The Munich Crisis

Jim Smith

CONTENTS

Systemic Environment 2

Bargaining Setting 32

Bargaining Process 45

Aftermath 125

Explanation of Outcome 127

Working Paper #6 131

Working Paper #3 164

Sources 193

In part I have sought to further coherence and avoid repetition by covering particular items in the case study format the first time they came up or needed to be brought up. This is in part responsible for the perhaps unfortunate length of my "Systemic Environment" section. I hope that this has not resulted in my burying any gems concerning military capabilities under "international organization." Rather, I have covered relative military capabilities under "distribution of power" and so on. Where the placement of an item has outraged even my psychologic I have included a back reference.

SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT

The international system of 1938 can best be characterized as one of rough global multipolarity. "Global" because its major membership ranged from Japan in the east through the Soviet Union to the European subsystem dominated by Italy, Germany, France, and Great Britain, and then back to the east where the United States rubbed against Japan. Among these major powers Germany, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were the most important national actors relative to the crisis over Czechoslovakia and merit the greatest attention in any attempt to examine that crisis. While consideration of the possible behavior of Japan and Italy did enter into the calculations of the national actors most central to the crisis, such considerations were generally marginal to the course and outcome of the crisis. The United States was to be of even less importance.

The international system of 1938 was "roughly global" because the congeries of power did not form the relatively seamless though stretched web of influence radiating from the major actors which characterize an idealization of recent global polarity, but rather because power, even for the major actors, was markedly local, even if potential for geographic scope was more extensive. In 1968 Soviet tank crews took an easy morning's drive across Hungary and Poland into Czechoslovakia. In 1938 the situation for Soviet tank crews was quite different with immense significance for what transpired in that year.

The multipolarity of 1938 was not a tight system of major power nudging against major power as so many billiard balls in

a rack. Rather, in the rack with the major powers were a number of important nooks and crannies filled by regional actors possessing no mean power in their particular geographic area of the system. Their number included Czechoslovakia, which was probably first among them in systemic importance, as well as Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Yugosloavia. Crucial to the systemic equation was the status of these regional powers, whose actual and potential importance in the system was not balanced by a firmly established position in the systemic status quo. In 1938 the importance of such middle-level states as Czechoslovakia and Poland was substantially greater than it is today. Both as geographic areas and possessors of national power such states were quite significant in any systemic equation of power. That their position in the systemic status quo was in some counsels penciled in made them doubly important in that earlier international system.

Even with the advantage of retrospection it is particularly difficult to estimate the distribution of power which obtained at the time of the crisis over Czechoslovakia. Yet calculations of power, some of them grossly inaccurate, were crucial to the crisis behavior of a number of important actors in 1938. Indeed, in the eyes of some observers misperception and misrepresentation of the power configuation is seen as the central aspect of the crisis outcome. In part confusion as to power distribution stems from the destabilizing effects that powerful organizational and economic tools brought to bear on given ratios of basic

national economic potential. In part such confusion derives from the particular state of military technology and thought extant in 1938 and the rapid changes that military technology and thought was undergoing. In part such confusion stems from willful misrepresentation of power by human actors both during and well after the crisis. Hence, from all of this, it becomes for the analyst particularly difficult and potentially redundant to separate questions of power distribution from questions of military technology or from questions of power perception. Thus, in the interest of economy, this section will attempt to deal with all such general questions relating to military affairs.

In the 1930's the states of Europe were faced with a concatenation of half-understood political and economic potentialities which crucially related to the military power they were able to bring to bear in pursuit of international policy. Operating from relatively equal economic bases, major European states contemplated possible force structures which were unsupportable in the long run from the dual perspectives of national will and economic stability. In a sense one might say that developments in military affairs required super powers while the only players actively on the field were middle powers.

Unfortunately for the stability of the relation of military forces and their utilization, there were forms of economic and political organization available which offered the apparent potentiality of transforming, if only for a short while, a middle power into a super power. War of course was the most appropriate

context in which to utilize such techniques and the First World War had demonstrated both their amphetamine-like potential for exponentially increasing national performance and also the moral and economic destruction such utilization ultimately caused in the national corpus. In the 1930's one set of powers was to more closely attend to one of these demonstrated effects and another set of powers was to attend more closely to the other demonstrated effect. While not to make too much of analogies, the situation was one of untrained runners of approximately equal ability in a long race of undefined length faced with the agonizing decision of when to put on a burst of effort which would ultimately weaken ones reserve. "Agonizing" is not too dramatic a word, for in Germany, Britain, and France much pains-taking attention was given to the problem outlined above. With full realization that the end result would be a peaking and then dropping off of German power, Germany was to choose one strategy for development of military power, though in practice her economic and political system was not to be as totally oriented toward building military strength as some observers have claimed. With the realization that Great Britain could not bear the burden of preparation for modern war for an indefinite period of time, the British opted for strength in the long run and agonized over national ability to survive until the short run became the long run. France, while not ignoring the problem, vacillated frantically between the two extremes.

Another question to consider before turning to the actual

distribution of power obtaining in 1938 is that of the military technology of the period, which in some ways was quite relevant to the crisis over Czechoslovakia. The military technology of the Munich period was of course conventional as opposed to nuclear, but three new developments representing elaboration from experiences of the 1914 war added a crucial element of unconventionality to the background of familiarity against which soldiers and statesmen moved in 1938 and significantly colored possibilities, expectations, and behavior during the Munich Crisis. The three, each of which was misunderstood by at least one party to the crisis, were strategic bombardment, elaborate hardened defensive lines, and, to a certain extent, armored-mechanized warfare.

Stanley Baldwin's observation that "the bombers will always get through"[1] was taken as axiomatic by most European powers in the interwar years. Experience in World War I, the writings of Douhet, technological developments favoring offensive air power, and the purportedly relevant example of undefended city bombing in the Spanish Civil War, all were factors in instilling universal if not evenly distributed fear of aerial attack on civil targets. On both sides it seemed an unlikely possibility that bombers could be stopped once they were in the air. One either aimed at deterring his enemy or sought to preemptively eliminate his enemy's bomber aircraft while they were on the ground. Once an attack was on, there was held to be little chance of a victim's significantly mitigating the damage he was to suffer. Such a situation was potentially quite unstable.

In many ways the situation resembled what in modern times has been called the "balance of terror" and shared with that more modern balance the characteristic of subjectivity, of balance being in the eye of the beholder. As a result moments of tension tended to be intense and more frightening than they otherwise might have been, especially for those who felt the most vunerable from the air. Moreover, the net effect of all of this, as Robert Osgood points out, was to put the nation itself in the front lines and to thus even further complicate the difficulties of rational response to the problems faced in conjunction with air bombardment.

The implications of hardened fortifications were also new and important to the military setting of the Munich period. In this case the implications went in the other direction from those relating to strategic bombardment and resulted in a heightened sense of security for those who thought in terms of such fortifications. Moreover, France in particular, but also in other states, the existence of military force structures which in some cases were overwhelmingly oriented toward more static defense complicated the problem for decision makers of estimating power balances. In a sense the problem was one of seeing how many apples equaled an orange. When an attempt was made to relate these differing force structures to differing foreign policy needs a complex equation was created whose difficult solution appears in some cases not to have been attended to, or perhaps even attempted.

Reasoning from the analogy of positional warfare as practiced during the First World War and the lessons the analogy taught, several powers began in the 1930's to construct massive defensive complexes. First France, then, with French assistance, Czechoslovakia, and then, in the midst of the Munich Crisis, Germany, all sought the advantage of digging the ditch and sighting the guns in before hostilities had begun. Each system of fortifications was theorectically more complex than those which had gone before, and all promised security inexpensive in terms of manpower. All promised more insulation from the outside world than subsequent history would prove warranted, though each power as a distinct state was to make a distinct and different use of that insulation.

The implications of the Maginot Line for French passivity toward alliance obligations are generally known. In addition the existence of the Maginot Line as a focus of attention for the French defense community caused a conscious French inattention to developments in air and mechanized warfare. Germany and Czechoslovakia were to share to a lesser, but still significant, degree the somewhat mystical French bemusement with the idea of fixed fortifications. During the crisis Hitler's sense of security was enhanced and his timing rigidly paced by the Organization Todt's rapid construction of the West Wall. For the Czechs the crisis began when the Anschluss outflanked their own impressive system of fortifications and reached its peak when the Germans were able to transfer trains from construction work on the West

Wall to troop movement in the east.

Finally, something should be said of the effect of the evolving concepts of armored-mechanized warfare on the military milieu. As respectable heirs of the Prussian General Staff, the Reichswehr had continued development of the technique of rapid movement. The equipment necessary for such warfare and the idea itself of such warfare had great appeal for Hitler and other top Nazis, perhaps more than for German military men. On seeing the first Mark I tank in 1933 Hitler was like a child with a new toy. Supposedly he had repeated over and over to Guderian, "That's what I need. That's what I want to have."[3] Development of armored-aerial striking forces and the theory of their utilization in Germany was to far outpace such development in other countries. Other powers were not particularly impressed by those techniques and even in 1940 the rapid events in France were a rude awakening for the world. Yet Hitler and other Nazis (though not most German military men) were of the belief that their rapid striking forces would be able to overwhelm the impressive Czech defenses. The salient existence of the fascinating and novel weapons was to maintain German hardliners in their course. Yet paradoxically German armored competence was not in 1938 what it was to be in 1940. A very strong warning should have come when during the Anschluss more than half of the German motorized vehicles involved had broken down along the roads. Indeed Hitler himself was later to admit, after inspecting Czech defensive works, that he had overrated the ability of his elite forces to deal with them.

Numerous popular accounts picture German strength as overwhelming in 1938, a product of relentless totalitarian efficiency which, with single-minded orientation toward total war, had maximized Germany's human and material power potential. Such accounts, while leading understanding in the proper direction, are untrue. In the summer of 1936 when Germany began rearmament in earnest, she possessed an economic base second only to the Soviet Union among European powers.[4] In a 1936 memorandum Hitler had characterized rearmament production not as an economic problem but as a question of will and had called for "unconditional subordination of all other desires to preserve Germany's national existence."[5] In practice however, because of remarkable areas of governmental inefficiency, military focus on a short rather than a long war, National Socialist sensitivity to the domestic effects of inflation and higher taxes, desires for consumer goods and public works, and general failure to apprehend the principle that "a nation can finance everything which can be produced,"[6] Germany fell dramatically short of realizing the military forces which Hitler had called for and which the economic base could have made possible. It was only after Stalingrad that Germany fully mobilized.

Though Germany followed after 1935 a consistent policy of exaggerating her military strength and though other powers, particularly France and Britain, tended to over-rate the force strength which Germany posited,[7] Germany nevertheless was probably the strongest single power in 1938. While not going to total

mobilization, the National Socialist state had, more than any other state, directed mass energy and economic manipulation toward the preparation for war. German planners correctly conceived that the burst of speed that they had put on would begin to fade in the 1942-44 period and would be surpassed by the efforts of others. Coupled with a revisionist mentality, the logic of such a situation was as inescapable as it was unfortunate. In 1937 Fromm, head of the Organization Department of the Army High Command had written,

> This situation is unbearable for any length of time...Is there, or is there not, a fixed intention to send the armed forces into action at a definite point of time? [8]

Germany's most marked force superiority was in the air. In both quantity and quality, and in psychic weight, the German air force significantly surpassed any other single air force. There was the possible exception of the Soviet air force which could not, however, be meaningfully brought to bear against Germany from Russian soil. In 1938 Germany had 2800 modern first line aircraft[9] of which the majority were tactical fighters and bombers designed for close in support of ground forces. The level of training for German pilots exceeded that of any other nation. In 1937 Germany had cancelled a potentially significant strategic bomber program and only by "stretching" could existing aircraft be utilized for substantial strategic bombardment of Paris and London. Fighter bases were not then close enough to Britian for the Germans to be able to provide fighter protection over Britain.

Germany's 1938 army consisted of 45 divisions. This was not the awesome military force some present day collectors of Nazi memorabilia imagine it to have been, at least not in 1938. There were inadequacies in training, middle-level officers, and equipment. German ground forces were, however, at least the equal of any other such force in Europe, perhaps a bit better. There were in September only 3 Panzer divisions. The speed with which these divisions could be deployed was limited in the case of the plan to reduce Czechoslovakia's defenses by the necessity of using other, slower moving divisions to augment Panzer strength.

As the total complement of troops to be used in the attack on Czechoslovakia was widely spread over various points, the Wehrmacht High Command required a go-ahead signal at least three days before an invasion of Czechoslovakia was to be actually launched. Moreover, because of planning which required utilization of the cover from early morning fog in the areas to be attacked, the penultimate order to attack was required from Hitler by the armed forces before noon on the day before attack. Finally, the same rolling stock was needed for both the frantic West Wall construction against a French incursion and movement of troops toward Czechoslovakia. Hitler's decision to continue construction on the West Wall until the last possible minute before an attack on Czechoslovakia meant the making of rigid plans for the loading and unloading of trains.[10] At a minimum it would take several days to alter such plans. The implication of this, which at one point the Germans ran up against, was that even as the pro-

jected attack date approached earlier plans and decisions constrained their ability to move the attack up. Once the first two weeks of September were past, an attack could only occur shortly after September 20. It could not occur before September 20.

In the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 Germany had been permitted leeway to construct a substantial number of capital ships in a ratio of 35:100 with the Commonwealth. By 1938 the German navy appeared to be strong enough to hold the Baltic and perhaps able to interfere substantially with British control of the North Sea. It was likely, however, that Germany would fall victim of a blockade in the case of a long war with Britain. In such a contingency Germany's earlier measure toward autarky would have made some difference. It was estimated in 1938 that in the event all outside supplies were terminated Germany would be able to fight a major war for seven months relying only on internal resources.

Czechoslovakia's defense establishment was quite impressive for a state of her size. She was the most defensively secure small state in Central Eastern Europe. Her regular army consisted of about 25 divisions, only a few of which were involved in holding the elaborate and sophisticated series of fortifications facing the German border. A few were kept in a more mobile status to fend off possible attacks from Poland and Hungary. The remainder were kept in the interior as a final strong point. While it is true that the Anschluss allowed German forces to out-

flank the southern terminus of Czechoslovakia's fixed defenses, north-south communications in the border area with Austria were less than perfect and the Czechs had been proceeding since the Anschluss to cover this flank with another set of defensive structures. Czechoslovakia also possessed an excellent reserve system numbering well more than a million men. The Soviet Union was supplying the Czech Air Force with aircraft and though quite limited in numbers, operational types possessed by the Czechs were held to equal in quality those of Germany. In the Skoda factories Czechoslovakia possessed some of the finest and most coveted armament works in Europe. As their defensive lines were breached in an attack Czech military leaders planned a carefully executed withdrawal from the border areas. Their experts estimated being able to stand alone against Germany for six weeks; for considerably longer with aid.

French industrial and economic strength had declined during the 1930's relative to that of other states. In the wake of the Depression severe social conflict had constrained French economic regeneration. Tools which in Germany could be used to increase military strength were desperately used in France to hold the country together. Yet France was the strongest defensive power in Europe. Mountains and the Maginot Line protected her from direct attack by Germany and Italy, her only possible serious enemies. Her Army numbered more than a hundred divisions at mobilization strength of more than a million men. Yet there was no significant offensive military capacity. French

air strength was pathetic. About 800 aircraft were available but it was judged by the French that if German bombers used their capability to attack French cities, almost all of these planes would have to be used in defense of Paris alone. As it was, every one of the French planes was obsolescent. German types were literally almost twice as fast.

Though untroubled domestically relative to other democracies in the 1930's, Great Britain hesitated to take on the economic burdens which great power diplomacy required. Even after some measure of rearmament was undertaken beginning in 1936, the thought of the chore ahead seemed to partially paralyze the British effort. If resources were devoted to armament, British export capacity would, it was thought, suffer and thence British economic strength, which was seen as the key to a long war, would flounder. As only a long war could ultimately threaten the islands and Commonwealth, it was for the worst possible eventuality that strength was husbanded. That this threatened the short run was clearly seen as both unfortunate and, given the British conception of economic possibility, unavoidable. In summing up this thinking, Chamberlain had told his ministers in 1937:

> In my view that is a matter of first importance. It may be that in the next war our enemy would aim for a "knockout" blow, but the evidence before me does not show that it would be likely to succeed...If that view is correct, the factor of our staying power must be present in the minds of other governments as well as of ourselves. They must be asking themselves what are our chances in a long war.[11]

In harmony with her thinking in terms of a long war and economic power, Britain's military strength was in her fleet, which was of course largely irrelevant to a short conflict in the center of Europe. In 1938 the air strength which existed during the Battle of Britain was mostly on paper. Less than a hundred modern Hurricanes existed and these were hampered by a failure in development of the heating mechanism for the guns. The remainder of Britain's air force, while substantial in numbers, was as pathetically inadequate as that of France. The British Army, while providing a vital core for expansion, numbered only 220,000 men. In the event of British involvement in the war, it was projected that Britain would only be able to transfer 30,000 men and 120 aircraft to the continent. Hence Britain would be unable to play a significant role in the early stages of any conflict in Europe, though it was believed that British air strength might dull the dreaded "knockout blow" which Germany might choose to deliver against the islands.

The Soviet Union was the great unknown in the power distribution equation of 1938. While it was clear that the Soviets had substantial economic power and military equipment in 1938, the leadership qualities and training of Soviet soldiers were rightfully quite suspect due to the scything taken by their military establishment in the purges of that period. However, the Red Army of 1938 did number over 50 divisions and was as modern as any in Europe. In the 1920's the Soviets and Germans had jointly developed mechanized tactics and the Red Army had

attended well to their lesson. Soviet planes numbered in the thousands and though Soviet production types were soon to be outclassed by the latest German types, in September 1938 Soviet operational types were on a par with the best in the world. Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the Soviets, Russia, as many other states in 1938, was beset on more than one side. By the summer of that year Japanese troop strength in Manchuria had reached 250,000 men.

By 1938 the League of Nations was almost dead. Neville Chamberlain was solidly on the mark when, in February 1938, he had observed that it would be best not to

> delude the small countries by making them think that they are protected by the League of Nations against acts of expansion when we know that they can expect no such thing.[12]

Gravely wounded by Manchuko, the failure of sanctions against Italy, and its failure to act during the Anschluss, the League was to take no action relevant to the course and outcome of the Czechoslovakian crisis.

Though the League took no action, this is not to say that its existence was irrelevant to the Munich Crisis. Geneva provided a location, a talking point, as it were, for Soviet interaction with those who were interested in Russian views on Czechoslovakia. Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was in Geneva during the height of the crisis tension and was thus more readily available and more readily able to meet with the highest ranking officials of various Central and Western European nations than if he had been at a distance in Moscow. Hence the League facilitated communication. Moreover, as Soviet diplomacy was quite active during the crisis, Litvinov and the Soviet Union were perhaps spared by Geneva's existence the loss of face which might have been suffered had Litvinov in his active maneuvering scurried as Chamberlain had back and forth across Europe.

Finally, though the League was almost dead, its mechanisms,

though disused, still existed and provided the most salient potential means for co-ordinating resistance to Hitler outside the existing framework of treaties designed to support Czechoslovakia, should those treaties fail. Or, perhaps, given the League's then recent moribund state, the League's existence provided a useful mechanism in which one could voluntarily entangle oneself so as to appear to support Czechoslovakia without the possibility of actually being asked to do do. Again it was the parvenu Soviet Union which most utilized the League, and its actions seem to have partaken of a bit of both of the just mentioned possibilities of the League as mechanism, albeit creaky at best.

If it was true, as Chamberlain was to say during the crisis, that it was incredible for Great Britain to be involved in war over a faraway people of whom the British knew nothing, how much more incredible must the idea have seemed from Capetown or Sydney? Apparently Chamberlain's statement came close to accurately reflecting the views of Britain's peculiar international organization, the Commonwealth. During September the Commonwealth High Commissioners made it abundantly clear to the Cabinet on a number of occasions that the Dominions were strongly against war for defense of Czechoslovakia. This was only an echoing of a stand taken soon after the Anschluss and on which Commonwealth representatives remained unanimous. The Commonwealth had played a crucial role in the last war and Britain would have been hard put to contemplate another war

without its support. Moreover, political and economic events since the First World War had disenchanted many parts of the Commonwealth with the very idea of membership itself. Chamberlain was aware that a war without certain and valid provocation might shatter the Commonwealth. In late September the opinions of the Commonwealth High Commissioners were to weigh heavily against Duff Cooper and other hard liners who were for standing firm.

Broadly speaking there were two types of national system structures and three ideologies relevant to the important actors in the Munich Crisis. Systems were either liberal democratic or, in Robert Tucker's appelation, fuehreristic totalitarian. As liberal democracies the significant aspect of Great Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia relevant to their international behavior during the crisis was that their political systems featured some interplay of and concern for partisan politics as well as a relatively high degree of autonomy in the area of civil military relations. In addition France and Czechoslovakia faced some substantial problems of internal cohesion, concern for which was to affect their international behavior during the crisis.

A reading of the domestic history of the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany during this period is enough to disabuse one of a notion of a dictator's total and easy running of a system. It is however clear that in the fuehreristic totalitarian systems there was a marked tendency toward leadership by one individual who more or less successfully controlled both an ideologically self-conscious party and, most important of the

state's organizations relative to the international crisis, a military apparatus. Stalin's progress in this direction by 1938 had surpassed that of his fellow dictators. In particular, a cautionary note should be added to contrast Hitler's tenuously absolute control of Germany in 1938 with the more firm control he was to achieve during the war years.

The 1930's were famous among counters of ideologies for their three-way split between communism, fascim, and democracy. The most important ideology relevent to the crisis over Czechoslovakia does not, however, appear in the familiar list. Nationalism, simple and passionate though its embodiment may have been, was the ideology which set the Sudetens off in a wild spasm of longing for the Fatherland they had never been a part of and apprehended only poorly. "One Volk, One Reich," they chanted in the wake of the Anschluss, and meant it. Dr. Goebbels and his philological insight may have stirred them, but the Nazis did not create those materials that were stirred, nor did they prove able to prevent a simmer from becoming a boil.

Perhaps more importantly nationalism was a factor that could be understood in the West and indeed sympathized with at a level which fascism would never have been able to reach. Indeed, nationalism was the lingua franca of justification for Sudeten rioting, Hitler's support of their demands, and even the explanation for the tortures Hitler claimed the Sudetens were undergoing. Three times during the crisis Hitler told the story of a Sudeten woman's being thrown out a window. The fact that nationalists traditionally did

and had done to them that kind of thing lent credibility to Hitler's claim for a change that had strategic implications, as did Hitler's apparently genuine agitation at such a story. Czechoslovakia, itself a product of nationalism and justified by those sentiments, was in fact hoisted by its own petard when one of the nations comprising the Czech state demanded to "go home to the Reich." Things were not then ameliorated for Czechoslovakia when other groups began to demand to go home to Poland, or Hungary, or to a new Slovakia.

There can be little doubt that of the big-three ideologies, communism seems to have most affected the outcome of the crisis. Though some will argue differently, it appears that the ideology of the democratic states or of the fascist states is difficult to relate qua ideology to any particular set of actions or outcome except as those two ideologies relate to communism. I am aware that National Socialist fascist ideology was quite conducive to a policy of expansion, even to the kind of radically "realistic" foreign policy which Germany followed. Yet it would seem most appropriate to relate this to an extreme of nationalist sentiment and the particular psychology of those who both created National Socialism and controlled German foreign policy.

Communism, then, was important, and important because of the way others reacted to it, particularly as communism might relate to domestic politics inside a particular country. Czech and French decision makers in some cases were loathe to enter into close co-operation with the communists for two reasons relating

to domestic politics. On the one hand, there are numerous statements indicating their fear of a Red menace, of the subversive utility the Soviets might find in alliance co-operation during a war. Secondly, there is substantial evidence that some decision makers in both countries fended the Soviet embrace off not because they themselves feared its implications for subversion, but because other political groups in their delicate domestic political balances were resolutely resistant to Communists both as subversives and as internal political competitors. The position of the Czech Agrarian Party precluded, it turned out, Czechoslovakia's accepting Soviet assistance without the moderating influence of France also being thrown into the alliance balance.

Finally, quite a debate has developed concerning Soviet intentions during the crisis. On the one extreme is the interpretattion based on the role of the notorious British "Cliveden set" and its supposed desires, after the Soviet infant survived strangulation in its crib, to set the two totalitarian adolescents to the east at each others throats. On the other extreme are those who paint the resolute Soviet behavior in the crisis as an effort to set capitalism against its National Socialist perversion in a war which would bleed capitalism white. While some such sentiments can be found, it is difficult to relate them directly to actual policy goals. In general, however, it would be possible to blame an ideological mirror image effect for somewhat heightened insecurity in each camp, though again this is difficult to relate to policy.

From 1936 to 1939 the Soviet Union was experiencing the period of the great purges. It seems clear that the effect of the purges, whatever their goal, was something approaching a domestic revolution and that this domestic revolution relates to the inter-state crisis. There appears to have been approximately a 60% change in the composition of many levels of Soviet leadership during this period.[13] Moreover, the Soviet Army suffered even more massive disruptions in its leadership. Though the purges were beginning to taper down by the Munich period, Khrushchev indicated in his famous 1956 "secret report" that the effects of the purges continued to hamper Soviet military capacity as late as 1941.[14] Further, though not nearly enough is known concerning Soviet decision making, it seems reasonable to suppose that the unsettling Soviet domestic events during this period might have had the potentiality for causing a more tentative Soviet behavior relative to Czechoslovakia than would otherwise have been the case. More certainly, it seems possible to relate the purges to heightened Western disdain for the Soviets on the ideological grounds above mentioned. Finally, and even more certainly, it seems accurate to assign the purges some influence in decreasing European respect for Soviet military power,[15] some role in reducing European confidence in the Soviet Union's profession of interest in Czechoslovakia, and some part in reducing the viability of the Soviet commitments which had been made relative to Czechoslovakia.

In Germany during the Munich period a highly placed group

in the military and Foreign Ministry was of some revolutionary potential. Consisting both of conservatives who had long disliked the tone and direction of the National Socialist social revolution and of others of a more pragmatic bent who doubted the practicability of Hitler's diplomatic and strategic intentions, this group coalesced in late August, 1938 around the leadership of Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff.[16] Continuing efforts which had begun in the spring in an attempt to co-ordinate action, this group on three occasions in August and September communicated with the British, seeking to discover British intentions and to encourage Britain to make a firm stand. In September plans were made by the group that, in the case that Hitler went ahead with the military attack on Czechoslovakia, certain military and police units were to seize control of Germany and of Hitler and were to bring the dictator to trial.[17] While perhaps colored by elements of fantasy and self-vindication, the conspirators' post-war accounts indicated that it was Chamberlain's trips to Berchtesgaden and Munich which had prevented the execution of their plans.

It is unfortunate that most of the literature on German resistance to Hitler, which is closely related to questions of war guilt and the nature of Germany, is as polemical as it is extensive. At any rate, the past few decades' history seems thus far to indicate that totalitarian regimes are not vulnerable to either mass uprising or successful coup d'état. Further, even after the war had been lost and Hitler continued the fan-

tastic struggle, the record of high-level resistance to Hitler is more one of hesitancy and perhaps even incompetence than of anything approaching success. Most of the civilians involved in the projected coup were unknown to the public and the military men involved all represented a group which had been publicly branded as "reactionary" by leading Nazis in the past. Further, the plotters were dependent for their forces on young recruits who were of doubtful allegiance.[18] Of course even an attempted coup could have had considerable significance for the inter-state crisis. Yet given what we know about the plotters and German politics, whatever the likelihood of the plot's being launched before the Chamberlain visits, it seems clear that Hitler's September success made such an attempt doubly unlikely. As in other, earlier crises, Hitler's international victories were also domestic victories. Chamberlain's visits forestalled the plotters, and, as we will see, the plotters' influence on the course of the crisis was to be more potential than actual.

In 1938 Czechoslovakia was a Switzerland without the centuries of history which supported unity with diversity. Slovaks, Magyars, Ruthenes, and Poles all desired either some fundamental change within the Czech state or some form of association with a neighboring state. These groups. however, paled into relative insignificance as compared to the Sudeten Germans. The Sudeten Germans, the immediate issue of the Munich crisis, were not mere hirelings of the Reich, but represented an important revolutionary factor domestic to Czechoslovakia. Germany's "one Volk" propoganda

excited the Germans living in Czechoslovakia but it came too late to claim responsibility for having created Sudenten Germans as a potentially explosive group. German's clandestine funding gave influence to certain more radical elements among the Sudetens, but it neither guaranteed Germany's control of these elements or of the larger mass of Sudetens. Relatively independent actions by the Sudeten Germans were in part responsible for the inception and pacing of the Munich Crisis. At times Sudeten hot-heads threatened the ability not only of statesmen but also of their own native Sudeten leaders to control events.

Czech-German conflict had existed for hundreds of years under the Hapsburgs. When the Peace Conference of 1919 created Czechoslovakia with 7 million Czechs and 3 million Germans, the poloarity of dominance in the domestic conflict may have been reversed and diminished, but it was certainly not eliminated. The Germans in Czechoslovakia, though perhaps the best treated of Europe's "new" minorities, were still less than equal in the Czechslovak state. The Sudeten Germans resented the Czechs as arriveste and the economic disaster of the early thirties weighed a good bit more heavily on Sudeten Germans than on Czechs, adding injury to insult. The increased tempo of National Socialist propaganda trumpetings and the remarkable, if momentary, success of the Reich's economic policy as contrasted with a particularly slow Sudeten economic recovery from the world-wide depression, lead more and more Sudeten Germans away from the Sudeten Activist parties which sought to co-operate inside the

framework of Czechoslovakian national politics. Sudeten Germans first moved toward a politics of nationalities, that is, politics predicated on a degree of autonomy but on their continued existence inside Czechoslovakia. Then, with the thrill of the Anschluss, the movement became a wild rush in Sudeten opinion toward favoring unification with Germany. The Soviet charge d'affaires in Germany was forced to admit that perhaps 90% of the Sudetens favored union with the Reich,[19] Sudetens wrested several towns away from the control of the central government, and the National Socialist Motorcycle Corps patrolled the back roads of Bohemia. Those members of the German government who were responsible for liaison with the Sudeten parties were greatly concerned that events inside Czechoslovakia had gotten out of hand and might no longer serve so well the interests of Germany.

The only formal alliances which were of any importance relative to the Munich Crisis were carry-overs, with modifications, of the early post-war French alliance system. France after the war and well into the 1930's had been the leading practioner of "pactomania". In general the French alliance system was composed of states which sought to maintain the status quo against the revisionist powers. Soviet participation in the French system was a function of a position which was somewhat revisionist, somewhat status quo. Originally the French had been almost as concerned with maintaining the status quo in Eastern Europe, hence a pact with Czechoslovakia pledging mutual support immediate to any unprovoked attack on either party. In 1936

a similiar pact between the Soviet Union and France was ratified. Further, Czechoslovakia was linked with the Soviet Union in a pact providing that if either was the victim of aggression and the recipient of aid from France, then the other would join France in aiding the victim. Thus, in the case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union was bound to act only after France honored its treaty with Czechoslovakia. Belgium had found her position after the occupation of the Rhineland similar to that which it had been before 1914. Accordingly, she had asked and been granted release from her Locarno commitment in return for her agreement to fortify the Belgian border with Germany. Thus France was unable to contemplate entering the Ruhr by the shorter route in a fulfillment of her treaty obligations against Germany.

Through Czechoslovakia France was an original and ardent supporter of the Little Entente, which linked Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia in an attempt to resist changes in Eastern Europe threatened by heirs of the Dual Monarchy. The Little Entente's only significant common bond was a mutual aid pact relevant to an attack on any signatory by Hungary. On almost all else the size of these successor states and the strength of the economic and political winds which buffeted them made it a case of every man for himself.

Finally the round of relevant French alliances was completed by the latest of its agreements with Britain, building on the weakened Locarno structure. This was a non-formal understanding

which Britain and France had publicly asserted in 1936 after the Rhineland had destroyed a broad interpretation of Locarno. For France this was a poor substitute for the long sought Eastern Locarno. It was clear from British and French statements that each had publicly affirmed an obligation to assist the other in the event it was the victim of an unprovoked attack. What was not clear as the Czechoslovakian crisis began was whether Britain would consider a French attack on Germany in support of France's Eastern Treaties a provocation which did not merit a British armed response should Germany then attack France. Moreover, up until the Munich period it was all too clear to France that even if Great Britain in such a situation should read "unprovoked" in a manner favorable to French interests, Britain would probably not intervene until German forces had violated French territory. A country, Eden had said, should not contract "automatic obligations" in an area in which it did not have "vital interest", and Great Britain has none beyond the Rhine.[20] Hence France could and would be forced in large part by the alliance structure to choose between supporting its Czechoslovakian alliance against Germany and risking British inaction, or letting the Czechoslovakian alliance collapse and depending on the much more certain British support in the case that a stronger Germany should then turn toward France.

During the mid-1930's an entente of the major non-status quo powers had begun to develop between Italy, Germany, and Japan. Events growing out of the Ethiopian Crisis and the

Spanish Civil War had laid the foundation for the Rome-Berlin Axis and Japan had become part of the entente when Italy acceded to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Yugoslavia, at one time part of the French system through its membership in the Little Entente, was linked to this grouping through a political accord with the Italian government. None of these alignments had, however, taken the form of alliances by the time of Munich. It was only in 1939 that firm military arrangements began to develop among the Axis powers. In 1938 collaboration among the four was uncertain at best, and even the closest pair, Italy and Germany, were far from any kind of dependence on one another. In March of that year, when Hitler had heard that Mussolini would not oppose the fait accompli of the Anschluss, he had hardly been able to contain his glee - "Tell him I will never forget him for this, never, never, never."[21] Hitler could hope that Mussolini would support him, but he was far from being sure.

BARGAINING SETTING

The principle powers involved in the Munich crisis, those for whom involvement was roughly continuous, were Germany, Great Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia. In general, the status quo in Europe was in a state of flux during the period before Munich. Germany continued efforts to alter the immediate post-World War I status quo, France fled from a Central European status quo which no longer served French conceptions of defense possibilities, and Great Britain sought to bring about a lessening of tensions in Europe through a settlement with either Germany or Italy or perhaps both. It could not be said that relations were particularly bad among any of the major three. British relations were probably better with Germany than were France's relations with Germany. Indeed, since the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which had stunned France, the French were wary for a possible rapproachment between Britain and Germany at French expense. Yet the general course of Anglo-French relations remained satisfactory from the British point of view, if too cool for the French mind.

The Soviet Union, though apparently suffering partial paralysis from the period of the purges, kept up efforts toward greater involvement with Europe. Unlike the French, all signs were that the Soviets placed great hopes in their treaties with France and Czechoslovakia as the promise of the general direction in which they intended their policy to evolve. It was, however, somewhat as an unwelcome intruder that the Soviets sought diplomatic entry into Europe. France, for reasons of implication with the Soviets in existing treaties and domestic political factors, sought to evade

the Soviet embrace, finding it more compatible to edge closer to Britain. Britain, interested in a general settlement, found Soviet advances both time-consuming and unnecessary. Germany was glad to raise the spectre of the Red peril to insulate Europe from Soviet intrusion and make room for itself. The Czech political parties which could stomach the idea of their existing alliance with the Soviet Union were glad the Soviets loomed in the background as Czechoslovakia faced Germany, though equally glad that treaty stipulations would not leave Czechoslovakia locked into war with Germany with the Soviet Union as lone ally.

There was once a time when "appeasement" was not a pejorative term, not a symbol for nervous and guilt-ridden policy. In the early inter-war years appeasement was the touchstone of British policy, an effort to bring Germany back into the family of nations, an effort to deal with the natural predominance of Germany in Central Europe. Initially appeasement meant the taking of steps not out of altruism or fear, but out of a desire to utilize untapped potential as an economic partner and ally. The Weimar years gave an element to the impetus for appeasement which grew more directly out of fear. Later the Hitler government and its talk of forceful treaty revision provided an even stronger, if negative, incentive for appeasement. Hitler appeared dangerous, but merely another extreme proponent of nationalism. By definiton nationalists were satiable. Diplomatic appeasement peaked in 1935 with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and shortly after that point in time fell increasingly in disfavor in official British decision

making circles. The Chamberlain Cabinet inherited the policy of appeasement.

During 1937 policy conflict had engaged British decision makers as they sought an appropriate way of handling increasingly apparent British inferiority in military forces. The Eden - Vansittart group, centered in the Foreign Office, while agreeing with the other group concerning the inferiority of British forces, judged the inferiority temporary and amenable to rectification. For the meantime they favored a policy of very cautious closeness with France and playing for time. The other group was centered around Chamberlain himself and included his more trusted advisers as well as the Chiefs of Staff. This group concluded that Britain would never be able to prepare a defense establishment to fight the probable enemies which would be arrayed against her in a long war. The Chamberlain group held for a dual policy of detaching one of the opposition states from the enemy camp and working for allies in the non-fascist world. Time must be bought, but not simply for rearmament, but for what was considered the more crucial and possible goal of working for the settlement which was still available and which alone promise Britain a chance of avoiding disaster. This group held that Germany was the power most likely to be successfully detached from the Axis and the power with which a detente would be most useful. In its policy of detente this group sought exchange of value with Germany. Estimations were made as to Germany's most likely desires and as to the things wanted by Britain that Germany would most likely be able to grant. For

this group and this policy somewhat of an incompatibility was held to exist between the policy of courting Germany and supporting an alliance, particularly in the case of the British relationship with France. Actions which were held likely to strenghen Anglo-French relations and co-operation in preparation for a possible war were also held as disturbing for the possible detente with Germany. Many of the contemplated steps in the projected detente with Germany were potentially threatening to the stability of the relationship with France.

By 1938 German policy was well on the way to overturning the status quo which in the inter-war years was virtually synonomous with the French system. During the first five years of the Third Reich Germany had proclaimed a policy of "everything for the armed forces." In reality, as noted above, something less than everything had been given the armed forces, but with the policy of military buildup Germany combined an assiduous diplomacy of maneuver to deprive France of her friends. With Britain, Germany mined the lode of Versailles guilt.

Hitler had long abandoned Mein Kampf as a key to foreign policy. Whatever it had once been, it was certainly no longer "the blueprint for aggression", but still accurately reflected the expansionist drive in German foreign policy and the workings of Hitler's mind. From the time of the reoccupation of the Rhineland the French system became purely defensive. Evidence is that in 1938 Hitler believed a European conflict to be inevitable, that Britain in 1938 was practicing appeasement so as so stall

for time in order to complete military preparation against Germany and Italy. Hitler believed that in three years German strength would begin to decline relative to other powers. As Hitler later told his generals, "we are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed."[22] Hitler never contemplated a large war as in Germany's best interest, yet was quite willing to use force and calculate risk. Czechoslovakia would, in Hitler's eyes, be a significant factor in a Franco-German conflict and should, if possible, be eliminated. In late 1937 Hitler seems to have favored an "Austrian" solution for Czechoslovakia, which at any rate, he thought, should not be attempted until Germany was sure that no other state would intervene. In Hitler's conception it was the goal of diplomacy to prepare a political situation such that the temporarily favorable military situation could be fully utilized over the next few years in order to further the development of German predominance in Europe. The domestic pressure of rearmament, social tensions, and dictatorship made the urgency of the international situation all the more compelling. The Third Reich, like the Red Queen in Through the Looking Glass, had to run faster and faster just to stay in place.

The Anschluss had dramatically increased the saliency of Czechoslovakia. As the highly visible first installment on Hitler's February 20 promise to alleviate the suffering of "ten million Germans who live in two of the states adjoining our frontier,"[23] the Anschluss increased the visibility of Czechoslovakia as a problem area. Further, the Anschluss had dramatically

changed Czechoslovakia's strategic position, as it meant that almost instantaneously Czechoslovakia's defensive positions had been outflanked. As the impetus for the outpouring of the violent passion of Sudeten nationalism, it introduced a relatively random element which by June had alarmed statesmen on all sides. Yet it could not be said that the Anschluss signaled the start of the intense crisis over Czechoslovakia. Time was not short, events still seemed manageable. After almost focussing on Czechoslovakia and indicating concern, Britain lapsed back into the more general focus on the settlement with Germany which had characterized British pre-Anschluss diplomacy. Chamberlain's rage over the method, if not the strategic import, of the Anschluss rapidly subsided. On March 24 Britain made it clear that she was not commiting herself to defend Czechoslovakia in case of attack, or France if she acted in support of Czechoslovakia. She did, however, under her Locarno obligations, reserve that right.

French Premier Daladier reaffirmed France's obligations to Czechoslovakia in the wake of the Anschluss. Without perceiving an immediate danger of war, the French sought, as they had before the Anschluss, to rally Britain to French support. Once Hitler had, as it was said at the time, "digested Austria," French commitment to Czechoslovakia might be called. The French wanted to be spared being called. In Anglo-French ministerial confererence at the end of April Foreign Minister Bonnet urged closer co-operation, yet the two powers were unable to agree on more than pressing Czechoslovakia to open negotiations with the Sudeten

Germans. On May 17 the Czechs agreed, reluctantly. Czech President Benes held that Czechoslovakia could never be a national state, but could reassure himself "that if things come to a crisis, the West...must stand by (Czechoslovakia)."[24]

Germany too was content to bide her time after the Anschluss. It will be remembered that the Anschluss was precipitated by partial inadvertence. Hitler was like a tank commander who has outrun his supply line. Indeed, between March and June it was not forseen as possible that Germany could easily reduce Czechoslovakia and certainly not by military means. Hitler still envisioned Italian initiative being fundamental to reducing Czechoslovakia in some sort of combined action involving the distraction of France. Further, the Axis needed repair. Hitler may have told Mussolini he would never forget him for his standing aside during the Anschluss, but it was problematic if Mussolini would ever forget the threatening growth of the German colossus. Indeed, it was the Duce who gave the strongest warning to Germany in this period. If the Germans tried to move a South Tyrol frontier post "one single yard," Mussolini promised, they will "learn that it cannot be done without the most bitter war, in which I shall combine the whole world into a coalition against Germanism, and we shall crush Germany for at least two centuries."[25]

The most intense phase of the Munich crisis, the point at which the crisis began to partake of all the elements Snyder has associated with an international crisis, began with the Sudeten German's breaking off of negotiations with the Prague government

in September. Yet in order to obtain a proper picture of the flow of policy it is best to compromise with definition and begin action analysis in the wake of the May crisis. On May 19-22 an intense crisis had developed as the Czechs had partially mobilized to prevent what they saw as a likely repetition of an Anschluss-like crisis over Czechoslovakia. Tensions which developed around Czech municipal elections and reports of German military activity appear to have set the crisis off and pushed it to a level unintended by the actors involved. Western support for Czechoslovakia reached a level it was never again to approach. Indicating a mobilization order on his desk, Daladier had said to the German Ambassador, "It depends on you, Excellency, whether I sign this document or not."[26]

The effect of the May crisis was the creation of feelings of fear and anger in Britain and France. Fear that another such uncontrollable incident would ignite actual hostilities and anger that Czechoslovakia had imperiled the peace of Europe. Chamberlain was disturbed by the actions of "small nations who have no responsibility."[27] Czechoslovakia stood in the way of a settlement. Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, wrote that "A second 21 of May will push (Hitler) over the edge, that I truly and honestly believe: if not of actual madness, then of mad action."[28]

In Germany the May crisis produced rapid ratification of a change in policy. No longer would Germany maintain the Sudeten Germany Party and hope that Sudeten intransigence would erode the Czech state. On May 6 Ribbentrop had told Ciano, his Italian

counterpart, that "the matter was not urgent, a regional autonomy system might delay the solution for several years."[29] On May 30, in a top secret military directive, Hitler stated "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."[30]

It was not, however, true that Hitler's mind was suddenly changed by the May crisis in his planning for operations against Czechoslovakia. Rather, in the immediate post-Anschluss period Hitler must have begun thinking about modifying the relatively leisurely and more opportunistic plans that were indicated in the celebrated Hossbach Memorandum of November 5, 1937. He told Henlein after the Anschluss that he intended "to settle the Sudeten problem in the not too distant future." Sometime before May he had said that "Austria must be digested first,"[31] which implies there was a second step. It was found that because of communication problems Austria did not pose such a springboard for attack against Czechoslovakia as had originally been supposed. Yet keeping the situation open through the Sudeten violence posed problems of control which both the Wehrmacht and Foreign Ministry feared might precipitate a crisis. Finally the May crisis erupted, in part from the drunken martyrdom of a pair of Sudeten predecessors to the Hell's Anglels. German prestige was injured by the Czech mobilization, as was the aggressive image which time since the Anschluss was slowly repairing. The May crisis seems to have precipitated out the elements in Hitler's mind that were pushing toward action. On May 28 he said that offensive and defensive

weaknesses prevented an attack at that time, but set about correcting them, as well as preparing German public opinion. On May 30 he indicated the political requisite of preparing a situation in which the military preparation could be best utilized. That meant isolating Czechoslovakia from possible support, from her friends. He soon set about doing this.

The conflict of interest relative to the Munich crisis concerned the status of Czechoslovakia as a geographic area and also the status of Czechoslovakia as the possessor of substantial military power in the European balance of power. Czechoslovakia's territory was like a swinging door separating Central Europe from Eastern and Southesatern Europe. Hence, as land area it had utility for both enchroachment and resistance to enchroachment in the whole area. This utility related to both more purely political and economic considerations as well as military considerations. The military power which Czechoslovakia possessed was the latch on the swinging door and represented in itself considerable significance in the exercise of influence in the European arena. Central to the viability of the military power which Czechoslovakia possessed was the line of fixed defenses along the border with Germany in Sudeten territory.

The immediate, ostensible issue of the Munich crisis was the status of the ethnic minorities within Czechoslovakia. The minority of the very greatest importance as an issue were the Germans, though during the crisis the question expanded to include the status of other minorities within the state. The notion of status

as an issue involved two elements. First, it involved questions of fact, that is, how were the Sudeten Germans actually being treated by the central government of Czechoslovakia. Secondly, it involved questions of the Sudeten German's future formal relationship to Czechoslovakia. The later question was limited not simply to possibilities of inclusion either in Germany or Czechoslovakia, but involved a number of other alternatives as well.

By the time the Munich crisis had begun there was, with the exception of Czechoslovakia herself, no state in Europe for whom the stakes were as high relative to Czechoslovakia as they were for Germany. Strategically Czechoslovakia represented what has been called "a pistol pointing at the heart of Germany" or an "aircraft carrier deep inside Germany." With her defensive strength and connection with Geneva, Paris, and Moscow, her previously displayed antipathy to Germany, and her logical fundamentality to the post-war status quo, Czechoslovakia stood in the way of any revival of German power to a position of paramountcy in Europe. For both Hitler and his generals, whatever their differences in terms of visions of the ultimate possibilities inherent in Germany's overturning the status quo, Czechoslovakia represented a crucial obstacle standing between where they were and where they wanted to go. Even if the equations of the geopoliticians were thrown out, Czechoslovakia remained the key to Central Europe. Moreover, at least in some eyes in Germany, on control of Central Europe rested the outcome of a Franco-German war, and on the possible

outcome of a Franco-German war rested the possibility of colonial restitution.

In France, which was increasing turning and being pushed inward by Germany's return, Czechoslovakia was seen as having less strategic significance, or more precisely, strategic significance as a general concept did not weigh as heavily in the French conception of things. For France Czechoslovakia was in a sense an unwelcome burden since she no longer possessed a substantial aggressive threat to a rearmed and expanded Germany. Czechoslovakia was seen as a potential liability for France, a commitment made which might result either in war or in a disaster for the world's conception of French honor.

For Britain as well, at least for the dominant soft line faction, Czechoslovakia was more of a hindrance to policy's intended course than an asset to be treasured. The passions which connected the Sudetens to the Reich stood in the way of the general settlement which the British sought. Time might take care of Czechoslovakia through what Goring had called a "chemical dissolution of the state".but in the meantime Hitler's rushing of that dissolution threatened to disrupt the process of peaceful change which Chamberlain sought to employ as a device for settlement. In Britain as well as France considerations of bargaining reputation were present as one aspect of the stakes over Czechoslovakia. Indeed, in Britain in particular, preservation of an image of resistance to threats of force was almost the only more positive stake directly involved in Czechoslovakia. Britain and

France would, as was later said about another troublesome small state, have been glad if Czechoslovakia had simply sunk into the sea. Shakespeare's "seacoasts of Bohemia" were not, however, available to British and French decision makers.

July 18 Germany explores the possibility of reaching a high-level settlement on outstanding issues between Germany and Great Britain.

Captain Weidemann, Corporal Hitler's former platoon commander, and now his aide-de-camp, brought to London a message containing elements of threat, good will, and encouragement. Hitler and Goering had carefully orchestrated the mission as their own and outside the regular channels of diplomacy. Orchestration as a private venture seems to have been dictated by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's strong opposition to any kind of accomodation with Britain. Timing seems to have been dictated by the latest of Ambassador Dirksen's apparently persuasive calls from London for a settlement with Britain and also by a desire to weaken the demonstration of Western cohesion implicit in the visit of the British King and Queen to Paris, scheduled for July 19.[32]

Weidemann expressed German interest in personal contact to Halifax and Chamberlain. Noting Hitler's disappointment with the events of May, Weidemann went on to express German's guarantees of peaceful intentions, Hitler's desires for friendship with Britain, and German desires for a more general settlement with Britain. Yet should some Sudetens be "massacred" by the Czechs, Wiedermann said, Germany might be forced to intervene. He however stated that "in present circumstances the German Government were planning no kind of forcible action."[33]

It was indeed Germany's desire to work out a general settlement with Britain, a theme which ran through both Hitler's and more traditional German decision makers' thoughts on foreign policy.

Wiedemann's statements concerning massacred Sudeten Germans were designed, as many other such German statements made in the crisis period, to convey German interest in Sudeten German affairs as legitimate. This was subterfuge in that invasion preparations were actually under way at this time and in that it was planned by Hitler to use a selected or even created event to justify the invasion, but only when preparations were complete.

The French, when they were told of the visit contrasted Wiedemann's assurances with recent German military preparations. This was, however, the kind of personal, man-to-man communication which Chamberlain favored. Coming at a time when negotiations in Czechoslovakia were clearly going nowhere and amid a barrage of reports of German preparations for war, the Wiedemann Mission heartened Chamberlain in his efforts to dispose of the Czechoslovak problem as the first step in a general settlement which would relieve Great Britain of the huge and, Chamberlain held, unbearable burden of preparing the military establishment for facing three powers at once. In the face of growing opposition to the course he had charted, coming both from the Foreign Office and even from the Cabinet, Chamberlain, unlike Halifax and others, perceived the Wiedmann Mission as an event of singular importance. In Cabinet Chamberlain spoke of Captain Wiedmann's "most binding assurance." This, like so many other apparently minor communications from Hitler to the West during the crisis, is difficult to directly link to any particular Western action. Yet additively the effect of these communications seems substantial. If there was a tendency toward

being unsure of oneself, such a communication was always there, ready to grasp. In the same message the carrot (general settlement) coexisted with the stick (action if Sudetens are "massacred"). That the carrot loomed larger in the foreground did not diminish the fact of the stick's presence in the background. Indeed, to many minds the threat of the stick made the carrot seem even more tempting.

July 20 The British suggest to the Czechs that mediation might be substituted for the faltering process of face-to-face negotiations between Prague and the Sudeten Germans. Britain backs her suggestion with the contingent threat that if the Czechs should refuse the mediator and negotiations should then break down, Britain might then publish the suggestion and the Czech response. Finally, the Czechs are asked in the interest of public opinion to request the mediator themselves.

The idea of either a mediator or arbitrator had been sporadically under consideration in Britain since April 30. The British desired a settlement but were increasingly pessimistic about the possibility for the solution of a centuries old problem being found in the atmosphere of 1938. Moreover, since the May crisis the British were not just pessimistic, but were also fearful of another crisis and war scare. Particular factors considered by the British in making this decision were continued reports of German military preparations, continued German attention to the question of Czechoslovakia, Henlein's oft-stated dissatisfactions with the sincerity of Czech negotiations, and British fear that the Czechs might take some step which would both doom negotiations and excite Germany into action. Hence with the objective of increasing the likelihood of

successful fruition in the negotiations, the British quite self-consciously sought to get an element that they could control interjected into the negotiations. As Henderson, in a minor panic, had written Halifax from Berlin on July 18, "...I wish we had our independent mediator already on the spot...Much as we may hate doing it, we have got to be disagreeable to the Czechs - in their own interests as well as ours."[34] Lord Runciman, with experience in business negotiations, was chosen as the mediator.

The effect of this move on Great Britain, once it had been accepted by France and Czechoslovakia, was to increase British involvement and commitment, hence both control and responsibility, in the Czechoslovakian problem. It soon became clear, if it had not already been, that Runicman was far from neutral. He was Britain's agent and acted accordingly.

The British had calculated that, in addition to the threat made to abandon Czechoslovakia to world opinion in the event the Czechs rejected mediation and negotiations collapsed, their plan might have some positive appeal to Czechoslovakia in that it did contain some increased British commitment to Czechoslovakia. When they first heard the plan the Czechs were stunned, seeing it as an incredible breach of their sovereignty, which ultimately would take control of the Sudeten question out of their hands. Czechoslovakia first sought French aid in fending off the British offer, complaining through their ambassador in Paris that the British plan threw them at the mercy of Germany in the long run if they accepted and in the short run if they refused.[35] The French, initially miffed

at the cavalier manner in which they had been informed of the British undertaking at mediation, supported the logic of Czech objections. Ultimately Bonnet, de Monzie and other soft liners on the Sudeten question prevailed and the French Cabinet backed off from their support of the Czech objections provided that Runciman was to be a mediator and not an arbitrator. At the sametime Hodza and others who valued the implicit enhanced British commitment prevailed in Czechoslovakia and by July 23 the Czechs had relented and, as asked by the British, requested mediation.

The results of the British proposal and Czech acceptance of mediation were quite significant. Initiative would be increasingly in Britain's hands and an insidious logic was furthered whereby France and Czechoslovakia would be less able to reject British conclusions, whether reached by Runciman in Czechoslovakia, or in London.[36] The Sudenten Germans too, in that they accepted mediation, would become more vulnerable to British conclusions. Only Germany, with its attitude of aloofness to the Runciman Mission, was able to avoid being implicated in its results. Germany was, more than any party, free to reject the results of the Runciman Mission. Hence, given their desire for success in the negotiations, the logic of the situation tended to push Runciman into producing results pleasing to Germany.

August 11 — Chamberlain and Halifax send a direct appeal to Hitler, outside the normal diplomatic channels, asking Hitler to reduce German military measures lest the tension be exacerbated, the Czechs respond, negotiations falter, and peace be endangered.

August 20 Hitler ignores the British appeal and has Ribbentrop reply through normal channels that British attention to internal events in Germany is inappropriate.

The British move was caused by considerations resulting from their concern over an increasing number of reports coming in both from the press and official British, French, Russian, and Czech sources concerning military preparations in Germany. These reports were true and there is no evidence that they were encouraged by official German sources, though they no doubt fit in well with Hitler's desires to create an atmosphere of crisis and to impress others with German strength. In the main, however, German military preparations at this point were directly related to necessary preparations for the actual attack on Czechoslovakia. Only later in August were some military moves to take on a demonstration character. At this point the Germans made the effort to camouflage such preparations as an earlier than usual set of Fall manuevers. The German intention in planning was to shift from massive manuevers in Silesia and Saxony in order to facilitate the invasion of Czechoslovakia in late September. British information sources indicated from secret channels on August 3 a plan for a partial test mobilization in September. Though Chamberlain in particular still retained faith in Hitler's basically good intentions, he was alarmed when Henderson reported from Berlin (incorrectly) that German military preparations resulted from National Socialist fanatics' gaining control of the policy - making process.

Hitler did not see the British appeal, which had been handed to Lammers, Chief of the Reichskanzlei, until August 17. A combination of bureaucratic jealousy (Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's resentment at being outflanked) and Hitler's being out of Berlin partially accounts for the delay in reponse. After August 17, when Hitler handed the British memorandum to the Foreign Ministry for reponse, Hitler appears to have taken advantage of the extra-regular nature of the message to avoid dealing with the substance of the message. In effect Germany said, "You asked an improper question. I didn't hear you." Hence, by relying on formal standards of diplomatic behavior the Germans politely ignored a significant British move dealing with what amounted to a state of partial mobilization in Germany. British alarm was momentarily shunted aside, but it was not quelled, as events of August 27 were to indicate.

August 17 — Great Britain receives, from a group inside Germany, an irregular warning as to Hitler's intentions.

On August 17, Ewald von Kliest met in London with Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the Cabinet. Von Kliest was one of the above-mentioned conspirators against Hitler's plans to invade Czechoslovakea. His efforts in mid-August were a continuation of the conspirator's efforts to cause Britain to stand firm. Their warnings were receiving increasingly more attention as the crisis developed. The response they produced in August was typical of their effect on British decision making.

From the Spring on, various Germans had been contacting in-

dividuals in the British Embassy in Berlin and individuals in the London government who they perceived (correctly) as favoring a stronger stand against Hitler. In London this group of resisters or perhaps hard liners included Vansittart, Churchill, and Duff Cooper. The German conspirators' message was invariably the same - Hitler intends to march in late September. Britain should stand firmly against this. Their collective goal seems not necessarly to have been to bring Hitler's regime down. Rather the conspirators sought, negatively, to prevent Germany's being involved in a war she would lose. Since the German political system did not permit their controlling policy to this end, they sought to use the international system to this effect. Positively, the conspirators, generally monarchists and militarists, hoped to increase their influence in the regime in the wake of a policy failure which would discredit more fervent Nazis.

Chronologically at least, there is evidence that the conspirators' decision to contact Britain again relates to the latest in their failures to obtain satisfaction in the sphere of German decision making. On August 4 a group of military commanding generals had, after a long period of hesitancy, met and prepared a dissent from Hitler's plans against Czechoslovakia. When presented with their objections Hitler had called a meeting on August 10. (It is significant that Hitler, in an ominous end-run, did not meet with the objecting generals, but with their seconds-in-command.) Here Hitler raged for several hours. When one general objected that the West Wall could not be held for three weeks,

Hitler stormed, "I assure you, general, this position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years if need be!" [37] The generals were cowed. On August 10 the conspirators, despairing in the German decision process, sent Von Kliest to Britain.

Ironically, in their efforts to influence British behavior, the conspirators seem to have produced something approaching the opposite effect than that which they intended. Indeed, one would be hard put to think of a better way of conveying Hitler's commitment to fight in late September. The conspirators operated on the mistaken assumption that Great Britain would stand firm if convinced that Hitler meant to attack in September. Those Britons they talked to were already commited to a harder position against Hitler. Chamberlain, Henderson, and other soft liners were, it seems, maintained in their course toward settlement by the concern which the warnings engendered. The Prime Minister compared the conspirators with distaste to "the Jacobites in the Court of France in King William's time" and was moved to "confess to some feeling of uneasiness." Further, he said, "I don't feel sure that we ought not to do something." The "something" which Chamberlain contemplated doing was not standing firm, but rather a heightening of British efforts in the course that had already been chosen. The French were not notified of the conspirators' contacts with Britain. For British policy the consistancy of images held sway.

August 27 — Sir John Simon, a member of Cabinet, publicly affirms the British position as stated by Chamberlain March 24 that, if war broke out, "it would be quite impossible to say where it would end and what governments would be involved."[38]

The decision to make what was from the perspective of British intentions the major warning of August 27 had been reached at a meeting of four Cabinet members on August 24. This was, it will be remembered, shortly after Chamberlain's private warning to Hitler of August 11 had been brushed off by Ribbentrop as inappropriate interference.

The decision was easily defended at a larger Cabinet meeting on August 30. Again, as in the case of the August 11 appeal to Hitler, the British move was dictated by a concern over the German military measures and British desire to restrain such measures in the interest of reaching a peaceful solution in Czechoslovakia. At this time Halifax and Chamberlain believed that Hitler's military preparations meant either that he had definitely decided to intervene, or that he had decided to use force to make threats in order to obtain his wishes in Czechoslovakia.[39] If this were true, then a clear warning might be the best means of forestalling Hitler. They concluded that a clear threat of war against German invasion of Czechoslovakia might deter Hitler, but that a threat should not be made which could not be supported. The Cabinet did not believe that either the British public or the Commonwealth would support such a threat. Further, the majority in the British Cabinet feared that a firm threat in support of Czechoslovakia might lead to Czech in-

transigence at the negotiating table. Hence the best they could do was, as they said, "to keep Herr Hitler guessing."

An additional consideration in the timing of the British decision was the deterioration of negotiations in Czechoslovakia, as evidenced on August 17 by the Sudentendeutsche Party's (SdP) sharp rejection of Czechoslovakia's Second Plan,[40] which represented significant movement toward the Karlsbad demands. British fears that an incident in Czechoslovakia would either set Hitler off or be used as an excuse for military posturing or action increased as the official optimism which had accompanied the beginnings of the Runciman mission faded. Finally, British decision makers had long viewed the National Socialist Party Congress scheduled for September 5 - 12 as a deadline of sorts in their efforts to reach a solution in the Czech problem. It was not that the Germans had made any particular threats relative to this date, but rather that British reading of Hitler's previous behavior had convinced them that the Congress would be used, as had other such occasions in the Third Reich's past, to make important announcements relative to Hitler's sequential modification of the status quo. With particular reference to Hitler's concluding address scheduled for September 12, British decision makers, and indeed many others, considered time to be running out.

The objective of the British move on August 27 was to raise the risk of British intervention without incurring the obligation of intervention should their warning fail and Hitler act.[41] Moreover, the British goal was to convey the warning "without risking

a further aggrevation of the situation by any formal representation which might have been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebuff."[42] The experience of May 21 and its aftermath cautioned them against this. The hope was that the uncertainty which the British move created in Hitler's mind would be sufficient to deter Hitler from violent action. Further, it was hoped that the ambiguous British position might avoid the above mentioned British fear of emboldening the Czechs in their negotiations with the SdP to the point of intransigence and fruitless negotiations. On September 6 a German Foreign Ministry secret memo dealing with the attitudes of various powers to war took note, without comment, of the British statement of August 27. There is no evidence that the ambiguous British warning affected Hitler's calculations in the slightest.

August 29 Hitler visits the West Wall.

An impressive visit by Hitler and a virtual platoon of high - ranking German generals to the bridge between Kehl and Strasburg on August 29 added to the salience of the German buildup in the West. It is unclear to what extent Hitler's visit was intended to add psychological weight to the French perspective. At the time Hitler definitely intended that the fortifications which he was inspecting on August 29 have such weight for Belgian behavior in the crisis. "They (The Belgians) must see from the construction of fortifications near their frontier that Belguim will be a battlefield if they attack us, or if they permit the French to march through,"[43] Hitler said. Further, Hitler was having

substantial problems in convincing his generals that the Czechoslovakian operation could be carried out successfully. His western visit was definitely related to efforts to bolster the military. Moreover, given what is known about the weight such things as new or modern weapons had in Hitler's calculations of the military balance, it seems from his pleased discovery that his troops could not be, as he said, "shot out" of their lines,[44] that the western visit as a side effect heartened Hitler himself in his course.

September 2 — The Chief of the French General Staff visits, as a friend, the German military attache and points out that German military measures require a French response. That same night France undertakes a partial mobilization with emphasis on fortress troops and anti-aircraft formations.

The French action appears to have related to the general trend of German preparations in the west. In conversation the French representative made it clear to his German counterpart that the measures taken by France derived from the military necessity created by the German actions and in that sense emphasized the technical rather than diplomatic genesis of the French measures. Included in the French verbal communication was a clear offer of stepping military measures down if Germany were also to do so.

Very deliberately the French had only mobilized forces with defensive utility, apparently, it appears, to pose a finely calculated, but not alarmingly excessive threat to Germany. From projection forward of respective positions taken at a German

military staff conference held during Hitler's western visit, one can fairly suppose the French actions' having two different effects in Germany.

Hitler's estimation of French intentions was not altered by the French mobilization. Indeed, the very fact that it was limited may have reinforced him in his estimation as to the extent of French commitment. As he had judged on August 28, French mobilization of offensive forces, unless it were to occur before the attack on Czechoslovakia, could not bring effective force to bear for an incursion to Germany in less that six plus days. In such time Hitler held that German forces could be transferred from the offensive against Czechoslovakia (Hitler later, after Munich, admitted to having been wrong on this). Hence, the French partial mobilization did not threaten Hitler, who was planning not the assault on France which would have made the mobilization relevant, but a limited assault on Czechoslovakia. His political judgment that France would not cross into Germany to save a Czechoslovakia that had already been lost (as events in 1939-40 were to bear out) made the six plus days required in France for offensive mobilization irrelevant to Hitler's military calculations relative to Czechoslovakia. That these six days on the French mobilization calendar were left unfilled-in meant that the French projection of commitment to Czechoslovakia was differentiated in Hitler's mind from Frances's September 2 projection of commitment to French territory itself.

On the other hand, German senior military men felt heightened

insecurity as a result of the French partial mobilization. Hence they too were maintained in their general conclusions about the advisibility of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. All along they had believed that Germany would ultimately loose in an attack on Czechoslovakia. For them, French partial mobilization could only maintain their fear that France would offensively mobilize behind her already mobilized defenses once the attack on Czechoslovakia had begun. In their estimation France would then, with British aid, proceed to wear Germany down in a long war.

September 2 Halder, on his first day as Chief of the German General Staff, sends an envoy to Britain to warn the West to stand firm.

Again, the conspirators were operating on the basis of an inaccurate image of British decision makers. In the conspirators' eyes British and French standing firm would follow from the British and French being convinced that Hitler intended to invade Czechoslovakia. If the British stood firm, the French would stand firm, and, in the conspirators' most optimistic calculations, Hitler could be destroyed, saving Germany from the ruin of a long war. Unfortunately for the conspirators' calculations, they were succeeding in the first part of their equation and thus contributing to the confounding of what they thought would follow. The British (who never mentioned these messages to the French) were growing more and more convinced that Hitler meant to do something about Czechoslovakia, in part by the messages of the conspirators. Increasingly, Chamberlain was to justify his actions on consid-

erations toward influencing the moderates in Germany. It was the conspirators' contacts which served as the most salient evidence of German moderates' existence. If Britain were to fight, the principle British decision makers concluded, it must be only as a last resort. In the meantime legitimate German desires to protect fellow Germans must be dealt with.

September 2 — The Soviet Union suggests to France that, in support of their joint treaties with Czechoslovakia, military staff talks be instituted and the League be utilized to seek authorization for Soviet transit of of Rumania.

As usual during the crisis period the Soviets appeared to be standing firm in support of Czechoslovakia. As usual the Soviets, though active diplomatically and perhaps potentially quite important, had no significant influence on the crisis outcome. In this case the Soviet offer was shunted aside through Bonnet's purposeful misrepresentation. To his own government he omitted mention of the offer of staff talks, and made the proposal of League action appear a proposal intended to bog things down. To Chamberlain he did the same. Two weeks later, Chamberlain was still under the impression that Soviet aid was likely to be limited to placing Czechoslovakia on the League agenda. When Churchill, who had the true account, mentioned the Soviet approach to Halifax, it was dismissed out of hand as not "helpful".[45]

Again, lack of documentation makes it difficult to even sketch the calculations behind this Soviet offer. Clearly the

Soviets sought to present a hard line on resistance to German encroachment in Czechoslovakia. Interpretations which see Soviet subterfuge in what they claim was Soviet foreknowledge that their proposals would not be accepted[46] should receive all credit that is due for being wise after the fact. On September 2 it could not have been clear to the Soviets that the West would eventually buckle under as it did. On paper the Soviet stance in favor of resistance is generally impeccable and, indeed, one must ask what more they might have done. Of course, the same geographic situation and structure of the Soviet treaty with Czechoslovakia which made it difficult for the Soviets to intervene without French action ultimately saved the Soviets from being called on in their offer. Bonnet's elaborate misrepresentation (which in itself indicated one perception of the potential significance of the Soviet offer) made it more unlikely that the French would act and in a sense, as events progressed, locked Germany's opponents into other courses of action. Halifax's dismissal of the offer as not "helpful" contributed to that same logic which narrowed alternatives, as in movement down a funnel. Both men's judgments and actions appear to have been vitally affected by the same funnel-like narrowing of alternatives which their actions produced in policy. For both, explanations must be found in the psychological cost of steering a course in a time of increasing crisis.

September 2 Runciman tells Benes that "if it came to a choice between the acceptance of the Karlsbad programme and war he should be under no illusion as to what the British choice would be."

September 4 Newton, on Halifax's instructions, tells Benes that the Karlsbad proposals are the minimum British requirements of Czechoslovakia. If it came to war he said, Czechoslovakia would be a battlefield and "however favorable the final outcome it (is) more than doubtful that Czechoslovakia would be re-established in its present form."[47]

September 4 Benes offers Sudeten negotiators a blank sheet of paper on which to write their demands. The next day the Czech Cabinet approves Benes' action and puts forward the Fourth Plan which features virtual total accession to Sudeten demands.

During the summer Benes had offered a series of proposals which had come closer and closer to approximating the entirety of the Karlsbad program. Each of these proposals had been rejected by the SdP after consultation with Germany. Rejections had been followed by increased British and French pressure on Czechoslovakia to yield. In the few days before September 4, British pressure in particular had grown incessant. This, it will be remembered, was a result of pressures the British themselves felt and of decisions growing out of the meeting of August 24 and the week following. (Halifax had suggested, without immediate results, that the French join Britain "to twist Benes tail").[48]

Perhaps it is to confuse gymnastics with being pushed down the stairs, but it appears that during the negotiations Benes had been concerned with maneuvering so as to demonstrate Czechoslovakia's good faith pitted against what he knew were considerably less than genuine antagonists at the bargaining table. There was however, something more than just a fortunate result in Benes'

maneuverings, for it was clear that in maneuvering he had gradually relinquished control in a logic that made Czechoslovakia more and more dependent on outside salvation. Indeed, this logic was inherent in his maneuvering. In effect what Benes was attempting to say to Britain and France was, "We've given ourself over on your advice, now protect us." What Britain and (ultimately) France were saying to Czechoslovakia was "You've given so much, you can give a little more and we won't have to protect you."

Hence showing Czechoslovakia as well-intentioned, the SdP as insincere, and thus implicating Britain and France in Czechoslovakia's interest, had been the positive considerations behind Bene's move. Negatively, if Benes did not yield given the British warning, Czechoslovakia would lose her only possible support. Hence by yielding to all the Sudeten demands Benes retained British and French support, or at a minimum avoided losing it.

The Fourth Plan would have commited Czechoslovakia to granting relative autonomy to the Sudeten Germans. By implication, given the other unhappy minorities in Czechoslovakia, its acceptance by the Czechs increased Czechoslovakia's vulnerability to minority pressure. However, the Sudeten negotiators' response to the Czech maneuver had been "My God, they've given us everything",[48] and then a rapid casting about for excuses on which to terminate negotiations. By September 7 Henlein had managed to stage an incident which allowed the breaking off of negotiations.

September 7 — The London Times suggests that it would be desirable to cede Sudeten areas to Germany.

September 7 — The British Foreign Office denies that The Times' suggestion represents the views of the British Government.

The Times was widely viewed abroad as the semi-official organ of the British government. Both the history of The Times' positions and the close personal connection between officials of The Times and officials of the government supported this. The Times position of September 7 was a restatement of Chamberlain's reputed off-the-record comments in April (which he would not deny). British policy as it had been made known to Germany certainly did not accept the idea of cession officially, and as we will see, the later suggestion of cession by Germany was to set Britain aback. The vigorous official denial following The Times statement suggests that cession was not yet official policy, and there is no evidence to suggest that this was a trial balloon. Germans, however, were encouraged in that they assumed, correctly, that The Times editorial reflected opinion held by individuals close to Chamberlain and Halifax.[49] Later they would be able to present cession as a British suggestion.

September 7-15 — Rioting spreads throughout the Sudetenland. By September 13 parts of the Sudetenland are in total revolt.

The rioting grew out of incidents that the SdP appears to have staged in order to justify their breaking off of negotiations in the wake of Benes' granting their demands. Moreover, though Hitler's September 12 speech wildly exacerbated the revolt, it does

not appear that Henlein and Hitler acting together intentionally created the revolt. Hitler's basic intention, as conveyed to Henlein in conferences on September 1-2,[50] was to continue the negotiations in apparent good faith until the time came for the attack. After Benes' maneuver of granting all of the Karlsbad demands, the SdP could not remain in negotiations and appear legitimately as an unsatisfied minority. Not knowing where to turn and unable to immediately contact Germany, Henlein had to find his way to avoid responding to the Czech offer. The increasing tempo of revolt may have been furthered by some SdP leaders in an attempt to force Hitler's hand (They themselves were not sure of his intentions). In part the magnitude of the revolt was a function of a Czech crackdown which sought to utilize the revolt to eliminate knots of armed resistance in the Sudetenland. Perhaps the largest component of the revolt was sincerely felt and highly exacerbated national passion among the Sudeten Germans.

The uncontrolled and unexpected revolt in Czechoslovakia verged on forcing Hitler to act. As far as an appropriate time for the German Army's coming to the aid of oppressed Germans, the Sudeten revolt was a perfect excuse before world opinion. Hitler had threatened action should one more German be killed; dozens were dying. Accordingly, on September 15, Hitler ordered military planners to determine if the attack could be launched earlier than intended. Yet earlier decisions relative to utilization of trains in last minute construction of the West Wall were to prove to have made early attack impossible. Jodl correctly

observes that Hitler's decision on West Wall construction limited German freedom to move. In the interim Hitler was bogged down in the negotiations with Chamberlain and by the ultimate resistance which was to prevent his military action in 1938.[51]

In Britain as well the Sudeten rioting in the wake of Benes' move almost forced a major action. On September 9 Halifax drafted the strongest warning Britain had yet made relative to the Czechoslovak crisis. Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, was instructed to deliver a demarche to both Ribbentrop and Hitler at the Party Congress. In the demarche Henderson was to warn that France would support Czechoslovakia and that "it seems to His Majesty's government inevitable that the sequence of events must result in a general conflict from which Great Britain could not stand aside."[52] This would have been Britain's first connection of "inevitable" British action to attack on Czechoslovakia. Fear and policy inertia were to prevent its being delivered.

Beginning on September 8 British decision makers feverishly sought to find a way to stabilize what they saw as a situation deteriorating on all sides. In particular they feared that Hitler might commit himself irretrievably during the Party Congress. British ministers feared developments in Czechoslovakia and the implications of warnings which had been received from inside Germany and which seemed to indicate a major move's being planned for the last half of September. Again, as in their deliberation before their August 27 warning, the British argued rather precisely over the utility and exact nature of a warning which they

might use to forestall Hitler. Judgment was about equally divided between those who believed a calculated, clear warning was the worst course and those who thought it the best course. Halifax and Chamberlain, supported by the ambassadors in Berlin and Prague, judged that, as Chamberlain was to say, "the formal warning would not stop Hitler, if determined on that course (war), and if not yet decided on it, might drive him to adopt the course that the Cabinet were anxious to avoid."[53] Halifax added that Hitler was "possibly or even probably mad."[54]

The presence of the hard liner Vansittart, along with some ambiguity in Halifax's mind carried the day, however, and the demarche noted above was telegraphed to Ambassador Henderson at Nuremberg.

Henderson, who had been, in his own frantic words "running around like a lunatic",[55] balked at delivering the demarche. Preferring more gentle suasion, Henderson begged to be let out of the chore of calling "a man who is bluffing with a full house in his hand."[56] In London, in Vansittart's absence, Henderson's bureaucratic demarche found a ready, if fickle, audience. In reply, Halifax indicated that the demarche to Germany need not be delivered provided "our meaning and intentions were fully understood by Germany."[57] A man as near mental collapse as Henderson was glad to take the out that had been gladly granted and, thinking over his morning's efforts, continued his tiresome repetition of earlier and milder statements. In a sense the tie-breaking vote of the man in the field had pushed British

policy back into the tracks which it momentarily had left.

September 10 Bonnet asks Britain, "Will you march with us in the event France is involved in war over Czechoslovakia?"[58]

French diplomacy had been relatively quiescent over the summer, maintaining the course settled into during the spring. During this period the French had contented themselves with occasional firm statements of support for the Czech alliance, yet had clearly subordinated their initiative in the question of Czechoslovakia to the British lead. While little detailed information seems to exist concerning the French decision process in early September, it appears from French diplomatic communications with Britain that around September 8 (shortly after the situation rapidly begain to deteriorate in Czechoslovakia), a shift began to occur in French thinking. By September 9 the French were convinced, given the uncertainty of the British commitment to France and hence to Czechoslovakia, that Germany had decided to attack Czechoslovakia. Accordingly the French government, facing the heightened prospect of war, began, as in the spring, a series of moves designed to obtain a firm British commitment. The moves were in the form of tentative questioning at the ambassadorial level. Bonnet's question of September 10 represented the development of that series of questions.

September 12 In response to the French question of September 10, the British answered: "While His Majesty's Government would never allow the security of France to be threatened, they are unable to make precise statements of the character of their future action, or the time at which it would be taken, in circumstances that they cannot at present forsee."[59]

On September 12, the British Cabinet had discussed the desirability of a process, as they termed it, of "neither applying the brake nor the accelerator to France."[60] Throughout the crisis' development the British had been faced with this dilemma. Some attention was given to the problem of avoiding disheartening France. Yet in particular the British had been haunted by the idea of a firm British commitment's emboldening France to the point that she could no longer be controlled in the interest of settlement in Europe. In British eyes France's perception of her strategic situation might be so sufficiently altered with Britain locked-in to commitment that French moves might, at the least, alienate Germany and Italy from Britain and, at the most, precipitate war, which Britain, with her concern for continental balance, must inevitably be affected by, commitment or not.

September 12 (Subsequent to British response to France). At a party rally Hitler demands self-determination for the Sudeten Germans and promises that Germany will defend the Sudeten Germans if asked. He expresses regret that German action might disturb relations with Europe, but says that the blame does not lie with Germany.

In this speech it seems Hitler would have, had it been available, appealed to the Munich Analogy. Hitler had reminded the world of German's efforts for peace. But he said, since "the self-limitation and self-restraint" displayed by Germany had "apparently been interpreted by many as merely weakness," this image must be corrected. Noting that "a Great Power" could not "for a second time suffer such an infamous encroachment on its

rights," Hitler pointed out that he had, since May, built the West Wall and proposed now to act unless difficulties in Czechoslovakia were alleviated.

Hitler was not ready to act on the matter of Czechoslovakia. He needed both time to prepare opinion at home and abroad and time to complete his military preparations against French incursion. In the eyes of the world Germany was now firmly commited to aid the Sudeten Germans, but Hitler could generally control the SdP power structure and also could choose whether or not to hear the Sudeten appeals for help. Hitler had turned the screw a bit but had avoided locking Germany into the ultimatum which his opponints so greatly feared. Though Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia felt relief at not hearing an ultimatum, the effect of the speech in conjunction with increased rioting in the Sudetenland (one spin-off from the speech) was to heighten the feeling of Germany's opponents that a move was up to them if peace was to be maintained. There is no evidence that Hitler calculated by the Nuremberg speech a pushing of his opponents toward a particular move. Indeed, he was, as we will see, astounded when they did move in response to the logic he and the Sudeten rioting had created. Rather, his intention was the maintenance and furtherance of a state of mind.

For France, Hitler's Nuremberg speech, taken with the deteriorating domestic situation of her Czech ally, amounted to a statement of "It's your move." According to Wheeler - Bennett, the French Cabinet spent September 13 facing a choice between a

firm response to Hitler's speech and allowing him, unimpeded, to make his next demand, which was likely to be for the annexation of the Sudetenland.[61] The general choice before France was one of resistance or acquiescence. In deliberations on September 13, the French Cabinet was deeply split on the fundamental question relevant to their next move: Could France emerge victorious in the next war? Calculations of force strength and allies' support were central. In particular French consideration seems to have been colored by the British response of September 12. Nothing could be resolved. The majority in the Cabinet were for taking no firm stand. With France in the back seat and Britain applying "neither the brakes nor the accelerator," French policy coasted. Despairing at decision, Daladier telephoned Chamberlain in the early evening to explore vaguely the possibility of reaching some vague arrangement with Hitler in face-to-face negotiations. Chamberlain was noncommittal with Daladier, but said that he had a plan which he had been thinking about for some time and which might be of some use.

September 13 Chamberlain proposes to Hitler that, because of the increasingly critical situation, he come to Germany for conversations. A meeting is scheduled for September 15.

In Britain as well, the Nuremberg speech had more clearly defined a situation in which it was believed that there must be action if Hitler were to be forestalled. The urgency in British circles was heightened by news from Ambassador Phipps in Paris which indicated the troubled, divided, and paralyzed state of the

French government. Chamberlain's request for a visit does not appear to have been made in a state of panic. Rather, it represented the dusting off of an emergency plan for a face-to-face visit which Chamberlain had been formulating since Spring and which had solidified in his mind around September 1. As Chamberlain told the full Cabinet the next day, "The plan was that as soon as it became clear that a solution could be reach in no other way..."[62] Chamberlain thought he was going to prevent a very likely war. The British move was one of reconnaissance rather than one of digging-in a firm position. Among the effects intended by Chamberlain and Halifax, the principle formulators of the plan, was an improvement of communication with Germany. It was thought that the inherent "dramatic force",[63] as Chamberlain characterized it, would clear the air. Secondly, the British had feared that their communications were not getting to Hitler. Finally Halifax hoped that the display effect of the visit, that is, its demonstration of British concern, might in itself alter internal German policy making through the encouragement of moderates.

It is clear that at this point Chamberlain envisioned its possibly being necessary to alter the frontiers of Czechoslovakia by way of agreeable solution.[64] He had, by September 14, tacitly accepted Hitler's demand for self-determination (made at Nuremberg) and indeed, had gone even further, and envisioned the direction self-determination would take. Moreover, he clearly did not relate territorial changes in Czechoslovakia to any significant shift in the strategic situation in Czechoslovakia. "If we fight," he had later

said, "it must be on larger issues than that." Rather, it should be against something dangerous, something on the order of one state's trying "to dominate the world by force."[65] At this point Chamberlain's thinking included a category for salami tactics and, one supposes anachronistically, "Munich Analogy," but the danger he saw as relevant was a possible World War I cataclysm.

September 15 The Berchtesgagen conversation. Hitler demands the "return" of the Sudeten Germans to the Reich, saying "I am ready to take the risk of war rather than let this state of affairs last any longer." Further, he asks for dissolution of Czechoslovakia's treaty with the Soviet Union and supports the claims of Poland and Hungary to parts of Czechoslovakia. The closest Hitler actually came to indicating limited ambitions was in a statement that he did not want Czechs and in an agreement to stay his hand unless it was forced while Chamberlain consulted his government and France.[66]

It would appear that Hitler was surprised by Chamberlain's offer to come to Germany. "I was astounded,"[67] he said. He later told Lipski, the Polish Ambassador that he had expected that Chamberlain was coming to declare Britain's intention to stand by Czechoslovakia. It is clear that the Chamberlain visits occured as the momentum for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was dramatically growing. Moreover, during the day of September 15, while Chamberlain was with Hitler, a note was brought in revealing that Henlein had formally broken off negotiations with the Czech government and fled into Germany. The state of open revolt in Czechoslovakia had reached a peak and the political climax of Hitler's plans was occurring. However, as it will be remembered from the

discussion of military forces, there was no way that a substantial German military operation could have been launched against Czechoslovakia at this time. Unlike Austria, Czechoslovakia was not vulnerable to a casual invasion. Many of the crucial forces were two days from the border and rolling stock was tied up in the West Wall construction. The military climax, the invasion itself, was not scheduled until September 28. The partially uncontrolled element of Sudeten disorders was resulting in a disjointing of the political and military elements of Hitler's plans. Hence Hitler was forced, by Chamberlain's visit in particular, to temporize. He did so by entering into a process which appeared to be negotiation on the problem of Czechoslovakia. In appearance Hitler was, during this period, making bidding moves supported by verbal and physical communications of commitment. In reality Hitler was organizing a conflict in his bidding and verbal communication moves; that is, he was preparing a picture for the consumption of his possible opponents in international politics. The picture, the image he wished to convey, was of an aggrieved nationalist forced by horrible atrocity into supporting his suffering compatriots. What might appear to have been physical communications relevant to the process of more formal negotiation were primarily actual preparations for the use of force, which the image of aggrieved nationalist was intended to justify. Chamberlain found the image Hitler had been projecting realistic enough to serve as a guide for British policy.

Paradoxically, Hitler's minimum demand made at Berchtesgaden

was for less than he was actually willing to accept. Basically, his demand as he communicated it to Chamberlain was for incorporation of Sudeten German territory into Germany and a change in the international status of Czechoslovakia. Hitler's actual minimum, the least he would have accepted on September 15 would seem to have been for something closer to total destruction of Czechoslovakia. Three bits of evidence support this contention. In the first place, it was the total destruction of Czechoslovakia as a state that Hitler was planning in the military operations that were being put together in September, and significantly, it was for this total destruction that plans continued to be made. Nor do the plans for total destruction seem to have been dictated substantially by the military impossibility of attacking only part of Czechoslovakia. Two other bits of evidence indicate that even after a political settlement would have given Hitler the Sudeten part of Czechoslovakia he still sought control of the whole state. First, when eventually offered, at Godesberg, what he had demanded at Berchtesgaden, he refused the offer. Secondly, Hitler told Hungarian Ministers on September 20, that is, before his initial Berchtesgaden demands had been met, that "The (possibility) of the Czechs submitting to every demand (is) a danger (to which) the only satisfactory solution" is military action.[67] Hitler was bluffing when he occupied the Rhineland. In the late pre-war and early war years, when the exercise of what Hitler called "will" still could make a significant difference in the power equation, Hitler may have fooled himself enough concerning the

military balance to execute a few half-bluffs. There is, however, no evidence or interpolation that convinces one that Hitler was bluffing at Berchtesgaden. On September 15 Hitler intended to launch in two weeks a military operation to destroy Czechoslovak power. In the meantime he would prepare justification and isolate the victim. All else was ancillary to the main goal.

Besides his surprised notice that Hitler was "the commonest little dog you ever saw,"[68] the Berchtesgaden visit bore no shocks for Chamberlain. In Chamberlain's eyes Hitler had made no significant new demands at Berchtesgaden, rather, he had more precisely summarized the German position as it had developed and explicitly confirmed what he had said at Nuremberg. As the translator Schmidt notes, Berchtesgaden was the first time Hitler was to use the phrase "so oder so", "one way or the other", with a foreign head of state.[69] It meant a verbal commitment to fight unless satisfied; yet by this time the flow of statements and actions had already confirmed Chamberlainmthat expectation of the possible outcome of the Czech situation. Chamberlain did not perceive "one way or the other" as the coldly calculated threat it seems when considered as a phrase out of the context of the history in which it was uttered. There is no evidence that he saw it as a manipulative threat. Rather, the phrase was received by Chamberlain more as a warning of the forces of human nature. Chamberlain appears to have taken this whole encounter as a confirmation of his earlier perceptions; perceptions of a developing dreadful automaticity inhering in

the passion of nationalism and not amenable to reasonable handling by the nationalist himself. Hence it became incumbent on those not burdened with the same passions to exercise reason.

September 22 The Godesberg conversations begin. Chamberlain offers, with French and Czech approval, cession to Germany of all sections in Czechoslovakia with more than 50% German inhabitants. In addition, he offers a change in the international status of Czechoslovakia, doing away with the Russian alliance.

The British Cabinet was deeply split over a response to Hitler's demands at Nuremberg and as specified at Berchtesgaden and reported to them by Chamberlain. The split had been developing since the middle of August. The increasingly perceived need for British action, in increasing relationship with British involvement in the crisis, heightened the need for a policy stance and thus heightened the division between the two groups in the Cabinet. For both groups the Berchtesgaden demands confirmed expectations and provided a concrete focal point for policy. One one side were Chamberlain, Halifax, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare. This group had been formed into an informal body, the "Inner Cabinet" during the week before Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden. Their commonality lay in their sharing soft line views on resistance to Germany. Their views were to determine British policy at this moment and had, in general, a Chinese box-like consistency: Hitler could be trusted in his statement of limited ambitions, Czechoslovakia was not vital to British interests, the idea of fighting a certain war now to prevent a possible future war amounted to "preventive war"[70] and should not be contemplated. The opposition was

less chohesive as a group, hence it is more difficult to define its views. Very generally, however, it was a mirror image of the soft line views. .Runciman, now back from Czechoslovakia, shared soft line views. These views reinforced those he had formed while in Czechoslovakia.

On September 18 Daladier and Bonnet arrived for a report on the Berchtesgaden visit. Though the British Cabinet as a whole had not resolved on a response to Germany and the crisis situation in two days' meetings, the "Inner Cabinet" met with the French. It was thus the views of the "Inner Cabinet" soft liners which were to determine the British position in the alliance bargaining which preceded the September 22 offer to Germany.

France.and Britain both entered into the conversations favoring incorporation of Czech territory into Germany. They differed over the method to be used, with the British favoring plebiscite and France in favor of direct cession. Apparently the French misrepresented the Czech position in arguing for direct cession.[71] In so doing the French ministers won the dispute with Britain over method and, through falsely claiming Czech support for direct cession, made British support for any kind of cession more easy to achieve. When Chamberlain returned to the full Cabinet he unknowingly used this misrepresentation in successfully quelling opposition to the idea of cession. Secondly, the French, their interest in involving Britain in French support continuing, won British acceptance of a proposal for possible British-French guarantee of a truncated Czechoslovakia, which the

French still saw as possibly useful to the defense of France against Germany. The British, on their part, agreed to what they had considered beforehand a possible requisite for prevailing on France to agree to the significant cession to be demanded of Czechoslovakia (all areas over 50% German). The French in exchange agreed to the magnitude of the cession.

As both groups of negotiators returned to their respective cabinets for approval of the decision reached, they faced the possibility of significant opposition to their joint decision. In the case of both cabinets the decision reached between the negotiators represented a commitment to a position which went significantly beyond anything actually agreed to by that time in cabinet. Indeed, more precisely, discussions in cabinet had been unable to reach agreement on the positions suggested, there having been significant opposition. Yet when those who were the soft liners in each cabinet returned with their mutual decision, its weight significantly countered opposition and each cabinet approved offering the proposals, which became known as the Franco-British Plan, to Czechoslovakia. It was as if the alliance discussions, standing in the air, had joined hands to complete the building of a policy base underneath themselves. Hence soft line policy was helped over what might have been a sticking point.

On September 19 the British and French delivered the product of their joint deliberations to the Czechs as a virtual ultimatum. A vague time limit of close to one day was attached

as gently as possible, requesting a reply which would allow Chamberlain to renew his conversations with Hitler on September 21. Czech deliberations were carried on in a desperate context militarily. Germany had by this time massed 30 divisions close to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, on French advice, and inspite of their own vigorous pleading to France, had taken only very minor mobilization measures. Only complete mobilization offered Czechoslovakia any significant chance of resistance to a German attack. Yet to have mobilized against French advice would have jeopardized the French and British support on which Czech policy throughout the crisis was predicated. The Czech failure to mobilize meant both that France was to be more inclined to push the thus weaker Czechoslovakia toward yielding, and also that Czechoslovakia would be less able to resist French pushing.

Also on September 19 and 20 Benes received, after inquiries, assurances that the Soviet Union would act in support of Czechoslovakia. In this too the mobilization imbalance was a factor, for it meant that Soviet aid, if it came, would have less time to reach Czechoslovakia or to draw an attack away from Czechoslovakia. This, coupled with the difficulties the Soviet aid would have had in reaching Czechoslovakia, made it more doubtful that these two states alone could prevail against Germany. Perhaps even more importantly, resistance to the Soviets as Communists came very strongly from elements in the Czech military and the entirety of the crucial Agrarian Party, who were loathe to depend on the Soviet Union, particularly the Soviet Union alone,

for aid. Hence because of geography and ideology and the pivotal position bearers of anti-communist ideology held in Czech politics, the only possible ally which remained generally steadfast to Czechoslovakia and in favor of resistance was precluded.

Hence the Czechs could go only one way in response to the Franco-British ultimatum. Yet they chose to split the difference. Without rejecting the proposed settlement they suggested arbitration. In part this was not merely a matter of bargaining for the best terms, but also, some evidence indicates,[72] an effort to delay over agreement so as to give the hard liners and public opinion in France time to come together with a policy of resistance. This was not to happen at this time. The French government remained as divided as it had been on September 13. Daladier and Bonnet were able to use their central positions to isolate the French decision process from the full effect of the Czech effort and to promote the policy entered into with the British.

The Czech response, whether splitting the difference or stalling, was rapidly quashed by Britain and France. Representatives of both states made it clear that Czechoslovakia must immediately and without reservation agree to the Franco-British plan or be left to face Germany alone. Someone, apparently Hodza, an Agrarian and the Czech Premier, appears to have urged this maneuver on the French as a device necessitated by intractable elements relating to the Czech decision process,[73] which were apparently Benes[74] and public opinion. It would seem however, that the British and French position would have been forthcoming without

Czech urging. On September 21 the Czechs yielded and agreed to the Franco-British plan. On September 22 Chamberlain returned to Germany to make the above-mentioned bid for settlement.

September 22-24 The Godesberg Conversations. Hitler rejects Chamberlain's offer as involving too much time in an unstable situation. He demands immediate (which he ultimately indicates as by October 1) Czech withdrawal from Sudeten areas and immediate occupation by the German military. Hitler asserts that this is his "last territorial demand in Europe",[75] but refuses to guarantee a truncated Czechoslovakia. Further, Hitler asserts that if negotiation does not succeed for Germany, "she is determined to exhaust the only opportunities that remain to her."[76]

Hitler's immediate response to Chamberlain's bid had been to indicate that events since September 15 made the German position of that date no longer sufficient to safeguard German interests. Hitler sought to indicate that through a widening of the issue (Polish and Hungarian interest in areas of Czechoslovakia) stability had been even further decreased and a negotiated arrangement was likely to be even more difficult to reach. While maintaining the German position as of September 15 (which Chamberlain had satisfied), Hitler added significant demands concerning the implementation of Chamberlain's bid. These centered around a virtually immediate occupation of the Sudetenland and a plebiscite to be held later. This was to be the general position which Hitler firmly maintained until September 29. The only change in Hitler's position during the days of the Godesberg conversations was an extension of the deadline for Czech evacuation

from September 28 to October 1.

On reading the documents and notes that have come down from Godesberg, one is struck by three pronounced themes that emerge from German attempts to support their opening and closing positions (which were the same). First, the Germans carefully sought to avoid alienating the British, prsenting their demands as vital for the security of a peace-loving and proud state and both praising Chamberlain's efforts for peace and holding out the prospect for a general settlement between Germany and Britain. Secondly, the Germans were very concerned to indicate the fundamental importance of time; the utter, unavoidable necessity of a virtually immediate occupation. Finally, to a lesser, but still significant and visible extent, the Germans maintained the importance of a plebiscite which, it will be remembered, was at this point quite unpopular in Czech, British, and French decision making circles.

Hitler, as he later confessed to Chamberlain, was surprised at Chamberlain's success. Chamberlain's actual offer on September 22 does not, however, appear to have been a complete surprise. On September 21 the Germans became aware, through their intelligence operations and a newspaper's error, that the Czechs had agreed to some sort of Franco-British plan. They did not, it appears, know the exact terms of the plan. Nevertheless, they would, given Chamberlain's undertaking at Berchtesgaden and no signs of a dramatic change in Western policy, have been able to surmise the general nature of the plan to be offered.

At this point (September 21) the surprise would have come. On September 21 the German High Command was ordered to prepare, for the first time, contingency plans for a peaceful occupation of Sudeten territories.

Chamberlain's September 22 bid, it will be remembered from the discussion of Hitler's September 15 demand, was less than Hitler required as a minimum settlement, but more than Hitler seems to have believed would have been offered. After September 21 or September 22 at the latest Hitler became suddenly aware, through Chamberlain's bid, that there might be a realistic possiblility of obtaining the strategically crucial portions of Czechoslovakia in a more peaceful manner. Greater complexity was added to Hitler's calculations. Nevertheless, Chamberlain's actual offer had been for far less than Hitler planned to realize through direct military attack. The Godesberg demands did not become Germany's stable minimum, the minimum with which she would have been satisfied. Rather, the structure, direction, and later German treatment of the Godesberg demands suggest quite strongly that, even if an actual bid, they were then seen by Germany as only a very temporary (6 weeks rather than months) minimum, intended to serve as a plateau or rest stop on the way to the attainment of the actual minimum which had existed at Berchtesgaden and earlier. Of course, this is only my most likely interpretation. Hitler never spoke for the record on precisely this point, but both immediately before and also after this point he indicated the strong desire for all of Czechoslovakia. Hitler's goal, his orientation, remained the same and something

close to the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Further, it was Hitler's good fortune that the same immediate steps, the same delineation of position, would serve two purposes. First, it would serve as a means of raising demands while threatening war in hopes that Chamberlain could be drawn closer to the German minimum. Secondly, it would serve as a means for maintaining an image of German justification until September 30 arrived and preparation for the attack was complete. Most observers (Robinson, Wheeler-Bennet, Eubank, Nogueres) support this dual conception of German policy at Godesberg. It is at least possible, given the lack of clear insight into Hitler's calculations at this point, that only one of the two means of goal attainment was being pursued. It seems most likely, however, that on September 21 or 22 the second means (more pure negotiation for cession without war) became at least a secondary possibility in German planning. This is supported by a number of bits of evidence: continued preparation for implementation of either means in the German military; what appears to have been agonized equivocation between the two courses later; and, if the rational policy model is allowed here, strong contradictions which inhere in the German position which appears to have been needless unless one views German policy as oriented toward two possible means of goal attainment which in themselves were contradictory. Admittedly this is an important point, and that in part one is forced to deduce policy from bargaining position to support it, pretty lame. It is however

the common and, it seems, correct judgment of German policy at this point.

The essential difference between the opposing positions at Godesberg was one of time. Both sides contemplated cession of approximately the same areas, with the same strategic importance (these areas contained the Czech fixed fortifications against Germany). At Godesberg Chamberlain appeared to acquiesce on the question of a plebiscite. Yet the dispute over immediacy of occupation remained. The actual effect of the immediate occupation proposed by Hitler would have been quite significant. The Czech border and its defenses would have melted away before the German forces in the attack which was planned for essentially the same time period in which immediate occupation was being demanded. Hence, if German demands were accepted, Hitler would not necessarily be forestalled in his plan to attack Czechoslovakia, but rather, his forces would be passed through the first line of defenses. The issue of the plebiscite (which even the SdP was against) could be used to justify further inroads by German troops. The Godesberg position taken by Germany, then, rectified the inflexibility and insufficiency of the earlier German position. It allowed a maximization of possible outcomes, a maximum of flexibility with a minimum of rigidity of commitment.

Amazingly, Chamberlain did not appear to perceive the strategic implications of the German position taken at Godesberg. Chamberlain objected and ultimately refused to do more than present the German position to Czechoslovakia. Yet his objections

were to the form, to the appearance of the German position and its likely effect on public poinion and Czech decision makers. Apparently Hitler's purely formal changes in some aspects of the appearance of the German position (such things as emphasizing the importance of its title "Memorandum" to indicate that it was not, as Chamberlain suggested, a "diktat") were sufficient to change Chamberlain's mind. In Cabinet he was an advocate of meeting the German position. Part of his statement in Cabinet on September 24 serves well to indicate the effect of the Godesberg conversations on Chamberlain himself:

> ...on the first day at Bad Godesberg (he) had felt indignant...After further conversation with Herr Hitler,(he) had modified his views... It was necessary to appreciate their motives and see how their minds worked in order to understand people's actions. In (his) view Herr Hitler had a narrow mind and was violently prejudiced on certain subjects: but he would not deliberately deceive a man whom he respected and with whom he had been in negotiation...He said he had no more territorial ambitions in Europe...[77]

Other British decision makers attached a different meaning to the German rejection of the British bid. The new German position temporarily altered the fairly even split in the Cabinet between those who supported and those who opposed Chamberlain's views. Halifax, Simon, Hoare (except for Chamberlain, all of the "Inner Cabinet") and three others who had formally been in favor of a soft line met on the night of September 23 and delivered notice to Chamberlain of the change in their position. "Change" may be too strong a word, for the British had not really

considered before Godesberg the possibility of having to deal with a rejection of their bid. Rather, the period of time which the British Cabinet had for decision before Godesberg had been filled with debate concerning the extent to which their bid should go toward meeting the German position and, once that was settled, obtaining agreement from Czechoslovakia. The contingency of increased German demands had not been dealt with in Cabinet, though its possibility had been suggested.

For this group the increased German demands appear to have begun to confirm portions of an image of Hitler which hard liners had suggested in Cabinet, but which had been rejected as unlikely. The image, as noted in the background to the British bid of September 22, was of Hitler as a "fair-player" with "limited ambitions. With almost incredible simplicity Hitler's first significant raising of demands during the intense crisis period had produced a negative response from the soft liners. As soon as it became clear that Hitler was raising his demands they began to make efforts to draw a line on concession. Frightened by the thought that Chamberlain might be going, in the spirit of concession, even further than the position of the bid he took to Godesberg, this group sent word to Chamberlain at Godesberg that it was now time for Hitler to make the next concession.[78]

> September 23 Britain asks the Soviet Union what measures it is prepared to take in support of Czechoslovakia.

At the same time as the shift in thinking in the British Cabinet, Halifax made this direct approach to the Soviets. This

was the only Western step toward co-operation with the Soviets during the intense phase of the crisis. The British approach followed two strong public statements from Litvinov on September 21 and 23 concerning continued Soviet support for Czechoslovakia. As at earlier times the Soviets were asking for joint action with the West.

It would seem fair to correlate Halifax's inquiries after Soviet support with the new mood produced in the "Inner Cabinet" by Hitler's increased demands and in particular with the apparent shift in Halifax's image of Germany. Halifax seems to have newly discovered the Soviet offers; perhaps because only then did these offers appear to be possibly relevant to a British policy which was then tentatively in flux between concession and resistance. Something like selective attention would seem to have been operating in British policy; the only options which had been very extensively explored were those which appeared relevant to the existing policy. Once Hitler's demands suggested a new image of his probable behavior, a policy of resistance came into consideration and as part of that consideration an exploration of Soviet intention was launched.

The Soviet response to British inquiries was the suggestion of a conference in order to discuss military co-operation in a more united political framework. The Soviets were not jumping in head first with an immediate response to Halifax's inquiries about military measures, yet those who suggest that their proposal of a conference was a dodge are not very convincing. On

September 23 the Soviets had warned Poland that Polish crossing into Czechoslovakia in pursuance of formerly Polish sections of Czechoslovakia would mean the rupture of the Russo-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty. Further, the Soviet's placing military co-ordination in the setting of political co-ordination seems a perfectly realistic, if unfortunately less speedy, method of organizing Czechoslovakia's support. Again the Soviet stance on paper is generally impeccable in the light of diplomatic practice; they could not have known that their own public assurance of support for Czechoslovakia would be left uncalled on, nor could they have known their reply to Halifax, which suggested a conference of resisters, would have been ignored. If a man has his uniform and is on the bench, it can be assumed that he is ready to play.

When we later turn to the deliberations in Cabinet concerning a British response to Hitler's Godesberg position, it will be noted that there is no mention of the Soviet Union as a factor in possible resistance. This is because there does not appear to have been any mention of Soviet co-operation in these Cabinet discussions. Discussions there were to center on the meaning of the Godesberg demands for the British image of Hitler. Those who sought to argue resistance dealt more with the opinion that Britain simply must resist than on precise arguments of how Britain might resist. That the two elements might logically have been related seems apparent now but does not seem to have been dwelt on then. It cannot be denied that the possibility of Soviet

aid may have privately strengthened existing hard liners and encouraged new hard liners. Only, however, when the French arrived for discussions with the British did the Soviet offer of aid receive consideration in counsel.

September 23 10:30 P.M. - Czechoslovakia announces mobilization.

September 24 4:00 A.M. - France mobilizes half a million men to supplement her September 2 mobilization.

On September 17 the Henlein Free Corps had been formed inside Germany as a component of German invasion plans. Composed of Sudetens who had fled or been expelled from Czechoslovakia during the recent disorders there, this group was primarily intended to keep order in the wake of German invasion. Military interests were served by the creation of this formation in that manpower would be released for the purpose of the actual assault. National Socialist interests were served in that the members of the Henlein Free Corps would be, due to the more radical nature of those Sudetens who had left Czechoslovakia, a rather ideologically pure police force. Concern had been growing in party circles about the ideological ductility of certain pro-annexation groups in the Sudetenland.

In the turbulent period of preparation for attack the Henlein Free Corps proved difficult for Germany to control and began, with the weapons it had been issued, to launch unauthorized incursions back into Czechoslovakia (a few such incursions appear to have been authorized). On September 20, because these incursions were drawing Czech forces to the border areas, Hitler

attempted to more tightly control the Free Corps action. In this he appears to have been somewhat unsuccessful. On September 22, Free Corps groups again went over the border and succeeded in capturing several small towns. It will be remembered that the Czechs had, before September 15, utilized the internal Sudeten disruptions to eliminate much of the armed Sudeten resistance inside Czechoslovakia. Not wanting to allow their re-established control to slip away, especially with the likely eventuality of of invasion by the Wehrmacht, the Czechs responded vigorously to Free Corps action. In short the situation in the Sudetenland was dangerously unstable and appeared to be escalating.

When Daladier and Bonnet learned that the conflict in the Sudetenland involved increasing use of force, they decided to accede to the previous Czech requests and allow mobilization. The French seem to have judged that the Czech resistance to the Free Corps was dangerous in that it both tied Czech forces down and heightened instability. The French may not have wanted Czech mobilization, but Czech escalation in the Sudetenland made it bearable at little extra cost.[79] France, however, was dependent on British support in the same sense that Czechoslovakia was dependent on French and British support. The train of mobilization could not start until all three were on the track. Lest they alienate the British, the French sought first to secure British support for a Czech mobilization. Given the events of Godesberg, that support was to prove somewhat easier to come by than it had earlier.

The French request met a favorably changed atmosphere in London. After some long-distance badgering from Halifax, Chamberlain relented at a point during his Godesberg stay when chances for settlement seemed particularly gloomy. Chamberlain quite reluctantly allowed Halifax and Daladier to approve the Czech mobilization request. In five hours time mobilization orders went out in Czechoslovakia.

Once the French had allowed the Czechs to mobilize, they were under increasing pressure to mobilize in France. On September 21 Britain had adopted a neutral position toward French mobilization. The factors of increased German military preparation and heightened German demands which had been relevant to the Czech mobilization were also, of course, relevant to the French mobilization. In addition, the Czech mobilization itself created increased pressure on France to mobilize, since it appeared even more to run the risk of pushing things out of control.[80] Though Czech mobilization had been allowed by the French in order to make the situation more stable in the event war broke out, it had the effect of increasing French perception of instability in the short run.

The Czech and French mobilizations must be seen as an unintended side effect of the German policy of gradual preparation for attack and escalation of demands. Hitler had, during the early summer, forseen possible negative effects in building up for an attack rather than striking "out of the blue", but Czechoslovakia was not Austria and Hitler correctly judged a need, at minimum, of maximum pre-attack military preparation. Hitler had

expected that he would be able to counter the negative effects by maneuvering Czechoslovakia into an isolated position, diplomatically. In part the negative British and French response to earlier Czech requests was a tribute to the partial success of that policy of isolation and its basis in promised reward and implied threat. Yet the French mobilization and British tacit acquiescence in French and Czech mobilization were the first significant actions deriving from a negative Western response to Hitler's allowing military dictates and his October 1 deadline to push the policy of isolation along rather than follow it. The other component in the Western mobilization position of September 22-24 seems to have been generated without German intention by the escalation of the Henlein Free Corps and the Czech response. Though Germany had created the Free Corps and soon recognized its danger for the German lead in military preparation, the Germans could not control the Free Corps.

There is evidence from internal German disputes on September 22 over the time of day for an attack that at this point the German military was losing both its fear of Czech resistance and its sense of urgency which dictated a rapidly successful operation before French intervention might be effective.[82] A component in the changing attitude of the German military was the failure to extensively mobilize in Czechoslovakia and the West. After the additional French mobilization, the German military attache in Paris reported (falsely) the certain French plans for an invasion well into Germany should war come.[83] There is no evidence that this

affected Hitler in the slightest, who was still arguing the overwhelming strength of the West Wall. There may be some connection, however, between the two mobilizations and the High Command's newly increasing objections to the invasion. These objections, after being held back for a while, began to grow in intensity as the French and Czechs completed their mobilization. This, of course, is tentative and, though one might suppose that the two mobilizations increased German fear and Western confidence as they altered the "real" situation, is difficult to relate directly to the outcome of the crisis on the basis of the information which is available.

September 25 The French Cabinet rejects the terms demanded by Hitler at Godesberg.

Throughout the crisis period the French had been rather self-consciously practicing what must have appeared to them Machiavellian realism. This is not, of course, to imply that policies formed in such a state of mind are necessarily realistic. On September 13 Daladier had frantically abdicated the lead in seeking a solution to the Sudeten problem to Britain. This abdication had come about after a deadlock in the French Cabinet over an estimation of the likelihood of French victory in a war with Germany. This deadlock derived from the need the French perceived to forestall Hitler and the French inability to obtain the guarantees of British assistance which would make, in the French conception, successful armed resistance possible.

In the Anglo-French conversations before Godesberg the French

had been for yielding certain Sudeten areas to Germany. Yet at the same time they envisioned Czechoslovakia, or the rump of Czechoslovakia, continuing to play a role in the maintenance of the new status quo against Germany. This had been the drive of French requests of Britain for new guarantees to the truncated Czechoslovakia. Such policy had been the saddle-point of division in the French Cabinet.

Yet the German demands at Godesberg went significantly beyond this point. Their acceptance would have destroyed the role the French saw for Czechoslovakia in maintaining the revised status quo. As the Czechs said in their own rejection of the German demands:

> They deprive us of every safeguard of our national existence. We are to yield up large portions of our carefully prepared defenses, and to admit the German armies deep into our territory before we have been able to organize it on the new basis or make any preparation for its defense.[34]

On the whole the French Cabinet was unwilling to have Czechoslovakia eliminated as a power factor, which in their eyes would have happened if the Godesberg demands were accepted (though apparently not if the Franco-British bid was accepted). They thus indicated to Germany that the newly proclaimed German minimum was too high for France, without, however, proclaiming the new French maximum. By implication, one supposes, the French maximum concession as soon as they had heard of Hitler's Godesberg demands remained at the level implied in the Franco-British Godesberg bid. Yet in Cabinet discussion before going to Britain in the evening

of September 25, it appeared that the French maximum had changed. A consensus was reached there to support Czechoslovakia if war came, but to push in the talks with Britain an approximate splitting of the difference between the Franco-British proposals and the new German demands.[85] It appears that French anger at Hitler's intransigence had initially supported French intransigence and desire to act from strategic considerations. In Cabinet however, as deliberations went on, the French had been unable on September 25 to resolve on a way to bring power to bear in support of achieving those strategic considerations.

September 26-27 In four related actions, Britain asks Germany to settle along the lines of the British proposal at Godesberg (no immediate German occupation). If Germany attacks Czechoslovakia, the British indicate, France will assist Czechoslovakia and Britain and the Soviet Union will stand by France.

As was noted above, the German stance at Godesberg rapidly (if temporarily in most cases) altered the positions a number of British decision makers took toward the Czechoslovakian problem. The net effect was to produce majority sentiment in Cabinet in favor of Britain's Godesberg bid as her maximum concession. In the "Inner Cabinet", where the influential soft liners were centered, outrage over Hitler's manner and concern over the apparently ever-growing nature of the German ambitions mingled. This group, Halifax in particular, began to feel that concession had gone far enough. Yet in its general eagerness to reaffirm Britain's Godesberg offer and the more limited extent to which it was able to contemplate calculatedly coercive action, this group remained some-

what distinct from the smaller hard line group. Among hard liners such as Cooper and Hore-Belisha, existing concerns over the unlimited nature of Hitler's ambitions were confirmed for them by the Godesberg episode. In Cabinet discussion this group displayed much less of a piqued attitude than the other group; perhaps by this time they had transcended this. In Cabinet discussion immediately subsequent to Godesberg, hard liners were more interested in taking firm action such as mobilization and gave less emphasis than what might be called the reformed soft liners to ideas of restating the British Godesberg position to Hitler.

Chamberlain, among important British decision makers, was in a category almost by himself when he returned from Godesberg. An unreformed soft liner, Chamberlain appears to have played two roles during the preparation of the British warning of September 26-27. On the one hand he personally argued quite strongly for giving to Hitler that which he thought Hitler had already been granted in principle in the Godesberg offer and argued against resisting on the issue of occupation of the Sudetenland. As Cadogan noted in his diary, Chamberlain was "quite calmly for total surrender." In this position he was able to succeed in drawing Simon and Hoare among the "Inner Cabinet" part way back toward his views.

The other role that Chamberlain played during this period was something approaching that of consensus gatherer. Yet, as was his practice during time when he encountered significant opposition, Chamberlain was to refrain during this period from asking for any sort of "sense of the Cabinet" statement. Hence

for this and other reasons Chamberlain's functioning as consensus gatherer was less than exactly representative of Cabinet sentiment. In general during this period Chamberlain's actions appear to have been somewhere between that which the majority of Cabinet wished and that which Chamberlain himself wished. With the Cabinet later (during the execution of the move) perceiving this and in one case (Halifax) acting so as to compensate, British international action became somewhat out of synchronization.

When the French reached London on September 25 they found the prevailing mood of the British Cabinet matched that of their own. Though Chamberlain and Simon sought through pointed questioning to expose French military weakness, Daladier steadfastly maintained, in keeping with tentative sentiment in his Cabinet, that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, France would attack Germany. Faced with growing opposition to the course he preferred, Chamberlain planned one last appeal to Hitler. In so doing he combined his desire to reach any settlement with the desire of most of his Cabinet and of the French to yield no further. Rather imperiously, he produced for his own Cabinet and for Daladier a proposal to send Horace Wilson to Berlin to warn Hitler and to offer him settlement along the terms of the original British bid. Both Daladier and Bonnet seemed to believe that Chamberlain's move reflected their own desires and in that sense Chamberlain appears to have acted somewhat against his own personal wishes and in the furtherance of the wishes of the French and British Cabinets. Yet the new policy was not to be firmly enough anchored for that to be

a valid conclusion on the part of either group.

Wilson's mission was called at the time "one last effort at settlement." Of crucial importance to the course followed at Munich was the fact that what would follow a failure of Wilson's mission was left unsaid in these deliberations. The question left hanging was "last effort before what, surrender or resistance?" The meetings after Godesberg and its shock were the high tide of hard line sentiment among British and French decision makers. The impression one gets is that hard line sentiment, as perhaps by definition it always is, was carried to its extremity not by calculation of forces and ratios and possiblities, but rather more by mental set and outrage. The crucial element in this high point of resistance was a feeling of affront. In the important cases (Halifax, Simon and Hoare at first) the impression one gets from reading their positions after Godesberg is that "things just aren't done this way. We gave in and they are still pushing."

The resultant decision was that Hitler would receive both a repeated offer and a warning. The warning would represent a significant new British commitment to France. Yet after describing the nature of this new message to Daladier, Chamberlain added the advisory to Wilson (the messenger) that the warning was not to be delivered unless Hitler would agree to nothing. Finding Hitler in a foul mood, Wilson interpreted the flexibility which Chamberlain had secretly added more broadly than perhaps even Chamberlain had intended and initially refrained from delivering the warning. Thus began the struggle in which two groups in the

British Cabinet sought to push, from different directions, British international action back on the particular course they favored. With the ensemble and the conductor unable to precisely agree on a theme, the joint output was poorly orchestrated.

In all, the British directed four communications to Germany in the period of time from the afternoon of September 26 until the morning of September 27. As Hitler was preparing for a speech (in which he publicly made an important commitment), Wilson called on him and assured him that he could get the essence of his demands without war. That night Halifax, in a broadcast Foreign Office Communique, echoed Wilson's statement and promised British, French, and Soviet support for Czechoslovakia if Czechoslovakia was attacked (the Soviets had not been consulted prior to the statement). At midnight Chamberlain repeated Wilson's assurances in a statement to the press. Finally, the next morning Wilson (omitting mention of the Soviet Union), repeated the message of the Foreign Office Communique.

The number of British messages sent out over the period reflected division. A policy had been decided on which represented a change, yet this policy was composed of two elements; one new, one old. Individuals and groupings in the government and in France emphasized the threatening or conciliatory aspect of the policy in accordance with their general orientation toward dealing with Germany and Hitler. Chamberlain's addition to the message which had been agreed on with Daladier has been mentioned. Halifax's communication, which may have been sent without Chamberlain's

explicit approval, represented the emergent grouping in the Cabinet who were for adding a leaven of threat to British aims at placating Hitler.. Pressure from Churchill and the Foreign Office appears to have been a significant factor behind the exact tone of this message.[86] Chamberlain's message reflected emphasis on the earlier position of the government and appears to have been delivered by the Prime Minister in an attempt to counter what he believed might be negative effects of the strong statement by Halifax. Wilson had contravened his instructions and failed the first time he saw Hitler to deliver the entire message he had been sent with, omitting the British promise of support for France because he judged the moment inappropriate.

Nor were the French solidly devoted to the new undertaking, and this too affected the message delivered to Germany. Through a clever game of musical chairs Daladier and General Gamelin had, while the French were in London, kept Bonnet from exercising his usual influence for a soft line. Yet Bonnet had his influence. With incredible deviousness Bonnet, in an effort to avoid further weakening the soft line group in France, did all that was possible to insulate French politics from the presumptively hardening effect of the Foreign Office Communique. Germany immediately became aware that Bonnet had, as part of his effort, denied the authenticity of Halifax's public statement of British support for France.

In all of this it might be fairly supposed that the impact of the newly delineated Western position was weakened. The in-

ternally stated intention of the new departure in Western diplomacy was a more clear drawing of lines, a statement of a maximum concession beyond which Britain and France would not go. In support of this maximum the British had made a significant commitment to support France in the event of war. Yet the communication appears to have been garbled in transmission, and garbled as a result of failure closer to the point of policy formation than of failure inherent in the communication process itself.

September 26 5:00 P.M. - In response to what was essentially a repetition of Britain's Godesberg bid Hitler demands Czech response to Germany's Godesberg bid by 2:00 P.M. on September 28 at the latest.

September 26 8:00 P.M. - In a speech at the Sportpalast Hitler reiterates the German position at Godesberg, adding to it a pledge to guarantee the remainder of Czechoslovakia. After boasting of German strength and his own personal bravery, Hitler closes with "Now let Mr. Benes make his choice."[87] Hitler is now publicly commited to the Godesberg position.

September 27 Noon - In a response to Wilson's face-to-face warning that Britain will be involved in support of Czechoslovakia Hitler summarizes his Sportpalast remarks and reaffirms the position he took there.

German response and action during the September 26-27 period in which the British messages were being delivered was remarkably uniform. Hitler was standing firm on his Godesberg demands. There is no certain evidence as to precisely how the new British commitment affected Hitler's calculations. In his second conversation with Wilson, Hitler sought to portray his intention to have either the Godesberg terms or war as automatic, as somehow built into the situation, as something others must swerve

aside from. When informed of the British commitment he said that,

> it means that if France elects to attack Germany, England will feel obliged to attack her also. If France and England strike, let them do so. Its a matter of complete indifference to me. Today is Tuesday; by next Monday we shall all be at war.[88]

There is no evidence that during the day of September 27 Hitler's private position was any different from his public position.

At this point in the crisis Hitler particularly emphasized military preparations and threat in his efforts and attentions. Most of his attention appears to have gone into getting the German populace and military ready for war. During this period he still sought to isolate Czechoslovakia before the attack, but now sought more to simply scare her friends away than to both woo and scare them away. He had entered into this mode concurrent with the hardening of positions against Germany after Godesberg. It is unclear to what extent this change in emphasis during the preceding 24 hours was a more rational calculation designed to meet a harder line with a harder line and to what extent it was something more primitive and indeed even non-rational. On September 26 both the interpreter Schmidt and William Shirer, both veteran Hitler-watchers, describe Hitler as having, for the first time in their experience with him, lost control of himself.[89]

The only significant new element introduced by Hitler at this point was a kind of time limit encapsulated within the Godesberg time limit of October 1. With Hitler now planning on having his forces in position for attack on 24 hours notice by September 30, the two days between the deadline Hitler posed for Benes' response

and September 30 was the same two day period that was required in German military planning for the ultimate pre-attack preparation. The way in which the dates click together makes it appear that Hitler was seeking to set up an index of compliance which, if compliance was not forthcoming, would neatly enable him to attack on October 1 with no time lost in ultimate pre-attack preparation. If this supposition is true, then it strongly supports the contention that Hitler was determined at this point to have either his Godesberg demands or war.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the deadline Hitler inserted into his Godesberg deadline was the way this new and secondary deadline was misinterpreted by Britain and France and relayed to to Czechoslovakia. After Wilson's first interview with Hitler (September 26) the West wrongly came to believe that they were laboring under a new and even earlier deadline. Hitler had said that Benes must reply to the Godesberg proposal by September 28 at 2:00 P.M. This appeared at the time to be in harmony with his original demand at Godesberg, which had been modified to October 1 on Chamberlain's request. On September 27 Goring, supporting Hitler's statement to Wilson, had said that unless the Czech government accepted the Godesberg proposals by that time "measures of mobilization would be immediately taken and followed by action."[90] Bonnet gives evidence that the French believed that an attack was being threatened for the same time[91] and apparently the British relayed similar information to the Czechs. The Germans at this point were working on a schedule which called for their being in

ultimate pre-attack readiness on September 30. It took two days for their forces to achieve such a state of readiness, and Hitler gave no enacting order on September 26, the day of his interview with Wilson. Assuming that the Germans would take no steps which would guarantee they would be revealed as bluffing, Hitler's failure to give the penultimate pre-attack order on September 26 indicates that Germany did not mean September 28 to be a deadline of the sort it was taken to be in Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia. Incredibly then, British, French, and Czech action was geared toward expectation of a possible attack two days earlier than it could have come. This meant that from September 26 when they had first picked up the "deadline",the time Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia perceived available for solution was at a maximum only half of the time actually available.

The most profound result of Hitler's activities on September 26 and 27 was their effect on Western perception of German commitment and resolve. It will be remembered that the Western message which Hitler was in part responding to during these days represented a new departure in British commitment to France and the most important Western attempt since May to draw a line and stand behind it. Even taking the May Crisis into consideration, this recent Western message seems to have been the most deliberate and non-spasmodic Western stand against Germany in time of crisis during the whole active careers of most of the important Western decision makers. After Godesberg a new and shaky majority in British and French decision making circles had, in anger mixed with

fear, tried a new approach to Germany. Hitler's response was his most violent and dreadful outburst of the crisis period. Indeed, it seemed to many of those in the new majority, which had the day before essayed a harder line course, that harder line courses were for madmen. Rather than saving the day the new resolve displayed by the West seemed to have brought war closer. The situation in the West was now much like it is in certain horror movies. The band of heroes empties their only revolver into the monster and he still advances. What can be done now? Hitler's continued advance and elaborated commitment, coming as it did on the heels of a Western "test" of a more firm policy of commitment, effectively indicted that policy through the projection of a much more credible commitment. Hard liners who had always been for resistance were discredited. Temporarily reformed soft liners like Halifax and Hoare were pushed back toward their previous position. Halifax, a crucial element in what had been a new balance in favor of resistance, began to intentionally misquote the French General Gameline and the British military attache in Prague to illustrate the futility of resistance if it came to that. Daladier, a waverer, began to oscillate under domestic pressure. Chamberlain and Bonnet were encouraged to use their pivotal positions to further the cause of a settlement.

September 27 1:00 P.M. - Hitler orders the 7 divisions comprising the first assault wave to get in position so that they can attack after September 30. At 7:00 P.M. he orders complete mobilization in the west.

Technically the invasion of Czechoslovakia had already begun.

On September 25 Hitler had ordered two battalions of SS into a district of Czechoslovakia, a salient, from which Czech troops had been withdrawn. In the confusion in Sudeten areas and given earlier unsubstantiated claims by the Czechs of similar limited invasion it would have been difficult to establish the September 25 action as an appropriate casus foederis. The intention of the German action seems to have been to give protection to the geographic base of the 40,000-member Henlein Free Corps[92] which was in the same area and which was intended to play a fundamental role in the larger invasion.

In the matter of final preparations for the ultimate step in the larger invasion, Germany sought to maintain utter secrecy. Thus Hitler's orders in themselves do not appear to have been intended as a bargaining action. Rather, the secrecy in which they were issued seems to have been designed to maintain some appearance of German forebearance in the furiously boiling situation. The High Command, in pursuance of Hitler's orders, dictated that the final and secret mobilization was to be carried out "without the political situation being aggravated."[93] Hitler retained authority for the final signal. Thus Germany sought to prepare for the attack without being locked into attack, alarming France to further mobilization (Czechoslovakia was already totally mobilized) or having further damaged the diplomatic situation.

Interestingly enough, it does not appear that Germany sacrificed much of an enhanced threat in order to preserve the purely diplomatic possibilites. For example, while the mobilization

in the west would put 14 German divisions facing France, the French and British were then estimating that 50 divisions would be mobilized there,[94] that an attack would be launched against the Maginot Line, and that Paris and London would be savagely bombed. In reality, Hitler had no plans for attacking in the west, and indeed had been forced to employ portions of the labor that had been building the West Wall as fortress troops. Rather, he hoped, by the prospect of forcing France to cross the threshold of first move, to limit the conflict and to avoid even a defensive war in the west.

September 27 10:30 P.M. - A letter arrives for Chamberlain from Hitler in response to the message Wilson had brought on September 26-27. Hitler reaffirms what he has told Wilson at noon. Hitler still demands "immediate occupation" as a "security measure". Hitler thanks Chamberlain for his efforts toward peace and states that he is "leaving it up to" Chamberlain to judge whether he will continue those efforts to "bring the Government in Prague to reason at the very last hour."[95]

Hitler's message represented an attempt to mollify Chamberlain and to soften the impact of the more harsh replies of mid-day and the night before. To be sure, Hitler's statements in the preceding twenty-four hours had significantly focused on the Czechs rather than on the British and indeed, even during that period, Hitler had some kind words to say concerning Britain. Yet the tone of this communication was very definitely in the manner of the diplomat, full of reason and sweetness, in strong contrast to the wild power of the earlier statements. Indeed, the contrast is startling. As far as actual content, the letter represented no

change in Germany's minimum disposition as it had been theretofore expressed. Rather, it was a justification of that position and a point-by-point refutation of Czech objections to the Godesberg demands. It did, however, as in the last sentence quoted above, suggest very delicately to Chamberlain that he might bring pressure to bear on Prague in the interest of settlement.

The letter to Chamberlain represented a return to a more familiar mode of behavior for Hitler, a mode which he had veered away from when British and French decision makers had attempted to project a stronger commitment to Czechoslovakia in the wake of Hitler's escalation of demands at Godesberg. The mode which Hitler re-entered included as characteristic a more pronounced accomodative veneer and, in particular, sought to further Czechoslovakia's isolation from assistance as much through appeal to logic and reason as through rattling the sabre. Some accounts, not necessarily the most superficial, see this as the point when Hitler crumbled and backed off from his intention to attack Czechoslovakia. Such accounts seem generally untrue, though there is no really firm evidence either way. It is difficult, however, to see Hitler's letter as a clear call for a negotiated settlement. Even in his earlier afternoon thundering at Wilson, Hitler had made it clear that the way to avoid war was to get the Czechs to stop playing "frivolous"[96] games. The emphasis was much more heavy on justification for the German attack in light of Czech intransigence. In only the very brief portion where Hiler suggested Chamberlain's intervention in Prague can anything close to

a statement of a desire for what was eventually to become the Munich Conference be seen. Read in context this statement seems designed to place blame in Prague for not yielding and thus causing the invasion. Hence the whole effort in the letter seems to represent a return to the efforts to isolate the Czechs from the world of reasonable and fair men deserving international support. It was, Hitler indicated, only the Czechs being such warlike and untrustworthy people that necessitated immediate German occupation. At midnight, well after the letter to Chamberlain had been written, Weizsacker found Hitler with Ribbentrop, who was by far the most hard line of those closest to Hitler. The two still intended to destroy Czechoslovakia.[97]

It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that Hitler's letter to Chamberlain bore no relationship to the events of the next day when Germany agreed first to postpone "mobilization" for twenty-four hours and then to attend a four-power conference. In the first place, as noted, the letter indicated a return to a more accomodative tone in German action. Once again Hitler was more moderately following the advice he had given Henlein long before: "We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied." Further, in the afternoon of September 27, elements had begun to appear which may well have raised Hitler's insecurity and perception of risk; hence first returning him to the more cautious course of polite isolation and demand, and then remaining in his mind on September 28 and combining with other, later developing factors to cause Hitler to back off from immediate in-

not an accurate observer.

vasion. Nevile Henderson, who was on the spot, seems correct when he concludes that Hitler's letter was "indicative of a certain nervousness."

The first of these two elements which may have caused Hitler concern, both of which were internal to Germany, was the culmination of a recent resurgence of military opposition to the plans for invasion of Czechoslovakia. Opposition to the invasion had been more quiescent in the first two-thirds of September. In part this quiescence had been a result of internal factors, of a battle between the resisting military soft liners and other elements in the government and party who were more in favor of a hard line policy. In this conflict the hard liners had successfully used threats of loss of command and charges of cowardice against the soft line military men. In addition, the West's relative acquiescence before September 26 had partially quieted the soft line reservations based on pragmatic considerations. Yet with the recent mobilizations in Czechoslovakia and France and apparent refusal of the West to conclusively give in under German pressure, military opposition to an invasion was increased. On September 26 and 27 two significant military dissents were registered with Hitler. In neither case were the officers connected with the above-mentioned group which was plotting in more sinister fashion against Hitler. On September 26 a delegation from the General Staff tried and failed to see Hitler. On September 27 they failed again, but left a memorandum behind expressing their opposition to war. On September 27 Admiral Raeder called on Hitler and ex-

pressed his opposition to invasion in a "vehement appeal."[98]

The second of these factors which may have increased Hitler's perception of risk was the singular response to a parade which took place in Berlin as offices and factories were closing on September 27. At Goebbel's urging Hitler ordered a mechanized division on its way to the border to pass through Berlin in order to "galvanize the people"[99] and to impress diplomatic observers. Berliners turned away in silence. Shirer called it "the most striking demonstration against war I've ever seen." Hitler is reported to have told Goebbels something to the effect that "Its hard to make war with these people."

September 27 8:00 P.M.- Britain mobilizes the fleet.
11:00 P.M.- Mobilization announced.

September 27 11:00 P.M.- Chamberlain proposes a new Anglo-French plan to Germany which involves immediate German occupation of a limited portion of the Sudetenland. A commission of Czech, British, and German members is to be set up. The commission will determine additional territories and methods for cession, which will be completed by October 31. In the immediate meantime the area will be occupied by 1,000 British Legionnaires armed with stout ash sticks.

September 27 Evening- Czechs are shown the new Anglo-French plan and are told that Czechoslovakia cannot be saved in a war or be very likely to be reconstituted afterwards.

September 28 11:00 A.M.- Britain proposes to Mussolini that he call a four-power conference to settle the Czech problem. Chamberlain also indicates to Hitler (who doesn't receive the message until after noon) that he is once again ready to come to Germany for discussions and that he expects agreement can be reached in a week on all outstanding questions.

After the above-mentioned apparent failure of the British

attempt to project an effective commitment relative to Czechoslovakia the reins of policy initiative in Britain could be firmly gathered in by Chamberlain. With Halifax more solidly back in the team Chamberlain's soft line image of Hitler as possibly mad but a sincere nationalist and limited in his ambitions began once more to lead British policy. Indeed the results of the failure at commitment seemed all the more to confirm Chamberlain in his image and convince him of the need to settle things rapidly. It would seem that the perception of a need to settle things rapidly was almost inherent in the image of encounter with a non-rational head of state.

Both the mobilization of the fleet and the proposal of the new Anglo-French plan were set in motion before Hitler's more conciliatory letter arrived. The British apparently only very reluctantly mobilized the fleet and thus intended it to serve a more purely defensive rather than deterrent function. It was Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, who from his more hard line and deterrence-oriented perspective pushed British policy toward mobilization and prevailed on Chamberlain, three hours after initial mobilization, to publicize mobilization. Hitler did not hear of mobilization until the next morning.

The new Anglo-French plan was intended to advance the Western Godesberg position toward the minimum which Hitler had suggested there and backed up with a forward rush toward action in the past few days. The essential difference between the two positions remained Hitler's desire to immediately occupy the Sudetenland. It

was not that the Prime Minister was against this at all from strategic considerations. Rather, rapid occupation was not orderly. Immediate occupation trammled Chamberlain's goal of peaceful settlement of existing disputes and created severe problems for him in both official circles and among the public in Britain precisely because it had the flavor of Britain's being pushed around. The next day an official of the German Embassy in London was to report on an early morning conversation with Horace Wilson, a Chamberlain intimate and messenger:

> Wilson told me the following: Everything depends on the Fuehrer's proposal being put in a different form. This above all is important...they are ready to agree to all the demands and to undertake a guarantee... that the plan should actually be carried out...The present form of the plan makes it impossible for any democratic government...to advise the Czechs to accept it. [100]

While the Czechs could not be advised to accept the German Godesberg position, compromise has the hoariest of traditions and the Czechs could be compelled to accept a modified version of the German Godesberg position. The logic of the Czech position remained as it was explicated above attendant to Czechoslovakia's September 4 move. Had the Czechs sought to project as strong a commitment against concession as the Germans projected towards changing the status of the Sudetenland, the Czechs would have been abandoned by France and Britain. Yet by locking the West into their dilemma, the Czechs locked the West into a situation which was ultimately to prove unbearable for the West under increasing German commitment to change. In pushing out toward solution

Chamberlain pushed against the weaker of two commitments: Czech support of the status quo in the Sudetenland. Under British pressure the Czechs were to find, as had the British the day before, that a commitment could not be establish over night. Indeed, it does not appear that Britain was unsure enough about the Czech course to listen for a reply. Chamberlain and Halifax knew the dilemma in which Czechoslovakia was locked. Both they and the French appear to have acted over the next two days as if Czech agreement were assured, as, indeed, it was. On September 29, in a diplomatic footnote, the Czechs agreed in principle to the new Anglo-French plan.

The territories which Germany, Czechoslovakia, Britain, and France had earlier agreed on as Sudeten (50% German) were involved in the new Anglo-French plan. Germany was asked to accept a delay in the immediate occupation proposed in the Godesberg demands in exchange for a commission which would labor under a thirty day deadline to settle on a mechanism for transfer. The right of a German occupation of the Sudetenland in stages was implicit. Czech troops were to be immediately withdrawn. Germany would receive a substantial part of her goal if she agreed to a delay. In exchange for agreeing to a more rapid cession, Britain and France would receive an orderly cession, "free from the threat of force", as they said.

Hitler received the new Anglo-French plan around midnight, while he was going over the invasion plans. It is impossible to establish at precisely what point on September 28 Hitler decided

to call off the invasion. It would, however, seem from his apparent agonizing in the morning of September 28 that the decision was not made as a direct result of the arrival of the Anglo-French plan. It does seem that the receipt of the Anglo-French plan may have encouraged Hitler to await further developments diplomatically (which would of course mean giving pause to the invasion). When he delivered the plan Henderson held out hope of further Western concession by stating that in his opinion the plan was no longer current, might have been useful three weeks ago, and at any rate "had nothing to do with the Fuehrer's letter of today to Chamberlain."[101] That was similar to offering a used car dealer $200, but telling him you might be able to go higher. Whatever Chamberlain's intention, Henderson certainly did not portray stability as an aspect of the British maximum.

Hitler's more conciliatory letter had arrived after the new Anglo-French plan had been sent off, but before the plan had been received in Germany. Hitler's letter convinced Chamberlain that there still was some hope, that indeed Hitler was, after all, reasonable, and that now, as Chamberlain said, "it was inconceivable that (differences) could not be settled by negotiations."[102] In the preceding treatment of Hitler's letter it was indicated in some detail that though firm evidence is impossible to find, it seems that the goal of that letter was not to reopen negotiations. Rather, it had been to further isolate Czechoslovakia through a portrayal of Czech unreasonableness and German fair-mindedness. If this true, then it would seem that though Hitler was not strongly striving

for reopened negotiations, he was striving to portray Germany as the kind of state one would wish to negotiate with. Chamberlain was, like Micawber, "waiting for something to turn up."[103] Chamberlain's state of mind was such that whatever turned up could become something. Chamberlain took the message and went further than Hitler may have intended. The idea of a multi-power conference had been in the air since summer, recently having been proposed to Hitler by Roosevelt. After thinking over the cheerful prospects he saw in Hitler's letter, Chamberlain decided to make a "last last"[104] effort. At 11:00 the next morning, September 28, Britain proposed to Mussolini that Mussolini mediate a conference of the powers to settle the Czechoslovakian question. Later Hitler was to complain that "That guy Chamberlain has spoiled my entry into Prague!"[105] If this were true, then Hitler and his maneuver twoards mollifying Britain and isolating Czechoslovakia must take some of the blame.

September 28 8:30 A.M.- France offers Germany immediate occupation of substantial areas on four sides of Bohemia. Czechoslovakia has not been told of the plan, but Germany is told that if Czechoslovakia refused, "conclusions could be drawn which (France) did not need to define more closely."[106] In a personal presentation of this bid to Hitler at 11:30 A.M. the French Ambassador indicates again that if Germany invades, world war will be inevitable.

On the morning of September 27 a meeting of the French Cabinet had broken up in confusion after a shouting match between supporters of additional measures of mobilization and supporters of additional concession. There are three widely varying accounts of the meeting,

each by an eyewitness. In general those who were for mobilization considered war inevitable. Those who were for concession considered there still to be a chance for settlement. The continuing Cabinet division resulted in no new policy's being produced. Rather, since neither group was satisfied, nerves were increasingly being frayed on both sides in the Cabinet. In lieu of any other policy, French policy remained, almost by default, the same as it had been since before the Anglo-French conversations after Godesberg; support Czechoslovakia if war came, but press for a compromise between Hitler's Godesberg demands and the British bid at Godesberg.

The French had approved Chamberlain's new plan of September 27 shortly before it had been submitted to Germany and Czechoslovakia. Bonnet, however, had followed that approval with personal instruction to the French representative in Berlin. Those instructions contained the new French offer above, with the stipulation that the offer should not be submitted unless Germany rejected the new British offer. Germany had no chance to reject the new British offer before being showered with the French offer as well. Bonnet's goal, as he said in the instructions, was to "make a last attempt at preventing the irreparable."[107]

The difference between the two plans was that the French plan offered approximately three times as much territory for immediate cession to Germany. Both plans provided for the same structure of administering the remainder of the cession procedure. From the tone of the morning's Cabinet meeting it seems doubtful if the Cabinet could have approved Bonnet's approach easily. Once

it was thrust upon them, however, and Hitler had accepted a conference, they acquiesced. There is no evidence that the British later voiced any objection to this French bid's being made without British approval. With France and not Britain as Czechoslovakia's guarantor, British disagreement with France could only be effectively registered if the French bid were less than the British maximum offer. Britain could pull France toward settlement but not back from settlement. The British maximum became irrelevent once the French bid went beyond the British maximum.

September 28 Noon - Hitler agrees to postpone "mobilization" for 24 hours, but asserts he will then order "mobilization" if the Czechs have not agreed in principle to the German Godesberg proposals.

September 28 2:00 P.M. - Germany calls a four-power conference to discuss the Czechoslovakian problem.

As September 28 began, Hitler stood publicly commited to his Godesberg demands. If his demands were not met by October 1, he very clearly promised war. This must have been very close to Germany's "real" position at the time. There is no evidence that Hitler was bluffing and a great deal of evidence that he fully intended to attack Czechoslovakia by October 1. The penultimate order for that attack was to be given at 2:00 - this was the "mobilization." Hitler had been threatening, though in reality Germany had been mobilizing for some time. Some accounts make it appear that the attack was scheduled to begin at 2:00, which is not true, though Britain and France thought it might be so. In fact, Hitler was planning to host a luncheon that day for the generals who were

to lead the attack.

Standing in the path of the German commitment were Britain and France, and, in a disassociated status, the Soviet Union. During the past week these powers had all affirmed their intention to support Czechoslovakia if she were attacked. At 8:30 in the morning Weizsacker had been given an outline of the maximum Western concession yet offered. At 11:30 the French Ambassador personally explained that bid to Hitler. France offered Germany occupation of very large segments of Sudeten territory by October 1. It was explained that arrangements for the transfer of other Sudeten territories would be made after more detailed discussions. Czech troops would remain in their fortifications during this period, but German troops could occupy the grounds around them as they so felt. Hitler was warned that an attack by Germany on Czechoslovakia would mean world war.

Though Hitler was commited to invasion if not satisfied, it appears that his private attitude was somewhat less resolute than that implicit in the mad automoton he has been portrayed as, and indeed, as he appeared in his Sportpalast speech of September 26. During the morning Hitler seems to have been quite nervous as he considered the commitment into which he had entered. Schmidt had described as much as will probably ever be known about the German decision making procedure on that morning:

> Yet these conversations were not carried out in the form of regular conferences. Hitler went through the rooms and talked now with one person, now with another. All who were nearby might come up to him, but no one could utter the slightest word, since

> Hitler treated each of them, whether he liked it or not, to a long speech on the way in which he himself saw the situation. This morning he made a whole series of little speeches of the Sportpalast kind. It was only with Ribbentrop, Goring or some soldier, generally Keitel, that he went back to the office for a long talk.[108]

It is known that Ribbentrop argued for attack and Goring vigorously dissented.[109] General Keitel or "La-Kaitel" as he was known for his subservience, filled the role of the technical expert with a "can do" attitude. All of this represents a considerable divergence from the descriptions which exist of Hitler grimly dogged and certainly mad "decision making" in the bunker under the same Chancellery in the last days of the war. Indeed, while perhaps displaying an excessive need for "sounding boards", the structure of the decision process that day in the Chancellery appears to have been not that different from that in Britain or France.

It was a few minutes before noon, while Hitler was hearing the new French offer (and, according to Schmidt, having an increasingly hard time refusing it), that the call came from Mussolini requesting a delay in mobilization. Hitler agreed. A few moments later Mussolini proposed that Hitler call a summit conference. After an interval for making the arrangements, France, Britain, and Italy were invited to Munich the next day.

It appears that Hitler's decision to agree to work toward a non-violent settlement came as he heard the new French proposals and was made possible without a perceived loss of prestige by Mussolini's proposal of a delay in "mobilization". For Hitler the notion of a delay was an idea whose time had come. He was,

according to an observer, having an uncharacteristically hard time dealing with the arguments of the French Ambassador. It was the problem Henlein had faced with Benes and Hitler had faced with Chamberlain in the initial Godesberg conversation. Yet because possibilities for increasing demands were foreclosed, it was no longer possible to demand so much that Germany could not be satisfied. To raise demands now would clearly go beyond the existing German apparent maximum to a new game, total destruction of Czechoslovakia, not just as a power, but as a state. In Hitler's mind that act would apparently engage too high a factor of risk against enemy commitments and might guarantee the world war he had long ruled out of the question. Having ordered the delay, Hitler was able to employ the means of a proposed conference to determine the exact arrangements of the settlement. Chamberlain's message then arrived and confirmed Hitler in what he had been told by the French Ambassador. The British and French had stated their general willingness to yield on the issue of immediate occupation. France had stated the minimum she would yield but had left the maximum up in the air, dependent both on clarification and the decisions of the international commission which was proposed.

> September 29-30 1:30 A.M. - The Munich conference reaches agreement that Czechoslovakia should yield predominantly German sectors to Germany in stages, beginning on October 1. An international commission will determine outstanding questions concerning the ultimate boundary, the plebiscite, and the evacuations.

The Munich conference ratified the arrangement implied in Hitler's postponement of mobilization after the French bid. Early

in the gathering Hitler himself defined the purpose of the conference as he saw it, and the German summary of that statement still serves well to portray the essential activity of the Munich conference.

> He had now declared in his speech in the Sportpalast that he would in any case march on October 1. He had received the answer that this action would have the character of a warlike response. Hence the talks arose to absolve this action from such a character. [110]

The new deadline of September 29 was used by Hitler to push things over rough points where Daladier and Chamberlain objected to certain possible procedures for execution of the cession, in particular in the treatment of the populace in the affected areas. On exchange for not invading Czechoslovakia Germany was allowed to enter Sudeten territories in a more orderly fashion without being confronted by warlike response from Czechoslovakia or from Britain and France. In exchange for cession of Sudeten territories Hitler allowed his takeover of the territories to be wrapped in the trappings of orderly and measured procedure featuring concern for the principles of peaceful change. Czechoslovakia was told to take it or leave it.

> If you do not accept you will have to settle your affairs all alone with the Germans. Perhaps the French will put it more amiably, but I assure you that they share our views. They will disinterest themselves. [111]

AFTERMATH

In the formal settlement drawn up at Munich Germany received the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia and along with those areas, the strategic frontier of Czechoslovakia. France and Britain avoided a war, which would have, in their perspective, been a disaster for them and for Czechoslovakia. The next day Chamberlain visited Hitler in his apartment and the two drew up an agreement which still symbolized the badly battered British hope for a general settlement of outstanding questions with Germany. This was the infamous piece of paper which Chamberlain waved on his return to Britain.

Though a formal agreement symbolized the end of crisis tension, much was left unsolved concerning the ultimate disposition in the crisis. Hence the Munich crisis settlement combined formal and tacit elements. The working out of the tacit elements was a reflection of the extent of the victory obtained by the German bargaining position. Germany generally received what it wanted in the later working out of the portion of the agreement left unstated.

Though I will elaborate this more in the hypothesis sections, the effects on relations between the parties seems to have been fairly straightforward. Germany was maintained and encouraged in her image of opposition weakness. Italy drew closer to Germany. The Soviet Union moved more into a position between the two developing alliance systems. Czecho-Slovakia (now ominously hyphenated), while retaining some significant military force, moved into the developing German sphere of influence. Britain and France, perhaps with

no one left but each other, moved closer together. While in both countries the most commited soft liners generally hewed to their earlier course after Munich, the desertions from the soft line camp which had begun to occur in mid-crisis slowly accelerated. In many quarters ultimate armed conflict with Germany was seen as more inevitable than in the pre-crisis period.

The above fairly summarizes the effects of the Munich crisis on the international system. It does not seem that Munich resulted in any sort of system transformation that made World War II inevitable. It did, however, support a line of thinking which in Hitler's mind encouraged him to push even harder against the status quo. Further, in that it exhausted Germany's last major possibility to argue for reasonable and fair system modification, Munich gave ultimate rise to the resistance that, when coupled with Hitler's developing goals, was to cause World War II. The mad downhill race of the human actors in the system was accelerated.

EXPLANATION OF OUTCOME

Perceiving two hostile and hate-filled anatgonists, Hitler sought to secure Germany's flanks for a larger contest to come, a risk which he judged must be undertaken before time ran out and the balance of military power turned against Germany. In June, Germany began military preparations for an attack against Czechoslovakia and began promoting an appearance of justification for that attack. At about the same time as those preparations began in earnest, France and Britain began vigorously pressing Czechoslovakia for concessions to her Sudeten German minority in the hope of removing the presumptive cause for a Czech-German conflict. Inspite of the involvement such action to remove the cause of conflict implied, both Britain and France sought to maintain their maximum possible flexibility relative to Czechoslovakia so as to avoid an escalation with Germany and the disastrous war such an escalation might bring. For the same reasons Britain sought to maintain the maximum flexibility in the context of the relationship with France, though France began to push harder for British support against Germany.

In order to demonstrate their own reasonableness and to increase the involvement of Britain and France in commitment to the defense of Czechoslovakia, the Czechs allowed themselves to be pushed into a process of negotiation with the Sudeten Germans. When negotiations broke down in Czechoslovakia, Britain first essayed, then cancelled, a direct warning of British commitment to Czechoslovakia's defense. At almost the same time Chamberlain picked up the effort to reach solution of the ostensible issue of the developing crisis by entering into face-to-face negotiations with Hitler. At

Berchtesgaden Hitler made clear what was gradually becoming the Western estimation of Germany's likely desires: Hitler indicated that he wanted incorporation of the Sudetens into Germany and was willing to go to war to support that goal. In this he was answering Chamberlain's irruption into his plans with continued preparation of justification for the attack, creation of a crisis atmosphere, and was also stalling for time until his military preparations were complete. Hitler could not express his true minimum, which was still destruction of Czechoslovakia as a state. He had apparently earlier estimated that the British and French maximum concession could never be moved (without war) to a point where a bargaining range would exist. Hence his chore was to prepare a situation in which Britain and France would not act in support of the values an attack on Czechoslovakia might raise. To have revealed his true minimum would, in Hitler's mind, have engaged such values in Britain and France as to precipitate greater resistance.

At Godesberg the British and French bid a maximum concession which turned out to create an apparent bargaining range when coupled with the falsely stated demand of Germany at Berchtesgaden. After having previously forced Czechoslovakia's maximum concession into the same range as that defined by the German, British, and French positions, the British and the French had then offered Germany a bid which they thought would meet the German minimum. Hitler was faced with what was implicitly his prior commitment to accept the bid. The disruption caused when he had to raise the demand and refuse the bid because it did not actually meet his minimum undid

some of the carefully prepared German justification for invasion by raising the possibility in many minds that Hitler's minimum was actually something which could only be justified from power-political considerations and something which grossly trammeled the principles of peaceful settlement. Values were temporarily engaged in Britain and France which might have eventuated in resistance to the more clearly perceived but still unstated German minimum of destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia concluded at this point that no possibility for a bargain existed and reacted by attempting to draw a line against any further movement toward a meeting in the newly perceived German preference area. Hitler, in return, stood firm on his Godesbsrg demand which was essentially the German Berchtesgaden demand coupled with a provision that it be executed almost instantaneously. It did not appear that agreement would be possible and general war seemed likely if Germany went ahead with its commitment to either an October 1 settlement or attack. With Britain and France now committed to aid Czechoslovakia if she were attacked, a game of chicken followed. The Western commitment was less effectively communicated and less firmly held to them was the German commitment, which had been locked in and picked up momentum at an earlier point in time.

At this point Hitler, while keeping up momentum, made a tentatively conciliatory effort at reaffirming Germany's general good intentions inspite of what he portrayed as Germany's geing locked into commitment on the issue of Czechoslovakia. This precipitated

sentiment among British and French decision makers for yielding (some of whom were for swerving aside in chicken and some of whom saw the situation as prisoners' dilemma). A new offer was made which roughly met the new minimum demand which Hitler had been publicly standing on since Godesberg.

Hitler had at this point three options: (1) attack, (2) accept the new Anglo-French bid, (3) let the deadline which he had set up pass without attacking. Attacking involved a probable risk of a general war which Hitler did not want; doing nothing involved considerable loss in prestige at home and abroad and would represent the second major prestige loss for Germany in four months. Hitler accepted the new Anglo-French bid, which also had the property of getting Germany past the deadline without risking the attack involved in option #1 and without incurring the prestige loss involved in option #3. Thus in the last few days of the crisis the German minimum for acceptable settlement, at least in the shorter run, had come down to meet the French, British, and Czech maximum concession, which had been jerkingly pulled up over the span of the crisis. Both persuasion and threat had been employed all around to push and pull expectations to the point of the Munich Agreement.

WORKING PAPER #6

A. Utility Models

1. Is there a bargaining range?

In June there was no bargaining range. Hitler thought that he wanted all of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France had not yet decided on ceding the Sudetenland. Indeed their maximum concession, even estimating liberally, would have been at this early point something like autonomy for the Sudeten Germans. Hitler set out to create a bargaining range. It was not his expectation, as he later said, that Czechoslovakia would be served up to him on a platter. Rather, he wanted considerably less from Britain and France: that they not prevent his taking military action against Czechoslovakia. From Czechoslovakia he asked even less: Hitler does not appear to have conceived of any sort of change in Czechoslovakia's utilities until after his forces had fought their way past the Czech defenses. It was Czechoslovakia'a Western supporters who, reacting from changes produces in their utilities by the developing situation, changed Czechoslovakia's utilities to the point that part of Czechoslovakia could be served up to Hitler. By the end of September, after much pulling and hauling, a bargaining range mentioned in relation to Godesberg and the explanation of outcome, created when Western and Czech movement on the utility continuum developed faster than Hitler expected or probably intended for the moment. Final agreement was the product of this movement and also of reduction in the German minimum position. The ultimate agreement featured steps which involved Germany's settling for less than all of Czechoslovakia and Britain and France's modifying the

extent of their demands for "peaceful change free from the threat of force." Neither side acknowledged what it was truly doing in the self-conscious sense of exchanging concessions in the very end, but both sides made much of minor concessions as justification and encouragement for movement along the way.

2. Is a bargaining range created or discovered?

As in #1 above, the Outcome, and Bargaining Process sections should indicate, the crisis involved all sorts of methods in the creation of the bargaining range. The majority of Germany's involvement was an effort to change utilities through a dual process of threatening and conciliating. This clarified for Britain and France probabilities, alternatives, and bargaining structures which had been more latent, and since as the crisis developed, these two national actors dimly perceived that there was no bargaining range, they were under great pressure to solve the Czechoslovakian problem. In large part they did this through re-estimation of their own utilities and successful attempts to change Czechoslovakia's utilities. The end came when they produced one very significant change in German utilities.

3. If there is a bargaining range, is it two-dimensional or one-dimensional (zero-sum)?

Hitler saw the bargaining range as zero sum, though he portrayed it as variable sum. In the West the British in particular were taken with this projected view, as to a lesser extent were the French. Hitler attempted to convince Chamberlain (and generally succeeded) that the issues involved in Czechoslovakia were of such

great importance to Germany that Germany could not back down. Britain, on the other hand could afford to acquisce, and indeed, would promote general and wider British policy goals if she did so.

4. Are there "salient" possible outcomes within the bargaining range?

There were a number of possible conditions which the Sudeten Germans might have existed in and which defined the possibilities for settlement of the ostensible issue once a bargaining range was brought into existence. Yet these, though they derived from general concepts ("autonomy" for example) which existed well before the crisis began, were important because an actor in the crisis had given considerable support to them. Hence, they do not seem to have truly leapt out at the actors because of salience. More pure salience would appear to have been operating when the West, after agreeing to cede "Sudeten" areas to Germany, could not escape the 50% dividing line for defining "Sudeten". The fact that there was so little such salience as related to the mechanics of separating the Sudetens from Czechoslovakia (such as Sudetens all living on one side of a river), profoundly complicated the problem of separation. In part these difficulties accounted for whatever resistance there was to Hitler on "humanitarian" grounds. Yet later, at Munich, this lack of salient solution to geographic and property problems was profoundly important. Under the pressure of time the thusly enhanced difficulties of cession were deferred for a commission's handling. As it was to turn out (and as was implied, almost promised by France at the time), Germany would control the con-

mission and hence the ultimate disposition of much more than was agreed to at Munich. Hence the typical lack of salience as often relates to complicated nationalities problems ultimately increased the German victory.

5. Do the players act like maximizers or disaster-avoiders?

When the whole crisis and its more general setting is considered, it is unclear whether the distinction is as sharp as might be expected. Relative to Czechoslovakia Hitler was definitely a maximizer, an ideal maximizer. Even when faced with British and French intractability in late September he backed off, but continued to orient his behavior around maximum possibilities for Germany.

We have, however, used "disaster-avoider" in a more commonsensical way in some case studies, which, while it does not pair as well with "maximizer", sheds light on the basis of Hitler's maximization and also blurs the distinction between maximizer and disaster-avoider. In this usage, "disaster-avoider" is taken to mean not playing for the minimization of "autonomous risks" and minimization of miscalculation, but playing not to lose as a player. In this sense Hitler was a disaster-avoider, as he was maximizing in the short run, he thought, so that Germany would be able to survive in the long run. There was a consistency between Hitler's perceived need to act on Czechoslovakia, his perceptions of the German lead in military power declining in the early mid-1940's, the growing antagonisms of Britain and France, and the factors he saw as responsible for the survival of nations.

Britain, and particularly Chamberlain, were very close to an idealization of disaster-avoider as minimizer of autonomous risks and minimizer of miscalculation. Indeed, this was almost how Chamberlain defined Britain's role and attempted to orient British initiative in the crisis. But one of the reasons Chamberlain avoided disaster in the short run (and other British decision makers went along with him) was in order to be able to utilize the avoided disaster to build both British military power and diplomatic influence. Hence in our other sense of the word the British may have been maximizers. Then too, while France and Czechoslovakia sought to avoid disaster, they sought to do so by a careful and grudging retreat from the status quo. Perhaps that was maximizing a very bad situation. Hence, for all of this, it does not seem that "maximizer/disaster-avoider" is yet a very useful dichotomy.

B. The "chicken-critical risk" model

1. Can this model be empirically applied?

2. Do the parties try to estimate the probability of the opponent's actions?

It should be clear by now that I have conceived of actors' behavior in the crisis in terms which are largely the same as those which are the structural components of the "chicken-critical risk" model; perception, manipulation, risk, threats, commitments, etc. I am not, however, able to use the formula for critical risk to produce a precise synthesis of these elements in a coherent model. The actors do not appear to have calculated even roughly along

this line of thinking when deciding on action. Rather, calculations of opponents' actions seems to have been at best an either-or type process, with response at times growing out of that dichotomy. Though the elements which the critical risk model tries to relate appear throughout the Munich crisis, the model itself does not readily serve to relate them.

3. Is there manipulation of the opponent's estimates of one's own probable acts?

There were a number of efforts made to influence the opponent's perception of ones probable acts without directly working on the opponents perception of ones utilities in the sense intended in this category. In the conversations between Hitler and Chamberlain both men referred to their constituency as limiting freedom of action, as did British and French in their ministerial conversations. Attempts were made to mobilize public opinion. It is my best guess that while Hitler at moments did not exactly pretend irrationality, he certainly did display it so as to affect Western estimations. Hitler also indicated to Chamberlain that while his own commitment to a change in Czechoslovakia was quite high, he thought that Great Britain had no interest there. On August 11 and September 26-27 Hitler pretended not to hear or not to hear all of certain warnings. On numerous occasions Hitler tied his own behavior to uncertainties in situation, as in "let one more Sudeten be killed". While there are a number of other similar examples, this list seems sufficient to indicate the high frequency of manipulating opponents' estimates of ones probable acts.

4. Is there manipulation of the opponent's perception of ones own utilities?

All sides acted so as to reduce the apparent net cost of war, mainly through alterations in capabilities, Germany much more and for a much longer period of time than other actors. All sides also made some effort at some point to increase their apparent valuation of the stakes. Here again Germany far outstripped the others, employing, as I have noted, a very substantial proportion of those tactics listed in Working Paper #4.

5. Is there manipulation of the opponent's utilities?

There was considerable emphasis from Germany on the increased German capabilities and readiness, even to the point of offering statistics on West Wall construction. Secondly, while Hitler exaggerated German capabilities, it is unclear if he intentionally exaggerated. Hitler sought to decrease cost of compliance for the West through stating limited aims, invoking community values, minimizing elements of duress, etc. Again, as in question #4, it is almost as if Hitler wrote the book on manipulation in the critical risk model.

The West, particularly Britain, was also especially adept at attempting to manipulate stakes and estimates of cost of war for Germany. The problem for the West in this particular respect was that while Hitler understood the values they were attempting to manipulate, in many cases he either considered them situationally not relevant or did not share them. As long as Hitler remained generally sure that the West would not fight, the finer calculation

of the critical risk equation would have been needless to him, even in a metaphorical sense.

6. Is there manipulation of shared risk?

Both sides pointed out to their opponent the general shared risk certain activities might raise. As far as manipulating that risk, the West and Czechoslovakia seemed quite cognizant of the danger in such actions and reticent to raise the level of common danger. Germany was much less reticent to use such tactics in the intial phase of the crisis, but as the tension rose Hitler himself backed off somewhat from such tactics. It was not so much that the effect of earlier such manipulations were neutralized by Germany, but rather that the Germans refrained from or covered up some actions which would have consitituted further manipulation of shared risk. The other, earlier manipulations remained as continuing generators of risk, but it seems that Germany could not have turned them off had they so desired.

7. What specific tactics are used in the above manipulations?

a. Threats

British, French, and German threat behaviors showed remarkable basic similarity to one another over the course of the crisis. Though German behavior tended to be "more similar" to the patterns noted here, all went in essentially the same direction. There was a general movement toward explicitness as the crisis developed, though Germany tended to lead and others followed. In addition there appears to have been a general tendency toward graphicness in threats. While again German threats lead the field, the other

two followed. Over the course of the crisis there was an escalation in the personal status of giver and receiver. Though Hitler's Nuremberg and Sportpalast speeches are significant exceptions, there was a slightly greater tendency to talk past the opponent to legislative, public, or media in the early phases of the crisis, and a tendency toward a more direct and more focused statement as the crisis developed. Perhaps because of this movement toward face-to-face threatening, Germany in particular, but also Britain, made late crisis threats more often as direct response to opponent's threats than before. While such threats tended to be more ad hoc by their very nature, the excitement of the moment does not appear to have lead such threats out on limbs of new commitment. Rather, such threats reflected existing policy, though perhaps more strongly stated.

b. Commitments

In the period immediately after the Anschluss, France had loudly reaffirmed commitment to its Czech treaty, yet at the same time it began a more pronounced policy of seeking to avoid that treaty's being called into action. After a public hiatus, France eventually moved back toward affirming commitment to Czechoslovakia. All other sides also moved toward positions of commitment over the course of the crisis. For Germany, a gradually developing commitment was a function of the gradual development and maturation of conditions inherent in Hitler's planning. For France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia, the gradual development of commitment to the position they eventually stood on was much less planned and more

a reactive development to Germany's response to their initial orientation and effort toward settlement. By the time Britain and France sought to firmly establish commitment they had already conceded so much that their commitment was difficult to establish for much more than resistance to overt attack on Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union's offers of commitment were tentative and ultimately dependent on the slow development of commitment in the West. Hitler's commitment to a rapid change in the status of Czechoslovakia appears to have been relatively high, both in his own mind and in the eyes of his opponents. The Western commitment to peaceful change, on the other hand, appears to have been much less irrevocable, both in their own and German eyes. Western commitment however, when coupled with their maximum offer, was sufficient to deter Germany from attack.

c. Coupling

In private, Britain and France gave some attention to the problem present behavior might have for future bargaining reputation. They did not publicly tie their behavior before Munich to their future bargaining reputation. Indeed, France may have positively avoided such mention, for it was France that was tied to Czechoslovakia by treaty and it was France that was concerned over the implications abandoning Czechoslovakia might have for national honor. Britain however, Chamberlain in particular, was particularly determined to couple the present with the future along the dimension of settlement. This theme opened the crisis for Britain and, indeed, was the final chord Chamberlain played at Munich. Hitler

was quite willing to join Chamberlain in this linkage of a Czech settlement to a broader future settlement. From the Wiedemann Mission to Chamberlain's visit to Hitler's Munich apartment, Germany deliberately encouraged an eager Britain in the expectation of a possible larger settlement. At the same time, as in his connection of German behavior in September with the German "defeat" in the May crisis, Hitler made linkage between present and expected future German firmness a criteria his opponents had to allow existed in his incentive structure. Hence Germany used coupling in two ways. In the early crisis coupling was used to pull opponents along by means of a string tied to a larger carrot. Later in the crisis, as Western intransigence grew, a different sort of coupling was used to justify the use of the stick which was German necessary use of force.

d. Warnings

Both sides used warnings in the sense defined in Working Paper #2. The German theme in warning, established quite early in the crisis, was to point out the risk raised by the uncontrollable elements in Czechoslovakia. Such warnings were effective. Chamberlain and his circle clearly acted in large part out of the same considerations posed by the German warnings, though the German warnings may have merely maintained rather than furthered such considerations. The British, for their part, used warnings to mask threats, and, it seems, did too good a job of masking. The British feared the emboldening effect threats might have on France and Czechoslovakia and the irritating effect of such tactics on Germany.

Early in the crisis Britain sought to pose the possibility of British involvement as a shared risk which general systemic considerations raised for Britain, and hence for Germany. The German diplomatic service and apparently Hitler as well interpreted such statements as representing no real commitment. Only when the warnings moved to threats did German calculations appear to be affected. That movement by the British from warning to threat appears to have been caused by a perception of the disutility of warnings.

e. Arranging or pretending lack of control or lack of choice

The only example of arranging or pretending lack of control or choice was Germany's treatment of the Sudeten demands and potential for violent escalation in Czechoslovakia, as in (d) above. Britain and France seemed less to be pretending lack of choice than actually having little choice. Could they have found a way to cheaply get rid of Czechoslovakia as a problem for reputation and system balance, they would probably have done so. On a smaller scale, after Godesberg, they did pretend that they could not advise Czechoslovakia to accept the German demands. In reality, they had such control over Czechoslovakia, but for their own reasons preferred not to exercise it.

8. What is the relative <u>effectiveness</u> and <u>frequency</u> of each of these tactics?

9. Responses to threats

Considering total interaction over the course of the crisis, threats were the most numerically common form of tactic, though

often, especially in the early stage, threats were closely connected with a warning of general danger or a coupling with a future payoff. Among tactics, threats seem also to have been the most effective in obtaining goals, especially if there is no discount rate for times at bat. The threats which most immediately stiffened resolve on both sides were those which stood out the most against the threatener's policy background, either because of the threats' explicitness, escalatory departure from apparent existing policy, or, in some cases, because of both factors. Moreover, this type of threat seems also in the immediate long run to have produced the highest ratio of compliance.

10. Responses to commitments

The few firmly maintained commitments, once established, carried the day. Both sides obtained that for which they were able to establish commitment. Neither side was willing to fly in the face of the opposing commitment, or at least to maintain direct opposition to the opposing commitment. Britain, France, and Germany obtained what they wanted from Czechoslovakia in light of Czech failure to establish commitment. For all parties (with the possible exception of the Soviet Union) the bargaining problem was not one of convincing the opponent of commitment, but more precisely, convincing oneself that commitment should and could be assumed. Both Hitler with his belief in "will" and Chamberlain with his faith in the nursery rhyme about the success of simply trying, proved to be right relative to basic bargaining tactics.

11. Responses to conciliation moves

At best many conciliation moves appear to have had no effect

on Hitler. It seems probable, however, that in the early stage of the crisis such moves had the effect of encouraging Germany in the belief that the West would not stand firm. At Godesberg efforts toward conciliation seem to have been responsible for Hitler's raising his demands. For Hitler Western conciliation moves fit well into his general image of the West as buying time for a longer-term struggle. Hence such moves may have heightened his perception of threat.

For the eventually dominant Western soft liners, conciliation moves also fit into existing images. If Germany made faint conciliatory noises, hopes for a possible settlement soared and efforts along those lines escalated. Western hard liners saw German conciliatory moves as meaningless. Czech efforts at conciliation, almost fantastically more extensive, were generally viewed as not sufficient, and tended to bring more pressure on the Czechs.

12. Loopholes

Though Hitler offered Chamberlain a loophole earlier in September when he indicated his opinion of the relative unimportance of the Czechoslovakian issue to Britain, the important loophole in the crisis was offered to, and accepted by, Germany. In a sense the whole Munich Conference was designed as an elaborate loophole for German commitment to immediate attack. Hitler had actually backed down somewhat, and the trappings of an international conference and the crucial request of an ally allowed the backing down. As the narrative indicates, this loophole was vital for Hitler's backing out of commitment, and was gladly offered and

gladly received. Though of minor relative frequency, loopholes were of major importance in the crisis outcome.

C. Expanded game models

1. Are escalation and de-escalation important?

2. Is there a choice by one or the other player among three or more degrees of toughness?

There was a gradual escalation toward toughness over the course of the crisis on both sides. In June Hitler foresaw a gradual escalation as his possible policy, though it is unclear to what extent he meant German military measures to represent step by step escalation. Since significant attempts were made by Hitler and the Germans to keep the escalatory aspect of military preparation for attack secret, part of credit for the escalatory impact of gradual German preparation must go to the Western journalists and intelligence apparatus. Hitler most definitely engaged in an escalation on three levels of demand from autonomy to incorporation to immediate incorporation. That German military preparations were racing ahead in the background certainly added to the impact of Hitler's escalation of demand and to the pressure on the West. However, it seems that in Hitler's eyes the military preparations were mainly intended to be oriented toward actual direct use, though he certainly did not regret the urgency the preparations added to the situation.

The British, French, and Czechs were much more self-conscious in their total escalation than Germany, more aware of the positive and negative effects of escalation, more agonized in their deliberations over escalation. An examination of Western three-step

escalation of resistance of August 11, August 27, and September 26-27 will readily reveal this, as will consideration of the stepwise mobilizations in the West. Like Germany, the West gradually moved toward toughness, but they were always the follower, more conditional in their shifts, more tentative and less effective in communicating the toughness of their escalation. It was almost as if a race had begun in June and the West was always a few steps behind, always beaten to the turn.

3. Does this choice make a real difference in the outcome?

Hitler started out early in escalation and remained ahead. (There were of course, other factors involved in his staying ahead than simple early lead, such things as incentive structurs, perceived power, etc.) By the time Western strategy began to focus on playing chicken with Hitler, his momentum was all but unstoppable.

4. Is there a shift of strategy, toward more or less toughness?

Over the course of the crisis there was a general shift of strategy on the part of Germany, the West, and Czechoslovakia toward toughness. In the end Czechoslovakia and the West backed off from a stance temporarily assumed, first the West, and then, after Western pressure, Czechoslovakia.

5. Are there warnings of conditional shifts?

In the sense of self-conscious warnings of conditonal shifts and inducement for shift on a mutually perceived escalation ladder, I found nothing which is not more conveniently and accurately reported as a threat.

6. Are there inducements offered for opponent's shift of strategy?

On both sides inducement was offered for acquiescence in the

form of promised payoffs in the larger context at a later date. Britain offered to defend the new Czechoslovakia, Britain tried to offer colonial restitution to Germany, and Germany held out the prospect of a general settlement to Britain and France. The prerequisite was that the other side abandon the strategy which jeoporadized the present and hence the larger common interest.

7. Are there salient thesholds which limit or focus escalation - de-escalation?

I have elaborated this elsewhere. In general, mutually perceived thresholds actually relative to the outcome of the crisis were in military affairs. Military staff talks were one such level, as were varying degrees of mobilization. The German false mobilization scheduled for September 28 was the most significant threshold in the crisis. Many classic thresholds such as border crossings either never occurred (the point was never reached) or were somewhat ignored and/or uncertainly reported and hence never really caused a precise focusing of attention on the specific act. Rather, they more simply served to heighten tension.

8. Are there transitions from one game structure to another?

The Munich crisis would seem to be best represented by expanded chicken. Chicken on both sides grew out of prisoners' dilemma. Hitler began the crisis action as a move in a larger prisoners' dilemma, as he saw it: act now, take the chance, because Germany must forestall the future, which is going against it. In the crisis itself, as it developed, Germany was, it appeared, playing chicken. The West, especially as British policy became Western

policy, saw itself in prisoners' dilemma and held to that structure much longer. A shift began at Godesberg, and by September 26, Western policy was refusing the martyr's role and was trying, briefly, to play chicken with Hitler. Hitler's isolation of Czechoslovakia, preparation of justification for the attack, and preparation for the attack looked too much like chicken and the West decided that it had to play. From September 26 through September 28 the crisis was predominantly chicken. Western difficulty in prevailing against Hitler's prior commitment produced a result that many Western decision makers preferred to think of as having been dictated by prisoners' dilemma.

D. Super-game model

1. Is there a supergame structure?

There was a supergame structure, as the Munich crisis was one in a series of moves by means of which Germany had increased her power. Other moves were to follow in this series.

2. Is a significant part of a country's aims a relative increase of power?

The major part of Germany's aim in the crisis was the bringing about of a significant change in national power. The dominant goal in this calculation was the seizure of Czechoslovakia as a strategic geographic area vital in war. The ability of Czechoslovakia to provide food, raw materials, and manufactured goods for Germany was a distinctly secondary consideration, though still significant. Paradoxically, an increase in relative power for a possible war was also one of the aims of some British decision

makers in the crisis. Though a war against Germany was not clearly envisioned, it was thought that one payoff from British concern with avoiding an immediate war would be time in which to prepare military and diplomatic strength for a future war.

3. Do cost estimates for choosing a strategy include prominently considerations of opponent's increased power or own decreased power including acquisition or loss of allies?

British and French decision makers appear to have considered prominently the effect of the general German strategy of increasing power, but such consideration rarely carried the day. There were a few in each cabinet who might be called "ministers for Supergame considerations." Their continuing attempts to push such considerations into policy were only successful when Hitler had taken some act which increased the salience of supergame factors. For example, the Godesberg demands made it appear that Germany might well have unlimited ambitions and be acting from other considerations than those of nationalism. In general, however, when the dominant faction was forced to deal with supergame considerations, its response was to deny that supergame considerations were relevant, or to hold that even if such considerations were relevant, the West, being weak, must play for time. There is no doubt that the framework of decision had a category for supergame considerations.

4. Is future relative strategic position estimated in strategic decisions including position in either the "balance of capabilities" or the "balance of resolve"?

Hitler appears to have calculated, as in #1 above, on the basis

of balance of capabilities. France seems particularly to have been torn between the poles of immediate safety and maintaining weight in the balance of resolve, as in the September 13 non-decision. France appears much more than Britain to have given consideration to the implications abandoning Czechoslovakia held for future bargaining reputation. In fact, relative to aspects of resolve, France gave very little attention to aspects of capabilities involved in the loss of Czechoslovakia. To be sure, however, questions relating to balance of resolve were raised in the British Cabinet. They met with the same fate described in #3 (In general they did not ultimately serve as the basis for action).

5. Apart from the above, is the crisis one of a series of crises involving the same players but different power positions?

6. If so, are the power positions the outcome of the previous crises in the series?

The crisis over Czechoslovakia came midway in a series of power transformations involving the same major players. The crisis over the Rhineland had effectively meant the end of France's ability to take the offensive against Germany. Further, it, in so doing, caused the ratification of a new policy in France which implied eventual abandonment of Czechoslovakia if pressed. Because of logistical difficulties enountered by the Germans in Austria and compensations made in the Czech defense against invasion from Austria, it turned out that the actual crisis over Austria had not in its immediate result weighed that heavily against Czechoslovakia.

However, the Anschluss meant enhanced power for Hitler inside Germany. Further, the time which it had allowed for internal German efforts at increasing power was significant in Germany's eventually bringing force to bear against Czechoslovakia.

E. Information processing model

1. Are misperceptions important in determining the outcome?

2. Nature of misperceptions.

Large sections of "Systemic Environment", "Bargaining Setting", and "Bargaining Process" have been devoted to misperception, reflecting and elaborating the importance of misperception to crisis outcome. As Schelling notes, ambiguity seems essential to bargaining interaction. In the case of the Munich crisis the misperception growing out of the attendant and necessary ambiguity seems essential to the nature of the crisis and its outcome. As noted, Western soft liners generally mispercieved the extent to which Hitler was motivated by considerations of power transformation and misperceived the potential for forceful resistance to Hitler. Attendant to this basic orientation, the dominant soft liners in the West tended to believe in the legitimacy of Hitler's demand for modification of the status quo and in the possiblity and low cost of settlement. Hitler and the other dominant German hard liners tended to overrate Western long run aggressiveness and German military strength at the time of the crisis. Attendant to this basic orientation, German hard liners tended to be excessively sure of Western immediate inclination to stand aside if Czechoslovakia were attacked and tended to be confident of German victory in

a war over Czechoslovakia. Dominant decision makers in Czechoslovakia tended to overrate the extent to which the West weighed Czechoslovakia in the strategic balance and tended to overrate the extent to which the West considered the strategic balance the most important criteria for action.

3. What happens when new information contradicts an expectation or image?

As numerous examples in the narrative indicate, most contradiction is adjusted to fit existing expectations. As in the case of Chamberlain at Godesberg, Hitler on September 26-27, and Benes after Godesberg, very major and salient contradictions take some time for adjustment and integration to more extreme hard and soft line images. During this period there appears to exist either a partial paralysis or, if action is absolutely required, it tends to occur as action more in keeping with the actual situation. However, the party involved seems to start casting about for new confirmation of the previously existing image. Chamberlain's in-Cabinet description of his changing attitude at Godesberg was an excellent example of this process, as was Hitler's response when the West began to play chicken on September 26. It should, however, be pointed out that the events which serve to reconfirm the old and endangered image were in both these cases and, it seems, in others, designed by the opponent to encourage that reaffirmation.

The behavior of Halifax and some others is an interesting contradiction to the general tendency just noted, though perhaps in truth more a contradiction of degree than of absolute quality.

Of the Inner Cabinet it was Halifax who remained the longest in the altered state of mind created by Hitler's sharp Godesberg escalation. Indeed, he seems to have temporarily altered his image and over a few days acted on that new image. The explanation seems to lie in Halifax's being a more marginal soft liner, as indicated in deliberations in the Spring of 1938 and in his position relative to warnings earlier in the crisis. Indeed, his behavior relative to new information seems to exemplify a pattern for decision makers such as Daladier and Goring, who being less extremely hard or soft line, were more perfectly able to respond to the changing situation.

Finally, there was a third type of decision maker, characterized by Bonnet, but also included Hodza, Runciman, and Kordt in the German London Embassy. Aware that reality is different from that which was desired, these individuals at times knowingly falsified information which they passed on to their own governments or to other governments at the alleged request of their own government. This type of behavior appeared only in the service of soft line considerations, turning the Lysistrata on its head and lying, so to speak, for peace.

4. What happens when new information contradicts an expectation or image?

In spite of psychological imperfections, wishes and desires, in as much as they can be witnessed, corresponded closely with images and expectations. My estimation would be that they stand in the same relation to events in the real world as do images and

expectations.

5. How is an incoming message interpreted?

6. What circumstances seem to affect the mode of interpretation?

Information about actor's thought processes is not detailed enough to extensively and confidently determine mode of interpretation. As in #3 above, it does seem that strongly contradictory incoming information is generally made to conform to existing firmly held beliefs through a process of selective attention and an eventual search for confirming information if necessary.

7. Do basic images and expectations change during the course of the crisis?

Basic images did not change over the course of the crisis, though there were some secondary modifications which grew out of commital tactics and attendant manipulations.

8. Are perceptions influenced more by the other party's deliberate bargaining moves, or by other elements of his behavior not intended primarily for communication or bargaining?

On the whole bargaining moves were the most important in influencing perceptions. Such events as the September 7 Times editorial, public opinion, and parliamentary debate appear to have merely confirmed opponents in their existing perceptions of each other.

9. Discrepancies between self-image and opponent's image of self; consequences for interpretations and misperceptions.

From what tantalizing evidence there is concerning discrepancy between self-image and image, this factor would seem to be of considerable importance. It is difficult, however, to find much clear

information on this divergence. Chamberlain saw himself as peace-loving and in no sense aggressive. Further, he accurately estimated that Hitler might see British policy in a different light. A major goal of Chamberlain's policy was to convince Hitler of Britain's good will toward Germany. In this Chamberlain landed in the doubly bad position of the eager suitor who spends a great deal of money courting the object of his affections without any success.

Hitler saw himself in an epic struggle for survival. To a limited extent his opponents understood Hitler's framework. Yet perhaps if they had seen the totality of desperation which framed Hitler's world view, they would have realized the impossiblity of reforming .the vision of one who considered his environment a true and total state of nature.

Benes saw himself as head of a state with crucial fundamentality to any balance of Europe. Benes' problem was to maintain an image of rationality and stability until the course of events brought that crucial fundamentality home to Britain and France. Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, Benes faced an enemy whose thought was too much in those fundamental terms and depended for Czechoslovakia's salvation on allies who either did not share his image of orientation toward the strategic balance or condidered the balance involving Czechslovakia materially impossible to maintain.

F. Cataclysmic model

A cataclysmic model is not broadly relevant to the crisis. What might appear at first glance to be cataclysmic elements are more accurately accounted for in expanded chicken. On all sides people retained a relatively high degree of control. There seems to have been little chance of things getting out of hand through misunderstanding or miscalculation relative to such possibilities in other crises. Further, there appears to have been no set of military responses which would be plugged in after a certain diplomatic act from the opposition and leave the parties in a cataclysm.

This is not to say that decision makers did not think in cataclysmic terms. One of the major goals of British and French involvement over the Sudeten Germans was to remove a factor that might "set Hitler off" and put everyone on the slippery slope. In the conception of Western soft liners Hitler might have had limited ambitions (indeed, this was the belief which, for some, justified the policy pursued over most of the crisis). Yet he was an extreme nationalist (one count of madness), possibly in the grip of National Socialist fanatics (two counts of madness), and perhaps insane himself (three counts of madness). Hence in the eyes of Chamberlain, for example, Hitler could remain an essentially decent fellow and at the same time be the carrier of stochastic elements which might push things out of control as in World War I. As in the advice to Czechoslovakia to desist from mobilization and in the limited Western mobilization, the constraining effects

of fears of cataclysm can be seen. As well, these fears seem partially responsible for the British refusal of military staff talks with the French and the French refusal to engage in such conversations with the Soviets. If cataclysm were to occur for some actors, perhaps others could stay out if they avoided creating the inexorable logics of predetermined reponse which might draw them in. Ever mindful of Henderson's advice that a second May 21 might cause an unintended explosion, the West, especially Britain, refrained from the strong commitment which was needed to play chicken with Germany. In this, cataclysmic fears were an important element, and hence an important element in the crisis outcome. In a sense the West, and even Czechoslovakia, were trapped by their own "rationality". Perhaps they would have all been better off relative to their behavior in the crisis period if World War I have never happened.

G. Miscellaneous

1. What rules or norms do the parties perceive and observe?

There appear to be no examples where a rule or norm hampered any actor's dealing with the crisis in whatever means the actor could manage. Action was first decided on, then, if necessary, the proper norm was chosen. This is not to deny the relevance of accepted ways of doing things to an actor's conception of the possible. However, to the extent that the diplomatic and political norms of the 1930's affected action in this sense, they seem to have been powerfully aided by lack of human imagination, and not in themselves able to take credit for forstalling any action an

actor could conceive. Hitler is generally seen as normless, and indeed, is often portrayed as the premier example of the exercise of power unhampered by normative considerations.

It is clear that Hitler and his Germany were poorly socialized into the world of diplomatic convention. Though in part this derives from the meteoric development of the Third Reich, in large part the blame must be given to those who in a sense sheltered Hitler from the application of at least a portion of the existing diplomatic norms (quid pro quo, for example). Yet these arguments that normlessness played a major part in the phenomena of Nazi diplomacy seem to overrate the extent to which norms play a major part in any diplomacy. Actors, it seems, are more interested in reminding their opponents to strictly follow the rules than in following the rules themselves. Where actors most consistently follow the rules is, it seems, in situations where following the rules is beneficial in the most immediate sense, as in the case of both interpretations of the Soviet insistence on submitting proposed co-operation to the League. Germany seems to have followed this use of norms as well, as in Hitler's refusal to consider the August 11 British comment on German mobilization because such comment was inappropriate interference in Germany's internal affairs. Hitler was well aware of the existing rules of the game of the 1930's and, as everyone else, could use such rules to fit his purpose.

2. Rationality and irrationality

a. Are there obvious instances of irrational calculation and behavior?

If one accepts the common definition of rationality based on

means and ends, then there do not appear to be instances of irrationality relative to the Munich crisis. Obviously Hitler and his cohort were criminals by commonly accepted international standards: they planned and conducted aggressive war. Later in the war Hitler was probably clinically insane. Yet as my earlier treatment of Hitler indicates, it does not appear that Hitler was mad at the time of Munich. He was simply playing extended chicken.

b. If so, what seems to be the source of the irrationality?

As in (a), people made mistakes and were criminals, but meet general standards of rationality.

c. Is irrationality sometimes feigned for bargaining advances?

Hitler is often used as an example of the "rationality of irrationality". It would, however, be more consistent with the actual situation which obtained during at least the Munich crisis and more consistent with data limitations if Hitler were used to illustrate the less poetic axiom, "its sometimes good if your opponent thinks you might be irrational." The implication of this is that while it does not seem that Hitler was irrational, there is not sufficient evidence to determine if he intended to appear irrational. Obviously he did appear irrational at some times to some opponents about some issues, with great positive effect on his bargaining position. Only once during the crisis, in the September 26 interview with Horace Wilson, might it be said that Hitler lost control of himself. It appears, however, that while Hitler may have felt great rage and fear appropriate for the moment (his offer to play chicken was being accepted) he did not so lose

control of himself that he acted irrationally. Rather, he seems to have successfully and intelligently enhanced German commitment to the policy Germany was following. It might correctly be said that to enhance ones commitment to chicken at such a point was highly dangerous, but Germany retained control of a possibility to swerve aside without significant loss, as Hitler well knew. Over most of the crisis Hitler retained a possibly mad coloration in some eyes for, in my estimation, two reasons. In the first place he was eccentric in the way gangsters are eccentric and alarming for the same reasons. Secondly, his payoffs were different and his opponents did not realize this. Hitler was playing chicken when Britain and France were playing prisoner's dilemma, though Britain and France thought Germany as well was playing prisoner's dilemma.

3. Is there a clear shift in bargaining behavior between "stages" of a crisis?

Activity in the crisis period seems to divide itself into three rough stages. From the crisis' inception until Godesberg, each side was preparing for a coming crisis, each according to its own visions of the requisites for solution of its own most immediate problem relative to Czechoslovakia. There seems to have been, relative to later periods, a fairly high degree of freedom to assume position in this period. This is not to imply very great actual freedom, for the participants were strongly directed into position by their strategic status, existing perceptions, existing goals, and by the particular nature of the Czechoslovakian problem.

In essence during this period the situation was being structured for the most conflictual second stage of the crisis, which was the period between Godesberg and Hitler's cancellation of the German "mobilization". This second stage was a summation, an adding-up of the various positions as they had evolved in the first period. Though the most conflictual, this period actually seems to have served a sort of mediatory function between the first, more unstructured period and the final period, the Munich Conference itself. This final third period, though it involved some potential for conflict, was almost merely a ratification, a literal inking-in of the agreement tacitly reached when Hitler cancelled the German "mobilization".

As the tension rose over Czechoslovakia there appears to have been a tendency for the tempo of action to pick up. In what appears to be an outgrowth of the tempo's increasing, human actors appear to have more single-mindedly focussed their action. In this there were two elements. Human actors increased the focus of doing what they were already doing. Bonnet, for example, began to cast even more desperately about for any way out, and began to misrepresent things even more in so doing. British hard liners and soft liners, each, it seems from the summaries of Cabinet deliberations, were heightened in their repective positions. Hitler began to more extremely alternate between his publicly displayed Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde extremes of conciliator and ruthless warrior. It would not, however, particularly in the case of Britain and France, be accurate to conclude that the policy output was a direct

result of this phenomena. Rather, in the cases of both decision making frameworks, intervening variables such as the structure of the decision making teapot containing the tempest and the changing external stimulii seem to have been involved.

Secondly, as the tension in the crisis increased, diplomatic norms seemed to have been left more aside. There seemed to be less concern with propriety, indeed even generally less relative valuation of the more familiar structure of diplomatic interaction as a framework and covering for action. Though the covering norms were to remain very important at some crucial points, it seems that there was, as tension increased, more "plain talk" between Germans and the West, between Britain and France, and between the West and Czechoslovakia. Indeed communication between the West and the Soviet Union even moved in this direction. This could of course be a function of all actions increasing and resulting in an increase of all types of communication. However, my admittedly impressionistic survey indicates otherwise.

4. What is the relative importance and frequency of "symbolic acts" and "acts of harassment"

With the exception of not blocking cultural exchanges, Germany engaged in all of the harassment acts listed in Working Paper #4. In addition, such phenomena as Hitler's visit to the French border, and the armed camp atmosphere of the Reich Chancellery, particularly on September 27, would seem to be examples of the symbolic acts listed in Working Paper #4. While other states engaged in some such activity, their activity in general seems to partake much less

of the "signaling" aspect than do the German activities in this category. Unfortunately, it is difficult or perhaps impossible to separate German activity in this dimension from activity fitting more neatly into a credibility-critical risk framework or from activity which was simply necessary for a state which was preparing a military attack on another state. For example, much has been made of what the translator Schmidt calls the "bang of the drum" when military men would enter bearing communications for Hitler, and by implication, communication for the Western statemen talking with Hitler. However, there seems no evidence that any communicative intent was purposefully designed into such an event. There may have been such intention. More likely, however, military men were around Hitler when Wilson brought his message, for example, because military men were always around. A uniform was no novelty in the Third Reich. Other German activities do appear to have been more purposefully related to Hitler's desire to create a crisis atmosphere and isolate Czechoslovakia, particularly those which match the list of "acts of harassment". Again, however, it seems impossible to separate signaling effect from other more obvious intentions more readily accounted for in other categories of action.

WORKING PAPER #3 HYPOTHESES

A. Hypotheses relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

1) Both Britain and France were very cautious. Both were aware of inherent possibilities that events might get out of hand either through accident or by things being set off and escalating from a move on the coercive continuum. Both sought to control the Benes government, and Britain, far from giving a blank check to France, sought a suspensive veto over French action once the going got really fast and treacherous. In the case of both states threats were avoided on occasion precisely because threats were threatening and might put them on a slippery slope with a dangerous state. The Soviets were more willing throughout the period to express commitment, but were very reluctant to jump in head first without predicating their commitments on actions by others or on certain conditions being met. Britain and France perceived the immediate cost of war as high, perceived it higher than any state except Czechoslovakia. London and Paris, they thought, would be destroyed in the first few days of war. Also, there comes a point when caution in the short run so mortgages the future as to become non-caution in the long run. France was much more guilty of this non-caution than Britain, for French mortgaging appears to have been less thought out, while the British, though perhaps making a mistake in their calculations, agonized over the choice of a policy of resistance or settlement with Germany.

If states can plan aggressive war and still be considered cautious, then Germany, given the necessity of serving that goal, was fairly cautious. Hitler tried over the summer to take care of

Germany's requisite in diplomacy and military affairs so that the war which he intended to start would be successful. He also agonized over his choices at times, even if he seemed to consistently under-rate his enemy. Hitler, of course, did take risks, which is by definition dangerous, though not necessarily uncareful. For Hitler the risk of a short war was lessened by his belief that German power was fading in the face of Western rearmament. Hitler certainly raised the risk of war, but for Hitler war needed to be risked if his earlier calculations of the future course of international politics were correct. When faced with a fairly certain large war Hitler backed down. In the end at Munich his calculation of risk was confirmed as accurate.

2) Once Czechoslovakia had decided to depend on allies in the crisis (if there was a choice) she had almost no freedom of action except to move further down the path France pushed her. Though France displayed little concern for saving the alliance with Czechoslovakia, considerations for the alliance as it might bear on French reputation should Germany attack Czechoslovakia were important for France. One theme of French behavior was to avoid its obligation being called or in the case of some Frenchmen, to avoid having to answer that call. Britain put reaching a settlement with Germany on an equal par with maintaining a close relationship with France. For a long time Britain, though indicating support for France, refrained from making a firm commitment to France in advance of conflict. When that commitment was made late in the crisis, Britain asked for a veto on French military measures.

Observers believe that an analog of the alliance system's role in the orgins of World War I was paramount in Chamberlain's mind.

3) Except for Czechoslovakia, preserving the value of alliances was relatively unimportant to the national actors. States were either thinking in the short run, in which saving an alliance for the future was less important, or if thinking of the future, were thinking, as Britain, of additional non-alliance means of maintaining security. Hence the British put less value into the possible alliance with France because other alternatives were available (which in some cases more firm alliances would interfere with). Czechoslovakia found a policy of alliance valuation desirable because there really was no other possible salvation for her, no other alternative policy. France placed different values on different alliances. Czechoslovakia was viewed as a liability in its pre-Munich form (though of some utility if Germay could be satisfied), while the developing alliance with Britain was viewed as a desirability. The variable involved that enabled France to make these distinctions was the possible aid the ally might give France in a conflict with Germany. France, unlike Czechoslovakia, thought that to an extent she could pick and choose between alliances and situations.

4) For dominant British decision makers the connectedness of issues pushed toward a softer line in which images of resolve were relatively unimportant. In fact, it was desirable to be soft on Czechoslovakia so a larger settlement could be reached. A second group, less influential, did relate resolve to future bargaining

reputation. Reputation was (as in #2 above) important for France. She sought to avoid reputation's being affected by a call to honor the Czech alliance. The Soviets appeared to act very properly with respect to alliance obligations, though their offers were never called. Hitler was quite concerned that Germany project an image of resolve, not only for the sake of enemies but for the sake of such actual and possible allies as Italy, Hungary, and Poland.

5) With the possible exception of Germany, stated and actual valuation of the stakes were at about the same level. Hitler appears to have exaggerated certain values (desires to protect the Sudeten Germans) and understated others (supergame considerations). On the average Germany's valuation as well seems to have been fairly accurately stated. My estimation is that if Hitler did exaggerate, he did not realize that he was exaggerating.

6) In general declarations simply indicated a willingness to fight. The German declarations tended to be more graphic as Hitler's "I will smash-h-h the Czechs" whereas the declarations of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were more straightforward. Britain attempted to employ a gradation of warning - "might not be able to stand aside", but this type of warning was either understood as a clear warning or no commitment, with the variable in understanding often being the perspective of the listener.

7) Again, British, French, and Soviet threats were more straightforward and colorless, whereas the Germans spoke of "exterminating" the Czechs, that "vile race of dwarfs". Germany also managed some

maneuvers during the crisis (such as awing Charles Lindberg with their aircraft) that were related to crucial fears in the West of city bombing.

8) This is difficult to answer. Though Germany was, in preparing for war, engaging in a very large number of physical actions below the level of violence, Hitler's words were still the focus of attention in diplomatic circles. Indeed, some physical acts which would have set things off in the nuclear age (such as border crossings) were, as individual events, less significant in the meaning that was attached to them. Other acts, almost as if part of a code, were held to be highly significant (mobilizations, inspections). Because the British, French, Czechs, and Soviets had not generated such a background of action as Germany, their actions appear to have had more saliency for all parties than do increases in the already high level of Germany activity.

9) There were no subsidiary confrontations between states to which great meaning was imputed at the international level.

10) As in #6 and #7 above, German threats were more bellicose and explicit.

11) In Britain and France measures which might incidentally have contributed to shared risk were finely calculated to eliminate that element in as much as was possible. Hence, for example, an urgently needed mobilization in France was limited to defensive formations, and certain Brisish warnings to Hitler were couched in the most delicate language possible to avoid transforming what was intended to calm things down into a verbal game of chicken.

Part of Hitler's strategy was of course to increase the tension and make war seem more possible. Yet it is questionable if he was truly manipulating a shared risk in the sense Schelling means. When there became a larger possibility that the Sudeten Germans might get out of hand, Germany tried to clamp down on them. Even in the final stages of the crisis, when it appeared Britain and France might stand firm, Hitler did all he could to conceal German preparations which might have increased the shared risk of war.

12) There was great uncertainly as to who would do what should war break out. Even the closest of allies could not count on each other in the Munich situation. Indeed, it was on estimations of this factor and efforts to alter and utilize it that the crisis in large part turned.

B. Propositions about coercive tactics

1) There were no irrevocable commitments in the Munich crisis.

2) As the crisis developed threats tended more and more toward being explicit and blunt. As above, however, Germany's threats were the most explicit, the least veiled. Veiled threats made by Britain early in the crisis appear to have given some soft-line German officials pause, but not, as far as is known, to have troubled Hitler.

3) There was no significant difference between threats made to the lowly and threats made to the mighty. An egalitarianism of threats seemed to exist, with such variation as there was being accounted for more by phase of crisis than by anything else. The British tended to be very careful when talking to Hitler, indeed parts of Chamberlain's Berchtesgaden conversation sound almost as

if he were talking a madman off a window ledge. The British were cautious because they began to see Hitler as both highly placed and possibly irrational.

4) The moves which come to mind as coercion wearing a non-coercive mask also appear to have had a more purely force orientation as well as psychological orientation in intention. Hence, for example, the Germans sought to mask their preparation for invasion as training exercises and the Brisish attacked the same label to the significant change in course by elements of the fleet. In these and other cases the technical mask seems more designed to further the action in its more purely force dimension than to grease the psychological skids in the opponents mind.

5) When the British and French finally made a firm commitment in late September Hitler attempted to deal with it not by creating loopholes, but rather by pushing harder. Further, "loopholes" is too filled with connotations of delicacy and precision to characterize the British and French action relative to Germany in the last days of the crisis. After having tried and failed at preventing Hitler from establishing a firm commitment, the two virtually begged him to step down, illustrating their pleas in the best Madison Avenue techniques with impressively colored maps. showing Hitler how much he could get by simply backing down.

6) Britain's early warnings were so ambiguous as to make "avenue of retreat" sound like an unnecessary narrowing of the many ways such warnings left for escape. France, however, was locked into support of Czechoslovakia by an alliance and concern for reputation,

as was the Soviet Union. The story of France's behavior in the crisis might be told as an effort to find a respectable avenue of retreat. As a result of France's unwillingness to concretize co-operation with the Soviets (hence avoiding another trap from which retreat would be difficult), the Soviet Union never was pushed to using the avenues of retreat it might have reserved. Germany gradually built up a commitment from which there was no easy retreat.

7) As in numbers 2,3,5 and 6, behavior in the crisis strongly confirms the hypothesis that favorable assymetry leads to firm commitment and explicit threat.

8) As in #6, commitment appears to have been gradual. The hypothesis is strongly confirmed.

9) Though they read their government organization charts incorrectly and alo at one time lumped Hitler with the German moderates, the British did talk about encouraging certain groups inside Germany,, though such plans never came to much. Soft liners in both Britain and France, as well as Czechoslovakia, tried to work together on occasion to influence joint policies, as on occasion did hard liners in the three countries. German soft liners attempted to intervene with British hard liners in order to influence British policy more strongly against hard liners in Germany. The hypothesis is strongly confirmed.

10) The most ambiguous communications were some of the public communications. Yet other public communications were highly unambiguous, perhaps precisely because they were publicly made, with

the attendant feature of implications for reputation, commitment, and so forth. In the case of public communications, ambiguity was reduced by an "I know he knows I know that he is commited" logic. For example, when Hitler told a Sportpalast crowd of his commitment to the Sudetens and that commitment is carried out over radio, the communication becomes less ambiguous than if the same words are uttered to a private envoy. On the other hand face-to-face conversation could also be very convincing. Chamberlain believed almost everything Hitler told him, believed that Hitler could not lie to a man with whom he had negotiated.

11) If anything, there was more risk manipulation as the crisis tension increased.

12) Unless the last stage is defined as the very end of the crisis, this hypothesis is untrue relative to Munich. As a perusal of the narrative will readily indicate, coercion increased as the crisis developed, then became very tacit after the proposal for the Munich Conference was accepted.

C. Hypotheses relating tactics to responses

1) A more harsh tune in threats seemed on both sides to incline parties toward resistance. Czechoslovakia would be the only exception, perhaps more from the position she was boxed into than from a particular internal idiosyncracy. Hitler's strongest response followed the strongest, most aggressive, and perhaps for him, most surprising stand which Britain and France took. Earlier the men who Hitler later called "worms" had turned when Hitler had pre-emptorily raised German demands.

2) Threats may well have a provocative effect, as the Czechs found out when they apparently threatened Germany by their May mobilization. The threat Sudeten rioting posed for the Czech state was ultimately very forcefully dealt with by the Czechs as it dramatically escalated. The examples in #1 are also relevant.

3) Outright threats were, as indicated, very provocative. Hitler's numerous attempts at changing British utilities were much less provocative, but probably in part because some of the British decision makers desired a different set of utilities anyway. The immediate effect of the newly strong stance of the West on September 26 proved to be immediately provocative, but, it seems, after Hitler had time to internalize implications and adjust utilities, proved less provocative. The hypothesis seems strongly confirmed.

4) There were two cases of rule breaking in the Munich crisis. In the first case the British tried to foist the Runciman Mission on the Czechs. In the second case at Godesberg Hitler broke the rules of peaceful negotiation for change. In both cases elements pushing toward resolve were momentarily increased yet did not immediately affect policy.

5) There appears no evidence of probabalistic thinking in the Munich crisis. Indeed Chamberlain once noted that chances might be 100 to 1 and went directly on to overrule that calculation with an "either-or" statement. In particular in the British Cabinet and in Germany much evidence of deliberation seems to indicate

careful attention to the opponent's various responses, but fails to indicate even rank ordering being involved in such calculations.

6) Toughness definitely produced counter-toughness between Britain and Germany. In Germany's relations with France and Czechoslovakia there appears to be somewhat less of a step-by-step escalation of toughness, though at the highest level of toughness high toughness was reciprocated. Between Britain-France and Czechoslovakia, British-French toughness produced eventual Czech compliance, but was often mediated by Czech toughness which produced even greater Western toughness as response to Czechoslovakia.

Except when their threat level was the highest, Western and Czech conciliation directed toward Germany appears to have encouraged Hitler to continue in the course he had originally charted and often encouraged him to raise demands. What amounted to Czech conciliation toward the West resulted indirectly in heightened demands being directed by the West toward Czechoslovakia in the sense of "But what have you given in on today?" German conciliation of the West was generally responsible for increasing soft line strength in the West and producing further concession.

7) Most compellent threats came from Germany and deterrent threats came from the West, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. While it would not be possible to disagree with this hypothesis, it does not seem that enough variation exists across states and between status quo - non status quo actors to justify drawing a conclusion which would positively confirm the hypothesis. It could certainly be said that the more compellent the German threat, the

more resistance such threats met, that is, until the West eventually crumbled. At the same time an increase in the specificity and level of deterrent threats produced, to a point, enhanced will to resist.

D. Hypotheses relating environment, setting, and tactics to outcome

1) By Munich there was relative inequality in bargaining power in the German-Western and Western-Czech relationships. Aspects of natural salience had very little effect on the ultimate settlement. Germany obtained roughly all it asked of the West, and the West was able to similarly prevail against Czechoslovakia.

2) It is certainly true that in the West and in Czechoslovakia salience had very great significance in restraining escalation and tactics. Though Germany was better able to manipulate and work around salience, it seems that tactical salience was also more important for Germany than salience as related to settlement.

3) The matter of asymmetries in systemic environment and bargaining setting was treated extensively in the first two portions of this paper. Such treatment reflects and indicates my conception of the overwhelming importance of such factors to the crisis outcome. In some substantial measure this may be a function of the wide definition that has been given to bargaining setting, which in effect forces many factors to stand on a base located in "bargaining setting". Yet it seems inescapable that such factors as power perceptions, operational codes, recent previous relations, etc., all things existing before the crisis began, had such positive inertia that in-crisis behavior was only of secondary importance

in determining outcome. Of course once the crisis had begun there was nothing but behavior that could influence outcome.

4) The crisis termination contained both formal and tacit elements. Though the crisis ended in a formal settlement, the Munich Agreement, much of great importance was left unsaid in that agreement. Indeed, as international agreements go, the Munich Agreement left many dispositions in a tacit state. In the month that followed the West allowed, while looking the other way, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia along lines that reflected their granting of major concessions at the end of September. This later specification of the tacit elements of the Munich Agreement should be differentiated from the normal carrying out of the formal language of an international agreement and also from the later German seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

5) If "intentions" is taken to mean "general goals relative to the issue of the crisis", then it seems that there was fairly accurate short term calculation of opposition intentions, at least if actors are not asked to be mind readers. Though there was some variation among individuals, the Czech, German, French, and British decision structures seem to have understood each others immediate goals relative to Czechoslovakia fairly well as such understanding goes in international politics. When motivations and longer range ends were considered, the level of understanding of course declined, though not, it seems, excessively so relative to the general abilities of human beings. Though a stronger case might be made for miscalculation of Soviet short range intentions

if more data were available, it seems that the Soviets were as much pushed aside as misunderstood. Greater treatment of miscalculation from another perspective will be found in the hypothesis section dealing with misperception and in the information processing model section.

E. Hypotheses about connections between alliance relationships and adversary bargaining

1) Certainly the West and Czechoslovakia acted as if they believed this hypothesis to be true. It does appear that as commitment went up between Britain and France and between Britain-France and Czechoslovakia, bargaining power increased relative to Germany. There did not, however, appear to be a corresponding increase in the ally's power over the guaranteeing ally.

2) Britain definitely presented two faces throughout the crisis. Toward Germany a stronger position was portrayed than that portrayed in conversation with France and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union behaved in the same way, toward Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, as did France toward Czechoslovakia.

3) Germany's demand was always for more than the Czechs would have appeared willing to give without French and British pressure. Western pressure resulted from the German demand falling in the range defined by their and Czechoslovakia's maximum concession. At times, however, German demands went past the maximum concession which the West was willing to make. At those times the West refrained from active coercing of Czechoslovakia.

4) I am presuming "acceptable" in this hypothesis to mean "easier

to take", as in its being sometimes easier to take bad news from a friend than from an enemy. Proposals were more acceptable to Czechoslovakia when they came from Britain and France, but not significantly so because of any more pleasant coloration which Britain and France added along this dimension. Czechoslovakia accepted British and French proposals not because such proposals were less unpleasant in delivery (indeed they were on occasion at least as harsh as any Hitler made) but because in delivering proposals Britain and Frnace made their continued support contingent upon Czech acceptance. Hence Western proposals were acceptable because of the threat which accompanied them. By the time Benes would have resisted he had gone too far with the British and French to attempt any other route.

5) Valuation of the stakes appears to have been inversely proportional to geographic distance from Czechoslovakia. In the West, in France in particular, some alliances were important more purely for reputational effect than for actual utility in the momentary relation of forces. It does not seem that Britain put a very high value on the developing alliance with France or that France put much value on the Czech alliance. No one was particularly interested in exploring the alliance possibilities or actualities with the Soviet Union. For Germany immediate possible power transformations were more important than the Italian alliance. It does not appear that this multipolar system placed great value on alliance preservation.

6) There was a rough but clear correlation between the extent

to which decision makers and states saw the conflict as part of a larger confrontation and the extent to which they shared Czechoslovakia's general values.

7) Increasing tension did, to a point, increase solidarity in a long run sense, though there were shorter run variations from the pattern. The only state, however, which was fearful of losing allies was Czechoslovakia, which did take on a commitment to sacrifice more as tension increased. France, trying to acquire a more firm ally in Britain, did, in part because of that goal, undertake certain commitments to Britain as the crisis developed in intensity. With reference to (b) here, the resisters did see a firm front as the way to deter Hitler.

8) As France grew more insecure about Britain, and Czechoslovakia grew more insecure about Britain and France, each was less willing to restrain the actual and potential ally. Further, Czechoslovakia, generally more insecure about allies than France, seems to have been generally less willing to place what might broadly be defined as restraints on those allies.

9) If Britain-France-Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union can be called an alliance, then Britain was certainly the dominant party. It seems clear that British co-operation with Germany over the course of the crisis came at the expense of the cohesiveness of the alliance.

10) It did not appear that multipolarity posed any substantial difficulties for British-German collaboration in de-fusing the issue, indeed it seemed to be an aid.

11) Though the situation was more risky for Czechoslovakia, the

the Czechs were in no sense less cautious than the other, larger actors in the crisis. Perhaps this is a result of their having less room to move, but this seems doubtful.

12) Germany, the unitary player, and, in that sense, more cohesive an actor, made firmer commitments and stronger threats than did the more loose aggregation it faced.

13) There seems to have been a crude correlation between the down-up-down course of Western resistance to Germany and Czech strength of resistance. It seems, however, that the intervening variable of Western pressure or lack thereof on Czechoslovakia was involved in this correlation.

14) Though Britain and France worried a great deal about their ability to control Czechoslovakia, they actually had very little difficulty in controlling Czechoslovakia, though Benes' policy and the general strategic situation were powerful aids to British-French control.

F. Hypotheses about perceptions and images

1) Actors perceived in accordance with their existing images as indicated relative to the information processing model and in greater detail in the narrative.

2) Certainly the West and Germany were running from World War I during the Munich period. The West feared the Great War's origins and gravity and tried to shed the guilt which the peace settlement had engendered. Germany sought to smash the ring of

hostile powers that in the war had meant defeat and unpleasant peace. Elaboration from the "stab in the back" theory made a succesful replay of World War I on a smaller scale seem possible. In a more narrow sense it seems clear that Hitler's perception was strongly determined by images in his own personal history, which he seemed to conceive of in a more grand sense than most human actors do. In particular his World War I experience and the nature of his domestic struggle before attaining power were apparently vital as more personal historical analogs.

It has been suggested that Benes was ever mindful of the disastrous defeat that the Czechs had suffered at White Mountain and which had taken 300 yers to repair. He was, the suggestion goes, determined not to waste those three hundred years by fighting another White Mountain alone against Germany.

3) Only German hard liners perceived adversaries as more hostile than they actually were.

4) Hitler overestimated hostility, but did not overestimate his adversaries' fear. Chamberlain overestimated his adversary's fear and underestimated his adversary's hostility. Benes underestimated his allies' fear.

5) In this crisis the level of wishful thinking was roughly equivalent to the level of expectations. The two factors may be so interactive as to be analytically inseperable.

6) Ambiguous signals appear to have had no impact more extensive than that of confirmation of existing images. This appears to have been true when governments followed less forthright and

active policies, when two or more groups were sending information, and when policy was undergoing a tentative initial change with information from earlier policy still lingering in the communication channels. All of these factors seem present, for example, in the development of British policy in September.

7) Images underwent most change at points when tension was quite high. Further, there does not appear to have been increasing image rigidity as tension developed over the course of the crisis.

8) As the crisis developed, Hitler and Benes thought that they had only the alternative of pursuing the policy they had initially taken. Both, though in different ways, perceived the West as being able to choose with greater flexibility among at least two basic positions toward Czechoslovakia. France perceived two distinct possibilities of policy, but each policy had its own constituency, which constituency in general did not accept the other policy as an actual possibility. Daladier vacilated, finding neither policy acceptable, though he mediated between the two in preparing the confused French policy output. Chamberlain, in contradistinction to other non-German actors, perceived Hitler, by virtue of Hitler's nature, regime, and previous bargaining behavior to be the most restricted of decision makers.

9) In general, everyone tended to view everyone else as more monolithic than themselves, tended more to see their opponent and/or ally as more of a billiard ball than reality warranted. This tendency was most pronounced in the case of the Western

view of Germany.

10) While it is true that military attachés were given less weight than ambassadors, it seems that at and above the level of ambassador, credibility was roughly the same for all human actors. The crucial variables in message weight seemed to be salience against policy background, tone, and, on occassion, channel of communication. Germany, however, was viewed differently, Hitler's being in Western eyes much more significant than other Germans. This Western perception accurately reflected German reality.

11) Resolve was definitely affected by perception of ultimate aims. Hitler's resolve was always high; he conceived Western long range aims as highly threatening. Western and Czech resolve to resist was much lower than Germany's initial resolve, but escalated as they increasingly perceived the opposition's aims as more unlimited.

G. Hypotheses relating internal decision making to bargaining tactics

1) The difficulty of changing an agreed position within a government seems to have led to inertia in bargaining position, though not necessarily through that to heightened resolve to resist demands. In Germany inertia led to maintenance of demand tactics and preparation for war. In Britain inertia led to maintenance of the soft line position for concession. In France inertia led to maintenance of ambiguous wavering. Hence only in Germany could it be said that mechanical difficulties of decision making aided a firm position. There, however, when confronted with resistance,

resolve eventually crumbled to a level such as to lower the risk of war.

2) As noted in detail in the narrative, lack of unity in the governmental structure of France, Germany, and Britain seems clearly responsible for considerable confusion attendant to bargaining position. In Britain and France ambiguity of bargaining position was particularly, at times almost amazingly, enhanced by lack of unity, indeed by individuals on occasion pursuing policies which they knew were counter to the general governmental policies. In Germany such disjointed individual action paradoxically enhanced Hitler's bargaining position and ironically encouraged the British soft line position which it sought to alter.

3) There were examples on almost all sides of emotion increasing as did the tension of the crisis. Unless, however, one calls all actions not perfectly rational "emotional", there was no point at which emotion was of any more than auxilary influence. While at times British human actors cried or initially angrily refused to deliver messages, there is no evidence that emotion carried the rationality of them or their government or their government's image. Even in the most extreme case of Hitler, there seems to be no evidence of emotion overriding more reasoned calculation. At most in the German case emotion served to complement the existing German position. Hence, while emotion increased with tension, it could never be said to have been a significant influence.

4) My general estimation is that search procedures rarely ever move beyond the fairly extensive categories of "traditional, habitual

or already planned moves" into the area of creative search. Hence a judgment as to the relative difficulties posed by urgency of time is a difficult one to make. Search procedures certainly did not appear any less successful in considering a range of alternatives in the most intense phase of the crisis than in earlier, more leisurely phases. Certainly the most extensive variation in policy courses came in the most intense phase of the crisis. Perhaps the rather slow development of the Munich crisis accompanied by continuing general focus on the Sudeten problem allowed actors to more carefully think things through before the most intense phase developed. Or perhaps the relatively firmly structured situation which existed at the time of greatest tension limited the breadth of alternatives which even lengthy search would have revealed.

5) As the crisis lengthened there was no indication that organizational roles affected perception and evaluation of alternatives to any increased degree.

6) The involvement of public opinion increased over the course of the crisis. In Britain and Czechoslovakia public opinion increasingly moved toward a hard line stand. In one salient example in Germany, the public indicated an anti-war attitude. In France public opinion grew in intensity over the course of the crisis, but remained sharply divided. In all cases, even the French case, public opinion apparently reduced somewhat the government's freedom of action. It does not appear possible to be more specific concerning the exact effect of public opinion on bargaining power and

accomodative capacity. The record, to the extent that it it is clear, was strongly mixed.

7) There is no evidence that decision makers in the crisis area generally preferred a tougher line than those at home. Indeed, their lines either mirrored home policy or were somewhat softer. Further, many diplomatic representatives throughout the important capitals of Europe tended to be as soft or softer in stance than the home governments.

8) The notion that military men tend to be tougher in crisis is strongly disconfirmed by Munich. In no case is there any evidence of this, if by military men one means the highest ranking officers. Only among younger and more ideologically zealous officers in Germany was there any sign of the military's pressing harder than civilians. The resistance of higher level German military conspirators has been mentioned, as have the less dramatic bureaucratic efforts of other high level German officers. The less independent German military men tended to follow rather than lead the civilian hard liners.

In Britain senior military advisors to the Cabinet pushed for only a very limited policy of co-operation in defense of the status quo. The Chiefs of Staff had not been able to foresee a time when British forces would be adequate for the chore they faced: hence Britain should retrench. Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admirality, did press for a tougher stand, but he was a civilian responsible for a military department. While the French military attaché in Prague ultimately destroyed his passport and

volunteered for service in the Czech Army, General Gamelin wavered, as did the French government. At times strong, at times for a policy closer to yielding, high ranking French military men were never optimistic about French prospects in a war.

H. Hypotheses relating outcomes to aftermaths

1) Evidence is mixed concerning the effect of weakness. It is overstated and overapplied to all sorts of irrelevant situations, but this hypothesis, the Munich Analogy, truly reflects what went on in the inter-war years between Germany and the other powers. Moreover, the unfortunate thing is that earlier what were actually concessions from strength were interpreted as weakness. After Munich Hitler was able to call his enemies "worms" because of their behavior. He used the Munich example to strengthen hard line courses. Yet on the other hand, after May no one thought that Germany, which had appeared weak in the May crisis, would behave weakly the next time.

2) Evidence is mixed concerning the effect of weakness on ones own future bargaining behavior. No immediate effort to repair reputation was apparent in the case of Britain and France after Munich. They did attempt, as they had been doing before Munich, to repair their armed strength. The fear, however, remained in them. They certainly were not spoiling for a fight. Yet this hypothesis was just possibly true for Britain and France after the Anschluss, though the desire to be strong never was effectively translated into policy.

This hypothesis was definitely true for Germany after the

May crisis. Indeed, this is one popular explanation of the plans Hitler made in June to crush Czechoslovakia. He would not only be tough next time, but be tough against the state that had caused him embarrassment in May. Moreover, Hitler publicly used this hypothesis in September to indicate his commitment to standing firm.

3) Again, evidence concerning the effect of a weak or strong stand is mixed. Czechoslovakia calculated, apparently, that increased cohesion would be the effect of standing firm in May but the actual effect was something closer to fragmentation. France did not want an ally that imperiled French security through risk tactics. Nor, despite the Czech calculation, did Britain want to be drawn into the support of such a state.

One effect of the Munich crisis has been held to be Soviet alienation from co-operation with France and the eventual Soviet pact with Germany. The Soviets were rebuffed quite often as they tried to pull the alliance together during the crisis. They would certainly have had pragmatic reasons for going somewhere else. On the other hand, Italy and Germany moved closer together as a result of the Munich crisis, though, in Italian eyes at least, the Anschluss had pushed the two further apart.

4) As in #3 above, the Soviets were alienated from co-operation with France, but it seems doubtful if the French would have been able to make any credible firm commitments to the Soviet Union in the wake of what had transpired relative to the major source of possible French diplomatic strength in Eastern Europe.

5) As for the hypothesis affecting outcome:

(a) The settlement was viewed as incomplete.

(b) The Soviet Union was not considered an actual common adversary.

(c) The tactics were provocative for some in Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, but attitudes reflecting the impact of provocation after Munich were submerged by the leading decision makers.

(d) As in (c), humiliation was felt in the West and Czechoslovakia, but the prevailing powers in the governments after Munich seemed to ignore it much more than did others in those governments and publics.

The Munich settlement produced a very great deal of debate in the West and in large part this related to whether a detente or heightened hostility should have been perceived and acted towards. The Chamberlain and Bonnet faction held out successfully for detente until after the German seizure of the rump of Czecho-Slovakia. In reality, there seems to have been neither a detente nor heightened hostility, but rather a continuation in heightened form of the mixed state of affairs existing before Munich and the crisis.

6) The defeated side did attempt to rationalize in a way which minimized cost. Part of the concern of France and Britain while actually at Munich was to make the terms look much like a peaceful transaction conducted without the threat of force. In the case of Britain (but not Daladier) this concern derived from at least some self-deception. Chamberlain's later visit to Hitler's flat to obtain the sheet of paper he waved when he returned to Britain

was a continuation of this self-deception. Chamberlain seemed to believe that the Munich Agreement was part of the general settlement sought by Britain.

7) Demonstration of resolve did not enhance potential attractiveness for Czechoslovakia after May, when she shot her only bolt and thus enhanced existing sentiment in France and in Britain to get the best deal possible from Hitler. Demonstration of resolve did increase German attraction with respect to Italy after Munich. Mussolini became more and more locked into a close relationship with Hitler, whereas in the past he had shown some independence. This was probably because Mussolini thought he saw handwriting on the wall.

I. Hypotheses about bidding moves

1) Germany, Czechoslovakia, Britain, and France all made some mutual concession during the crisis period. No such concessions were made in the pre-crisis period. It is difficult to imagine the major concessions which were made as a result of the crisis being made in any but a crisis situation. The concessions which were made were of some considerable intrinsic value and it is difficult to believe, given the actors' statements and behavior, that the crisis atmosphere added much weight to the concessions in the actors' mental balancing. Of course some concessions, such as Hitler's postponement of invasion, were significant concessions precisely because of factors which had developed with the crisis. Yet it seems possible to analytically separate such factors (Hitler's statement of deadline for example) from the crisis atmosphere itself.

Though unlikely, had the deadline been stated and for some reason remained in a non-crisis situation, it would have been virtually as hard to back down on the deadline in that more calm atmosphere. Very substantial reputational factors would have remained operative. Evidence relative to Munich does not indicate that actors saw reputational factors as especially more significant in intense crisis than in earlier, non-crisis or early crisis situations. Moreover, concessions of the extent and strategic import that the West and Czechoslovakia granted in the heat of the crisis would not have been possible in a non-crisis situation without the extensive quid pro quo that Germany was not willing to grant. To say that it is easier to grant such large concessions in a non-crisis situation seems similar to saying that it is easier to give a stranger ones billfold than it is to give a mugger the billfold.

2) Czechoslovakia, Britain, France, and Germany used the tactic of softening concession with a quid pro quo a number of times as they moved through concession toward settlement. It appears, however, that the relatively costless quid pro quo was used as much by the actual granter of the significant con-concession as a kind of self-directed mental judo as it was used to justify compliance to the more external constituency audience. Hence Chamberlain may well have obtained the infamous "scrap of paper" from Hitler for two reasons. It was a handy item to wave to the crowd on return to London, but it also felt good in his pocket as on the way home he thought about his role in the crisis.

3) In public at least, backing down was justified throughout the crisis not by redefinition of vital interests, but rather by indicating that vital interest had been put below the common good and joint interest.

4) In general, concessions only occurred at high points of tension and were interpreted, with the exception of German concession, as signs of weakness, though by ally as well as adversary.

5) With power defined very broadly, Britain appears, by the final stages of the crisis, the most powerful member of what might broadly be called the Anglo-Franco-Czech alliance. The maximum concession of this, the defending side, clearly moved with Britain's maximum concession during the intense phase of the crisis. A more narrow definition of power in more purely military terms would make France the most powerful ally but because of British influence on France and French paralysis, the French maximum generally followed the British maximum.

6) There were no examples of concession being offered in "sign language."

FOOTNOTES

[1] Osgood, R. and Tucker, R. Force, Order, and Justice (Baltimore: 1967), p. 69.

[2] Osgood, p. 68.

[3] O'Neill, R.J. The German Army and The Nazi Party, 1933 - 1939 (London: 1966), p. 94.

[4] Renouvin, Pierre. World War II and Its Origins (New York: 1969), p. 124.

[5] Renouvin, p. 122.

[6] Klein, Burton. Germany's Economic Preparations for War Cambridge, Mass.: 1959) p. 21.

[7] Klein, p. 76 - 82.

[8] Robertson, E.M. Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933 - 1939 (London: 1963), p. 84.

[9] Eubank, Keith. Munich (Normon, Oklahoma: 1963), p. 282.

[10] Robertson, p. 138.

[11] Colvin, Ian. The Chamberlain Cabinet (New York: 1971), p. 80.

[12] Renouvin, p. 134.

[13] Harcave, Sidney. Russia, a History (New York: 1964), p. 642-3.

[14] Lammers, Donald. Explaining Munich (Stanford: 1966), p. 32.

[15] Churchill, Winston S. The Gathering Storm (New York: 1961), p. 289.

[16] Craig, Gordon. The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York: 1970), p. 499-500.

[17] O'Neill, p. 163.

[18] O'Neill, p. 165.

[19] Thorne, Christopher. The Approach of War, 1938-39 (New York: 1968), p. 57.

[20] Renouvin, p. 134-35.

[21]Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. Munich, Prologue to Tragedy (New York: 1963), p. 25.

[22]Robertson, p. 110.

[23]Eubank, p. 22.

[24]Thorne, p. 58.

[25]Robertson, p. 120.

[26]Braddick, Henderson B. Germany, Czechoslovakia, and The "Grand Alliance" in the May Crisis, 1938 (Denver: 1969), p. 20.

[27]Braddick, p. 42.

[28]Braddick, p. 43.

[29]Braddick, p. 45.

[30]Loewenheim, Francis. The Munich Crisis (Boston: 1965), p. 14.

[31]Robertson, p. 122.

[32]Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA). Survey of International Affairs - The Crisis over Czechoslovakia (Volume II, 1938) (London: 1951), p. 190-91.

[33]RIIA, p. 192.

[34]RIIA, p. 194.

[35]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 72.

[36]RIIA, p. 196.

[37]Nogueres, Henri. Munich (London: 1965), p. 84.

[38]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 85.

[39]Colvin, p. 140-42.

[40]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 84.

[41]Colvin, p. 142-43.

[42]RIIA, p. 269.

[43]Robertson, p. 133.

[44]Robertson, p. 133.

[45]Lammers, p. 37.

[46]Eubank, p. 111.

[47]RIIA, p. 238.

[48]Nogueres, p. 95.

[49]Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918 - 1945, Germany and Czechoslovakia 1937-38 (Series D, VolumeII) (Washington: 1949), p. 723. This source will henceforth be abbreviated as "DGFP".

[50]Robertson, p. 136.

[51]Robertson, p. 138.

[52]Colvin. p. 148.

[53]Colvin, p. 151.

[54]Colvin, p. 150.

[55]Colvin, p. 148.

[56]Colvin, p. 148.

[57]Colvin, p. 150.

[58]RIIA, p. 274.

[59]RIIA, p. 275-76.

[60]Colvin, p. 151.

[61]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 101.

[62]RIIA, p. 326.

[63]RIIA, p. 326.

[64]Colvin, p. 152.

[65]Rock, William. Neville Chamberlain (New York: 1969), p. 149.

[66]Nogueres, p. 130.

[67]Thorne, p. 76.

[68]Rock, p. 149.

[69]Nogueres, p. 129.

[70]Colvin, p. 158.

[71]Nogueres, p. 135-37.

[72]Nogueres, p. 146.

[73]Thorne, p. 75.

[74]Nogueres, p. 151.

[75]Thorne, p. 77.

[76]Nogueres, p. 168.

[77]Colvin, p. 162-63.

[78]Lammers, p. 41.

[79]RIIA, p. 386.

[80]Nogueres, p. 176.

[82]Robertson, p. 143.

[83]RIIA, p. 392.

[84]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 142.

[85]RIIA, p. 394.

[86]Thorne, p. 80.

[87]Loewenheim, p. 52.

[88]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 151.

[89]Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Conn.: 1964), p. 538.

[90]Wheeler-Bennet, p. 152.

[91]RIIA, p. 423.

[92]RIIA, p. 414.

[93]RIIA, p. 415.

[94]RIIA, p. 416.

[95]Loevenheim, p. 53-55.

[96]Eubank, p. 181.

[97]Robertson, p. 145.

[98]RIIA, p. 415-416.

[99]Nogueres, p. 204.

[100]DGFP, p. 989.

[101]DGFP, p. 985.

[102]RIIA, p. 423.

[103]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 160.

[104]RIIA, p. 423.

[105]Vogt, Hannah. The Burden of Guilt (New York: 1964), p. 189.

[106]RIIA, p. 425.

[107]RIIA, p. 423.

[108]Nogueres, p. 277.

[109]Wheeler-Bennett, p. 22.

[110]DGFP, p. 1004.

[111]Eubank, p. 216.