

1940

July 18 Kono Cabinet formed.

July 27 J's basic policy set - conquer China, control SE Asia raw materials, avoid trouble with US, cultivate Axis alliance.

Sept. D. to ally with Germany. Push: Army, Matsuoka
27 Drag: Navy, ambiguously.
HL (Mat.): pact will deter US.

July US Defense Act - prohibits export of strategic materials.
Sparingly applied. Morg. HL - apply
Welles M - sparingly
FDR - firmly.

Aug 1 J ec. + mil. demands on Indo-China - Troop pass
Sept } J. increases oil demands on NE Indies. through
Aug 27 } ~~Sept. Military plan to advance on I.Ch.~~

Sept 19 US tightens embargo - Scrap iron.

→ Oct. 8 J. protest.

Oct 12 FDR makes firm speech

Nov. 29 Hull again defines policy: Slow up Japan by diplomatic delaying without provoking J to attack E. Indies for supplies.

Nov 25 Br. want U.S. fleet based at Singapore

Ex 15, 176
Hull dodges: problem is for the experts.
Hornbeck for; Stark against: weakens fleet by spreading it out. Hull against: provoke J.

US response: quietly reinforce Philippines.

Dec. 10 Licenses required for non exports &

For: Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau

Doubtful: Hull - provoke J.

comb: make licenses gradual, unobtrusive.
Expanded gradually into 1941.

Dec. Walsh brings prop. perhaps from Kevoye ?

J, to nullify Axis pact in practice

J. to recall troops from China

Gr 314

J + US to explore ec. problems

4/Jan 23: J to support either US or G against attack by other

US to help settle China incident

US to give ec. assistance to J + Ch

US-J. guarantee SE Asia status quo

Props. worked out, become docs of Apr 9 '41

1941

Feb 10 report, J. about to move against Singapore.
Should U.S. send ships to Singapore?
Hull, yes. Stark, Stimson no.
FDR: a few ships to the Philippines. - turned down.
note: Lend-Lease bill pending in Congress.
Passed Mar. 11

Feb. 14 Dooman (Tokyo) warns that US will support
Britain, incl. Singapore. Grew. (not Washington)

15 Churchill HL statement; US-Britain can deter Japan

18-24 J. backs down?? G+L 327-30: No.
J. had no intention of attacking Singapore then.
Churchill had stewed up an artificial crisis
to involve U.S.

Feb. 1, 3 J. Liaison conference

Feb 14 Nomura intro. to Roos.

March 8

Hull - Nomura talks

1. Hull: Japan is abandoning peace, law, and order, and engaging in military expansion.

2. Nomura: Not so. Japan is seeking to offset Western pressure. There would probably be no more military movements unless Japan was forced into them by increasing U.S. embargoes.

April 9

Proposal of unknown private origins, taken as basis for discussion. (Written by a Japanese Army officer.) ^{Wakawa - vol by Sugawara} Seen by Japan as a U.S. bid.

1. Japan would: a) use no military measures in SW Pacific. b) Support Germany only against aggressive attack. c) Withdraw from China in part, by agreement w. China.
2. U.S. would: a) restore normal trade with Japan. b) assist Japan to obtain raw materials from SW Pacific area. c) ask Chiang to make peace and join the rival Chinese govt.; US to cease supporting Chiang. d) assist in stopping British pol. encroachment on Asia from Hongkong and Singapore.

Hull: Proposals no good. But U.S. should keep them alive to maintain J. interest and hope for peaceful negotiation. (Feis) or in hopes of J. good ~~with~~ faith (L+G)

Japan: Issue is whether to pursue this U.S. proposal (Nomura) or to attack Singapore (Matsuoka) by way of loyalty to the Axis agreement.

Apr. 18: Conditionally accept proposal, but keep loyal to Axis agreement. No promise ~~not~~ to advance southward. U.S. should sign neutrality treaty.

April 14 U.S. proposal.

1. Respect for terr. integrity + sovereignty of all n.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of " "
3. Equality, incl. equality of commercial opportunity.
4. No coercive change of status quo in Pacific.

Japan: abstract, doctrinaire.

May 7 Japan's reply, A.

Nomura proposes neutrality treaty =
U.S. will not support Britain against Japan.
Hull: nothing doing. ^{Natsuoka: test of U.S. goodwill.}

May 12 Japan's reply, B.

Conditional acceptance; but:

U.S. should ~~seemingly~~ stop aiding Britain

U.S. should ask Chiang to make peace
+ suspend aid if he refused

No J. pledge to refrain from force in SW P.
US to end trade + immigration restrictions.

U.S. reply: J. should refrain from force

U.S. aiding Britain in self-defense;

J. should not enter U.S.-German war

J. should withdraw from China.

(Langer: why did U.S. continue neg.? 476 SL report - (Kono trying))

FDR: time needed; some Navy to be moved to Atlantic for convoys)

May 31 US reply: (see May 12) ?

Axis pact does not apply to US self-defense.

J. reply: reject. J. faithful to Axis pact.

June 6 Hull: things getting worse; J. should reconsider its rejection.

Nomura: astonishment. Thought ~~agreement~~ differences were being eliminated.

June 10 - J - Dutch negotiations suspended
J.: bases in Saigon area needed.

June 6, 20 U.S. E. Coast oil embargo

Dickes: applies to J. Hull, FDR: don't provoke J. into attacking Indies. Dickes: they won't, they are occupied w. Siberian issue.

June 41 Matsuoka - move on Siberia

Tojo - NO: J. army inferior to Soviet army;
should wait till S.V. is weakened.

Konoe - NO: J. will then face Br - SU - US comb.
Kwantung army defeated by SU forces '38-39
Oil + raw materials are in the South, not Siberia
(except N. Sakhalin)

July 2 decision: Priority for China, South.

Reinforce Kantō army, accelerate training.

= Response to Dutch, U.S., German moves.

Dutch: break off negotiations

U.S.: Note of June 21, hardening its position

Embargo of June 6, 20

Ger: Attack S.V., urge J. attack on Siberia.

U.S.: Increased supplies to China

A - Br - Dutch staff conversations in Singapore

July 4 FDR to Konoe: warning against J. military moves
(~~esp~~ in mind: Siberia)

Konoe reply: no intention to invade Siberia;

does U.S. intend military moves in Europe?

U.S. reply: U.S. will not permit German control of seas.

1941

June 21 U.S. statement - Repeats U.S. position

1) (Matsuoka's) statements cast doubt on usefulness of negotiations. (oral statement)

FDR: prop. to extend mil. service beyond 1 yr, use drafters outside U.S. Much cong + pop. opposition.

Compromise: 1st part passed Aug 12 by 1 vote in House.

- 2) J. should stay out of U.S. - German war
- 3) J. should negotiate peace w. China + withdraw.
- 4) equal ec. opportunity for whole Pacific region.

J. reaction: US has hardened position.

July 14 Matsuoka reply - US must withdraw

statement. Hull agrees to. July 16

cabinet resigns; 17 new one without Matsuoka

Other J. moves: call up reservists, recall merchant fleet from Atlantic, press censorship, restrict foreign travel in J. (war prep.)

~~July 26 US freezes assets.~~

July ~~14~~ 14 Note on Indo-China - reply req. by July 20

8 air, 2 naval bases in ~~Saigon~~ S. Indo-China

U.S. interp.: Vichy collaborates w. Axis

Hull: J. may soon break loose. Neg. should continue "for the record".

~~Aug. 6 Kono proposes meeting with Roosevelt.~~

~~J. promises not to advance S. past Indo-China~~

23 Hull to Nomura 23: J. is now on a policy of force and conquest; no basis for negotiations left. Endangers U.S. access to tin + rubber; end. Philippines.

1941

July 26 U.S. freezes assets

Hull, FDR shift: J. is now moving on Indies
FDR July 10 inform Br. that US will embargo of J. moves.
Discussed by cabinet July 18-24
21 Stark objects: Navy not ready for war.
24 Indo-China news; FDR demands embargo.

Compromise: Treasury will license exports on demand.
applications accepted, but not acted on.

24 FDR prop. to Nomura: neutralize Indo-China, J. withdraw.
HL: J. must now back down. SL: ^(Grew) war is coming.

J. reaction: SL: war likely HL: prepare for war.

Aug. 5 J. proposal

- 1) J. troops will not advance beyond Indo-China
- 2) J will withdraw from Indo-China after peace w. China
- 3) Philippines neutral
- 4) US to suspend military prep in Pacific; also S. D.
- 5) US-Japan co-op in raw materials
- 6) US help J.-China negotiations
- 7) J. has special position in Indo-China

1941

Aug. 8 Konoé proposes meeting w. Roosevelt

Hull: cool to idea, Atland to cover J. mil. preparations

Hull Aug. 4 - war inevitable; Any to delay till U.S. is ready.
Grew SL: urges acceptance Aug. 19.

Aug 17 FDR warning to Nomura: if J. uses force US will
take defensive steps. ~~Compromise; ^{appears} Churchill: incl. poss:~~
^(OK) ~~of conflict. Hull: tone down~~ By agreement w.
Churchill. Toned down by FDR too: suggests Juneau
mid. Oct for meeting w. Konoé.

Aug. 28 J. reply: J. will withdraw from Indo-China after peace set.
J. will take no military action.
J. accepts Hull's general principles.
US: be more specific.

Sept. 6 J. proposal

U.S. to resume trade w. J. - help w. Indies.

US to end help to China

US to suspend military buildup in Pacific

J. to withdraw from China + Indo-China
after a peace settlement.

J. not specifically bound by Axis agreement.

(No further J. military moves.)

Sept 22, 25 J. restatement.

US interp: HL: J. is scared, backing down.

SL: Last chance for neg.

ML: impressed by J's Indo-China moves.

Oct 2 US reply

J. of Sept. 6 no basis for settlement
Kooze - Roosevelt meeting put off till a
meeting of minds about the 4 principle.

J. reaction: negotiations are hopeless.

J. reply: US should be specific in its demands
on J. Suspect a stall. Repeats prop.
of Sept. 6.

~~(Nov. 1-5 U.S. decision on warning to J on Kanning.~~

~~HL (Korubek): send warning, J. will back down.
or if it doesn't, then war; things could be worse.~~

~~ML (Hull): no warning unless US is ready to act.~~

~~Military support: neither US nor J ready.
FDR: take no action.~~

1941

Oct 23-31 J. D-M. 3 alts finally emerge from a canvass of the situation:

1. Caution; continue negotiations; no war.
2. Immediate war.
3. Immediate prepare for war, continue negotiations.

Two negotiating proposals worked out, A and B.

Nov. 29 Tojo speech - purge Orient of U.S.

U.S. resp. - dramatic challenge

Butow - Tojo did not give nor write the speech. ³⁵⁵

1941

Nov. 7 Final J. offer: Plans A, B

A: Free trade in Pacific if US accepts it elsewhere.

J. under no Axis obligation

J. troops to remain in select spots in China only, for 25 yrs, after peace.

J. comment: 1+2 accepts U.S. position; 3 the U.S. must accept.

Hull response: stall: J+China might make peace.

J. interp: China issue settled; (SL) then frantic.

HL: negotiations impossible.

Nov 14 US reply: rejection. Pressure by Br, Ch. Ch. rejected.

Nov 20 B: J+US to avoid invasion
" To co-operate in obtaining raw mat. ex. 6 Million tons of oil
U.S. to cancel freeze + supply oil.
US to stop aiding Chiang.

Purpose: enable J. to conquer China.

Nov. 29 deadline.

Nov. 26 US decides against further attempts - at modus vivendi.
(10-point plan - for the record) Pressure by Br, Ch.
J. reaction: an ultimatum.
SL (Nomura): continue negotiating on Nov 26 basis.

1941 ideas

army absolute - win in china

navy absolute - lift US embargo - get oil

~~inspect detailed proposals on both sides~~

1941

Bulow 153, 154, 155, 191, 203, 208-9, -210, 221

223, 4, 9, 240-1 ~~230~~ inf. processing 419.20

June 15 1940 US embargo act: sugg. by Army by ref to Europe.
opp by Hull = free trade ideology

July 25 partial oil-iron embargo. = compromise betw SL-HL.

Sept 26 scrap embargo... others... June 6 E. coast oil embargo

'41 June 17 Neg. w. Dutch E. Indies broken off.

July 2
J. D. to
move south

Late July 21 J. forces permitted into S. Indo-China

July 26 '41 US ~~is~~ freezes J. ec. assets - CHALLENGE?
US intention vague: licenses required. DENIAL
seen as Cth. by J.

"ABCD encirclement" 242-3 TIME PRESSURE

U.S. fleet is at Hawaii; other U.S. measures.

6: Aug 7 Kono suggests meeting

Aug. 9 Army decides to move south, prepare for US-BJ war by Dec. 1.

Aug 16 Navy by Nov 1

3 Sept later — time pressure → decision by early Oct.

Oct 2 US respects J prop.

Oct. 17 Tojo cabinet formed.

Nov 2-5 policy re-examined.

U S

HL Stimson P49 Morgenthau

SL Hull - Crew - Hamilton

HL Hornbeck



Japan forces

- Push:
- 1) Matsuoka: German advice
 - a) go south, Singapore
 - b) go north, Vladivostok
 - 2) Tojo etc: Secure J's position before situation worsens
 - 3) Germans: Stop US aid to Britain
join war if U.S. convoys lead to shooting.

Drag: 1) ^{Nomura} Kono, Kido ^{Mb?}: Stay out of war, convince U.S.

2) Oikawa, navy: J. will lose war
~~unprepared~~ = unprepared.

Summary: Two-stage increasing push a) Ally-M b) Army
with mostly decreasing drag.

U.S. forces

Push: 1) Stimson
Morgenthau
Hornbeck

} HI deterrent theory
Japan is bluffing, will be deterred
by strong action

{ 2) Chiang: request for aid

{ 3) Br-Dutch: request for involvement

Drag: 1) Hull: don't provoke Japan
Walker
Grew: support J. moderates: SL

2) Stark: fleet not strong enough yet

3) Industry: production needed for
Britain, armament for sea convoys

4) pub. opinion, esp. election '40: stay
out of war. (Roosevelt) Shifted by U.S. actions.
Requires US drag till Sum. 1941 or so.

Summary: steady push, gradually decreasing drag,
plus shift by Hull July 41.

~~Differential~~ reaction time functions

0) Ally: constant push, discontinuous in time.

1) HL: immediate reaction - ~~greater~~ firmness

ML.

2) FDR, pub. opinion: about 1-2 yrs to shift.
Shift by series of internal moves which shift pub. opinion, enabling next move. = internal lag mechanism.

3) SL: infinite reaction time - never shifts, instead, runs out of neg. proposals, stops. Variable time for this.

Power influence increases w. success, decr. w. failure.

4)

Military: compound reaction function

a) push incr. w. greater preparedness

b) push incr. w. prospective deterioration



... push forward
- preparedness

5) Ally: short reaction time, 1-2 months - greater demands based on ~~time~~ reaction time of D-M STR, same as oppts. " " " "

mech:

Ally's rep. strengthened by pos. reply, weakened by neg. reply.

Reaction functions over time.

5) ML Hull: step-function, ^{immediate} drag when opp. appears negotiable, push when he appears coercive. Hull shift: J. move into S. Indo-China.



1. 1927-1928 - Chinese military resistance treaty against attacks by Japan
2. The Nationalist government the 1927-1928 treaty to protect ports and waters
3. October 1928 - Communist attack on the Nationalist government
4. In 1928 the Chinese Communist army captured a number of Nationalist
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10. In 1928 the Chinese Communist army captured a number of Nationalist

Butow

1941 misc. notes

inf. processing 230, 241,

US tries to strengthen J. moderates 239
(overestimated)

d-m 257 unpleasant consequences cancelled by
statement that counter-measures were
under consideration. 317

hopeless sit. 265 Konoé; alts. are war or
strangulation by embargo. D: continue negoti-
ations, hope that something will turn up,
346

280 bottom HL view - US wanted domination; yielding
would increase US demands.

v 284 Alphonse-Caston army-navy over taking resp.
to decide for war.

d-m 315 ff.

T-search 321-2

coalition politics 323; Konoé's fall.

329 failing strategy against China used against US.

Feis

1941 misc notes

-33-

wishful thinking 46 Hull: firmness is succeeding.

53-54 J. image: there is, and will be no free-trade world
J. being excluded by ^{immigration} import restrictions, boycotts, embargoes.
∴ J must control its own raw material sources.

63 Monroe Doctrine includes Br-Fri. Pacific possessions E. of Int. Date Line.

274 SL misperception - Konoe believes in US principles.
∴ (so also on J. side.)

298 SL misp. - Grew sees his predictions confirmed
by later events (war if US doesn't relax embargo)

304 S-search US looks for ec. rewards to a
peaceful Japan.

334 HL misper. Churchill urges threat against J - will
stop them.

Langer - J. skillful deception; so also Konoye.

US

J

Dec 10
unobtrusive licenses
for iron exports

Dec. - Jan.



Apr. 9 Bid from
Konoye, perceived
as from U.S.
Strengthens K?

May 1. Reply

strengthen SL?

June 6, 20
E Coast embargo
June 10 Dutch
neg. suspended
June ~~20~~ 21 US Statement

~~German~~

German
demand

July 2

M. out
K. weaker
T. stronger

us moves (FDR)

weaken public opp.

weaken Hull, FDR

July 14 Dudo-china
note

July 26 US freezes assets

K. weaker
T. stronger

us armament
weaken Stark opp.

no change

Sept. 26 J. prop.
22, 25

~~Nov 7 Final K offer~~
~~Oct 15~~
K. out, O shifts
F, T stronger

no change

Nov 7 final offer
War Dec. 1