Research Report

THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS

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Systemic Environment

System structure

The international systemic structure of 1956 was mid-cold-war bipolarity, that is, there were two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union; there was the People's Republic of China--diplomatically active but not militarily significant; there were two western European powers not yet fully convinced of their second-tier status (a situation which had obtained since the Second World War), Great Britain and France; and there were several medium powers of both the more traditional, fairly well-established type, as for example, Canada, and the newer states--essentially former colonial areas as for example, India; and there were many small powers--primarily in Europe, Latin America, and Asia Minor.

It is thought that the United States was the foremost nuclear power in 1956, followed by the Soviet Union and then Great Britain. (Britain did not then possess a hydrogen bomb capacity. It was only in March, 1955, that Churchill announced the decision to develop such a weapon.)

In 1956 there were numerous international organizations, but the United Nations was the only one of major significance apropos the Suez Canal crisis.

Ideological heterogeneity

The conflict between the nationalism of the newly-emerging states and the colonialism of the former imperial states was clearly demonstrated by the Suez Canal crisis. Although Anthony Eden and others have since denied any taint of

colonialism, there seems something paternalistic in an attitude toward Egypt and Jordan which emphasizes their inability to deal with international affairs in the manner of the older, much more experienced, European states. The fact that Britain's former colonies and protectorates were thought to need special looking after--and there were many in Britain who thought so and proposed that the Commonwealth be the instrument of that direction--substantiates the claim of men such as Nasser that independence and sovereignty were nonexistent until all bounds with the imperial power were severed, until all bases and financial controls were eliminated, and so on.

Nasser explained his objection to the American-British-World Bank proposals for assistance in building the Aswan Dam in such terms: The Egyptians could not tolerate having their economy subject to American domination. This, to him, would be a formidable infringement on Egypt's sovereignty and independence. American arms, he argued, did not come without certain strings--for example, a military mission in the country or perhaps repayment in currency. What to John Foster Dulles seemed like good business practices smacked of a new colonialism to Gamel Abdul Nasser. And not just to the Egyptian but to men like him---Nehru and Krishna Menon in India, Tito in Yugoslavia, and leaders in other Arab and Asian states.

Thus to Nasser the furor which followed his nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was really more than he had anticipated, especially on the part of the British. But the more vehement the British reaction, the stronger was his proof that colonialism was not in fact an anachronism. For the British and the French to assert that a government other than that of Egypt could exercise sovereignty over part of what was unquestionably Egyptian territory gainsaid any pretenses that the Europeans were not the old colonial powers Egypt had suffered since the Napoleonic invasion.

Military technology

The military hardware employed during the crisis was entirely conventional. Only the Soviet Union made mention of nuclear weaponry and this as a threat to Britain. The Soviets at that time possessed a fractional intercontinental missile capacity. The balance (in the sense of predominance) of missile strength was with the United States. What missiles the Soviets had were first generation ground-to-ground missiles--modified V-2 type German rockets with a limited range, perhaps 300-400 miles. Any firing would be sporadic and uncoordinated and thus insufficient to bring London under threat and accordingly not a serious constraint on British decision-makers.

The Soviet Union had exploded a hydrogen bomb device in 1953; Britain had only announced its intention to develop such a weapon in March, 1955 (Churchill).

Egypt had received from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia some 80 MIG-15's, 115 Joseph Stalin and T-34 heavy cruiser tanks (the type used by the Soviet army--qualitatively superior to anything the Israelis possessed), several hundred self-propelled guns, armored personnel equipment, supporting equipment, and (of considerable importance) some 45 Ilyushin-28 strike bombers. Soviet personnel largely controlled and handled the aircraft and the tanks. During the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion the Ilyushin bombers were flown either to Syria through Saudi Arabia or into upper Egypt. Once these aircraft were withdrawn the Egyptian strike capacity was crippled. (Israeli decision-makers were most fearful of possible air attacks on their cities; hence their insistence that the British and French devise ways of protecting Israel from air attack--mainly by swiftly knocking out the Egyptian capability.)

The British had called up reserves in August, 1956. This was necessary (that is, a call-up two months and a half before forces were utilized) because of a weakness in overall defense policy. At this time Britain was incapable

of mounting even a small operation without calling up reservists. Curiously once Eden had ordered the call-up, he could scarcely permit the reservists to return to their homes without seeming to concede victory to Nasser. "Once they were called up, then the government was on a slippery slope: if you call up reservists you have either to use them or let them go home." (Calvocoressi, 1967: 29).

Because the British could not land in Egypt from bases in the United Kingdom, Malta (although a thousand miles from Egypt) was selected as the primary staging area for the British fleet. Cyprus, though preferable, lacked a deep-water port necessary for landing-craft and transports. Eden conceded that even had the British and French desired immediate action following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company there was no escaping "these logistics." "We had nothing like enough airborne troops for an operation of this kind. The French had more, but together we could not have mustered a full division with artillery support. The follow-up would have taken several weeks to organize, even with the most brilliant improvisation." (Eden, 1960: 479).

The French, as Eden indicates, were a bit better off with respect to airborne troops. The rebellion in Algeria, however, was beginning to require greater force and hence the French could not commit too much to the Suez invasion force.

Israeli strength lay primarily in decisive and resolute leadership, well-trained soldiers, organization both in the field and on the home front, and French-made weaponry, especially some 60 Mystère-4's.

Syria had some Russian equipment; Saudi Arabia some obsolete American material; Jordan, the British-trained Arab Legion and some British-made equipment. There is little need to detail further the military capabilities of

the Middle Eastern states since such considerations were not important factors in Anglo-French decision-making.

Alliances and alignments

Several alliances involving (1) states in the Middle East with other Middle Eastern states and (2) states in the Middle East with Britain and (3) an American-British-French declaration supposedly bound allied states to perform certain pledged behaviors in situations which called the relevant casus foederis into question. These treaties were:

(1) Mutual Defense Pact (signed October 20, 1955) between Egypt and Syria.

(2) Mutual Defense Pact (signed October 27, 1955) between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

(3) Military pact (signed April 21, 1956) between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and The Yemen. Provided that armed aggression against one of the pact members was armed aggression against all; the member states would come to each other's defense; consultations would be arranged between members; joint command would be established.

(4) Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1948 between Jordan and Great Britain. Britain would aid Jordan if attacked and would provide certain financial support for Jordan (for the Arab Legion and other not necessarily military purposes). In return Britain would be permitted to maintain military bases in Jordan.

(5) Baghdad Pact--member states: Iraq (February 24, 1955), Turkey (February 24, 1955), Britain (April 5, 1955), Pakistan (September 23, 1955), Iran (November 3, 1955). The United States accepted (November 21, 1955) an invitation to send observers to Baghdad Pact meetings. The Baghdad Pact was intended by Britain to be the basis for a general Middle Eastern Security

system analogous to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe. In the end, the pact probably caused more trouble than what it was worth as an element of the containment-of-the-Soviet-Union schemes. Of the states involved only Turkey had substantial military strength. Britain was some distance away and had great difficulty mobilizing what military capabilities it did have.

(6) Tripartite Declaration (sometimes called Pact) of May 25, 1950, (undertaken by the Truman Administration and accepted by Secretary Dulles) between the United States, Britain, and France. Terms: (a) the three states pledged themselves to regulate the supply of arms on the basis of parity between Israel on one side and all the Arab states (combined) on the other; (b) would not permit armed aggression across the armistice lines drawn up in 1949 and signed by the Arab states (excluding Iraq) and Israel under United Nations auspices; (c) should aggression occur in the Middle East, the three states (U.S., U.K., France) would act against the aggressor both within and outside the United Nations. The general aim of the Tripartite Declaration was (1) the maintenance of the status quo and (2) the prevention of a Middle Eastern arms race. In his memoirs Eden is careful to remind the reader that Egypt had never accepted this Declaration. During the crisis, Eden used this fact (that without Egyptian acquiescence no state was bound by the pact) as a reason for his (intended) failure to consult with the United States prior to the Anglo-French intervention. (Eden, 1960: 589-590).

Bargaining Setting

The Middle East in 1956 was no less beset by rivalries and enmities than it is today. Although the primary target of Arab nationalism in 1956 was Israel, the state devised from the former British Palestinian mandate after British withdrawal in 1948, Arab nationalism was defined in terms of British

colonialism. (It should be remembered that in 1956 Britain still ran half of Africa, that the expression, British Empire, was more than an anachronism, that the Commonwealth of Nations was not then primarily a collection of newly-independent African and Asian states.)

Egypt had been a vital element in Britain's colonial operations, for solely within Egypt lay the Suez Canal--the link to India and parts east. In both world wars Britain had fought to preserve Egypt on the side of its allies as well as to protect the lives and the not inconsiderable wealth of British subjects resident in Egypt. From the British "temporary occupation" of Egypt in 1882 until June, 1956, when the last British troops quit the Canal Zone, Britain had maintained a military presence on Egyptian soil. It was not until 1947 that British forces withdrew from Cairo and not until 1954 that the British government agreed to begin a phased withdrawal from the Canal Zone (Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1954).

It was probably inevitable that Britain should be the object of much Egyptian animosity, for Britain had been the paramount power with her great commercial interests secured by treaties and troops and spread throughout the Arab regions. Britain was the most visible colonial power.

Compounding the enmity between Britain and Arab nationalism were rivalries between various Arab states themselves. The most manifest were between the supposed modern and enlightened government of Nasser in Egypt on the one hand and the traditional Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia and Iraq on the other. The long-standing feud between Egypt and Iraq over the question of which was to be the decisive magnet of Arab unity was still burning. So was the conflict between Syria and Iraq which had resulted from the wish of the Iraqi royal house to establish themselves as monarchs of the Fertile Crescent--that is, the desire for a unified and royalist Syria and Iraq.

Even between two Suez-crisis allies there was a pre-crisis rivalry: France insisted that Britain had pushed Iraq along the road to expansion at the expense of an independent Syria. (The French interest in Syria stemmed from the fact that until the Second World War Syria had been a French dependency.) France had quite recently and increasingly become the object of Arab ire because of the French role in the Algerian revolution. The animosity was reciprocated: The French saw Nasser as the moral patron as well as the material supplier to the Algerian rebels.

The United States and Britain were also Middle Eastern rivals. While Britain seemed compelled to act in the trappings of a colonial power, the United States could proceed only in terms of commercial interests. The United States had no colonial past in the area to constrain its activities there. Britain was sometimes annoyed by the actions of the United States, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Even on a matter so close to the hearts of most cold warriors, the alliance systems designed to encircle the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain were not in total agreement with regard to the Middle East. The United States saw the target as the Soviet Union and only the Soviet Union. Britain, however, saw a chance by means of the Baghdad Pact to renew its former position in the Middle East--a goal rather different from containing the Soviet Union. The proposed British system included states some distance from the Soviet borders.

There was a most intense conflict between the new Israeli state and its Arab neighbors. The Arabs could not tolerate the existence of Israel, nor could they forget their own humiliation at suffering defeat at the hands of the Israelis seven years before. Even though an armistice was in effect the Arabs and Israelis were engaged in a continuing series of raids and reprisals, some quite grave in terms of human life and property. The United States was

not exempt from Arab hostility either: the putative influence of American Zionists on the United States government apropos the Middle East made many Arabs wary of United States policy.

The main concern of United States policy in this Middle Eastern jangle was peace and stability, the latter being then defined in terms of keeping the influence of the Communist bloc at a minimum. Egypt was increasingly becoming a problem: After Dulles' refusal to sell arms to Egypt (he could not see how the Egyptians could afford them) Nasser turned to the Soviet Union. On July 26, 1955, secret deliveries of arms began to leave Prague for Cairo. (The Egyptians pledged cotton shipments rather than currency for payment.) This action greatly irritated the American and British governments which then initiated a policy of conciliation of Nasser. This policy culminated in December, 1955, with American and British offers of currency to meet the foreign exchange costs of the Aswan Dam. There was no doubt about it: here was an attempt to keep Soviet influence out of Africa. Financial negotiations for the dam project continued through the spring of 1956. The World Bank would, in addition to the United States and Britain, supply needed currency though not all that was required.

Dulles and Eisenhower were terribly chagrined by the Egyptian recognition of the People's Republic of China in May, 1956. The next month, the Soviet foreign minister, Shepilov, brandishing samples of the weaponry he had brought along, joined the Egyptians in their festivities marking the final withdrawal of British military forces. The reaction in Washington was far different from the celebrations in Cairo. There was more bad news in Washington: Shepilov--according to the Egyptian press--had dropped a hint that the Soviet Union would better the Western financial offer for construction of the Aswan Dam and thus permit Egypt to remain free and independent of United States economic control.

Eisenhower's Treasury secretary, George Humphrey, mused that Egypt was holding the option of the Western offer while shopping around for something better. He further doubted whether Egypt would be able to repay the loans and interest--what with all those expensive arms being purchased from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1956, Dulles, after but a brief consultation with Eisenhower (who acquiesced), abruptly withdrew the United States offer of financial assistance for building the Aswan Dam. Dulles released a statement to the press on the withdrawal of promised aid only shortly after he had informed the Egyptian ambassador in Washington. The United States, he said, "did not submit to blackmail." Later he said that he was not unaware of the effect such a withdrawal of aid would have on other states which "played both sides." Even the United States' partner in the project, Britain, had been apprised of the aid withdrawal decision less than an hour before. Britain took little time in following suit: Next day, July 20, the British offer was also withdrawn.

Word of the aid withdrawal came to Nasser while he was hobnobbing with Tito and Nehru at Brioni. Naturally this was a bit embarrassing for him. On July 22, back in Egypt, Nasser made an angry speech in which he vilified the United States and Britain. The Egyptian press had already prepared the way with considerable and quite bitter recrimination toward the United States.

Toward the end of another lengthy harangue delivered only four days later (July 26) at Liberation Square in Alexandria on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the expulsion of King Farouk, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. By prior arrangement the nationalization decree was published that same day in the official gazette and Egyptian troops moved into the Canal Zone to take control of the assets of the Suez Canal Company.

Nasser stated that the withdrawal of the United States' offer was a means of "punishing Egypt because it refused to side with military blocs." He asserted that the revenues from the Canal tolls and fees would accrue to Egypt and thus enable it to build the Aswan Dam and develop the country and its resources independently of foreign assistance. (Barraclough, 1962: 5).

Bargaining Process

schema for interpretation

Nasser's fait accompli was not well-received in Paris and London. The brusqueness of the nationalization order was seen as an unwelcome reminder of Hitler's "weekend technique": "there is no doubt that the British, American, and French governments were taken by surprise." (Barraclough, 1962: 6).

How could Nasser expect to get away with nationalization? Couldn't he anticipate an immediate response, at least from the British? In an interview ten years after the Suez crisis Nasser said he thought at the time (July, 1956) that

> it was clear to us that Britain would not be ready to have any military movement before three or four months. We studied the deployment of the British troops and, of course, there were British troops in Libya, British troops in Germany. We thought at that time that it would be possible to reach a sort of a settlement during these three months. (Calvocoressi, 1967: 44).

Prime Minister Eden was informed of the nationalization decree while at a dinner he was giving in honor of the king and leaders of Iraq. Immediately Eden met with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd; the Lord President of the Council, the Marquis of Salisbury; and the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth, the Earl of Home. Shortly after, Eden spoke with these men plus the Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan and the Chiefs of Staff, Sir Gerald Templar, Lord Mountbatten, Sir Dermot Boyle, and Sir William Dickson (chairman). To this meeting the prime minister also invited the French ambassador Jean Chauvel and the United States chargé d'affaires, Andrew Foster.

Eden allowed that Nasser's action was most serious: "the economic life of Western Europe was threatened with disruption by the Egyptian seizure of the canal." He asserts in his autobiography that he "had no doubt how Nasser's deed would be read, from Agadir to Karachi. This was a seizure of Western property in reply to the action of the United States Government. On its outcome would depend whose authority would prevail." (Eden, 1960: 472).

Eden told the French and American representatives the terms of the statement he would be delivering next day in the House of Commons. He also had the British embassies in Washington and Paris informed. In his House of Commons speech the prime minister said he would consult with other nations before doing anything. The Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, called Nasser's act highhanded and unjustifiable, but in no way criticized the prime minister. Eden saw the canal seizure as being in defiance of international agreements, specifically the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 which referred to the canal as an international asset. A government and a man who showed so little respect for international obligations and legal propriety could not be further suffered. "Failure to keep the canal international would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty's Government had to act alone they could not stop short of using force to protect their position." (Eden, 1960: 475).

In trying to devise a strategy to counteract the canal nationalization, Eden decided against asking the Security Council of the United Nations to take up the matter. His reasons: Egypt had disregarded the Security Council resolution concerning passage of Israeli ships through the canal, the Soviet Union had a veto, and the Americans and French were opposed. Instead it was decided that it was necessary to employ some kind of force against Nasser. The major candidates were: (1) <u>political</u> pressures, (2) <u>economic</u> weapons (the Chancellor

of the Exchequer prepared financial measures that were to go into effect at midnight, July 28), and (3) military (the Chiefs of Staff were to frame a plan for the occupation and securing of the canal). Eden telegraphed President Eisenhower to inform him of the actions being prepared. The High Commissioners in London were also appraised of these activities.

British banks were given permission to block Egyptian sterling balances in London; the assets and funds of the Suez Canal Company in London were to be protected against expropriation; and a ban was placed on the export of arms and military materials to Egypt. The four Egyptian destroyers then in harbor in the United Kingdom and Malta were to be delayed if possible. The British Foreign Office prepared to warn British subjects resident in Egypt of likely developments. An examination of the British shipping position was to be undertaken. United Kingdom oil reserves were thought to be sufficient for no more than six weeks. A formal note of protest was given the Egyptians but (as might be anticipated) they rejected it.

Next day (July 28) Eden had a meeting with a ministerial group--the so-called Suez Committee--which had been set up the day before "to control the situation" (Thomas, 1969: 41). The members, other than the prime minister were Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary; Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Allen Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary; the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord President of the Council; Viscount Kilmuir; and Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade.

At this point Eden apparently thought Britain in the position of the bully in a bully-chicken game:



In order to cinch an early solution at DC, all Eden presumed necessary was a pledge of American support. Nasser would have no other alternative.

President Eisenhower notified Eden that he was sending ace trouble-shooter Robert Murphy to talk with the British. (The peripatetic of world renown, the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was in Peru when the canal nationalization occurred.) Eden interpreted the American response--let's arrange a meeting of the maritime powers--as a desire to isolate Egypt and bring the moral pressure of combined opinion on Nasser. Eden agreed to a conference but preferred that the parties to be invited be the six or ten major canal users. The prime minister wanted some kind of firm action against Nasser and sought to have Murphy convinced of the necessity of American participation. While Eden was at his country cottage at Wiltshire on Sunday (July 29) Murphy had conversations with Selwyn Lloyd and the French foreign minister, Christian Pineau. Eden was in frequent communication with Lloyd. At this point the aims of American policy were: (1) to widen the basis of discussion, (2) to keep the parties talking, and (3) to avoid precipitate action (Barraclough, 1962: 9).

The alliance bargaining situation was bully-leader:

		UK-France: passive stance C	UK-France: active stance D
Unconditional support for allied	C		Risk of war, loss of control over allies / Chance to put Nasser down, restore prestige in Middle East
Restraint of allies, diplomatic conciliation of Egypt	D	Status quo (ante-nationalization preferred but not insisted upon)	Loss of allies, possible involvement of third parties / Disaster

The American proposal for diplomatic moves can be viewed as some minor negotiation in the area of DC--not so much because the U.S. was at this point firmly committed to restraining its allies but because it sought calm before all else.

Dulles arrived in Washington the same day. His statement upon return pointed out in what way the nationalization affected United States policy--"Such action could affect not merely the shareholders, who, so far as I know, are not Americans, but it could affect the operation of the Canal itself. That would be a matter of deep concern to the United States as one of the maritime nations." (Frankland, 1959: 122) This was, of course, something that time would expose. Since Americans were not shareholders, the United States had little cause for alarm.

Next day in the House of Commons Eden announced the financial measures that were being taken against Egypt, commented upon the conversations H.M. Government were having with Mr. Murphy and M. Pineau, and noted that he was

in close contact with the Commonwealth countries apropos this matter. The British ambassador in Washington informed Eden that the United States State Department was "cool and hesitant about taking urgent action." (Eden, 1960: 484). In London Murphy threw himself into legal argumentation--he began vetting the Convention of Constantinople of 1888. It was curious for the United States to use this agreement as a basis for discussion since the United States was not a party to it although the Soviet Union was (as successor state to Czarist Russia). Murphy made it clear that the United States was not in favor of referring the canal matter to the United Nations. He personally thought that a specially-created United Nations agency should control the canal.

On the last day of July Dulles himself left for London. It is generally assumed that he had become rather alarmed by Murphy's reports of British and French bellicosity and thought it best to go to dissuade them. Dulles saw the crisis as "fundamentally a business dispute over the control of an international public utility in a monopolistic position, which required cool heads, legal acumen and patient negotiation." (Barraclough, 1962: 9).

Dulles saw the United States in two dilemmas, the first concerned the United States and the Panama Canal--some were wont to make comparisons between the situation which obtained there and in Egypt. To Dulles such comparisons were invidious and completely out of order. The second dilemma for United States policy--and much the more important--had to do with American-European relations and American-Middle Eastern relations. How could the United States keep the Atlantic alliance intact (requiring solidarity with the British and French) while simultaneously keeping on good terms with the Middle Eastern states? Preserving the Atlantic alliance would drive the Arab states into the Soviet orbit while remaining friendly with the Arab countries would mean

a split between the United States and two of her major N.A.T.O. allies. These relationships were further complicated by the differing American and Anglo-French perspectives. To the British and the French a satisfactory solution was a matter of national interest pure and simple, while to the United States the Middle East was but "one sector in a global policy in which the adversary was not Arab nationalism but Soviet 'imperialism'" (Barraclough, 1962: 56-58).

of US military measures in S.E. Asia without approval.

On the first of August Dulles arrived in London. His line was legalistic: a resort to military measures would, for the participation of the United States, require the approval of Congress. Before the President would be willing to make such a request the legality of the joint proceedings (U.S.-U.K.-France) would have to be unimpeachable. Curiously Eden was not wholly discouraged--after all Dulles was thinking in terms of military action (CD). To clear away any possible doubts Dulles reassured everyone that the Panama Canal was American and not international.

Pineau argued for urgent and decisive action (CD). He thought the Americans implicated in the whole nationalization mess since it was the American Aswan Dam loan cancellation which prompted the nationalization decision. Dulles and Murphy dissented but were unable to convince Pineau that the two events were unconnected. There was some agreement: Dulles, Pineau, and Lloyd wanted to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute separate from the future of the canal. Dulles's seeming conclusion--Nasser must be made to "disgorge" and if all else fails force will be employed--after this initial meeting greatly encouraged Eden. The use of the word, "disgorge," he thought impressive and indicative of a (CD) military solution--at least an American-supported ultimatum to Nasser. It may be that Eden did not see the game as bully-leader; perhaps, rather, some form of leader. In his own eyes the Americans probably placed a higher value on the Atlantic alliance than was the actual case. Thus DD as in leader should be avoided.

In the evening of August 2 the British, Americans, and French agreed to invite twenty-four countries to a conference. Eight of these states were signatories of the Constantinople Convention and the other sixteen were principal users of the canal. After some discussion they elected to have representatives from these countries meet in London beginning August 16. This date was a compromise between the British and French desire for an immediate parley and the American suggestion that it be later. The question of payment of canal dues was also debated but not resolved. The British would continue paying in London (where Nasser could not get his hands on the money) and the French in Paris. The Americans had always paid in Egypt and said they would continue to do so. Even on so minor a matter the United States was unwilling to suggest any solution other than DC. Eden neither then nor later saw this as behavior one would expect from an ally. Evidently he was unaware of the actual game (bully-leader) dynamics.

All the states invited responded affirmatively with the exception of Egypt and Greece which declined. Israel was not invited.

That same evening Eden explained in the House of Commons the terms of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and announced that H.M. Government were taking certain "precautionary measures" including the movement from Britain of army, navy, and air force units and the calling up of some 20,000 army reservists. (See pp. 3-4 above.)

Nasser was neither interfering with British shipping through the canal nor compelling payment in Egypt. The 13,000 British subjects in Egypt were not being harassed.

After the preliminary arrangements were made for the conference Dulles returned to Washington (August 3). To a nationwide television and radio audience Dulles proclaimed that the United States had given no commitment to

employ force. He emphasized the point that "by the conference method we will invoke moral forces which are bound to prevail" (Frankland, 1959: 153).

What the Americans, British, and French expected to emerge from the conference and the international system for the Suez Canal was varied: the British (Eden) saw the need for writing the constitution of an international authority which would manage the affairs of the canal; the French (Pineau) countenanced an authority which would regulate the day-to-day working of the canal; the Americans (Dulles) wanted only agreement on the establishment of an adequate and dependable international administration.

Thus there was reason for the cautious attitude then developing in Washington. By now it was evident that there were sharp differences of opinion within the countries most directly concerned; the legal position against Nasser was not quite as clear as the British and French governments had convinced themselves; and world opinion (a prime American concern) was hardly unanimous in supporting Britain and France and in condemning Egypt.

Dulles wondered about the two-thirds majority he thought necessary before the conference could take a supportable position. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, India, and Spain favored the Egyptian position while the Scandinavian countries were skeptical toward the British and French position. West Germany concluded that the canal was really an Egyptian internal matter. Even the Australian minister of external affairs (Casey) urged moderation and was critical of Eden's handling of the affair.

On August 4 the United States government issued a statement which denied there were any differences between it and the British and French governments. Although Dulles was urging calm for all parties he did--at least according to Australian prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies--regard "the crisis over the Suez Canal as the gravest incident since the Second War" (Menzies, 1968: 150).

On August 8 Sir Anthony Eden took to the tube: in a broadcast to the nation he tried to explain just what the crisis was about and what H.M. Government were doing to resolve it (that is, the upcoming conference). One sentence from that broadcast is indicative of Eden's approach to the crisis and his own more general outlook on international relations: the Munich syndrome--"We all know this is how fascist governments behave and we all remember, only too well, what the cost can be in giving in to fascism" (Frankland, 1959: 160).

Next day (August 9) the Soviet Union issued a statement which took exception to the tripartite note (the invitation) of August 2. This was not the kind of action that would please Dulles--". . . the Soviet government considers the Egyptian government's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company to have been a perfectly lawful action following from Egypt's sovereign rights" (Frankland, 1959: 163). "The Soviet government cannot disregard the fact that an increasingly tense situation is developing at present in the area of the Near and Middle East" (Frankland, 1959: 164).

On August 12 Egypt formally rejected the invitation to the London conference in a propaganda-free statement which set forth the legal justifications for nationalization of the Suez Canal. "This skillful reply went at least half way to meet the majority of the powers over the only point about which they were really concerned, and thus helped to isolate still further the British and French governments" (Barraclough, 1962: 23).

On August 13, the Opposition Shadow Cabinet issued a statement approving forcible action but only if it were sanctioned by the United Nations. This was a position unacceptable to Eden, since,he reasoned, Egypt had the Soviet veto which would be used to insure that force would not be employed. Britain and France would thereby lose what was seen as a preferred option.

Since Eden's call up of reserves on August 2 there had been adverse diplomatic repercussions. Some states had difficulty believing Eden serious when he told them he sought a diplomatic solution. Not all states invited to the conference were anxious to come. Perhaps the shortness of the period from invitation issuance to conference commencement put too great a demand on lethargic foreign offices concerned with being tricked. For whatever reasons the acceptances to the conference were slow in coming in. "That, in the end, all save Egypt and Greece agreed to attend was a tribute to Mr. Dulles' adroit diplomacy and still more to the general desire manifest in all quarters to leave nothing undone which might prevent a conflagration: (Barraclough, 1962: 20).

Eden wanted two things to come from the conference: (1) an agreement by a large majority on the international control of the Suez Canal and (2) a decision upon the steps to be taken to effect this control. It annoyed Eden that Nasser was still getting 35 percent of canal dues and these mostly from American sources who evidently preferred (they were never ordered or requested) not to pay into a blocked canal account. (Eden, 1960: 500). Once more Eden seems to fail to see that the game is bully-leader and that the U.S. has no reason to be concerned with a CD solution.

When the London conference opened on August 16 twenty-two states were represented. The primary issues at hand were: (1) the matter of Egypt's sovereign rights and (2) the nature of the proposed international system and the character and functions of the agency that was to administer that international agency (Barraclough, 1962: 23).

Dulles's opening proposal "appeared to endorse the Anglo-French thesis that Egypt had gone beyond its rights in taking unilateral action to nationalize the Canal" (Barraclough, 1962: 23). Four days later the Indian government

presented an alternate proposal that did not point the finger at Nasser. Next day (August 21) the United States-sponsored draft as amended was accepted by a good majority.

> In presenting his proposed text, Mr. Dulles made it clear that there was no intention of making decisions binding on the minority. Nor was it the purpose to deliver an ultimatum to Egypt. "What we propose," Mr. Dulles said, "is to inform Egypt courteously of certain facts and to ask whether it is or is not disposed to enter into negotiations with a view to a convention which will take account of those facts." This disarming statement, very different from the threats issued by England and France, probably turned the day. . . ." (Barraclough, 1962: 25).

On August 23 Khrushshev, while at a function at the Rumanian embassy in Moscow remarked that Soviet volunteers were preparing to go to Egypt. Although this matter was not mentioned in the Soviet press it was taken up by the Egyptian newspapers (Calvocoressi, 1967: 21). Although an aside such as Khrushshev's did not ultimately mean much, it was a note of encouragement for the Egyptian's to be resolute.

In his autobiography Eden says that "the course of the Suez Canal crisis was decided by the American attitude toward it." (This is the outcome of a bully-leader game.) Eden thought it unfortunate that the question of colonialism kept going through the American mind like some irritating palindromic tune. Colonialism only served to confuse the issue (Eden, 1960: 512).

In late August the question of referring the whole matter to the United Nations again came up. Dulles did not favor it: was the affair a dispute or a situation? Eden decided on August 28 to go to the United Nations (an attempt at independence from the bully?). The same day he said he would call Parliament to debate the report of the Menzies Committee--set up by eighteen nations adhering to the majority (American) proposal at the London conference--when it was submitted (after the committee had met and discussed the issues with Nasser). The French were not in favor of submitting the Suez Canal matter to the United Nations.

They believed they might have more to lose than gain by such an action--the precedent might not be good apropos Algeria and all that.

The same day (August 28) the Soviet Union notified the Egyptian government that Soviet anti-imperialist credentials were still unimpeachable.

French military forces took up stations in Cyprus the same day.

Likewise on the 28th Nasser announced his willingness to meet with the representatives of the Eighteen Power (Menzies) committee.

At the end of August the U.S. State Department had reports that military supplies considerably in excess of the officially announced quantities were entering Israel from France; for example, sixty not twenty-four Mystères were shipped. France had ceased providing information required by the Tripartite Declaration about military materiel sent to Israel. "France, there is some reason to think, had already undertaken to give Israel all possible backing--including the use, if necessary, of the French veto at the Security Council--if it decided to launch at attack on Egypt, and it may already have been planned to stage the beginning of operations on 5 or 6 November, the day of the United States presidential election" (Barraclough, 1962: 53).

On September 3 Eden received a message from President Eisenhower in which the latter took exception to the use of force (CD). That same day Menzies arrived in Cairo and in a private interview with Nasser "Menzies warned Nasser that he would be mistaken if he supposed that the London Conference had ruled out the use of force. It had not addressed itself to that question. But France and Britain took a serious view of the situation and had taken the precautions of which he was aware (Eden, 1960: 523).* (Eden was still misperceiving what the U.S.--U.K. and France game was. Once again he seems to think it a leader rather than a bully-leader situation.)

*Substantiated by Menzies, 1968: 164-165.

Menzies came away from this session thinking Nasser had taken the warning to heart. And then a boom from across the ocean--Eisenhower stated in a press conference: "I am still very hopeful that the London proposals will be accepted; but the position of the United States is not to give up, even if we do run into obstacles." (Eden, 1960: 524). Thus, the U.S. was not budging from DC.

Menzies reports that Eisenhower's pronouncement "gave the final power into the hands of Nasser." (Menzies, 1968: 165). From a bargaining standpoint Menzies found this move by Eisenhower reprehensible. Even if this were the American intention, Menzies thought, it is good to keep the other man guessing. (Menzies, 1968: 166). Eden, too, was dumbfounded: "This sentence gave encouragement to Nasser, who did not need much, to raise those obstacles. The Egyptians began to feel it safe to say no. Such was the impression gained by Mr. Menzies" (Eden, 1960: 524). Eden was as yet convinced that the Western powers had Nasser over a barrel if only the United States would cooperate. The adversary game was thus still thought to be bully-chicken.

Eden had decided that if Nasser rejected the Eighteen Power proposals he would seek to refer the issue to the Security Council and try to intensify the financial and economic pressures upon Egypt by obtaining wider international support (CD strategies). The United States continued to discourage both Britain and France in both initiatives (DC <u>is</u> the only solution). In fact the United States remained uncooperative in the matter of the canal dues--one of the most direct pressures that could be applied to Nasser. Dulles only side-stepped the issue by emphasizing the disadvantages of having to sail around the Cape--a possible consequence of nonpayment of dues. Eden was a bit irritated, too, by the lack of American action regarding the freezing of Egyptian financial accounts in the United States. Dulles frequently responded that the American public would have to be prepared before such bellicose actions could be taken. To Eden, though, continual delay in resolving the problem--Nasser--

meant increased legitimacy for the action--nationalization: "The risk of letting Nasser keep his prize might in the end be greater than the risk of using force." (Eden, 1960: 509). Eden always had military action in mind(CD); Dulles, apparently, never did (DC).

The British and French were not unhappy to see about sixty canal pilots quit Egypt or fail to return from leave in early September. To Eden's chagrin, however, Nasser was able to find pilot replacements who performed well.

Not satisfied with the United States position, Eden sought to broaden his base of support, either for the support itself (in the context of his bully-chicken game) or the pressure widened support for his position might place on the Americans (Eden was still exploring CD possibilities). On September 15 Selwyn Lloyd went to a meeting of the N.A.T.O. Council to deliver a report on the discussions of the London conference. Eden thought the Western European leaders should know the situation. To some extent the British were successful: the Netherlands foreign minister, Luns, and the Canadian minister of external affairs, Pearson, endorsed the view of refusing recognition of the seizure of the canal. Belgian foreign minister Spaak insisted that the West must be firm, for Nasser's action seemed similar to some of Hitler's not so long before. Spaak promised Belgium's support of Britain in the United Nations.

On September 7 Menzies told Nasser that as far as he (Menzies) was concerned there was no need of further discussions.

Eden know that the Anglo-French position (in what he first thought was a bully-chicken game) was deteriorating and he held the United States primarily responsible. He was now convinced that Britain's best course was the United Nations. Dulles was just as adamantly opposed.

Eden was fearful that further delay would result in a situation analogous to that after the Berlin blockade in 1948. The Berlin question was not brought

before the United Nations until some months after the blockade and, according to Eden, then the result was nothing but talk. To Dulles (in the words of one of his advisors) the Security Council was a quicksand. Still thinking that a solution favorable to Britain and France was possible, Eden noted to Dulles that the United Kingdom was pledged to go to the United Nations before it resorted to the use of military force. Eden still had force on the mind.

By September 7 Eden realized the United States was not going to provide the kind of leadership he thought was called for. On September 7 Britain in an assertion of its independence informed the United States that it might within twenty-four hours go to the Security Council. Eden was actually convinced that Britain's legal argument was strong enough to win United Nations support. Dulles questioned the United Kingdom's basis in law (curiously Dulles had no such doubts at the time of the first London conference). The United States, now clearly rebuking any British illusions of a CD solution, indicated it would not support the British-French resolution in the Security Council. Dulles accused Britain of forcing a new treaty on Egypt which would bestow new rights on canal users (Eden, 1960: 530). The Anglo-French resolution essentially called for acceptance of no solution short of the Eighteen Power proposals and requested that any move by a less friendly power to limit another state's freedom of action be resisted. Dulles insisted that the United States could not be bound by such conditions.

On September 8 Selwyn Lloyd informed the United States government that Britain and the United States seemed further apart apropos their respective positions than at any time since the crisis had begun. Lloyd also asserted that further delay would be disastrous because: (1) Nasser was strengthening his hold on the canal, (2) the Western powers would lose face unless they reacted quickly to Nasser's anticipated rejection of the Eighteen Power proposals,

and (3) those Arab states considered friendly were in great and ever-increasing peril. Eden admits that H.M. Government saw the canal issue and the general Egyptian menace to friendly governments as linked and in fact as inseparable issues (Eden, 1960: 531). Eden was finding it increasingly difficult to determine just what United States policy was. He was still exploring in his favored CD area rather than accepting the reality that he had no choice but that dictated by the United States, that is, DC.

On September 9 the Menzies committee finished its work in Egypt. After Eisenhower's public rejection of the use of force, Menzies concluded that Nasser could safely reject the Eighteen Power proposals since the latter could wait until the United States opted for something even more favorable to Egypt (Menzies, 1968: 166).

The United States position was partially clarified the same day. In the State Department's view "the main aim of Western policy . . . without any use of military force . . . should be to keep the canal open to world shipping rather than to seek methods of punishing President Nasser" (Barraclough, 1962: 32). There could hardly be a more explicit statement of the U.S. insistence upon DC.

U.S. troubleshooter Murphy has written in his memoirs regarding the probability of success of the Menzies committee that:

> It was my own opinion that the Menzies committee never had a chance of success. The Suez problem did not lend itself to negotiation, because, in seizing the Canal, Nasser had burned his bridges and could not retreat. Nationalization had become an accomplished fact. The proposed new treaty did not seem to me a practical device because there was no adequate reason why it should be accepted by the Egyptians (Murphy, 1964: 387).

Menzies returned from Cairo on September 10. That same day Dulles unveiled his "Users' Club" scheme. He was not especially interested in finding a permanent solution; rather he was maneuvering to gain time "in the sincere and

honorable belief that anything was preferable to an outlook of hostilities which, in his view, would only have served the purposes of Soviet Russia" (Barraclough, 1962: 34). Neither Eden nor Mollet was thrilled by the planned Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) but Eden, thinking that he had to cooperate with the United States or all was lost, went along. Eden seemed to admit the game was bully-leader: DC was preferable to DD. Next day he persuaded the Cabinet to go along with SCUA and on September 12 he presented the SCUA proposals to the House of Commons (which had been called from summer recess) in opening the Suez debate. He concluded his remarks with the exact words agreed upon by the American, British, and French governments.

Egypt proposed on September 10 that a conference be called along the lines of its August 12 note (rejecting the invitation to the London conference)--to settle questions in which all states using the Suez Canal were interested and to review the Convention of Constantinople of 1888. President Eisenhower dismissed the suggestion out of hand as lacking any "substantive point." The Egyptian proposal was, however, accepted by twenty-five nations, including five which had participated in the London conference--Ceylon, Indonesia, Pakistan, Spain, and the Soviet Union.

Dulles could see that Britain and France were not to be contained completely; thus he withdrew total objection to bringing the matter before the Security Council but suggested that Britain and France only send a letter to the President of the Security Council informing him of what had and was happening. The United States would <u>not</u> support a <u>request for action</u> or any move stronger than the "take notice" approach. Dulles seemed convinced that Britain and France were not honestly attempting to reach a solution by diplomatic means but rather fashioning "a device for obtaining cover" for an armed attack on Egypt (Barraclough, 1962: 31).

On September 13 Mollet announced in Paris the French government's support for SCUA. As Eden's statement had, Mollet's too, employed certain words previously agreed upon. For Mollet to do this was not so easy for he was not really in favor of the proposal. He thought it essential, however, to cooperate since going along with this American proposition was supposed to assure American cooperation and that meant a satisfactory solution.

Dulles also announced on September 13 that the United States would participate in a user's association. He, too, employed the agreed upon sentences in his press conference announcement. Dulles's rationale for establishing SCUA was simple: If the canal pilots were withdrawn Egypt would not be able to guarantee passage through the canal and thus would be in breach of the Convention of Constantinople to keep traffic moving. Egypt would then be forced to accept SCUA's offices. If Egypt refused, then sanctions would be justified. According to this legalistic reasoning the deadlock would be broken either way. Dulles "warned"Egypt that no interference with international rights of free access would be tolerated.

Eden was aghast: "The words were an advertisement to Nasser that he could reject the project with impunity. We had never been told that a statement of this kind was to accompany the announcement of the Users' Club." Eden could not see how the Atlantic alliance could be preserved. Dulles was just impossible. Eden concluded that the "American torpedoing of their own plan on the first day of launching it left no alternative but to use force or acquiesce in Nasser's triumph" (Eden, 1960: 540).

Max Freedman of the Manchester Guardian wrote on September 14 that "the State Department, in formulating its policy, was 'thinking of New Delhi even more than of Cairo,' or possibly even than of London" (Barraclough, 1962: 32). To Dulles, it seemed, there was no casus belli so long as Nasser permitted

traffic to pass without interruption, that is, the operative consideration was freedom of navigation (Barraclough, 1962: 31). Dulles continued to separate the question of the canal from the menace of Nasser (as Eisenhower had done in his letter to Eden on September 3).

In a statement on September 14 Dulles expressed support for Eden and Mollet: it was "so firm and unfaltering that it took the United States by surprise" (Barraclough, 1962: 35). In order that economic pressure could be brought on Egypt, the United States would extend massive dollar aid to the countries adversely affected by an anticipated shut-down of the canal once the European pilots were withdrawn. When it was seen that Egypt had an adequate financial margin to sustain the revenue loss and had enough pilots of its own to keep the canal open the whole basis of Dulles's SCUA was undermined.

On September 14 invitations were sent to the eighteen states which had voted for the United States proposal at the London conference the previous month. The purpose of this second London conference was to consider the report of the Menzies committee, to take note of the Egyptian memorandum of refusal, and to discuss arrangements for SCUA.

On September 15 Nasser rejected SCUA. To Eden it was necessary to "resist force with force" (Eden, 1960: 542). The adversary game still to Eden was apparently bully-chicken. Thus a logical appropriate first step was the withdrawal of the European pilots. Dulles was opposed to this move although he had countenanced it two days before. Again he noted that he was dubious about the Anglo-French legal position: "that, far from seeking to safeguard the Convention of 1888, which Egypt had not called into question, Great Britain and France were seeking to force a new treaty on Egypt" (Barraclough, 1962: 31).

The Soviet Union began to take a more active role on September 15. It complained about the British and French military buildup in the Mediterranean.

Bulganin wrote Eden to underscore the Soviets' concern. (Eden replied on September 17--he reminded the Soviets that Nasser was a militarist and that the Soviet Union had yet to disapprove of the state of tension Nasser had created in the Middle East.)

Not only did the Soviets complain about the Anglo-French military activity but also hinted that they might seize the initiative and themselves take the matter to the United Nations. Thus Britain and France would find themselves arraigned for threatening to use force against Egypt. (Frankland, 1959: 226-227).

On September 17 Dulles was back in London and back at trying to keep things calm. In order to prevent defections from among the Eighteen-Nation group, he said that his SCUA proposals were open to modification. The world reaction had generally been poor: the Scandinavian foreign ministers, for example, would not commit themselves in advance to the SCUA arrangements--instead they preferred to turn the matter over to the United Nations; Pakistan had associated itself with India and would vote against SCUA; Egypt maintained SCUA was an act of provocation; the Soviet Union asserted it would be "unable to stand aloof"; and Ceylon and India called SCUA a giant stride toward war.

Egypt formally responded to the Anglo-French letter of September 12 by stating its position in a letter to the President of the Security Council.

The second London conference opened on September 19. Dulles presented his SCUA proposals and went out of his way to meet the reservations demanded by some nations. (Barraclough, 1962: 38). Lloyd handled the negotiations for Britain (and chaired the conference as well).

On September 21 the conference formulated a statement (SCUA) to which fifteen nations adhered. Both the British and the French governments found the conference outcome rather indifferent. Evidence to substantiate such an observation: canal users <u>may</u> pay dues and tolls to SCUA or continue paying them to Egypt (as one representative--the Italian--said his government would)

(Barraclough, 1962: 38). Even Dulles was skeptical concerning the utility of SCUA. Three days later the French government announced explicit reservations it had about SCUA. A third conference in London was planned for October 1.

Eden has written that the negotiations at the second London conference were "the most crucial" phase of the crisis, for Britain and France fell in with the American plans which gravely affected their whole future position (with respect to the canal), absolutely relinquished the initiative, and lost whatever sympathy of Europe and the world they ever had. Increasingly Egypt looked the wronged party. What had happened to the British and French plans for military action (CD)? Did Dulles succeed in restoring calm at a crucial point?

> It is impossible, on the basis of the existing evidence, to assert beyond cavil that invasion of Egypt had been planned for 16 September, though it is clear that Britain and France were expecting an incident at that date which would justify intervention; but it is evident that, through his Suez Canal Users' Association project, Mr. Dulles was able to bring effective pressure on the British and French governments to postpone their operational plans, and thereafter their hands in large measure tied. In particular, it was by now abundantly clear that any show of force would incur almost universal disapprobation and probably action in the United Nations, and it was certain that there would be no support, moral or military, from the United States. (Barraclough, 1962: 39).

This effectively meant that the Americans thought it high time the British and French cease exploratory actions in CD and settle down to the inevitable DC solution.

On September 23 the British and French governments asked in a letter to the President of the Security Council that the Security Council meet on September 26 for the purpose of examining the situation created by "the unilateral action of the Egyptian government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal" (Frankland, 1959: 241). Egypt requested on September 24 that the Security Council meet to consider "actions against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, which

constitute a danger to international peace" (Frankland, 1959: 241). Thus bringing the matter to the United Nations was now assured. Britain and France had rebuked Dulles but the delays he had instigated had deflated their initial case.

On September 26 Eden and Lloyd went to Paris for meetings with Mollet and Pineau. Eden reports that Mollet and Pineau were firm in the belief that Britain and France had to stand by the Eighteen-Power proposals and resolutely oppose negotiations on any other grounds (Eden, 1960: 552). Eden had always seen these proposals as requiring force if not acceded to by Egypt; in other words, they constituted a CD solution. Given this perspective one can see why Eden found the Eighteen Power proposals so enchanting when initially propounded by Dulles.

The French were generally skeptical about SCUA and the utility of going to the United Nations. They favored action (military) at an early date. The French were convinced that the United States administration was not keeping its promises and that the way Dulles and Eisenhower were speaking the Russians might well conclude that they could support Nasser with impunity. Further the French believed that delay only served Nasser's purposes--it allowed him to build up a stronger position with the continuous supply of Russian weapons Egypt was then receiving. The spectre of the Soviets becoming dominant in the Middle East seemed even worse than Egyptian influence there.

Dulles, in a press conference on September 26, said he thought a just solution could be reached through the United Nations. He exhorted all nations to be tolerant of Egypt, especially now because of the economic hardships that country was suffering because of the crisis (Frankland, 1959: 247).

Britain and France at last seem prepared to strike a course independent of the United States. Eden's statement regarding his and Lloyd's conversations

with Mollet and Pineau demonstrate that the course he had set upon in August when he called up reserves was still his (and the Frenchmen's) preferred solution.

> The Foreign Secretary and I undertook, however, that if the Security Council showed itself incapable of maintaining international agreements, Britain would not stand aside and allow them to be flouted. If necessary we would be prepared to use whatever steps, including force, might be needed to re-establish respect for these obligations (Eden, 1960: 554).

Eden still envisaged the adversary crisis as bully-chicken and thus requiring a simple masterstroke to assure his preferred DC solution.

On October 1 Eden wrote Eisenhower that Nasser was in Russian hands as Mussolini was in Hitler's. He reviewed the Egyptian plots in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Next he asserted that SCUA must be made effective (how could Eisenhower say no since it was the handiwork of his own Secretary of State) and to do so meant that the United States would also have to cooperate. Specifically the American government should force the vessels (American really) flying the flags of Panama and Liberia to do as British and French registered ships were required - pay dues in London or Paris. Eden concluded by suggesting that Eisenhower show firmness to Nasser. He also conjured up that ever-present bugbear, the Soviet Union: resolution in face of Nasser would "help the peace by giving the Russians pause" (Eden, 1960: 556).

The third London conference got under way on October 1. The work at hand was, as stated before, getting SCUA off the ground (or should it be into the ground); thus its work was generally technical in nature. Dulles, in Washington, was not especially helpful. On October 2, in a press conference, he noted that the United States was not one hundred percent on either side--the colonial powers or the nations claiming to seek independence. He added that SCUA never had any teeth in it so the talk about pulling the teeth from it was peculiar. Eden says

what he had in mind as "teeth" was not military force as such but paying canal dues to SCUA. He did not like Dulles' allusion to colonialism: the dispute with Nasser was concerned with international rights not colonialism; in the same manner that an American defense of its own treaty rights in the Panama Canal would not be considered a colonialism issue.

Barraclough (1962: 41) seems correct in his observation that:

> it is by no means certain that a majority of those at the conference would have supported the constitution of the Users' Association, if it had been endowed with "teeth" in the way in which Britain and France desired; and by emphasizing the essentially defensive character of the project as a security for users' solidarity against further Egyptian action and as an organization to develop alternative routes and to operate a "Suez sea-life," on the analogy of the Berlin air-lift, if Egypt were to abuse the position of monopoly it had seized, Mr. Dulles probably ensured the necessary support for the resolutions by which on 4 October a council, executive group and administrator were finally appointed.

Focus of attention was now on the Security Council. In a meeting with Lloyd in Washington Dulles lamented the "suddenness" of the British-French recourse to the United Nations. Dulles finally seemed to accept the Anglo-French argument that time was running out and thus a need for a decision was at hand.

American press reports that there was a rift between the United States and Britain were denied by Dulles. He maintained that with the exception of the use of force the United States and Britain were in agreement; that the United States respected Britain's right to threaten use of force; and that he did not rule it out entirely as an ultimate resort (Eden, 1960: 561). Eden tells us that at this point Dulles believed Nasser's position to be deteriorating.

What the British and French sought in the United Nations was simple: the Eighteen-Power proposals. This they made clear in preliminary consultations with other United Nations representatives. There was no place for committees of mediation--to the British and French the issues were clearcut and admitted

of no exception. Dulles, of course, disagreed with this strategy--better would be to treat the Eighteen-Power proposals as a negotiable starting point, not an ultimatum to Egypt. (Barraclough, 1962: 43).

The Security Council in October 1956 was composed of the permanent members--United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China--plus the elected members--Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Iran, Peru, and Yugoslavia. All of these states were considered "friendly"--Yugoslavia being an exception.

On October 5 the Security Council opened hearings on the Anglo-French proposals. Dulles' speech indicated firm support for Britain and France. In another speech (not at the United Nations) Dulles presented his analysis of the situation:

> The main issue, as he (Dulles) saw it, was whether it was just or even tolerable for nations whose economies depended upon the use of the canal to accept exclusive control of it by a government professing to be bitterly hostile to them; the Egyptian government had nationalized the canal under conditions which suggested that it was intended to exert economic pressure on other countries, and (he added) it was unreasonable that any nation "should be required to live under an economic sword of Damocles" (Barraclough, 1962: 43).

He added, however, that the Eighteen-Power proposals were by no means "sacrosanct" and as such the Security Council should not be averse to consideration of alternative suggestions. Lloyd and Pineau were in complete disagreement with Dulles on this point: the Eighteen-Power proposals should be the recommendation of the Security Council; thus, there would be no loopholes, no substitution of Indian, Egyptian, or Soviet proposals.

The public sessions of the Security Council, held October 8 and 9, demonstrated that "there was no overwhelming pressure of moral resentment against Egypt" (Barraclough, 1962: 43). Otherwise nothing new came from these two days of meetings.

Pursuant to a Security Council resolution of October 9, Lloyd, Pineau, and the Egyptian foreign minister, Fawzi, had private talks while the Council stayed

in secret session. These talks lasted from October 10 through 12. Little came of them because Egypt would not accept an international authority and automatic sanctions for a breach of the principle of free navigation while Britain and France insisted upon them. The substantive result of the talks was a six-point agreement which was to govern subsequent negotiations. These six principles were admittedly fairly vague. Lloyd was quite critical of them, mainly because of the absence of specificity. Eisenhower thought them grand: "a very great crisis is behind us" (Barraclough, 1962: 45).

On October 13 Britain and France presented a new resolution of two parts. The first part consisted of the six agreed-upon principles; the second part requested the Egyptian government to present "precise proposals" which would provide "guarantees to the users not less effective than those sought by the proposals of the eighteen powers." The first part was unanimously accepted by the Security Council but the second part failed because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union; hence the "operative" (Eden's word) part of the resolution (paragraphs 2-5) was vetoed.

Eden though Eisenhower's and Dulles' optimism even after the Soviet veto ill-timed. Lloyd saw the American attitude as strengthening the Egyptian position. Eden remembers that he had hoped for a very grave statement by the Americans (Eden, 1960: 567).

What now? Dulles' conferences had not resolved the problem. Neither had the Security Council. What alternatives were left for the British and French? First they could have continued the private talks with the Egyptians at Geneva as United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjöld proposed. This alternative they rejected on the grounds that it was unclear if the Egyptian government really wanted to participate in further talks. Second they could consider other proposals such as the one presented by India, but it did not come up to

the minimum requirements of the Eighteen-Power proposal (Eden, 1960: 563). Third, they could resort to "policy by other means."

On October 16 Eden, Mollet, Lloyd, and Pineau had conversations (they were free of assistants most of the time) at the Hotel Matignon (in Paris). The topics discussed were: (1) the future of the canal, (2) progress of SCUA, and (3) pooling of information and consideration of action that might have to be taken in light of developments in the Middle East, with particular attention devoted to the growing menace of Egyptian hostility toward Israel. Eden had promised on September 26 that if the Security Council failed (to support the Eighteen-Power proposals) Britain would take "whatever steps, including force" that "might be needed."

This meeting in Paris is still the subject of considerable controversy. Doubtless minutes were not kept and those present will never reveal what actually transpired. Barraclough (1962: 48) argues in this regard that: "Even today most of the evidence as to what took place is circumstantial; but the circumstantial evidence provides a strong presumption that decisions were taken which led directly to the Israeli attack on Egypt on 29 October and the subsequent Anglo-French intervention at Port Said." The question of collusion between Britain, France, and Israel is still debatable and speculative but we need not tarry with the arguments. There seems little doubt that after the Hotel Matignon meetings the British knew that France and Israel were working on some plan that fit the category of pursuit of policy by other means.*

Thus October 16 is a most important day in the crisis period. French-Israeli plans were by then at an advanced stage. There could be little holding Israel back now. Eden and Mollet had never ruled out using force--on the

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*On this see Barraclough, 1962: 48, footnote 4.

contrary Eden never seemed to get it off his mind. It had not taken Eden long to realize that nothing more could be expected from further negotiations or SCUA (even if it ever got going); thus the decision about employing force had to be made--no longer need he be concerned with Dulles' opinions on these matters. He knew that Israel was about to act and that this situation should be exploited by coordinating it with some joint British-French intervention scheme. Eden finally broke the American tie--to him Dulles had not been helpful. It was the American contention after the crisis that there had been a communications black-out during the period after the United Nations meetings and before the outbreak of war at the end of October. Probably for the very good reason that the United States would have at least tried to prevent military action Britain and France stopped the normal cooperative consultations with the United States. Dulles' excuse for not questioning this quietude was that he thought direct negotiations between the British,French, and Egyptians were continuing at Geneva.

Curiously France and Britain had some negotiating to do between themselves: their aims and interests in the Middle East were divergent; if they were to coordinate policy (even by other means) they had to reconcile some of those differences. France was closely aligned with Israel and since the spring of 1956 had been working even more closely while Britain was allied with Iraq and had treaty obligations to defend Jordan. One of Britain's major concerns was keeping Jordan and Iraq afloat against the onslaughts of Nasser's pan-Arab expansionism. These two countries were the pillars of Britain's position in the Middle East. France's attention was on Nasser as supplier of arms and cheerleader to the Algerian rebels. Both Britain and France saw Egypt (read: Nasser) as the source of their Middle Eastern and North African problems. They could not, however, appear to be ganging up on Nasser by allying themselves with Israel. This was parlous business, for any such overt support for Israel was sure to unite the Arab world behind Nasser.

In the Hotel Matignon meetings the British and the French evidently resolved these difficulties and set upon a plan of action in concert with Israel. Sir Charles Keightley (British commander-in-chief, Middle East land forces), supreme commander of the Anglo-French Suez operations, at this time received instructions to recast his plans "so that action could if necessary be taken any time during the winter months." Mollet and Pineau made some peculiar statements in this period which indicated that the matter was not settled.

Israel's prime minister Ben-Gurion had rescheduled a speech to the Knesset from October 8 to October 15. And he did not raise the question of possible Iraqi troop movements into Jordan if Israel should go to war against Jordan. Some other country evidently would be the object. In a speech on October 17 Ben-Gurion referred to Nasser as the "Egyptian fascist dictator." Thus his attack was altered in an apparent attempt "to prepare Israeli opinion for a radical switch in policy; and it is difficult to believe that its timing, one day after the Anglo-French talks in Paris, was accidental" (Barraclough, 1962: 55).

Military plans seemed about ready. A reason (or excuse) for direct intervention would be needed--at least the French government was requiring such proof. It came on October 18 when the Egyptian motor yacht Athos was captured and found to be loaded with seventy tons of arms bound for the Algerian rebels. For the French this was conclusive evidence that the question of the Suez Canal and the more general matters of North African politics could not be separated. On October 18 the Israeli ambassadors in London, Paris, Washington, and Moscow were recalled for consultations with the foreign minister, Mrs. Golda Meir.

Next day the SCUA administrator was appointed--after some ten days of secret negotiations--but no seat of the association was chosen. Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi proposed that the British, French, and Egyptian governments

resume talks in Geneva on October 29. India's Krishna Menon continued his efforts to mediate--most successfully in Egypt.

On October 21 the anti-western parties won a majority in the Jordanian elections. Britain's influence there was further deteriorating since it was well known that the new parliament would be united on at least one question--revising or abrogating the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Britain was understandably annoyed.

Next day the French forced down a Moroccan aircraft and took prisoner certain passengers who just happened to be leaders of the Algerian Liberation Front who were returning from consultations with the Sultan of Morocco. The Arab world was irritated at this action.

On October 23 Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the Opposition declared in the House of Commons that the Indian proposals which had been reported in the press two days before "seem to many of us to offer a very reasonable half-way house solution to the whole problem" (Frankland, 1959: 253). The Times, too, concluded that India's proposals represented "a careful attempt to weave together the requirements of both sides." Lloyd rejected such arguments--claiming that it was not clear whether the Indian proposals represented the views of the Egyptian government, and, even if they did, Lloyd found them lacking precision; thus he concluded that it was incumbent upon the Egyptian government, if it desired renewed talks, to put forward proposals for consideration as soon as possible.

The French recalled their ambassador to Cairo on October 23. One reason for this action was the Athos affair.

That same day an announcement was made that a joint command between Egypt, Jordan, and Syria had been established under the leadership of Egypt.

At eight that evening Pineau arrived in London, dined with Lloyd, met in addition with Eden at ten, and left for Paris at eleven. Pineau's task was supposedly to inform the British that Israel was now prepared to launch a preventive war against Nasser. (Barraclough, 1962: 56).

Unless Egypt was going to make some new concession Britain and France could see no point in renewing talks. United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjöld was frenetically trying to discover what would be acceptable to them. On October 24 Hammarskjold requested Fawzi to clarify the Egyptian understandings of certain matters (Frankland, 1959: 254-257). Egypt did not reply until November 2 even though the talks were to commence October 29. Eden reports that he had no intention of going to Geneva anyway (Eden, 1960: 568).

The Soviet Union's armed intervention in Hungary started on October 24. It is thought that Israel believed Soviet hands would be tied and hence aid would not be forthcoming to Egypt. Because of this sordid intervention Israel supposedly advanced the plans for military invasion by one week--from November 5 to October 29. American intelligence was reporting to President Eisenhower at this time that there had been a sharp increase in the volume of official encoded telegraphic and cable traffic between Paris and Tel Aviv. Eisenhower was alarmed. On October 27 he sent a strong warning to Ben-Gurion not to use force and set in motion machinery for joint consultation with Britain and France. Eisenhower's pressure had the opposite effect: Israel determined that action was necessary before a frenzied international opinion developed against it.

In a meeting on October 25 the British Cabinet discussed the possibility of conflict between Israel and Egypt and what would be done. Three points were agreed upon: (1) call upon both parties to cease hostilities and (2) withdraw their forces to a distance from either bank of the canal (which meant, when

formulated as the ultimatum, that Israeli forces would have to advance about a hundred miles to be within ten miles of the canal and thus would be occupying almost the whole of Sinai), and (3) if there was no compliance, intervene directly and militarily. Eden writes: "The same plan that had been intended to deal with Nasser's seizure of the canal fitted equally well with our new objective" (Eden, 1960: 584).

Two days later (October 27) slower vessels of the British navy set sail from Malta--the Suez invasion staging area. The very next day Israel officially announced that it was mobilizing. Eisenhower was so greatly distressed by the Israeli mobilization that he again wrote to warn Ben-Gurion against any precipitate action.

Eisenhower in a separate action, also invoked the parts of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, which provided for discussions with Britain and France. These consultations got under way in Washington.

Israel attacked Egypt on October 29. Eisenhower's press secretary James Hagerty stated that the United States would honor its pledge (under the terms of the Tripartite Declaration) to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East. Hagerty added that the United States was consulting with Britain and France and would take this matter (the Israeli invasion) to the Security Council the next day.

On October 30 the British Cabinet was apprised of the fact that Israeli soldiers had set foot on Egyptian territory on October 29 and that during that night the Israelis had reached a point midway between their frontier and Ismailia. A second Israeli force was said to be striking toward Suez. The Cabinet was ready to act (after all, it had decided what to to five days before). It needed only the agreement of the French (Mollet and Pineau were making their way to London) to execute those plans. The notes to be sent to Israel and Egypt were discussed as was a letter to be sent to Eisenhower assuring him of

Britain's desire to bring this matter before the Security Council (the U.S. was, according to Eden, urging the Security Council to brand Israel the aggressor) and the text of the speech Eden was to deliver that evening in the House of Commons.

In that House session Eden declared that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was inapplicable because it had never been accepted by the Egyptian government. Thus questions of support, requirements for consultations, and so forth need not be considered. He also told the House that Britain and France had delivered an ultimatum to Egypt and one to Israel: both nations were to cease hostilities and accept a temporary Anglo-French occupation at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez within twelve hours.

Eisenhower was incensed--his information on the ultimatums came from press reports,not the British and French embassies. He urgently appealed to Mollet and Eden and expressed hope that the United Nations would be given a full opportunity to settle these matters without resorting to force. The peaceful means of the United Nations, Eisenhower went on, would secure a solution to: (1) restoration of the armistice and (2) the Suez Canal "controversy" (Frankland, 1959: 263-264).

The draft resolution presented by the United States to the Security Council (1) called upon Israel to withdraw from Egypt and (2) asked other members to refrain from the use of force. Eden thought the resolution ghastly--it was a condemnation of Israeli action rather than a statement of principles for a general settlement. "They refused to amend the letter summoning the Security Council so that the French and ourselves could also sign it. To denounce and neither to offer nor to accept any constructive suggestions was the core of American policy" (Eden, 1960: 591). The resolution was vetoed by Britain and France; the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Iran, and

Peru voted yes; Australia and Belgium abstained. On the resolution of the Soviet Union calling for Israel to withdraw and all parties to cease fire, the United States and Belgium abstained; Britain and France voted no (veto) and all the others voted yes.

At 5:30 a.m. October 31 the ultimatum expired. Aircraft based on Cyprus commenced attacks against Egyptian territory. Britain was, according to Eden in a statement to the House of Commons, in a state of "armed conflict."

Hammarskjold suggested he would quit as Secretary-General unless some kind of positive action were taken immediately.

Eisenhower took to the airwaves: in a radio and television address he discussed the situation in Eastern Europe--Hungary and Poland--as well as that in the Middle East. He informed the American people that the United States had not been consulted about the Israeli mobilization or the Anglo-French ultimatum and the consequent use of force.

> As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right--if our judgment so dictates--to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settl ement of international disputes (Frankland, 1959: 268).

Eisenhower did not, however, think the situation so grave as to necessitate the convening of a special session of Congress.

The Soviet government was not quiet either. It condemned the aggression against Egypt and the Tripartite Declaration as being "colonialist" and a violation of United Nations commitments. It reminded certain governments it labelled as aggressors that the responsibility for the consequences was entirely theirs.

In the Security Council Yugoslavia proposed a "Uniting for Peace Resolution" which if adopted (as a procedural question not subject to the veto) would place the matter before the General Assembly. The United States, the Soviet

Union, Yugoslavia, China, Iran, Cuba, and Peru voted yes; Britain and France voted no; Australia and Belgium abstained. On November 1 the General Assembly inscribed the question on its agenda by a vote of 62--yes, 2--no, 7--abstain.

On November 2 the General Assembly accepted by a vote of 64-5 (U.K., France, Israel, Australia, New Zealand) with six abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal, Union of South Africa) the United States resolution which was similar to the one presented in the Security Council but with an instruction to the Secretary General that he was to report promptly on the compliance with the resolution.

In a non-United-Nations action the Soviet Union suggested that there should be an intervention by the Bandung powers. The Soviet President appealed to Nehru and Sukarno in this regard. Thus for the first time the Soviet Union was proposing some kind of direct intervention. In early November Moscow radio was heard calling for volunteers and arms for Egypt. This was the kind of situation Dulles dreaded; thus it became even more urgent for the United States to get the fighting stopped and all foreign troops withdrawn before the international situation deteriorated further.

So serious was the international situation in early November that the Swiss government proposed a conference at Geneva to be attended by the heads of government of Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and maybe India. World War III looked menacingly close.

On November 2 and 3 Egypt sank block ships in the Suez Canal and thereby insured no further passage through it.

On November 3 Britain in a letter to Hammarskjöld asked that the United Nations constitute a force to keep the peace. Until it was ready the British and French forces would act in that capacity. The same day Israel's United Nations representative informed the Secretary General that the General Armistice

Agreement of February 24, 1949 was no longer to be considered a proper point of reference to which to return. Israel, however, would agree to a cease-fire if Egypt would.

On November 4 three oil pumping stations belonging to the Iraq Petroleum Company were destroyed in Egypt. This in conjunction with the blockage of the Suez Canal meant the halt of the flow of oil to Britain. Although the United States had previously promised to help with regard to oil supplies, the Americans now maintained such a promise was made under different circumstances.

The same day two more important resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly. The first, supported by India and eighteen other Afro-Asian states (1) called for a cease-fire in twelve hours and (2) ordered the Secretary General to arrange compliance. The second, by Canada, called for the setting up of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.

Hammerskjöld acted without delay--he began making arrangements for a cease-fire by sending out cables to Egypt, Israel, and Britain. Egypt replied affirmatively but Israel insisted on a clarification that would in effect guarantee an unequivocal acceptance by Egypt. Next day Hammarskjöld formally announced that both Egypt and Israel had accepted the cease-fire. Britain could not back down: in Eden's words--once the fighting had ceased the "justification for further intervention ceased with it."

On November 4 the Soviet government sent identical notes to the British and French embassies--reminders that the British and French bore "responsibility for all possible consequences of such actions," that is, responsibility for blockading the Suez Canal and an area of the Mediterranean in violation of the Convention of Constantinople (Frankland, 1959: 281).

Soviet activity was not confined to sending notes. On November 5 the Soviet consul in Port Said began actively stimulating resistance and insuring further help. Loudspeaker vans had made the rounds in Port Said announcing much the same--with the additional "facts" that London and Paris had been bombed and that the third world war was underway. The situation in Port Said was confused: at 3:30 p.m. (November 5) the Governor of Port Said agreed to a cease-fire; at 7 p.m. it was announced that Egypt had accepted the terms of the cease-fire; and at 8:30 p.m. the Governor changed his mind, said he could not agree to the terms of the cease-fire and accordingly had to order the fighting to be renewed. Eden comments that at this point in time "the Russian hat was now in the ring" (Eden, 1960: 619).

Britain responded to the General Assembly resolution calling for a United Nations force in a letter to Hammarskjold which asked more questions than it answered. It allowed that the United Nations force was a good idea but pointed out that the General Assembly had not accepted a plan and the Security Council had not endorsed one either. Agreeing to something still subject to discussion did not seem proper and the matter of the composition of the staff and contingents of the United Nations force had not been settled. Thus Britain concluded that once the United Nations endorsed a plan for international force all military action would cease. Until then, however, it noted, "certain Anglo-French operations with strictly limited objectives are continuing" (Frankland, 1959: 283-284).

The General Assembly passed a resolution on November 5 which set up the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and appointed General E.L.M. Burns as chief of the command. Officers were to come from the United Nations Truce Observation Organization and troops were to be recruited from the members other than permanent members of the Security Council. Britain acceded to these proposals but not until after requesting clarifications (on November 6) from

Hammarskjöld on two points: (1) were the Egyptian and Israeli acceptances of an unconditional cease-fire and (2) was the United Nations force competent to secure and supervise attainment of the objectives of the Resolution of November 2? Since the Suez Canal would now require clearing, Britain offered the United Nations the assistance (just a coincidence that they were on the spot already) of French and British technicians.

On November 5 the Soviet Union asked the President of the Security Council to summon a meeting for that evening. At that time the Soviet Union presented a draft resolution calling on the United Kingdom, France, and Israel to leave Egypt and promising United States and Soviet aid and assistance to Egypt. This resolution failed: 3--yes, 4--no (Australia, Britain, France, and the U.S.), 4--abstain.

Bulganin on November 5 sent menacing letters to Eden and Mollet. In the one to Eden he emphasized that aggressive war was fraught with very dangerous consequences for universal peace and that stronger (than U.K.) states could send rocket weapons rather than naval or air forces to Britain's shores. Thus "the war in Egypt can spread to other countries and turn into a third world war. . . . We are fully determined to crush the agressor by the use of force and to restore peace in the East" (Frankland, 1959: 288-289). To Mollet, Bulganin ranted similarly but did not mention the "rocket weapons." He did add a personal touch, perhaps to appeal to Mollet's socialist conscience: "During our meeting in Moscow last May you said that socialist ideals inspired you in all your work. But what has socialism in common with the predatory armed attack on Egypt, which is an open colonial war?" (Frankland, 1959: 290-291).

Ben-Gurion was in receipt of one of these Bulganin missives too. It informed the Israeli government that the Soviet Union was instructing its

ambassador in Tel Aviv to quit Israel for Moscow immediately and hoped that the government of Israel would "properly understand and assess this warning. . . ." (Frankland, 1959: 291-292).

Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower was not a threatening one. It did remind the President that "if this war is not curbed, it is fraught with the danger of, and can develop into, a third world war" (Frankland, 1959: 293). Bulganin was suggesting the Soviet Union and the United States pool their efforts in the United Nations to adopt resolute measures to curb aggression. He noted that both could act without delay--the United States had a navy in the Mediterranean and the Soviet Union possessed a strong navy and powerful aviation. Eisenhower replied straightaway: and what about Hungary? He said no to the Soviet suggestion for creation of a bipartite force to send to the Middle East.

The United States desire to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt was intensified at the prospect of a Soviet military entry into the Middle East. "Thus, the position being defended by Egypt was virtually guaranteed against the assault of Israel, Britain, and France and it was no longer a question of anything other than time until all three countries withdrew their forces" (Frankland, 1959: 246).

In his reply to Bulganin's letter, Eden indicates that at first he thought he "could only instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador to return it as entirely unacceptable." Eden, however, decided to answer: Hungary--it "ill-becomes the Soviet Government to speak of the actions of Her Majesty's Government as 'barbaric'" (Frankland, 1959: 302). The Soviet threat--using rocket weapons--could be dismissed because if the Soviets unloosed missiles against Britain and France the United States had let it be known that American retaliation would be forthcoming. The American counterthreat "clearly took the sting and indeed took the timing out of the Soviet ultimatum which was allowed to die a small little death and was never heard of again" (Calvocoressi, 1967: 22).

The British accepted the cease-fire and the UNEF on November 6. Their goals had not been accomplished--as a matter of fact Britain and France had to give up what they had accomplished, the subjugation of Port Said. Ironically, this defeat for Nasser was to Eden cause for great humiliation:

> Out of this situation intelligent international statesmanship should, we thought, be able to shape a lasting settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the future of the canal. We had not understood that, so far from doing this, the United Nations, and in particular the United States, would insist that all the advantages gained must be thrown away before serious negotiation began. . . . the major mistakes were made, not before the cease-fire or in that decision, but after it. I did not foresee them (Eden, 1960: 625).

So why did they halt their military operations? Of primary importance was the attitude of the American government. Eden anticipated this show of independence would meet with disapproval but not disapprobation supported with hardhitting financial and economic pressures. In early November there had been a run on the pound--this considerable speculation against sterling was largely in the American market or on American accounts. India reduced its sterling balances and China withdrew its balances, converted part to Swiss francs and placed this money at the disposal of Egypt. Most of the Middle Eastern oil states reduced or withdrew their balances. In September reserves fell by $57 million and in October by $84 million. These reductions were anticipated by the British Cabinet as consequences of taking action at Suez. The November fall in reserves of $279 million (accounting for about fifteen percent of total dollar reserves) was not expected, for it was more the result of conscious pressure against Britain than a direct consequence of military action. Eden's comment on this matter demonstrates the effectiveness of the United States campaign: "This was gloomy foreboding and could have been decisive within the next few days" (Eden, 1960: 623). The sterling rescue operation in December 1956 consisted of $1.3 billion from the International Monetary Fund and $150 from the ExIm Bank to pay principally for United States oil imports. These loans probably would not have been forthcoming if the fighting in Egypt had continued.

Other factors involved in Britain's decision to accept the cease-fire were Commonwealth attitudes, Soviet threats, British public opinion. (Eden had had some resignations and even more threats of resignations, including some members of his Cabinet. The Labor Party was almost unanimous in its opposition to government policy. Even in Eden's own Tory Party there was dissent--some M.P.'s going so far as to rebuke the whip.)

Eisenhower was greatly concerned with the Israelis' delay in accepting the proposed cease-fire. He informed Ben-Gurion and insisted that Israel withdraw to the General Armistice Line of 1949 and comply with the United Nations General Assembly resolution. The next day Ben-Gurion replied that there had been a breakdown in communications between the United States Department of State and the United States embassy in Tel Aviv. As such Eisenhower was not properly told that Israel had no intention of annexing the Sinai desert. He added that Israel was agreeing to the United Nations force.

All parties had agreed to the cease-fire and the UNEF. The first UNEF units arrived at Abu Suweir on November 15. The Norwegian contingent of UNEF entered Port Said on November 21. Yugoslav units arrived there on November 29.

Outcome and Aftermath

Strictly speaking the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force following the cease-fire in Egypt was the formal settlement of the armed hostilities rather than some arrangement consequent to a series of concessions by both sides in the more characteristic manner of crisis bargaining.

Britain's international position had been seriously compromised by its Suez paroxysm. Quite clearly there was a weakening of the Anglo-American alliance (the special relationship) that would require some time to shore up. Britain's relations with the Commonwealth countries became strained. In a

sense the bugbear of colonialism was less easy to dismiss after the Suez invasion than it had been before. The British decision to pull back once the Suez operation commenced created a bitterness between Britain and France. The French thought (probably rightly so) that the British government had reneged just when military victory appeared to be within reach. One of the most important results of the crisis was the demonstration that Britain no longer had much power in the Middle East. This was quite a blow since one of Britain's aims in reacting to Nasser as it had was to retain (if not increase) what prestige and influence it possessed in that part of the world. For Britain there were of course the economic difficulties which ensued from the run on sterling and the blocking of the Suez Canal to oil tankers. Eden's government, though not directly threatened, was the center of considerable and caustic criticism from some of its own backbenchers as well as Opposition members of Parliament. It is generally thought that Eden's Suez "adventure" as much as his bile-duct problems contributed to his departure from the prime ministership. A substantial element of the British press had fulminated against the Conservative government during the late October and early November 1956 days. There had been a few resignations from the government as well as resignations of the party whip by backbenchers.

For France the aftermath of the Suez crisis was no less dreadful. Its position in the international community had also been compromised: the bully-boy tactics employed against Egypt met with almost universal disapprobation. But, as was the case with Britain, the pronouncements that there was no such thing as colonialism could only be seen as disingenuous. The decline of French influence in the Middle East was expedited by the retreat. The major reason for French participation in this affair had been to gain a great military victory which would assure its position in North Africa, cut off the supplies

being sent from Egypt to the Algerian rebels, and ultimately to put an end to the Algerian rebellion. Instead the French difficulties in Algeria were exacerbated. Less than two years later the Algerian rebellion reached such a frenzied state that the French government could not handle it. Thus, in a sense,the result of Suez was the inauguration of the death throes of the Fourth Republic.

For Nasser and Egypt the outcome of the Suez crisis was a tremendous moral and political victory. Egypt had asserted its independence and had made it stick. Could there be any doubt about which state should lead the Arab nations? Although Egypt was shown to have been militarily vulnerable, the political triumph over Britain and France amply offset the losses Egypt had sustained in the field.

Israel emerged from the crisis stronger than before: the invasion into Egyptian territory represented a formidable military triumph. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force provided a barrier between Israel and Egypt that was not unwelcomed by the Israelis. The withdrawal of the UNEF in 1967 (at Nasser's insistence) restored the threat to Israel. The rest is history.

The role of the United Nations as a peacekeeping organization was affirmed. The hasty creation of the UNEF demonstrated the ability of the United Nations to take part in international politics in the range of high politics. Obviously for effective action the United Nations required the support both of the United States and of the Soviet Union. In some respects the position of the middle level powers, especially Canada, was underscored by the establishment of the UNEF. The then Canadian minister of external affairs, Lester Pearson, worked diligently in the United Nations to restore and then maintain international peace.

The Soviet Union as compared to the United States came through the crisis enjoying greater good opinion of the Arab states. Even though the United States had disapproved the Anglo-French-Israeli operation, it found, once calm was restored, that it had to restrain its criticism of Israel, Britain, and France, while the Soviet Union, not having a Baghdad Pact to keep together, was free to engage in great vituperation.

In the eyes of some of the Third World countries the Soviet Union's anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist credentials remained intact--the Soviet operations in Poland and Hungary were seen as separate matters.

Thus, in summary, the results of the Suez crisis and subsequent intervention were several. In the conflict (so often denied as meaningful by Eden) between the nationalism of the so-called new states and the colonialism of the Western powers the new nationalism was the winner. Suez spelled the conclusion of great power influence of Britain and France in the Middle East. In the conflict between Israeli nationalism and Arab nationalism both were winners: Israel by reason of its military success and Egypt by virtue of its political victory. In the context of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition, the Soviet Union was the greater winner. The Eisenhower Doctrine of March, 1957, is evidence to support such a contention.

Conclusion

A. Explanation of the Outcome

Alliance politics more than anything else determined the outcome of the Suez Canal crisis, that is, British and French humiliation was a consequence of American policy more than some military weakness on their part. The Anglo-French decision to employ military force against Nasser was an assertion of independence of the United States when in fact Britain and France, although

legally independent, were not capable of carrying out the operation in face of American opposition. Thus because the United States would not support military force against Nasser Britain and France would have to accept humiliation (a matter of their own definition--in terms of status in the Middle East, access to the canal, upholders of international law) at the hands of the upstart Nasser. Unwilling to suffer such an indignity they were compelled to rebuke this new Hitler at the Rhineland rather than waiting for some future Poland. When they did, the United States refused support and in fact coerced Britain to back down. Thus because of American opposition what probably would have been a successful intervention (resulting in international control of the Suez Canal) was doomed.

In the context of a bully-leader game no other solution is possible. From August when the United States, Britain, and France discussed the nationalization of the canal and appropriate reaction to be taken, the American proposed solution was to be the ultimate solution, that is, the Atlantic allies were to be restrained from using military force. The first London conference of maritime powers was the result of alliance bargaining--primarily over the date it should start. This represents the first round of the alliance bargaining. The United States had not excluded the possibility of military force. The British and French followed the American lead. Eisenhower's statement about an amicable settlement with Egypt gainsaid what the British at least had taken as a commitment. When Britain suggested going to the United Nations (in the firm belief that it would obtain the support it actually sought) the United States devised a new proposal. Thus the Suez Canal Users Association was round two. This time Britain and France only grudgingly followed.

Round three is Britain and France seeking to lead the United States, that is, intervening in Egypt without the consultation of the protector ally. The

United States did not alter its DC strategy as its allies might have hoped; thus DD (alliance breakup) was imminent. Since to the British the costs were prohibitive they were forced to undo their fait accompli.

Eden's difficulties in interpreting American behavior in the Suez crisis might stem from a fundamental misconception--that Britain and France were great powers in the same league with the United States and the Soviet Union. The Second World War had ended only eleven years before; perhaps men such as Eden were unable in so short a period to comprehend the changed international situation. Britain, too, was still a formidable colonial power. Thus myopia on Eden's part could have led him to believe that the alliance bargaining situation was that of leader rather than bully-leader.

To some extent what appear to be peculiar actions by Eden make sense in the leader context. The preferred British solution was to force Nasser to yield, that is, if necessary employ military force to require Nasser to permit (at a minimum) international control of the Suez Canal. The payoffs would be: (1) the cooperative payoff: a guarantee of the international status and operation of the canal which would be enjoyed by all members of the alliance; (2) the leader's payoff: to Britain this would be the restoration of prestige in the Middle East and assurance of the credibility of the American commitment to its allies; to France the payoff would be the elimination of Nasser as a part of the Algerian problem.

The American proposal in this contrived Eden's-eye-view of the situation would run somewhat as follows: Pursue all available diplomatic channels and means. The alliance payoff would be the restoration of the status quo regarding the Suez Canal and the non-involvement of the Soviet Union. The payoff to the United States would be a demonstration to Egypt and other Middle Eastern powers that the United States was not working with the former colonial

powers against the middle Eastern states. In the American view Britain and France should be satisfied with renewed access to the Suez Canal.

Misperceptions à la leader are also evident in this contrived game. Both the Americans and British thought the agreement made (in August concerning strategy which resulted in the first London conference) was a commitment that both intended to keep. The Americans knew they themselves were, and thought the British were also, committed to resolve the matter (restoration of the status quo) diplomatically. The British convinced themselves at least that the Americans were committed to the British position, that is, to make Nasser yield.

Each party interpreted the agreement as favorable to itself: the United States assumed that Britain would follow and hence the United States and Britain would get along all right. Britain emphasized that the United States had not excluded the possibility of using military force to make Nasser yield. In fact, Eden had been greatly impressed in this regard with Dulles' choice of words: that Nasser must be made to "disgorge."

Neither party recognized the possibility of alternative interpretations. As far as the United States was concerned all parties were committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Britain, however, interpreted the American position as being the same as its own, that is, commitment to the proposal offered by Dulles--no retreat. Appropriate action would, in the British view, be taken to back up the Dulles plan if Nasser dared to reject it.

As the alliance bargaining proceeded each party perceived its ally as reneging. Thus after Britain went its own way (the intervention) the United States reacted with bitter anger. Likewise the British saw the Americans as reneging on their initial pledge of support--"disgorge" and all that. The British reaction was one of frustration and disappointment. Eden was convinced he had been doublecrossed by Dulles and vice versa.

The United States was not playing leader but bully-leader. Of that, there is no doubt. The point of the leader illustration is a possible explanation for Eden's apparent curious misperceptions of what the United States was up to.

One final note. The emphasis of this case study has been alliance bargaining because most of the actual bargaining was between allies rather than adversaries. No specific mention was made of supergame (in the most general sense) considerations. The United States was concerned about the possible involvement of the Soviet Union in the crisis and sought to prevent this from occuring. Eden at several points attempts to conjure up the great cold war Communist bugbear but with no success. Another supergame type of consideration on the part of the United States was the fear

> of the precedent which would be created . . . by the precipitate use of force. They (the Americans) were conscious of trying to hold back a number of governments in different parts of the world who felt they too had grievances and who were eager to use force to try to redress them. For example, in South Korea . . . and Taiwan, the United States probably felt that their restraints would be weakened if in fact they consented to the use of force by France and Britain for redressing what they conceived to be abuses of their interests (Calvocoressi, 1967: 10).

In his section on empirical interpretations of supergames Diesing comments that the Suez case might turn up an example of supergame changes along the R-S (asymmetric) dimension. Anglo-American relations do not provide an example, for shortly after Suez, Eden quit as prime minister, Macmillan took charge, friendship was emphasized, and the British came to the conclusion that they needed the United States.

But as far as Franco-American relations are concerned it could be argued that joint disputes were increasingly underscored after Suez. So much of French policy under General de Gaulle reflects this. Disagreements on matters of international economic affairs, the gold standard, French participation in NATO including the removal of the part of the NATO bureaucracy that had been established in France, the American involvement in a war in Southeast Asia, French openings

to the Soviet Union, the French independent force de frappe, the seeming reversal of French policy with respect to selling armaments to Israel--all these serve as examples of the growing list of disputes between the United States and France.

After the Suez Canal crisis the British and French governments could see clearly what the difference between great power and superpower status implied. In an alliance with a superpower, the client state follows; never the reverse.

B. Hypotheses Checklist

A. Hypotheses relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

1. Bipolar crises are characterized by greater caution and moderation than crises in a multipolar system because of the greater potential costs of war.

As far as the United States is concerned this hypothesis is true. Dulles, as was his wont, feared the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Suez crisis and tried to keep the American allies from incautious behavior. Britain and France seemed less concerned with the overt involvement of the Soviet Union; probably since they (Britain, especially) thought the Soviet Union already involved in the Middle East. Eisenhower rejected out of hand the Soviet proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union devise a bilateral force to put down the aggression in the Middle East.

2. In a multipolar system the imperative of alliance cohesion exercises a greater effect on crisis bargaining tactics than in a bipolar system. Thus, in a multipolar system, states have less flexibility in their choice of tactics because of a need to accommodate the wishes of allies. In a bipolar world, great powers are less concerned about shaping tactics to suit allies because of their lesser dependence on allies; thus they can afford to be more flexible.

In a bipolar system alliance cohesion is of little importance to the superpowers but of great importance to client states. Freedom of action (flexibility) for clients is impaired in a bipolar structure as much as hypothecated in the multipolar system for all allied states.

3. The preservation of alliances is a larger component in the values at stake in a multipolar crisis than in a bipolar crisis.

Alliance preservation was important for the clients, Britain and France. The United States found it had values at stake which evidently were of greater worth than alliance preservation, e.g., relationship with the Soviet Union, control of allies, colonialism issue, stake in Middle East.

4. Considerations of bargaining reputation and images of resolve are a larger component of the value of the stakes in a bipolar crisis than a multipolar one (for the superpowers at least) because (1) the adversary of the present is likely to be the adversary of the future, and (2) the adversaries are in conflict on a wider range of issues.

The United States tried (successfully) to keep the Suez crisis from becoming a superpower confrontation; hence American resolve vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was not put to the test.

5. Exaggerating one's valuation of the stakes is a more common tactic in the nuclear than the pre-nuclear environment because of the greatly increased costs of war and the need, for the sake of credibility, to make interests seem commensurate with war costs.

Britain and France did not value their stakes in the context of nuclear war. Thus the matter of exaggerating the values of the stakes is not especially relevant.

6. In the pre-nuclear age, threatening declarations emphasized simply a willingness to fight; in the nuclear age they tend to emphasize at least as

heavily how one will fight--i.e., the resolve to use nuclear weapons or the possibility that a war will escalate to the nuclear level.

The employment of nuclear weapons against Nasser was not considered.

7. Threats are more crude, explicit and bellicose in the nuclear age than before--to compensate for the inherent incredibility of nuclear threats and their lack of support through experience of previous use. I.e., the lower the inherent credibility, the more explicit and fearsome the threat must be. Also, perhaps, to play upon fears of nuclear war in mass public opinion.

The adversary bargaining in the Suez crisis is pretty much characteristic of the pre-nuclear era. Explicit threats in the Suez crisis were rare.

8. Physical actions (below the level of violence) are relatively prominent as compared to verbal communications in nuclear age crises; they were less prominent in the pre-nuclear age. (This follows in part from the notion that "use of force short of war" has become a substitute for war.)

Most communications were verbal. British mobilization might be considered an exception but it was more likely not intended as a threat, just a consequence of poor defense planning.

9. Nuclear age crises tend to be characterized by minor, subsidiary confrontations as tests of resolve; these are much less prominent in the pre-nuclear age.

Britain would have liked for this crisis to be some kind of a test of resolve, especially for the United States. Eden's Hitler analogies were intended to convince all that Nasser was testing Western resolve.

10. In heterogeneous systems, threats and other declarations are more bellicose and explicit than in homogeneous systems.

The Bulganin letter to Eden might be used as evidence to substantiate this hypothesis. In general though there just were not many threats, Dulles

and Eisenhower essayed to keep matters cool, and with the exception of the British-French-Israeli operation, they were successful.

11. Deliberately "increasing the shared risk of war" (Schelling's "manipulation or risk") is not a very frequent tactic, but it is more common in nuclear age crises than in pre-nuclear ones.

Not applicable.

12. In a multipolar crisis, the crucial uncertainty is the identity of one's opponents if war breaks out; in a bipolar crisis the identity of the opponent is clear and the crucial uncertainty is the likely degree of escalation if war breaks out.

Evidence neither confirms nor denies.

B. Propositions about coercive tactics

1. Absolutely irrevocable commitments are rare.

The only action that could properly be called an irrevocable commitment was Nasser's canal nationalization. Britain and France, however, never perceived this to be the case. Is a commitment irrevocable if the adversary refuses to recognize it as such? Nasser actually could have backed down -- with some loss of prestige.

2. Threats are usually ambiguous or "veiled" rather than explicit.

Without American support Anglo-French threats were not taken seriously. The American disavowal of the use of force pulled the rug from under the intended threat of possible force that was the import of the Menzies mission.

All Soviet threats -- to Britain, France, and Israel -- were ambiguous, so ambiguous that they were not considered seriously.

3. The severest, most explicit threats are usually made by and to (a) officials of medium or low status, and (b) private individuals. I.e., the higher the official status of the communicator or the recipient, the greater

the ambiguity and moderation of communications.

Not the case in the Suez crisis. Menzies was to be the agent to deliver the threat -- and directly to Nasser. (See B.2.)

4. Coercive moves are often given a non-coercive rationale to minimize the element of duress and minimize the costs of retraction (e.g., closing the Autobahn for "technical reasons").

No such moves.

5. Parties will attempt to create loopholes through which the opponent can back down.

Britain and France were not trying to find graceful ways for Nasser to back down. There can be little doubt that they would have been happy to do Nasser in.

6. In making threats and other moves, parties will try to leave themselves an avenue for retreat.

Not applicable.

7. Nations make firm commitments and explicit threats only when they are clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation (e.g., relative fear of war, relative valuation of the stakes, relative capabilities).

This hypothesis is probably true. The British and French thought the relationship with Egypt greatly favored themselves. With American cooperation rather explicit threats could have been made.

8. The process of commitment is usually progressive rather than "all-at-once".

Britain, especially, was committed from the beginning to have its way.

9. Tactics may be modulated in a crisis to keep in power, or bring to power, a faction more favorable to oneself in the adversary state, or to maximize the internal influence of that faction.

This may have been a consideration of Britain and France but there is no evidence that tactics were tailored in any way to aid Nasser's domestic opponents.

10. Public communications are usually more ambiguous than private ones.

No evidence to confirm or deny.

11. Tactics of "risk manipulation" tend to be least likely and least frequent in the high-tension phase of a crisis.

A high-tension phase of the Suez crisis (in terms of adversary bargaining) is not delineable).

12. Moves in the early stages of a crisis will be relatively coercive and conflictful; in the later stages they will be more cooperative in nature.

In the Suez crisis, just the reverse is true. In terms of both adversary and alliance bargaining the cooperative moves came first, then the conflictful ones. (Perhaps this is indicative of crises which erupt into war.)

C. Hypotheses relating tactics to responses

1. Blatant, peremptory, openly aggressive demands and threats are more likely to be resisted than those presented in a "reasonable" tone.

Nasser's action in nationalizing the Suez Canal was interpreted by Eden as a blatant and aggressive threat to the international order. Since the canal was an international asset and since Britain was economically dependent upon it, any action which imperilled access to it had to be resisted. Nasser's threat to the international community was perceived (by Eden at least) as being quite unreasonable.

British demands for international control of the canal were seen by Nasser as unreasonable since they violated Egyptian sovereignity. In a cocksure manner, he felt he could resist British demands with impunity. And he could so long as Britain was unable to obtain the cooperation of the United States.

2. Threats may have a provocative effect (stiffening the other's resolve) which undermines or offsets their coercive effect.

It is hard to say that Nasser's resolve stiffened during the crisis. Eden's resolve never diminished: he saw Nasser as Hitler and was determined that the mistakes of the 1930's would not be repeated.

3. Less provocation is caused by attempts to change utilities and utility perceptions than by outright threats.

In the adversary bargaining there is nc evidence of genuine attempts to change utilities.

4. If a "rule of the game" is broken, the other party's resolve is likely to increase.

The "rule of the game" had been broken long before the crisis -- nationalization was to Eden a violation of the international rights of all users of the Suez Canal.

5. Decision-makers seldom think probabilistically, calculate "expected values" or "expected costs" of moves, etc; moves tend to be rejected bacause they are "too dangerous", or undertaken because they are "necessary", without much careful estimating of the probabilities of various adversary responses.

It could probably be said that the Anglo-French decision to join company with Israel in moving against Egypt was not carefully considered in all its ramifications. By mid-October Eden was convinced he could not count on American help so he and France would have to go it alone. This required doing what was "necessary."

6. "Toughness" tends to breed toughness in the other; firm commitment generates firm counter-commitment; conciliation produces reciprocal conciliation.

The toughness of the decision-makers was pre-crisis, that is, Eden and Nasser were tough apropos one another independent of the crisis.

7. Compellent threats stiffen the opponent's will to resist; deterrent threats do not.

This is most likely the case. The longer Nasser was able to assert that nationalization of the canal was within Egyptian rights the more legitimacy was accorded this position by the international community. Eden's plan to use force if the canal were not restored to its prenationalization status was resisted by Nasser.

D. Hypotheses relating environment, setting and tactics to outcomes

1. When inherent bargaining power is relatively equal, salience will have maximum effect on the outcome; when there is inequality in bargaining power, bargaining power will overcome salience.

This hypothesis is not confirmed. No salient solution was found. Neither did the asymmetries favoring Britain and France assure that their bargaining power would guarantee their way.

2. Salience has little effect on settlements, but more effect in limiting tactics and restricting escalation.

Not applicable.

3. Asymmetries in the systemic environment and bargaining setting (i.e., inherent power) have more effect on outcomes than bargaining tactics (tactical power).

Evidence indeterminate.

4. Before the nuclear age, crises tended to be terminated by a formal settlement if they did not lead to war; now they tend to fade away, ending in tacit acceptance of a de facto state of affairs.

The Suez crisis did not fade away. Britain and France attempted to settle it on terms favorable to themselves but lost in the end.

5. Miscalculation of others' intentions is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar system.

Cross-case hypothesis.

E. Hypotheses about connections between alliance relationships and adversary bargaining

1. Firm commitment increases bargaining power vis-à-vis the opponent but decreases bargaining power vis-à-vis the ally.

The hypothesis is generally confirmed. In the early crisis period British commitment probably increased its power in Egyptian eyes but certainly not in American eyes. Of course the asymmetries in the alliance relationship make the hypothesis less relevant than would be the case in a more equal situation.

2. Especially when the supporting ally values the stakes lower than the target ally, the supporting ally is likely to take a firmer position in communications with the opponent than in communications with the target ally. (This follows from the tension between the desire to deter the opponent and the desire to restrain the ally).

The evidence from this case does not indicate that there was much communication with the adversary in the formal sense. The United States did not take a firmer stand apropos Egypt than it did with Britain. As a matter of fact, the reverse was probably true, that is, greater firmness with the ally than the opponent.

3. When allies value the stakes differently, the aggressor will modulate his demands to fall somewhere between the maximum concession point of the target country and the maximum concession point of the supporting ally.

Nasser may have been willing to modulate his demands to fall between what he thought the United States would settle for and what the British demanded but certainly not after Eisenhower made it clear that the United States would not be resorting to the use of force.

4. Proposals emanating from the ally of the aggressor state are likely to be more acceptable to the target country than those coming from the aggressor himself because (a) the ally's endorsement enhances the power behind the proposals, (b) to some extent the ally may be able to assume the pose of a disinterested third party, and (c) there is less humiliation in conceding to the aggressor's ally than to the aggressor himself.

Egypt did not make proposals which indicated willingness to settle for less than what its fait accompli had brought about.

5. In a multipolar system there are likely to be greater differences in the allies' valuation of the immediate stakes than in a bipolar system, but this may be offset in part by the greater value placed on alliance loyalty and alliance preservation in a multipolar system.

There was some difference in the valuation of the stakes by Britain, France, and the United States. Alliance preservation was not apparently an overriding concern for any of the parties.

6. If the protecting ally sees the issue as only part of a larger confrontation, his values at stake are more likely to approximate those of the target ally.

The United States refused to see the Suez crisis as part of an Egyptian-Soviet plot or the first (or next) step in a conspiracy to do something pernicious in the Middle East.

7. In a multipolar crisis, as tension increases, commitments to allies tend to become firmer, for two reasons:

a. With rising tensions, countries become more fearful of losing allies; thus allies tend to be supported rather than restrained.

b. A belief that the best way to preserve peace is to deter the adversary by a firm alliance front.

Commitments to allies in the Suez crisis did not become firmer as tension increased.

8. The less confident a country is of the loyalty of an ally, the more reluctant it will be to restrain the ally in a crisis (especially in a multipolar system).

The United States tried very hard to restrain its allies. In fact this activity was the most intense part of the crisis bargaining.

9. Collaboration between alliance leaders in a crisis tends to reduce cohesion in one or both alliances.

Eisenhower's refusal to collaborate with the Soviet Union in its request to devise a bipartite force to put down aggression may in part have been because he (Eisenhower) thought such action would weaken an already unhappy alliance.

10. Since alliance cohesion is less crucial in bipolarity, the easier it is for alliance leaders to restrain lesser allies and collaborate to de-fuse a crisis between their subordinates.

The United States was unsuccessful in restraining Britain, France, and Israel and unwilling to collaborate with the Soviet Union.

11. Small powers are more likely to take risks than their big power allies.

Confirmed. Britain and France certainly were willing to and did take risks the United States refused to consider.

12. Other things being equal, firmer commitments and stronger threats will be made by the more cohesive alliance.

Not applicable since not a confrontation between alliances.

13. The target country's will to resist will vary directly with its perception of its supporting ally's resolve.

Evidence does not bear this out. Britain's will to resist was not diminished by the perceived lack of American resolve. Britain would have preferred American

support but in the end decided it had to strike an independent course.

14. It is easier for great powers to control small allies in a bipolar system than a multipolar system (in crises as in other situations).

When Britain and France got out of hand the United States was able to bring them back by certain controls, specifically in the instance of Britain, by economic and financial sanctions.

F. Hypotheses about perceptions and images

1. Actors tend to perceive what their images lead them to expect; incoming "signals" are interpreted to conform to the existing image.

Eden saw Nasser as Hitler and as such everything Nasser did was perceived as pernicious. The absence of American support for the British position was difficult for Eden to understand: how could the United States, given the evil wrought by Hitler, stand idly by as the new Hitler started on the path once again with the aim of destroying Western civilization?

Dulles thought he had been assured that calm would prevail after each of the London conferences and the United Nations sessions. Thus his chagrin (and Eisenhower's too) when news of the (Anglo-French-Israeli) war against Egypt commenced.

2. Historical experiences and traumas heavily condition images. The Munich syndrome was a dominant factor in Eden's calculations. His many references to Hitler and Nasser's obvious similarities confirm this hypothesis.

3. Decision-makers tend to perceive adversaries as more hostile than they really are.

Not enough evidence to confirm or deny.

4. Decision-makers over-estimate the degree to which adversaries are motivated by aggressive aims and under-estimate the degree to which they are motivated by fear.

Not enough evidence.

5. Expectations are more influential than desires in the interpretation of incoming signals and communications.

Not enough evidence to evaluate interpretations of signals and communications.

6. The greater the ambiguity of incoming information and communication, the less impact it will have on pre-established beliefs.

Not enough evidence.

7. The higher the tension, the more rigid the images. Thus, the higher the tension in a crisis, the clearer one's communications must be in order to modify the adversary's image.

Not enough evidence.

8. Statesmen tend to perceive their own alternatives as more restricted than the adversary's alternatives.

Not enough evidence.

9. The adversary usually appears as more monolithic, with greater singleness of purpose, than one's own state.

No evidence.

10. The greater the stature and authority of the person making a declaration, the greater credibility will be attributed to it.

Not much secondary and tertiary communication.

11. The resolve of statesmen in a crisis will be heavily influenced by their perceptions of the adversary's ultimate aims -- whether they are limited or far-reaching.

True for Eden. If Nasser was not stopped, Eden reasoned, he would continue just as Hitler had. Nasser's aims were the elimination of British, French -- probably all Western -- influence in the Middle East. The Suez Canal nationalization was just the beginning.

G. Hypotheses relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics

1. Difficulty of changing an agreed position within a government lends extra resolve to resist the opponent's demands.

Accepting American moves to keep calm (e.g. the London conferences) were not difficult to obtain from hardline decision units -- in the main because of alliance considerations. The question of changing positions and resolve is not especially enlightening in the Suez crisis. The exception might be in Egypt's decision unit but such evidence was not available.

2. Lack of unity in a government increases the ambiguity of bargaining moves.

There was no lack of unity in the British or French governments until the invasion had commenced and the United States expressed its disapprobation by various moves to impose financial hardships on its allies, especially, Britain. Thus the evidence neither confirms not denies this hypothesis.

3. The higher the tension, the greater the influence of emotion as compared to reasoned calculation.

In judging Eden in the Suez crisis one must take into account the rather considerable influence of emotion. He disliked Nasser intensely and did not think too highly of John Foster Dulles. Perhaps some of Eden's peculiar inabilities to perceive the situation correctly, especially the American position, arose from emotion rather than reasoned calculation.

4. Urgency and time pressure in a crisis inhibits the search for alternatives and favors the selection of traditional, habitual or already-planned moves.

This hypothesis is probably true with respect to Eden and Dulles. The former had set upon the use of force as the method of settlement and never got it out of his mind. The latter never seems to have countenanced war but rather

devised dilatory activities -- conferences and meetings. Both reflect their habits of mind.

5. The longer the duration of a crisis, or the lower its severity, the greater the influence of organizational roles on perceptions and evaluation of alternatives.

The evidence does not domestrate this to be the case, at least with respect to the British. Eden and the members of the Suez Cabinet committee did not change in their evaluation of the stakes.

6. The greater the involvement of public opinion, the less the government's flexibility; this will reduce the government's capacity for accomodation and compromise but strengthen its bargaining power behind the position it takes.

In the early weeks of the crisis this was true at least in England. As the crisis wore on public opinion (as expressed in the press and polls) changed sufficiently that the government was called upon to compromise. Eden had no intention of doing so. His attitude was generally that ten thousand or ten million fools shouting nonsense did not make it any less nonsense. The press was divided along party lines throughout the crisis. Some easing of hardline positions developed over the invasion of Egypt.

The impact of public opinion in the French government was not discovered.

7. Decision-makers in the crisis area generally prefer a tougher line than decision-makers at home.

Not relevant.

8. Military men generally prefer tougher tactics than civilian decision-makers.

Not relevant.

H. Hypotheses relating outcomes to aftermaths

1. Weakness in one crisis creates an expectation in the adversary that one will be weak in the next.

Eden was certainly afraid that this was the case, that is, that Nasser would feel free to commit more nasty acts.

2. A show of weakness in one crisis stimulates a desire to correct this image by toughness in the next.

Not relevant.

3. A demonstration of resolve in a crisis strengthens alliance cohesion; a show of weakness reduces cohesion.

The opposite was the result: British and French resolve in one direction and American resolve in another resulted in a fracture in the Atlantic alliance.

4. In a multipolar system, a state's weakness in a crisis may stimulate a trend toward defection and realignment among its allies; firmer commitments to the allies may be necessary to counteract this trend.

Not applicable.

5. Some crises leave an aftermath of hostility between the parties (e.g. Germany and Austria after Bosnia, 1908); others result in increased friendship or detente (Fashoda and Cuba). Provisionally, we hypothesize that which result occurs will depend on the following:

a. The finality of the settlement

b. The existence of another common adversary of the parties

c. The provocativeness of tactics used in the crisis

d. The degree of humiliation suffered by the defeated side

There was rancor between Egypt and Britain and Egypt and France. Neither the British nor the French had accomplished what they had set out to. Anglo-American and Franco-American relations were cooled. The British more or less came around within the next few years; the French were not to trust the Americans for a long time.

6. The defeated side in a crisis will attempt to rationalize its capitulation in a way which minimizes costs.

Britain did not have much chance to rationalize the virtual enforced defeat at the hands of the Americans. The British economy had to be looked after immediately.

7. A strong show of resolve in a crisis enhances a state's attractiveness as a potential ally.

This may have been the result for Egypt. Other Middle Eastern states could look to Nasser for leadership.

I. Hypotheses about bidding moves

1. Concessions made in a crisis will be perceived as more costly than the same concession made in a non-crisis period because much of the cost of a concession made under duress is in terms of reputation for resolve. Thus concessions are less likely in a crisis than in "peaceful diplomacy."

2. An actor can help himself to concede by asking a quid pro quo which is relatively costless to the other side but can be rationalized as substantial to his own constituency. (E.g., Krushchev and the "no invasion" pledge in Cuba, 1962).

3. Losses from backing down to a challenge may be reduced by redefining one's vital interests (e.g., in the Berlin Wall crisis, saying our interests were limited to the integrity of West Berlin).

4. The higher the level of tension, the more likely that concessions will be interpreted by the adversary as a sign of weakness.

5. In a multipolar system, the maximum concession by the defending side will be the maximum acceptable to the most powerful supporting ally; in a bipolar system, it will be the maximum acceptable to the most interested ally.

6. Concessions may first be offered in "sign language" to test the opponent's willingness to reciprocate; if no reciprocating signal is received, the

first side will go back to its original position.

After the Menzies mission to Nasser following the first London conference, there were no moves well-characterized as bidding moves. Nasser's rejection of the Eighteen Power proposals occurred shortly after Eisenhower's announcement that force would not be employed by the United States. Nasser could in effect keep what he had, that is, there was little further necessity of engaging in bidding behavior.