

July 5, 1971

Glenn and Paul,

Here are the hypotheses; paper on relevance of various general models to come later. I hope these answers aren't too roundabout and inconclusive. Sometimes I felt like questioning the logic of the hyp itself, sometimes its relevance to my case. Often, too, I have included probably too much historical references in summing up the evidence. And, temperamentally, or because of reality itself, I have rarely been able to conclude in yes or no terms.

Chip

A. Sys environ to choice tactics

1. ~~Bipolar system under threat from multi-polar system~~

Calls for cross-case comparison. Caution of West. powers in my case's early stages related to need for future as well as concurrent dipl. cooperation of Soviet Union. Can also say there was great reluctance to risk war, but the relevant risk was loss of needed diplomatic partner in resolving issues of WW II. Decision of West. allies to become more hard line continued to be balanced by desire not to thoroughly discredit, embarrass SU. SU, for its part, avoided pushing overtly against clear-cut Br and Am opposition. Perhaps it feared actual war, perhaps more so, analogous to West., feared complete dipl. break, making all other attempts at coop. in other areas more difficult. (Problem with the hyp. is that two contradictory imperatives exist in bipolar system: One, hesitate before extreme provocation, cause of dipl. need in future, costs of war. Two, if not present vigorous opposition to presumed challenge, run risk of losing struggle quickly, since no other available partners to help recoup the balance if misjudged.)

2. I described the system in my case as emergent bipolar---not yet clear that US, and SU only effective, decisive actors; not yet clear how impt. good-will or hostility of other actors might be. This is revealed in the case, in the terms of the hypothesis, in that the US was at most points hesitant to get too out of step with Britain or even Iran tactics. Not yet the sense that US power alone basically adequate, nor that US could dispense with allied accompaniment in opposing the SU. The hesitation to become bloc leader rather than coalition head is apparent at later stages of cold war, too, but may be said, in terms of Iran case, to be more prominent earlier. (States never dispense with facade of allied support if they can maintain it without much trouble, even under bipolar.) So, hypothesis somewhat confirmed, in that to degree US in particular not yet senses bipolar world, it did not feel it had unlimited tactical flexibility.

3. Somewhat dealt with under #2. Repeat that importance of allied accompaniment evident in both sides' efforts to have local proxies, supporters, to have backing in UN, too. However, the "preservation of alliances" is a more definite constraint than concern for diplomatic support; the "alliance" operative in these years was, however, the Grand Alliance, and the UN. No. #1 deals with impt of preserving the Grand Alliance, nos. 2 & 3 the latter.

4. Reputation not only for image of resolve, but also for image of cooperativeness; don't want to be considered weak in the next round of bipolar confrontation, but also don't want to be considered to be illegitimately intransigent, deceptive, whatever. I think, on the basis of little systematic evidence and reflection, that this idea may be overdrawn. In a multipolar system, too, there are reasons to watch out for your reputation for resolve: your present antagonist may reappear in the next encounter but one, if not the very next. He may be an ally of your antagonist in the next. And also, everybody in the system watches the outcome of each conflict, even when not participating. Relations not dyadic and secret in multipolar.

Hypotheses, Iran case (2)

5. The Iranian case takes place before the integration of nuclear forces into actual military capabilities, and into the rhetoric of statesmen. To some degree, if there was an exaggeration of the stakes, it may have occurred because the universalist rhetoric of the UN organization, making int. stability a seamless web, once torn anywhere, dangerously weak everywhere, tended to permit the overdramatization of particular events. Stalin objected, for obvious tactical reasons, but maybe also for real, to the making of Iran into a "test case."
6. Not applicable.
7. The threats were of a diplomatic character, not military. Russian threats to the Iranians alone were rough and ambiguous. Great power exchanges almost always circumspect. It is perhaps, true, that given the rhetoric of an undivided Grand Alliance with which the war was prosecuted and the peace talked about, that each side had to upgrade its intensity in speaking of the situation to alert the other that it took it seriously and might risk splitting the Grand Alliance in order to persevere there. This is related to remarks on the impt. of UN R rhetoric in the exaggeration of stakes; when it is not part of recent expectations to expect discord, one may have to invent new language to have opposition register with the other side. Rewording a phrase in the hypothesis---"to compensate for the inherent incredibility~~x~~ of a breakdown of the wartime alliance"
8. This crisis was pretty much verbally executed on the Western side, but quite a mixture of phys and verbal actions on both the SU and Iranian part. Not, however, because of a need to find means short of war given nuclear weapons' unusability and hence need for substitute acts far from the nuc threshold.
9. True that actions of all sides designed to impress the other were often low-level dip. warnings, indications of concern, etc., in the early stages, and that evenx when the opposition became more pronounced, see avoidance of direct and explicit confrontation. This not a reflection, however, of constraints imposed by nuclear technology.
10. This system was heterogeneous in fact, one might say, but not in the conceptions of the main actors, or at least in the language they chose to confront one another with in the early cold war period. Although certain pronouncements---Stalin's ~~xixxxx~~ of Feb 46 announcing a new five year plan, Iron Curtain speech---do employ strong, ideological language, that is not the dominant mode of describing things in this period, nor even less so the means of actually communicating. Therefore, hypothesis only holds if the main actors have decided there's nothing more to be gained from refraining from employing "honest" ideological language and more unequivocal threats to go along with it.
11. The Soviets more than once deliberately sought to increase the risk of armed conflict with a solitary Iran. An occasional Western pronouncement---Iron Curtain speech, Byrnes to Overseas Correspondents, Feb, 46, ---did touch~~x~~ on the general possibility of war arising from East-West hostility, generally or in Iran. No force movements seemed intended to create a "war scare," at least between the greats.

Hypotheses, Iran Case (3)

it being bipolar and the Soviet Union being the opponent.

12. Generally confirmed, for the West/ For the Soviet Union, it was more multipolar, who would resist and how much---Iran, Britain, the US?

B. Propositions about Coercive Tactics

1. Generally confirmed. The Iranians scarcely made a one, except late in 46, they said they were going into Azerbaijan, regardless of the consequences. The US, in March, 46, said at one point they'd go to the UN regardless of whether Iran persisted in its complaint. But generally, one sees equivocal language----"we'll be forced to reconsider our position," "could have unfortunate consequences,"---or unequivocal statements that have no clear operative meaning---"we stand behind the principle of Iranian sovereignty" etc.
2. I would say, less so in cases of bargaining between rather clear unequals; although most Soviet language remained vague, cf # 1, still on occasions they told the Iranians quite explicitly---if you send troops north, it will only mean more bloodshed and necessitate our sending in new troops. You mince words and waffle when you are afraid of the consequences and need to find out how bad the reaction might be; it's simply less important to be tentatively coercive in unequal relationships because the harm you may receive is less of a deterrent.
3. Have no severe, explicit threats between greets. Of those exchanged between unequals, ie SU to Iran, this hypothesis does not hold. The Soviets often told of their displeasure or made threats in official notes to Iran, in visits of high officials to Teheran, or by inviting Qavam to Moscow to deal directly with Stalin and Molotov. That is, often chose extra-ordinary channels to make sure the message got through.
4. If you call West. opposition to SU in UN "coercive," this is somewhat confirmed, as this opposition was described as being legally necessary under the charter, a matter of duty, and so forth, a disinterested act. Try to make it "impersonal" in international terms. This form of non-coercive rationale, it should be noted, however, is somewhat at odds with the aim of making opposition easily retractable, since it is a presumably "principled" stance, independent of interest. Still, the aim was to give the Soviet Union a chance to withdraw by obeying a generally valid set of rules; similar to the Charter here were the legal treaty commitments to withdraw forces after the war---agreement was presumably made easier by the fact that all had acknowledged this commitment beforehand. Again with reference to SU-Iran bargaining, the Soviets were not, on many occasions, sensitive to the need to make Iranian compliance seem something less than a result of coercion.
5. Often confirmed. Some exs in previous point. Br, US, first reaction to SU interference with Ir troops during Az revolt, was to say, must be some misunderstanding or local-level insubordination. In UN debates, pass resolutions asking SU-IR report together on successful resolution, to put compliance into a positive, accomodative light. But hyp may be misleading: In crisis bargaining, you are setting limits to be conformed to; you are closing loopholes as well as leaving some open. Loopholes usually encountered are of secondary importance, they facilitate compliance.

Hypotheses, Iran Case (4)

6. Repetitious of 1, 2, and 3.
7. Yes, except it sounds too simple. My point throughout is that you may not know when you are favored in these ways. At extreme pole, bargaining among clear unequals, relatively easy to see this happening: Stalin/Qavam.
8. Confirmed for all parties I would say.
9. Apparent in a number of ways:
 - a. SU at pts becomes harsher to try and get more accomodative govt into power.
 - b. SU at other points sees that any replacement may be worse, and modulates pressure on Qavam. More often a than b, however.
 - c. Re West. tactics, can't speak about calculations vis-a-vis the SU; little such speculation about internal influences encountered there. But, in US dealing with Iran, there was an awareness that too much insistence on Iran. resistance to SU could have had internal effects---replacement of Qavam with less subtle, more reactionary regime, one that would force action too quickly.

Each side had an interest in maintaining the right kind of Iranian regime between itself and the other great power, the SU looking ideally for an appeasing/Quisling/neutral? regime that would willingly meet its demands and hence avoid international opposition, the West looking for a neutral/really pro-West? regime that would appear/actually be independent in resisting SU demands. Hence, considerable attention throughout to how tactics influence Iranian internal politics.

10. Generally confirmed. With this exception: Sometimes the US, in its private delibs with Qavam, laid bare more of its uncertainty about what to do, how much support he'd get, than was apparent in public declarations on the crisis. These public decls, however, were of a general, principled character, usually. Pt is: Private deliberations won't be unambiguous if policy itself is ambiguous.
11. If this means that caution begins to prevail as main antagonists become engaged, in the "deadlock" stage, yes.
12. The second part of this hyp needn't be linked with the first. Crisis may begin with more coercion and conflict, because one side has the initiative, may not expect resistance, throws its weight around. What doesn't follow is that the later stages, the "resolution" phase seems to be meant, all will act cooperatively. One side may have lost conclusively, the other being rather firm. Certainly as US power became engaged on the Iranian side, and as the Iranians themselves stiffened versus Russian demands, Western policy became less accomodative. The Soviets, too, in this last stage were trying to coerce, but had no power to do so, and mainly retreated with angry gestures. So: Hyp assumes a structure of crises that may not always hold--coercion, opportunism at outset, caution and opposition at the middle (hyp 11, above) and accomodation at end.

xxx

C. Hyp relating tactics to responses

1. Yes. The use of power overtly always threatens to be counter-productive.

Hypotheses, Iran Case (5)

2. Yes. But key here is the perceived legitimacy of the demand which the threat relates to. Some Iranian politicians understood that threatening SU behavior was in some proportion to the validity of their interest in northern oil, or keeping other powers from that oil (and strategic position). Still, the provocation involved may certainly undermine or offset even this communication-of-concern effect, too.

Br and

3. Probably true. One finds, in internal ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ US deliberations, acknowledgement that SU case for repressiveness and backwardness of Teheran regime, and its policy toward Az historically, which was an effort presumably to lower the importance of defending Teheran, that these aspects of the SU case were given some credence. West. powers willing to listen, in part, to grounds given; were alarmed on the other hand by direct steps SU took to enforce its or Az's claims--which steps were "threats" in a way of use of SU mil power to intervene.

4. Yes, to a point. SU violation of w/drawal commitment in March 46 quite imp't in stiffening US resolve. The clearer the rule, the more such an effect it will have. Amplification, the clearer and more imp't the rule, the more such an effect. States willingly discount trivial departures from procedures, invoking them only when they need pretexts for a conflict that goes beyond particular infractions.

I have interpreted the phrase "rules of the game" too legalistically thus far. One "rule", in the less-legal sense, that may have been important, at least to the Western powers, was that, in dealing with a backward, weak area, don't flaunt your control of the local government to the world, to the other side. Maintain the formalities of independence and non-intervention. When the Soviets broke this practice, Western opposition, esp. US, stiffened considerably. The "rule" the Soviets objected to the breaking of by the West was that other powers should not expect the ^{maintenance of} mere formal neutrality and independence of a government to adequately insure the Soviets their interests weren't threatened. That is, respect for formal neutrality no substitute for atten. to overall balance of great power interests--compounded of history, precedent, proximity, etc. (This isn't quite a "rule" either. Not so good an answer.)

5. This hyp. ²⁰ confirmed ^{entirely} because its key term---"probabilistically"---is derived not from social life but from mathematics. Social life probability-thinking it seems to me was present in my crisis, at least in so far as I have evidence on internal deliberations. Qavam often outlined five or six possible ways of proceeding, estimated degrees of provocativeness, and chose. The US often discarded various forms of protest as likely to do more harm than good to UN negots, etc. To say such thinking lacks "careful estimating" is to assume such estimation is possible--that you can say what the other will do in various contexts, that even if you can that these can be measured against one another and hence ordered. I think one finds in my case, in US and Iran. delibs, considerable weighing of possible levels of opposition (and accomodation) against likely consequences. Not a "perfect" process, even given "real world" standards of expectation, because certain imp't. features of the other side's involvement were systematically underestimated or ignored, but there was an effort to gauge the different likely consequences of different acts.

Hypotheses, Iran Case, (6)

6. If you are weak, or if you feel there to be some legitimacy in the demands, or if some combination of these conditions exists, "toughness" can well breed accommodation, although that accommodation may be drawn out and circumscribed so as to avoid the impression that toughness can work all the time. If you are strong, but haven't been paying much attention to the issue and its importance for the other side, "toughness" may just give you pause, make you pay attention, with the qualification in this instance that the awakening can't be too rude. If you are strong and quite involved in the issue in terms of values and attention, "toughness" can very well breed counter-toughness at first, but whether it will do so over time depends on the ultimate balance of power and interest in the case. One cannot say without introducing other factors what the responses will be.

As to commitment, it can be that a firm commitment will make you re-examine your own, not immediately reaffirm it; you may later come to underwrite it more solidly or not. That depends on other things. It's true nonetheless that failure to restate one's own commitment in a disputed area after the opponent has done so is generally avoided, because of what that ~~would~~ would indicate about general resolve, but it doesn't follow that it will be reaffirmed in the end. It may change, as I said.

As to conciliation, Western-begun moves did not generate counter-conciliation in my case. To a bit greater degree, Iranian concessions did, but not so much as to be a counter-instance. The problem in interpreting this is one of context: Was Iran, in the Soviet view, likened to Mexico or Italy for the US? That is, did they feel they were being conciliatory with ref. to other arenas of possible conflict, and expected Western conciliation here? Britain presents a complicated issue, here; for them, Iran was like Iran, an important, if not perhaps the most vital ^{post-}colonial area of influence. Maybe the Soviets saw Iran for the British as too much in the area of a luxury, a non-essential advantage, and thought that since they were leaving the real areas of British concern alone---Greece thru 45, India, Malta, Gibraltar, Suez---that Br should reciprocate in Iran. This is more difficult to argue than the comparable argument with ref to the US. Point is: No confirmation for the conciliation portion of the hyp when its limited to the Iranian competition alone. Soviet restraint is consequence of coercion by others, or internal calculations we don't know about, than of Western restraint.

7. Don't see a clear distinction in my crisis.

D. Hyp rel. environ., setting, and tactics to outcomes

1. Seems confirmed. ~~Salient solution was a mutual respect for treaty commitments to treat Iran neutrally, withdraw at same time. SU not respect this solution as long as no West willingness to resist. West, esp. US, not respect salient solution of no increased, disproportionate, ec and dipl advantage to either side when SU ability to oppose declined. Each side took advantage of its particular advantage in power (bargaining power, I think) and when it had the advantage, neither side would stay carefully by the salient solution of restoring the absolute neutrality of Iran, according to various treaty commitments undertaken during the war. I would say that salience facilitates resolution of standoffs between relative equals.~~

Hypotheses, Iran. Case (7)

2. Seems confirmed. Overall outcome reflects more than salience, pattern of escalation and definition of dispute in pre-final stages often determined by legal, historical boundaries. Parties in Iran cautious of interference in each other's zones. Britain especially begins at points to tactfully acknowledge SU sway in north; most convenient stopping place. Parties to dispute hesitant to overtly repudiate legal definition of their various roles and rights in Iran, too. These aspects to help structure and pattern strategies, but not determine overall goals.

3. Yes, but tactical power can overcome to an impressive degree weakness in inherent power. Two instances: SU bluntness, bullying alienates sectors of Iran even Western opinion, that would perhaps have tolerated a considerable upgrading of the SU ^{influence} ~~xxxxxxx~~ in the country. Conversely, what looked like a very weak Iranian position was strengthened considerably by Qavam's delicate strategy of delay, strung out minimal concessions, and caution in not gathering anti-Soviet support to quickly and publically. US itself, lacking local power, did good job tactically in exploiting the UN forum, pushing for just so much and not too much implied censure of Soviet behavior. Unilateral US dipl. opposition might have been just as effective in inducing X SU moderation and retreat, but it's clear that the multilateralized, UN based-opposition that ~~was~~ was relied upon was used with astuteness, in terms at least of the outcome of this particular conflict.

Point worth repeating: It would be hard to predict from the systemic environment and bargaining setting alone the outcome. The tactical moves of almost all sides seem to have importantly affected the outcome.

4. True, there is no directly negotiated deal between ^{the} two decisive powers, US and SU. But there was a formalized accretion of US influence within Iran and failure and in some senses abrogation of such influence of SU in Iran. Generalization?: Bipolar contests are resolved by changes in intra-camp relations (ie changes are reflected there), multipolar contests resolved by changes in inter-state relations. Too broad: Refers to bipolar heterogeneous, when two blocs don't acknowledge legitimacy of the other. Could have bipolar condominium with lots of formal agreements between.

Now, to the hypothesis itself, which speaks of nuclear-pre-nuclear: I don't find the character of the outcome significantly affected by this possible variation.

5. I'm not sure what general reasoning this is built on in the first place. In a bipolar system, one could argue just as plausibly perhaps, the need to focus all attention on one power, who can hurt you decisively if any mistakes are made, would be a situation very conducive to miscalculation---wishful thinking---desire to escape the dangerous situation---could lead to underestimation of threat; or, more likely, excessively fearful thinking could lead to an overestimation, -extrapolation of where any particular act might lead. Contrarily in a multipolar condition, no single power can hurt you decisively, so that the distortions of wishful or insecure thinking would be less likely.

Anyway, in my crisis the problem is that the situation is conceived of as a concert or condominium, actually becoming more and more bipolar, but with significant residues of power enjoyed by at least one other power---Britain. (red page continues)

Hypotheses, Iran. case (8)

5. cont'd.

This hyp is hence hard for me to assess. The basic Soviet mis-judgement, that opposition to its move in Iran would be bearable, stemmed, at least in part, from belief that the US would not become engaged and Britain would be insignificant. Is that a consequence of being in a "multipolar" system in which it wasn't clear from whom the opposition would come? Or from being in a "bipolar" system in which the rules of competition weren't yet established, regularized as they were ~~more~~ in later years? Some combination of both I'm afraid.

E. Hyp about connections between alliance relationships and adversary bargaining

I don't think most of these apply, since the crisis took place at the transition stage away from one alliance---the "grand alliance" and to another system of alliances---the East-West coalitions or blocs. There was, legally speaking, a brief space in which the parties' main links were those of a collective security ^{arrangement}---the UN_o (even the 42 treaty on Iran and the 43 declaration had a "round" set of commitments, technically applying equally to all)---before the negotiation of more limited alignments that superseded the collective security ones. The "alliances" here are really emergent diplomatic alignments but the implication of the language of the hypotheses is more precise.

Would it be proper to assess these hyps against my case with SU being the aggressor and US the supporting ally of Iran as the target country? Yes, in terms ~~xxx~~ of the final outcome, but it was just that definition of who was who that was at stake for some time.

(I'll be glad to think through these for the case anyway, but don't give them priority now.)

F. Hyp about perceptions and images

1. US did not yet have a fixed image of the SU in this period. Can say that US policy-makers tried to retain the viability of the image of an ally prepared to cooperate on US terms in peace-making even when considerable evidence mounted to disconfirm it. But that's not quite the same as "seeing what images lead them to expect"; it's more staying with the initial image and policy conception flowing from it until a variety of signals lead to the necessity of rethinking.

We may infer (only) from SU actions that they perceived the US and Britain to be preparing, late 43, throughout 44, to extend imperial control to the north, in line with previous conception of capitalist behavior. This may explain a Soviet "over-reaction" in 44 to the oil concession efforts of the West. Or maybe the perception was right, but the response to the consequences of it faulty. On a larger scale, it may be (I need to study the whole period more generally for this) that the SU had an image of a US return to isolationism after the war and mis-judged FDR, other US spokesmen's remarks and actions to presage this, when in many ways the US was preparing for a quite extensive economic and in some respects diplomatic presence in the postwar world.

Qavam may have perceived Soviet demands ^{MORE} in the context of traditional Russian expansionism than was correct; he may have distorted the situation thus into one where limited concrete concessions would suffice to ease the pressure.

Hypotheses, Iran. case (9)

2. History of Russ-British sphere of influence politics in Iran was much in the minds of all actors. Possibility of achieving third power counter-balance---as they had used US and Nazi Germany before---very much in Iranians' minds. These historically ~~derived~~ derived possibilities and likelihoods all failed to be entirely accurate in the final outcome: Russian policy something more than 1907 again; Britain not the same imperial power she had been; introduction of US presence not as minimal as other third powers might have been in the past. But there does seem to be a tendency of decision makers to reason in terms of past occurrences repeating, needing considerable new data to convince them a new constellation of goals and power is maturing.
3. Taking US interpretation of SU moves, for instance, it's less that they are perceived as more hostile than actually they are, and more that the motivations for undoubtedly hostile acts are not read as empathetically or completely as they could be. Once a country has entered into the "hostile" category, historically or in terms of formalized antagonisms (alliances, etc) this hyp no doubt exists (with rational grounds as Jervis has argued). But in the period of discovering a new, dominant antagonism, which is what the early cold war is, the lack of information, the over-reliance on historical analogies and inappropriate but well-formulated conceptions of what should be happening---these are the distorting elements. Not quite so simple as the hyp states, in this instance.
4. I think this is true in my case.
5. Seems true. Think in term of evolved strategies and conceptions of how things will proceed. Not wishful thinking, but the influence of established policy winning out over surprises, new constellations.
6. This seems true for US and Iran response to SU moves, which contained at many points sufficient evidence to be read as still consistent with expectations (for Iran, possibility of getting by with ltd concessions, for US, possibility of more or less reciprocal adherence to non-interference).
7. High tension--awareness of seriousness of dispute for all involved---can also introduce efforts to rethink images which have been inadequate in anticipating the high tension for you. Again I am talking about a dispute that breaks upon the main antagonists--that is the precipitation of US-SU conflict in Iran was not expected, or historically rooted, for either. It took a while for each to fit it into a more general pattern of conflict. Hence my first sentence. But true that parties work to send clearer messages when tension becomes high.
8. Not much evidence in my case for this kind of judgement by the parties.
9. Def. true in perceptions of SU policy. Occasionally references to multiple possible motives, but feeling usually that one or another set must be controlling. No evidence on SU perceptions.
10. Probably so. The several reassurances Molotov and Stalin gave American and British statesmen in late 45, ~~corrected~~ though perhaps other remarks were misperceived at these times, too, seem to have been taken more seriously than evidence of factions to the contrary. It makes sense to believe the opposite leadership for quite a while, anyway.

Hypotheses, Iran. case (10)

11. Unclear hypothesis. How influenced, the exceptions? If view adversary aims at far-reaching, tend to "over-perceive" lack of limits in even smaller steps? and vice versa? But both would be quite rational behaviors.

~~Generally, as Western views of overall SU policy became more pessimistic,~~

G. Hyp relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics

1. In my case, the inability of US decision makers to get a pause and focus on possible change in policy led to drift within terms of present policy, which did not mean "resistance to opponent's demands" as much as would have been possible, BECAUSE that policy was not suited to the effective resistance of those demands. Therefore, most you can say, I think, is that difficulty of changing agreed position lends continuity to policy--quite trivial---this continuity may be other than resisting demands.
2. Yes, again with focus on US. Reiterations of formalistic complaints by US were, to some extent, interpretable ~~as~~ as a policy of ignoring what US was objecting to, whereas they could also be taken as beginning to indicate serious, concrete opposition. Since the outward form and definition of US policy didn't change for a while--most importantly, ^{during} during 46---the earlier signs of opposition were ambiguous, though to some of the US policy makers they were intended to indicate a stiffening.
3. This needs more qualifications to be answerable. Tension has a way of focusing attention and deliberation on a set of circumstances which process can be more "reasonable"--ie more thorough, etc.---than the habitual one of responding to uptense situations. I would say, however, in partial disconfirmation, that in Iranian policy---where very often tension was high as Soviet power in the north grew and demands along with it---we get not more emotion but more and more elaborate procrastination, search for options, etc. With reference to Qavam, that is; some of the other leadership--the Shah, Arfa, Chief of Staff---did at some points favor a more straightforward military response. But I don't see this as necessarily a consequence of heightened emotion.

General point: I'm skeptical, given my case, about the direct relationship between tension and emotion. Both terms, by the way, and obviously, are notoriously slippery to define. Perhaps the central weakness of the Stanford studies is an equation of "tension" with periods when, objectively speaking, there were fewer and fewer options. The implied pejorative reading of the state of being "tense" in such situations may be wrong.

4. Seems generally disconfirmed.
US: Immediate responses to SU initiatives, fall 45 on, were initially in terms of previous declaratory policy. But evolution of new policy instrument--UN forum---and different definition of stakes--principles of small power rights in postwar int. order---and finally of new level of involvement in Iran itself---These innovations, changes of policy came about under pressure of time, need to act. One policy became obsolete and had to be transmuted into another stance.

~~SU: Effect of various timed resolutions in UN spring 46 seems to have been to cause SU to postpone, maintain as much as possible of seemingly planned policy of using mil presence and Tudeh to influence pol. change.~~

Hypotheses, Iran. case (11)

4. cont'd.

SU: During spring 46, often under pressure in form of timed deadlines of treaty and of UN resolutions. Appears that these deadlines did force the Soviets to speed up the process of using what influence levers they possessed, whereas with more time, a more subtle strategy might have been pursued. Yet I don't read this as confirming the hyp. since I don't know if the measures taken were traditional, habitual, or already-planned. The goal of preserving considerable Soviet influence over Iranian policy was well-established during the war, but whether the rather abrupt and often provocative means adopted were planned is less clear. A more leisurely penetration may have been the intention and when this was too slow in materializing and objected to by the West, a quickly arrived at switch to coercion may have taken place.

5. Iran crisis was long in duration, often not viewed as severe. But deliberations of internal US policy show quite continuous scanning of alternative interpretations, possible responses; not that these encompassed all possible policy options. But don't find single, simple-minded application of organizationally-defined policy--if that's what's meant by "org. roles."
6. P.O. unexaminable and/or influential in SU. In Iran, true that Qavam lost flexibility as imp. segms of army, parl., and tribes took close interest, and that this helped back up his finally adopted position. For US, there being no well-developed focus of attn of Iran in particular, policy makers had considerable freedom, I believe, in making it imp. or not. We know from the general policy calculations leading up to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, which concerned Iran's area, at least, there was considerable ~~work~~ effort devoted to how to make commitments in these seem important with the public, seem like something the executive branch was plausibly committed to do. "or the US, in other words, we are in a period of the creation or drawing out of latent strands of public opinion relevant to policy steps undertaken for other or differently arrived at reasons. In formative period of policy, therefore, govt had flexibility because p.o. not too involved. Hyp. generally confirmed.
7. Don't know for SU. Untrue for Qavam, who was closest to Soviet Union and rarely more hard than others in Iran. politics. Haven't studied relat. of home or general fo po opinion in Br or US to contrast to mood of those directly involved.
8. True for Br military, Iran. military; don't know for SU; little evidence of US mil. opinion one way or the other. When finally asked for estimation of the imp. of Iran, the JCS came through with a statement giving the area tremendous and global importance--but definition of strategic significance of this portion of the Near East was quite general among civilians by this time, too.

Hypotheses, Iran. case (12)

H. Hyps relating outcomes to aftermaths/

1. Many Western diplomats and Western chroniclers of the Iranian crisis took the lesson of the early portion of the Iranian dispute--42 to early spring 46---to be that of this hypothesis: That is, that Western, esp. American, tolerance of SU acts in the north, pressure on Teheran only encouraged the Soviets to upgrade their aims. There is considerable truth to this, except that from the Soviet side there may have been the feeling that unless they vigorously pursued, asserted their interests in the area, the West would progressively expand its ec and pol poXsition within the central government.
2. & 3.x Require comparative analysis. As does 1. also; but I tried to answer it taking the Iranian dispute as involving successive little crises.
4. True, in so far as Iran, when Br and US backing to degree it hoped for was not immediately forthcoming, did have to keep lines of possible agreement with the Soviet Union open. To put an end to this dangerous option, the US did have to incre,se its level of commitment during 1946. The conclusion applies, however, more to a bipolar than multipolar situation, since Iran did not believe she could stand alone, or find an alternative to an expanded US or Russian presence.
5. Iran. crisis did result in, better put, take place in context of, ever worsening relations. To assess howmuch its conduct and resolution played in this process would require a long analysis. Answering in a more limited fashion we can point out reasons for its increasing hostility, in its own right.
 - a. finality---was a definitive exclusion of one power and introduction of another's presence in Iran. A regime of mixed influence---at least a theoretical possibility---made impossible.
 - b. other common adversary: the great powers had no other major adversary; possibly, the joint interest of SU, US in eliminating British imperial interest in the area was such an interest, and the two superpowers policies in the Middle East in this period can be seen as having the common effect of undermining British presence. But they also clashed directly in other and more important areas for this local congruence of intersts to be decisive.
 - c. provocativeness of tactics: SU definitely provoked US by bullying Iran, clearly violating legal commitments. US definitively provoked SU by insisting on UN level exposure of issue, thus indicating ^{that} private modes of working out great power disagreements would be abandoned if expedient. (This should not imply, however, that SU was ready for a privately-elaborated spheres deal in Iran; such was never clearly offered; but also SU may have thought it deserved, could get major influence in the country. However, use of UN to wage opposition most certainly poisoned atmosphere for other diplomatic encounters between the main actors.)
 - d. humiliation: Within Iran, this humiliation was considerable for the SU. In the UN deliberations, US, others sought to minimize direct accusations of SU, so long as minimal goal of troop removal gained. I believe the international level of humiliation could have been much worse. To degree, however, that US increasingly became main diplomatic ally of Iran in continued elimination of SU influence throughout 47-48, Soviet defeat was linked with West. success in bipolar competition.

Hypotheses, Iran. case (13)

subsequent

6. SU withdrawal and various/defeats (on oil, Azerbaijan) was attributed by them to fascistic character of Iran govt, its links with imperialist forces outside. This to demonstrate that defeat suffered at hands of illegitimate forces. On the other hand, the Soviets, simply by virtue of the amount of futile railing they do in later stages of the defeat--late 46 on---seemed to disregard impression this gave of defeat and futility .

Additional points: When SU gradually withdraws troops in spring 46, this done at every step under guise of partially fictitious statements that SU and Iran had agreed to this. In fact there were bilateral agreements concurrent with, facilitating withdrawal, but also it was clear that it was attributable to UN pressure, which Soviets didn't want to admit.

So; must give a mixed answer. If a state is terribly engaged in the crisis area, and suffers a defeat, it may not be able, psychologically, to completely act as if nothing happened. Moreover, this could be a bad strategy for the future. To rationalize, minimize the defeat might be taken as a sign that it didn't matter to you. Better to complain loudly, however futilely, at the moment?

7. Certainly Iran's final willingness to act firmly on behalf of its own independence enhanced its attractiveness to the US as an ally.

I. Hyps about bidding moves

1. It was the crisis atmosphere of UN and other pressure that forced the Soviet Union to begin defining its aims concretely to the Iranian government. As I said in the text, the very act of defining is in a way a "concession" since to define is to delimit. In some situations, therefore, a power won't make any concession at all until someone else calls to his attention the need to limit or define his policy aims. The act of beginning to negotiate is, in this respect a concessionary one. (Not "talk" but negotiate. "Talk" is usually going on continuously, except in situations where the adversaries don't acknowledge each other, or have regular relations--eg. US and North VietNam and NLF; this not the case here.) A power still may decide to change his behavior in an indirect way rather than make concessions explicitly and publically. Unacknowledged withdrawal as a way of ending crisis is apparent here, but along with it, concrete, explicit talks and deals struck between SU-Iran.

SO: I can't answer directly to the hyp. On the Iranian side, too, it was the insistent Soviet pressure that brought Qavam to the conviction that he needed to make some offers to assuage that pressure. The offer of oil negot with all sides after all troops out---which was made before the crisis atmosphere came on---was succeeded by an even more concessionary proposal once it did come on.

2. ~~Qavam did place all sorts of conditions on the oil agreement with the SU after having decided he had to grant one in any case. It, US do agree to postpone their oil requests, fall 44, if SU does likewise. The SU did "give up" troop presence in return for oil, conditions of Az autonomy, which in a way was not theirs to give up, it was ordained by treaty. But this not a meaningless quid pro quo, actually. Treaty conditions wouldn't hold if Iran proceeded contrary to SU interests in other important respects. Hence, SU could argue, giving up troop presence was real concession, not just~~

Hyes, Iran case (14)

2. Some instances of this: Qavam attaches various conditions to oil agreement with SU, which limit SU control. But could argue that key decision is to grant deal in first place, the rest window dressing for purposes the hypothesis asserts. SU, in asking for role in Az settlement at various points in talks with Q, may have been asking for what was essentially a diplomatic symbol of influence there, in order to progress with oil deal. This less certain; that is, may have been real concession by Iran.

Thus, generally, I do find instances of this tactical procedure.

3. West did this, in claiming that main aim is removal of SU troops spring 46. But do dislike other imminent Soviet gains--such as oil, air rights to north. SU, as I said above, tended to talk as if they had suffered a major loss of influence.
4. No evidence.
5. Somewhat perversely: My crisis must be bipolar, because the maximum concession was always defined by the most interested ally (Iran), rather than the US.
6. Not so much sign language, as in informal talks; pre-Security Council meetings, ~~formal sessions~~, Qavam-Sadichkov talks before presenting drafts to one another. But hyp may overstate degree of prior-communication. Is considerable thought about what's likely to be responded to, or good basis to gain others' support on, but less^{of} conscious if implicit sign-sending and -reading, at least in my case. (Also, very often in the pre-fall 45, Big Three diplomacy stage of the dispute, Br and Am would offer plans for mutual withdrawal directly and clearly, have them rejected just as clearly. A rather straightforward process during this low-crisis atmosphere phase.)

83 hypotheses! Whew.