

French policy to achieve security by breaking up Germany.

PD? No: play is not simultaneous G. reacts to F. action.

Ineffective strategy, self-defeating. Damages G, produces hostility
desire for revenge. Same result would have occurred
if F. successful in separating Rhineland.

Decision was irrational, based on hostility + revenge.
internally (F, B): predominance of Right Nationalists.
Model: Richardson process.

2) Cost is also excessive: weak G cannot pay reparations

1. G. invasion ^{versailles} Fr. reparations G. moratorium demand
2. Fr. reparations 22 w. guarantees
3. G. Rapallo
4. Fr. Ruhr + rep. mot. + ec. crash
5. G. revenge 1930s

Chicken? P. 75-6 Both play D_c = Fight. Supergame?

Fr. Br.-St. coalition. Fr. policy rejected by coalition; carried through
by deception, pretence that reparation guarantee is aim.
When deception becomes clear Sept 23, collapse of G. resistance,
coalition again rejects policy: Br. threat to break alliance.
Bgg: B-Fr.

NO. Fr. are demonstrating resolve to G. so G. will concede.
Fr. begin by wanting reparations⁽⁵⁷⁾; after invasion this changed
aim became victory -

P 11 missing

P 26 "

Stresemann bids Aug - Sept. 23 - attempts to gain Fr. concessions for abandonment of passive resistance. a) S^s commodity gradually vanished, was worthless. b) Fr. aim, breakup of G., not obtainable from S. = No real bgg occurred, no bgg range existed.

Might have occurred early '23 P. 74. Very speculative.

'23 leader

Divergent aims revealed

1919 Fr prop. Rhineland state Br-US objection; Fr concede Apr.

Aim pursued by reparations pressure + occupation. P. 4.

Cost: loss of reparations if G. weakened.

22 Br interest in ec. recovery; rejected by Fr. Jan 22 p. 4
Dec 27 Br support for reparations moratorium
~~Fr go ahead~~
= opp. for financial control of G. + debt repayment to Br.

Fr. air power; Br need help in Turkey Sept 22 p. 8
p. 22
conservative Govt. Oct.

Dec. 22 Fr. go ahead
Jan 23 Br. prop. rejected. p. 11-12

Sept 23 G resistance abandoned
G. in process of breaking up; ruinous inflation.
Oct - Rhenish Republic

Oct 23 Br reactivate commission plan 25th reject G. breakup

Nov. 23 Br. threat. p. 49

Detach Fr. allies: Bel, It.

Fr. Retreat p. 50

Fr. financial + pol. weakness - need Br. help.

Br Strategy Aug 22 Br ask Fr debt repayment
slight escalation.

~~Thesis: proper unit of anal. is national actor~~

One should distinguish levels of analysis + interrelate them:
 system, national actor, internal politics, individual styles.
 National actors express actions ultimately.

Rationality. 1. Feelings are always present - Fr. also.
 2. Statesmen are "responsible"

Qu: did Fr. have no other options?

Qu: would G. have tried to dominate anyway?

Qu: was there chance of Fr. success in $\approx \approx \approx$

G.S.: in multi-polar system states have few options.

conclusion: rationality of Fr. actor is hard to evaluate.

DR-FR chicken framework: indep = D

Fr play D after threatening to; value of D changes:

from $\begin{matrix} 3 \\ 2 \\ \text{bully} \end{matrix}$ to $\begin{matrix} 3 \\ 2 \\ \text{chicken} \end{matrix}$ Br then threatened D and
 Fr. yielded. End: DC.

crisis is abnormal time = more coercion, less bargaining.

when crisis is solved, bgg takes over again. Ans: this is coercive bgg.
~~trial of strength, deadlock phase of bgg.~~

Br. decided '23 to let G. hit bottom to teach Fr. error of its position; then Fr. could be pulled back

Fr. aim: get Br. to agree to ec. controls over G. Prefer Br. support, threaten unilateral action.

Br. favored control: financial council in Berlin (Jan. 23)
 Fr. " Fr. " of G. industry in the Ruhr. MIN.

Break in Aug 22 Poincare prop. ↑ rejected by Br.
 Br. hope Aug. that Fr. will back down.

Oct 22 Tory Govt - may need Fr. help in Turkey
 notes increased Fr. airpower

Result: Br. stops pressuring Fr. Jan 23 (p. 12 top)