

Center for International Conflict Studies

Case Studies

The French Invasion of the Ruhr (1923-24)

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THE FRENCH INVASION OF THE RUHR (1923-24)

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I. Text

The French invasion of the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, in January 1923, signalled the beginning of the major political crisis in the European interstate system between the defeat of the Central Powers in the fall of 1918 and the challenges of the Axis powers in the mid-1930's. This French venture into "coercive diplomacy," though at first apparently successful, proved to be indeed a Pyrrhic victory. The whole affair is now universally regarded as a failure, though this failure is sometimes perceived in the form of a missed opportunity. The crisis can be divided chronologically into the five following phases: background to the crisis (1919 - January 1923); invasion and "passive resistance" (January - August 1923); the abandonment of "passive resistance" (August - September 1923); the French agreement to a resumption of negotiations and her eventual abandonment of a policy of support for German separatism (October 1923 - February 1924); and the negotiation of the London agreements of 16 August 1924, which formally resolved the two major overt crisis issues, reparations and the continued French presence in the Ruhr.

Background to the Crisis

Nature of the international system, 1919-1922

The major units in the international system after the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 consisted of five European (England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia) and two non-European (Japan, United States) states. Of these last two, however, the United States had withdrawn from any political commitments in the "Old World" in the aftermath of the Senate's repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles in November 1919, while Japan's interests were limited to the Far East.¹ (One might

¹The Anglo-Japanese alliance, operative since 1902, came to an end on 17 August 1923, formally in consequence of ratification of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty of Washington (December 1921), more fundamentally because of American pressure on London.


add that with Japan racial and cultural factors reinforced a shared sense of strangeness.) Moreover, Russia took little part in international transactions both because of the geographical and economic isolation and weakness imposed by her defeat in March 1918 and, more importantly, by her adoption of a form of government and a system of property ownership feared and despised by the leaders of other states. In consequence international affairs in Europe between the two world wars are largely conducted by the traditional European Great Powers.

To be sure, the constitution of a League of Nations (the Council of which first met in January 1920) theoretically brought into being an institutional framework for a modified form of state behavior - the attainment of a condition of collective security through cooperation, scaled disarmament, and a minimum of coercion - to make less likely those pre-1914 attributes - balance-of-power politics, the increasing commitment to alliances, and armaments escalation - which had led to the catastrophe of 1914-1918. The League of Nations "idea," however, was more honoured in public speeches than embedded in statesmen's operational codes. Even if this were not exclusively the case, questions arising out of the interpretation or application of the peace treaties of 1919-1920 were decided, not by the League, but by the victorious Allies. Such decisions were customarily taken by the Supreme Council (constituted under the name of Allied Supreme War Council in November 1917) with a membership of ministers, the Conference of Ambassadors, which met in Paris.¹ Within such institutional frameworks the Germans might appear as adversaries or pleaders, but never as equal partners.

Descriptively and historically, one might summarily characterize the 1919-1922 international system as one wherein the former western (England, France, Italy) European Great Powers enjoy a temporary and rather artificial predominance and freedom of action owing to the defeat, isolation, or voluntary absence of other members of the international system and can thus be regarded as constitu-

¹The first meeting was held on 26 January 1920.

ting a Concert of Europe. The major question at issue is the relationship between this concert and Germany. More abstractly, the system in operation in Europe can be diagrammed as follows:



Verbally, a limited (maximum five members)-multipolar system¹ contains a three-member alliance the only explicit function of which is (owing to the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles) to impose its previously expressed will on a fourth, defeated member. Little wonder, then, that the alliance should prove shaky.

Issues and actors

The invasion of the Ruhr was ostensibly precipitated by the failure of Germany to meet its obligations for reparations for war damages, obligations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. In a less narrow sense, however, the international crisis of 1923 was the outcome of a failure by the system, and more particularly by the Allied Powers, to resolve three interrelated sets of issues. These three, which we will briefly call national security, economic recovery, and international conciliation, were all posed by the outcome of the "Great War;" the juridical form that these issues took, however, tended to be defined by the Versailles Treaty. The British Government under the largely personal impetus of Prime Minister Lloyd George made a determined effort from late 1921 on to resolve all three issues - this effort culminated and failed in the fiasco of the last major post-war "summit" meeting, the International Economic Conference of Genoa of April-May 1922. Thereafter the drift toward inter-Allied conflict, and toward French coercion of Germany and German resistance, went unchecked. In this brief introductory

¹Rothstein goes so far as to state that "France was virtually the sole power factor in Europe until the 1930's...the period we are discussing is primarily unipolar, but uniquely so, for it was the seemingly decisive center of power which acted in the most distraught and destabilizing way." Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers. (New York, 1968), p. 223.

background sketch we propose to discuss the underlying issues, the reparations problem, and the immediate origins of the crisis.

To the French, who initiated and controlled the crisis until Poincare's retreat in October 1923, the issue of national security was the dominating one. They were well aware that with a population of 40 million compared to Germany's 60, the war had been won only with the aid of their allies' military forces. To prevent future German invasion, they had in 1919 proposed the separation of the Rhineland from the rest of Germany. The "Anglo-Saxons," conscious of the 1871 example of Alsace-Lorraine, were opposed to the creation of such a cause for permanent German grievance. The French conceded the point in April 1919 in return for Allied military occupation of the Rhineland for a 15-year period and an offer of an Anglo-American guarantee pact of French territory against German invasion. The U.S. rejection of the Versailles settlement effectively nullified this offer, and the British decided not to take it up unilaterally. With Russia "gone," the French were left dependent on their own efforts.

The consequent French search for security took two principal forms. The first was the creation of an alliance system with those smaller European powers which had reason to fear the reversal of the Versailles settlement. In the early 1920's this took the form of military alliances with Belgium and Poland, and close relations, including military assistance and advice, to President Benes' Czechoslovakia, itself the hub of the so-called Little Entente, which also included Rumania and the state renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. The strategic rationale of this alliance system was the advantage of a two-front offensive against a resurgent Germany, facilitated by the continued French military presence in the Rhineland.

The second form was a policy of keeping Germany itself weak by an insistence on Germany's diplomatic isolation and on Allied control of disarmament and continued military occupation, and on economic pressure. In this conceptual scheme the German reparations obligations could be used - in an ascending scale of inter-

vention - to keep Germany busy and impoverished, to exert control over the industrial infrastructure necessary for war, or even - as was finally proved the case - as an excuse for military coercion and an attempted break-up of the German state.

The difficulty, however, with these more drastic exploitations of the reparations "aim" was that they were incompatible with the need French statesmen, and even more the electorate, continued to experience for the reparations payments themselves. "It has been stated in connection with the policy of disintegration and weakening of Germany," reported the commander of U.S. troops in the Rhineland, also U.S. "observer" on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, "that it is not practicable to obtain steak and milk from the same cow."¹ The unwillingness of parliament and the electorate to bear the internal economic and financial consequences of a policy of coercion was a basic, possibly the basic, cause of the French failure. This unwillingness made Anglo-American pressure on France effective and helped justify the French leadership's own division of aim.

The principal British concern in European affairs in the post-war period was not so much national security - in which arena the perceived threat, now that the German navy no longer existed, came less from Germany than from the French submarine and air forces - as economic recovery, or as it was then called, "reconstruction", and a degree of Continental political tranquillity. The economic and financial motivations for bringing about international conciliation were probably dominant from early 1921 on, when the post-war boom collapsed and massive unemployment became what proved to be a permanent feature of the interwar years. It was these considerations that lay behind the trade agreement with Russia in March 1921, the conciliatory stance on reparations in the fall of that year and after, and the attempt, formalized in January 1922, to ease the French stance on reparations by lessening her concerns on security.

¹ Henry T. Allen. Preliminary Report. Washington, D.C., 29 May, 1923: National Archives, State Department files, 862t. 01/1796.

Lloyd George's "grand design" for "European appeasement" had as its economic aspect the re-establishment and hence revival of the European economy through the re-entry of industrial Germany and agricultural Russia. This could only be done with the consent of France, itself the most economically self-sufficient of the major European states. In January 1922, at Lloyd George's urgings, a meeting of the Supreme Council in Cannes decided on the convocation of a forthcoming "Economic and Financial Conference" to include "all the Powers of Europe, including Germany [and Russia]"¹ plus the United States. The Reparations Commission, established by the Treaty of Versailles and summoned to Cannes, granted a moratorium on cash payments for January and February, the French representative on the commission concurring. Finally, Mr. Lloyd George gave the then French prime minister, M. Briand, a text of a project for an Anglo-French guaranty pact. M. Briand, who had a reputation for flexibility and had moreover in October 1921 publicly opted for a "policy of peace"², desired to negotiate along Lloyd George's lines. He had already "ceded on reparations to obtain more on security."³ The French President and Council of Ministers, however, repudiated this policy, insisting that no moratorium could be granted without "guarantees and securities"⁴ and surrounding the projected economic conference with a number of restrictions. M. Briand thereupon returned to Paris to face his colleagues and his unruly legislature; finding himself without support he resigned, to be succeeded by the dour and legalistic Raymond Poincaré, identified with a policy of constraint. Exit a dove, enter a hawk.⁵ Thereafter the French stood firm against what they considered

¹Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23 (London, 1927), p. 21.

²Georges Suarez, Briand, V 1918-1923 (Paris, 1941), 219.

³Ibid., 391 (author's translation).

⁴Council of Ministers to Briand, tel., January 1922; Suarez, Briand, 397.

⁵The dean of French diplomatic historians refers to a continuing "côté Briand" and a "côté Poincaré" in French postwar policy. Elsewhere, however, he wonders if Poincaré were not merely stupid.

England's blandishments.

The year 1922 marked a steady decline in Anglo-French relations. The negotiations on an alliance continued in desultory fashion, but without conviction and on occasion with petty impoliteness. They were discontinued in July. By then the grand economic conference, held at Genoa (10 April - 19 May), had ended in far worse than mere failure, a failure which Poincaré's intransigence on all issues made highly likely. Not only had the United States declined to attend, but the Germans and Russians made their own side arrangements in a separate treaty at nearby Rapallo on 16 April, proffering diplomatic recognition and pledging not to make economic or financial claims against each other. Lloyd George's clumsy diplomacy¹, it appeared, had brought about what ever since 1919 had been regarded as the worst possible long-term political outcome of the war, a Russo-German rapprochement.

Germany, however, reaped no benefit from this defiance of the allies, whose indignation knew no bounds. Communications channels with Germany were immediately narrowed, and the possibilities for frank discussion greatly inhibited. To take one important example, informal German discourse with the French technical experts on the Reparation Commission was henceforth impossible.² The French government in particular, aroused by this perceived challenge to the French alliance system, responded by a renewed determination to crush German resistance.³

France's freedom of action was enhanced in the remainder of 1922 by a spectacular British blunder. Lloyd George, his political position gravely shaken by the Genoa fiasco, attempted to retrieve some support by a "vigorous" policy

¹The German government was persuaded to the Rapallo agreement in part because of the allies' threat to impose further reparations payments for Russia on Germany, a contingency expressly foreseen in the Versailles Treaty.

²See Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations (Boston and N.Y., 1927), 129, 158.

³According to the testimony of the then minister of the liberated areas, the French Government had decided "to act" against Germany since July, though preferably with Great Britain (Charles Reibel. "Une grande occasion manquée: le premier drame de la Ruhr." Ecrits de Paris, Mai 1949, no. 55, p. 24).

against Turkey, courting the risk of war. This led to the grave humiliation in September of Chanak. A British military detachment at this post on Anatolia opposite the Gallipoli Peninsula was exposed to the danger of destruction by the victorious "nationalist" Turkish forces. The French contingent was ordered to be withdrawn. At the height of the crisis the British Foreign Secretary arrived in Paris to remonstrate with the French, possibly not the best way to regain their support. The unexpectedly formidable little Poincaré in the ensuing Anglo-French confrontation reduced the majestic Lord Curzon to flight and tears.¹

The crisis passed without war, but Lloyd George was finished. Deprived of Conservative support, he and the Coalition government resigned in October, to be succeeded by a Conservative administration under the colourless and passive figure of Mr. Bonar Law, who was doomed to die of cancer within a year of taking office. With the fall of Lloyd George, since 1916 a statesman of recognized European reputation and high prestige, any sense of direction in European international affairs was lost. French nationalism, personified by M. Poincaré, was for the first time since 1919, perhaps since 1870, given full scope.² The Supreme Council was no longer a locus for the non-existent concert.³ France was determined to reassert her will on Germany unencumbered by her previous allies. It

¹"Rising from his seat [Curzon] muttered something about an adjournment and limped hurriedly into the adjoining room. He was accompanied by his secretaries and by Lord Hardinge, then our Ambassador in Paris. He collapsed upon a scarlet settee. He grasped Lord Hardinge by the arm. 'Charley,' he panted, 'I can't bear that horrid little man. I can't bear him. I can't bear him.' He wept." Harold Nicolson. Curzon: the last phase, 1919-1925 (Boston, N.Y., 1934), p. 274.

²"This hankering on the part of French Governments for an invasion of the Ruhr I had already to combat a year previously at the London Conference [of 1921]. So long as I remained in office, I was able to postpone the carrying out of that threat."

David Lloyd George, The Truth about Reparations and War-Debts (London, 1932), pp. 69-70.

³"The breakdown of the Genoa Conference, followed soon after by the fall of Lloyd George...brought to an end the active existence of the Supreme Council." F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations. (London, 1952), 167.

only remained to choose the issue. That did not prove difficult. The one issue that had consistently kept Germany and the allies in a conflict posture since 1919 was reparations. We must say something about it.

Reparations¹

Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany, after accepting responsibility for the war, undertook to make compensation for all wartime damage to allied civilian population and property. In May, 1921, under the menace of an Allied occupation of the Ruhr, a new German Government accepted a Schedule of Payments committing it to a grand total of 132 billion gold marks² with payments at a yearly rate of 2 billion gold marks plus 26% of the value of German exports.

Both of these German acceptances were made under the threat of immediate military coercion, and the reaction of Germany was thereafter to lessen or eliminate payments. Nonetheless, a "bargaining range" on reparations did exist, was so recognized³, and can be rather precisely defined. In terms of total payments, it ranged from 30 to 50 billion gold marks; in terms of annual payments, from one to three billion.⁴ However, after the acceptance of the Schedule of Payments the German Government chose to seek through negotiation, not a reduction but a moratorium in payments, one moreover that the Germans soon made clear would extend over a period of years, that is to say might well be equivalent to total cancellation. The policy was formalized in a German note of 14 December 1921 to the

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, the reparations "narrative" is taken from Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923 (London: British Institute of International Affairs, 1927). See also Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les réparations allemandes et la France, 3 vols. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1947 ff.

² There were approximately 4 gold marks to the dollar.

³ Though not in this technical term.

⁴ These figures are based on an analysis of the actual, as distinct from apparent, demands of the Schedule of Payments, together with statements by the French member of the Reparation Commission and the German delegate thereto. See Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations (Boston and New York, 1927), Part I.

asked only for postponement, June 22
hardened to long-term moratorium

hope for an explicit moratorium

Reparations Commission,¹ following a discussion in London between Lloyd George and German Foreign Minister Rathenau. By the time of the Cannes Conference, in the words of the German delegate to the Reparations Commission,²

The granting of a moratorium, and this through a decision of the Supreme Council, was now definitely accepted as the aim of reparation negotiations. It was, therefore, no longer possible to negotiate with the Reparations Commission on other lines. We had entered the blind trail of the moratorium; it was soon to terminate in a jungle.

On the conditions for a moratorium the British and French positions after the advent of Poincaré to power were too far apart for agreement to be reached, or perhaps it would be more accurate to state that they bore little relation to each other. International conciliation and economic recovery apart, the British favored a moratorium for two specific reasons. One, the "City" had over-extended itself in previous loans to Germany to finance German imports. "...so far as British finance is concerned, the moratorium...is an absolute necessity."³ Two, the moratorium appeared as a means to wield very extensive financial controls over Germany, thus offering power to statesmen and economic opportunity to British businessmen and financiers.⁴ The French, however, by July 1922 had committed themselves to a policy of "productive guarantees" (i.e. the mines of the Ruhr) and demanded such as a condition for a moratorium, which by then the Germans were asking through 1924.

The British, moreover, then made a move which restricted both their own freedom of action and that of the French. The "Balfour Note" of 1 August proposed

¹The Reparations Commission, established by the Versailles Treaty, was composed of delegates from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. Decisions were made by majority vote, with the chairman (the French delegate) having a casting vote. See SIA 1920-23, 35-36.

²Bergman, History of Reparations, 112.

³Foreign office memo, 30 November 1921: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 1st series, vol. XVI, p. 26.

⁴"...more definite proposals as to the precise conditions of the moratorium will be before the Cabinet: they are directed towards the control of the German budget and practically amount to the "Ottomanising" of Germany." Ibid.

Br. willing to give up war debts + reparations in a general
ec. settlement. (catch: U.S. + Fr. not willing) (message: Fr.
should start paying war debts to Br.)

This move shortens playing time: Br. requests
collecting part of DD payoff, cost part. Result:
Fr. urgency to collect positive part of D, German
payments.
or CD, Fr. accepting Br. policy.

... inter-allied war debts and reparations, but made clear that if ~~the~~ ~~proposition~~ were not accepted by the "Allied and Associated Powers" (an unlikely contingency) the British would proceed to make their own arrangements as debtors with the United States and further demand as creditors repayment from the French. Though at fifty years' distance the Balfour Note appears to speak wisdom, at the time it was not regarded as a serious contribution. Perhaps it was, indeed, written, as the French say, "pour l'histoire" -- "for the record". At any rate both France and the United States rejected it. France was thereupon confronted with pressing financial demands from Britain, and Britain from the United States.¹ All the more need, then, for France to obtain money from Germany. Options had decreased, freedom of action narrowed.

Germany, in the meantime, possibly hoping to profit from Anglo-French disputes,² submitted in November a request to yet another allied conference for a three-to-four year moratorium which ignored both the French industrial-territorial and British financial-control conditions. The allies agreed [10 December] on its rejection, but on nothing else save another meeting in Paris in January. In the interim the French set the stage for the independent action against Germany threatened since April. On December 26, at the instance of the French chairman and over the opposition of the British member,³ the Reparation Commission declared Germany in volun-

¹The British reached agreement with the U.S. on repayment of war debts in January 1923, at what the British government considered an excessive rate of interest. Her own financial needs were thereby obviously increased. Bonar Law considered resignation as a protest at the agreement made by his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stanley Baldwin, but thought better of it and contented himself with an anonymous letter to The Times denouncing his own policy!

²"Before the occupation of the Ruhr the Cuno Cabinet could very well have got into touch with France, and in my opinion should have done so, as the decisive political centre is in Paris. It was undoubtedly an error to depend on London and Washington." Ltr., 1 Aug. 1923, Stresemann to Janeks, Sutton, Gustav Stresemann (N.Y., 1935), I, 75-6.

³"The fact was that this trumpery accusation was only before the Commission at the moment as a preparation for an offensive in other fields. Since, in the tenth year of the war, Troy fell to the stratagem of the wooden horse, history recorded no similar use of timber. The situation was at present somewhat different; it was the fifth year of peace, and the city under attack was not Troy, but Essen." Sir John Bradbury, minutes of meeting, Reparation Commission, Report 1920-22, as cited in Toynebee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923, pp. 191-192.

tary default in respect to timber deliveries. At the Paris Conference of 2-4 January Bonar Law put forth without conviction, hope, or will the British "financial control" scheme, prepared by the Treasury centering on the constitution of a Foreign Finance Control to meet in Berlin.¹ The French proposed an allied mission of engineers to Essen to ensure coal deliveries, plus requisitions, duties, and forest-fellings in the Rhineland and Ruhr. The Germans had been invited to the conference, but their opinions and proposals were not solicited. On 4 January the conference closed with a Franco-British statement noting policy disagreements but professing friendly sentiments. On the 9th the Reparation Commission, once again over British dissent, declared a German default in coal deliveries; the following day France and Belgium announced their decision to send a largely civilian "Control Commission" into the Ruhr. Military forces accompanied and followed it, not to be withdrawn in their entirety until June 1925. The crisis had opened.

Invasion and "Passive Resistance"

Rationale of the French Occupation

On 10 January 1923 the French government announced to the German its intention of sending a civilian control mission of engineers and officials into the Ruhr area² with a minimum supporting contingent of troops to insure German respect of her Versailles obligations. The German government on the 12th protested against this act of "lawlessness, oppression and violence" and declared a suspension of all reparations in money or in kind.³

¹ "Motored to Churt to spend the week-end.... Lloyd George was very severe on Bonar Law's handling of the Paris Conference and thought it one of the most grave failures of recent years. Every effort ought to have been made to keep Theunis (Belgian prime minister) on our side. The moment Poincaré saw that he could separate us from the Belgians and Italians the occupation of the Ruhr was inevitable." Entry for 8 March 1923, Jones, Whitehall Diary, 233; "Mr. Bonar Law said that there was 'no chance of agreement'-- these, said the Ambassador, were his exact words -- while M. Poincaré held office." "Memorandum of interviews with the British ambassador", 18 December 1922, Charles Evans Hughes Papers, con. 175, f. 76 (b).

² Administratively mainly included in the Prussian provinces of Rhineland & Westphalia.

³ French Foreign Affairs Ministry note to German Embassy, German note to the Powers: copies in National Archives, State Department files, 862T. 01/557, 558.

A process of escalation then occurred. By April, some 70,000 French and 10,000 Belgian troops¹ were in occupation of a 60-by-28 mile area² accounting "for 80-85 percent of Germany's coal and 80 percent of her steel and pig-iron production, for 70 percent of the goods and mineral traffic on her railways, and for 10 percent of her population."³ That population was largely hostile. The French and Belgian authorities created a customs cordon and embargo between Rhineland/Ruhr and the remainder of Germany, and proceeded to enforce their will through a program of dismissal and ejection of recalcitrant officials, managers and workers, and arrest and execution of saboteurs and francs-tireurs. This application of coercion - the outcome of what we might call BASIC MOVE ONE plus increments⁴ - continued at least until the abandonment of "passive resistance" in September.

France's Ruhr policy was above all that of Prime Minister Poincaré, who in the French political spectrum was a Republican of the center-left and a responsible if narrow-minded "hawk". Once put into operation, that policy received political support from all parties save the socialists and communists.⁵ The policy, as formally stated by Poincaré himself and the Foreign Ministry, included the following elements, which were subscribed to by all its supporters. First and foremost, "la volonté de vaincre" - the assertion of the will to impose on

¹According to the U.S. Embassy in Paris (Ltr., Amb. Herrick to Sec. State, Paris 20 April 1923: National Archives, State Department files, 862T.01/746.)

²Survey of International Affairs 1924, 269 N2.

³Ibid., 270.

⁴"General Degoutte Commander-in-Chief of the French army on the Rhine and Commander of occupying forces / ... admitted that his Government had anticipated an early solution of the matter by Germany coming to terms but that events had demonstrated that a few months more would be required before the final submission was secured." (Visit of 14 February) Henry T. Allen, Preliminary Report. Washington, D.C., 29 May 1923. National Archives, State Dept. files, 862T.01/769.

⁵The vote on 11 January 1923 in the Chamber of Deputies was 452 to 72. However, the pivotal Radical Party, while supporting M. Poincaré for patriotic reasons, declined all responsibility. "Mr. Poincaré's action will be judged by its results." Herriot's parliamentary speech of 1 Feb. 1923, as cited in Michel Soulié, La vie politique d'Edouard Herriot (Paris, 1962), p. 112.

Germany a practical willingness to pay and to submit to the victor's dictates. Two, the exaction of regular and substantial reparations payments, either through inter-governmental agreement or through direct impositions in kind.¹

Two other goals are often suggested -- military/territorial and economic.

France was often accused, at a minimum, of using the Ruhr as a means of creating a separate enlarged and economically viable Rhineland (the thwarted policy of 1919); at a maximum, of aiming at the complete break-up of the German territorial unity achieved through the Prussian victories of 1866 and 1871.² It does appear that over time the French aims expanded and hardened,³ and by the end of the year France actively encouraged Rhineland separatism while observing with mixed feelings the possibility of a more general disintegration of the German Reich through the combined actions of the Comintern, the Land of Bavaria, and the National Socialists.

The possible economic -- as distinct from financial -- goal of the Ruhr operation requires a slightly more complex explanation. The iron-ore of Lorraine and steel-and-coal industries of the Ruhr formed -- under the direction of the Bismarckian Reich -- an economic whole. The iron-masters of France, who controlled the politically powerful Comite de Forges, of which the Lorrainer Poincaré

¹See notably Poincaré's explanation in the London Conference of Dec. 1922 and that of French ambassador Saint-Aulaire on 30 July '23, cited in Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23, p. 188 and Northedge, Troubled Giant, p.188 respectively

²The most comprehensive contemporary published statement of this theme is a memorandum by the staff of General Mangin former French commander in the Rhineland, dated 5 April '23 and submitted to Poincaré. See Note Sommaire sur l'établissement de la République Rhénane, in Commandant L.-E. Mangin, La France et la Rhin (Geneva, 1945), pp. 169-210.

³The Paris correspondent of The Times noted toward the end of the summer, that "exasperation, pride, a hardening of feeling, gradually led M. Poincaré to envisage the virtual annexation of the Ruhr and to impose hard conditions ... Now we reached a stage in which the French policy has completely crystallised...France... has changed her purpose from a) bluff, to b) timid realization, with the hope of a brief demonstration leading to a solution, to c) angry insistence on unconditional surrender, to d) growing desire for the smash of Germany since nothing else can be had, with France holding to the Ruhr. In other words, we have gone from a search for reparations to a demand for a political victory, and then to a search for security in the European chaos." Sisley Huddleston, Poincaré (Boston, 1924), p. 151.

himself had earlier been the chief legal agent, were dependent on the coke and blast furnaces of the Ruhr. If, however, this dependence could be reversed, if, so to speak, a "coal and steel community" could be created in which French industry would have the dominant role, then French strength and self-sufficiency would be enormously increased. Such French control would go far to reverse German economic and demographical preponderance, thus affecting the balance of power. For precisely this reason it would also pose a considerable threat to the economic, perhaps even to the national security, interests of Great Britain, now operating "the world's workshop on short time."

Such a policy of French economic penetration and intervention in German industry was urged on the French Government by M. Paul Reynaud, perhaps the leading and certainly the most vigorous parliamentarian of the republican right, on two occasions in the Chamber of Deputies. M. Poincaré himself claimed to repudiate this policy, going so far on one occasion as to direct that a telegram from the French ambassador in Berlin advocating it be charged to the latter's personal account. As with the territorial aims mentioned earlier, however, M. Poincaré -- once Germany surrendered its passive resistance -- was inclined to let "events take their course" and allow local French authorities their head. We shall have more to say on aims and their possible concealment later.

The German Response

The Germans reacted (BASIC MOVE TWO) to the French occupation by an attempt to make life as difficult and unprofitable for the French as possible in the occupied areas (Ruhr and Rhineland), combined with a suspension of reparations payments and a search for diplomatic support, the latter attempt primarily directed at England.¹ "What we must do," observed German People's Party leader Gustav Stresemann in a speech in the Reichstag on March 6, "is to force France, by

¹Hajo Holborn went so far as to call this last a "fundamental principle of German political thought" during the postwar decade. Chapter in Craig and Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, The 1920's, 159.

our unanimous resistance, to abandon her opposition to international negotiations on the Reparations question."¹

The local Rhein and Ruhr struggles, under the leadership of the Cuno government,² took an overt and a covert form: "passive resistance" and active sabotage respectively. By passive resistance was meant, essentially, the injunction (by a German law of March, accompanied with the threat of severe penalties) on inhabitants of the occupied territories not to collaborate with or work for the invading armies or controlling authorities. Those who were expelled or lost their employment in consequence were to be given financial support by the government. The covert sabotage operations were under the direction of the Operations Direction of the General Staff. The German government for its part not only authorized these operations but further approved recruitment of short-term volunteers (Zeitfreiwilligen) and paramilitary units, including the notorious Frei Korps - all in violation of the Versailles Treaty.

At the interstate level, however, the German government neither denounced the Treaty (which would have thrown the British and Italians into the enemy camp and deprived them of legal justification for mediation) nor broke off diplomatic relations with the French (which might have given the latter an excuse to declare war or embark on more territorially extensive military operations). The Germans confined themselves to withdrawing their ambassadors in Paris and Brussels and imposing official and social isolation on the French and Belgian representatives in Berlin. In preparation for the possible disaster of war, the German government -- in addition to the measures already discussed -- sounded out the Soviet Union on deterrence measures on the eastern flank, approved the organization of second and third line formations, and directed the purchase of

¹ Eric Sutton, Gustav Stresemann (N.Y., 1935), I, 47.

² A "non-political" administration headed by a former general manager of the Hamburg-America Shipping Line.

weapons, including fighter aircraft.¹ It further refused to permit allied inspection of her armed forces (as provided for in the peace treaty), alleging the dangers of controlling an inflamed populace.

In an attempt to sway "world opinion", the undoubtedly drastic measures of coercion² which were taken by the occupying command were given widespread publicity by the Germans. Particular attention was given to the alleged sexual misdeeds of France's African -- actually light-skinned Moroccan -- troops. For public and diplomatic consumption, emphasis was placed on the excellent prospects for successful resistance.³ "The battle," Chancellor Cuno proclaimed in the Reichstag on March 6, "is not to decide whether Germany will agree to negotiate, but solely whether France will finally recognize the honest desire of Germany to reach a free understanding on equal terms and on economically feasible bases. ...therefore away with talk about negotiations (applause), with appeals to reason, which should not be addressed to the German but to the French address. ... It is not our task to make offers..."⁴

¹Gordon, Reichswehr and German Republic, 349; Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, 155.

²By November 1923 some 147,020 German citizens, of whom 46,292 were civil servants and their families (SIA 1924, 280), were expelled from the territory. It is altogether likely that these expulsions were motivated more by the desire to create the basis for an "independent" Rhenish state than by the will to crush resistance. The Mangin staff memorandum cited earlier alluded to the need for "preparing the ground," and specifically to control of the railways.

³Thus American ambassador Houghton could report on 8 February a statement by Chancellor Cuno "that while he could not discuss reparations while French were in the Ruhr he was willing to discuss conditions for their surrender" and on the 17th that "His one anxiety is lest population may get out of hand...without usual restraints of civil authority." National Archives, State Department files 862T.01/605, 628.

⁴As translated for transmission to Washington. National Archives, State Department files, 862T.01/713. The reference, of course, is to direct negotiations with France. At this stage the Germans also rejected the British plan, as presented in Paris in January. In Cuno's words to the British ambassador, "the figure fixed for reparation is too high, and the measures of control too severe." d'abernon's Diary, 20 March 1923, II, 184.

Reactions of the Powers

The League of Nations took no position, while, of the Western Powers, Belgium and -- initially -- Italy associated themselves with the French Government. Britain and the United States assumed a neutral stance, that of Britain being one of disapproving benevolence toward France. The Soviets first supported Germany, then tried to subvert her.

The military occupation of the Ruhr was shared by the Belgian Government. The Belgians, who had been granted a special priority claim on reparations payments¹ and who were conscious of their diplomatic and military dependence on France, felt unable to disassociate themselves from the operation. They insisted, however, on limiting the purpose of the occupation to that of obtaining reparations.² Fearful of their protector, they proved opposed to schemes for French expansion and the further alienation of Britain.

The Belgian participation saved the French from isolation. Perhaps it also constricted them. At any rate, French diplomacy on the Ruhr issue had to work in concert with the Belgians, and the Ruhr policy was further defined in two Franco-Belgian conferences on 12 March and 13-14 April in Brussels and Paris respectively. On 26 January the Reparations Commission (the British abstaining) found that in view of the German declaration of the 12th, the Schedule of Payments was once again in force, and that Germany was in consequence "in general default". Having entered into the Ruhr ostensibly in order to force direct payment in kind, an aim thwarted by "passive resistance," the two governments declared on March 12 that they were in agreement to evacuate the newly occupied territories only "proportionately as Germany carries out here reparations obligations."³ On April 16 M. Theunis, the Belgian prime minister, asked that Germany

¹ A priority denied by the British plan of January 1923.

² See in particular the Belgian Foreign Office note of May 17, 1923, cited in Survey of International Affairs, 1924, 323.

³ Translation, official communique, 12 March 1923. National Archives, State Department files, 862T. 01/720.

"decide to make reparation and to make propositions."¹ The road to productive negotiations still seemed open, should Germany decide to take it, but total evacuation was also pushed further into the future.

Mussolini's Italy, too, associated herself with the Ruhr operation, though only to the extent of a subsequently withdrawn contingent of engineers. Mussolini is said to have justified this limited solidarity by Italy's need for coal, while deprecating the emphasis on military coercion and favoring "the possibility of accords." By March he was reported as inclining "toward the British attitude." The developing Anglo-French-German split, however, clearly favored Italian hopes for expansion, and on 31 August the Italian navy proceeded to bombard and occupy the Greek island of Corfu. According to the Italian historian Salvemini, Mussolini counted on Poincaré's support in keeping the dispute out of the League of Nations and within the Conference of Ambassadors in exchange for backing the French occupation. As so often before and since, Italy shifted from one Great Power alignment to another in pursuit of her own Adriatic and Mediterranean expansion.²

The League charter protected only the member states. Nonetheless, the Swedish delegate to the League council Paris meeting of 29 January - 3 February put forward a weak proposal on the occupation in secret session. Finding no support, he withdrew it. Thereafter the Ruhr question failed to find its way onto the League agenda.³

The Papacy, in a letter of 27 June 1923, affirmed the legitimacy of both

¹ Translation, speech at Press Club (?). National Archives, State Department files, 862t. 01/747, enc.2.

² Remarks by Mussolini at a Cabinet meeting of 19 January. Tel., Child/Sec. State, Rome, 3 March. National Archives, State Dept. files, 862t. 01/607, 664; Gaetano Salvemini, Prelude to World War II (N.Y.: 1954), pp. 47-57, as cited in Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr, 241. See also Alan Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy and Hughes, "The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism 1922-1932," The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Craig and Gilbert, eds. vol. I (N.Y.: Athenium, 1965), pp. 210-233.

³ F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London 1960), p. 236.

reparations and guarantees, approved the concept of an "impartial judgement", doubted the need for military occupation, and condemned the use of reparations "to force total exhaustion."¹

The Soviet Union on 13 January sent, in the "Spirit of Rapallo," a lengthy protest against the Franco-Belgian occupation in the form of a telegram to the "Peoples of Europe."² In the spring it did what it could to frighten the Poles from putting pressure on Danzig or East Prussia. Germany's mounting economic and political troubles in the summer and fall, however, proved too great a temptation for the ideologists of the Third International, and by October the Soviets were actively stimulating a European revolution and promoting a Soviet Germany. They wished both to foster and to profit from German disintegration.

The other great "rim" power, the United States, observed the crisis with regret and concern. Though determined to avoid political commitments, Secretary of State Hughes was well aware of the American stake in the European economy. More specifically, U.S. capital was largely barred from export to those countries who had not paid their wartime debts, thus excluding France,³ while Germany -- the obvious market -- was not a good risk in view of European instability and the proven weakness of German currency. In the last months of 1922, Hughes had repeatedly called the attention of both France and Germany to "the desirability of utilizing non-political fiscal aid 'in resolving the French-German impasse'."⁴ In December 1922, he went further and, in a speech to the American Historical Association, urged a non-political "expert inquiry" into Germany's economy and finances, even voicing confidence in the willingness of American citizens to serve on such a body. The French, however, attached to

¹ Weill-Raynal, Les réparations, 429-30.

² Copy in State Department files, 862t. 01.

³ Duroselle, Wilson à Roosevelt, 189-90. On this point see further Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, first era, 1919-1932 (Baltimore, 1950).

⁴ L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, (New Brunswick, 1968), pp. 198-99.

Versailles, thought that the Reparations Commission was expert enough and declined the motion.

The United States disassociated itself from the Ruhr action by withdrawing its military occupation forces (a maximum strength of twelve hundred men) from the Rhineland and by having its commander, General Henry T. Allen, resign (3 February) from his position as "unofficial observer" on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. Hughes further took advantage of the visit to Washington in January of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Stanley Baldwin, to organize what a French historian has called an Anglo-Saxon "front" in favor of the expert inquiry plan.¹ Though it was clear that the United States did not favor the French action, it was on record as sanctioning reparations payment. Hughes declined to make any formal protest. For the moment, he had done all he considered -- no doubt rightly -- possible or wise.²

The Failure of British Mediation

The British Government's position toward the Ruhr operation might most accurately be described as disapproving but effectively benevolent neutrality, a stance that changed to powerless and transient hostility by July. The most restrained official announcement of British policy came in the House of Commons speech from the throne of February 13, in which George V stated, "My Government will in no way increase the difficulties of the Allies, though it can neither approve nor take part in this operation."³

¹ Duroselle, Wilson à Roosevelt, 167-68.

² "The Secretary said that the French knew perfectly well that there was no British force which could prevent their doing what they pleased in Germany; that the British had no forces to oppose them, that the United States had no forces to oppose them, and they could overrun the whole of Germany if they desired..." Memorandum of Interview with the Ambassador of Great Britain, 25 January 1923, Charles Evans Hughes Papers, con. 175, f. 77(a), The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

³ Cited in Stresemann Diaries, I, 41.

Unlike the United States, the British did not withdraw from their Rhineland occupation zone, just South of the Ruhr and between the French and Belgian zones. On the one hand, the British zone proved a refuge of peace and tranquillity from the arena of Franco-German conflict. On the other, the British posed no obstacle to the "free movement" through their zone of French troops.

Throughout most of the 1923 phase of the crisis, Britain's foreign policy was formulated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon. The two prime ministers, Bonar Law (who retired because of his fell affliction in May) and his successor Stanley Baldwin, were primarily interested in domestic politics. Neither was a man of force. Law tended to hold Curzon back,¹ Baldwin for a brief period let him have his way.

In consequence Anglo-French policies in 1923 were both conducted and expressed by Curzon and Poincaré, or rather, Curzon versus Poincaré. This proved unfortunate for Anglo-French relations. While at first sight few personalities could seem more apart than these archetypes of self-conscious British aristocracy² and French professional bourgeoisie, the flamboyant Curzon and the dry-as-dust Poincaré shared certain characteristics which in the circumstances proved counterproductive: untiring industry, encyclopedic knowledge, unwelcome persistence³, and most fatally, a competitive outlook toward the partner in diplomatic negotiation, a partner invariably regarded as adversary. Anglo-French relations became a duel of prima donnas playing to the grandstand of national opinions. Curzon

¹ The Balfour and Bonar Law Papers (in the British Museum and Beaverbrook Library, London, respectively) make clear that the cautious Law was 1) very conscious of the dangers of exerting pressure on a country with greatly superior air power, 2) desirous of eliciting French cooperation with Britain in the on-going peace negotiations with the Turks at Lausanne. Lloyd Georges's recklessness, which had led to disaster, was no longer in style.

² Though it is doubtless familiar to most readers, I cannot resist recalling the old saw "My name is George Nathaniel Curzon, I am a most superior person."

³ One more old saw - Metternich's advice to a neophyte diplomat: "Surtout, pas trop de zèle."

held the stage, but Poincaré proved more effective. The Germans paid.

France from the onset of the crisis made clear opposition to outside intervention, and as late as 5 April "Officials in London" were in agreement that "there is no sense in negotiating" on the excellent grounds that "If England, uninvited, takes the initiative of intervention, it will be resented by France and will lead to nothing."¹ Nonetheless, on the 21st, Curzon in a speech in the House of Lords advised the Germans "to take the first step and make an offer... to the effect that Germany is prepared to fulfill her obligations so far as her strength will permit. I know that the French and Belgian Governments are ready, when they have such an offer before them -- whether it be addressed to their two countries or to the Entente as a whole -- at once to enter upon negotiations on the subjects with the Governments concerned and seriously to discuss what may be proposed."² Curzon's "knowledge" proved in error.

Curzon's initiative may have owed a little to a speech by Stresemann on the 16th indicating willingness to negotiate on reparations³ (a shift in stance - communications move?) and a good deal to an "unofficial" ("officieuse") visit to London earlier that month by a prominent French politician and businessman, M. Louchur. During this trip -- made with the full approval of President Millerand and (former) Foreign Minister Barthou, both hardliners, and with the knowledge of Poincaré -- Louchur outlined what was reputedly a moderate plan for the solution of the reparations problem and maintenance of the Rhine/Ruhr areas under German, though not Prussian, administration.⁴ The visit, however, was

¹London, 5 April. Lord d'Abernon's Diary, II, 187-88.

²As cited in Stresemann Diaries, I, 62.

³Ibid., 59.

⁴As reported in the Daily Telegraph, the Louchur proposals included German pledges for reparations in the form of customs and railways receipts and of 25% stock in some German industries. See d'Abernon's Diary II, 190-92.

"disavowed" by the French Government.¹ Curzon would appear to have been either duped or to have shown insufficient caution.²

Germany's hopes were raised. Despite a statement on the 26th by Poincare that no German offer would be considered that was not addressed to France directly (communications move? -- attempt to lessen pressures on France), the Germans on 2 May addressed a note to the allied powers which met with universal disappointment.³ While confirming its intention to maintain passive resistance and its opinion on the "lawlessness" of the Franco-Belgian action, the Germans once again proposed its familiar -- and in consequence virtually taboo -- figure of 30 billion gold marks without guarantees and rather ungraciously volunteered arbitration of this estimate as a total "capacity to pay" to Hughes' proposed non-political "enquiry".⁴ After much arm-twisting by the British Government⁵ and consultation with its ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon, the Germans on June 7 issued a second, markedly more conciliatory, note which unequivocally acknowledged its reparations obligations, specified in detail how it proposed to meet

¹See Index to Foreign Office Correspondence...for 1923 under "Loucheur".

²Since these lines were written I have found (in the Hughes papers) a confidential German note to the United States (referring to an identic note to the British two days earlier) stating that the German Government, while making no request, would accept Hughes' "expert inquiry" plan "with the participation of Germany and France on the basis of total equality...German industrials and economic classes will place their resources...to cover Germany's obligations." Memorandum, German Embassy, Washington, D.C., 16 March 1923: Charles Evans Hughes Papers, c. 174 f. 75(b). The Foreign Office Confidential Print on Germany further indicates that the Curzon move was preceded by both Belgian and Italian suggestions that Britain invite Germany to make an offer, with the implication that Belgium and Italy might separate from France should the latter then prove unreasonable. In the event, France experienced no pressure from either of these powers till the fall.

³"On the diplomatic side the whole tone of their offer is such that it will alienate public opinion instead of winning it." Berlin, 2 May 1923: d'Abernon's Diary, II, 206.

⁴Note to Allied Powers, 2 May 1923. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, II, pp. 59-60 (hereafter cited as FRUS).

⁵Notably in a note of 13 May.

them, indicated its clear willingness to "accept the verdict of an impartial international body as regards the amount and the mode of payments to be made," and repeated "its request to call a conference in order to agree upon the best mode to fulfill this obligation."¹ Just the day before, however, probably by no coincidence whatever, a Franco-Belgian conference in Brussels agreed on the cessation of "passive resistance" as a condition of negotiations with the Germans. The French had used British well-meant pressure and German maladroitness as a means of constraining the Germans to, at a minimum, severe humiliation, at a maximum, loss of the Ruhr.²

The receipt of the second German note produced a flurry of diplomatic activity. The Belgians prevailed on the reluctant M. Poincaré to accept the notion of a collective reply (reparations was, indeed, a matter of joint allied concern under the terms of the Versailles Treaty), but in return agreed that a condition of such a reply should be British and Italian advice to the Germans to "abandon passive resistance".³ A Franco-Belgian oral demarche in this sense, pre-figuring

¹ German memorandum to Allies, 7 June 1923: FRUS 1923, 62-64. That same day Secretary of State Hughes informed the Belgian ambassador "that this was a clear indication that the Germans were desirous to enter into direct negotiations with the French and Belgians. ..."

² "The June principles elaborated at the Brussels Conference were undoubtedly one of the turning points of the struggle. Hitherto it would have been possible for the French to have left the Ruhr on a satisfactory settlement. I had the impression that the French would have been glad to find some valid reason for evacuation. ... The French would almost have been glad to have taken the credit and let the cash go. But now greater insistence was being placed on the productivity of the pledges." Huddleston, Poincaré, 149-50. In a memorandum "drawn up towards the end of the summer," Huddleston noted that "Exasperation, pride, a hardening of feeling, gradually led M. Poincaré to envisage the virtual annexation of the Ruhr and to impose hard conditions. At Brussels it was decided not to evacuate the Ruhr until the last penny was paid, or to engage in conversations until Germany surrendered. The chief point was Germany's surrender: that had to be won at all costs; as for the continued occupation, it could still be interpreted in many different ways." Ibid., 151. About a month later a well-known and responsible French journalist ("Pertinax") is said to have indicated that "Poincaré wanted to insure that Germany could not raise her head for fifteen years - by which time the countries of the Little Entente would have 'grown to maturity'." Middlemas, Baldwin, 188.

³ Survey of International Affairs, 1924, 327.

a consequent 'constructive' attempt at the reparations imbroglio, was made to the British Foreign Secretary. The suspicious Curzon thereupon on the 13th addressed a "questionnaire" to both governments concentrating on the attempt to clarify the notions of "cessation" of passive resistance and proportionate, phased withdrawal from the Ruhr.¹ The replies, made on 3 and 6 July by the Belgians and French respectively, did not remove Curzon's suspicions. Rejecting the request in the latter note to respect the confidential nature of inter-allied discussions, the British Government on July 20 sent a public note to the Allied and Associated Powers proposing adoption of an enclosed identic reply to the two German notes of 2 May and 7 June. Germany would be advised to cease passive resistance, but "so soon the economic sureties and guarantees which Germany will have pledged to the allies have been put into effective operation, the occupation of all German territory outside the limits laid down in the Treaty of Versailles to come to an end."² An "expert inquiry" was to be constituted with American participation and discussions were to be opened to adopt "a plan for general and final financial settlement;" to be accompanied by "some form of international control of German financial administration."

This attempt to apply the glare of publicity failed; the Belgians in their reply of the 30th merely requested attention to specific Belgian interests, but the French declined any concessions in return for the end of passive resistance and stated

There can be no ambiguity with regard to the progressive evacuation of the Ruhr; it will be carried out according as payments are made.

They adhered to the so-called Versailles "plan" for reparations and to the Reparations Commission.³

¹ Ibid., 320.

² As cited in SIA, 1924, 331.

³ Ibid., 331-34.

Curzon thereupon abandoned -- at least for the present -- hope for French agreement on an identic note to Germany and persuaded a reluctant Cabinet to allow a statement for public opinion, present and future.¹ In a lengthy (55 points!) and precise document to the Belgian and French governments, Curzon on 11 August made the case against the Franco-Belgian occupation, for the first time terming it illegal under the Versailles Treaty, accusing the French of planning to stay in the Ruhr "indefinitely, if not in perpetuity," and obliquely threatening "separate action" (presumably with regard to a reparations settlement).² Consequently HMG could not advise the Germans to abandon passive resistance. Doubtless Curzon thought this unanswerable, but Poincaré was equal to his antagonist, and as early as the 20th dispatched a reply equally lengthy, equally precise and -- in the view of some observers -- at least equally cogent.³

The "Entente Cordiale" had well and truly been replaced by a "Repture Cordiale." The Germans could -- and did -- console themselves with British moral support and this confirmation of the legitimacy of German indignation. The French stance toward Germany, however, had only been hardened as a result of British involvement. Germany had nothing to gain from Britain's disapproval of France and the unruly Continentals.⁴

¹Nicolson, Curzon, 364-65

²However, in Cabinet of 7 August, "Despite vehement complain from Derby and Amery, there was no consideration of the nature of the separate action with which Curzon was threatening France. That, it was held, could be reserved until the French reply was received." Middlemas, Baldwin, 190.

³The correspondence is summarized in SIA 1924, pp. 334-38.

⁴"Even before the Note (of 11 August) was published, a Reuter dispatch particularly stressed the fact that London Government circles were glad to observe the Chancellor's statement that Germany expected nothing from England. It was quite erroneous to assume that England was anxious to help Germany out of troubles that she had brought upon herself. The new English note was stated to be a last attempt to co-operate in the reconstruction of Europe. If this met with no success, the entire Cabinet had decided to withdraw from the affairs of Europe." Sutton, Stresemann, 79.

BW
threat

The German Abandonment of "Passive Resistance" (Sept. 1923)

The German bargaining positions from January to September 1923 vary in the direction of steadily increasing accommodation of the adversary culminating in abandonment of "passive resistance" without quid pro quo, meaningful negotiation, or even a face-saving concession -- a defeat characterized by a lack of ambiguity which is probably rare in international crises. All the more striking, then, proved to be the barrenness of the French victory.

The initial German stance was expressed in the formula "no negotiation without previous evacuation"¹ coupled with an insistence on the "internationalization" of such eventual negotiations, by which was meant British and (hopefully) American inclusion. At an early stage stress was laid in diplomatic communications on the dire internal political and social consequences of any modification of such stance -- and in particular the abandonment of passive resistance -- consequences which would allegedly "blow away" any German government which contemplated it.² By mid-April, however, Stresemann explained³ that "the question of Reparations is a question of compromise, of negotiation" in contrast to that of the status of the Rhine and Ruhr, and Chancellor Cuno eventually abandoned the insistence on evacuation of the Ruhr as a precondition to negotiations, thus alienating "the Parties of the Right", to which, according to Stresemann,⁴ Cuno was "more committed...than any previous Chancellor".

¹Sutton, Stresemann, I, 104.

²"The Ambassador said that there would be no yielding by the German Government; that it could not yield, it would be "blown away" if it did yield, the sentiment was so strong in Germany". Memorandum of interview with German Ambassador, 20 January 1923, Charles Evan Hughes papers, con.175, folder 75(b); German Foreign Minister to British Ambassador, 9 March 1923, Middlemas, Baldwin, 153; D'Abernon Diaries, II, 222-23 (entries for June 11 and July 1923).

³In a speech to the Reichstag, 16 April 1923; Sutton, Stresemann, I, 59.

⁴In a letter to the Crown Prince dated 23 July 1923. Ibid., 213.

It had indeed been evident to clear-sighted observers, including American diplomatic representatives of the developing crisis, that the French were playing a winning game and that -- given the right mixture of conciliation and coercion, with emphasis on the latter -- they were bound to prevail. The key elements, as perceived by these observers, in the ability of the Germans to resist were the successful persistence of the local passive resistance and the ability of the German economy cut off from the coal and other products of the Occupied Territories to survive.¹ By mid-summer it was clear that the French were in effective occupation of the Ruhr and that the German government's financial support of passive resistance had wrecked the German currency. In early July the American lawyer and reparations expert, John Foster Dulles, had arranged -- or thought he had -- an agreement with Chancellor Cuno whereby a cessation of the weakening "passive resistance" would be followed by deliveries in kind and guaranties in exchange for an "invisible occupation" in the Ruhr. In the face of resistance from his Foreign Minister, the intransigent Rosenberg (and from the Right generally), Cuno reneged (13 July) on the proposed agreement.² The German government drifted along indecisively, to its own detriment and that of the nation. On 11 August, the date of the British note which made clear, among other matters, that the British had failed in its mediation efforts, the Social Democrats withdrew their support, proclaiming the need for a stronger government. The "non-political" Cuno government resigned the following day, to be followed on the 13th by a "Great Coalition" under Gustav Stresemann, with representatives of all the major political parties save the jingoist German National People's Party.

Chancellor Stresemann came very shortly to the conclusion that passive

¹Secretary of State. Memorandum of interview with German Ambassador, 23 January 1923, State Department files, National Archives; 862T.01/561½; Telegram, Houghton, Berlin, 3 February 1923, *ibid.*, 862T.01/589; Ltr., Herrick, Paris.

²Louchur, *Carnets Secrets*, 130-132. The proposed agreement was to be in the first instance with the Belgians.

resistance would have to be given up, and from 14 August until the end of September unsuccessfully attempted to trade off this wasting asset against ever-diminishing concessions. "The real danger," he explained to his Cabinet on 23 August, "quite apart from the desperate financial situation and the insecurity in home affairs, was that passive resistance might break down at the onset of winter, the population of the occupied territories having become thoroughly demoralized. ...The Ruhr war must be regarded as honourably concluded if the sovereignty of the German Reich remained intact." One could not rely, the Minister of Interior further elaborated at a meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the People's Party on September 11, "on the Ruhr after the end of September. The end would come before the beginning of the cold weather. This situation was the foundation of foreign policy."¹

In his inaugural speech before the Reichstag on 14 August, Stresemann declared that "Germany would be willing to abandon passive resistance on the three conditions that German (administrative and economic) control should be restored in the Ruhr, that the Versailles Treaty regime should be re-established in the Rhineland, and that all German citizens who had been imprisoned or deported during the struggle should be released and allowed to return to their homes and occupations."² No mention was made of evacuation.

However,³

the consolidation of our political and economic affairs is a condition of a resumption of the deliveries in kind, which, as a result of the economic disorder produced in Germany by the occupation of the Ruhr, had to be suspended.

In Washington the German Ambassador either betrayed his despair or attempted to

¹Sutton, Stresemann, I, 95-96, 112-13.

²SIA 1924, 286.

³Sutton, Stresemann, I, 90. Deliveries in kind to those countries not participating in the Ruhr invasion were suspended on August 11 by the German Government, which, according to Toynebee (SIA 1924, 286), thus "betrayed its exhaustion."

rouse the Americans to action through a confession that "He saw no hope whatever. The Secretary asked what he thought would follow. The Ambassador said he did not know. Then, in a hushed voice, he said, probably a break-up."¹

Stresemann continued, however, to strive to minimize his losses. In the inaugural speech just mentioned,²

The Government of the Reich proposes...that the question of the justice or injustice of the dealings with the Ruhr shall be submitted to an international court of arbitration. We do not doubt that any impartial decision would place us once more in authority over the Ruhr.

Three days later the Chancellor insisted, at his inaugural reception of ambassadors, that "of any negotiation with France alone -- of any negotiation except with the Entente Powers as a whole -- there can never be any question."³ The printing presses, despite the already calamitous inflation,⁴ were kept busy subsidizing the work stoppages in the Ruhr, and perhaps to demonstrate to the world the impossibility of monetary reparations. "It is hardly an exaggeration to say," commented the British ambassador on the 20th, "that those responsible for the financial policy of the country are committing suicide in order to avoid the payment of reparation."⁵ Attempts were further made to frighten the British and Americans with the spectre of a Franco-German economic alliance.⁶ On the other hand, the British were informed of the German acceptance of the British proposals of 20 July, including industrial and commercial guarantees. "They [the

¹Memorandum of an interview with the German Ambassador, 22 August 1923, Charles Evans Hughes Papers, con. 175, f. 75 (b).

²Sutton, Stresemann, I, 89-90.

³D'Abernon Diaries, II, 237.

⁴The exchange value of the mark, held steady at a rate of some 20,000 to the dollar from February 1923 onward through the intervention of the central bank, began its slide to infinity in May. By mid-August it had reached a rate of three to four million to the dollar (Eyck, History of the Weimar Republic, I, 243, 246, 257).

⁵D'Abernon Diaries, II, 239.

⁶Tel., Wheeler, London, 20 August 1923: State Department files, National Archives, Microfilm Publication 336/176/0517.

Germans⁷ recognize that the crux of the whole problem now lies in the question whether and how it is possible to substitute for the general Ruhr and Rhine pledges others which are equally effective but of a general and non-political nature."¹

None of these overtures having met with any success, Stresemann went further in the direction of direct offers to the French. On 2 September, he offered a mutual security pact to France at a public speech in Stuttgart.² The next day, the official "boycott" of the French and Belgian diplomatic representatives having been lifted, Stresemann had a long and secret conversation with the French ambassador, de Margerie, in which he dangled before the Frenchman the prospect of the creation of "productive pledges" through "a hypothecation of industry and agriculture, and by pledging part of the property of the Reich,"³ a proposal elaborated on by Stresemann in a speech to the Foreign Committee of the Reichsrat a few days later. In return the Germans asked only for an immediate restoration of normal economic activity in the Ruhr and eventual military withdrawal.⁴

The French Ambassador, however, was under instructions not to enter into negotiations, as opposed to conversations, until the end of passive resistance,⁵ and Stresemann was already engaged on the task of reconciling his own public opinion to the necessity of surrender. At an address on 6 September, the Chancellor quoted Goethe to effect -- "the great man knows when to yield...I should

¹D'Abernon Diaries, II, 244-45.

²Bretton, Stresemann, 65.

³Sutton, Stresemann, I, 100.

⁴Turner, Stresemann, 117.

⁵"Margerie told me yesterday that his instructions were definitively not to enter into negotiations of any sort until surrender was an accomplished fact. Despite Stresemann's predictions of separatism and communist revolt/ it seems more likely that as soon as a complete surrender has been made negotiations will begin. Margerie tells me that Poincaré will recognize Germany's need of a reasonable moratorium and is willing to examine Stresemann's recent offer of guarantees by German industry which is not entirely clear." Tel., Houghton, Berlin, 16 Sept. '23: State Dept. files, National Archives Microfilm Publication no. 336/176/0764.

like to put [this phrase] forward as a symbol of the policy that I have to pursue. Compliance in all material things. A people is not great for being rich and endowed with many possessions; a people is great through the spiritual forces at its disposal. Compliance in material things, but uncompliance in the defense of German soil, of which not one stone must be sacrificed -- compliance on the one hand and uncompliance on the other -- such is the policy which I acknowledge and shall pursue."¹ On the 12th the Chancellor publicly reiterated that passive resistance would be given up against the assurance of evacuation of the Ruhr and the restoration of German "rights" in the Rhineland.² In hopes of French relaxation and British intervention, Stresemann on the 15th in cabinet advised continuance of the policy of resistance "for a few days longer."³ Four days later, however, all basis for such hopes disappeared when a meeting between British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and French President of the Council Raymond Poincaré at Aix-les-Bains was followed by a bland communiqué to the effect that they had been able "to establish a common agreement of views..."⁴ The next day, the 20th, Stresemann received cabinet permission to prepare the end of passive resistance.⁵ As he explained at a cabinet meeting on the 24th with representatives "of industrial and official association,"⁶

¹Sutton, Stresemann, I, 103.

²Ibid., 115-116.

³Ibid., 120.

⁴SIA 1924, 339. The record of the conversations demonstrates that Baldwin was at this stage most eager to conciliate the French, indicating the British intention to press for the end of passive resistance and contenting himself with a request for the French statement of intentions (very vaguely given) thereafter. Lord Curzon, who had not known of the meeting, was furious, and blamed the French Ambassador in London, M. de Saint Aulaire, with whom "his relations became strained to the point of rupture" (Nicolson, Curzon, 372). The most likely explanation of Baldwin's overture is his concern over the European-wide economic repercussions of the continued conflict and resistance in Rhine and Ruhr. Curzon was more concerned with the clash of political interests, and with personal rivalries.

⁵Turner, Stresemann, 117.

⁶Sutton, Stresemann, I, 131. The "complete collapse of German currency," of course, proved irretrievable.

A prolongation of passive resistance would not have been possible without the complete collapse of German currency and industry; and no external advantages were to be expected from its continuance.

Two days later a government statement to the German people explained that¹

In order to maintain the life of the people and the State, we stand today before the bitter necessity of breaking off the struggle. ...the Government's principal task is now to secure the release of the prisoners and the return of the exiles. The struggle for these elementary human rights comes before any economic and material considerations.

The following day, the 27th, the official announcement of the abandonment of passive resistance was made to the representatives of the Allies, and that same day, "Present Ebert signed a decree cancelling all regulations and orders in support of passive resistance in the Ruhr which had been enacted by the German Government. ...On the 28th, the ordinance of the 13th January suspending Reparation deliveries to France and Belgium was likewise withdrawn."² (BASIC MOVE THREE.)

On the reparations and security fronts the Germans' loss was total; and the Germans were now confronted with the new phenomenon of French military and administrative control of the Ruhr and part of the Rhineland. The French victory appeared complete, far more so than that of November, 1918. How would France exploit it?

The French agreement to an "expert inquiry" on reparations (Oct.-Nov. 1923)

The French political scene

The Ruhr crisis did not so much end as fade away. If there are definite turning points, they are probably to be found in (1) the delayed constitution of an "expert inquiry" by and under the auspices of the Reparations Commission on 30 November, a move accepted in principle by Poincare on 26 October, and (2) the collapse of the "Rhenish Republic" and of its successor, the "Autonomous Government of the Palatinate" over the winter, culminating in the "massacre of Pirmasens"

¹Ibid., 133. Political considerations were not even mentioned.

²SIA 1924, 287. See also Stresemann, 133.

on 15 February 1924. The history of France's German policy from the end of passive resistance on 26 September to France's acceptance in principle of the Dawes Plan in April 1924 is complex and, in detail, still quite obscure. My own interpretation is that there was probably a minimum and maximum aim, and that Poincaré attempted to continue to pursue the latter while preserving the forms appropriate to the former. I further believe that the maximum aim crumbled under, to be sure, a variety of pressures, but most specifically because of British threats uttered within the forum of the Conference of Ambassadors on 19 November 1923.¹ There is, however, ample latitude for a variety of differing interpretations.

The first major disappointment to the French hardliners in the inner governmental circles came on the day of victory, 26 September, with Poincaré's disassociation. Despite numerous efforts, Poincaré had succeeded in avoiding any debate within the council of ministers on the conditions to be imposed on Germany,² whether for fear of arousing internal dissensions or laying bare his own lack of a precise goal is difficult to say.³ With the news of the abandonment

¹The minutes of the Conference of Ambassadors have never been published, and it is possible that their significance has in consequence been underrated by historians dependent on second-hand accounts. These minutes, which I have consulted for the purposes of this paper, are to be found in the Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris 1918-19 [ACNP], National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²Charles Reibel, "Une grande occasion manquée: le premier drame de la Ruhr," Ecrits de Paris, Mai 1949, No. 55, p. 25. Reibel was Minister for the Liberated Areas in the Poincaré cabinet.

³The French ambassador to London, the almost comically reactionary Comte de Sainte-Aulaire (he ascribed the results of the French elections of 1924, which put the Cartel des Gauches into power, to the British Intelligence Service!), notes in his memoirs, with reference to a British accusation against the French government of harboring designs on the Rhine behind the reparations facade of the Ruhr occupation, "J'ignorais si notre gouvernement nourrissait cette arrière-pensée, ou même une arrière-pensée quelconque... nous ne disions pas clairement ce que nous voulions, sans doute parce que nous ne le savions pas." Sainte-Aulaire, Confession, 553. A French member of the Reparations Commission, in a later exhaustive study of the reparations question, states that "M. Poincaré n'avait aucun plan d'ensemble à l'égard de l'Allemagne, ni pour les réparations ni pour la politique générale. Sa pensée s'est tournée presque exclusivement vers les régions occupées, où il s'est attaché à faire organiser l'exploitation des gages et où il a observé avec sympathie le mouvement autonomiste rhénan." Weill-Rayal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, II, 492.

of passive resistance, a number of official Frenchmen - including President Millerand; Marshal Foch (now head of an inter-allied military staff advising the Conference of Ambassadors); the Ambassador to Berlin, Roland de Margerie; and a number of ministers, including the Minister of Liberated Areas, M. Charles Reibel - urged Poincaré to capitalize on the French victory through immediate negotiations with the Germans, aimed at a settlement incorporating all French desires. As Foch himself recognized, Poincaré's achievement was greater than his own in 1918: this time France had accepted no 14 points; the surrender was unconditional; and France's victory was won without allies. On what this settlement would incorporate, opinions differed, but included new frontiers and economic control of Ruhr industries. In the rather poignant comment of President Millerand, who had backed the Ruhr venture from the beginning, imposing his view on a hesitant Poincaré, "But then, if Poincaré does not want to negotiate with Germany, why did we go into the Ruhr?"

Poincaré, however, despite pleas from the hardliners, refused to embark on a policy of exploitation of German distress through immediate coercive negotiations with Germany, alleging concern at a quarrel with Britain and indicating determination to be his own decision-maker. "En tout cas, je ne ferai pas cette politique; et, si on voulait me forcer à la faire," he and his government would resign.¹

But, then, what policy was Poincaré pursuing? The answer which best fits the observed facts is that the French prime minister, in view of the opposition from other countries - notably England and the United States, but also Belgium - and within his own parliament - where "the Left" had become increasingly restive² -

¹Reibel, op. cit., pp. 27-31. See also Jacques Chastenot, "Une occasion manquée. L'affaire de la Ruhr", Revue de Paris, January 1959.

²The leader of the radical party, M. Herriot, came out for "negotiations in accord with England" as early as May 25. The radicals, with Herriot at their lead, emerged as chief opposition to the government in June (over internal matters - the royalist "threat"), thus being forced to constitute, as an alternative to the "Bloc National," in power since 1919, a "Cartel des Gauches," with a more conciliatory, if vague, foreign policy. By October party politics, aided by an Agnew-like defense of the "Bloc National" by President Millerand (who further demanded a strengthening of executive power) were once again in turbulence, and the parliament was divided between "bloc" and "cartel." See Soulié, Herriot, 112-26.

felt unable to avow a policy of German separatism and economic control, but still attempted to achieve it through allowing the French authorities in Rhine and Ruhr "their head" and through doing nothing to avert the growing chaos elsewhere in Germany.

Toward German disintegration?

The two months following the abandonment of passive resistance indeed witnessed the most acute internal crisis - or series of crises - since the foundation of a united Germany in 1871. The Comintern in Moscow made use of the new socialist governments in the German states of Saxony and Thuringia to attempt to mount a German communist revolution from those two states as well as from the populous city-state of Hamburg to the northwest. Politicians in Catholic Bavaria flirted with the idea of a return to the Wittelsbach dynasty or with forming the nucleus of a second Catholic German empire in central Europe on the model of the Habsburg state defeated by Protestant Prussia in 1866 and dissolved in 1918. The new National Socialist party under Adolph Hitler took advantage of these discontents to mount its own putsch in Munich on 7 November.¹ The mark continued its vertiginous slide, quickening in tempo until by November 15 (date of issuance of the new Rentenmark) it had reached the rather inconceivable rate of 2,520,000,000,000 marks to the dollar. With these flights from stability and the center as background, the French could well feel entitled to hope that a slight extra push on their part in Rhine and Ruhr could topple Germany into final dissolution.

¹The French ambassador on 9 November called on Stresemann to express the "great deal of anxiety in France" caused by rumors of a coming "dictatorship of the Right". "The French Premier was disquieted by these manifestations, and wanted to point out /that peace in Germany and in Europe would be best secured by/ the consolidation of the democratic form of government in Germany..." Stresemann understandably replied that "the disposition of great masses of the people towards Communism and Radicalism of the Right, which latter elements now included not merely theorists but large numbers of working men was a result of the desperate situation in which Germany was now involved." Sutton, Stresemann, I.

The French attempt to capitalize on German surrender

During the month between the end of passive resistance and the French acceptance "in principle" of the "expert inquiry" plan (26 September - 26 October) the French bargaining strategy was double edged: uncompromising and "non-negotiable" toward the German Government, whom the French attempted to keep in isolation; reluctant concessions to the increasingly suspicious and militant "Anglo-saxon" powers.

The French decision not to embark on "coercive negotiations" with the German Government has already been described. Instead negotiations were opened up (against the will of the Reich government) between the occupation authorities and industrialists in the Rhine/Ruhr areas on a basis for resumption ~~of production~~ of production (and therefore employment). On October 8 the Wolff industrial group signed an agreement with the Mission Interallié de Contrôle des Usines et des Mines (MICUM) whereby in return for confiscated metal goods and the grant of export licenses, the group resumed delivery of coal to the mission. On the 16th similar negotiations were conducted with the Stinnes group and others, controlling in all 80 per cent of the production of the Ruhr.¹ Representations by the German chargé d'affaires in Paris, Counsellor von Hoesch, to Poincaré on these moves met with no success.² On the 20th Stresemann was forced to inform his Cabinet that Poincaré in what seems to have been his first substantive interview with Hoesch

¹ SIA 1924, 288; Sutton, Stresemann, I, 152-59.

² The semi-official French news agency Havas stated "the German authorities intend to use a resumption of work and of coal deliveries as a pretext for fresh negotiations. But there is good reason for supposing that their hope in this respect will be disappointed..." In effect, at a German cabinet meeting of the 10th Stresemann had to "report...the failure of the conference between Her von Hoesch and the French Premier, who persisted in his opinion that passive resistance had not come to an end. In this connection he had in mind the salary advances paid in the Palatinate. It was now possible to state unconditionally that passive resistance de facto had been given up." Sutton, Stresemann, I, 154-55.

had left no doubt that he intended to remain in the Ruhr until Reparations payments had been made. The Government of the Reich had now to apply to the Reparations Commission in order to clear up the Reparations question.

Moreover, and ominously, "local authorities" in Ruhr/Rhein were to control and administer the railways, including freight rates, and were to consider the repatriation of exiles only on each individual case. "These demands," Stresemann noted,

were not acceptable. France, however, insists in her answer that a protocol containing these demands shall be accepted by the German Government; if this consent is withheld, the negotiations are to be broken off. That means that France wishes to retain complete control over the Ruhr and declines to enter upon any negotiations until this situation is recognized. Such a policy could only be pursued by a Power that did not intend to negotiate. ...Any disposition to discuss the French conditions would lay the foundation for the establishment of the French Rhenish State.¹

On the following day such a state, a "Rhineland Republic," was proclaimed by "Separatists" at Aachen, in the Belgian zone.² On the 22nd the President of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, M. Tirard, a Frenchman, called in Dr. Hans Dorten, the reputed but reluctant leader of the Rhenish separatist movement since 1918,³ and informed him (according to Dorten's own account) that⁴

Le gouvernement français a l'intention de se joindre a l'initiative prises par les Belges, les instructions dans ce sens ont été données d'ores et déjà par M. Poincaré.

¹Sutton, Stresemann, I, 173-74.

²SIA 1924, 305. On the 9th the American embassy in Brussels had reported that the "Prime Minister stated he believed that election of the Rhineland into a separate buffer state was a possibility that Belgium might have to reckon with". National Archives Microfilm Publication 336/177/0057.

³Dorten's career is reviewed in Jere Clemens King, Foch versus Clemenceau: France and German Dismemberment, 1918-1919. (Cambridge, 1960) pp. 29-30

⁴Dr. H. A. Dorten, La tragédie rhénane (Paris, 1945), p. 166. Elsewhere Dorten is cited as "expressing my anguish," "il me répond que le gouvernement français donnera son appui a l'action". (L.E. Mangin, La France et le Rhin, Geneva, 1945, p. 120.)

Il paraît utile que toutes les organisations rhénanes entrent en action. Un gouvernement provisoire formé par leurs représentants serait reconnu de facto par la France.

Within the following week seizures of public buildings and administrative organisms accordingly took place in the major cities of the French Rhineland zone. Concurrently, on the 24th, a French representative of General de Metz, the chief delegate of the Rhineland Commission in the Palatinate (at the extreme south of the French zone, just east of the Saar and legally part of Bavaria) announced to a meeting of the Provincial Council at Speyer, the capital, that "the Palatinate is constituted, from this day onwards, an autonomous state with a provisional Government...", a statement unanimously rejected by the Council.¹

Meanwhile, the British and the Americans, now that the German proclaimed (if not effective) resistance to reparations had collapsed, swung into action in an attempt to keep France on the reparations and off the territorial "track." The initiative was taken by President Coolidge, who on 9 October issued a statement that the United States still supported the "expert inquiry" plan put forth by Secretary Hughes the preceding December. On the 13th the British Government asked the United States whether the latter would be willing to participate in such an enquiry, to which governments would be invited by Great Britain, even if "complete unanimity had not been forthcoming in Europe (i.e., without France)," or alternatively, whether it would participate in an enquiry "entrusted to the Reparation Commission or to some other body appointed by it?"² In its reply of the 15th, Secretary Hughes, while reserving action on the unanimity question, indicated the entire willingness of the United States "to take part in an economic conference...for the purpose of considering the questions of the capacity of Germany to make Reparation payments and an appropriate financial plan for secur-

¹SIA 1924, 305-310.

²Aide-Memoire, British Embassy, Washington, D. C., 13 October 1923: FRUS 1923, II, 69-70.

ing such payments" and further assured that,¹

competent American citizens would be willing to participate in an economic inquiry...through an advisory body appointed by the Reparation Commission to make recommendations in case that course, after further consideration, should be deemed preferable.

On the 22nd the American Embassy in Brussels reported that the Belgian minister of foreign affairs had been given, together with the other allies, a British memorandum indicating that²

The Government of Great Britain did not deem it possible to ignore such a generous and helpful offer or to refrain from making it known to their Allies with the hope that the Allies would take careful note of the advantages to be obtained from the cooperation of the United States at this critical time... Fearing sudden negative reaction in France the Minister of Foreign Affairs at once instructed the Belgian Ambassador to state that the Government of Belgium deemed the matter worthy of the most careful consideration. However, he was unable to predict how the idea will be received in Paris.

That same day the French chargé d'affaires in Washington informed Secretary Hughes that the British proposal would be considered by the French cabinet on the 25th.³

On the 24th the German Government informed the Reparation Commission that while it intended in principle to resume reparations payments and deliveries, it was in fact unable to do so in view of the⁴

radical changes in the resources and capacity of Germany /since its last statements to the Commission of November 1922/. The German Government consequently submitted to

¹ SIA 1924, 342-43; FRUS 1923, II, 70-73.

² FRUS 1923, II, 74-75.

³ Ibid., 79-83. ("The Charge said that France needed the reparations payments and that a very serious situation would exist in France if conditions should arise under which France would be unable to obtain reparation payments.")

⁴ SIA 1924, 346. The American Embassy in Paris reported on the 24th that Poincaré had told von Hoesch on the 16th that negotiations with the Reparation Commission would not be allowed. "French observers close to Poincaré intimate that he and Barthou (President of the Commission) have stated more or less openly that they would put the German note "in the garage ...if this should happen...I can foresee no other result but the break-up of Germany..." FRUS 1923, II, 76-78.

the Reparation Commission a request to enter upon an examination of the resources and capacity of Germany -- in pursuance of Article 234 of the Treaty of Versailles...

The British during these days exercised modest pressure. In a speech at Plymouth on the 25th the Prime Minister¹ declared that "we cannot contemplate with any satisfaction the disintegration or the disruption of Germany, which must be put back for years her powers of reparation. Nor can we contemplate the breaking off of any part of Germany into a separate state, which would at once break the Treaty of Versailles." He thereupon pleaded with Poincaré "to think, for his country, for us, and for the world, once, twice, three times", before rejecting the British proposal.² The next day, however, under a variety of restrictive conditions, France and Belgium made known their agreement in principle to the constitution of an "expert inquiry" committee subject to the superior authority of the Reparation Commission, which alone could extend the period or modify the means of German payment of reparations, the total sum of which in turn could be reduced only with the unanimous consent of the creditor powers.³ This concession, in appearance and probably in intent trifling, to the "Anglo-Saxons" was to

¹ A confidant noted on the 18th that "it was plain that his attitude to Poincaré was hardening. I said, "It is not enough to have one honest man at an interview." "Poincaré has lied," said S.B. "I was led to believe that when passive resistance ceased he'd negotiate with the Germans." Jones, Whitehall Diary, 249. The Cabinet's chief concern, however, as evidenced by discussion on the 15th, was "the urgent and immediate danger to British industry...from the possible dumping...by arrangement between French and German industrialists of the large stocks of steel at present in the Ruhr..." The remedy was thought to be allied control, but "very great care" would have to be taken "in view of the risk of our becoming involved in the Ruhr operation...and in order to avoid any suggestion that, after having refused to run risks of the Ruhr occupation, we were attempting to derive benefit from the results." Cabinet Conclusion, 15 October 1923. Cab.23/46.P.R.O.

² Middlemas, Baldwin, 204; Weill-Raynal, Les réparations allemandes, II, 502; Foreign Office, 2 November 1923. Memorandum on Developments in Germany, F.O., 408115, No. 60.

³ The French note to Britain of 26 October 1923 has not been published, but can be found in F.O. 4081 14, P.R.O. I follow the account in Weill-Raynal, op.cit., II, 85. The Belgians claimed that "it was due in very large part to Mr. Jaspar /Belgian Foreign Minister/'s earnest efforts that the French decision was reached...the Belgian Government had been all along of the opinion that the Secretary's plan should be taken up...this was a great victory..." Memorandum of an interview with the Belgian Chargé d'affaires, 29 October 1923; Charles Evans Hughes Papers, c. 174, f. 57.

prove the main mechanism for keeping France on the reparations "track" and in so doing for negating all the previous French gains in the Ruhr adventure.¹

Anglo-American pressures - the Conference of Ambassadors of 19 November

In the month between France's acceptance "in principle" of an "expert inquiry" on reparations and the decision by the Reparation Commission on 30 November 1923 to create two such committees France attempted to conduct the same double-edged policy toward Germany and the Anglo-Saxons as described at the beginning of the preceding subsection. This time, however, British pressure in particular caused further French withdrawal.

In Rhine-and-Ruhr the process of penetration and crumbling continued. Negotiations between the Ruhr industrialists and the occupying forces, broken off on the 16th of November on the question of whether payments and deliveries under the projected agreement would be credited to Germany's reparations account, were resumed on the 21st and two days later a standard MICUM agreement was reached with the Ruhr Bergbauverein, controlling 80% of the production in the area. Since unemployment in the Ruhr had reached the two million figure, and the German cabinet envisaged "a condition of absolute famine"² in the area, there was little

A note on British policy -- The British long hugged their caution prior to Baldwin's statement, and even thereafter. On the 20th the Foreign Office refused to make any statement on Rhenish separatism to the Belgium ambassador (Note by Sir Eyre Crowe, Foreign Office, 20 October 1923 : F.O. 408 114, p. 172, P.R.O.). In a Cabinet discussion of the 23rd on the Separatist movements in Bavaria, Saxony and the Rhineland "Strong representations were made that in no circumstances should British troops in the Rhineland be utilised to suppress any movement of a Separatist tendency within the British zone, and that the attitude of our forces towards any such movement should be one of strict neutrality and impartiality." The Cabinet agreed "That no public statement of any new development in Foreign Policy should be made by the Prime Minister without previous consultation with the representatives of the Dominions and India at the Imperial Conference..." (Conclusions Cabinet 23 October 1923; Cab.23/46, P.R.O.). That same day a Foreign Office meeting passively lamented the process of German disintegration with particular emphasis on the lessened prospects "for obtaining satisfaction of our just claims of Germany..." (Memorandum by Mr. Cadogan, Foreign Office, 23 October 1923; F.O. 408/14, P.R.O.)

²Stresemann, Cabinet meeting of 7 November 1923; Sutton, Stresemann, I, 196-197.

the German government could do, though a protest was filed with the Reparation Commission on 30 November.¹ By then Stresemann was no longer chancellor. His government had fallen on the 23rd as a result of an adverse vote by the Social Democrats, angered at the collapse of the 8-hour day in consequence of the end of passive resistance, and by the Nationalists, who had not agreed with the capitulation. More fundamentally, in d'Abernon's words, his downfall was brought about by "the failure to obtain any adequate return for the abandonment of passive resistance." Stresemann's last diplomatic move as Chancellor had been to reject a French demand that coal shipments be regarded as payment for damages incurred rather than as reparations. In the new, virtually identical (save for the withdrawal of the Social Democrats) government formed by Wilhelm Marx on November 30, Stresemann remained foreign minister.²

The separatist movement in the Rhineland continued, but the Belgian Government dissociated itself from it. On 2 November³

the Belgian High Commissioner compelled the Separatists to evacuate the Rathaus at Aachen after which the Separatist Movement virtually collapsed as far as the Belgian Zone was concerned.

The movement in the bulk of the French zone was hampered by quarrels between various Separatist factions, and by the population's indifference or resistance, but to the south the compact Palatinate was overrun by armed bands of Separatists by train from the north who, protected by the French occupying forces, proceeded to occupy public buildings in the towns and to extort allegiance from officials to the "Autonomous Government."⁴

¹SIA 1924, 288-90.

²Turner, Stresemann, 150; d'Abernon Diaries, III, 3; Bretton, Stresemann, 66; Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, 283. The MICUM agreements provided that some 27% of the Ruhr coal production plus taxes were to be delivered to the occupation authorities without payment.

³SIA 1924, 306. A successful Rhenish separatist movement would have hemmed in Belgium with French power to the east as well as south.

⁴SIA 1924, 310. The area was an obvious jumping-off point for a French invasion of Germany.

French efforts to stave off the British and the Americans proved less successful than its pressure in the Bavarian Palatinate. In Washington, Secretary Hughes complained that the limitations on the "expert inquiry" on which the French continued to insist seemed to indicate that the French were really not interested in a reparations settlement. Assuming the role of Dutch uncle, he told the French ambassador on 5 November that he¹

wanted to know whether M. Poincaré had any program to meet the situation. The ambassador did not know.

This inquiry, if it were allowed to proceed, would help them to get reparations. Of what advantage, asked the Secretary, was the breakup of Germany? Here was a dangerous situation with threats of communist uprisings and, on the other hand, with the monarchistic sentiment in Bavaria. If Germany broke up, would France be secure? The Secretary said he thought this was an illusion, that it might not happen during the ambassador's lifetime or his life, but the Germans would come together again in the future and then France would have neither security nor reparations. It seemed to him inconceivable that at this time the French Government should try to put obstacles in the way of the only avenue of helpfulness that seemed to be open. ...He was proceeding upon the idea that the French did desire some reparations plan and the question was how it could be evolved amid the present difficulties...He saw no other avenue of hope, and if this were abandoned the ambassador knew that a cloud of despair would settle down on Europe which involved very serious responsibility...

The Secretary said that it seemed, while he had listened intently to the ambassador, he really did not know what M. Poincaré meant; he did not know what limitations were proposed.

On 7 November Secretary Hughes informed the ambassador, and on the 9th the press, that²

In the opinion of the Government the limitations insisted upon by Poincaré would frustrate the purpose of the inquiry suggested in my communication of 1 October.

¹Memorandum of interview with French ambassador Jusserand, 5 November 1923: Charles Evans Hughes Papers, c.174/f.74b.

²FRUS 1923, II, 91-95. As reported by Jusserand, these limitations included no reconsideration of the amount of reparations as fixed on May 1, 1921, no remission of the amount of obligations as fixed on the same date (FRUS 1923, II, 86-87), no discussion of the occupation of the Ruhr (*ibid.*, 90-91) nor of "the system of collection of taxes established by the French nor the guaranties which had been seized nor the agreements with the industrialists," and no consideration of Germany's "capacity to pay" beyond 1930 (*ibid.*, 91-94).

The British also made expressions of just indignation, though not so publicly expressed,¹ but went further. With skill and effectiveness,² Great Britain worked to detach the other allies from France and to threaten the security and solid advantages gained by France under the Versailles Treaty, thus forcing her back on the reparations track. After a meeting of the cabinet on 30 October, the allies were warned against the creation of independent German states.³

Such a disruption of the Reich would naturally affect the status of Germany as a contracting party to the Treaty of Versailles, so much so that in certain conveniently 'undefined' PG/ important respects the latter would automatically cease to operate and would require complete revision.

On 2 November, the Belgian Foreign Ministry confirmed a press report that the⁴

British Government has notified Belgian and French governments and inter-allied Rhineland Commission that recognition of Rhineland Republic involves violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

Whether because of these pressures or for other reasons, the "Latin Front" was broken. On October 29 Italy accepted the "expert inquiry"⁵ and on the 31st⁶

¹ Thus on 8 November the permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs, Sir Eyre Crowe, stated that Britain had no more confidence in a "disloyal" France since the latter had broken her promise (but was there any such promise?) to negotiate after the end of passive resistance, had torpedoed the expert inquiry, and was practicing disguised aggression in the Rhineland. LaRoche, Au quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 182.

² Due to the re-emergence of Curzon? Baldwin had come out for protection on 25 October and the cabinet was thereafter immersed in party politics. Parliament was dissolved on November 16; the election campaign continued till the elections of 6 December.

³ Middlemas, Baldwin, 205.

⁴ Tel., Fletcher, Brussels, 2 November 1923; National Archives Microfilm Publication No. 336/177/0062. This notification seems to have been made at the instance of General Smuts, then in London as South Africa's representative to the Imperial Conference of 1923. He had long been an advocate of opposition to France.

⁵ FRUS 1923, II, 87.

⁶ Tel., Ambassador to Belgium, Brussels, 2 November 1923, FRUS 1923, III, 90.

Belgium...informed Great Britain that it accepts the text of the joint invitation proposed by Great Britain to be sent to the United States regarding expert commission /the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Jasper/ said that this action was taken without consultation with France...Jasper says he intends to stand firm because he thinks the limited inquiry which Poincare desires is useless.

These desertions must surely have had some effect on the French, but the pivotal pressure took place within a communications channel which the French had blocked before and now made available to their own detriment -- the Conference of Ambassadors.

This body,¹ sitting in Paris and with the veteran French diplomat Jules Cambon (prewar ambassador to Berlin) as president, held 34 meetings between the outbreak of the Ruhr crisis and the German abandonment of passive resistance,² many of them devoted to fruitless consideration of the German decision not to allow the French and Belgian members of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control to carry out visits of inspection to confirm German disarmament.³ On 26 September, however, the day of abandonment of "passive resistance," the Conference of Ambassadors approved a letter from Poincare to the German government, dated 3 October, asking it "for the last time" to admit such visits and warning of "grave consequences," a threat of war in the language of the old diplomacy still fancied by the Conference.⁴

The Conference held no meetings thereafter until 30 October. At meetings thereafter the French representatives harped on the control theme and added another--the decision of the German government to allow Crown Prince William, son

¹ See above, p. 2.

² Minutes, Conference of Ambassadors, National Archives.

³ The British in effect frustrated joint decision on carrying out these visits come what may, despite Foch's warnings of "tanks in the Gruncwald" (16 May).

⁴ C.A. 232, 26 September 1923; ACNP 180. 0330/232. vol. 70.

of the abdicated William II, to return to Germany to live.¹ On the 12th Cambon convoked a meeting of the Conference to state that

l'autorité des Gouvernements alliés et de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs a été bafouée...M. Cambon a eu un entretien à ce sujet avec M. Poincaré. Celui-ci estime que les Gouvernements alliés ne sauraient, sans grand dommage pour eux, laisser ces faits impunies et que si satisfaction ne leur est pas donnée, ils devraient prendre des mesures.

He then went on to state that if "satisfaction" were not given meaning in the case of the Crown Prince extradition to the allies for trial as a war criminal under the treaty of Versailles⁷, such measure might take the form of the seizure of a port, for example on "l'embouchure de l'Elbe," i.e., Hamburg. If Allied agreement were not forthcoming, the French would act on their own, occupying another ^{German} French town. The ambassadors agreed to ask for instructions.² The first British reaction as evidenced in a meeting of 15 November, was negative but mild, warning against unilateral French action.³ The other non-French representatives abstained from debate (the Belgian ambassador managed to straddle both the British and the French view). Marshal Foch, present for the meeting in his capacity as President of the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Versailles, proclaimed the German military menace, alleging military groupings in Bavaria and Thuringia and an ability to arm 800,000 men. Under these circumstances Cambon apparently felt safe in pushing further and even in bullying the British ambassador. Refer-

¹This has generally been interpreted as a harmless sop to the dangerously disaffected German Nationalists. It seems more likely, however, that the Crown Prince's return was a pre-emptive reaction to the hopes of some Bavarians for a restoration of the Wittelsbachs. Jules Cambon in his capacity as President had blocked discussion of the Ruhr occupation as a political matter beyond the competence of the Conference.

²C.A. 235, 12 November 1923; Tel., Herrick to Secretary of State, Paris, 12 November, National Archives Microfilm Publication No. 336/41/586-7.

³The Cabinet agreed on the 14th that "the Ambassador should be instructed to make clear that the British Government...could not acquiesce in the taking of separate sanctions..." One of its members thereafter exclaimed to the Italian Ambassador, "What more could be done in the face of a France so armed and with such a powerful air force?" Conclusion Cabinet 14 November 1923; Cab. 23/46, P.R.O.; Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 7th Series II, No. 477

ring now to the desirability of a blockade, he added that

Il paraît nécessaire que le Gouvernement britannique entre un peu dans l'ordre d'idées qui vient d'être indiqué au cours de la présente discussion et se rendre compte qu'il est indispensable de menacer l'Allemagne.

He then repeated the French intention to take unilateral sanctions if necessary.¹

On the 19th the Conference met again to consider a draft note prepared by Foch to the German government. This time there was no ambiguity as to the British position. The British ambassador, Lord Crewe, read an official "His Majesty's Government" statement condemning the effects of the occupation on German public opinion, dismissing the notion of current German military aggression, and condemning any idea of unilateral French action. With "all the energy which I possess" he underlined the importance of the repercussions such a decision would entail.

Threat

The French Government must realize the full measure of the responsibility which they will incur since by separating themselves from their allies they could not fail gravely to endanger the very foundation of the entente and of future cooperation. As his Majesty's Government could not remain associated with a line of policy of which they disapprove, they would be compelled, however reluctantly, to consider whether it might not be necessary for them to withdraw from the Ambassadors' Conference and possibly also from the commissions of control.²

This statement had an immediate effect. The Italian Ambassador declared his agreement with the British view and added that Italy could not consent to any other occupation of German territory. The Belgian Ambassador said that his instructions were to associate himself only with the unanimous decision of the Conference. He would have to refer to his government before any agreement on sanctions. Cambon, while repeating the "right" of the French government to take

¹C.A. 237, 15 November 1923; Tel., Herrick/Sec. State, Paris, 16 November 1923, National Archives Microfilm Publication No. 336/41/590.

²This identical threat had been recommended by Bonar Law's cabinet just before the Paris Conference in January, but not made by the prime minister. Is there any reason to suppose that it would have been less effective than it proved to be at the end of the year, after so many irreparable sufferings and political consequences?

what measures its national security interests dictated, stated that some other measure than territorial occupation might be found. The Conference then reached agreement on a draft vote, to be subsequently submitted to the allied governments before sending, to Germany warning it only that in the event of German obstruction to the Control Commissions the Allied governments would agree on the appropriate measures to assure the execution of the Treaty. The debate ended on the following curious note (my translation):

M. Cambon declares that, in the discussion which followed the reading of the British note on the control question, he did not feel it his duty to take up the last paragraph of that note, in order to maintain the debate's entire security; in any event the agreement that the Conference has reached proves that what seemed a threat in the British note will doubtless not materialize. The French government for its part would undergo the most sharp regret at seeing the Entente Cordiale broken.

Lord Crewe clarifies that there is only a conditional threat, appropriate only to an immediate French occupation of new German territory.

M. Cambon states that, whatever the bearing of that passage in the British note, France has never had the intention of immediate sanctions, but clearly reserves the right to take eventually whatever measure imposed by her concern for security.

The signal of retreat!¹

On the 21st the Conference reached agreement on a modified text of a note to the German government informing it that the Allied governments had decided on the necessity of a resumption of military and aeronautical inspection. In case of obstruction, the Allied governments reserved the right to take the measures appropriate to assure the execution of the Versailles Treaty.² On Poincaré's instructions, the French representative agreed to forego any ultimatum to Germany in exchange for absolute secrecy on the divergence of Allied views. Cambon then thanked his colleagues for the good will and spirit of conciliation

¹C.A. 238, 19 November 1923; Tel., Herrick/Secretary of State, Paris, 19 November, National Archives Microfilm Publication 367/511/0413.

²A retreat from the language of the draft of 19 November.

of the meeting. "It is evident," the American ambassador to Paris reported, "that there is a very general sense of relief among the Allied representatives at the termination of the strained situation."¹

The French further made concessions, or rather sidestepped the "limitations" questions, on reparations, for on the 28th the French delegate to the Reparations Commission offered a draft resolution which was adopted on the 30th:²

In order to consider, in accordance with the provisions of Article 234 of the Treaty of Versailles, the resources and capacity of Germany, and after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, the Reparation Commission decided to create two Committees of Experts belonging to the Allied and Associated countries.

One of these Committees would be entrusted with considering means of balancing the budget and the measures to be taken to stabilize the currency.

The other would consider the means of estimating the amount of exported capital and of bringing it back into Germany.

The U.S. government, invited to acquiesce in the appointment of American experts (it being generally understood that this was a precondition for the loan of American capital), was at first inclined to ask what had happened to the French limitations, but was assured by the Belgians and British that this was neither necessary nor desirable. The continuing ambiguity (which will be commented on later) was due, the Belgians and British assured the Americans, to considerations of "face-saving" or "internal politics." "It was not believed," according to Lord Curzon, "that any attempt would be made to restrict the investigation by the imposition of limitations upon which the French Government desired to insist in the negotiations heretofore had."² On the 11th Secretary

¹C.A. 239, 21 November 1923; Laroche, Quai d'Orsay, 184; Tel., Herrick/Sec. State, 21 November, National Archives Microfilm Publications 336/41/0600.

²SIA 1924, 347; Tel., Herrick (Sec. State, 28 Nov. 1923: FRUS 1923, II, 98-101.

³Memorandum of interview with the British Chargé d'affaires, 7 December 1923: Charles Evans Hughes Papers, con. 175, f. 77 (a).

Hughes replied favorably to the Reparations Commission and suggested the appointment of Charles G. Dawes, a Chicago financier, to the first committee. On the 21st the Reparation Committee appointed "General" Dawes¹ to what became known as the Dawes Committee, while a British financier and ex-Liberal politician, Reginald McKenna, chaired the other committee. Though not everyone at the time realized it, the temperature had gone below flash point, and, to vary the metaphor, the key to resolution of the crisis turned. Whether the French in particular realized this is, as the lawyers say, a moot question.²

The Ruhr Henceforth a Local Crisis Only

At the beginning of this paper we divided the crisis chronologically into five phases. The first three and part of the fourth (the French agreement to a resumption of negotiations) -- through November 1923 -- have been analyzed in some detail. We do not propose to discuss the further process of resolution of the crisis--through the negotiation and signing of the London agreements of 16 August 1924, whereby the "Powers" (including Germany and, implicitly, the United States³) accepted the so-called Dawes Plan on reparations and France agreed to withdraw from the Ruhr completely within a 12-month period--with any comparable completeness. The reason is that, though the specific issues still remained to be settled after November 1923, the French occupation of the Ruhr was no longer an international crisis in any of the accepted meanings of the term.⁴ From January 1923 until the end of the year Franco-German conflict had been pushed to

¹Dawes had served with the American Expeditionary Forces in France with the rank of brigadier general.

²SIA 1924, 347-48; Memorandum of an interview with the Belgian charge d'affaires, 31 October 1923; Charles Evans Hughes Papers, con. 174, f. 57.

³Though the United States was not formally represented at the conference, Secretary of State Hughes was present in London, ostensibly in his capacity as President of the American Bar Association, and played an active role.

⁴For discussion of the concept of the crisis see Oran Young, and Glenn Snyder, Crisis Bargaining (unpublished paper, July, 1967).

the degree of risk of war, danger to the existence of the German state and actual major change in its internal structure, involvement of and effect on other major states, severe general economic and financial disturbance, and an acute if undefinable phase of perturbation and change in the international system itself.¹ From December 1923 on all of these factors, save for the involvement of other states, faded away and that of third-party involvement became constructive rather than primarily reactive. From the viewpoint of the international system, the crisis is essentially over by the end of 1923; what remains to be done is to find solutions to the particular issues. In the remainder of this paper we therefore propose to provide a synthetic account of the further evolution and close of the crisis, with, as always, particular attention to the role of negotiation and bargaining. This role was, as a matter of fact and to my mind reasonably enough, far more important in the crisis aftermath, once the power relationships fundamentally at issue are settled, than in the earlier and more crucial stages. Before thus proceeding, in altered form, with the narrative, however, there is one particular major "decision-making" event or series of events that requires fuller and more separate analysis than we have been able to devote to it--the French retreat from a coercive policy to full acceptance of a "pro-German" Anglo-American mediation. From an external standpoint, France, having achieved dominance in Europe, allowed herself to be "euchred" or "finesed" out of it by the "Anglo-Saxon" powers. A "decision-making" analysis presents a different perspective, though it hardly invalidates (indeed, it rather confirms) the first. It also makes it more understandable.

¹If, for example, the communist attempted coup in Germany of October had succeeded the international system would have been transformed. General war followed by a Soviet Bloc comparable to that of after 1945 might well have emerged, but with the addition of all Germany. Quite a new balance of power would thus have appeared.

Poincaré's Retreat

We have identified earlier (see above, pp. 13-15) four motives in the Ruhr occupation: 1) the assertion of dominance, 2) the exaction of reparations, 3) the weakening or disruption of the German state, and 4) the economic exploitation of the Ruhr. We now propose to analyze French politics with particular reference to this complex of motives. We shall then be in a position to appreciate the variety of pressures and incentives to which the chief and crucial French decision-maker, Raymond Poincaré, responded.

For our purposes the organs of the French state, then a parliamentary republic, can be divided into three basic units: parliament, the executive, and administration, with particular reference respectively to the Chamber of Deputies; the President of the Republic (Millerand), and the President of the Council (Poincaré), and the Council of Ministers or cabinet; and the French civil-and-military high command in the Occupied Territories and the ambassadors to the Powers. From 1914 to 1919 parliament and executive, the latter under the nominal leadership of then President of the Republic Poincaré, had adhered to the concept of the "Union Nationale" or "Union Sacrée," the replacement of party politics by a government supported by, and shared in, by all parties (save, after 1917, the Socialists). In 1919, however, under the particular aegis of Millerand, a "Bloc National" was founded which formed the majority of the new "bleu horizon" (the color of the French army officer's uniform) chamber, which convened in January 1920² 1924, the most conservative parliament to sit since France's defeat in 1871. Under the constitutional law of 1875, the chamber was to be reelected in its entirety every four years. During these four years, while French public opinion was subject to change, a jingoist parliament continued to be dominated by the Bloc Nationale.

The socialists and communists were excluded from the Bloc, while the radical socialists, the strongest party before 1914 but also the one which had lost most heavily in the elections of 1919, on occasion contributed in parliament

both votes and ministers. Despite the predominance of the Bloc, Poincaré, prime minister since January 1922, refused to identify with either its policies or its political concepts, and continued, virtually by himself, to incarnate and appeal to the National Union.¹

With regard to the Ruhr, Parliament as a whole, like the nation as a whole, wanted the minimum objectives of "victory" and reparations. While the Bloc National had no distinctive German policy, many of its leaders went beyond these objectives toward military-territorial and economic gains, as did, typically, the diplomatic and military leadership. Millerand was specifically identified with the control-of-German industry motive. If pressed, this political/administrative leadership would have foregone reparations benefits as a necessary price of these larger gains.

Contrariwise, those organs of the French administrative apparatus responsible for the French budget were painfully conscious of the financial costs of the Ruhr operation and of the need for immediate resumption of reparations payments.² More importantly, however, if the interpretation here put forward is correct, Poincaré, while willing to "let things happen", was not willing to accept the external and internal consequences of a complete "Bloc National",

¹Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Troisième République, III, 387; "In the peculiar situation existing in France at the moment, M. Poincaré, although originally an 'Homme des Gauches,' has been able to avoid labelling himself as a partisan either of the Bloc National or the Bloc des Gauches, and has governed on something of a coalition system based on the Union Sacrée. The present situation may, from this point of view, be said to present political phenomena not unlike those inherent in a recent situation at home. The bonds of the Union Sacrée are becoming somewhat slack, the coalition is dissolving, and M. Poincaré has been forced to spring to one side or the other of the gulf which is opening in its midst..." Dispatch, Lord Crewe to Lord Curzon, Paris, 18 June 1923; F.O. 425/391, P.R.O.

²"à la fin de 1923, le Reich n'effectuait plus aucun paiement au titre des réparations, le remboursement des prestations opérées par les industriels des territoires occupés ne devant avoir lieu qu'à une époque ultérieure; seul le paiement des frais d'occupations...était provisoirement maintenu..." Weill-Raynal, Les réparations allemandes et la France, 487.

rather than French victory in the Ruhr.

During the course of 1923 the Bloc National made efforts at "assimilating the President du Conseil into their party system."¹ "If the Ruhr situation continues and can be made to play a part in the elections," the British ambassador noted after the vote on the debate of June 15, where most of the Radicals found themselves in opposition, "the Bloc des Gauches will find itself seriously handicapped."² Millerand went further and hoped to capitalize on the German cessation of passive resistance both externally, through coercive negotiations, and internally, through immediate general elections in which a Bloc National victory would be followed by a strengthening of Presidential prerogatives at expense of parliament and cabinet, a Gaullist constitution, in fact.³ We have seen how Poincaré in September frustrated the first of these goals. In October Millerand none the less marched toward the second through his notorious speech at St. Evreux (see above, p.36, N2) posing the question of constitutional revision, which attacked and alarmed ("La République en danger") the "Left."

Poincaré refused once again to be coerced into the ranks or internal policies of the Bloc National, "to which", as the British Embassy had noted earlier in the year, "He looks for support in his Ruhr policy," refused to disassociate himself definitely from "the Left, in which direction his personal inclinations drew him,"⁴ and therefore, in his attempt to maintain a position over-above and acceptable to both, "hastened," in the words of his latest and most authorita-

1
Dispatch, Crewe to Curzon, Paris, 2 July 1923; F.O. 425/392, P.R.O.

2
Dispatch, Crewe to Curzon, Paris, 19 June 1923; F.O. 425/391.

3
See Saint-Aulaire, Confession, 574.

4
Phipps to Curzon, Paris, 25 March 1923; F.O. 408/9, No. 829, P.R.O.

tive biographer, "to throw ballast in foreign policy."¹

By November, under the impetus of Millerand's speech and Herriot's organizing efforts at a "Cartel" of the left, the division between the two groups for the first time emerged clearly in parliament.² "The chief factor in the internal political situation," the British Embassy reported, "is the general election due next April."³ The Bloc National press," it noted a month later, "continues to call upon M. Poincaré to resume the leadership of that party."⁴ In vain. Throughout the following months, Poincaré neither in public nor private actions (e.g. directions to the Prefects to bring in the "right" voting results) gave any encouragement to the partisans of the Bloc National, thereby in effect helping to bring about the victory of the Cartel des Gauches. But in his determination not to become a prisoner of the Bloc, the prime minister had to heed the needs and preoccupations of the Cartel, and these powerfully affected the future course of France's Ruhr policy.

It affected it primarily in two related aspects: finance and relations with Britain. The radicals under Herriot had adopted a most cautious stance on the Ruhr. In essence, they said "we will support French policy so long as it works

¹Miguel, Poincaré, 479-80. "S'il restait obstinément libéral (beaucoup plus à vrai dire que républicain, car la République n'était menacée par personne)... c'était peut-être par calcul politique, pour ménager son futur retour au pouvoir comme réconciliateur. / More profoundly, however, he was opposed to denigrations of the parliamentary régime. / Poincaré avait choisi...entre le fin du libéralisme et le Cartel, il préférait le Cartel dont il supputait l'existence précaire...c'est pourquoi il s'était empressé de jeter du lest en politique étrangère; l'extrémisme était dangereux ici plus qu'ailleurs. / There was nothing to do but follow the dialogue with the Allies. / Toute autre voie serait funeste et aurait pour conséquence de précipiter la France dans une aventure dictatoriale.

²"A trois reprises (Poincaré) passa la question de confiance et chaque fois les 160 à 170 voix du Bloc des gauches s'opposèrent aux 380 ou 400 voix des majorités." Bonnefous, Histoire politique, III, 387.

³Crowe to Curzon, Paris, 7 November 1923; F.O. 425/392, P.R.O.

⁴Ibid., 1 December 1923.

and doesn't involve any risks or sacrifices." For the record, they said, "We support it out of patriotism and so long as it does not adversely affect Anglo-French relations." In speeches to the chamber when challenged, from June 1923 to January 1924, Herriot harped on the primary importance of maintaining close relations with England, and this was formalized in the adoption of programs for the Cartel in October 1923, when the Radicals moved from qualified support to qualified opposition to the Ruhr occupation.¹

To Poincaré, then, the more trouble with England, the greater the split with the Cartel.

The second aspect was finance. From January to November 1923 the franc fell from 13½ to 17 to the dollar, the most severe depreciation taking place in January, June, and again in November.² The fundamental reason for this was the imbalanced budget owing to the uncovered costs of the Ruhr occupation, but in November "speculators" were declared to be deliberately at work.³ The obvious solution to this problem in so self-contained an economy as the French was to balance the budget: through taxes, reparations, or a foreign loan. The Finance Minister discovered, however, in a discussion with the Finance Committee of the Chamber that the deputies were not disposed to ask the country the "sacrifice" of increased taxes with the prospects of elections in the offing. The apparently stymied (see above, p. 45) "expert inquiry" scheme, however, was generally understood to be the precondition for a foreign loan as well as for agreed-upon reparations. Therefore, in "result of this contact"⁴ and after an inter-

¹ Bonnefous, Histoire politique, III, 383. The socialists and communists opposed it without qualifications throughout.

² Eleanor Lansing Dulles. The French Franc, 1914-1928 (N.Y.:Macmillan, 1929, p. 165)

³ Observers of England's Harold Wilson government will remember the "gnomes of Zurich." Nonetheless it is a fair question as to whether the British and American governments may have deliberately employed the financial weapon. At any rate they do not seem to have discouraged "speculation".

⁴ Bertrant de Jonvenel, de Versailles à Locarno, 336-37; Weill-Raynal, Politique, p. 51.

view with M. Poincaré, M. Barthou, as French delegate, proposed as early as 13 November to the Reparations Commission, the constitution of a committee of experts to examine Germany's actual capacity for payment. In January 1924 M. Herriot, in a major speech to the Chamber, noted the historical correlations between good Franco-German and France-Allied relations and the strength of the franc. The moral for the future was clear: the more France conceded to the Allies, with particular reference to acceptance of the proposals of what was now the Dawes Committee, the better the prospects for French finance and the lesser the burden on French taxpayers. A hard line on the Ruhr contrariwise, would foreclose the prospects of a foreign loan and disturb internal "tranquillity."

Let us attempt to derive some general conclusions on French policy from the previous rather complex narrative and analysis. The repeatedly proclaimed aims of the French occupation were limited to "victory", reparations, and guaranties. By November 1923 the first and last of these had been attained, and the "expert inquiry" offered hope of reparations. Was not French acceptance of this inquiry therefore only the logical completion of a former French policy, the attainment of French objectives in the entire operation?

It was not. Whatever the official explanations, the thrust behind the operation was not so limited, nor would the government have embarked on it had it foreseen this outcome. Acceptance of the inquiry meant acceptance of Anglo-American leadership, the repudiation of which was the meaning of France's unilateral Ruhr occupation. Having attained victory, the government lost it through over-caution.

Poincaré in September refused an apparent opportunity to impose France's own peace settlement by itself on Germany, through fear of complications with England and in a desire to avoid dependence on Millerand and the Bloc National. Instead he preferred to let matters "take their course" though economic control of the Ruhr, encouragement of Rhenish separatism, and application of the coup

de grace to the over-all process of German political disintegration by military sanctions, either alone or in agreement with Britain. Under British and, to a lesser extent, American pressure, to which Belgium and Italy¹ also adhered, Poincare abandoned further military sanctions and accepted the "expert inquiry" scheme put forth by the United States in December 1922 and gradually accepted by all the major powers but France thereafter. This international pressure would not have been effective had it not been for 1) Poincare's determination to conciliate the Left and to maintain general as opposed to partisan legislative support, 2) the unwillingness of the legislature, in the prospect of general elections, to pass on the costs of the Ruhr operation onto the electorate rather than to delay it in form of acceptance of a foreign loan hopefully to be met later on by reparations.

The extent of the French retreat was camouflaged by the restricted terms

¹The British Embassy in Paris attached much importance to Italian pressure. "The most striking feature in the conduct of the French Government would seem to be the departure from their attitude as defined by M. Poincare as recently as the 18th November in his speech at Neuilly...M. Poincare then said/"Des sanctions s'imposent. Nous les prendrons, si nous m'obtenons pas satisfaction." Nevertheless the fear that M. Poincare would remain obdurate has been falsified, and since the Neuilly speech the dominating factor in the situation...on the side of the French has been a desire to avoid a breach with Great Britain...the sudden change of attitude manifested at the Ambassadors' Conference of 19 November/ is to be ascribed to a general wave of public opinion in this country in favour of avoiding a breach...

But this wave of public opinion was in its turn to a large extent the result of the dramatic intervention of Signor Mussolini who, in his speech in the State Senate on the 16th, made clear what certainly was not clear to the French before, namely, that the Italian Government intended to give active support to His Majesty's Government in opposing the French demands for...sanctions... There would seem...to be grounds for concluding that a breach with both Great Britain and Italy on the question of the Crown Prince and the Control Commission, following immediately upon the breakdown of the proposed Experts' Committee, was a consummation which, in the light of public opinion in France, M. Poincare felt unable to face." Crewe to Curzon, Paris, 22 November 1923: F.O. 408/15. P.R.O. The most recent student of Fascist diplomacy, however, notes that "Italy did not join actively in the campaign to bring the United States into the reparations picture. Before agreeing to participate in the international investigation of Germany's economy...Italy hedged and called, albeit in vain, for an Allied understanding beforehand." Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, 149.

of reference constituting the expert committees as well as by the legalistic frame of mind of M. Poincaré. In the months and years that followed the decision on November 30 to constitute these two committees, however, German unity, both political and economic, as well as financial stability, were re-established and the hard-won guarantees relinquished. It is only just to add that the reparations "problem" was also settled for a seven-year period with regular payments to France. This as well as the solution of the "security problem" at Locarno was the result of great power (including Germany) agreement, not unilateral French decision.

Resolution of the Crisis:

The Collapse of Rhenish Separatism, the Dawes Plan,
and the London Conference of July - August 1924

On the morrow of the Reparation Commission's decision to create Expert Committees to consider German finance, Stresemann wrote a despairing letter to his ambassador in Moscow.¹

The world cannot but cease to regard Germany as a Great Power since she has lost the Ruhr and the Rhineland, and must look on helplessly while her most valuable provinces are taken from her, taxed and exploited by other Powers...

What will happen during the years to come, until the situation has changed, no man can foretell. The French militarists have no notion of retiring from the Ruhr; they are determined to obtain control of the railways, and to prevent the establishment of any considerable German manufacturing plant in those parts, their intention being to turn the district into a French arsenal and use it to protect France against any possible attack by Germany.

...I have already heard some talk about a possible dismemberment of Germany, and I believe that there is some reason to regard this as the aim of French policy...

Already, however, the Reparation Commission's decision had provided the vehicle whereby French policy would be overturned and meaningful negotiation and bargaining between equals take place.

¹Ltr., Stresemann to Brockdorff - Rantzau, 1 December 1923: Sutton, Stresemann I, 255 -256.

The constitution of the Dawes Committee, which immediately went far beyond the scope of its terms of reference to consider the general reparations problem in its economic aspects, focussed international attention on reparations, provided a goal for Anglo-American financial pressure, dangled hopes for reparations and foreign loans before the French, and offered the Germans (with Anglo-American help) a major bargaining weapon. Certainly for the first time since June 1923, when the French insisted on the abandonment of passive resistance as a prior condition to negotiations, and probably for the first time since the German acceptance of the Schedule of Payments in 1921, the pre-conditions for bargaining now existed. The possible trade-off was, broadly speaking, the Ruhr versus a reparations settlement. France was in possession of the former, which the Germans badly needed and could hardly live without. On the other hand, France, in its existent internal political situation, badly needed an over-all financial settlement, of which reparations and a foreign loan were inseparable elements. Such a settlement could not be reached without both Germany's and "Anglo-Saxon" agreement. Both parties to the crisis had something the other needed,¹ both were now fundamentally willing to make the necessary "sacrifices."² Negotiations could take place, and did. Between France and Germany, at two levels or in two channels. First, in Paris, between Poincaré and von Hoesch, who was promoted from chargé d'affaires to ambassador on 1 February 1924 and received by Poincaré as such. Second, and more importantly, in Berlin as well as elsewhere among the Dawes Committee, the German government, and French diplomats and members of the Reparations Commission.

The Poincaré-Hoesch interviews were concerned primarily with the military

¹Before the abandonment of passive resistance, Germany contested the French occupation; afterwards Germany recognized it as existent - to be removed through diplomacy, not force.

²The Germans now had the prospect of reparations payments being covered, and more than covered, by American capital.

control issue and Rhenish separatism, on the first of which Poincaré had on 15 December hinged the opening of direct negotiations.¹ This found its solution with an offer on 5 March 1924 by Poincaré, acting in the capacity of President of the Conference of Ambassadors, to von Hoesch to substitute the Control Commission by a less exacting and less inquisitorial Committee of Guarantees, thus bringing the inspections to an end.² The German complaints on Rhenish separatism and related issues were met by a bland assertion of French neutrality in German internal affairs.³ Nonetheless, in deference primarily to British concern, the French quietly took steps to terminate the separatist movements in the Rhineland, or more accurately to transfer support from the "activist" to the "legalist" wing, represented by the mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer.

On 4 December Dorten was called in by Tirard and told to give way to Adenauer.⁴ By the 15th the British representative on the Rhineland High Commission reported that⁵

there is considerable evidence to show that the Separatist movement, as far as the Rhineland Province is concerned, is now moribund...The reasons which have contributed to a change in the situation are the withdrawal of the French support, the hostility of the local population, dissensions among the Separatist leaders, and the want of money.

A week later, on the 22nd, according to Dorten's account, Tirard informed him that France had pledged itself to England to end the separatist movement by coercion if necessary.⁶ The Separatist occupation of public buildings came to an

¹Sutton, Stresemann, I, 258-259.

²An English proposal. The letter is in National Archives Microfilm 336/41/0771: State Dept. files 862/20/160.

³Ltr., Poincaré to Forster, German chargé d'affaires, Paris, 7 February 1924: copy, National Archives Microfilm 336/177/0458, State Dept. files, 862t.01/899.

⁴Dorten, Tragédie rhénane, 188-189.

⁵Dispatch, Kilmarnock to Curzon, Coblenz, 15 December 1923: F.O. 408/15, P.R.O.

⁶Dorten, Tragédie rhénane, 192.

end and the movement as a whole collapsed. In the Palatinate the French authorities mounted a rear-guard action through January, causing something of a tempest-in-a-teapot crisis with Great Britain, where Curzon, in virtually his last act as foreign secretary, denounced¹ the "hasty and upstart simulacrum of a government" and ordered the British consul-general in Munich to visit the area and report on the degree of popular support for the "Autonomous Government". The Clive report concluded that the government could not exist without French support, and was proved right in the "massacre of Pirmasens" on 13 February. Some fifteen separatists were lynched on fleeing from a burning city hall by the local citizenry while the French observed. That was the end of "activist" Rhenish separatism.

Meanwhile the Dawes Committee pursued its labors, and by mid-February Stresemann could allude with reference to reparations to "silver streaks on the otherwise dark horizon."² General Dawes, who had been on record as a supporter of the French occupation,³ took the view that German stability, the necessary prerequisite to a foreign loan and regular reparations payments, could only be attained through the restoration of German economic unity, thus excluding all schemes for German railway, currency, and industrial holdings by the French. This view was very strongly held by the American and English industrial and financial communities as well as by, if not in consequence, the American and British governments. The strictly military French presence in German territory was of less importance. The restoration of German economic unity was the key provision in the so-called Dawes Report, presented to the Reparations Commission on 9 April. No total reparations sum was established, nor was a moratorium accorded. Instead, a foreign loan was envisaged. The German financial system

¹In the House of Lords on 15 January 1924.

²Speech at Elberfeld, 17 February 1924; Sutton, Stresemann, I, 277-78.

³Chosen for that reason, to conciliate the French?

was to be subject to a degree of foreign control. Reparations payments would rise over a five-year period from one to two-and-a-half billion gold marks.

Anglo-American financial power had by then been effectively wielded. The German Central Bank had speedily acquired financial support from the Bank of England for the introduction of the new mark in December 1923, while plans for the introduction of a new "regional" currency in the Rhineland foundered for lack of outside assistance. Pending the adoption of the Dawes Plan, the French franc had been subject to recurring "attacks", particularly in January and March. A loan of \$100 million to the Bank of France in support of the franc was made in March by J. P. Morgan and Company after discussion with Dawes and sanction by President Coolidge on condition that the loan "would not adversely affect chances for the Dawes Plan."¹ By then Herriot and the radicals, conscious of their increasing strength in the country, had broken with the government and continued to stress the need for foreign financial help and close relations with the "Anglo-Saxons." Millerand, still vainly insisting that "As regards foreign policy, France could not evacuate the Ruhr before the total payment of reparations,"² was now in an isolated position, and by June was forced to resign from public life. The French retreat was verging on the precipitate.

In the months preceding the presentation of the Dawes Report,³ Stresemann never tired of repeating that the restoration of German sovereignty in the occupied territories was the prerequisite for reparations payments, thought the distinction between economic and administrative sovereignty was not always clearly drawn. As for guarantees, these would have to be national rather than local, revenues on the entire German railway system, for example, rather than on "reparations provinces." To skeptics in Germany, including those in his own

¹Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr, 225, which cites the Dawes Papers.

²Declaration to Paris press of 27 March 1924, as reported by the British Embassy in Paris. F.O. 425/393, P.R.O.

³The Dawes Committee held its first meeting on 14 January.

party, he pointed out the other side of the coin--that the Dawes Report had to be accepted as a means to recovery of the Ruhr.

These pressures proved effective. On 16 April, Germany accepted the "Dawes Plan" and the Reparations Commission approved it one day later. The reparations-receiving powers accepted the Plan in principle by the end of the month. Two weeks later, on May 11, the French elections were held, the Cartel des Gauches received a majority, Herriot became prime minister on June 1, Millerand disappeared into oblivion, and Poincaré retreated to the Senate. On May 19 the Belgian and Italian governments proposed¹ that an international conference be held to confirm the Dawes Plan and to make the necessary implementing arrangements.

After much preliminary diplomacy, the consequent Inter-Allied Conference met in London from 16 July to 16 August 1924. As the result of strong pressure from England and the United States, Herriot accepted the Dawes Plan but was prevailed upon to discuss the question of military evacuation of the Ruhr. A French proposal to make this evacuation proportionate to German purchase of bonds provided for in the Dawes Plan met with universal disapproval. In talks with Stresemann, Herriot finally agreed, dropping various conditions, to evacuate the Ruhr militarily within a twelve-month period. The first evacuations took place directly, and the German Reichstag accepted the Dawes Plan on August 28. By the end of 1924 the Ruhr had been substantially evacuated² and the loans to cover reparations payments successfully made at 8 to 10% interest by American and British financiers. The crisis was over.

From its beginnings in January 1923 until the abandonment of passive resistance in September, the evolution of the crisis left little scope for negotiations or meaningful bargaining. Thereafter, however, the internal vulnerabilities of victor France allowed for pressure by outside but interested parties.

¹For fear of being left in the cold?

²The last evacuations took place in June, 1925, as part of the bargaining process in achieving the Locarno security treaties.

Once the victor had been persuaded to forfeit "coercive bargaining" or detachment, true bargaining between roughly equal states took place. The result was crisis-revolution and conflict transcendence.

II. Methodological and Theoretical Notes

The following is essentially an attempt to fill in the case study format and checklist (Working Paper No. 6 and others). I may, however, on occasion depart from that framework.

Systemic Environment

1. System structure. See text, pp. 1-3. As a result of the "absence", voluntary (U.S.), enforced (Russia), or geographical (Japan) of three major states; the defeat of another (Germany); and the "Europocentric" outlook of the time (question of perception), political power appears to be more or less equally distributed among the three World War I victorious "entente" powers--England, France, and Italy. Military factors, however, favor France (see No. 3 below); while financial factors over time and in particular situations favor England, as does the latter's prestige (victory, headship of Empire) and "swing" role in the European balance of power. Financial factors also make possible major and eventually determining U.S. influence. International organizations play no discernible role in the crisis, but the allied body established by the Treaty of Versailles [Reparations Commission] and the Versailles settlement as part of the "public law of Europe" does.

2. Ideology. Parties to the crisis have basically similar ideologies and social systems. The shared socialist ethos and membership of the socialist International by British Labour (in power from January 1924), the French socialists (opposed to the Ruhr occupation), and the German social democrats (members of the "Weimar Coalition" and supporters of the Weimar republic) was of some importance in the evolution of the crisis. The rise in power of the Car-

tel des Gauches, of which the socialists were members, and the intensified "pro-German" policy of MacDonald's Labour government against "French militarism" contributed to France's acceptance of the "Dawes Plan" and thereby to resolution of the crisis. One extreme conservative (the French ambassador to London, the Comte de Saint-Aulaire) saw in the outcome of the Ruhr crisis the triumph of international socialism over the French nation, and he may have been right.

The fear, and to a lesser extent the reality, of the spread of communism was an important factor in the perception of European politics by all statesmen of the time. The immediate threat of communism, all were agreed, was in Germany, and all were equally agreed that the victory of communism in Germany would be followed by a formidable German-Russian Soviet bloc that might liquidate Eastern Europe and pose a formidable threat to the Entente. On the whole, however, awareness of this "cataclysmic" effect tended to be manipulated and used in pursuit of national goals /Germany - "if you push us too far we'll go communist," an argument taken up by the English in their dialogues with the French/ rather than exercising any real inhibiting influence. However, the Germano-Soviet alignment at Rapallo was a factor in the decision of the Bloc National to move against this challenge to the existent international order. Elements in the bloc, and some British conservatives who supported the French action, may well have envisaged the French occupation as a move to strengthen the forces of "order" against those of "movement".¹ This interpretation, however, is not to be carried too far.

3. Military technology. The pattern of the time is conventional plus the consciousness of strategic airpower. On the land and in the air the French superiority in Europe was overwhelming, and the British consciousness of their vulnerability to French air attack, to which there was as yet no military deterrent, was of great importance in inhibiting British pressure on France, indeed to a

¹A distinction originally made by the French political scientist Goguel.

far greater degree than the French government realized. The Germans were for the most part disarmed. In military terms the system was not multi- but unipolar. (Britain's naval strength was of limited applicability in an intra-European struggle, and even in this sector the British feared the French submarines. Submarines had very nearly spelled Britain's doom in 1917.)

4. Alliances and alignments. See text, p. 1, n. 1 and diagram on p. 3. Formally, there was no alliance save the expiring Anglo-Japanese connection. The term "Entente" persisted, however, and England, France and Italy, who had been allies during the "Great War" and had pledged to make no separate peace, had signed the Treaty of Versailles, furnished personnel to the "inter-allied" bodies established by Versailles, and were committed to its application against a defeated but still potentially dangerous enemy. Though Rapallo only committed Germany and Russia to diplomatic recognition and a reparations "peace", Germany's military activities in Russia helped to constitute a meaningful alignment between the two powers,

Simply stated, the "systemic" meaning of the Ruhr crisis is the failure of a French attempt to maintain a predominating role and to weaken or destroy another member of the system. From 1919 to 1925 French influence in Europe is paramount and Germany is excluded; from 1925 to 1939 Germany is admitted to the concert and itself establishes a predominating role, only to be checked thereafter with the necessary aid of initially outside or "rim" states.

Bargaining Setting

1. Parties -- France and Germany
2. Previous relations -- terrible
3. "Conflict of interest" -- (a) French desire to maintain the victory of 1919 through impeding German political or economic recovery versus German desire for recovery and at a minimum equality within the European state system (b) French desire and need for monetary payments versus German desire for nonpayment.

4. Crisis precipitated by deliberate act by France in form of declaration of German default by Reparations Commission.

5. Immediate issue - Terms of moratorium on German reparations.

6. & 7. "Relative valuation" -- France -- security, reparations, resolve and prestige. 30 (illustrative), Germany -- territorial and political integrity 80 (illustrative).

8. Relative military capabilities - Overwhelming French preponderance.

9. War would have been catastrophic for the Germans, highly unpopular with the French. Germans none the less would have fought to degree of capacity if cornered (i.e. further involved), which may well have inhibited the French. Thus Germans greatly feared the condition that would bring about war, and the war's results rather than war itself; the French preferred not to have to fight. Comparison here is difficult. Neither side wanted war; hence the real conflict was waged at a paramilitary level.

10. Pre-crisis commitments. See above, I.4. Germany was committed to reparations payments through her forced acceptance of the Schedule of Payments in 1921.

11. Asymetries -- All in France's favor, save for value of the stakes. Third parties tended to desire to limit French actions, but could only do so after German surrender when France for reasons of domestic politics proved vulnerable to financial pressure and "world opinion." At this point for that reason the international system saved Germany; until then it was incapable of doing so, and in fact the powers acquiesced in French persistence as they doubtless would have continued to do thereafter.

12. Initial "Images" and perceptions -- These are difficult to evaluate in the light of the available material, which does not include intelligence reports. However, with respect to France's perception of Germany, we can say that Germany's immediate interests were the nonpayment of reparations, her ultimate goal the

overthrow of the entire Versailles settlement and the re-establishment of German preponderance in Europe, possibly accompanied by an attack on France ('1940'). Though Germany would "try every trick in the book," she would eventually, in the light of her lack of military strength and in view of the scarcely debatable outcome of military conflict, concede what France demanded, but only under coercion. France underestimated German resolve in the Ruhr; in Poincare's explanation in the chamber to French socialist leader Blum, he had foreseen German resistance but had not desired it. The initial expectation was of a "military promenade." The continued German resistance increased the French stakes and costs in the crisis, thus in itself invalidating the reparations motivation as a sufficient cause for French action. The continuation of German resistance until September, though ending in surrender, so weakened the French as to make them vulnerable to outside pressures. In this sense the German defeat led to victory, and contrariwise from the French. In Germany's perception of France, this outcome was unforeseen, which proves only, as with the British decision to resist in 1940, that action can be very well-motivated even if its immediate purpose be unclear and in this sense "irrational."

The German perception of France is less well-documented and perhaps less articulate; after all, Germany's national "duty" - resistance - was clear, regardless of French motivations. In other words, France required an interpretation of German behavior for French actions, Germany did not, unless it was a concept of the ultimate French lack of "seriousness", which proved well-justified. Though France was perceived as an "oppressor", evaluations of her interests and goals varied. Evaluations as presented to non-Germans were shaped primarily by the desire to influence rather than to elucidate. On the whole, German officialdom thought France occupied the Ruhr to keep it indefinitely as a "Reparations province". Germany over-estimated the French readiness to invade other German territory.

Bargaining process - Franco-German moves only

Basic moves

French occupation of the Ruhr (January 1923-September 1923) - Basic Move One
plus increments

German passive resistance and active sabotage (January-September 1923) - Basic
Move Two plus increments

Germany's abandonment of passive resistance September 1923

The Micum agreements and the proclamation of the Rhineland Republic and of the
Autonomous Government of the Palatinate - October-November 1923. Text pp.
39-40, 43.

Franco-German Acceptance of Dawes Plan, April-August 1924.

Bidding moves

Franco-Belgian declaration of 12 March 1923 - Text, pp. 18-19.

German statements of Reparations obligations, 2 May and 7 June 1923-Text. pp. 24-5.

Franco-Belgian statement on cessation of "passive resistance" as condition of
negotiations , 6 June 1923 - Text, p. 25.

Stresemann's attempts to gain concessions in return for abandonment of "passive
resistance" August-September 1923 - Text, pp. 30-34.

Decision by Reparations Commission to constitute Committees of Experts, 30 Nov-
ember 1923.

Communication moves (minor) - sample items

German actions on diplomatic relations with the French and Belgians - Text p. 16.

German refusal to permit inspection of armed forces, Jan.-Dec. 1923 - Text p. 17.

German Chancellor's statement declining offers on negotiations, 6 March 1923
Text p. 17.

German statements on internal consequences of abandonment of passive resistance

German statements on resolve

I have tried to analyze the crisis in such a way as to focus on the negotiation-bargaining process and highlight the applicability of the various theoretical concepts and techniques identified and discussed in the Project Working Papers. Space and time considerations preclude further and repetitive exhaustive analysis of each move. I propose rather to discuss the relevance of each of the itemized models to all or part of the crisis.

A. Utility models

1.-4. Bargaining range

As indicated in the text (p. 9), a bargaining range on reparations existed, ranging in terms of total payments from 30 to 50 billion gold marks and in terms of annual payments from one to three billion. The Dawes Plan, which "solved" the crisis, fell within this range and constituted a fairly obvious "salient" outcome mildly favoring the Germans in the short run (one-billion gold marks) and favoring the French in the more problematic long run ($2\frac{1}{2}$ billion). When reparations payments ceased altogether in 1931, the Germans had paid 23 billion of largely American and British money, an outcome very favorable to the Germans, despite France's pyrrhic victory. In the terms just defined, the range was zero-sum.

The German demand for a moratorium, however, threatened to remove the reparations issue to a plane on which France was threatened with no gains whatever. Conversely, though the concept of guarantees as first put forth by the French delegate to the Reparations Commission had important implications in favour of Germany as well as France (an example of a search for mutually beneficial moves), that concept as put forth by Poincare was wholly detrimental to Germany, and consequently rejected by the Cuno government. In this pre-crisis period I can discern no attempt to change opponent's utilities, re-estimate one's own, clarify relative preferences or search for possible mutually acceptable outcomes, save in the last instance, by third parties.

From the outbreak of the crisis on 10 January 1923 until the decision of the Reparations Commission to constitute Expert Committees on 30 November of that year it is difficult to discern a bargaining range; primarily because the only bargaining the French were interested in was of a coercive character. Until June 6 the Germans might have expelled the French military presence from the Ruhr by concessions on "guarantees" and reparations, though it is highly unlikely that the internal political constitution of Germany made such bargaining feasible (see text, pp. 28-29). Even this highly tenuous possible bargaining range was indisputably removed by the Franco-Belgium insistence on "surrender" through the abandonment of passive resistance. France was not concerned with any estimate of Germany's utilities or any attempt to change them; over time, however, as the early-expected German crumbling failed to materialize, "victory", rather than FIGHT guarantees, reparations, or even security, became the highest French utility (see text, p. 25, N. 2). Conversely, as Stresemann discovered and as Cuno probably would have discovered had his proposed July initiative been made (text, p. 30), the proposed abandonment of passive resistance proved no bargaining counter.

Once, however, following on the abandonment of passive resistance, the French had been maneuvered back on the reparations track, meaningful bargaining could and did take place, but around the concept of "trade-offs" rather than range. These salient trade-offs were "Ruhr" versus "reparations and guarantees." Each of these concepts could be differently interpreted, or could be seen as having maximum and minimum ranges. The French could use their economic control of the Ruhr to prolong their military occupation; the extent of reparations and guarantees were negotiated with and by the Dawes Committee, that is to say to a considerable extent by third-party intervention. The final outcome, the French withdrawal from the Ruhr, was mutually and even systemically beneficial. The search for mutually beneficial moves was made by third parties.

5. Maximizers and disaster-avoiders

France is a maximizer, but when confronted with external and internal troubles, if not disaster, became a trouble-avoider. This may well have had something to do with the vagueness and indeed indecisiveness of the initial positive aspiration. Germany is seeking to preserve her freedom of action, and to minimize commitments. France practices coercion; third parties crisis management.

B. "Chicken-critical risk model

The Ruhr crisis is no prisoners' dilemma. There was no compulsion on France to occupy the Ruhr, none on Germany to "go for broke" in applying for a moratorium with no mention of guarantees or partial reparations. The French played chicken, misperceiving both the extent of Germany's determination to resist and the kinds of resistance still available to a disarmed state. The Germans, on the other hand, overestimated the degree to which third parties could and would attempt to inhibit the French.

If I follow Snyder's analysis in Working Paper No. 1 correctly, the parties in the Ruhr crisis are concerned less with influencing critical risks than they are with increasing and manipulating costs. Of course the threat of a French invasion of all Germany was always in the background, but neither the fear nor the threat played a major role. The Germans attempted to create the specter of a French military "surrender" in the face of guerrilla warfare, but did not succeed. Germany essentially gave way because she no longer had means to resist, in the presence of the reality - not the threat - of coercion.

Probability estimates are rare, attempted manipulations of opponent (and third parties') estimates, perceptions and utilities legion. Examples are given in text. There was some attempted manipulation of the shared risks of "bolshevism" and financial collapse; interestingly enough; these became (moderately) effective only after the actual collapse of Germany was plain to see. Germany's favorite tactic was that of stated lack of control - the government would be swept away if it did not resist, if it abandoned resistance without a quid pro

quo, etc. The Germans coupled the resumption of negotiations to evacuation of the Ruhr in early stages of the crisis, then decoupled evacuation as a condition. The French thereafter coupled the abandonment of resistance to resumption of negotiations; this stayed coupled. Stresemann vainly dangled the carrot of extensive French sharing in the assets of German industries while attempting to avert the simple collapse of passive resistance.

French threats in 1922 and the actual occupation in 1923 aroused, even created, resistance and stiffened resolve. Compliance came when the resisters' powers of resistance were mostly, and plainly, eroded.

The French interpreted Germany's commitments to Russia at Rapallo as defiance, and were the more determined to coerce Germany. The German conciliatory move in her note of June 7 to the Powers, however, seems to have been interpreted as evasion or (less likely) weakness, and was exploited by the French with equal fervour.

The lack of or cutting off of loopholes was a characteristic feature of the crisis - the most dramatic example being the Franco-Belgian demand of June 6 for the public ending of "passive resistance."

C. Expanded game model

Escalation and de-escalation were important and even crucial at two sectors of the crisis. From January 1923 on the French escalated the area and degree of coercion in an attempt to break down the German resistance (thereby increasing both their own costs and utilities); from December 1923, conversely, under third-party pressure, the French de-escalated. In both cases the process was effective in its aim. I am unable to identify choices among more than two degrees of toughness. There are many warnings, coupled with appeals and misinterpretations, of Germany's abandonment of passive resistance; more ambiguous indications of France's shift to conciliation, a shift in which Anglo-American in-

ducements play an important part.

The major salient threshold both limiting and focusing escalation - de-escalating processes was a geographical limitation - the Ruhr and Rhineland areas. On at least two occasions the French made minor incursions beyond these, to signal the possibility of major escalation to a "new game." None actually occurred, however.

D. Super-game model

Highly relevant. The supergame structure and the role of France within it have been identified and analyzed in the text, pp. 1-4 and section I of these notes. As a result of the 1914-19 crisis and settlement France emerged as a dominant yet insecure and vulnerable member of the international system. Germany's continued weakness and isolation were perceived as essential to the continuance of such predominance, and the Rapallo treaty was a supergame move which threatened this French position. The occupation of the Ruhr was aimed at maintaining and consolidating France's supergame position. France's cost estimates centered initially, though far from exclusively, on the opponent's power position but alliance considerations eventually (September 1923 and after) became crucial, though only because of decision-making factors. Germany's aims were in many ways the "other side of the coin," though the basic aims, that of freedom of action and recovery, related to autonomous rather than systemic considerations. Future relative strategic positions, as regards both capabilities and resolve, were highly important factors in strategic decisions; in the basic "resolving" decisions, however - abandonment of passive resistance and French acceptance of the expert inquiry - less so than external constraint and internal political factors respectively.

The Ruhr occupation is clearly one of the long series of Franco-German crises reaching at least from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the French defeat of 1940. The power positions at the outbreak of the crisis were clearly

the result of the 1914-18 war; France, however, failed in the attempt to maintain that position.

E. Decision-making model

I use the term in preference to information-processing because (1) decision-making has been explicitly added to the project's frame of reference; (2) the checklist items do not seem particularly pertinent to the available material on the Ruhr crisis; and (3) internal political (rather than administrative) processes are of major importance in a number of major national moves.

The French decision-making structure and political environment have been analyzed in some detail in the text. The Poincaré government's declaratory policy throughout the year 1922 created a climate of "expectancy" in French political circles such that when the British finally clearly broke with the French on reparations policy in the first days of January 1923 some kind of "dramatic move" could only have been avoided by a decisive act of will. The German response was (therefore?) downgraded.

Once having launched itself into the unknown, the French government was constrained by reasons of prestige to keep up the pressure, though the reason for the French insistence (on June 6) on German abandonment of passive resistance is not documented. I conjecture, however, that it fits into the demand for "victory", a demand with in large part internal imperatives. Once that particular "victory" had been attained, the French prime minister perceived his interests primarily in internal political terms, and therefore allowed one type of political calculation to dominate further decisions on the Ruhr. It is altogether likely that this "perception set" so focused attention on the financial aspects of the proposed expert committees as to divert realization of their more basic external political meaning. With the rise in influence of the Radical Socialists and the "drama" of the "battle of the franc" in late 1923 and the spring of 1924, perceptions of Germany became increasingly less significant.

With respect to Germany, two points seem particularly relevant. The Cuno government (November 1922-August 1923) was more dependent on, and in part in personnel drawn from the Right, including the anti-republican German National People's Party, than any of its Weimar predecessors. The Right perceived the French as obdurate oppressors, with whom no negotiation was possible, honorable. Of course this stance was more tenable out of responsibility than in. I have indicated (text, p. 29) the "sabotage" by the Right of one proposed German initiative. Stresemann, however, as leader of a "Great Coalition" government, and an optimist by nature, tended to believe that give-and-take negotiations were possible, and in any event tried to pursue them. His estimates of French goals varied.

F. Cataclysmic model

Not relevant to crisis as a whole; of minor relevance to later stages (end 1923) of crisis.

The element of "catastrophe" most present to statesmen's minds was not war but "chaos" leading to "Bolshevism," military dictatorship, or right-wing radicalism. The Fascist take-over in Italy in October 1922 had been the major European "event" prior to the outbreak of the crisis. From the French point of view, the menace was not so much "chaos" in Germany as in its spread throughout Europe or its possible external implications. It is interesting to note that the French ambassador in Berlin expressed alarm to Stresemann about the Nazi attempted putsch in Munich on 7 November 1923 stressing the desirability of a democratic German government; the Germans seized on this admission and thereafter repeatedly stressed in conversations with the French the latter's responsibility for the growth of anti-constitutional movements. The specter of German chaos, however, had varying and contradictory effects on the French, and it would be difficult to estimate its precise bearing. That it did have a bearing, however, is clear.

The French were suspected of "manipulation of risk" by encouragement of German communism in Rhine and Ruhr; the Germans did create risk through encouragement and often direction of "guerilla warfare" in the same areas.

The Germans made a number of statements to the French, directly or indirectly, throughout the crisis, underlining the danger that "order" in Germany would "inevitably" be "swamped" as a result of French coercion. That this was a deliberate attempt at influencing perception is clear; but events showed that the danger was real, though overcome.

G. Miscellaneous

1. Observation of norms - The parties preserved diplomatic relations and did not declare a state of war. The French refrained from major invasion beyond the Ruhr and justified their measures of coercion in terms of the need to keep order and compel compliance with the Treaty of Versailles. The Germans kept their reprisal and "active" resistance measures covert. It is altogether likely, however, that these limitations were observed for prudential rather than ethical or moral reasons.

2. I have noted no obvious instances of irrationality, feigned or real.

3. Shift in bargaining behavior - I have already noted that open willingness to bargain on both sides did not occur until German concession of "defeat" and French submission to third-party pressure. The realization of the impending spontaneous collapse of resistance in the Ruhr spurred offers on Germany's part. Direct threats by the French, however, in the form of "acts of harassment" or otherwise, seem to have inhibited other than automatic responses of resistance.

4. Symbolic and harassing acts (the distinction is sometimes fine)

Symbolic acts - German withdrawal of ambassadors to Paris and Brussels (and their return).

Refusal to permit French and Belgian officers on visits of inspection to verify disarmament measures (and their resumption)

French minor military incursions beyond Rhine and Ruhr.
German lifting of isolation of French diplomatic representatives.

Acts of harassment - French prohibition of trade between Germany and Occupied Territories.

German denunciations of Poincare in early 1924 (when vulnerability to pressure demonstrated).

German imposition of official and social isolation on French Embassy staff.

French expulsion of German officials and hostile nationals from Occupied Territories.

German sabotage in Occupied Territories.

Seen from one angle, the entire French occupation and German resistance thereto are acts of harassment. On the whole, however, it seems more illuminating to regard the former as a measure of coercion with many harassing increments. If this be accepted, symbolic acts and those of harassment are frequent but of minor effect on major moves and decisions.

5. Involvement of the Powers - See Text passim, but esp. pp. 18-21, 23-27, 39-43, 44-46, 59-60, and Part I, "Systemic Environment", of these notes.

The organ of the "international community," the League of Nations, played no role. The European members of the Concert, Great Britain and Italy, together with Belgium and a major non-European power, the United States, sought, with various degrees of involvement and pressure, to play a mediating role between the parties, which, under the circumstances, meant a role in support of Germany. This involvement was substantially limited, however, by (a) the common "Concert" agreement that Germany should continue to meet the financial obligations and conserve some of the lowered status of defeat and by (b) French military preponderance. Belgium and Italy were actually associated with France in the Ruhr enterprise,

and for the most part kept their efforts secret from France itself, thus gravely reducing their effect. As I have repeatedly indicated, only French internal factors made Anglo-American pressures effective.

Once the French embarked on their occupation, they attempted to avert "international community" involvement, and thwarted League action and debate. The German "bidding moves" of 2 May and 7 June 1923 looking toward a reparations settlement were elicited by concert pressure (directly by England, indirectly by Belgium and Italy) and offered in the hope, for which there was a basis in the form of oral assurances from these powers, that the Concert would exert the pressure necessary for French acceptance. The pressure was exerted not at all by Belgium and Italy, however, while that of England was limited to oral disapproval and vague and empty threats ("separate action"), withdrawn shortly after being made. The French seized the occasion to insist upon, with Belgian agreement, the abandonment of passive resistance prior to negotiations leading to a settlement. Thus international involvement in support of Germany led to a deterioration of the latter's position.

Germany thereafter delayed "surrender" in hopes specifically of British support, but gave in after the Baldwin-Poincare meeting of 19 September signalled the end of British disagreement with France.

Germany's request of 24 October 1923 to the Reparations Commission to examine German economic resources was an appeal to the international community, and France's positive answer, after many delays, to this request though the decision to constitute an expert committee was a concession to international community pressure. The real bargaining that went on thereafter with and concerning the Dawes Committee, negotiations that effectually resolved the crisis, took place with active and continuous involvement and participation of the Powers. I doubt that resolution, or even negotiations, would have been achieved without this participation, given the secular adversary-oriented perceptions of tradi-

tional French and German leadership.

Outcome and aftermath

On the type of settlement (informal), the payoffs to each party (France-Reparations settlement, Anglo-American loans, eventually justified - at Locarno - hopes for security protection; Germany - return of Ruhr, loosening of military and other constraints, payment of reparations covered by Anglo-American capital), and the trade-off bargaining methods by which settlement was reached, I trust I have identified and analyzed the essentials in the text, pp. 52-53 and 61-67.

So far as formal relations between the French and German governments are concerned, the effect of the London agreements of 16 August 1924 were almost wholly beneficial. The resolution of the crisis paved the way not only for settlement of the reparations and military occupation issues, but also constituted a probable necessary foundation for the subsequent negotiation of the Treaties of Locarno, which provided for settlement of the security issue on a basis essentially acceptable to both France and Germany, if not to the former's central and eastern European allies and proteges. Reciprocal perceptions of resolve were heightened: the Germans had had to bear French pressure until German surrender; French expectations of a military promenade were proved false.

The strain on the Anglo-French "Entente" was largely repaired by the conciliatory efforts of the new 1924 leaders, MacDonald and Herriot, of both countries, and the Locarno treaties made British obligations to France specific while subsuming them in the form of a collective security and mutual guarantee treaty structure (in these respects Locarno was a model for NATO). Even Russia was "forgiven" by Germany for the Comintern's attempt at German and European revolution; Germany's entry into the Western European Concert at Locarno was balanced the next year by a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union under terms that boded ill for Poland.

After the strains within the postwar international system and the shaking-up of the Ruhr crisis, the effect of the settlement was one of increased stability. One major member (Germany) had been preserved, another (France) contained. With the failure of international communism in 1923, following the first success of 1917 and the failures of 1919 and 1921, the homogeneity of the system with the exception of Russia was preserved. The rise to power in Russia the following year of Stalin and his program of "socialism in one country" coincided with a European-wide movement toward formal recognition of, if little increased transactions with, the Soviet regime. Thus the over-all settlement of the crisis confirmed multi-polarity and equilibrium, regulated stable relationships between the members, and lessened strain between the ideologically "odd member out" and others.

In a longer time-span, however, the effects of the crisis itself, if not the settlement thereof, were less happy. As a result of what appeared to the Germans as a gratuitous attack, the French image in Germany was comparable to the Belgian (and European) image of Germany in 1914 - a wanton aggressor. The Ruhr invasion made the Nazi movement a national one, revived German chauvinism, and created many martyrs and historical myths. It thus contributed to the Nazi takeover ten years later, and to the continued German national support of that movement. On the other hand, the failure, costs, and international opprobrium surrounding the Ruhr occupation powerfully inhibited any similar French action in the future. The next major overt challenge to the international system after 1923 came thirteen years later with the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936. The French then showed no determination once again to occupy German territory and through coercion compel German observation of the provisions of the Versailles treaty. Moreover, the failure of the League to act either in the Ruhr crisis or the associated Italian bombardment and attempted occupation of Corfu (settled by the Conference of Ambassadors) further lessened whatever

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tendencies there may have been to rely on or make use of that international institution. Furthermore, the image of French "aggressiveness" was enhanced, with important effects on subsequent lack of support for moves in resistance to the Nazi juggernaut.

Conclusion

A. Explanation of the outcome

I do not have anything to say here which would not be repetitious.

B. Report on checklist and hypotheses

Checklist - no further comment

Hypotheses (Working Paper No. 3)

(a) Relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

1. No comment
2. France was little affected by consideration of alliance cohesion in the early stages of the crisis. She did, indeed, acquire flexibility in choice of tactics through her defiance of Britain.
3. No comment
4. Confirmed
5. Doubtful
6. Confirmed
7. No comment
8. No comment
9. Disconfirmed
10. No comment
11. Not a very frequent tactic
12. No comment.

(b) On coercive tactics

1. Confirmed

2. No comment
3. No comment
4. Confirmed - Initial French movement into Ruhr given low-key rationale with military element played down, but this was with the purpose of avoiding German resistance.
5. No comment
6. No comment
7. Confirmed
8. Clearly confirmed, witness French process of deeper involvement
9. Doubtful
10. No comment
11. No comment
12. Clearly confirmed

(c) Relating tactics to responses

1. No comment
2. Mildly confirmed by German reactions to French moves in early stages of crisis
3. No comment
4. No comment
5. Confirmed
6. Confirmed
7. Confirmed with respect to compelling threats

(d) Relating environment, setting, and tactics to outcomes

1. Confirmed
2. Clearly disconfirmed
3. Confirmed, but decision-making factors have more effect than either
4. Crisis was eventually terminated by formal settlement
5. No comment

(e) About connections between alliance relationships and adversary bargaining

1. Disconfirmed. French bargaining power increased vis-a-vis Great Britain following on the occupation
2. No target ally
3. French demands were probably lessened to keep in step with Belgium
4. No comment
5. Mildly disconfirmed
6. No comment
7. No comment
8. No comment
9. Disconfirmed - pressure for cohesion
10. No comment
11. Disconfirmed - Belgium more cautious than France
12. No comment
13. No comment
14. I doubt it.

(f) About perceptions and images

1. No comment
2. Definitely confirmed - French and German images of implacable opponent
3. No comment
4. Mildly confirmed
5. No comment
6. No comment
7. No comment
8. Confirmed
9. Disconfirmed
10. No comment

11. No comment

(g) Relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics

1. Confirmed
2. Confirmed
3. No comment
4. No comment
5. No comment
6. Confirmed
7. Confirmed
8. Mildly confirmed

(h) Relating outcomes to aftermath

1. No comment
2. No comment
3. No comment
4. No comment
5. See IV above, outcome and aftermath
6. Confirmed - "Strong Man Knows When to Yield"; Ruhr struggle a victory if homeland preserved
7. No comment

(i) About bidding moves

1. No comment
2. No comment
3. No comment
4. Confirmed - Ruhr reactions to German proposed concessions in September 1923 and after
5. No comment
6. No comment