

GUIDELINES FOR CASE STUDIES IN CRISIS BARGAINING

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This paper is intended to provide a uniform set of questions, hypotheses and analytical procedures, which, hopefully, will serve to orient our case research theoretically and enhance the comparability of our respective outputs. Undoubtedly new questions and hypotheses will occur to us during the course of the research and the analytical framework presented here will prove to be more fruitful in some cases than in others. Nevertheless, this will serve as a starting point. Further explication of the concepts stated herein will be found in theoretical papers written by Paul Diesing and myself. Case researchers should also be familiar with other major theoretical works on bargaining.<sup>1</sup>

I. Some Fundamental Questions

It seems appropriate to start with a list of general questions which we hope to answer in our empirical research. A list of more specific hypotheses related to these questions is presented at the end of the paper.

1. How closely does actual behavior correspond to the "ideal types" of bargaining tactics (threats, irrevocable commitments, manipulating risk, etc.) which are found in the bargaining literature? If actual behavior deviates from the ideal types, what are the reasons?

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1. In particular, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict and Arms and Influence; Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, and my "Crisis Bargaining", in Charles F. Hermann, Research on International Crises (forthcoming). Also Oran Young, The Politics of Force.

2. What kinds of variations and nuances of the various kinds of bargaining moves treated in the literature can be found in the "real world"?

3. What is the frequency of use of certain broad classes of bargaining tactics like the following:

- a. Threats (both bluffs and non-bluffs)
- b. Irrevocable commitments ("burning bridges", etc.)
- c. Manipulation of one's own apparent valuation of the stakes (payoffs)
- d. Manipulation of the probabilities which the other party associates with one's own strategic choices
- e. Manipulation of the other party's valuation of the stakes
- f. Manipulation of shared risk

4. How does choice of tactics and bargaining behavior in general differ as between different systemic environments? e.g.,

- a. Bipolar vs. multipolar
- b. Nuclear vs. non-nuclear
- c. Heterogeneous vs. homogeneous (in terms of ideology)

(Important note: Chances are, one of our most original and interesting contributions will be the identification and comparison of characteristic behaviors in different systemic environments. Our case studies will sample three different system-states in terms of the above variables. Therefore, throughout the research, and with respect to virtually all the questions listed here, we should be on the look-out for effects of system variables)

5. Are different kinds of tactics typically used in different stages of a crisis?

6. Where and how do states strike the balance between "firm

commitment" and "preserving options"?

7. Where and how do states strike the balance between manipulating risk and minimizing risk?

8. What is the relative importance of inherent bargaining power and tactical skill in determining the outcome of a crisis?

9. What is the role of "salience" or "prominent solution" in determining outcomes?

10. How do states preserve "control" in a crisis, what techniques are most effective in this respect, and at what point or under what conditions are the parties likely to "lose control of events"?

11. What are the characteristic interactions or links between adversary bargaining and alliance bargaining?

12. What is the relative influence of verbal and non-verbal communications?

13. Are different levels of credibility typically associated with different kinds and sources of communications? In general, how much credibility is given to signals in a crisis? Do states generally believe each other's communications?

15. Do the parties often misperceive each other's intentions? What are the sources and causes of misperception?

16. What is the impact of pre-crisis "images" on perceptions during the crisis?

17. To what extent are perceptions and behavior conditioned by historical analogues?

18. What is the relative importance of emotion vs. rational calculation in the choice of moves and responses?

19. How does intervention by the "international community" (U.N., League, Concert of Europe, etc.) affect bargaining behavior?

20. How does the type of government and decision-making process affect the choice of moves?

## II. Format for Analysis and Presentation of Case Studies

### A. Systemic Environment

The first step is to describe the systemic environment in which the crisis is imbedded. This is necessary not just for narrative purposes but because systemic factors may be extremely significant in their effects on bargaining behavior and outcome. The most important of these factors are the following:

1. System structure--i.e., power configuration
2. Ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity
3. Military technology
4. Alliances and alignments

### B. Bargaining Setting

The "bargaining setting" refers to certain relatively static aspects of the crisis situation which are more immediate and closer to the bargaining process itself than the systemic environment. The following items should be identified and described, if possible.

1. Recent previous relations between the parties
2. The conflict of interest which underlies the crisis
3. What precipitated the crisis?
4. The immediate issue of the crisis
5. Relative valuation of the stakes at issue
6. Relative capabilities
7. Relative fear of war
8. Each party's "image" and initial perceptions of the other

- a. Immediate interests and ultimate goals (including intensity of valuation).
- b. Capabilities
- c. Fear of war
- d. Degree of "resolve"; degree of "credibility" associated with the other's initial threat or initial indications of intent.

9. The "bargaining range"<sup>2</sup>

10. Points of salience

11. Pre-crisis commitments

12. Alternatives available to the parties

13. Asymmetries between the parties (i.e., geographical, capabilities, value of the stakes, support of allies and third parties, etc.)

Analysis of the systemic environment and bargaining setting should serve to establish, in rough approximation, the initial "inherent" bargaining power of each of the parties.

### C. The Bargaining Process

The next step is to analyze the bargaining process, move-by-move. In general, this should be done chronologically. However, in some cases, particularly those in a multipolar context, it may be more practical to analyze sequences of moves between particular pairs of

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2. The bargaining range is not the difference between the initial demand and initial offer, but the distance between the maximum the "victim" will concede and the minimum the "aggressor" will accept, the latter being the lower of the two. There is no bargaining range if the aggressor's minimum is higher than the victim's maximum. Even where it exists, the limits of the bargaining range are likely to be difficult for the researcher to identify; it is mentioned here because in some of the cases it may be possible to say something about its approximate boundaries.

countries, with the sequences overlapping somewhat in time. Some other modification (not yet clear) may appear most useful in some cases.

We are interested in two general types of moves: "bidding moves" and "coercive moves".

Bidding moves are demands, offers or proposals for settlement. Acts of "capitulation" or "concession" are bidding moves. Bidding moves change the "positions" on which the parties are standing and behind which they mobilize coercive pressures. Bidding moves and coercive pressures may be closely linked, perhaps combined in the same act or communication, and a change in one's "bid" may affect the other's perception of one's coercive "resolve"--nevertheless, it seems useful to separate the two.

Coercive moves are acts or statements which exert power and influence, and are likely to be considerably more prominent in our analysis than bidding moves. A more precise definition would be: "A coercive move is one that attempts to influence the other party's choice, in a manner favorable to oneself, by affecting his perceptions of one's own incentive structure, (payoffs) and the probabilities of one's own alternative choices, or by modifying the other party's incentive structure, or by changing the alternatives available to the other or both parties."

Coercive moves can be separated into two classes: "basic moves" and "communication moves".

Basic moves are moves which irreversibly change the structure of the game--in terms of alternatives, payoffs and probabilities (and perceptions of them) but particularly in terms of alternatives. In effect, they set up a new game with new alternatives for each party. Examples of basic moves would be Russian mobilization in 1914, the

establishment of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the counter-move of the airlift, the conveying of Chiang's troops to Quemoy Island in 1958, the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, the establishment of the U. S. blockade in the Cuban crisis, the construction of the Berlin Wall, etc. There are likely to be only a few of these basic moves in any particular crisis, perhaps no more than two or three. Basic moves are probably always physical acts of some kind, but not all physical acts are basic moves. Acts of "automation" or "burning bridges" (e.g., deploying troops on a threatened territory) are basic moves, but most "shows of force", like naval visits or calling up reserves, are not.

Communication moves differ from basic moves essentially in that they do not change the fundamental alternatives available to the parties. They do modify payoffs and probabilities (and perceptions of them), sometimes only marginally, sometimes significantly. Putting it another way, communications moves modify payoffs and perceptions in a given game; they do not transform the situation into a different game. Communications moves are intended, or have the effect, of (1) changing the probability that one will choose certain alternatives, (2) changing one's incentive structure (values at stake), (3) modifying the other party's perceptions of (1) and (2), or changing the other party's incentive structure. An obvious example of a communication move is a threat, which usually changes one's incentive structure by engaging new values, increases the probability (perhaps to certainty) that one will choose the alternative threatened, changes the other party's perception of one's incentive structure and probabilities of choice, and perhaps also modifies the incentives of the opponent. But a threat is not a "basic move" because alternatives are not physically and irreversibly changed. Other types of communication moves are the invocation of moral principle

or tying the immediate issue to other issues, thus apparently changing one's incentive structure by increasing the moral and "bargaining reputation" costs of backing down. Communication moves which modify the other party's incentive structure include declaring that "This is my last demand" or pointing to the "illegitimacy" or "unfairness" of the other party's position, which (if successful) may reduce the other's perceived cost of compliance.

Most of the "moves" in a crisis are communication moves and almost any communication bearing on the situation may be interpreted as affecting, or intended to affect, one or more of the variables mentioned above. Since in many cases there are a great many such communications, we must have some criterion for discriminating between those moves which are worth exhaustive analysis and those which are not. Hence, we shall attempt to distinguish between "primary" and "secondary" communication moves. Primary communication moves are those which are intended to have, or actually do have, major effects on one or more of the variables discussed above. Examples would be the Lloyd George speech in the Agadir crisis of 1911, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, the German statement to Russia that Russian mobilization "would mean war", Kennedy's TV speech in the Cuban crisis, etc. Secondary communication moves are those which have, and are intended to have, little or no effect on our central variables, or which are merely designed to support previous primary moves. An example would be the statement of the German ambassador to a French foreign ministry official in 1914 that Germany desired to cooperate with France for the maintenance of peace.

Admittedly, this distinction is pretty lame but I cannot think of a better one for reducing our case studies to manageable proportions. It will have to be up to the individual researcher to judge whether a



particular move is "primary" or "secondary". After a certain period of immersion in the materials, it is likely to become clearer which moves had significant effects on behavior and outcome and which did not. When uncertainty exists, it is probably best to consider the move primary rather than secondary. Also, it should be borne in mind that sequences of secondary moves may have cumulative consequences which amount to a primary effect. Thus a series of apparently minor exchanges between the German ambassador and officials of the French foreign ministry in July, 1914, had the result, according to B. E. Schmitt, that "by 28 July, the German government could not doubt that France was immovable."

In our case study research, secondary moves need only be recorded in summary fashion, and perhaps some can be ignored altogether. However, all basic moves and primary communication moves must be analyzed exhaustively. To analyze "exhaustively" means to ascertain at least the following, if possible:

1. The intended effects of each component of the move--i.e., what the communicator wanted to communicate.
2. The actual effects on the communicator's incentive structure and intentions (e.g., is he now "committed"?)
3. Effects on the perceptions of the recipient with respect to "2."
4. Effects on the "payoffs" of the recipient--e.g. his valuation of the stakes and perceived costs of war.
5. Effects on the behavior of the recipient--i.e., effects on his choice of his next move.

Point "1" requires a little elaboration. Many "moves" will have several "components", each with a different bargaining function. For example, on July 25, 1914, the Austrian Foreign Minister sent to the Russian Foreign Minister a message with these points: (1) Austria had

no territorial ambitions against Serbia, (2) Austria, Russia and Germany had identical "conservative, monarchical and dynastic interests", (3) Austria would "go to the limit" to enforce its demands and would "not draw back before the possibility of European complications", and (4) Austria "would not stand alone." The first point was designed to minimize the Russians' perceived costs of backing down; the second, to maximize the Russians' ideological costs of precipitating a conflict; the third, to communicate that Austria was committed; and the fourth, to maximize the Russian costs of war by stressing the likelihood of German participation. Each component, in other words, was aimed at a different aspect of the Russian incentive structure and perceptions.

Most communication moves are verbal but some are not. Among the latter are visits of important officials to the crisis area, various kinds of "force demonstration", and a variety of other kinds of maneuvers--e.g., General Clay's helicopter flights to Steinstucken in the Berlin crisis, or Sudeten Nazi rioting in the Munich crisis.

In our definition of communication moves, we include only those which are chiefly aimed at another government or governments. They can be sent through many possible channels--e.g., diplomatic communication, public statements and speeches, contrived leaks to the press, private emissaries, etc. Also, the definition includes only communications which originate with governments and official decision-makers. (This excludes statements by members of legislative bodies unless they are clearly "inspired" by the executive branch). Statements addressed primarily to domestic or foreign non-governmental audiences, or statements originating from non-official sources, are not "communication moves" by our definition, although they may have significant effects on governmental perceptions. (See below on "perceptions")

Finally, bidding moves are also to be analyzed "exhaustively". Most demands, concessions, or even hints of concession are likely to be so important in the total picture, that it probably is not worthwhile distinguishing between "primary" and "secondary" instances. Some obvious questions to ask about bidding moves are (1) what prompted the demand or concession--i.e., what considerations and pressures motivated it? (2) was it a "real" concession or only an apparent or "face-saving" one? (3) how did the other side perceive it--i.e., as an indication of weakness or as a genuine attempt at accommodation not forced by weakness? (4) how did the other party respond--by increased toughness or firmness or by reciprocal concession? and (5) how was the concession rationalized to minimize costs and damage to the party's image of resolve?

#### Perceptions

Although most of the activity in bargaining consists of "moves", more important is the other party's perception of the meaning of a move. Most moves (though not all) are primarily designed to affect the other party's perceptions and expectations concerning one's own future behavior. Perceptions, in other words, are a crucial mediator between a move and the other party's response; the nature of the perception will importantly determine whether or not the move achieves its end. Hence it is essential that we search our material carefully for evidence bearing on perceptions.

Closely related to perception is the notion of "image". Images may be simply defined as clusters of more or less stable beliefs about other actors--about their power, their interests, their degree of resolve, their characteristic behavior, their degree of rationality, and so on. Available research indicates that images are extremely resistant to

change in the face of contradictory information and evidence. It follows, then, that pre-crisis images are likely to be important in determining behavior during a crisis. Perceptions during a crisis may be distorted by the need to make them conform to the prevailing image. On the other hand, particular perceptions may modify the image. It is important for us to understand when and how and by what mechanisms --select attention, misplaced emphasis, slanted interpretation, etc.-- perceptions are conditioned by images.

In general, we should be on the look-out for instances of outright mis-perception of the other party's intentions and of the "signals" he is emitting. When misperception occurs, we must try to explain it, perhaps by reference to the party's basic image, but also perhaps in terms of other factors such as wishful thinking, "noise" in the communications channels, ambiguous information, etc.

Perceptions of another party's intentions are thus conditioned in part by images and in part by specific bargaining moves, as discussed above. But there are still other influences on perceptions. These include manifestations of public opinion in another country, statements in the press, speeches and statements by important but unofficial persons, parliamentary debates, statements by officials directed primarily to domestic audiences, etc. Also worth mentioning are the personalities of statesmen and the influence of interpretations of history, particularly traumatic events of the recent past which are invoked as analogies.

Robert Jervis has advanced a useful distinction between "signals", "signs" and "indices". Signals are more or less equivalent to our "communication moves". They are intended to affect the other side's perceptions and expectations but involve little or no material cost and do not change the distribution of power. Signs are acts which may be

intended in part to communicate something, but which do involve costs and shifts in relative power. They include increases in military capabilities, increasing the readiness of military forces, attempts to acquire allies and the mobilization of domestic public opinion in support of the government's position. Indices are aspects of a state's behavior which are not consciously used by the state to communicate its intentions, but which are interpreted by other states as evidence of intentions. Examples would be an election which brings another party to power, domestic policy debates, and general trends in a country's foreign policy ("No more Vietnams"). The lines between these categories are not sharply clear, but all three may have a role in influencing others' perceptions in a crisis.

Since perceptions are influenced by factors other than bargaining moves, they may have to be described and explained somewhat separately from the move-by-move analysis of the bargaining process, perhaps in summary fashion at the end of a sequence of moves. Nevertheless, specific perceptions of a specific move should be included in the analysis of the move.

#### Decision-making

To what extent should we get into decision-making analysis? Much of the work on crises thus far has focused on decision-making and this is the primary thrust of the forthcoming book edited by Charles Hermann on Research on International Crises. Yet the most fruitful focus would seem to be on bargaining, or more broadly, "strategic interaction." Bargaining is a crucial link between "systemic analysis" and "decision-making analysis". The international system, and decision-making and political processes in domestic systems, may be conceived as "arenas" which produce inputs into the bargaining process from

opposite directions. An ideally complete study of crisis bargaining would study both of these subsidiary arenas in depth, and we have already decided to pay considerable attention to the systemic environment. Should we do so as well for decision-making?

There are at least two arguments against this: we shouldn't try to do everything, and many of our cases will not reveal much about internal decision-making. I propose, therefore, that we study decision-making only in a limited way, and make it definitely subsidiary or contributory to the bargaining focus. This means that we should analyze the decision-making factors behind the choice of moves for all basic moves and primary communication moves and bidding moves, whenever domestic politics was apparently an important factor in determining the choice of move, or when an important conflict existed within the government concerning the appropriate choice of move. We should do the same for instances when a country failed to make a certain move which was a particularly obvious or salient alternative--e.g., the British decision not to give a firm pledge of support to Russia and France in 1914. Thus we are interested in decision-making only as it helps us explain choices among alternative bargaining moves. For this purpose, we do not need any formal theoretical structure. Some obvious things to watch for, of course, are cabinet splits, pressures from public opinion, differences in values, perceptions and influence among decision-makers, and particular characteristics of governmental structure and procedure which affected choices.

Thus, we will not attempt to make a theoretical analysis of crisis decision-making processes in terms of generalizations referring solely to these processes. Our generalizations and hypotheses will be about bargaining, not decision-making. We may, however, find some links between bargaining and decision-making which are important enough to be stated

as generalizations or hypotheses.

#### D. The Outcome

Little need be said about this, except that the description of the outcome is also the occasion for its explanation--e.g., in terms of such factors as asymmetries between the parties in inherent bargaining power, differences in tactical skill, the efficacy of different sorts of bargaining tactics, the role of "salience", etc.

#### E. The Aftermath

An important question is what is the effect of the crisis on the subsequent state of the international system and relations between the parties. Did the crisis leave a legacy of hostility between the parties or did it result in accommodation and reduction in hostility? What was the effect on post-crisis alliance cohesion? What was the effect on images of resolve and actual resolve? Did the crisis result in a formal settlement, an informal settlement, or no settlement at all of the issues in conflict? Did the system become more or less "stable" after the crisis?

#### F. Conclusion

Here is the place for extracting everything of theoretical relevance from the study, including confirmation or disconfirmation of our hypotheses, and suggestion of new hypotheses.

### III. Hypotheses

#### A. Hypotheses relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

1. Bipolar crises are characterized by greater caution and moderation than crises in a multipolar system because of the greater

potential costs of war.

2. In a multipolar system the imperative of alliance cohesion exercises a greater effect on crisis bargaining tactics than in a bipolar system. Thus, in a multipolar system, states have less flexibility in their choice of tactics because of a need to accommodate the wishes of allies. In a bipolar world, great powers are less concerned about shaping tactics to suit allies because of their lesser dependence on allies; thus they can afford to be more flexible.

3. The preservation of alliances is a larger component in the values at stake in a multipolar crisis than in a bipolar crisis.

4. Considerations of bargaining reputation and images of resolve are a larger component of the value of the stakes in a bipolar crisis than a multipolar one (for the superpowers at least) because (1) the adversary of the present is likely to be the adversary of the future, and (2) the adversaries are in conflict on a wider range of issues.

5. Exaggerating one's valuation of the stakes is a more common tactic in the nuclear than the pre-nuclear environment because of the greatly increased costs of war and the need, for the sake of credibility, to make interests seem commensurate with war costs.

6. In the pre-nuclear age, threatening declarations emphasized simply a willingness to fight; in the nuclear age they tend to emphasize at least as heavily how one will fight--i.e., the resolve to use nuclear weapons or the possibility that a war will escalate to the nuclear level.

7. Threats are more crude, explicit and bellicose in the nuclear age than before--to compensate for the inherent incredibility of nuclear threats and their lack of support through experience of previous use. I.e., the lower the inherent credibility, the more explicit and fear-some the threat must be. Also, perhaps, to play upon fears of nuclear



war in mass public opinion.

8. Physical actions (below the level of violence) are relatively prominent as compared to verbal communications in nuclear age crises; they were less prominent in the pre-nuclear age. (This follows in part from the notion that "use of force short of war" has become a substitute for war.)

9. Nuclear age crises tend to be characterized by minor, subsidiary confrontations as tests of resolve; these are much less prominent in the pre-nuclear age.

10. In heterogeneous systems, threats and other declarations are more bellicose and explicit than in homogeneous systems.

11. Deliberately "increasing the shared risk of war" (Schelling's "manipulation of risk") is not a very frequent tactic, but it is more common in nuclear age crises than in pre-nuclear ones.

12. In a multipolar crisis, the crucial uncertainty is the identity of one's opponents if war breaks out; in a bipolar crisis the identity of the opponent is clear and the crucial uncertainty is the likely degree of escalation if war breaks out.

#### B. Propositions about coercive tactics

1. Absolutely irrevocable commitments are rare.

2. Threats are usually ambiguous or "veiled" rather than explicit.

3. The severest, most explicit threats are usually made by and to (a) officials of medium or low status, and (b) private individuals.

I.e., the higher the official status of the communicator or the recipient, the greater the ambiguity and moderation of communications.

4. Coercive moves are often given a non-coercive rationale to minimize the element of duress and minimize the costs of retraction

(e.g., closing the Autobahn for "technical reasons").

5. Parties will attempt to create loopholes through which the opponent can back down.

6. In making threats and other moves, parties will try to leave themselves an avenue for retreat.

7. Nations make firm commitments and explicit threats only when they are clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation (e.g., relative fear of war, relative valuation of the stakes, relative capabilities).

8. The process of commitment is usually progressive rather than "all-at-once".

9. Tactics may be modulated in a crisis to keep in power, or bring to power, a faction more favorable to oneself in the adversary state, or to maximize the internal influence of that faction.

10. Public communications are usually more ambiguous than private ones.

11. Tactics of "risk manipulation" tend to be least likely and least frequent in the high-tension phase of a crisis.

12. Moves in the early stages of a crisis will be relatively coercive and conflictful; in the later stages they will be more cooperative in nature.

### C. Hypotheses relating tactics to responses

1. Platant, peremptory, openly aggressive demands and threats are more likely to be resisted than those presented in a "reasonable" tone.

2. Threats may have a provocative effect (stiffening the other's resolve) which undermines or offsets their coercive effect.

3. Less provocation is caused by attempts to change utilities and utility perceptions than by outright threats.

4. If a "rule of the game" is broken, the other party's resolve is likely to increase.

5. Decision-makers seldom think probabilistically, calculate "expected values" or "expected costs" of moves, etc; moves tend to be rejected because they are "too dangerous", or undertaken because they are "necessary", without much careful estimating of the probabilities of various adversary responses.

6. "Toughness" tends to breed toughness in the other; firm commitment generates firm counter-commitment; conciliation produces reciprocal conciliation.

7. Compellent threats stiffen the opponent's will to resist; deterrent threats do not.

D. Hypotheses relating environment, setting and tactics to outcomes

1. When inherent bargaining power is relatively equal, salience will have maximum effect on the outcome; when there is inequality in bargaining power, bargaining power will overcome salience.

2. Salience has little effect on settlements, but more effect in limiting tactics and restricting escalation.

3. Asymmetries in the systemic environment and bargaining setting (i.e., inherent power) have more effect on outcomes than bargaining tactics (tactical power).

4. Before the nuclear age, crises tended to be terminated by a formal settlement if they did not lead to war; now they tend to fade away, ending in tacit acceptance of a de facto state of affairs.

5. Miscalculation of others' intentions is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar system.

7. In a multipolar crisis, as tension increases, commitments to allies tend to become firmer, for two reasons:

a. With rising tensions, countries become more fearful of losing allies; thus allies tend to be supported rather than restrained.

b. A belief that the best way to preserve peace is to deter the adversary by a firm alliance front.

8. The less confident a country is of the loyalty of an ally, the more reluctant it will be to restrain the ally in a crisis (especially in a multipolar system).

9. Collaboration between alliance leaders in a crisis tends to reduce cohesion in one or both alliances.

10. Since alliance cohesion is less crucial in bipolarity, the easier it is for alliance leaders to restrain lesser allies and collaborate to de-fuse a crisis between their subordinates.

11. Small powers are more likely to take risks than their big power allies.

12. Other things being equal, firmer commitments and stronger threats will be made by the more cohesive alliance.

13. The target country's will to resist will vary directly with its perception of its supporting ally's resolve.

14. It is easier for great powers to control small allies in a bipolar system than a multipolar system (in crises as in other situations).

#### F. Hypotheses about perceptions and images

1. Actors tend to perceive what their images lead them to expect; incoming "signals" are interpreted to conform to the existing image.

2. Historical experiences and traumas heavily condition images.

3. Decision-makers tend to perceive adversaries as more hostile

than they really are.

4. Decision-makers over-estimate the degree to which adversaries are motivated by aggressive aims and under-estimate the degree to which they are motivated by fear.

5. Expectations are more influential than desires in the interpretation of incoming signals and communications.

6. The greater the ambiguity of incoming information and communication, the less impact it will have on pre-established beliefs.

7. The higher the tension, the more rigid the images. Thus, the higher the tension in a crisis, the clearer one's communications must be in order to modify the adversary's image.

8. Statesmen tend to perceive their own alternatives as more restricted than the adversary's alternatives.

9. The adversary usually appears as more monolithic, with greater singleness of purpose, than one's own state.

10. The greater the stature and authority of the person making a declaration, the greater credibility will be attributed to it.

11. The resolve of statesmen in a crisis will be heavily influenced by their perceptions of the adversary's ultimate aims--whether they are limited or far-reaching.

G. Hypotheses relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics

1. Difficulty of changing an agreed position within a government lends extra resolve to resist the opponent's demands.

2. Lack of unity in a government increases the ambiguity of bargaining moves.

3. The higher the tension, the greater the influence of emotion as compared to reasoned calculation.

4. Urgency and time pressure in a crisis inhibits the search for alternatives and favors the selection of traditional, habitual or already-planned moves.

5. The longer the duration of a crisis, or the lower its severity, the greater the influence of organizational roles on perceptions and evaluation of alternatives.

6. The greater the involvement of public opinion, the less the government's flexibility; this will reduce the government's capacity for accommodation and compromise but strengthen its bargaining power behind the position it takes.

7. Decision-makers in the crisis area generally prefer a tougher line than decision-makers at home.

8. Military men generally prefer tougher tactics than civilian decision-makers.

#### H. Hypotheses relating outcomes to aftermaths

1. Weakness in one crisis creates an expectation in the adversary that one will be weak in the next.

2. A show of weakness in one crisis stimulates a desire to correct this image by toughness in the next.

3. A demonstration of resolve in a crisis strengthens alliance cohesion; a show of weakness reduces cohesion.

4. In a multipolar system, a state's weakness in a crisis may stimulate a trend toward defection and realignment among its allies; firmer commitments to the allies may be necessary to counteract this trend.

5. Some crises leave an aftermath of hostility between the parties (e.g. Germany and Austria after Bosnia, 1908); others result in increased

friendship or detente (Fashoda and Cuba). Provisionally, we hypothesize that which result occurs will depend on the following:

- a. The finality of the settlement
  - b. The existence of another common adversary of the parties
  - c. The provocativeness of tactics used in the crisis
  - d. The degree of humiliation suffered by the defeated side
6. The defeated side in a crisis will attempt to rationalize its capitulation in a way which minimizes costs.
7. A strong show of resolve in a crises enhances a state's attractiveness as a potential ally.

#### I. Hypotheses about bidding moves

1. Concessions made in a crisis will be perceived as more costly than the same concession made in a non-crisis period because much of the cost of a concession made under duress is in terms of reputation for resolve. Thus concessions are less likely in a crisis than in "peaceful diplomacy".

2. An actor can help himself to concede by asking a quid pro quo which is relatively costless to the other side but can be rationalized as substantial to his own constituency. (E.g., Krushchev and the "no invasion" pledge in Cuba, 1962).

3. Losses from backing down to a challenge may be reduced by redefining one's vital interests (e.g., in the Berlin Wall crisis, saying our interests were limited to the integrity of West Berlin).

4. The higher the level of tension, the more likely that concessions will be interpreted by the adversary as a sign of weakness.

5. In a multipolar system, the maximum concession by the defending side will be the maximum acceptable to the most powerful supporting

ally; in a bipolar system, it will be the maximum acceptable to the most interested ally.

6. Concessions may first be offered in "sign language" to test the opponent's willingness to reciprocate; if no reciprocating signal is received, the first side will go back to its original position.