

SAMPLE OF MESSAGES AND INDICES, WITH INTERPRETATIONS

P. DIESING

CRISIS BARGAINING PROJECT

Abbreviations: Br., Britain; C., China; F, France; G., Germany; I, Italy; J, Japan; R, Russia; S, Spain; S.U., Soviet Union; T, Turkey; U.S., United States; Amb., Ambassador; M, Message: I, Index; B, Basic move.

Coding categories:

0. Uncodable because either intention or interpretation is not known.

1-7 Correct Interpretations

1. Interpretation correct, in conformity with image and expectations.
- 1a. Correct recognition of a bluff.
2. Correct in conformity with desires but not expectations.
3. Correct perception of duplicity.
4. Correct in opposition to expectations but not requiring change of tactics.
5. Correct requiring change of tactics.
6. Correct requiring change of strategy.
- 6a. Correct requiring change to "yield".
7. Correct requiring change of strategy and of image.

8-22 Incorrect Interpretations

8. Perceiving a challenge when none is intended.
9. Exaggerating a danger or challenge.
10. Failure to perceive opponent's security worries; failure to recognize own behavior as threatening.
11. Disturbance, aggression, or other trouble being stirred up by an inherently aggressive opponent.
12. Suspicion of ally's unreliability.
13. Underestimating diversity or internal conflict within the opponent.

- 13a. Exaggerating diversity within the opponent; exaggerating the "reasonableness" of some faction within the opponent.
11. Use of historical analogy to misinterpret present situation. Instances further coded under 8-11.
14. Misperception in accordance with expectations but not desires.
15. In accordance with both desires and expectations.
- 15a. Including exaggerating one's own effectiveness.
16. In accordance with desires or hopes but not expectations.
17. Ignore bad information, continue strategy.
18. Misinterpret as bluff.
19. Reinterpret as duplicity of sender.
20. Discredit or reject source of message; reject message as erroneous.
21. Admit puzzlement, then ignore message.
22. Seek and exaggerate confirming information to counter negative message.
- S. Sending failure: Unintentionally vague, ambiguous, or garbled message.
- T. Transmission error: Ambassador revises or fails to deliver a message.
- R. Receiving error: Ambassador misinterprets, revises, or fails to deliver a received message.

Alternative plausible codings appear in paranthesis after main coding.

Signals are classified as messages (explicit, intended communications), indices (states of affairs or events which permit inferences about opponent), and basic moves (a change in the actual military or political situation conveying incidental information). A number of important messages were omitted from the sample because they were obviously uncodable.

Interpre-
tation
CODE

Type of
Signal

1898 FASHODA

- | | | |
|-------|---|--|
| | I | 1. Sept. 7. Amb. Monson's (Br.) discussion with Delcasse. |
| 1 | | Monson: F. will accept Br. claims to Sudan unless Delcasse is forced to be firm by domestic pressure. |
| | B | 2. Sept. 9. French forces reported to be at Fashoda. Kitchener forwards news to Salisbury. |
| 1 | | Salisbury: ? No direct evidence. He probably understood that this represented a territorial claim by France, since he took only two hours to draft a reply. |
| | M | 3. Sept. 9. Br.: Sudan belongs to Br. and Egypt by right of conquest. Other territories are negotiable. |
| 1 | | F: M. received. |
| | M | 4. Sept. 10. Delcasse inquires about Russian attitude. |
| 1 | | R: Will support F. on Egypt. |
| | M | 5. Sept. 18. Delcasse: Marchand's rights at Fashoda equal Kitchener's at Khartoum; Fashoda not included in Br. territory; F. has never accepted Br. claims to whole Nile valley. (Repeated in London.) (reply to 3.) |
| 1 | M | 6. Monson: Fashoda is Br. territory. Br. will not compromise. (Reply to 5.) |
| 0 | | Delcasse: ? |
| | M | 7. Sept. 25. Br.: Marchand has no ammunition and supplies; his position is impossible. |
| 1 | | F: Delcasse uses statement to urge F. restraint; |
| 15 | | Ministry of Colonies denies its truth. |
| | M | 8. Sept. 27. Delcasse: Must hear from Marchand before deciding anything. Requests Br. assistance in sending message to Fashoda via Cairo. |
| 1 (4) | | Salisbury: O.K. (F. is obviously stalling.) |
| | I | 9. F. Ministry of Colonies disclosure stirs up public opinion in F and Br.; belligerent speeches in Parliament. |
| 5 | | Delcasse: frightened, Br. must now stiffen their position, maybe send an ultimatum. |
| | M | 10. Sept. 30. Delcasse to Monson: F. will not accept an ultimatum. |

Code	Type	
1		Monsen: D. is not bluffing; F. domestic situation is difficult and any weakness would mean downfall of the Cabinet.
	M	11. Oct. 6. Delcassé via Courcel makes a concession: suggests Marchand's withdrawal in return for territory.
15		Salisbury: D. wants a face-saving concession; this is O.K.
	M	12. Oct. 12. Specific F. demand: left bank of Bahrel Ghazal valley.
5		Salisbury: surprised. Demand is much too high. Rejects demand later in Oct.
	I	13. Late Oct.: Warnings of a possible F. coup d'etat war with Br.
5		Br: military preparations made.
	M	14. Oct. 21. F. will settle for a commercial outlet on the Nile, west branch.
1		Salisbury: an acceptable compromise. Br. cabinet: but a compromise is irrelevant if war is coming. War would resolve all En-F disputes favorably.
	M	15. Oct. 27. Br. reply to 14. Br. fleet mobilized in Mediterranean. There will be no compromise, no negotiation, no promise of concessions. Marchand must go.
5		F. amb. Courcel: The best time for Marchand to withdraw is immediately. F: M. received. Possible responses: a) war; b) recall Marchand. B is chosen.

1905 MOROCCO

4	B	1. March 31. Kaiser's speech at Tangiers. Delcassé: Trouble ahead; G. wants something.
1 (4)	M	2. April 7. Delcassé: F. is willing to negotiate over Morocco and correct any G. misunderstandings. Holstein: bilateral negotiations would be bad for us G. should ignore this offer. Bülow accepts his advice.
S	M	3. Vague G. demand for a conference. A stall based on disagreements in the G. government.
13a	I	4. F. indices of Delcassé's unpopularity. G: With Delcassé out, F. will be reasonable and accept a conference, leading to a G. victory.

Code	Type	
	M	5. Feedback to G. demand for a conference. A,R: disapprove. S,I: approval is conditional on F. Br. acceptance. Er: disapprove.
17(15)		G: feedback is ignored.
T	M	6. Apr. 23. Br. M. of support for F. is edited by amb. Bertie to strengthen Br. degree of support.
	M	7. April 26, 30. Rouvier offers various concessions to G.
0		G:
14	M	8. G: reject or ignore Rouvier's offers. Rouvier: concessions must have been inadequate; try a new one.
	I,M	9. Early May. German press demands Delcassé's resignation. Molstein: G. does not trust Delcassé. Repeated May 16.
15		Rouvier: Once Delcassé is removed, G. will negotiate and accept the concessions I have offered.
1		Delcassé: On the contrary, my resignation would be a sign of weakness and would be followed by new G. demands.
1	M	10. May 3, F. amb. Cambon requests firmer Br. support Er: Evasive answer, Let's wait and see.
	M	11. May 17. Lansdowne, fearing F. concessions to G. in Morocco or elsewhere, suggests joint Br-F discussions on Morocco; expresses Br. anxiety over possible F. concessions.
16		Cambon: Good news; Br. will support F. fully, perhaps even sign an alliance.
S	M	12. May 24, Lansdowne, finding that Cambon has misinterpreted his request, clarifies it vaguely.
15		Cambon: earlier interpretation confirmed. Br. is offering a de facto alliance.
15		Delcassé: excellent.
12		Rouvier: Br. is trying to stir up a G-F war.
	M	13. Early June. G. amb. in Rome: If F. attacks Morocco, G. will attack F.
1a		Delcassé: a bluff. Soft reply will bring more demands.
14		Rouvier: G. is serious, situation is dangerous. Delcassé must go.
	I	14. June 6. Delcassé forced out of office.
15	G:	Good for us, F. will now accept conference.
12	Br:	F. is yielding to threats, showing weakness; is unreliable

Code	Type	
	M	15. G. repeats demand for a conference. Feedback from R, A, I, Br., others, negative, repeating no. 5; G. ignores.
17		Rouvier: ignores, repeats offer to negotiate (no. 7); suggests additional concessions.
17		
	M	16. G. ignores or rejects Rouvier's offers. Rouvier: discouraged. Strategy fails. Shifts image of G. Shifts to D strategy.
7		
	M	17. Rouvier rejects a conference. Bülow: Threats are not working, try a hint of G. concessions.
5		
	M	18. June 12. Bülow offers to negotiate the conference program if Rouvier will agree to a conference.
0		Rouvier:
	M	19. June 21. F. insists on negotiations and agreement prior to any conference.
18		Bülow, Holstein: F. is bluffing, will back down if G. is firm.
	I	20. G. representatives in Paris report strong F. resentment against G, support for firm F. stand.
17		G: ignore.
	M	21. June 28. Br. warning to G. Br. will support F, perhaps in war as well.
5		Bülow: Br. will support F, time to make a concession or negotiations.
	M	22. July-August-Sept. Bülow proposes conciliation, Kaiser commands G. conciliation to break negotiation deadlocks. Rosen (HL) is unable to be conciliatory.
T		
	I	23. Dec. New Br. government; Grey becomes Foreign Minister.
15 (13a)		Bülow: good for us; the new government is peaceful, will not support F.
	I	24. Dec. G. amb. reports that F. will not make any concessions at the conference and are preparing for war.
17		Bülow: ignore. High hopes for conference; expects support from A, I, S, U.S.
6		Moltke: Conference will go badly for G. (Jan. 23)
	M	25. Dec. 19 Grey repeats Lansdowne's warning to G. that Br. will support F. and could not remain neutral in war. Repeated Jan. 28, 1906.
17		G: ignore; Br. warned of war danger, advised to restrain F.

Code	Type	
	M	26. Jan. Cambon requests more definite Br. assurances of support.
S		Grey: Br. support depends on circumstances; depends on the Cabinet, which would probably not approve a written statement.
	M	27. Early Feb. Feedback from discussions on police issue: Br., R., I., U.S., support F; A, S disapprove G. position.
17		G: Ignore. Conference is going well.
	M	28. Feedback from G. threats to break up the conference: general disapproval.
0 (17)		G:
	M	29. Feb. 19-20 R. warnings: If G. breaks up the conference this would produce general hostility to G. (Br. warnings also Feb. 19.)
17		G: ignore.
	M	30. Late Feb. A. warnings: G, A isolated; G. should back down.
0 (17)		G:
	M	31. Mar. 3, 5 Major votes: G. isolated.
6a		G: Strategy fails, G. must yield.

1908 BOSNIA

16 (13a)	B	1. July 24. Young Turk coup d'Etat. A. Good for us; young turks are wise and reasonable politicians, interested in reforms. Will not oppose Bosnian annexation.
20	I	2. A. amb. to Turkey warns against dangerous consequences of annexation; reports warning by Turkish officials. A: Warning rejected, amb. instructed to refrain from further consultation with Turks about annexation.
15	B	3. Oct. 7. Annexation of Bosnia. R. Izvolsky: A double-cross, but a fait accompli. Violates the Treaty of Berlin and thus makes a conference necessary.
18 4		P. Stolypin: a bluff. G. Kaiser: Austrians and Bulgarians are treacherous criminals, but our allies.
0	M	4. Oct. 5. B: Will refuse to recognize annexation until the views of other concerned Powers are known. (Meaning: until Turkey receives adequate compensation.) T:

Code	Type	
R	M	5. Turkey: Annexation is illegal; protests to A. A. Amb: This protest is pro forma; T. will do nothing further.
4	M	6. Oct. 10. R to Br: R. hopes to arrange opening of straits with T. and hopes Br. will not oppose this. Br Grey reply: This is not the sort of action I agreed to support last year. Time is inopportune for pressure on T. Br. will reserve judgment on this.
5(4)	M	7. Grey: Br. will support the straits opening some day on a basis of equality among countries. Meanwhile R. should be helpful to T., to build good will. R. Izvolsky: disappointed, but Grey's proposition is acceptable.
1	M	8. Oct. 12. G. to Br: G. supports compensation to T. and preservation of new T. boundaries; but G. will support its ally A. Br: Ms. received.
H,9	M	9. Izvolsky proposes conference to G. G. Kaiser: a conference will be a second Algeciras (1906); unacceptable.
18 4	M	10. Oct. 17,25. R. warning: G. failure to satisfy R. will produce deep distrust of G. and A.
4	M	11. G.: A bluff. ignore. No reply. R: G. will support A. completely.
4	M	12. Oct. 24, 30. A. warning: if Izvolsky makes trouble, A. will publish secret agreements. R: Ms. received. Reply: Izvolsky will be discreet.
5	M	13. Nov. 14. A: Accepts R. proposal for a conference, but with essential reservations that nullify the acceptance. A. estimate: R. will not risk war and will not make trouble about a conference R: A. does not want a conference. But R. can do nothing about it, must accept A. procedure.
0	M	14. Nov. 10.R If there is a crisis in the Balkans, what will Br. do? Grey reply: I cannot ask the Cabinet to consider this question.
1 1	M	15. Jan 1. A, Conrad: If there is war, what is the G. plan? G. reply: G. will attack F. first. But G. will mobilize when R. does. Details of G. and A. troop dispositions on Eastern Front worked out in further discussions.

Code	Type	
2	M	16. Oct. 15. Br: Will support T. in getting financial and other compensations, but T should not insist on recovery of Bosnia. T: Delighted at Br. support. But T. also needs protection against Eulgarian aggression. Perhaps Bosnia can become an independent principality.
11 4	M	17. T. protests annexation, boycotts A. goods, proposes conference. A, G: T. resistance is due to Br. support. A. amb: I have underestimated the extent of T. opposition (cf. no. 5.)
0	M	18. Oct. 28. A. initiates informal discussion with T., offers economic advantages but no financial compensation. T:
	M	19. Oct. 30 Br: A. should compensate T. for the annexation.
20 17 22	M	20. A. Amb. Mensdorff: Br. is not inciting T. resistance; will be happy to see a settlement. A. Aehrenthal: Doesn't believe Mensdorff. Ignores Br. statement.(19) Cites supposed support of T. boycott by King Edward.
14	M	21. Nov. 18. T: Bosnia should become an autonomous province. A: T. really wants financial compensation; rights in Bosnia are not a genuine demand.
6	M	22. Dec. 6. G.: T. is serious, A. is advised to negotiate and to offer financial compensation. A. reply: will think this over. A. decides to begin formal negotiations by asking for compensation for boycott damage. G. advice repeated Dec. 16, 31.
0	M	23. Dec. 14. T. demands financial compensation. A.:
11(8)	M	24. T. rejects A. counter offer. (Twice) A: Br. is behind this obstinacy. Perhaps Br. desires a war.
1	M	25. Jan. 3. A. offers financial compensation. T. accepts.
1a	M	26. Jan. 2. Serbia demands Bosnian autonomy. A: apology demanded and received.
3	M	27. Jan. 1, F. propose mediation to G. G: this would help R. against A., since R. by itself is helpless. Refuses mediation.

Code	Type	
5	M	28. Feb. 15 R. hints possible realignment if Br. offers no assistance. Er: Realignment is a possibility. Br. must support Serbia on behalf of R.
3	M	29. Feb. 19. Br: A. should propose concessions so Br. can mediate with Serbia. G. Reply: This would be putting pressure on A. But pressure should be put on Serbia. A. has no intention of attacking S.
5	M	30. Feb. 26 F: Territorial compensation to Serbia is not possible. R: Ms. received; R. must submit.
5	M	31. Feb. 27 R: Serbia must abandon its demands on A. Serbia: accepts R. advice.
1 (15)	M	32. Mar. 10 Serbian note abandons all claims, submits to the Powers. A: Since R. will not fight, this is a good time to be hard on Serbia; prepare additional demands.
0	M	33. Mar. 11. A. rejects Serbian note, demands submission and a start to disarmament. Serbia:
16	M	34. Mar. 14 G. offers to help R: the Powers can exchange notes recognizing the annexation; then R. can pressure Serbia to submit to A. demands. (G. aim: help R. retreat from its intransigent stand, put pressure on Serbia to submit.) R: A conciliatory offer, aimed at relaxing tension. Good.
15	M	35. Mar. 20 R. accepts G. offer. G: an insolent refusal.
5 (12)	M	36. Mar. 21. G. demands advance acceptance of A. proposals; Yes or No answer required without hedging. (R. will not fight; a stern note will make R. yield). R: This is an ultimatum; R. is isolated and must submit.
15a	M	37. Mar. 23. R. accepts G. demand. G: peace preserved and the Entente weakened by G. firmness.
5	M	38. Mar. 25 Br: Br. will not accept the annexation until A., Serbia reach agreement. Br. can advise Serbia to agree to good behavior but will not support any humiliating demands on Serbia. A: Mediation accepted, agreement reached with Serbi

1911 AGADIR

Code	Type	
	B	1. July 1. <u>Panther</u> anchors at Agadir. G intention: provides a guarantee for compensation to G. as well as an inducement to F. to bargain.
8		F: G. wants part of Morocco and wants to humiliate F.
8		Er: Ditto.
S	M	2. July 4. Br, Grey: Br. has an interest in the Morocco situation. Intention: find out G. intentions.
		G: F. will probably keep Br. informed, so no action is necessary.
	M	3. July 10 Br: F. should compensate G., perhaps a Moroccan port.
12		F: Dismay, doubts about Br. support.
14	M	4. July 15. G: G. demands F. Congo as compensation
		F: G. may be interested in getting some Moroccan territory.
8	M	5. F reply: Minor Congo compensation offered.
		G: an insult.
1a	M	6. July 20, 28. G: Willing to go to extreme length
		F: a bluff.
S	M	7. July 21. Br. again requests information about G. intentions in Morocco.
		G: Grey is worried about something.
	M	8. G: No answer given to Br. requests of July 4, 21.
8		Er: An insult. G. intentions may be more dangerous than suspected.
5	M	9. July 21. Br, Lloyd George, speech with added statement that Er. will not be humiliated.
10		G: Br. will support F. if it comes to war, and may be preparing to attack G. Warning necessary.
8(10)	M	10. July 25 G: G. will not bow before Br. threats.
		Br, Grey: G. is about to attack Br.
1	M	11. Grey to Cambon: Br. support for Fr. is not automatic in case of war.
		Cambon: Br. will probably support F.
5	M	12. Late July, early Aug. Caillaux makes substantial compensation offers.
		G: F. is serious about giving substantial compensation; settlement possible; time to compromise.

Code	Type	
	M	13. Late July. Caillaux orders secret mobilization to frighten G.
1a		G: a bluff.
	M	14. G: stop F. mobilization or negotiations end. Ms. received, mobilization stopped.
5		
	M	15. Aug. 1. G. reduces Congo demands. (Response to 12.)
5		F: Congo settlement in sight, time to compromise.
	M	16. Aug. 4 Caillaux: "8 days" threat
1a		G: a bluff. Ignore.
	M	17. Sept. 4 to Nov. 2. Detailed bargaining made possible by prior corrections of misperceptions.

1914 EUROPE

	B	1. June 28. Assassination.
10		A: Here is our chance to deal with Serbia. We have a good case finally, so R. and F. may not fight to protect Serbia.
10		G: (interp. of assassination and of Berchtold's report of July 2) Here is our chance to move. Austria is united; good case against Serbia; R. is not ready for war till 1917 and so will not fight until then.
	M	2. July 6. G. amb. Lichnowsky: G. has serious worries about R. rearmament and the R-Br. naval agreement; if G. becomes convinced of a future attack on her, she will tend to accept trouble now rather than later.
10		Grey: Don't worry, there are no secret Br-R. agreements, only military discussions initiated in 1906. Br. has no automatic commitments. (Note: Grey interprets G. worries in terms of his colleagues' worries about entangling alliances.)
	M	3. G. amb. Lichnowsky: Br. will fight if A. attacks Serbia.
20		G: don't believe Lichnowsky.
	M	4. July 20. Grey: General war must be avoided.
15		G: Br. will not fight.
	M	5. July 22. Reports to Br. that A-G will make unacceptable demands on Serbia.
5		Br: Reports are plausible.
	M	6. Br. response: warning to A. that Br. will not support unacceptable demands.
17(8)		G Kaiser: Br. warning is tremendous insolence.

Code	Type	
18 18	M	7. R. warnings (via various channels).: R. will fight if Serbia is attacked. G,A: a bluff.
16 H,8 RR	M	8. July 23. A. ultimatum. F: There is still hope for peaceful negotiations; Serbia advised to concede A. demands. F. newspaper: a new Agadir. A, G amb. in Paris: F. desires localization to A, Serbia. Based on discussions with Foreign Office.
15		Br; Grey: Grave danger to peace. War if A. invades Serbia, between F-R and A-G. Suggests Br-G. mediation to Lichnowsky.
1 R,R		R. Sazonov: This means war. A,G. amb: R. wants to negotiate. Reports repeated July 24, 25.
1	M	9. J. 23 Serbia: requests R. protection. Serbia will accept anything compatible with its sovereignty. R: Serbia wants R. support.
1	M	10. J. 24 P: Serbia should make no resistance to an A. attack, should appeal to the Powers. Serbia: will do.
1	M	11. F: will fulfill alliance obligations to R. R: F. will support us.
1	M	12. Br: cannot guarantee support. R: Br. support not certain.
R	M	13. J. 24. R.: cannot remain indifferent to A. ultimatum. G. amb: Ms. not transmitted.
R R 1	I	14. R. press hostile to G, A. G, A. amb: ignore or distort. Br. amb: correct transmission.
1	M	15. J. 25 R. to Br: Br. should maintain balance of power by firm Entente support; this will prevent war. Br: Ms. received; not persuaded.
22	I	16. Labor unrest in R. G: R. is weak, will not fight.
0(15)	M	17. Br. to G.: Urge A. to postpone deadline; restrain A. from rash action. G:

Code	Type	
3	M	18. G: deceptive reply. G. is restraining A. Br: G. is trying to deceive us.
15	M	19. J. 26. Sazonov calmer. R. cannot permit invasion of S. G, A: Sazonov backing down because Br, F will not support R.
3	M	20. J. 26. G (Schön) to F: F should restrain R, but G. will not restrain A, as conflict should be localized. Intention: separate R, F. F: This is an attempt to separate
T	M	21. F, R. Reply: F will accept joint restraining efforts only. Schön: F. is drifting away from R. Does not communicate F. refusal to restrain unila- terally. Reports: F. will restrain R. if G. re- strains A. G: ignore.
17		
1	M	22. Grey proposes conference at R request. G: G. will be outnumbered in such a conference. Rejects proposal.
17	I	23. J. 27 Br. navy stays mobilized after fleet maneuvers. G: ignore.
4(5)	I	24. J. 28. G. learns of secret A. plan to divide Serbia between A. and Bulgaria and Albania. G. Kaiser: A. deception is intolerable. A. should halt in Belgrade. (Idea not taken up by Bethmann- Hollweg).
	M	25. J. 29. A, Conrad: A. must know G. military intentions in case of war. Requests G. mobili- zation against R., so A. can mass its army in Bosnia to attack Serbia. Otherwise A. must divert most of its army to the R. front.
1 5	M	26. G. Moltke reply: G. will attack F, A. must use its army to hold back R. A. Conrad: Will do so.
15	M	27. J. 29 Br. Grey proposes A. should halt in Belgrade so other powers can mediate the dispute. G: Br. becoming more reasonable; Grey's views similar to the Kaiser's.
20	M	28. G. amb. Lichnowsky: Br. will fight if there is war. G: Don't believe this.

Code	Type	
22	M	29. Br. King George to Prince Henry: Br. will try to stay out of war. G: Confirms estimate that Br. will not fight; Lichnowsky is mistaken.
6	M	30. G: If Br. stays neutral G will not take F. or Belgian territory in event of war, only some F. and Belgian colonies. Br: Infamous proposal; anger at G. Mediation strategy abandoned.
1	M	31. G: R. should not mobilize against A or else. R: G. will support A; war is inevitable.
6	M	32. Br.: Br. will not remain neutral in war. G: Ms. received. <u>G. strategy fails.</u> Panic and disorganization.
T	M	33. J. 30, AM. G: A. should halt its mobilization. halt in Belgrade. Ms. delayed in transit by amb. Tschirschky.
S	M	34. J. 30 G. Moltke: A. should continue to mobilize, war is imminent.
1		A: Ms received; mobilization continues.

1923-4 Ruhr

6	M	1. Jan. 10 F. announces intention to send civilian control commission, supported by troops, into the Ruhr to ensure G. reparations payments. (Real intentions-varied, ranging from maintaining credibility with Br., through stated aim, to promoting breakup of G.) G.: Lawless, oppressive, violent deed.
1	M	2. Apr. 26. Poincare - G. should make offers directly to F. G: An attempt to close off G. drive for support.
0	M	3. May 2 G: repeats 1922 reparations offer. F:
1	M	4. June 7 G: Requests conference, impartial judgment on G. ability to pay reparations. F. reply: No negotiations until G. passive resistance stops.
1	M	5. July 20. Br. note proposes compromise: G. should guarantee reparations payments, F. should end occupation. F: Br. is trying to oppose occupation. Reply: rejection.

Code	Type	
18	M	6. Aug. Br: occupation is illegal; Br. separate action is possible. F: Curzon is trying to stir up trouble. A bluff nothing serious.
1	M	7. Aug. 14, Sept. 2 Streseman increases concessions. F: G is weakening.
5	M	8. Sept 27. G. ends passive resistance, requests instructions from F. F: Ms. received. What do we do next?
4	M	9. Oct. 9, 15. U.S.: Still supports the Br. expert inquiry plan. R: U.S. is getting involved again. Not so good.
6	M	10. Oct. 21 Rhineland Republic formed. Br: An alarm signal. Real F. intentions clear now; intolerable.
5	M	11. Oct. 22 Br. propose accepting U.S. offer of an expert inquiry commission. F: Trouble ahead; Br. is serious.
3	M	12. Oct. 26 F. accepts Br. proposal with reservations Purpose: stall. Br: Relief, skepticism, suspicion.
4	M	13. Oct. 29-31 I, Belgium accept expert inquiry commission. F: Looks bad.
1	M	14. Oct. 30-Nov. 2. Br. asserts that the Rhineland Republic violates Versailles Treaty. F: More bad news.
1	M	15. Nov. 2. Belgium stops supporting Rhenish separatists. F: More bad news.
6a	M	16. Nov. 19. Br. threat to break the Entente if Fr. occupies any more of G. (F. had proposed occupation of Hamburg at an ambassador's conference Nov. 15.) F: Cannot afford to lose Br. support, must retreat.
		1938 MUNICH
17	I	1. Nov. 1937 Halifax visit to Germany. Chamberlain hoped Hitler would meet Halifax in Berlin; regarded this courtesy as an acid test of Hitler's good faith. Hitler remained in Berchtesgaden, summoned Halifax. Chamberlain: ignore.

Code	Type	
1 16		Eden: Discussion was vague, nothing new. Halifax: No actual results, but Anglo-German understanding is still possible.
9	I	2. 1938 May 20. Mobilization crisis. Chamberlain: war very near, dangerous.
15a	I	3. May 22. G. troop movements stop after amb. Henderson transmits Br. warning that Br. might get involved in a F-G war. Chamberlain: Br. firmness caused G. backdown, cancellation of Hitler's plans for a coup.
16	M	4. July 18. Hitler: G. desires a settlement, wants peace, will take no forcible action for a time. Purpose: Test strength of the Entente. Chamberlain: most encouraged. Hitler wants a peaceful solution. Rearmament less necessary now.
15(16)	M	5. July 20. Br. proposes mediation to Czechoslovakia. Purpose: guard against breakdown of Czech-Sudeten negotiations. Benes: Infringes Czech sovereignty but at least indicates greater Br. commitment to support Czech.
R(13a)	I	6. Early Aug. Br. amb. Henderson reports Nazi extremists in control, making preparations to attack Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain: alarmed. Must appeal to Hitler to stop the extremists.
4(18)	M	7. Aug. 11 Br. requests G. to reduce military measures, to avoid accidental war. Response to 6. Hitler: a bluff. Ignore. G. refuses.
20	M	8. Aug. 17 Kleist visits Vansittart, warns that Hitler is the extremist bent on war. Urges firm Br. stand, which might deter Hitler. Chamberlain: Ignores. Kleist has no power. He is anti-Hitler and wants to stir up trouble.
20	M	9. Aug. 23 Report that Hitler has secretly announced his intention to attack Czechoslovakia by Oct. 1. Halifax: ignore.
1a	M	10. Aug. 27. Br. warning: No telling who may get involved in a war. Motive: deter Hitler by a threat, without committing Br. to anything, without encouraging Czechoslovakia to intransigence, without alarming the Dominions. Hitler: ignore.

Code	Type	
	M	11a. Aug. 30. Runciman: Benes' concessions are inadequate to satisfy Sudeten.
		11b. Aug. 30. McFarlane: Hitler will attack if Sudetens are not satisfied by Sept. 12. Confirms Kleist's points.
		11c. Aug. 30. F. intelligence report: G. is mobilizing for an attack.
20		Henderson: McFarlane is biased.
5		Chamberlain: Believes, especially 11c. Consults Cabinet.
	M	12. Aug. 29 Hitler inspects West Wall. Motive: impress Belgians, his own generals.
0		Br, F. - ?
	M	13. Litvinov, amb. Maisky: S.U. wishes to help Czechoslovakia. Requests four-power defense talks.
20		Chamberlain: believes his military reports of Soviet military weakness. Offer is insincere.
	M	14. Sept. 2. S.U. suggests S.U.-F. military talks to defend Czechoslovakia.
R(20)		F. Bonnet twists Ms. to make it seem deceptive; ignored by Cabinet.
	M	15. Sept. 2 Fr. warning, defensive mobilization on Maginot line
2		Hitler: F. will not attack to save Czechoslovakia, will only defend itself.
14		G. generals: increased apprehension of war.
	M	16. Sept. 2. G. Halder advises Br. to stand firm against Hitler, prevent attacks on Czechoslovakia (A leader of the plot against Hitler.)
14		Br: Increases fear of G. attack.
	M	17. Sept. 2-4 Br: Benes should accept Sudeten demands.
5		Benes: Will do.
	M	18a. Report by Conwell-Evans: Hitler plans to attack in early Oct. but may be stopped by firm stand and generous offer to Sudetens.
		18b. Sept. 5. Secret service report: Hitler will attack end of Sept; strong G. opposition to this move; Br. should be firm.
		18c. Sept. 5. Kordt report confirms 18b.
5		Halifax: Perhaps we should warn Hitler of possible Br. involvement (bluff).

Code	Type	
14		Reverses stand Sept. 12. Hitler is probably mad, will be provoked by a Br. warning.
1	I	19. Sept. 7-15 Czech riots against Sudeten. Hitler - a good time to attack. Checks preparations.
T	M	20. Sept. 10. Br: Warning to G. of possible Br. involvement in war. Not delivered by amb. Henderson.
12	M	21. Sept. 10-12. F. asks for Br. commitment to defend Cz. Br. reply: Br. will defend F, but cannot make advance decisions on other unforeseeable contingencies, (Fear: commitment might encourage rash F. act, lead to war.)
13a (15)	M	22. Sept. 12. Hitler demands self-determination for Sudetens, public speech. Motive: maintain pressure but stall till preparations for attack are complete. Br: Situation dangerous; Hitler is trying to restrain extremists.
2	M	23. Chamberlain: proposes discussion with Hitler. Motive: display Br. concern, improve communication, support Hitler against extremists. Hitler: Astonished. Br. is ready to make concessions. Had expected Br. firm stand.
15	M	24. Berchtesgaden discussions. Chamberlain: confirms estimate that situation is dangerous. But Hitler's claims are limited. Chamberlain has made a good impression, laid basis for discussion.
R	M	25. Sept. 18. Bonnet dishonestly reports that Czechs are ready to give Sudeten areas to G, in a joint Br-F meeting.
5	M	26. Sept. 19 Br-F. ultimatum to Benes. Benes: Ms received; must submit.
15	M	27. Sept. 23. Hitler makes new demands at Bad Godesberg meeting. Chamberlain: First anger, then doubt, despair; then optimism. He has finally established some influence with Hitler, whose word is reliable; detente is in sight.
6		Halifax: accepts Chamberlain's interpretation, then convinced by Cadogan that appeasement is not working.

Code	Type	
		Shifts to favor warning Hitler.
0	M	28. S.U. suggests military conference to co-ordinate resistance to G., in reply to query by Halifax. Halifax:
17	M	29. Sept. 25. F. rejects new G. demand. G: ignore.
T	M	30. Sept. 26. Br. asks G. to accept the Berchtesgaden terms. Warns that Br. will support F. in war. Warning not delivered at first by Wilson, at Chamberlain's urging. Hitler: reject hysterically.
17		
14	M	31. Sept. 26-7 Hitler reaffirms Sept. 23 terms, sends Czechs an ultimatum. Br: Firmness did not work, try appeasement. (Halifax especially.)
15(16)	M	32. Sept. 27 Hitler sends Chamberlain letter of thanks for his efforts, suggests he might continue to pressure Czechs. Background: mounting G. opposition to planned attack. Chamberlain: Proof that Hitler is reasonable, agreement still possible.
	M	33. Sept. 27. Br. fleet mobilizes (precedes Br. receipt of 32). G.
6	M	34a. Sept. 27 Chamberlain proposes compromise. 34b. Sept. 28 F. proposes compromise. G: F. offer is attractive, given 30, 32, 33.
6	M	35. Sept. 28. Chamberlain proposes conference to Mussolini. M. transmits to Hitler with his strong approval. 2 PM Hitler accepts.
15	M	36. Sept. 29-30. Munich agreement. Chamberlain: Peace, detente in our time, achieved on the brink of war. Strategy succeeds.

1940-41 U.S.-JAPAN

3	M	1. 1940 July 25. U.S. places limited embargo on fuel, scrap iron. Intention: deterrent warning. Welles adds that embargo was imposed purely to conserve for U.S. needs. J: Welles is trying to deceive Japan. U.S. is depriving J. of vital materials; possibility of war increases.
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Code	Type	
	M	2. Aug. J. increases demands on Indo-China, Indies, to replace embargoed U.S. material.
10		U.S.: Open J. aggression.
	M	3. Sept. 27. J. treaty with G. Purpose: deter U.S.
8		U.S.: J. is an enemy, and aggressive. Attitude stiffens.
	M	4. Oct. 5 and later. B. request part of U.S. fleet to Singapore, to deter J.
4		U.S. Ms. received.
	M	5. Oct. 5-8. J: J. intentions are defensive, peaceful. U.S. embargoes are regarded as an unfriendly act in J. Request no more embargoes.
19		U.S. Don't believe this. Look who's talking about unfriendly acts.
	I	6. Nov. 12 J. settles for reduced oil supply from Indies. REason--fear of provoking U.S.
1(13)		U.S.: J. will take whatever oil it can get; was deterred by firm U.S. stand.
	M	7. 1941 Feb. 14. Dooman, U.S. embassy, advises J. that U.S. will support Br. even at risk of war; J. occupation of Dutch or Br. possessions would lead to war; U.S. avoids oil embargo to avoid putting J. in a difficult position.
0		J.:
	M	8. Mar. 8 J, Nomura: J. expansion is defensive against foreign pressure; J is concerned about possible U.S. embargoes; J. will take no new military moves unless forced to by new U.S. restrictions.
19		Hull: Doesn't believe this. J. is pursuing an aggressive policy.
S	M	9. Dec.-Apr. Konoye's secret proposal bypassing Matsuoka. Transmitted as proposal of concerned citizens. Received by U.S. as of unknown origin.
	M	10. Apr. 14 U.S. Is this proposal an acceptable basis of negotiation?
16		J.: Proposal comes from U.S., looks reasonable.
	M	11. Apr. 16 U.S. states four principles as foundations of its bargaining position.
17		J: Vague, irrelevant abstractions.
	M	12. May 7-12. J: U.S. offer conditionally accepted. U.S., Hull: despondent. Negotiations are hopeless. Proposal gives J. everything it wants.
4		

Code	Type	
4	M	13. May: U.S. gently rejects J. response (12). J: Discouraged. U.S. getting less reasonable.
	M	14a. June 6-20. Partial U.S. embargoes. U.S. stated reason: domestic shortages.
4		14b. June 10. Indies negotiations break down. J: more discouragement.
15	M	15. June 6 Amb. Oshima, Berlin: Hitler seems to be planning attack on S.U. J.: A camouflage for G. attack on Br. S.U. is neutral, may even join G, J. alliance.
H,8	M	16. June 21. U.S. hint that Matsuoka is cause of U.S.-Japan troubles. Matsuoka: Just what G. said of Delcassé in 1905, must be a prelude to U.S. aggressive moves.
10	M	17. July 14. J. demands bases in Indo-China. response to 14; J. needs materials, has not gotten them by peaceful negotiations. U.S.: J. has decided on aggression. Supposed need for raw materials, is pretext, not real reason.
6(10)	B	18. July 26. U.S. freezes J. assets. Intention: warning against further aggression. J. War is almost inevitable. J. is being encircled by enemies.
3	M	19. Aug. FDR: No embargo intended; J. can still apply for export licenses. J: U.S. duplicity.
19 15	M	20. Aug. 8 Konoye proposes meeting with Roosevelt. Purpose: bypass hardliners on both sides. Hull: A ruse to cover J's military preparations. Grew: A real chance to reach agreement.
15 16	M	21. Sept. 6, 22, 25 New J. proposal. Last try for peace. USHL: J. is starting to back down. USSL: Last chance for successful negotiations.
6	M	22. Oct. 2 U.S. rejection. Intention: deter (HL) or stall (SL). J: War inevitable.
19	M	23. Nov. 7 New J. proposal. Another last try for U.S. reasonableness. Hull: Negotiations hopeless, continued only to show US concern for peace, J. duplicity.

Code

Type

1945-6 IRAN

- | | | |
|---------|---|--|
| 15 | B | 1. Nov. 1945 Azerbaijan independence movement.
S.U.: A true democratic movement, facilitated by
S.U. keeping repressive Iranian forces out. |
| 11 | | U.S.-Br.: Soviet subversion aimed at taking over
part of Iran permanently. |
| 14 | B | 2. Dec. '45 S.U. blocks Iranian troops, warns
them to stay out.
U.S.-Br.: confirms interpretation of 1. |
| 19 | M | 3. Dec. S.U. denies involvement in Azerbaijan
events; revolt is indigenous.
U.S.-Br.: don't believe this. |
| 17 | M | 4. Nov.-Dec. U.S. notes: S.U. reminded of pledge
to withdraw troops, respect Iranian sovereignty.
Intention: hope this will induce S.U. to with-
draw.
S.U.: Ignore. (?) |
| 17(10) | M | 5. Dec. U.S. announces troop withdrawal from Iran
by Jan. 1. Hope: S.U. will follow this example.
S.U.: ignore. No objection to presence of U.S.
troops in Iran. |
| 11 | M | 6. Dec. Foreign ministers meeting. U.S. expresses
concern over S.U. troops.
S.U. Iranian government is stirring up U.S., causing
trouble between the allies. |
| 19
7 | M | 7. S.U. reply: S.U. has no territorial interests,
is only worried about the security of its Baku
oil fields. Hostile Iranian govt. poses a danger
for example. Once oil is secure SU will withdraw.
S.U. has right under 1921 treaty to station
troops there in disturbed conditions.
Byrnes: A flimsy excuse. Unbelievable.
U.S.: Strategy of cautious warnings is not working;
stronger measures needed. |
| S | M | 8. Dec. 23 Byrnes: Iranian dispute may come up at
the UN; hopes this can be avoided. Intention:
warn S.U. of possible U.S. opposition.
S.U.: UN is no problem if the Allies do not let
smaller powers stir up trouble between them. |
| 19 | M | 9. S.U. reply: don't worry; UN is no problem.
Byrnes: Suspicion. Despite all his reassurances,
Stalin is up to something. |

Code	Type	
11	M	10. Jan. 1946. Iran enters complaint at U.N.; support by U.S. S.U.: Dismay. Treachery by our ally. Iran is responsible for this.
6	M	11. S.U. response: cuts off trade between Azerbaijan and Iran, announces it can no longer work with Hakimi. Iran: Hakimi's firm strategy fails; Hakimi resigns, replaced by Qavam. Accommodation with S.U. is necessary.
10	M	12. Mar. 2. S.U. fails to withdraw troops; sends in new combat troops, puts various pressures on Iran government. U.S., Byrnes: a clearly aggressive act.
	M	13. Mar. 6,8. U.S. protest notes. U.S. cannot remain indifferent; requests information on troops and their purpose.
1	M	14. S.U.: Mar. S.U. makes three bargaining demands. Qavam: Stalin's real interest is No. 3, oil.
1	M	15. Mar. S.U. warning: Pursuing the U.N. complaint would be an unfriendly act. Qavam: S.U. serious; caution needed at the U.N.
19	M	16. Mar. 26. S.U.: May withdraw from U.N. Soviet troops are withdrawing from Azerbaijan and will be out in 5-6 weeks. U.S.: ignore. S.U. no longer credible.
T	M	17. Apr. 3 Qavam reports progress in negotiations to U.N.; amb. Ala denies this, repeats Iranian grievances.
15a	M	18. Apr. 4. Agreement announced between S.U., Iran. U.S.: Our firmness caused Soviet retreat.

1948 BERLIN

1	B	1. June 18. West announces currency reform. S.U.: West is implementing its plan to split Germany, form a separate state. Reform threatens East zone economy in addition.
10	B	2. June 21. East zone currency reform. Intention: protection against flood of old currency from West. June 22 extended to West Berlin. U.S.: S.U. intends to incorporate West Berlin into East zone.
	B	3. June 23. West currency reform extended to West Berlin.

Code	Type	
0		S.U.:
4	B	4. June 24. Blockade. U.S.: S.U. wants to stop formation of West Germany.
0(17)	B	5. June 25. Airlift begins. S.U. ?
1	M	6. July 3. Marshall Sokolovsky: Blockade will continue until West abandons plan for separate West Germany. U.S. Interp. of 4 confirmed.
1	M	7. July 6. U.S. protest note. Blockade is illegal. West will negotiate on Berlin only. S.U.: West wants to stay in Berlin.
1	M	8. July 14 S.U. reply. West has many times violated the occupation agreement and has thus nullified it and the consequent rights in Berlin. S.U. is willing to negotiate on Germany. U.S.: S.U. wants to force West out of West Berlin.
2 6a	I	9. Jan 1949. Airlift working even in winter; West Berliners holding out. U.S.: We're winning, concessions no longer necessary. S.U. Blockade failing, time to back down.
1	M	10. Jan. 31 Stalin press conference. U.S.: Notes no reference to currency question; Stalin is ready to give in. Confirmed Mar. 15.

1956 SUEZ

H,8	B	1. July 26. Nasser announces nationalization of Canal. Purpose: get income to replace withdrawn U.S. aid, demonstrate independence from Colonial powers. Eden: Looks like Hitler's sudden aggressive moves. If this one is not stopped worse aggression will follow. Nasser plans to expel all Western influence from Middle East.
10		Dulles: A business dispute over control of a public utility; should be settled by negotiation. Sees no connection with withdrawn U.S. aid.
16(15)	M	2. July 28. Eisenhower proposes meeting of maritime powers. Purpose: keep disputants talking, avoid sudden military action. Eden: This may be a good way to exert pressure on Nasser. Accepts conference.

Code	Type	
16	M	3. Br. amb. in Washington reports State dept. hesitant, unwilling to take sudden action. Br: Maybe they are just waiting for Dulles to return from Peru.
16(15)	M	4. Aug. 1. Dulles states that military measures could be considered only as a last resort; would require Congressional approval. Purpose: use legalism to block military action. Eden: Dulles is considering possible military action, may therefore support such a strategy.
17	M	5. Aug. 9. S.U.: Egypt's action is legal. Repeated Aug. 12 by Egypt. Br: Ignore. Nasser's speech is abusive, perverse, deluded.
22	I	6. Feedback from conference invitations: Not much support for Br., F. Br: Ignore. 22 eventual acceptances out of 24; 18 agree to final US-sponsored resolution.
16	I	7. Aug. Dulles is evasive about applying various forms of economic pressure on Egypt. Eden: Keep trying to persuade him. Makes several attempts during August.
12	M	8. Aug. 28. Br: Br. may take Suez issue to the Security Council. U.S.: UN move maybe a pretext for military action.
0	M	9. Aug. 29. Dulles expresses doubts, points out technical difficulties in going to UN. Purpose--delay. Eden:
16(15)	M	10. Sept. 3. Eisenhower rejects use of force on Egypt; insists on continuing negotiations. Eden, Menzies: A stroke of bad luck. An unwise tactic; Nasser can now avoid concessions, knowing that U.S. force is ruled out.
15(16)	M	11. Sept. 4. Dulles suggests SCUA. Purpose-Stall. Br: Looks promising. At least commits the US to use economic pressure on Nasser (nonpayment of canal dues.)
21	M	12. Sept. 7. Dulles refuses to support an appeal to UN. Eden: Disappointed. Where does U.S. stand? U.S. has continually obstructed Br. without offering any alternatives.

Code	Type	
6	M	13. Sept. 10. U.S. clarifies SCUA. Teeth missing. Pineau: A device to stall F-Br. action against Nasser. F-Br should take independent action.
16(15)		Eden: A possible way to get U.S. co-operation; possibly toothlessness can be corrected. Most reluctant to break with U.S.
6	M	14. Sept. 13. Dulles again rejects use of force or economic pressure in his public version of SCUA. Eden: A double cross. Co-operation with US is impossible.
14	M	15. Sept. 15. Nasser rejects SCUA as colonialism Eden: Natural result of Dulles' statements; with force and economic pressure excluded Nasser has no reason to compromise. Can now go on to new aggressive moves in Middle East.
15	M	16. Sept. 21. Br-F. are going to Security Council. Dulles: A double cross. U.S. was not consulted.
15	I	17. Oct. 3. Macmillan estimate after U.S. trip: Eisenhower will do nothing until after Nov. 6 elections. Eden: Good. U.S. will not interfere in Br.-F invasion. Besides, US may have to defend Panama Canal some day, will welcome Br. precedent.
17	I	18. Late Oct. Much cable traffic Between F, Israel. Something afoot. Dulles: Ignore. Br-F will restrain Israel from military adventures. Also Br. will consult US before doing anything itself.
6a	M	19. Nov. 6 Humphrey (US) ultimatum: F will be ruined by US unless Br ceases fire by midnight. Br: Ms received, must submit.

1957-8 LEBANON

11(9)	I	1. August 1957. Syria - S.U. treaty involving economic and military aid; personnel changes in Syria, with Communists increasing influence. U.S.: Syria all but lost to the Communists; this will soon be followed by some aggressive Syrian move.
13	I	2. Egyptian propaganda against U.S. policy, Eisenhower doctrine. U.S.: Nasser is either a secret Communist or a close fellow traveler.
	M	3. Aug. 1957. Turkey reports evidence of plans for a Syrian attack, proposes preventive Turkish strike.

Code	Type	
14		U.S.: This is the expected Syrian move. Time to support our ally and warn Syria.
	I	4. Turkish military buildup on Syrian border; U.S. military buildup in Turkey, eastern Mediterranean.
5		S.U.: Turkey may be planning an attack on Syria. Protection needed.
	M	5. S.U. warning to Turkey - diplomatic note, warships to Syrian port.
14		U.S.: S.U. may be intending to join the Syrian attack on Turkey. Interpretation of 1 confirmed.
	M	6. U.S. warning to S.U. - leave Turkey alone. S.U.:
0		
	M	7. S.U. counterwarning on Syria. U.S. confirmation of 5.
14		
	I	8. 1958 Feb. 1. UAR formed. Syrian purpose: gain Nasser's support against communist faction in Syria.
13		U.S.: Another Communist consolidation. (Minority view in State Dept.: a bulwark against Communism.)
	I	9. UAR declares Communist Party illegal. U.S.: ignore.
17		
	I	10. March: Saudi Arabian power shift: Faisal replaces Saud. U.S.: Another anti-communist bulwark lost; another gain for Nasser.
13		
	I	11. April. Lebanon election campaign, waged Lebanese style with guns and street barricades. U.S.: UAR-SU internal aggression.
11		
	M	12. Pres. Chamoun, who is trying to amend the Constitution to succeed himself, requests U.S. assistance to restore order. U.S. A perfect case for the Eisenhower Doctrine.
15		
	M	13. May. U.S. announces readiness to support Chamoun militarily if needed; warns UAR to stay out of Lebanese affairs. UAR:
0		
	M	14. May: Nasser offers to try to help quiet down Lebanese civil dispute. U.S. Eisenhower: puzzling, since he is responsible for the disorder.
21		

Code	Type	
21	I	15. June: UAR, S.U. accept UN observation team on Lebanese border. U.S.: Puzzling, since team will confirm UAR meddling. Perhaps Nasser wants a temporary truce.
20	I	16. July: UN observation team reports no evidence of UAR infiltration. US: It's hard to distinguish a Syrian from a Lebanese; or perhaps UN team didn't try very hard.
11	I	17. July 14 Coup in Iraq. U.S.: Last straw. Probably a Nasser or pro-Nasser move. New Nasser move in Lebanon expected next; only Lebanon and Jordan are left for the Free World now. Time to send the Marines to Lebanon.
22	I	18. July Nasser visits S.U. U.S.: Confirms interpretation of 2.
10	M	19. July. Khrushchev calls for summit conference to resolve crisis caused by U.S. invasion of Lebanon. U.S. Eisenhower: S.U. doesn't dare use force against U.S., so it limits itself to propaganda.
10	M	20. Khrushchev and Mao call on U.S.-Br. to withdraw their troops; Khrushchev calls for special UN session to deal with crisis. U.S. More propaganda.
15a	M	21. S.U. announces that Soviet volunteers will not be sent to Middle East unless situation deteriorates further. Intention: U.S.: S.U. probably wants to reduce tension, call off its meddling. U.S. firmness has saved Lebanon. Aftermath: Evidence of UAR-SU divergence. US: Results from U.S. firmness during 1958 crisis. 15a. Historical analogies used by Eisenhower-Dulles. Syria 1957 is like Czechoslovakia 1948. Lebanon 1958 is like Greece 1947.

1958 QUEMOY

11(8)	B	1. Aug. 23 Chinese bombardment of Quemoy. Aim: perhaps to neutralize Quemoy, perhaps to test reactions. U.S. A Soviet move to challenge U.S., test U.S. resolve, compensate for Soviet defeat in Lebanon one week earlier.
	M	2. Aug. 27 C. broadcasts calling on Quemoy to surrender and announcing imminent invasion of Quemoy.

Code	Type	
0(9)		U.S.: C announces campaign to liberate Formosa beginning with Quemoy. (This may have been a calculated misinterpretation designed to stir up public support for U.S. actions.) (Possible for No. 1 also.)
4	I	3. Nationalists report no C. military landing craft in Quemoy area. C. bomber fleet is inactive. U.S.: No invasion of Quemoy intended.
0	M	4. Aug. 28, Sept 3, 4 U.S. warnings. Dulles press conference: "Stiff, blunt warning" to C. that U.S. will defend Quemoy if necessary and may bomb the mainland if Formosa is threatened. Invites resumption of talks with C.
0		C:
0	M	5. C. halts bombardment Sept. 4, accepts talks Sept. 6. U.S. crisis is lessening.
13(18)	M	6. Sept. 5, 7 S.U. warning. U.S. is occupying C. territory; U.S. military buildup is provocative, though battleships are obsolete. S.U. will defend C. against U.S. attack. U.S.: Evidence that SU-C are collaborating, in the Quemoy aggression.
0	M	7. U.S. reply: U.S. has no aggressive intentions. S.U.:
0	M	8. Sept. 15 Warsaw negotiations begin. U.S. offers concessions on Quemoy. C:
4(12)	M	9. Sept. 25, 30. Dulles: U.S. willing to eliminate provocative features of Quemoy, including troop reductions. U.S. has no commitment to defend Quemoy, no commitment to support Chiang's return to mainland, and his return is most unlikely. Chiang cannot use force without U.S. Permission. Chiang: an insult, a betrayal by Dulles. Statements Oct. 1-5 repudiating use of Quemoy to invade mainland. Quemoy is a purely defensive base, needed to protect Formosa.
0	M	10. Oct. 6. C: Bombardment to be reduced on condition US halts convoy support. Purpose was to call attention to U.S. occupation of C. territory. However, this dispute should be settled by peaceful negotiations. U.S. will eventually withdraw. Evidence: Dulles' Sept 30 speech.

Historical analogies: Like Berlin (Dulles)
Like Munich (Eisenhower)

Code

Type

1958-62 BERLIN

- | | | |
|--------|---|--|
| | M | 1. Nov. 27 S.U. note.
Adenauer: Shows S.U.'s aggressive intent to dominate the West, beginning with West Berlin.
Dulles: a way to reopen the whole German question (U.S. concern); S.U. has a security problem in Germany. |
| 11(10) | | |
| 15 | | |
| | M | 2. Dec. 16-31 US reply. Broad negotiations suggested, but not under duress.
S.U. U.S. has misunderstood Soviet note. |
| 5 | | |
| | M | 3. Jan. 5-10. Mikoyan commentary on note; S.U. reply to 2. Wants talks on Berlin only; give-and-take bargaining aiming at compromise desired.
Adenauer: Soviet position softening due to U.S. firmness in December. |
| 15a | | |
| S | M | 4. Feb. 16 US proposes foreign ministers' meeting including German advisers.
Intention: hint concessions on de facto recognition.
S.U. proposal is not constructive; concession hint not noticed. |
| | | |
| 12 | M | 5. Feb.-Mar.-Macmillan-Khrushchev discussions.
Adenauer: Macmillan has made concessions without S.U. counterconcessions by talking separately.
Macmillan: no actual results, but a start on needed negotiations. |
| 15a | | |
| | M | 6. May-July Geneva negotiations.
Khrushchev: never expected results from this kind of negotiation anyway.
U.S.: Khrushchev deliberately arranged a breakdown because of Summit invitation. |
| 15 | | |
| 14 | | |
| T | M | 7. July 11. Eisenhower conditional invitation to Khrushchev; distorted by Murphy in transmission.
Murphy omits condition.
Khrushchev: Invitation may have resulted from popular pressure to reduce tensions. |
| | | |
| | M | 8. Oct. 15, Jan. 8 1960, Oct. 18, 1960 etc. S.U. notes to Bonn requesting negotiations.
Adenauer: no change in aggressive S.U. intentions.
An attempt to split NATO. |
| 19 | | |
| | M | 9. Sept. Camp David discussions.
Khrushchev: A failure. But it was too soon to expect any agreement. More discussions needed.
Eisenhower: At least Khrushchev has made a concession by removing the time limit for negotiations. |
| 16 | | |
| 16 | | |

Code	Type	
0(5)	B	10. 1960 U-2 flights. S.U.: Intolerable provocations. U.S. talks peace while engaging in warlike acts.
7	M	11. May 7, 9, 11 U.S. justifications: Eisenhower takes responsibility. Khrushchev: Eisenhower has betrayed my confidence in him. Will have to wait for next President.
10	M	12. May 16 Khrushchev demands apology for U-2 flight. S.U. cannot negotiate under insult. Eisenhower: a brutal speech. Khrushchev is trying to wreck the Summit with impossible demands.
5	M	13. May 17 Eisenhower refuses apology. Khrushchev: Eisenhower is under Herter and Dillon's control; with reactionaries in control, this is not the time for negotiations.
14	M	14. 1961 Jan. 6. Khrushchev speech restating Soviet position; conciliatory gestures. U.S.: a truculent speech.
9	I	15. March. U.S. military budget increased. Aim: increase conventional alternatives to atomic weapons. S.U.: U.S. acting tough.
17	M	16. April 18. Lippmann - Khrushchev meeting. Lippmann reports Khrushchev's aim is defensive; he wants to fix German boundaries before West Germany gets atomic bombs and attacks GDR or blackmails S.U. U.S.: ignore.
4	M	17. June 3-4 Vienna summit. Kennedy: we have entirely different concepts and perspectives on Berlin. Khrushchev: A failure; Cold War aggravated. Too bad
17	M	18. July 5 Kornienko-Schlesinger meeting. Repeats No. 16. S.U. wants status quo in Berlin; U.S., should propose adequate guarantees. U.S.: ignore.
0	I	19. July 6 S.U. military budget increased, in response to U.S. increases. U.S.:
5	M	20. July 25. Kennedy: Western frontier runs through Berlin; three essentials, military measures. Khrushchev: Kennedy toughness makes negotiation more difficult by activating S.U. hardliners; delays solution.

Code	Type	
1		Ulbricht: Kennedy will not fight for East Berlin.
	M	21. Aug. 7. Khrushchev: no blockade of West Berlin planned. West Berlin is a loophole in East Germany.
17		U.S.: Ignore.
	B	22. Aug. 13 GDR closes border.
17		Adenauer: this is only a preliminary step. Main crisis coming yet.
17		U.S. U.S. rights in West Berlin not affected. Main crisis coming yet.
18		Macmillan: Both sides are bluffing, pretending firmness. War by miscalculation may result.
	M	23. Aug. 26 or so: Segni, Fanfani report to Rusk on Aug. 5 meeting with Khrushchev. Kh. has limited defensive aims; will not insist on formal recognition of East Germany.
17		U.S.: Ignore.
	I	24. Aug. 30 S.U. resumes nuclear testing.
13		Kennedy: Khrushchev is not ready to negotiate yet; wants to scare the world first.
	M	25. Sept. 5 Khrushchev through Sulzberger: Suggests unofficial discussions, correspondence. Proposes S.U. access guarantees, drops recognition demand. Sulzberger reports to State Dept. which files the report. Does not reach Kennedy.
R		
	M	26. Sept 13., Nehru report to Macmillan, forwarded to Kennedy. Substantially repeats 16. Similar reports by Reynaud, Sept. 15; Spaak Sept. 19.
17		U.S. ignore.
	M	27. Sept. 24 Khrushchev: repeats 25, hopes Kennedy U.N. speech will be conciliatory.
17		Kennedy: ignore. Khrushchev should show good faith in Laos first.
	M	28. Sept. 25 Kennedy's UN speech. More conciliatory than July 25.
0		S.U. ?
	M	29. Sept. 29 Khrushchev letter. Discussion necessary, correspondence proposed.
5		Kennedy: A good opportunity to lower tensions, correct misunderstandings. (?)
	II	30. Early Oct. Kennedy reply via letter and Kekkonen. U.S.-S.U. common interest in a divided Germany, avoidance of neutralism in West Germany. = U.S., S.U. must each retain control over its part of Germany.

Code	Type	
0		S.U. ?
	M	31. Oct. 17 Khrushchev drops deadline. West has shown willingness to negotiate.
4		U.S. Surprise. (Schlesinger.) Shows that Khrushchev's aim was defensive after all. Treaty given up because of U.S. firmness. U.S. concessions irrelevant.
	B	32. Oct. 27 tank confrontation.
R		S.U.: Believes report that U.S. intends to destroy border installations with bulldozers. Stopped by S.U. firmness.
15a		Clay: U.S. firmness successful in demonstrating S.U. responsibility in East Berlin
1		U.S.: incidents can still occur; shows importance of reaching a negotiated settlement.
	M	33. Nov. 9 Kroll interview with Khrushchev.
16		KH.: Delighted at prospect of negotiations with Bonn at last.
	M	34. Nov. 27 Khrushchev working paper; sent to Bonn by mistake.
T		Bonn: attempt to confuse West German thinking, stir NATO distrust of Bonn.
	M	35. 1962 negotiations. Each side interprets other's proposals in the context of its own objectives.
15		Expects concessions by opponent and therefore finds them hinted at; eventual disappointment when concessions do not materialize.
15		
5		
5		
1962 CUBA		
	B	1. S.U. sends missiles to Cuba.
10		U.S.: A test of U.S. resolve.
	M	2. Oct. 17. Gromyko: Soviet arms to Cuba are defensive.
19		U.S.: It's a lie. Shocking.
	B	3. Oct. 22 U.S. blockade announced.
0(5)		S.U.
	M	4. Oct. 23 Dobrynin: As far as he knows, there are no missiles in Cuba.
0(19)		U.S. Another lie.
	M	5. Oct. 23 Khrushchev: blockade is banditry; boarding ships will be resisted. Arms in Cuba are defensive
0(17)		U.S.: Ignore. S.U. has not yet decided on its response.

Code

Type

0

M

6. Oct. 25 Kennedy: U.S. relied on S.U. assurances that no offensive weapons would be sent to Cuba. These assurances were false. S.U. should withdraw.
S.U.:

5

M

7. Oct. 26 Khrushchev: Missiles are defensive. Proposes U.S. no-invasion agreement and S.U. missile removal.

U.S.: Sounds like a possible settlement. Accepts Oct. 27.

0(S)

M

8. Oct. 27 SU proposes missile removal exchange, exchange of no-invasion pledges. Intention? (Khrushchev: Turkish missile removal would be symbolic only; missiles are obsolete.)

U.S.: S.U. position has stiffened? Some confusion here.

1

M

9. Robert Kennedy: Missiles must be removed; answer by 28th. Turkish missiles will be removed soon.
S.U.: U.S. is serious, preparing to invade Cuba.
U.S. acceptance of 7 received.

TOTALS

DATE	CORRECT	INCORRECT	TRANS	UNCODABLE
1898	13	2	0	1
1905-6	10	20	5	4
<hr/>				
1908-9	22	15	1	5
1911	8	8	2	0
<hr/>				
1914	18	19	10	1
1923	14	1	0	1
<hr/>				
1938	13	22	5	2
1940-1	9	14	1	1
<hr/>				
1945-6	4	13	2	0
1948-9	8	1	0	2
<hr/>				
1956	3	17	0	1
1957-8	1	13	0	2
<hr/>				
1958Q	2	2	0	6
1958-62	12	27	5	4
<hr/>				
1962C	2	2	0	5
<hr/>				
351	139	181	31	35
Total	39%	52%	9%	

TOTALS BY CATEGORIES

1.	In conformity with image and expectations	48		
1a.	Recognizing a bluff	6	=	54
2.	In conformity with desires but not expectations			4
3.	Correct perception of duplicity			7
4.	In opposition to expectations but not requiring change of tactics			20
5.	Requiring change of tactics			33
6.	Requiring change of strategy	14		
6a.	Requiring complete backdown.	4	=	18
7.	Requiring change of image and of strategy or tactics			3
				<hr/>
	Subtotal			139

INCORRECT

8.	Perceiving a challenge when none is intended			9
9.	Exaggerating a challenge or danger			3
10.	Failure to perceive opponent's security worries, one's own threatening behavior			13
11.	Opponent is stirring up trouble in some third country			10
12.	Suspicion of ally's dependability or loyalty			6
13.	Underestimate diversity of opinion within opponent			5
13a.	Exaggerate diversity within opponent, reasonableness of one faction		2 =	7
	H Historical analogy - 4		Subtotal	43
14.	Incorrect interpretation based on expectations but not desires			15
15.	Both expectations and desires	31		
15a.	Exaggerated estimate of own effectiveness	7	=	38
16.	Desires, hopes, but not expectations			17
17.	Ignore bad information			29

18. Misinterpret as bluff	7
19. Reinterpret as duplicity of sender	10
20. Discredit source of message; reject message as erroneous	9
21. Admit puzzlement without changing expectations	3
22. Exaggerate importance of confirming information	5

Subtotal 133

cb-7/16/75