emphasis on the subjective element of group cohesion is a recognition of the fact that ethno-political groups are, in Anderson's (1991) sense, “imagined” communities—the cohesiveness of the group is not based on interpersonal contact among group members.

all others as “0.” These five regions should be much less likely to give rise to ethno-nationalist political activity, given that they are the historical, cultural, and political “core” of the country; in contrast, the remaining 12 communities are the historic “periphery” whose residents should be more prone to retain or develop a distinct ethno-regional identity. In utilizing both objective and subjective indicators of identity, our test should provide strong insights into the extent to which different levels of contentious political activity are dependent on historical and psychological conceptions of a distinct regional political identity.

### ***Incentives***

There are three basic categories of grievances in the model that lend a group the incentive to mobilize for political action: “(1) the extent of their material, political, and cultural disadvantages; (2) the historical loss of political autonomy; and (3) the extent to which force has been used to establish and maintain their subordinate status” (Gurr 2000: 73). All three categories are measured here.

#### **Collective Disadvantages—Unemployment, GDP per capita, and Central Transfers**

First, the concept of collective disadvantages, which refers to “socially derived inequalities in material well-being, political access, or cultural status by comparison with other social groups” (Gurr 2000: 71), has been specified a number of ways. Gurr and Moore (1997) included measures of political discrimination, economic discrimination and demographic distress; Moore and Gurr (1998) used economic, political and cultural discrimination; and Lindström and Moore (1995) tested a composite measure derived from seven discrete indicators of collective disadvantage (see also Scarritt and McMillan 1995; Dudley and Miller 1998). None of these is satisfactory for measuring the collective disadvantages of ethno-political groups in Spain. Not only are the objective conditions of deprivation denoted by “demographic distress” (poor health, high birth rates, resettlements, etc.) simply not found in democratic Spain, but there is little or no discrimination of any of the country’s ethno-regional groups in either economic, cultural or political terms.

There are, however, pertinent grievances in terms of inequalities in the “material well-being” of the groups studied. Gurr (1993a) argues that material grievances derive from unequal economic growth,

with lagging regional economic performance sharpening the communal sense of relative deprivation.<sup>21</sup> We therefore posit a strong negative role for regional *GDP per capita* (expressed as a proportion of the overall Spanish average of 100, adjusted annually) in the mobilization of grievance.<sup>22</sup> We also believe that the astonishingly high *Unemployment* (annual regional unemployment rate; source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística) that plagued many regions of Spain in the 1980s and 1990s could provide a potent material incentive for collective action. In addition, we posit that a re-direction of the country's wealth to a given region can act as a negative material incentive for the development of contentious nationalist activity.<sup>23</sup> We therefore include a measure of the total amount of central government funds transferred annually (in 1,000s of 2002 euros) to each of the 17 regions (*Source*: Fundación BBVA 2005).<sup>24</sup> We expect higher levels of *Central Transfers* to be associated with lower levels of contention.

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<sup>21</sup> There is some evidence that lower levels of GDP will not produce more intense grievances. First, growth per se does not necessarily lead to a redress of economic-based grievances (see, inter alia, Bookman 1993); in certain relatively well-off areas (e.g., Catalonia), regional leaders can feel they would be *even wealthier* were they to have been a separate country. Second, economic development leads to social change processes that create new and often more contentious forms of inter-group conflict. And third, wealth is associated with both social capital (Putnam 2000) and social mobilization (Deutsch 1954), which are posited to increase community mobilizational capacity. In short, there are good reasons for associating economic growth with either amelioration of grievances (Muller and Weede 1990; Auvinen 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2001) or the enhancement of ethnopolitical groups' mobilization potential.

<sup>22</sup> These scores (along with the updated Spanish average of 100) were available for each of the 17 regions for 1973, 1985, 1989, 1991 and 1993. Missing years between 1977 and 1996 were given scores via interpolation and extrapolation (sources: Rodríguez 1989; Heywood 1995).

<sup>23</sup> We thank an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point.

<sup>24</sup> *Central Transfers* covers spending and public investment in the areas of highways, dams and water projects, ports, education, and health, etc.

## Political Autonomy Grievances

The second category of incentives for mobilization derives from resentment over the loss of political autonomy (Gurr 1993a, 2000; Lindström and Moore 1995; Gurr and Moore 1997; Moore and Gurr 1998). In response to a predominant usage of objective, yet *indirect* indicators of grievances in the literature, Gurr (1993b) set out to directly measure “active” political autonomy grievances—that is, those that are actually felt or expressed by political actors. We employ a similar measure here (*Political Autonomy Grievances*) by summing the percentage of residents in each community who respond in favor of federalism or independence in periodically recurring surveys.<sup>25</sup> These respondents effectively desire greater autonomy for their home region than that allowed for under current arrangements; they presumably feel, by extension, a sense of autonomy-related aggrievement that could lead to mobilization into nationalist organizations.

At the same time, it is equally important to tap the “objective” indicators of potential grievances predicated on the loss of historical political privileges and autonomy.<sup>26</sup> We do this through *Historic*, which indicates the three “historic” nationalities of Spain—Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country (values of “1,” all other regions “0”). Given their long histories of separate political autonomy, these three regions should be much more likely to retain a sense of grievance that will give rise to nationalist political movements.

## Repression

To measure coercive government repression, the third category of collective incentives, we utilize the frequency count, or “protest policing,” approach used in Davenport (1995), Beissinger (1996, 2002), and della Porta and Reiter (1998). Two variables are employed—one region-specific and one country-wide in scope. First, *Repression* taps restrictions on political activity via the measurement of the annual

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<sup>25</sup> Surveys conducted in 1976, 1979, 1980 and 1990. Interpolation and extrapolation used to assign values for missing years (Sources: Ferrando 1980; Ferrando et al. 1994).

<sup>26</sup> We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.

number of injuries or deaths that occur during nationalist protest events in each region. Second, because the value of repression will always be “0” unless a community has actually engaged in protest (which would effectively cancel out any understanding of the impact of repression on the escalation to electoral nationalism or protest), we also use the *National rate of repression*, the annual number of injuries and deaths per protest event in the country as a whole (source: annual indices to *El País*, 1977-1996). To guard against reverse causality and to ensure that past repression is impacting current nationalist political expression (Gurr and Moore 1997; see also Davenport 1995), both of these variables are lagged a year.<sup>27</sup>

### **Capacity**

In addition to the strength of the ethnopolitical identity, three of the most powerful determinants of a group’s mobilizational capacity are size, territorial concentration, and control over a regional government (Gurr 1993b, 2000). The latter two are constants for the groups in this test: all are territorially concentrated and, since the early 1980s, each has attained a relatively high degree of autonomy in the form of regional governments. In effect, all of the groups have a relatively high capacity for ethnopolitical mobilization. Accordingly, the best way to tap variation in mobilizational capacity here is with *Relative population*, the group’s population expressed as a percentage of that of the entire country (source: Fundació Bancaixa 1995). We follow Gurr’s reasoning in expecting that, “Groups that are large...in proportion to the country’s population...are more likely than small groups to mobilize for substantial political action” (1993b: 175), primarily inasmuch as greater size facilitates the mobilization and organization of group members (Lindström and Moore 1995; El-Badawi and Sambanis 2002).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> While Gurr’s models (1993a, 1993b, 2000) do not examine the effect of ethnopolitical contention on repression, we agree with an anonymous reviewer that it is an important area of future inquiry.

<sup>28</sup> Some have recently speculated on the indirect role that size plays on rebellion via a direct effect on governmental practices. Fearon and Laitin, for example, argue that, “larger groups have more individuals willing to rebel for any given level of counterinsurgent spending, and this implies that they produce more damage for the state. In turn, this leads the state to fight harder to limit the damage...” (1999: 31).

## ***Opportunities***

Lastly, the more extensive the opportunities to engage in contentious activity, the more likely that community is to develop ethnopolitical movements. Inherent in the model is the idea that identity, incentives, and capacity are more important in determining the latent “mobilization potential” of ethnopolitical groups, while political opportunity structures (POS) have a primary impact on the timing and strategic choice between electoral participation, protest, and rebellion. The literature points to a variety of ways of operationalizing those domestic and external factors that expand the opportunities of the group to engage in contentious political behavior.<sup>29</sup> Gurr focuses on six key characteristics of the state and the ethnopolitical group’s relationships with external actors: support from external actors, the contagion or diffusion of communal conflict,<sup>30</sup> the expansion of state power, the level of institutional democracy, the extent and direction of regime change, and regime durability. With the exception of external support, which is not tested because none of the groups receive support substantial enough to impact the intensity of political expression,<sup>31</sup> all of these factors are included in the present test.

### **Democracy and Democratic Durability**

First, Gurr posits a strong role for the level of institutional democracy in mitigating the extent of ethnopolitical conflict. In particular, he argues (1993a) that the values and institutions of democracy tend to pacify the rebellious tendencies of potentially violent ethnic communities insofar as democratic states are less likely to rely on coercive means of social control (see also Gurr 1988; Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995, 1999; Gurr and Moore 1997; Zanger 2000). It is also argued

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<sup>29</sup> In an early overview, Tarrow (1988) found that the most common POS variables were regime type, state capacity and stability, elite divisiveness, repression, and the presence of enemies and allies.

<sup>30</sup> Contagion occurs when a group’s actions indirectly impact the strategic or tactical actions of non-kinship groups elsewhere; diffusion involves the direct spillover of rebellion from one region to the next.

<sup>31</sup> There was small-scale support of the Spanish Basques by the French Basques, which may have exacerbated the level of rebellion but was not instrumental in the choice to use this strategy.

that, the more durable the democratic regime, the more pronounced the characteristic practice of democratic accommodation under pressure becomes (Gurr 1988; Gurr and Moore 1997; Moore and Gurr 1998; Gurr 2000). For this reason, two measures of the relative openness of the political system are employed: *Democracy*, an annual indicator of the relative openness of the regime using Polity's popular democracy-autocracy index (Polity IV Project 2000); and *Democratic durability*, a dynamic measure of the number of years a country goes without major or abrupt change in its political institutions after a successful transition to democracy.<sup>32</sup> Because claims-making is effectively channeled towards conventional and non-violent unconventional forms of expression, we would expect a positive relationship with electoral expression and protest but a negative relationship with rebellion.

### Democratization

Gurr and others (Tarrow 1994; Moore and Gurr 1998; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001) have also found that the instability and insecurity engendered by democratic regime change can create a substantial, albeit transient, increase in the opportunities for group mobilization and contention.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, *Democratization*, a measure of the extent of change in the country's democracy score from the previous year, should be positively associated with ethnopolitical expression at all levels.

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<sup>32</sup> The variable is a count of the number of uninterrupted democratic years since transition to democracy. Though the democratization process began in late 1975, the transition cannot be considered complete until 1982—after the creation of the constitution, after regional autonomy negotiations with secessionist-prone regions, and after the failed military coup d'état of 1981 effectively de-legitimized remaining anti-democratic sentiments. Accordingly, the democratic durability count begins at "1" in 1983 (for 1977-1982, the score is "0").

<sup>33</sup> A growing literature stresses the inflammatory impact of regime change—and regime openings in particular—on ethnic and nationalist conflict (Huntington 1991; Horowitz 1993; Posen 1993; Olzak and Tsutsui 1998; Snyder 1999; Saideman et al. 2002; see Fearon and Laitin 2000 for an overview).

## Contagion

The occurrence of ethnopolitical conflict in outlying regions provides a model or “signal” for action for other contentious groups (Gurr 1993a, 1993b, 2000; see also Lindström and Moore 1995; Gurr and Moore 1997). Saideman (1998) and Gurr (2000) further contend that such contagion effects are most powerful among comparable groups in the same country. *Contagion*, the average annual *expression* score throughout the country, should, accordingly, be positively associated with the intensity of ethnopolitical strategic behavior.

## Nationalist Representation in Government

We next include a measure of the scope of state power at the regional level. Gurr (1993b), Lindström and Moore (1995), and Gurr and Moore (1997) found that rebellion diminishes the more thoroughly a state penetrates society, but the role of the variable as they operationalized it was primarily to delineate “hollow” developing states from the far-reaching states of the developed world (Gurr 2000). Since the Spanish state has a high level of capacity throughout the time frame of the study, such a traditional state power variable is not measured here. We can, however, operationalize an important component of state power in this model—that facet of state expansion that aims to assimilate minority ethnopolitical groups and restrict their collective autonomy and political access (Gurr 2000). Specifically, we utilize *Nationalist representation* to tap the extent to which ethnopolitical groups’ interests are incorporated into the state’s political decision-making processes. The logic is that, to the extent that a regional community’s demands can be met via conventional means—such as occurs in federal systems—there is less of a reason to resort to non-conventional claims-making in the form of protest or rebellion (Lijphart 1977; Beissinger 1996; Saideman et al. 2002).<sup>34</sup> All communities receive a score of 0 for their

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<sup>34</sup> In cross-national tests, it makes sense to operationalize conventional incorporation into the polity via autonomy statutes and the like. Since all of the Spanish regions attained a relatively high degree of political autonomy since 1980, however, further sophistication was necessary for the present test. Instead

respective pre-autonomic periods, and a score from 1 to 5 depending on the extent of nationalist political party involvement in the regional government: 1) no nationalist representation; 2) nationalists are minor partners in government (one seat in cabinet); 3) significant partner in government (several cabinet seats); 4) major partner (greater than 20% of cabinet seats); and 5) nationalist majority government (source: *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982 – 1996). Nationalist representation should be negatively associated with ethnopolitical expression.

### Lag of Expression

Lastly, to control for potential temporal dependence, we include a lagged version of *expression*.

## Estimation and Results

Our dependent variable, nationalist political expression, is categorical and hence requires a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure. Recall that communities are assigned annually a value from 0 to 3 depending on the highest level of political expression that takes place. In essence, these values form a reliable Guttman scale whereby 0 = no contention, 1 = electoral contention only, 2 = electoral plus nonviolent protest activity, and 3 = violent rebellious activities in addition to nationalist political party politics and social movement protest. As noted above, this scale captures the behavior of nationalist groups remarkably well, and allows for the consideration of how the key model variables listed above affect the likelihood as well as the intensification of the political expression of nationalist demands.

While the dependent variable is ordinal, there are several important reasons why we do not use an ordered estimation technique such as ordered logit. First, an Approximate Likelihood Test illustrates that our model does not meet the parallel regression assumption necessary for ordered logit ( $\chi^2 = 108.49, p \leq 0.000$ ). This is not surprising, as we would expect different factors (e.g., political opportunity structures) to affect electoral, protest, and rebellious behavior differently. Moreover, Hausman tests for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption illustrate that the dependent variable outcomes

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of merely measuring the existence of autonomy, we have also measured nationalist political parties' degree of involvement in the regional governments.

are distinct and that an estimation technique for nominal outcomes is appropriate (McFadden 1973; Amemiya 1981; Long 1997; Borooah 2001).<sup>35</sup> Thus, while nationalist groups do tend to move up the ladder of contention with great regularity, the well known determinants of contention do not have a monadic effect on moving groups from no action to electoral contention to protest and then to rebellion. Only with the use of this variable are we able to test, for the first time, the variegated impacts Gurr posits for individual components of the political opportunity structure on the different strategies of contention.

Consequently, we employ a multinomial logit (MNL) model with Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered on the region for all estimations. In so doing we are able to capture the odds of moving between categories of contention as a result of the influence of the independent variables. Table I illustrates how each of the independent variables changes the odds of moving from no political expression to electoral contention; from electoral to protest behavior; and from protest to rebellion. These outcomes are shaded in grey. As implied in our discussion above, we also find it instructive to look at the outcomes of the moves from no action to protest; from no action to rebellion and from electoral to rebellious action. These outcomes are unshaded in the table. Overall, these logit estimations tell us how changes in the identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities of ethnonational communities affect their odds of moving up and down the ladder of contention.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> To ensure that the odds of each of the dependent variable outcomes was independent of all other dependent variable outcomes, we ran a series of Hausman tests. The  $p$  values of these tests were all well above the 0.10 level. For example, with protest we obtained a  $\chi^2$  of 1.967 ( $p = 1.000$ ) relative to no contention, a  $\chi^2$  of 0.00 ( $p = 1.000$ ) relative to electoral contention, and a  $\chi^2$  of 0.474 ( $p = 1.000$ ) relative to rebellion. Consequently, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the odds of outcome<sub>j</sub> versus outcome<sub>k</sub> are independent of other alternatives. In addition, Wald tests for combining outcome categories were all highly significant, suggesting that the categories of the dependent variable cannot be collapsed.

<sup>36</sup> Traditional logit coefficients are presented in the first columns with the more easily interpretable odds-ratios in the third column. For categorical variables, we present the factor change in the odds for a unit

[Insert Table I about here]

## Identity

We find that the stronger the subjective group identity, the more likely it is that a group will be engaged in a stronger form of contentious action—either protest or rebellion—rather than remain politically quiescent.<sup>37</sup> In addition, identity is instrumental in pushing groups from conventional electoral action to non-conventional protest and rebellion. It does not, however, have a monotonic escalatory effect in moving groups from one level of contention to the next: while *Identity* significantly increases the odds of participating in protest over no contention and electoral action, it does not facilitate the move from no contention to electoral action nor from protest to rebellion.

Objective conceptions of identity, on the other hand, obtain a different pattern. *Castile* is significant only (albeit importantly) in reducing the likelihood of a region developing rebellion over all other forms of contention—whether protest, electoral contention, or quiescence. In fact, its effect is strong enough that it is almost wholly unlikely that the historical, political, and cultural ethnonational groups which make up the Castilian core of the country would choose to employ a rebellious strategy.

## Incentives

We examine three measures of collective disadvantages. To begin with, *Unemployment* and *GDP per capita* obtain significant, negative coefficients only with the electoral contention versus protest

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increase in the independent variable, and for interval/ratio-level variables we present the change in the odds for a standard deviation increase in the independent variable. The odds can be transformed into a percentage change in the odds by subtracting one and then multiplying by 100. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in a group's relative population increases the odds of protest over electoral action by 477% and the odds of protest over quiescence by 77%.

<sup>37</sup> The relatively low N for the analysis gives especially high weight to the various significance levels. Consequently, we suggest that a  $p$  of  $\leq .1$  still points to an interesting and important relationship between, for example, identity and the moves from no contention to rebellion and from electoral action to rebellion.

outcome. These two forms of economic grievances thus have little effect on ethnonationalist contention. The extent of *Central Transfers*, however, has a consistently important effect on moving groups away from rebellion. These findings suggest the possibility that groups place more weight on grievances which are directly traceable to central government policies than to those that likely also have a strong basis in the economic infrastructure and policies of the autonomous communities themselves.

We next focus on both subjective and objective measures of political autonomy-related grievances. Since autonomy-seekers should be those most amenable to mobilization into both conventional and non-conventional political organizations, we first expected that those communities with the greatest percentage of *autonomistas* and *independentistas* (as measured by *Political Autonomy Grievances*) would contain more intense levels of political expression. The findings here suggest that, controlling for the other structural and political factors, subjective levels of autonomy-related grievances are not powerful. In fact, in two of the cases where it is significant, higher grievance values render the community more likely to remain politically inactive than to engage in either electoral or protest politics. Only in differentiating protesting from rebelling regions does the variable obtain a positive relationship with conflict escalation. Clearer is the effect of the *objective* measure of political autonomy grievances, *Historic*, which is positively related to each of the discrete forms of contention. Specifically, we find that the history of distinct political autonomy tapped by this variable is associated with an increased likelihood of a group being involved in electoral contention, protest, and rebellion as compared to political quiescence, as well as, conversely, electoral contention compared to protest.

Lastly, we included two measures of repression. The *National Rate of Repression* does not have a significant effect on action at any level. However, the direct *Repression* of members of an ethno-political group is shown to have an important, positive impact in moving up the ladder of intensity in every case except the move from electoral contention to protest. Overall, a state that kills or wounds protesters increases the likelihood of electoral, protest and rebellious ethno-political contention enormously.

Taken as a whole, these variables clarify how incentives actually affect nationalist expression. More abstract, indirect causes of ethno-political grievances such as the level of regional unemployment,

disparate levels of economic development, how repressive the government is overall, or the desire to obtain more regional autonomy, generally do not affect expression and occasionally even decrease the likelihood of electoral or protest action. Since a smaller GDP, higher unemployment levels, and a more intense national rate of repression cannot be said to be aimed specifically at one's own ethno-political movement, it is perhaps not surprising that they generally fail to intensify levels of contention. Likewise, the subjective desire to obtain more regional autonomy may be too soft an incentive to push a group over the threshold of quiescence to action (though, interestingly, the *objective* measure of political autonomy grievances, *Historic*, did prove to be positively associated with the level of contentious activity). In short, it seems as if there must literally be a "smoking gun" for the motive for contentious action to either materialize or de-materialize. In consequence, focused governmental repression involving the wounding or killing of protesters leads to an almost certain future of ethnonationalist contention and a progression from conventional electoral expression to more militant forms of contention. On the flip side of the coin, the direct disbursement of national government money, via central transfers, appears to act as a consistent disincentive to rebellion.

### **Capacity**

As mentioned earlier, all of the groups have a high level of absolute, yet constant capacity in terms of territorial concentration and control over an autonomous regional government. What the results show here is that variation in capacity in the form of relative population is of limited import in determining the level or progression of contention. Larger relative populations tend to predispose a community to protest over both no contention and electoral contention, and also increase its likelihood of rebellion versus electoral contention.

### **Political Opportunity Structure**

We examine three key factors tapping the democratic nature of the state. The level of *Democracy* has the surprising effect of significantly increasing the likelihood of rebellion over either an electoral or protest strategy and decreasing the odds of electoral participation. *Democratization* is shown to increase the odds of electoral action over both quiescence and protest. And for a quiescent community,

*Democratic Durability* significantly reduces the likelihood of escalating to electoral expression. At the same time, more durable democracies are more likely to incite a move from electoral action to protest. While these results do not fully support Gurr's hypotheses, the findings may be explained by his argument that democracy is actually "a proxy variable for state preferences for policies of accommodation vs. repression, and that it is the mix of the latter rather than democratic institutions per se which affects conflict strategies" (Gurr and Moore 1997: 1082).

The two remaining POS variables have a much more important and consistent impact on ethnonationalist expression. Both the extent of regional political control (*Nationalist Representation*) and the average level of ethnonationalist voting, protest, and rebellion in the country as a whole (*Contagion*) have an incendiary effect on expression.

### **Implications and Conclusions**

In this study we have attempted to answer a fundamental question: what incites nations to intensify or moderate their claims-making behavior between the primary strategic forms of political expression—quiescence, voting, protest, and rebellion? Because existing research has focused almost exclusively on only one strategic form of political activity in isolation from the others, the use of previously established dependent variables made the examination of the strategic dynamism along this ladder of contention an impossibility. Consequently, working through the notion of "contentious politics" and building on recent operational developments in the domestic conflict processes literature, we developed a new, integrated dependent variable that taps the intensity of the three primary strategic forms of contention in a single scale.

We then adapted Gurr's leading model of ethnopolitical protest and rebellion to our examination of contentious strategies in post-Franco Spain. In this model, quiescence, conventional electoral politics, protest, and rebellion are strategic choices of differing intensity whose ultimate selection is dependent on the identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities of each ethnopolitical community.

The findings confirm, first of all, that the strength of group identity, as measured with both subjective and objective indicators, is one of the most powerful factors in affecting the intensity of

expression. Secondly, the results show that a group's mobilizational capacity—measured here via relative population—is not as important as expected. However, because all groups in this study have a constant high capacity in terms of being territorially concentrated and in control of a semi-autonomous regional government, capacity may still be part of the back story in determining contentious strategies.

Third, we show that incentives play an important, though mixed role in determining a group's placement and movement along the ladder of contention. We find that the more abstract, less immediate incentives—GDP per capita, unemployment, and the national rate of repression—do not have an important impact on contention. However, the more visible, concrete level of central government transfers does have a significant effect in decreasing the incentive to rebel. By implication, beleaguered democratic governments may have the power to buy themselves out of a rebellious relationship. The more immediate impact of the repression of ethnopolitical groups is also clear: this “direct” grievance plays a strong role in spurring communities at all levels of contention to intensify their strategies. In fact, in our model, government repression is the most powerful factor in determining the intensity of a community's ethnopolitical contention.

The final piece of the causal puzzle developed by Gurr is the way in which political opportunities—specifically level of democracy, democratic regime change, democratic durability, nationalist representation, and contagion—condition the strategic choices that contentious and potentially contentious ethnopolitical communities make. Each of these factors, Gurr suggests, may have a unique conditioning impact on the predominant forms of political behavior. This is where the design used here helps us considerably. By using a scale of ethnopolitical “expression,” we are able to see, for the first time, the ways in which the individual opportunity variables affect a group's strategic choices among quiescence, electoral strategies, social movement protest, and violent rebellion.

The three key factors tapping the democratic nature of the state were each posited to play a distinct role in the conflict process. However, after controlling for repression and other key factors, we find that neither the static level of democracy, the extent of regime change over the previous year, nor the durability of the post-Transition democratic regime was associated with a consistent, monotonic effect on

conflict intensity. This highlights a complexity in the relationship between democratic regime changes and contention that is not explicitly predicted by Gurr's model. Yet it corroborates findings from Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch's (2001: 44) large-N investigation of regime changes: Though "the most reliable path to stable democratic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible, ...it [can] take a long time before there is a net decrease in violence." The lingering effects of Spain's historic transition appears to be a prime example of this.

We also found that those regions where nationalist activists enjoyed considerable conventional access to the political system via representation in a regional government were much more likely to contain electoral, protest and rebellious tactics than they were to be politically quiescent. Fortunately, such access does not seem to push already contentious communities to escalate their strategic behavior. Finally, contagion was found to be second only to repression in predicting movement on the ladder of contention. Together, repression and contagion present clear practical implications: given the incendiary impact of repression to incite activists to "trade up" to more intense expressions of political demands and the potential of a contagious "domino effect" of ethno-political contention, states should tread carefully when responding to ethnonationalist claims-making. In the end, the results imply that repressive democratic and democratizing states may win individual battles of protest, but they will likely lose the war.

Overall, these results highlight the basic utility of Gurr's theoretical model (with some important caveats) in explaining variation in the intensity of nationalist expression tapped by our scale. Importantly, using this leading model of ethno-political behavior has allowed us to see what is gained through our conceptual framework and research design compared to prior tests.

What has been missing in previous approaches? The results presented here especially highlight the difficulty in imputing monotonic causality to such general factors as capacity, identity, incentives, and opportunities. Gurr's highly valuable model suggests that the first three of these would essentially work in concert to more or less uniformly increase a community's contention. That this was not the case is noteworthy; it also lends additional credence to the utility of the design chosen for this study. How are we

ever to know, for example, the relative impact of incentives or capacity on the movement between different levels of contention unless we allow for such potential movement in the research design?

In concurrently testing the impact of Gurr's four primary factors on the different forms of contentious politics, we are able to link individual variables to different forms of ethno-political contention. For example, the primary impact of democratization is to predispose communities to electoral politics over any other strategic alternative. Stronger ethnonationalist identities and larger groups, in turn, work primarily to increase the odds of a community engaging in protest and rebellion.

Our approach further adds to extant theory by facilitating an investigation of what is behind a group's movement along the ladder of expression. Specifically, it presses us to identify factors that tend to either ameliorate or exacerbate contentious behavior. With the exception of repression, none of the factors examined here is consistent in pushing communities up or down the ladder of contention in a predictively ordered manner. In effect, the predominant model of ethnonationalist conflict proves to be more adept at explaining a group's initiation into the three levels of contention from quiescence than at predicting escalation from one form of expression to another. Thus, while we are able to illustrate that ethnonationalist groups clearly employ multiple strategies of contention, we still find that there is much room for a more nuanced explanation of such dynamism.

Nonetheless, this model sheds fresh light on the factors that play consistently important roles in communities' level of ethnonationalist expression. This study suggests that the most important dampening effects on the intensity of political expression derive from higher levels of central transfers and from being part of the cultural and political center of the Spanish state. In contrast, subjective identities, nationalist representation, repression, and contagion all tend to have an "escalatory" effect.

Previous literature has failed to adequately point out these linkages among voting, protest, and rebellion. Our findings hence substantiate the belief that violent and non-violent ethnonationalist behavior can be theoretically and empirically linked by an all-inclusive framework of "contentious politics." When we applied this framework concurrently to the study of the full range of political behavior of nationalist groups—the participation in electoral politics, the engagement in social movement protest activities, and

the violent rebellious actions of covert organizations—we were able to examine whether what motivates groups to engage in electoral politics is the same as what motivates them to engage in protest or rebellion. When contention is viewed via this overarching lens, we effectively acquire a better sense of the causes of and connections between aggregate contentious strategies in ethnonational communities. What we show is that, as the configuration of capacity, identity, incentive, and opportunity variables in a community changes, organizations acting within that community may respond to the altered incentives and changing political context by moving up or down the ladder of contention. The findings thus suggest an under-explored “strategic dynamism” in force in these communities.

These results represent a substantial confirmation of the merits of the integrated scale of ethnopolitical contention. It suggests the knowledge that could accrue by continuing the search for a more integrated science of contentious politics. We believe that the ladder of contention is a generalizable explanatory tool that could usefully be employed in cross-national data sets like *Minorities at Risk*, since it is essentially applicable to any situation where the primary forms of expression are permissible. In essence, the lessons learned here are highly relevant to all democratic and democratizing states dealing with regionally autonomous, territorially concentrated ethnonationalist groups—such as France, Indonesia, the UK, India, Canada, Serbia, the Ukraine, Mexico, Russia, Iraq, and scores of other countries. This study effectively underscores the complex determinants of strategic choices of ethnopolitical contenders in these countries’ geographic and cultural peripheries. When we build our models to specifically account for the strategic dynamism that regularly obtains in these communities, we will move a step closer to understanding not only the contentious cycle of nationalism that burst onto the scene with the demise of Franco in Spain, but also the occurrence—and quiescence—of nationalism throughout the world.

**Table I. Multinomial Logit on Level of Nationalist Expression in 17 Regions of Spain, 1977-1996**

	No Contention → Electoral			Electoral → Protest			Protest → Rebellion			No Contention → Protest			No Contention → Rebellion			Electoral → Rebellion		
	b	z	odds	b	z	odds	b	z	odds	b	z	odds	b	z	odds	b	z	odds
<b>Identity</b>	0.168	0.679	5.778	<b>0.412**</b>	2.418	74.080	-0.065	-0.601	0.506	<b>0.580***</b>	2.628	428.05	<b>0.514*</b>	1.877	216.508	<b>0.347*</b>	1.717	37.470
<b>Castile</b>	0.297	0.236	1.345	-0.435	-0.390	0.647	<b>-13.49***</b>	-11.40	0.000	-0.138	-0.128	0.871	<b>-13.623***</b>	-9.219	0.000	<b>-13.920***</b>	-10.38	0.000
<b>Pol. Autonomy Grievances</b>	<b>-0.163*</b>	-1.716	0.193	-0.058	-1.013	0.559	<b>0.124**</b>	2.051	3.499	<b>-0.221***</b>	-3.711	0.108	-0.097	-1.135	0.377	0.067	1.000	1.957
<b>Historic</b>	<b>15.707***</b>	5.062	6.63 e+06	<b>-4.526**</b>	-2.136	0.011	0.499	0.227	1.646	<b>11.181***</b>	3.736	7.18 e+04	<b>11.680***</b>	2.838	1.18 e+05	-4.028	-1.153	0.018
<b>Repression</b>	<b>9.121***</b>	3.335	5.34 e+26	-0.067	-0.716	0.637	<b>0.159*</b>	1.730	2.923	<b>9.054***</b>	3.289	3.40 e+26	<b>9.213***</b>	3.356	9.95 e+26	<b>0.092***</b>	4.455	1.862
<b>National Rate of Repression</b>	0.004	0.025	1.003	-0.113	-0.287	0.934	0.319	0.950	1.212	-0.109	-0.38	0.937	0.210	0.451	1.234	0.206	0.416	1.132
<b>Unemployment</b>	0.126	1.578	2.187	<b>-0.235**</b>	-2.500	0.232	0.077	0.430	1.612	-0.109	-1.097	0.507	-0.032	-0.160	0.818	-0.158	-0.800	0.374
<b>GDP per capita</b>	0.032	1.047	1.974	<b>-0.044*</b>	-1.639	0.393	0.030	1.033	1.887	-0.012	-0.366	0.775	0.018	0.381	1.462	-0.014	-0.339	0.741
<b>Central Transfers</b>	0.001	0.283	1.125	-0.002	-0.483	0.781	<b>-0.023***</b>	-3.281	0.031	-0.001	-0.625	0.879	<b>-0.024***</b>	-3.551	0.027	<b>-0.025***</b>	-3.524	0.024
<b>Relative Population</b>	-0.236	-1.101	0.306	<b>0.350*</b>	1.757	5.777	0.005	0.034	1.025	<b>0.114**</b>	1.993	1.770	0.119	0.746	1.814	<b>0.355*</b>	1.813	5.919
<b>Democracy</b>	<b>-2.406***</b>	-2.807	0.090	0.840	0.673	2.315	<b>2.598*</b>	1.714	13.445	-1.566	-0.856	0.209	1.032	0.522	2.808	<b>3.438**</b>	2.148	31.131
<b>Democratization</b>	<b>0.601***</b>	3.535	1.824	<b>-0.622***</b>	-2.908	0.537	0.094	0.189	1.099	-0.022	-0.076	0.979	0.073	0.143	1.075	-0.528	-1.190	0.590
<b>Nationalist Representation</b>	<b>2.755***</b>	3.406	54.445	-0.608	-1.285	0.414	0.194	0.336	1.325	<b>2.147*</b>	1.929	22.538	<b>2.341**</b>	2.046	29.869	-0.414	-0.626	0.549
<b>Democratic Durability</b>	<b>-0.156***</b>	-4.273	0.856	<b>0.278***</b>	3.027	1.321	-0.117	-0.709	0.889	0.122	1.264	1.130	0.004	0.031	1.005	0.161	1.064	1.174
<b>Contagion</b>	0.626	0.543	1.077	<b>6.153***</b>	3.501	2.066	9.727	1.238	3.149	<b>6.779***</b>	3.626	2.224	<b>16.507**</b>	2.100	7.003	<b>15.881**</b>	2.051	6.505
<b>Lag of Expression</b>	<b>2.519**</b>	2.310	12.410	-0.230	-0.354	0.794	<b>3.161***</b>	3.808	23.600	2.288	3.937	9.858	<b>5.450***</b>	3.713	232.655	<b>2.931***</b>	2.785	18.747

Log Likelihood = -164.739,  $\chi^2=545.45^{***}$ , Pseudo  $R^2=0.623$  N=323

\*p ≤ 0.1, \*\*p ≤ 0.05, \*\*\*p ≤ 0.01 (n = 323) for two-tailed tests of significance

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