

Challenge? no; drift into opposition between G and F. Mistake - overlooking G reaction? No - Delcasse aimed at Br. alliance + gaining advance on G. ? Surprised at G reaction? MAYBE OVER yes - p.9

Policy? no; search process: try out one line for a while; if no success, try another. alternatives determined by alt. domestic views.

{ Ex Ger trying to conciliate B + R
Ex Br. looking for reduced tensions as new alliances

Ex Ger. looking for Fr. position. 3 options; offer 2 posts

Ex Fr. HL-SL division; Rouvier tries conciliation. several significant offers. G locked into conference idea.

Solution depends on luck: right comb. appearing in the

3+ countries involved -

Preliminary scanning, in which a line is dropped at one rebuff. Opp: persistent finkering with one line. P.22 not that fast Took months of careful discussion.

P.77 chicken strategy: firmness vs. concessions.

-78 carrot-stick.

conclusions

6 "moved to CC" needs clarification. } Qn: incremental
"part way" "all the way" } or discrete jumps.
"residually in DD"

15 C.C.R? High CR approaches and looks like P.D.

Doubt about extreme asymmetry. Ans: Fr willing to risk conf. breakup and war, given Br. support, never mind G. actions = P.D.

P.17 Objective game cannot change that easily; perceptions can.

OK

Internal politics :

Br. Liberal imperialists (Grey) - worried about German power on seas : navy, merchant marine, ports.

3 dimensions :
1) HL - SL
2) imperial - continental
3) phobia - philia

Modes : HL - continental ??
SL - imperial ?

Except : Germans, reversed.

autonomous, accidental instead of cataclysmic

search

Why preliminary scanning?

in multipolar system several alts. are open
one can try them all. alts. reflected domestically.
in bipolar basic policy is set; details change.
in aligned multipolar, options are narrower
than bipolar because of need to keep ally.

several policy lines are being pushed constantly
in each govt = not search.

search occurs in lgs.

Imperial Supergame ec. benefits, prestige
(PD) costs - adm., defense

Continental S. - security, prestige, expansion
(PD) costs - armaments, alliance restraints.

Component games for each pair

Subgames for specific crises

Secondary supergame = sequence of subgames, cumulative shifts



PD

SEARCH

Why did G think it could coerce F. into alliance?

Planck: ignorance of diplomacy, plus rapidly increased strength; few accumulated contacts, ties, seasoned diplomats.

Queen: G. had won in the past by coercion, a few times.

RULE: winning strategy goes to top of list.

Primary supergame, preparedness, PD

~~secondary~~ action, chicken

= war not possible without overt crisis, which can be chicken

Marelaan 1
Oegstgeest
The Netherlands
Sept. 27, 1971

Dear Paul,

Enclosed are some more "conclusions" on Morocco. I'm having Betty Balcom (our secretary in Townsend Hall) type the whole case over for purposes of submission to NSF, but thought you might like to see this new material for your own purposes. Betty will send you a clean copy of the whole thing, but that might take some time.

I'm still working on the pre-World War I cases. With visits from relatives and excursions around the country, I haven't accomplished as much yet as I had expected. Still expect to write something on the logic of multipolarity vs. bipolarity as my next task.

I'm wondering whether you will be able to finish what you are working on now in time for our annual report. Ordinarily that goes in about Nov. 1 but there is no fixed time. I want to show as much evidence of progress as I can because on this annual report, and supporting materials, will depend whether we get a continuation of the grant next year. The point is simply that whatever you do have finished you ought to have typed up pretty soon so we can include it, if you can.

From your last letter, sounds like you're doing some very interesting things with the game models. As for your critique of the middle section of my paper: I concede that it is heavy on coercion and that there should have been a list of accommodative tactics as well for balance. I think both of us should try to keep both of these processes in mind rather than emphasizing one or the other, since that is what the actors do: sometimes they try to win, sometimes to reach a settlement via mutual compromise. One of our main empirical problems is to show how these two processes interact, get in each other's way, or perhaps support each other.

I'm not ready to say that verbal tactics "don't work"; I see many examples in the cases where they do. However, ~~ixxxxpaxxxx~~ I agree that I probably over-emphasize themx in my paper. I also agree that I neglect misperception. I think you have misunderstood my "tests of will on minor issues." This refers to minor confrontations within a general context of coercion (the Berlin crisis was full of them--I believe you call them "probes") ~~xxxxxxx~~ and it refers to "action" episodes rather than negotiating concessions. Thus, your Morocco, 1911, example is irrelevant to my meaning, although the point you make about that is good in its own right.

I've met a kindred spirit at the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague--a Yugoslav named Kodzic who's working on game models. He's quite good and I've had a couple good conversations with him.

Holland is still a lovely country. We took a six-mile walk on the beach yesterday. I think we will try to get to Rome in about three weeks when the kids have their fall vacation. That's no way to get work done but now that we're here we ought to see something of Europe.

Best regards to Ellie, kids and Ziggy.

Cordially,
Ellen