

48 challenge - currency ref -
denial - blockade - challenge
deadlock - ? airlift - denial - verbal ?

aggressive - defensive distinction does not fit .

SU was in PD - intolerable situation

US did not deny = sit. not intolerable .

no direct confrontation on a single issue .

Dec-Jan 49 sit. could have become intolerable for U.S.

62 denial blocked SU. not so in '48 .

48 Was this only a propaganda crisis for U.S. ?

Is the CDD-R scheme formal only ?

- ~~Denial~~ Response {
- 1) outflank = vitiation, circumvent
 - 2) block = denial
 - 3) avoid defining ch. as challenge
 - 4) retreat, accommodate, accept

Is it a crisis when subjective ? 1 side ? 2 sides ?

or objective ? real intentions of both ?

obj: unstable situation, could lead to war or loss by 1 side
too broad. Incl. unusual sits. -

intolerable ? - changes during a crisis

Resolved: 4 stages apply to most cases, not '48

Murdoch

blockade: chicken?
YES.

Explain P.5 bottom PD and chicken

Is PD the basic structure, though only dimly perceived by the players

Assume the airlift had not worked. What would the structure of the crisis be?

relate internal factors to interaction: did one stop when the other started? Ans: int. factors drop out when actors agree internally.

Supergame? - there is some interdep. of commitments, exaggerated esp. by U.S. "power carry-over."

bargaining range: minimum

1. Expectations: min + max (aspirations)

S.U. min: control Berlin U.S. min: stay in W.B.

2. min. acceptable short of war: not known in advance
not reached in '48.
bgt is on 3 diff. dimensions: control of Germany; control of Berlin; split of Berlin.

no bgt range, no bargaining. No game: no rules.

use of force is stymied

rule against escalation

two sides confront and handle each other.

~~2 2 0 3~~

~~3 1 0~~

this is different: there are 3 dimensions

Murdoch

Hist. explains the end of accommodative attempts and begin. of coercive confrontation.

Hist. explains development of policy + goals by official jockeying. Esp. Clay's narrower concern for self-sufficiency + S.V. concern for reparation.

Hist. explains Soviet perspective + goals, to which the blockade was a means. = S.V. was defensive.

Crisis had 2 stages:

1. S.V. takes Berlin

2. S.V. offers W.B. back in return for Potsdam etc.

U.S. offers smaller payment: currency.

U.S. position hardens, S.V. softens, as airlift becomes successful.

General - Schelling '66

- a) escalation - chicken
- b) interdep. of commitments - prevents de-escalation

Deterrence - Brudie - avoidance of escalation, risk of war
Snyder - use esc. to stop opponent.

Escalation models are self-defeating; controlled esc. model → uncontrolled esc.; avoidance model → usability of esc.