

NOTES ON IRAN CASE

Snyder?  
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Soviets' motive: Head off penetration by U.S. and Britain via oil concessions. Need to have Iranian oil in reserve in case their own conquered. Feeling of rights of influence in territory along its borders. Basically security. (PD here) (primary supergame) (I'm not sure this is all: How about simple expansion of Communism?). *Abstracts from circumstances. Rationalization at most.*

But are U.S. and Britain acting in PD terms? In part, yes. They wanted to pre-empt Russian control as well as to gain economic advantage for themselves. Pre-empting Russian control had basically a security motive, but economic as well.

If Central regime had had a different policy, then separate Communist regime in N. Iran might not have been necessary. (46) This means that even-handed and firm policy by local target country can mitigate the operation of primary supergame there (same in Lebanon). (This is the strategic content of an "open door" policy) (Open door is agreeing not to defect in primary supergame).

Control of Azerbaijan functioned both as source of leverage and aim of policy. As source of leverage it was an ongoing "threat" which could be used to pry more pro-Soviet policy out of Central govt. (46) (Similar to Russian use of Berlin).

Target regime wants to maintain open door (4). This is similar to Middle East where "neutrality" ("neutralism"?) is the equivalent of the open door. The outcome of the Lebanon-Jordanian crisis was to strengthen sentiments of neutralism as protection v. competition by the superpowers in their primary supergame.

If small power cannot implement neutrality and independence (cannot prevent the primary supergame from operating) it will favor the intervening power which is least distasteful (49).

But this runs the danger of provoking more intervention by the more distasteful powers (49-50). They see the efforts of the congenial outside power (for the target state) as attempts to gain advantage and the primary supergame comes into play. This is the perennial dilemma of the target state--its best outcome is independence and open door (neutralism), but it may not be able to enforce it. This is also the best outcome for the outside powers--staying in the cooperative box in their own PD. But they may defect (1) if the fears of the other's defection are too great and (2) if the target country is not strong enough to enforce neutralism. The label of "neutralist" in the present age may serve the function of establishing the illegitimacy of intervention--thus providing a normative deterrent to defection by the outside powers.

British interests (1) maintain in power a govt. receptive to their economic and strategic interests (there are relatively static strategic interests independent of the primary PD supergame), (2) this also saved the British from having to protect their interests in the south by direct military control (i.e., avoidance of having to defect in primary supergame).

Outside power which is already established to some extent may favor a moratorium on continued play of the primary supergame in order to avoid the costs of competition which may include losses of assets already held (51). (British favored moratorium on negotiations for new oil concessions).

U.S.: Wanted to maintain independence and open door to prevent more blatant forms of outside intervention. "Testing ground for cooperation" (This was probably in part idealistic and in part /Planck/ a cloak for allowing free play for pursuit of American advantage).

- (1) Prevent competitive intervention to reduce danger of war,
- (2) Prevent Soviet-British collusion which would prevent American access to economic values,

(This suggests that another outcome of primary supergame may be spheres of influence--collusion between oligopolists--which neutralizes supergame competition between those two but perhaps to the detriment of others. Cf. Chinese fears about Soviet-American collusion now.) (I suppose that in economic oligopoly, the small firms who may be frozen out are in favor of anti-trust legislation).

Three possible outcomes of primary supergame:

- (1) Competition (defection)
- 2) Collusion (spheres of influence)
- (3) Abstinance (open door; neutralism, disengagement, peaceful co-existence)

3x3 PD? ("3" is best, "2" is second best, and "1" worst). (1) is DD, (3) is CC, (2) is also CC after some defection has already taken place. (1) is similar to arms race; (2) to arms control, (3) to disarmament.

U.S. had option of achieving cooperation in Iran (1) by traditional inter-state diplomacy among the interested powers, or (2) by invoking the new norms of "community" (UN). On the latter: all had (in U.S. perceptions) a stake in the new community organ. Therefore, not complying with its norms would undermine that stake. Hence, the "test case" idea. (54)

Implied: A country has the coupling/de-coupling option vis-a-vis community organs. Making it a "test case" or not. Making it a test case is a gamble: runs the risk of discrediting the community organ.

There is a difference between these two options for the U.S.; but not clear that there is a contradiction. Why would U.S. interests suffer with a U.N. "community" solution? (54)

The tension between self-interest and community solution is much more obvious for a country which can expect to have predominance in an area through normal diplomacy (E.g., U.S. in Latin-America).

P. 57. I disagree with much of this on relative fear of war. It is often not difficult to make a comparative judgment. Even if these judgments can only be made retrospectively, why can't they be cited as an explanatory factor? And the disutility of war is logically separable from the changing value of the stakes, although difficult to disentangle in practice.

P. 59. Difficult to differentiate between misperception and objective uncertainty about the other's intentions (Does this uncertainty refer to uncertainty in the other's minds? But then a correct perception would be simply a perception that the other is uncertain what it wants; a misperception would be a perception of certainty one way or another).

Tension in use of proxy: One object is to make the change tolerable to other states by showing that only the proxy is acting, not the outside sponsor. But making it tolerable also may have a power element--convincing others of the cost of resisting and this logically requires frankness about involvement of interests of the sponsoring power. Essentially a conflict between appearance of legitimacy and exercise of power (63). "Non-committal commitment" as method of resolving this dilemma (63). (Do we find this also in Lebanon, Munich, Austria?)

P. 63: Soviets coupling of their prestige to success of rebel regime.

But denied actual involvement (63). Put onus on U.S. and Britain of charging Soviets with dishonesty. (If Soviets believe the West believes the Soviets are involved; they will expect Western resolve to be higher. West had the option of de-coupling here (going along with the Soviet deception) if they wished to avoid a conflict at minimum cost.) (There are also cataclysmic--emotional, affective--costs of charging opponent with dishonesty--he may be "provoked." Also costs of destroying an incipient community or new world order--particularly important at this time).

The challenge is the total of Soviet penetrative and coercive activities in Vietnam, culminating in the blocking of column of Iranian troops (p. 64).

American dilemma: Convince Soviets to desist while avoiding coupling them with rebel activities so closely that they could not accept a rebel defeat (67). (This is "avoiding increasing opponent's stakes").

U.S. proposal for reciprocal disentanglement is attempt to move out of DD into CC in PD (primary supergame). Parties at a disadvantage in the DD competition likely to try this tactic (67).

U.S. announcement that it would withdraw ahead of time, expecting others to do the same. Intended to indicate trust. (70) (Overtones of GRIT).

British can't do this because their interests at risk are greater (70).

Avoidance of acts that would increase Soviet suspicion (71). (I.e., avoidance of coercive moves). (This is all trying to minimize PD defection). Murry: Man on the spot is HL. Washington is SL.

Accommodative tactics not effective because of Soviet belief in superior bargaining power (?) (72).

Soviets surprised at U.S. action in U.N.: previous signals didn't get through. (Why?) (79).

Massodeg proposal for resignation of Iranian govt. in favor of neutral one which could deal in good faith with S.U. (82). (Again, neutral stance by target state as means of getting Great Powers to play CC in PD). (Also, overtones of Morocco, 1905, resignation of Delcasse).

Murray still HL; Byrnes SL. Byrnes thought protests would be "pin-pricking" which would undercut accommodation (83).

U.S.: Some <sup>avoidance of</sup> ~~accordance~~/provocation, some support for traditional sphere of influence idea, but dominant tendency increasingly is to challenge Soviets in U.N. (84).

UN: Community forum allows outside parties to act more like judges than as antagonists of one side or the other (88). (Important, but I'm not sure why. Allows coercion to be exercised, while making counter-coercion illegitimate, and giving no reason for emotional "provocation"?).

Soviets decide on continuing negotiations rather than coup (100). (Reason: Coup too risky now that U.S. has established considerable resolve?).

Missouri mission; plans to send entire fleet vetoed by State as too provocative (cataclysmic; disaster-avoidance) (102).

Western toughness considerably influenced by desire to get UN. off to good start (106). But toughness might also cause Great Power split.

U.S. takes Iranian side but also sponsors procedural compromises to give Soviets more time (113). (Sanction is break-up or discrediting of U.N.--disaster-avoidance. U.S. doesn't want to push Soviets to this extent). *(Cf. M.S. attempt to give Soviets more time in Cuban crisis)*

Supergame considerations for both U.S. and S.U.

U.S.: Signal willingness to resist on future occasions

S.U.: Was continued persistence in Iran worth the general deterioration in East-West relations? (125).

Implicit threat of reassertion of British control in south. But demise of central government authority in south could easily mean the same in north (British reluctant to defect in PD because this means Russian defection too. But DD is better than DC--Communist control of whole country.) (Similar to Berlin, 1948-49).

British threat of defection mainly directly toward Iranian government (137). (Signal: Either you maintain your independence or neutrality or we will partition you into the old spheres of influence. Pressure on Iran is designed to preserve CC and make DD unnecessary).

Soviets withdrew not because of threat of force, but danger of "negative diplomatic consequences" worldwide (156). (Does this mean more likelihood of Western resistance elsewhere? Or do Soviets want to preserve Great Power collaboration--the W.W.II myth? Or do they want to make it easier going for subversive activities in other area?).

Soviet misperception that U.S. didn't take U.N. seriously.