

The 1914 Crisis

Dennis Yena

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
THE BARGAINING PROCESS

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The Bargaining Issues

We are using Ikle's bargaining model to set forth in diagram fashion the basic issues involved in the crisis bargaining of 1914. This might serve as an outline for the move-by-move analysis segment of the report in which we attempt to describe how the bargainers attempted to realize their values and goals.

The first bargaining problem, or confrontation, involves the redress of Austrian-Hungarian grievances after the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, an assassination involving the status of Serbian nationalists living in the Austrian empire. The opposing values might be diagrammed as follows: Austrian-Serbian bargaining Range




The bargaining issue, as seen in a utility model, involves the question of the Austrian demands which were thought by Serbia to violate the Serbian government's power to determine its domestic affairs without intervention from interested outside powers. The details of the Austrian ultimatum and the details of the Serbian reply are not significant. The only difference between Austria and Serbia involved the introduction of Austrian officials on the Serbian judicial and investigation institutions. The difference does not on the surface appear to be unresolvable. But in truth, the Austrians were practicing diplomatic deception; their bargaining demands were false demands.

The Austrians had little intention of peacefully resolving the different preferences of Serbia and Austria. The Austrians engaged in bargaining with the Serbians in order to establish a pretext for an invasion of Serbian territory.

Bargaining did take place between Austria and Serbia. Austria sent a set of demands to Serbia and Serbia replied to the Austrian demands. But the bargaining that took place between Austria and Serbia was without consequence or importance. The reason this was so is that the Austrians intended a military solution of their differences with Serbia, the real differences not having been included in the ultimatum.

Our next diagram setting out the different preferences of the national powers involved in the crisis bargaining of 1914 concerns Austria and Russia. A bargaining diagram might look somewhat like this:

AUSTRIAN-RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES OVER THE STATUS OF SERBIA



The differences between Austria and Russia are quite large. If the bargaining is to start from these initial positions, then the bargaining situation appears to be a difficult one. It appears from this utility range diagram or simplification that the bargaining involved the attempt

by Austria to deter Russia from intervening in the Austrian dispute and in the planned invasion of Serbia, and also involved the attempt of Russia to deter Austria from using force to dominate Serbian international and domestic politics. But this is quite an over-simplification and distortion of what the facts of the case are. In reality, the Austrian bargaining with Russia was peripheral to the course of the crisis bargaining. Once again, the Austrians had no real intention to achieve a peaceful solution of their problems with Serbia, and therefore had no intention to compromise with Russia over a military intervention in Serbian politics. The Austrians were concerned during the crisis with preparing for an invasion of Serbia and with preparing a diplomatic excuse for this invasion. The Austrians did not concern themselves seriously with bargaining, either with the Serbians or with the Russians.

The significant and authentic bargaining of the 1914 crisis was concerned with the problem of a continental war occurring as the outcome of an Austrian mistreatment of Serbia. Germany, bargaining for the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria, and supposedly for Italy and the Triple Alliance as well, demanded the non-intervention of Russia, the ally of Serbia, in the Serbian-Austrian dispute. The German demand on Russia, the German attempt to deter Russia from aiding Serbia in the event of an Austrian invasion of Serbia, moved Russia to involve its two allies, France and Britain. France was willing to involve herself in a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and Germany-Austria; Britain was not initially willing to support Russia in this particular diplomatic dispute.

A diagram of the central or essential bargaining issue of the crisis adversary bargaining of 1914 might look like this:

Issue: Russian and Triple Entente Intervention in the Event of an Austrian Invasion of Serbia



A fourth bargaining issue concerned the intervention or non-intervention of Britain in a war of Germany against France. Germany sought to persuade, not coerce, England into a commitment to neutrality in the event of a German war against France. The English diplomats intended to stay aloof from the commitment struggle over the consequences of the Austrian-Russian confrontation. The British bargained so as to keep their options for war/peace open until the last possible moment.

In the next 50 pages, we shall examine how these bargaining issues were resolved.

I hesitate to divide the crisis bargaining into basic and communication moves because Working Paper No. 2 has left me quite confused concerning the distinction. But only the basic moves are to be analyzed in depth; therefore, it is necessary to use the categorization scheme, no matter how imperfectly I understand the scheme.

The following are what I consider to be the basic moves of the 1914 crisis:

- 1) Austria's ultimatum to Serbia
- 2) Austria's declaration of war on Serbia
- 3) Russia's partial mobilization
- 4) England's warning to Germany
- 5) Russia's general mobilization
- 6) Germany's ultimatums to Russia and France
- 7) Russia's decision to resist Germany's threat
- 8) Germany's declaration of war on Russia and France
- 9) Britain's declaration of war on Germany

Obviously, this choice leaves a good deal open to argument. Following this choice, a great deal of the bargaining will be left out. But we must be selective, or else we would have to write a book about the strategic moves of the crisis. I myself would not be satisfied with this group of moves as the significant moves of the crisis; this selection stresses adversary and belligerent moves, not ally and conciliatory moves. But this is the kind of division the conceptual framework required, by its definition of terms. As it is, I have distorted

or stretched the definition of basic moves to include several verbal moves, while a strict adherence to the definition provided in the working paper would not allow of such an inclusion.

1) The Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, July 23, 1914.

The first official demand of one state upon another in the bargaining of the crisis of July, 1914, came with the Austrian ultimatum on July 23, 1914. The ultimatum had been ready on July 20 but had been held back until the French President and Prime Minister had left Russia. The message was intended to publicly place Serbia in the wrong, to make it appear that Serbia was not willing to bargain, to make it appear to all the interested European powers that Austria was to be forced to go beyond a political solution to gain a redress of grievances. The message was directed not at Serbia, but at the Russians, French, English, Italians.

The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne was not a solid grounds for going to war, especially since the circumstances of the murder were unclear. Austria, in using the ultimatum as a political tactic, wanted to have it seem as if she had been willing to attempt to negotiate aside the differences between herself and Serbia, of which the assassination was only one issue, but that she had been forced by the non-cooperative attitude of Serbia to resort to the use of force against Serbia.

The actual effects of the move were the opposite of the effects the Austrians had intended. The Serbians were not outraged, but calmly responded and conceded on almost all the demands, illustrating their intent to have anything but a violent resolution of the differences between Austria and Serbia. The drastic nature of the demands and the 48 hour time limit lost whatever sympathy Austria's attempt at a

peaceful solution was meant to have gained from the European powers. The note looked like what it was, namely, nothing else but an excuse for ending relations with Serbia and for resorting to war.

What was the influence of this move on Russia? Sazanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, had just finished a series of talks with the French leaders who had just left the capital city of Russia. He received word of the Austrian ultimatum on the 24th of July. "C'est la guerre europeene," was his reaction (see Schilling, How the War Began in 1914, p. 28+). The following is part of what the Russian Foreign Minister told the Austrian Ambassador after the ambassador delivered the ultimatum message to Sazanov:

I know what it is. You mean to make war on Serbia.... You are setting fire to Europe. It is a great responsibility that you are assuming, you will see the impression that it will make here and in London and Paris and perhaps elsewhere. It will be regarded as an unjustifiable aggression.... Why was Serbia given no chance to speak and why the form of an ultimatum?...The monarchic idea has got nothing to do with it.... The fact is you mean war and you have burnt your bridges.... One sees how peace loving you are, seeing that you set fire to Europe. (Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, p. 291)

The reaction of the Russian leadership to this Austrian move was great hostility, as is evident in Sazanov's remarks to the ambassador of Austria. The nature of the demands made on Serbia, the short time limit granted for unconditional acceptance, the presentation of the note at the time the French leaders were leaving Russia and thus would not be in France for several days, indicated to Sazanov that Austria intended to go to extremes and attack Serbia without thought for the reactions of Russia as Serbia's supporting ally. The Austrian tactic

moved Sazanov to respond with a decision for partial mobilization against Austria. As soon as the Austrian Ambassador had left his office, Sazanov conferred with the Russian Chief of Staff and directed the Chief of Staff to draw up a plan for mobilization against Austria. By putting only part of the Russian army on war footing, Sazanov reasoned that he could threaten Austria without provoking Germany. Sazanov's intention was to make Austria draw back from an attack upon Serbia, and to influence Germany to restrain her ally, Austria, and thus, to open up the possibility of successful diplomatic action. This move by Russia would up the risk of war and move the concerned parties to the brink. The tie-in of this type of tactic to the critical-risk and credibility model is obvious. Sazanov got the Council of Ministers on the 24th and the Tsar on the 25th to approve of the partial mobilization as a response to the Austrian ultimatum. The move was undertaken on the 28th of July, immediately after the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.

Perceptions and strategic calculations based on perceptions are what we are after here. Sazanov perceived from the ultimatum which Austria had delivered to Serbia that Austria intended to go to war against Serbia. His job was to deter Austria from resorting to violence against Serbia. His only hope was to convince Austria and Germany that Russia meant to resist an Austrian invasion of Serbia even at the cost of an alliance war. To put his army on a war footing, on a partial war footing, to mobilize his army to the extent that Russia could make war on Austria but not on Germany, was a clever move, at least in my estimation. Sazanov also made another wise move on the

24th of July. Sazanov sought to deter Germany and Austria by insuring the solidarity of the Triple Entente against a coercive move by the Triple Alliance against Serbia. At a meeting with the English and French Ambassadors to Russia on the 24th, Sazanov sought the solidarity of England with France and Russia. Sazanov told the English Ambassador that the demands which Austria had presented to Serbia were unacceptable and that Austria would never have acted as she had if she had not first consulted Germany. To the Ambassador's reply that England had no direct interests in Serbia and that public opinion in England would never sanction a war on behalf of Serbia, Sazanov responded that the Serbian question was but part of the general European question. Sazanov went on to say to the British Ambassador that he hoped that Britain at least would express strong disapproval of the Austrian ultimatum, and that in any case, if war did break out, the British would sooner or later be dragged into it. But Britain would render war less likely if she made common cause with France and Russia from the start.

We see that the Russians (and the French and the British) were well aware of the risk of war involved in the crisis, from the very beginning of the crisis. The Russians did not misperceive what the Austrians and the Germans intended to do in the crisis. Also, the Russians calculated very carefully their future course of action, settling very reasonably or intelligently upon a strategy of conflict for the crisis. This strategy of conflict involved both political and military measures or moves. The Russians were to reveal

immediately their willingness to go to the very brink of war in order to forestall a coercive move on the part of their adversary. Their task was a very difficult one; to deter an aggressive nation without entering or beginning a self-defeating escalation into a state of continental war. Ultimately, the Russians were unsuccessful. But their deterrence failure was not due to misperception of the opponent's intentions nor to an emotional, impulsive, irrational assessment of what strategy and tactics to choose. One part of the Russian failure was Sazanov's and the Chief of Staff's ignorance of the difficulties a nation in 1914 encountered when going on a war footing. The intricacies of the military milieu helped to defeat the sober and wise use the Russians made of their arms and influence.

On the 24th, the Germans put into effect their strategy of conflict for the Serbian crisis. Their strategy was to support and to encourage their ally, Austria, in a military solution to the problem of Serbia. Germany would seek to localize the conflict, i.e., the war of Austria and Serbia, by threatening intervention in an Austrian-Russian war or hostilities. The diplomatic strategy of the Germans was to be akin to the prior strategies and tactics of Bismarck. One must isolate the nation to be attacked from the support of other nations, and then spring a lightning war on the isolated nation. The interested nations would be faced with a fait accompli. German military strength and prowess would intimidate Russia while France and Britain would be unwilling and uninterested in supporting Russia in a crisis in which they had no interests worth the risk of a war with Germany.

The German attempt at localizing the conflict between Austria and Serbia, which we shall classify as a deterrence maneuver, failed. The German failure to deter Russia from intervening in the Austrian-Serbian conflict was not due to irrationality nor to an unwise choice of strategy and tactics. It was due to a miscalculation of the resolve of the Russian leaders to allow of a repetition of the Bosnian crisis. The Russian leaders were resolved not to be coerced in 1914 by Germany as they had been coerced in 1909 over the Bosnian issue. But more than an initial miscalculation of the coercive effects of a credible threat of war was involved in the German failure to deter Russia from resisting an Austrian invasion of Serbia. Misinformation prevented the German leaders from perceiving, realizing, until it was too late, the error in their calculations of Russian values, i.e., the lengths to which Russia would go to avoid a diplomatic defeat at the hands of the Triple Alliance. The German officials were poorly informed by the German Ambassador to Russia; the message and the media. The medium of the German Ambassador distorted the Russian messages informing Germany of the Russian intent to resist coercion. This distortion, this misinformation, the process of communication and its importance, can be illustrated in the German attempt to put its strategy into effect on the 24th of July.

*if was worse
 followed it left
 no room for
 reaction*

The German Ambassador had a very polite threat or warning to give to the Russian Foreign Minister. The Ambassador informed Sazanov that Germany approved and supported the action, the ultimatum, of its ally. Austria had to receive full acceptance of the demands made upon Serbia, for matters of security and of dignity. If Serbia refused to accept the

Austrian demands, then Germany felt that Austria was entitled to use strong measures, even military measures, against Serbia. In any case, the whole question was to be left to the Serbian and Austrian governments. Germany desired the localization of the conflict because any intervention by another power might in consequence of the various alliances bring incalculable consequences in its wake. These were the words of the German Ambassador in his conversation with the Russian Foreign Minister. The response of Sazanov was one of anger and firm resistance and extreme agitation. But was Sazanov's response accurately relayed to the German leaders by the German Ambassador? No. The Ambassador did report that Sazanov was extremely agitated and that he accused Austria of seeking a pretext for swallowing Serbia. The Ambassador also reported what Sazanov told him the Russian response would be to an Austrian invasion of Serbia, that Russia would go to war against Austria. But in his interpretation of Sazanov's remarks, the German Ambassador concluded that Russia would not take up arms except in the case that Austria were to want to make territorial acquisitions at Serbia's expense and that Sazanov's wish for a Europeanization of the question seemed to indicate that an immediate Russian intervention was not to be anticipated. But the Ambassador wrote in his private record of events that Sazanov had given him the impression that Sazanov had seriously considered the possibility of a breach with Austria and Germany and that he had resolved not to hang back from an armed conflict. Why the disparity? That is not our concern. Our purpose is to point out a key factor in the violent

conclusion to the bargaining of the crisis of 1914. The German officials were misinformed on this key occasion and others about the intentions of the Russian government. The German leaders were not accurately informed about the Russian responses to German strategy and tactics. Without accurate feedback on their decisions, the German officials were misled into believing that their policy of diplomatic coercion was succeeding, while in fact, all the time, their policy was failing to achieve its purpose.

The facts of a situation, the facts of diplomacy, are subjective creations. Sazanov did not intend nor attempt to deceive the Germans of his strategy for the conflict between Austria and Serbia; he told the truth. But what was registered in Berlin was a lie, a bluff. Because of what the German Ambassador concluded the home office wanted to hear? That Russia was bluffing in her threat to resist Austria even at the cost of a war with Germany?

Thus far, we have considered the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia (which began the bargaining part of the crisis), the Russian response to the ultimatum, and the German threat against a Russian intervention in the dispute between Austria and Serbia. In our coverage of the bargaining setting, we have mentioned the intentions of the participants. What we propose to do in this section on the bargaining process is to consider the interaction of intentions, the translation of intentions into specific strategies and tactics, and the interpretation or perception of intentions, strategies, and tactics. Without dividing the discussion or thought into classes and structures, we hope not to cover the tactics and moves without a constant sense of the larger strategic picture.

2) The Serbian Reply to the Demands of Austria

no.

The diplomatic situation after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was analagous to a game of chicken. Either Austria would stop coming or Russia would swerve aside; otherwise, a collision would result.

The Austrian note to Serbia had contained a 48 hour time limit for a reply. Serbia replied on the 25th of July. In between the ultimatum and the reply, 1) Austria had declared that she would be contented with nothing but the complete acceptance of the whole of her demands; 2) Austria had refused the Russian request for the prolongation of the ultimatum time-limit; 3) Russia had publicly stated that she could not be disinterested in the Serbian question; 4) the leaders of Britain, France and Russia had advised Serbia to be as conciliatory in her reply, definitely avoiding a negative reply.

The differences between the demands of the Austrian note and the Serbian reply are not significant enough to consider. What is important for us is the Austrian response to the Serbian note. No matter what the content of the Serbian note, the Austrian response was to be a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Serbia and a partial mobilization for an attack on Serbia. The serbian government decided upon mobilization and upon moving the government from the capital to the interior of the country.

The Austrian ultimatum had achieved its first purpose; Serbia had given a negative reply, and now Austria had an excuse for going to war against Serbia.

On the third day of the crisis, the bargaining positions of the participating powers had been established and communicated. Austria had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia and was committed to the policy of winning her demands by war. Germany had proclaimed her solidarity with Austria and had made it known that she would give Austria her full support, if necessary, even in war. Russia had declared that she could not disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia, and had let it be known that if necessary, she would intervene with military measures to protect Serbia. France had committed herself secretly or non-publicly to solidarity with Russia and had encouraged Russia to take the firmest of stands against the Triple Alliance coercive diplomacy. Britain had not committed herself to the Triple Entente, but had declared herself unwilling to participate in any role other than that of a mediator. Italy had not committed herself to the Triple Alliance position, but had let Austria and Germany know that she might be persuaded to support their policy if the territorial rewards were persuasive.

3) Moves for Mediation

The British and Russian attempt to move away from the dilemma of probable war involved mediation of the conflict between Serbia and Austria. The British proposed on the 26th of July that the

— powers not immediately interested in the conflict should mediate between Austria, Serbia, and Russia. The Russians proposed that a settlement might be arrived at by separate conversations between Russia and Austria.

The German and Austrian prescription for avoiding the dilemma of a continental war was to intimidate Russia into backing down. Neither nation had any intention of diplomatically solving the Serbian threat to Austrian security. Their plan was to refuse all mediation proposals.

The time covered by the negotiations was short, but in the space of three days, a large number of interviews took place and telegrams were exchanged between all the governments of Europe. The negotiations were complicated by the fact of so many participants and poor communications. The proposals for mediation followed one another so rapidly that the discussion of one had been begun before the last one was concluded. Both the British and Russian moves toward mediation of the conflict were fruitless; they were put into one form after another, but whatever form was used, they were all ineffective against the resistance of Germany and Austria.

Without a doubt, Austria had the diplomatic means for gaining an impressive diplomatic victory over Serbia and over Russia. Why did she refuse mediation? A letter from the Austrian Prime Minister written on July 21 explains why.

In our exposed position, with the unreliability and jealousy of our Italian ally, the hostility of Roumanian public opinion, the pressure of Slavophil advisers at the Court of the Tsar, the responsibility, as I am well aware, is no light one. But the responsibility of doing nothing, for letting things take their course till the waves engulf us, seems to me still more grave--if momentarily less arduous--than to offer resistance and accept its consequences. ... It was not our concern to humiliate Serbia but to bring about

Bully

a clear-cut situation in respect of her neighborly relations with the Monarchy and as a practical result to achieve--in case of acceptance, a thoroughgoing purge of Serbia with our co-operation or--in case of rejection, a settlement by force of arms, followed by the greatest possible weakening of Serbia. ... Tisza thinks of even a merely diplomatic success as a means of strengthening our position in the Balkans, and wants if possible to avoid the breach, whereas I, on grounds of the diplomatic success of 1909 and 1912 which had no effect in the long run and only made our relations with Serbia more difficult, am extremely sceptical of another peaceful triumph (see Albertini, vol. 2, p. 382-83).

This letter was written to the Austrian Ambassador to Italy. The Ambassador's reply is worth using to illustrate the kind of thinking that went on at the time in the various capitals, to reveal the cost-benefit thinking of the diplomatic leaders. The letter is quite typical of the strategic thinking of the crisis participants.

I shall regard it as a piece of real good fortune if war with Serbia does come about. Supposing a European conflagration does result, that will seem to me to prove that it was in the air and would have come sooner or later for one cause or another, and there is no doubt that for the Triple Alliance the present moment is more favourable than another later. So I sincerely congratulate you on your, as I well understand, difficult resolve, so full of responsibility. As is clear from what I have said above my approval is only of the eventuality of a real war with Serbia. In the opposite case, i. e. of Serbia's yielding at the eleventh hour, or worse, of our acceptance of mediation or similar negotiations, I am, as is logical, of the opposite opinion, and would regard this as nothing less than a catastrophe. On this point our views do not seem entirely to coincide. You seem to regard such an eventuality perhaps not as desirable, but as anyway a certain diplomatic success and to expect a 'thoroughgoing purge' in Serbia as the result of acceptance of our demands. My view is that Serbia's acceptance of our demands within the forty-eight hour time limit would have been a petty, purely diplomatic success for us, with all its exclusively harmful consequences and without the slightest real benefit. Serbia could have done us no worse service than to say: Yes to everything. (Albertini, vol. 2, p. 383).

Austria, then, thought that war, even a European war, was preferable to a diplomatic success that most probably would be fruitless. Austria rejected the mediation proposals of July 26-28 because her leaders calculated that a war against Serbia was necessary to safeguard Austrian security. The calculation of the costs and benefits of the Austrian policy were not precisely calculated. At the beginning of the crisis, the Austrian leader had said to the Austrian Council on Ministers that he was clear in his own mind that a war with Russia would be the most probable consequence of Austria's entering Serbia. But then he changed his mind after learning of the German belief that Russia was not prepared or willing to go to war. But through most of the crisis, it is clear that Berchtold could not make up his mind as to what the Russian response would be to an Austrian invasion of Serbia. He wanted to believe that the Germans were correct in their estimations of Russian intentions; he wanted to believe the repetition of Russian submission to Germany. But Berchtold remained uncertain; this uncertainty about whether the Austrian invasion of Serbia would bring on a continental war did not affect his choices of strategy and tactics. The possibility that Austria and Germany might lose an alliance war seems never to have been considered by Berchtold. He considered the possibility of an alliance war, but did he consider the chances of losing that war? Did he weigh such an outcome against the benefits of Austrian control of Serbia? I doubt it; his long-range calculations seem dominated by one theme; the alternative of inaction was dissolution and defeat.

What is certain is that the Austrian leaders never foresaw the realities of World War One; they thought only of a "potato war" or some kind of limited continental war. They manipulated the risks of a continental war to gain a military victory over Serbia, but they did not foresee the nature of that war. A continental war was perceived as less of a catastrophe than the continuance of the gradual Austrian decline in arms and influence.

On July 26th, Austria sent four telegrams to Italy, Germany, France, and Britain to explain that war was imminent. The telegrams to France and Britain asked the governments to understand that after exhausting the peaceful means of diplomacy, Austria had no choice but to appeal to the arbitrage of war. Thus Austria announced that she had begun to mobilize for a war against Serbia.

The effect of the Austrian move was to make Britain and Russia attempt all the more strenuously to get Austria to agree to mediation. The British move was to propose mediation by herself, Germany, France, and Italy. The British intended this mediation to prevent the Austrian-Serbian dispute from becoming an Austrian-Russian dispute and from becoming a world war on account of the alliances. The British desired the four powers to enter between Russia and Austria if they both mobilized, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross frontiers and to allow the four outsiders to arrange matters between them. The British recognized at this early point, contrary to the conventional wisdom of contemporary interpretations of the World War One crisis, that the key to the outcome of the crisis was the question

of German mobilization. If the British could get Germany involved in a mediation attempt, Germany might not have to react to a Russian mobilization with a German mobilization. In effect, what Grey, the British Foreign Minister, was attempting was a British rendition of a localization of the conflict. But the British version of the localization of the conflict was different from the German version; the British tried to localize the conflict around Austria, Serbia, and Russia. The Germans tried to localize the conflict to include only Serbia and Austria. The British, in their mediation moves, did not attempt to stop the Russian and Austrian mobilizations, but they did try to localize the conflict by preventing a German mobilization. Grey had been informed by the German Ambassador to England of the volatile character of a German mobilization, that such was tantamount to a declaration of war.

What was the effect of the British move to have the other members of the two alliances umpire the conflict between Russia and Austria? The Russians accepted the plan but thought it was a better idea to have negotiations between Austria and Russia alone. The Germans and the Austrians rejected the proposal on the grounds that they were seeking to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. The Germans communicated that it would be a national humiliation for Austria to have to have matters of security referred to a conference. Actually, the Germans calculated that such a conference or mediation by the 4 powers of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance would find Germany isolated by Italy, France, and England, as had happened in the past on Moroccan matters. The German reaction was to put

additional pressure on Austria to declare war on Serbia immediately. This would make mediation attempts look foolish, as the Austrians would present the Triple Entente powers with a fait accompli. A diplomatic solution would then be out of the question. Russia would either have to accept the situation or try to alter it by force, in which case, Germany would enter between Russia and Austria with a threat of war against Russia. It was a diplomatic maxim of the Germans, following Bismarck's experiences with the uses of warfare, that it was much more difficult for a state to contemplate the use of violence to free an already conquered nation or ally than it was for a state to contemplate the use of violence to defend a still independent nation.

What was the British expectation for their mediation moves? The British did not expect success; they expected that Germany would not participate in such a four power mediation. Neither did the British believe that Germany had intervened, or planned in the future to intervene, with Austria as the British had intervened with Russia. Undersecretary of State Nicolson wrote to Grey on the 26th that Germany was playing with Britain. Nicolson calculated that Germany would not play the same role in relation to Austria as Britain intended to play in relation to Russia. Germany would not cooperate with Britain in restraining these two long-time enemies as she had done in the two years previous. Yet England clung to a strategy that had worked in 1912-13, a meeting of the foreign ministers or ambassadors to London in London. The same personnel was still in London, but the strategic situation was so different. For complicated reasons, the British

government chose a strategy of conflict or a crisis strategy that they felt had very little chance of success. To understand the rationale for this choice of strategy, we should have to consider not international factors, but domestic, British political factors. The British strategic freedom of choice was limited not only by what the opponent did but also by the internal political situation. Those amateur historians in the political science discipline who do not admit or do not perceive the importance of this intra-national factor judge the British crisis diplomacy or bargaining to be quite inept. The primary reason the British would not commit themselves against the Triple Alliance in the 1914 crisis before the actual outbreak of violence was a domestic reason, not an international reason. Perhaps this sentence entails too strict a usage of international.

The effects on Germany and Austria of the Russian suggestions or moves to peacefully settle the conflict between Serbia and Austria are interesting. They were the opposite of what Russia intended. Germany and Austria mistook the calmness of the Russian government and its willingness to negotiate for lack of resolution and for weakness. Sazanov's interviews with the German and Austrian Ambassadors to Russia led them into believing that the Russian promise to defend Serbia if necessary by force of arms was a bluff, not a second preferred outcome which would be chosen over a third preferred outcome of peace paid for by a Russian diplomatic defeat far worse than the Bosnian defeat.

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In conversations with the German and Austrian Ambassadors on the 26th and 27th of July, Sazanov had appeared more conciliatory and very hopeful of an avoidance of war. To the Austrian Ambassador, he apologized for his loss of self-control in the conversation of the 24th. He appeared willing to make Serbia accept almost all of the Austrian demands as he objected not so much to the humiliation of Serbia but to the invasion of Serbia. Although Sazanov still maintained that the sovereignty of Serbia could not be infringed, the German ambassador gained the impression that Sazanov had probably received news from Paris and London which had not encouraged him to continue to use the aggressive tone he had used two days before.

On the 26th, Sazanov was also trying to win over the British to publicly announce their solidarity with France and Russia. But the British Ambassador informed Sazanov that his government did not believe that they would be promoting the cause of peace by telling Germany if she supported Austria by force of arms she would have Britain to deal with as well as France and Russia. The British Ambassador asked Russia not to do anything to precipitate a conflict and to defer the mobilization of troops as long as possible. Sazanov replied that mobilization would begin probably on the day on which the Austrian army entered Serbia. Thus, Sazanov was willing to give an important military advantage to Austria in exchange for keeping alive the possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict. He was also willing to give the Austrians a headstart in military operations because such a move would make a very favorable impression on his British allies.

On the 27th of July, the British made an important military move; the British fleet had been on practice maneuvers at full strength but on the 27th was supposed to disband and discharge portions of the crews which were reserves. The British decided to keep the navy mobilized. Grey intended the move to sober the Central Powers and to steady his allies. He told the German Ambassador that the move reflected the British anxiety about the possibility of a European conflagration.

What was the effect of this British move on Germany? The move did not have a marked effect on the German government. The German government still believed that the English government intended only mediation and that, in the event of a war between Germany-Austria and France-Russia, England would remain neutral. King George V had told Prince Henry of Prussia at a breakfast meeting that England would try to keep out of the struggle and to remain neutral. This information contradicted the German Ambassador to London's impressions of Grey's calculations. But the German Ambassador to London was not given full credibility by the German officials in Berlin. He was known for his devotion to the idea of English-German cooperation and for his opposition to the dual alliance of Austria and Germany. His dispatches informing Germany that England was beginning to see through the German deception were discounted. The German government continued to pressure the Austrians to declare war on Serbia even if the Austrian army would not be ready to attack until the 12th of August.

4. The Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia

The Austrian declaration of war on Serbia is a basic move. The Austrian move negated the mediation moves of the previous days. The purpose of the move is obvious, yet the timing is not so obvious. Why did the Austrians declare war on the 28th when their army would not be ready to begin an invasion until the 12th of August? The reason for the Austrian move was pressure from Germany. The German leadership wanted the crisis over with and quickly. The Germans were in a difficult diplomatic position, pretending to the Russians and British that they were restraining Austria, while in reality they were persuading Austria to act as quickly as possible. Why did the Germans pressure the Austrians to declare war even if they could not wage war? Because the Germans were uncertain about Berchtold's fortitude or resolve. German prestige and security were on the line now as well as the prestige and security of Austria. Germany did not want Russia to mobilize because a mobilization meant a continental war. Germany wanted Russia to fall far behind Austria in mobilization measures; a head-start for Austria would make a Russian decision for war much more difficult, as they would be at a distinct disadvantage on the Austrian frontier. In any case, the Germans wanted to make sure that the Austrians, when faced with the certainty of Russian intervention, would not back down. Berchtold's telegrams to Germany up to the day of the declaration of war still alluded to the fact that an Austrian war against Serbia was not that certain a necessity.

Only the German telegram asking for an immediate declaration of war and the opening of hostilities (to foreclose mediation attempts and to put further pressure on Russia before she could mobilize) brought Berchtold to the point of taking the plunge.

To repeat, the purpose of the premature declaration of war on Serbia was to pre-empt diplomatic pressures from the Triple Entente nations, who were attempting to coerce Austria and Germany from choosing a military solution to the Austrian decline in power and influence. What was the effect of the Austrian move? Disasterous. The Austrian declaration of war led directly to a Russian mobilization and a blunt warning from Britain to Germany. This first declaration of war started the race for mobilization, which in its turn, led to the outbreak of war between the alliances.

5. Russian Mobilization

Before we enter into an analysis of the next basic move, a report on the implications of mobilization might prove of benefit in understanding the forthcoming mobilization moves, all of which are basic moves. One of the decisive factors in the crisis of July, 1914 was the absence of understanding of military matters on the part of several statesmen who had to make the decisions on war or peace, decisions which were closely connected with military problems, in particular, those of mobilization. It is an overstatement to say, as most of the historians who treat this variable say, that the statesmen of the crisis had no knowledge of what mobilization actually was, what demands it made on the country, what consequences it brought, to what risks it exposed the peace of Europe. The statesmen of the

period, save for Sazanov and Berchtold, knew what risks a mobilization entailed. Grey was not incorrect in thinking it safe for Russia and Austria to mobilize; he was correct in perceiving the German mobilization move as being the spark that would set off the European war. Sazanov had been informed of the nature of the German mobilization measures, that such measures meant war. The fatal mistake was that Sazanov did not know that a partial mobilization was not possible for Russia without its making a complete mobilization impossible. But the fault or responsibility lies with the Russian Chief of Staff who himself did not know of this relation between partial and complete Russian mobilization. When Sazanov asked about a partial mobilization after the receipt of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the Chief of Staff did not inform him of its impossibility, even after the Chief of Staff had found out that a plan for partial mobilization did not exist.

Germany had tried to inform Sazanov of the nature of German mobilization. On the 26th of July, Bethmann had sent a telegram to the German Ambassador in Russia, instructing him to say to Sazanov that

preparatory military measures on the part of Russia directed in any way against ourselves would force us to take counter measures which would have to consist in mobilizing the army. Mobilization, however, means war, and would moreover have to be directed simultaneously against Russia and France, since France's engagements with Russia are well known. (Quoted in Albertini, vol. 2, p. 481)

It has already been related that, when on July 24 Sazanov learned of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, he had the feeling that there was going to be a war and went to the length of asking the Tsar for permission to mobilize 13 army corps against Austria, should the need arise. By mobilization against Austria, Sazanov thought to put pressure on Austria and Germany by making them understand that, this time, in contrast to 1909, Russia was determined not to knuckle under to the Central Powers. On the morning of the 25th the Tsar approved, not only the proposal for partial mobilization (not, however, to be put into operation immediately), but also the immediate adoption of measures for the "period preparatory to war" which was a prelude to general mobilization. But on the 26th, Sazanov calmed down, having been assured by both Germany and Austria that Austria had no designs on Serbian sovereignty and integrity, but only meant to safeguard itself against the anti-Austrian agitation of the Serbian nationalists. At the suggestion of the German Ambassador, Sazanov had a talk on the 26th with the Austrian Ambassador in an endeavor by direct conversations to get toned down, at least in form, the Austrian terms that were incompatible with Serbian sovereign rights, and he had asked Berchtold to authorize the Austrian Ambassador to study and revise the ultimatum with him.

But the Austrian declaration of war changed the Russian attitude. Rather than deterring Russian resistance, the declaration increased Russian resolve. The Russian response was to think immediately of the inevitability of Russian participation in a war with Austria.

The Russian response consisted of several moves. First, Sazanov told the German Ambassador that he was sure that Germany had not tried to restrain Austria, and he pointed out to the Germans the great danger of the far-reaching military preparations already undertaken or just about to be undertaken. Second, Sazanov sent a message to England saying that the key to peace or war was now in the hands of Germany and England. England ought to try for mediation with a view to stopping the military operations against Serbia. Third, Sazanov dropped the idea of direct conversations with the Austrian Ambassador. Fourth, Sazanov and the Tsar decided to order partial mobilization and to announce such on July 29, the day after the Austrian war declaration. Fifth, Sazanov decided not to break off diplomatic relations with Austria. Sixth, he sent a note to Germany which said that Russia had no aggressive intentions against Germany, but in consequence of the Austrian declaration of war, Russia had no choice but to start mobilizing the army on borders facing Austria.

In the four days between the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, Russia had been groping for appropriate tactics to persuade Austria not to violate Serbian territory or sovereignty. Sazanov first had suggested that Serbia appeal to the Great Powers. Then he had suggested that England and Italy mediate the crisis. Third, he had requested direct negotiations with Austria, and fourth, he had suggested that England intervene with Germany for mediation efforts. This choice of tactics

had no effect upon the adversary. Sazanov gave up hope of assistance from Germany in settling the conflict; Russia now had to put pressure directly upon Austria. This the partial mobilization was meant to achieve. The partial mobilization had more than a diplomatic purpose however; the military purpose of the move was to prepare for a war with Austria if the need arose, i.e., the failure of the diplomatic efforts to deter Austria from invading Serbia. Russia could manipulate the risks of a violent outcome in this fashion because of the way in which she had already arranged her priorities. Russia had already made the decision that she could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans. Russia, secure in the support of France, had already decided that she was willing to face all the risks of war to deter Austria.

What were the effects of the Russian partial mobilization which was announced to the other nations on the 29th of July? Did it work to deter Austria and Germany from resisting Russian and French pressure to agree to a peaceful humiliation and chastisement of Serbia? No. The Russian mobilization caused Austria to mobilize against Russia as a necessary means of self-defense.

It is important to note that no influence was exercised by either France, Britain, or Germany to restrain Russia from partial mobilization. The French Ambassador had urged Sazanov to be unyielding; Grey had thought the move to be a natural one; Jagow,

the German Secretary of State, had communicated that it was permissible that Russia should mobilize against Austria. Jagow had told the French and Russian Ambassadors to Germany that the partial mobilization of Russia would not be a grounds for German mobilization.

This definitely seems to be a German tactical mistake. Bethmann and Jagow do not seem to have realized that if Russia mobilized against Austria, Austria would have to order general mobilization and this in turn, under the terms of the alliance and because of the assurances given to Austria in July, would call for a German mobilization, and consequently, war. There was still another point about the partial mobilization of Russia that was overlooked by the German diplomats. The Austrian Chief of Staff needed to be certain of Russia's intentions before going ahead with mobilization against Serbia. If Russia decided not to intervene, Austria would take the offensive against Serbia with 7 army corps, i.e., 412,000 men (Case B, war in the Balkans). But if Russia attacked Austria, then Austria would remain on the defensive on the Serbian front with 3 army corps (190,000 men) and send the remaining 4 corps to the Russian front with 9 other corps (Case R, war against Russia). All doubt on the point had to be cleared up by the fifth day of mobilization (August 1), when Austria had to decide whether the 4 army corps were to be sent against Serbia or against Russia.

If Germany and Austria erred in not attempting to influence Russia against a partial mobilization, what was their reaction to the mobilization announcement on the 29th? Bethmann, the German Chancellor, received word of the Russian partial mobilization after having returned from a meeting with the Kaiser and the military officials. The Kaiser had just returned to take a hand in the policy-making. He had not been kept well informed by the Chancellor while he had been absent. Upon reading the documents that had been accumulating, the Kaiser decided that there was no necessity for Austria to invade Serbia to gain a redress of her grievances. The Serbian reply to the Austrian demands left no grounds for a war. The Kaiser did not know that Berchtold had thought the same thing and had only declared war on account of German pressure. After the morning of the 28th of July, the chief German decision-makers began to work at cross-purposes with each other. The Kaiser wanted a peaceful solution to the crisis and began to look for a conciliatory formula. But he was unaware of what a gross turn-about of policy this constituted for his Chancellor and Secretary of State. The Chancellor could not accept the instructions of the Kaiser without ruining his entire crisis strategy (which had been to have Austria make an end of Serbia, annex a large part of the Serbian territory and thus put herself in a position to offer Italy considerable compensation).

The disunity and ambiguity of German policy after the 28th of July contributed to a great extent to the violent outcome of the Sarajevo crisis. If Bethmann had carried out the Kaiser's instructions of the 28th and sent the "halt in Belgrade" proposal immediately to Austria, it appears likely that the World War would not have started in August, 1914.

What was the "halt in Belgrade proposal" and what went into its genesis? The Kaiser proposed that Austria capture Belgrade, the capital city of Serbia right on the border of Austria, and hold Belgrade as hostage and guarantee for the Serbian fulfillment of the Austrian demands. More than the Kaiser's judgment that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum had removed the reasons or justification for an Austrian war on Serbia went into the decision to send this proposal to Austria. When the Kaiser had finished reading the collection of diplomatic documents up through the night of the 27th, he found that the situation was beginning to look very black for the Central Powers. The optimism of his Chancellor about the successful localization of the conflict seemed unwarranted. When the Kaiser had given a blank check of support to the Austrians on July 5th, he had thought that the neutral attitude of England would allow Austria to handle Serbia without causing a European war. But on the 28th, the news of England's crisis intentions was not reassuring. The German Ambassador had reported Grey as saying that Serbia had given satisfaction to Austrian demands so completely that,

if Austria was not satisfied with the Serbian reply, the most terrible war might break out that Europe had ever known. Added to the English change of position after the Serbian reply and the English warning that Austria should not attack Serbia, Italy had said that she was under no obligation to take part in a war of aggression and would not do so unless she was given promises of compensations which Austria was dragging her heels over. The "halt in Belgrade" plan was designed to rationalize the third mobilization of Austria against Serbia in the past 5 years and to allow Austria to vent her vengeance on Serbia in a way that might not prove provocative to Russia. Certainly, an occupation of Belgrade was not nearly so provocative as an invasion of all of Serbia.

Thus, the Kaiser's proposal would spare the Austrian national sentiment and the military honor of the Austrian army while avoiding a military confrontation with Russia. It must be remembered that the Kaiser did not yet know of the Russian mobilization. In any case, if Austria accepted this plan, the Kaiser planned to serve as a mediator for Austria with the other powers. Would this plan or bidding move have probably formed a basis for a peaceful solution with Russia? Probably it would have done so, for it appeared to be exactly what Russia wanted. It did not demand from Serbia unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands. And it appears doubtful if Sazanov would have waged or risked an alliance war for the sake of defending the capital city of Serbia from a temporary occupation.

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We must pay careful attention to what forces or influences moved the German Kaiser to change his mind. He had not been influenced to change his policy and make a new bidding move which was definitely conciliatory by anything that Russia had done; at least as far as this author can ascertain (it is a controversial proposition). What did influence the Kaiser was the English warning that she might not be able to remain neutral in case of a war between France and Germany. What also influenced the Kaiser to make a new bidding move was the lack of support from Italy due to the unwillingness of Austria to discuss her plans with Italy and to offer Italy an incentive for support. This Austrian silence on the point of working to obtain Italian cooperation particularly galled the German leadership who were positive that Italy would not support Austria and Germany in a war with France and Russia unless she were promised some territory by Austria. It appears that Sazanov's analysis of the diplomatic situation was correct on this point; nothing that Russia would do would deter Germany and Austria, but the only deterrence would be English support of Russia and France.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State were unwilling, after having urged Austria to declare war on Serbia, after telling her not to pay any attention to English proposals for mediation which were being sent from Germany to Austria to deceive England into believing Germany was cooperating with England for peace in the Balkans, to tell the Austrian leaders that their calculations had been

mistaken. How could the German leaders now say to Austria that they were obliged to withdraw their support for an Austrian war on Serbia? What did the Chancellor and the Secretary of State do with the Kaiser's proposal? They delayed sending the proposal to Austria until after Austria had declared war on Serbia. They did not attempt to persuade Austria to not declare war on Serbia. During the last 8 days of July, every hour was of importance. A delay of a few hours meant that proposals and the responses to them became outdated and useless. The two German statesmen delayed the sending of the Kaiser's proposal for a peaceful solution to Austria until the 29th of July, when it was meaningless.

What did the Chancellor intend to do in place of the Kaiser's plan? His aim was not to hold Austria back but to cast the blame on Russia if a general war resulted. He sent explanations, assurances, and soft words to England and Russia to neutralize the Austrian declaration of war and to save the principle of the localization of the conflict. He meant to uphold his policy even at the cost of a more or less probable European war. His primary task appeared to be to make Russia appear responsible for the war in order not to forfeit the chances of British neutrality and Italian support in a general war. It might be added that the German military officials reported that the Chancellor at the meeting with the Kaiser on the 28th in which the Kaiser had told the Chancellor of his "halt at Belgrade plan", had appeared near a state of emotional and physical collapse.

This digression into the perceptions and reactions and internal divisions of the German leadership was intended to serve as a context for an analysis of the German reaction to the Russian partial mobilization move. The digression illustrates something about our analysis, that is, the difficulty of defining what is basic and what is not, and the difficulty of tracing the effects of a move by one nation on the decision-makers of another nation. Germany, for example, in the period covered by the digression above, was simultaneously reacting to the nearly simultaneous moves of several nations, not just one. The record provided by the historians does not report all reactions to moves, nor does it differentiate the different effects or weights of simultaneous moves by adversaries and allies. We are left to our own intuition, which serves as a warning to the reader not to give complete credibility to this report or summarization of the events and causal inferences of the crisis of 1914. We would be lying if we did not say to the reader that we ourselves are appalled at the amount of personal choice or interpretation which this account contains. The controversial character of the evidence concerning the events of 1914 provides too much room for individual interpretation or intuition. These notes are added to forestall an emotion of bad faith on the part of the author. Thus, the reader stands warned that this interpretation of 1914 events might not be approved of by those in the historical profession. What has been left out of this summary may well be more significant than what has been put in.

Hopefully, we have related one move to another move without too much untruth. But the relations among these complicated events are complex.

Again, what were the effects of the Russian mobilization move upon Germany? One effect was to bring the military officials into the decision-making sphere in a more significant fashion. The German Chief of Staff, Moltke, had stayed out of the decision-making before the Russian partial mobilization. But after the Russian move to threaten the security of Austria in a way which would prevent her from committing troops to the invasion of Serbia, Moltke began to take a position on the crisis. Moltke drew up a memorandum entitled, "Towards an Estimate of the Political Situation," and sent it to the Chancellor on the 29th. The memorandum explained what Moltke reasoned should be the German response to the Russian mobilization. Moltke argued that Germany must mobilize if Russia mobilized against Austria. Russian partial mobilization rendered German mobilization necessary, rendered the casus foederis for Germany, because Russian partial mobilization against Austria would force the latter into general mobilization, from which war would necessarily result. This was exactly opposite to the statement the German government had given to the Russians and French concerning the casus foederis. The Germans had told the Russians that their partial mobilization would not affect German mobilization. Only Russian general mobilization or an attack on Austria would constitute a reason for German mobilization and war.

Therefore, one effect of the Russian partial mobilization was to commence a struggle between the military officials and the diplomatic or civilian officials of Germany. Moltke and Falkenhayn, the War Minister, were in conflict with Bethmann and Jagow after the Russian partial mobilization. The military officials held the opinion that the diplomatic officials had made too many mistakes and had failed to localize the Austrian invasion of Serbia. The Kaiser had informed the two top military officials on the 29th of his dissatisfaction with Bethmann, of his incompetence in his handling of the crisis. At the meeting of the Kaiser with Bethmann and the military officials on the 29th, Bethmann is reported to have collapsed completely. For these reasons, the military officials felt obligated to enter the decision-making process to insure that the military security interests of Germany were not forgotten or ignored or sacrificed to last minute desperation attempts at a diplomatic solution of the debacle. However, the military officials failed to persuade the Kaiser to announce the preliminary moves toward mobilization. The Kaiser decided to postpone the decision on mobilization until he had received an answer from Austria concerning his "halt at Belgrade proposal".

Bethmann persuaded the military officials not to press for the proclamation of the "state of imminent danger of war" which was the German word for mobilization preliminaries. Moltke agreed that Germany ought to try to wait until Russia gave the casus foederis, as Germany had first defined it, in order that Russia would bear the

war guilt. Otherwise, England might side with Russia and France. This proved to be more important than a day or two day's loss of lead+time of Germany over Russia. Thus, the German reaction to the Russian partial mobilization was determined by the German relation to England, the desire not to alienate English opinion from Germany's role in the crisis. It appears that at this stage, only the Kaiser held any hope of avoiding a war with Russia and France. Bethmann and the military officials were attempting not to avoid such a war but to maximize the chances of winning such a war. Obviously, the chances of Germany and Austria winning a war with France and Russia were much higher if England did not aid France. Preventing British participation was far more important than losing a slight advantage to Russia in mobilization schedules. Now this is quite contrary to most historical analyses of the German response to Russian partial mobilization which identify different determinants of the German decision.

Before we leave the German decision-makers, let us note that they no longer considered incredible the Russian threat to wage war against both Germany and Austria if such a move proved necessary to defend Serbia against an Austrian invasion. Their diplomatic representative at the court of the Tsar reported on the 29th that the Tsar's entourage had been convinced by the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia that Austria had been acting in bad faith and that a general war as a consequence was considered inevitable. The representative added that the Russians did not want war and regretted

no power had been able to hold Austria back.

The Austrian response to the Russian partial mobilization is very illustrative of Austrian conduct throughout the crisis. We would have no one believe that Austrian conduct in the crisis was independent; Austria did whatever Germany wanted Austria to do. This particularly holds true for the Austrian reaction to Russian mobilization. Austria, not Germany, was threatened by the mobilization. Yet, Berchtold informed Germany that he thought it desirable if the German and Austrian Ambassadors to Russia should receive instructions to state in a friendly spirit that the continuance of Russian mobilization would lead to counter-measures in Germany and Austria which would have serious consequences. In no case was Austria ready to act unilaterally; Berchtold received his cues from Germany. In this instance, Berchtold told the German Ambassador to Austria that the decision to mobilize altogether (Austria had already partially mobilized) would be taken as soon as Germany agreed to it. Thus, the Austrian response to the partial mobilization of Russia was to ask Germany to agree to Austrian and German mobilization.

6) The British Threat of Intervention and the German Bid for British Neutrality in a German-Austrian, Russian-French War

As soon as Bethmann had returned from the meeting with the Kaiser and the military officials, he had sent for the British Ambassador and on this night of the 29th made a bidding move.

What are the details of the German bid for British neutrality in the event of a continental war? Bethmann assured the British that the Germans, in return for a British promise to remain neutral, would not take any territory, except possibly colonial territory, from France if Germany won a European war. Bethmann also promised to respect the neutrality of Holland. He made the same promise concerning Belgium as he had made concerning France. But the promise not to take Belgium territory after the war was made contingent on Belgium's good behavior during the war. Bethmann had drawn up a draft to give to the Kaiser which also promised the naval agreement which England had tried so hard to get Germany to come to before the crisis. The Kaiser however would not agree to limiting his fleet in return for a British promise of neutrality. So Bethmann instead held out the prospect of a general neutrality treaty in the future, meaning after the war, if the war occurred.

From the vantage point of no pressure and omniscience and non-responsibility, this German bid appears to be a faulty tactical move. It reveals the disorganized mind of Bethmann on this date. His proposal to Britain revealed so plainly that he was not concerned with avoiding war as much as he was concerned with winning a war. The move also revealed his desperation to England. England before had never agreed to exchange her neutrality for a naval agreement. How much less motivated would she be to exchange her uncommitted ways for a German promise to take only colonial territory away from France in case of a German victory. All in all, a colossal mis-

calculation of British intentions and crisis strategy. Even at this critical point, the Germans could not decide either to accept the costs of agreeing to an agreement to regulate the pace of naval construction or to keep their hands off French colonies for attaining the benefits of British neutrality. The cost-benefit calculations of the Chancellor at this point in any case appear to be badly mistaken. Perhaps it was this quality of strategic thinker which explains why the Germans attempted to deceive England into thinking that Germany had been a force for moderation and peace in the crisis and that Russia was responsible for violence if it occurred, with the corollary of a neutral England and a German military victory on the continent and thereafter a free hand against the French and the Russians. It was much to ask.

The effect of the German move on the British was the opposite of what the Germans intended. The British decided to retain full liberty of action, that is, not to offer a commitment of neutrality in return for certain German promises not to rule the continent in a fashion too detrimental to the British interests. Grey considered the proposal infamous.

The next move is the English communication to the Germans that they would probably not remain neutral if a continental war occurred. On the afternoon of the 29th, Grey held a conversation with the German Ambassador to England. One could call the British communication move a coercive move or a threat or a warning. In the conversation,

Grey said that he did not want to say anything that sounded like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that if things became worse, Britain would intervene. Yet that is exactly what he was doing. But as vaguely, as non-forcefully, in as non-committal a fashion, as was possible. Grey also said that he was anxious to avoid charges from the German government, if war was general or continental, and Britain decided to intervene because the issues were no longer parochial but European, that the friendly tone of all the British conversations had misled the Germans into supposing that the British should not take action and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different. The record of the conversation is a very strange document, in fact, probably the strangest in the entire British Documents on the Origins of the War. Or at least the parts of the documents that we perused. Grey was issuing a warning and a threat and was putting pressure on Germany to put pressure on Austria. But his language was so vague.

What was the effect of the British threat of intervention, however vaguely worded, on the German choice of strategy and tactics? The message turned the Germans toward seeking a peaceful settlement in earnest. In the conversation Grey held with the German Ambassador, he had attempted to set conditions for one last mediation attempt. His proposal for mediation was one that was nearly identical to the Kaiser's "halt in Belgrade proposal". At the end of 6 days of negotiations (24-29 July), a formula of compromise had been found

that was acceptable to both Germany and England. Though knowing nothing of the Kaiser's proposal for an occupation of Belgrade as a basis of negotiations or mediation, Grey, on his own initiative had suggested something similar. On this coincidence of proposals from Germany and Britain, Bethmann, persuaded now that Germany might have to face Britain in the event of a continental war, sought to avoid an outbreak of that continental war that appeared so nearly inevitable. In reality, the situation was so complicated by the night of the 29th, that it must have been difficult to have chosen any tactic or move, even communicative. With everyone in all the capitals of Europe convinced of the almost complete inevitability of a general war and with everyone trying to be prepared for the eventuality, how could a start be made on unraveling the dynamite or defusing the dynamite? Criticism of the choices made after the 29th of July is easily and frequently done, without realization of the immensity of the task and the exhaustion of the decision-makers.

7) The German Move to Restrain Austria

Bethmann on the night of the 29th had perceived the failure of his crisis strategy and tactics. He had been informed by Moltke that it had been a serious mistake to not have put pressure on Russia to prevent a partial mobilization. The partial mobilization did not harm German interests directly but did seriously jeopardize Austrian security and the war plans for the Serbian invasion. The partial mobilization logically called for an Austrian mobilization on the

Russian frontier. Bethmann's deception as to the true relation of German crisis strategy to Austrian crisis strategy had not persuaded England that Germany was attempting to influence Austria toward a peaceful solution to the crisis. It appeared that England would not remain neutral in the event of a war between France and Germany. Bethmann had also failed to persuade Austria to agree to the kinds of terms that would influence Italy to agree to aid Germany in a war between Germany and France. It also appeared that Rumania would not provide troops against Serbia in the Balkan sector of a possible continental war. And last of all, Germany had not yet received an answer to the Kaiser's formula for a peaceful negotiation of the crisis.

At this point in the crisis, Bethmann seems to have become confused and demoralized. It was at this moment that he sought to gain a concrete British commitment to neutrality in the event of a continental war. But beyond this move, Bethmann could not choose exactly what to do. He sent a note, several notes, to Russia, attempting to water down the severe tone of the German note condemning the partial mobilization of Russia which he had sent earlier in the day. He also appealed to Russia for restraint against Austria and asked and advised that Russia agree to recommence direct conversations with Austria on the subject of the Austrian demands on Serbia. To Austria, he sent 6 messages after midnight informing Berchtold of the probability of British participation in a continental war and requesting that Berchtold begin conversations with Russia and allow

the Kaiser to mediate the crisis on the basis of limited Austrian military operations against Serbia. Above all, Bethmann did not want Austria to mobilize against Russia. An Austrian general mobilization would force Russia to completely mobilize and then Germany and then there would be a war that looked increasingly unpleasant to Germany.

Thus, on the night of the 29th, Germany's crisis intentions and strategy changed. Bethmann did not attempt any longer with any hope to deter Russia from resisting an Austrian invasion of Serbia. What he did attempt after the 29th was to persuade Austria not to provoke Russia into armed intervention in the Austrian-Serbian conflict by invading all of Serbia and by refusing to agree to negotiate on the basis of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. But Bethmann was also attempting to prepare for a continental war by making Russia appear to be the guilty party. Bethmann wanted to arrange matters so that it might be Russia who provoked Germany into mobilization and war, not Austria provoking Russia into general mobilization. Russia had to appear responsible for the continental war even if Austria appeared responsible for the Serbian war. In this manner, Bethmann might make it impossible for the British statesmen to support Russia and France in a war against Germany.

Germany had made a basic compromise; she now agreed with

the need for a negotiated settlement. Only two days before, it had been Germany who had been pressuring a reluctant Austria to immediately declare war and begin military operations against Serbia precisely in order to make the adversary's proposals for a negotiated settlement meaningless, outdated. This change in the German bargaining position was due, as we have noted, primarily to the crisis behavior of Britain and Italy, adversary and ally.

The Austrian leaders, who had shown no independence of Germany throughout the crisis, suddenly refused to cooperate with the German change in strategy and bargaining goals. The Austrian leaders perceived the communications of Bethmann in the very early morning of the 30th to be suggesting a retreat, a retreat the Austrians were unwilling to make. The Austrians agreed to reopen negotiations with Russia, but did not agree to the mediation of Germany, Italy, France, and England. Unlike Germany, Austria refused to change their policy of localization of the conflict; the Austrians, from past experience, simply had no trust in negotiations. They did not want a political settlement but a military settlement. Their security and future standing in the European hierarchy could not be left dependent on the ability of Germany to persuade the three hostile mediation members to allow a complete Austrian diplomatic victory.

How did Germany fail to persuade Austria to agree to a negotiated settlement rather than a settlement by force of arms?

Some of the explanation lies in the contradictions and ambiguity in the German policy and policy announcements after the 28th. Part of the answer appears to lie in the incorrect communication by the German Ambassador of Bethmann's July 30th messages to the Austrian Prime Minister, Berchtold. The sting in the Bethmann communications was not reported by the Ambassador to Berchtold until the last of the Bethmann messages made it crystal clear to the Ambassador that Germany no longer wanted to risk a European war for the sake of Austrian security against Serbian nationalism. And by that time, Berchtold had received the messages from Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, stressing the immediate necessity for Austrian mobilization against Russia and an all-out acceptance of a continental war. Ultimately, the German disunity of leadership resulted in the Austrian decision for complete mobilization and complete refusal of discussion by other powers of the dispute with Serbia.

Let us review the pressure Germany put on Austria. On the 27th, Germany had supported the English proposal for mediation only as a feint and on the 28th put forward the "halt in Belgrade" proposal with little conviction and with instructions to the German Ambassador to carefully avoid giving the impression that Germany wanted to restrain Austria. Only on the night of 29/30, did Germany make up its mind to bring real pressure to bear on Austria to accept the "Halt in Belgrade" plan and mediation and resumption of the conversation with Russia. But the new line was ambiguously communicated to Austria, at least initially. The Chancellor did not

come right out and say that the strategic conditions and developments that Germany had expected when she made the pledge of support to Austria had not come into existence at all and therefore, Germany had to change her strategy to fit the unexpected strategic developments. He never said that the "halt in Belgrade" plan was a necessity for Austria, but only a suggestion. Only in the last message of the 30th, delivered by the German Ambassador just before the Ministers' meeting with the Austrian Emperor to decide what to do in reply to Germany and in reply to the Russian partial mobilization, did the German Chancellor even suggest that Austria had better agree to mediation or else face a loss of German support. But this message, quite unambiguous, was negated by the message of Moltke which stated that Germany was going to mobilize and that Austria must mobilize against Russia at once. At the meeting of Berchtold and the other Ministers with the Emperor, it was decided that the Austrian response to the Russian partial mobilization was to be an Austrian general mobilization to be ordered on the first day of August. Germany did not attempt to change the Austrian decision on the next day, the 31st, because Germany learned of the complete mobilization of Russia, which she was sure would lead to war. On the 31st, at 1:45 p.m., Bethmann sent the German Ambassador to Austria the notice that Germany expected from Austria immediate active participation in the war against Russia, which appeared inevitable. Germany did not expect the German ultimatum to Russia to have any effect on Russia.

8) Russian General Mobilization

The foregoing analysis illustrates the importance of the next basic move to be considered, the choice of the Russian leaders to mobilize on the German frontier.

What logic was behind the choice of a general mobilization? Was this action intended as a coercive move or a communicative move? Did it have a military and/or a diplomatic function or purpose? Were the Russian decision-makers aware that the inevitable response of the German government to Russian general mobilization would be a decision for German mobilization? Were the Russian leaders conscious of the fact that German mobilization meant war; was this information part of the input into the process of decision? Was Russian mobilization chosen in direct response to a particular move of Austria or Germany or both?

The Russian decision for general mobilization was not a bidding or a coercive or a communicative move; it was not a bargaining move at all. Let us not force it to be such; the action falls outside our analytical framework. The logic of the decision is military, not diplomatic. The purpose of the move was to prepare for war, not to influence the bargaining or diplomatic decisions of other statesmen. The Russian leaders had given up the diplomatic situation as lost; they had not succeeded in peacefully deterring the Germans and Austrians from violating Russian interests. There was no choice of strategy or tactics left; no diplomatic maneuver would suffice to stop the Austrian attack on Serbia. The violation of Serbian and

and Russian interests would be punished and the conflict settled by the force of arms.

Was the decision for the Russian general mobilization chosen in response to a specific set of adversary moves? Yes, the decision was taken to counteract the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia and the bombardment of Belgrade. Total mobilization had also been ordered as a consequence of German threats of the 29th following the partial mobilization of Russia. (The Russian decision for mobilization against Germany was made on the 30th.) The threats made Sazanov conclude that Germany would support Austria in the war with Russia over Serbia. War with Germany appeared inevitable, as Russia had decided at the initiation of the crisis that she would not yield to German threats, Russian prospects in the war with Germany would have been impaired by a continuance of partial mobilization, partial mobilization having upset the one existing plan for general mobilization. The motivation behind the move was to be prepared for the war with Germany when it came.

What were the effects of the move on the adversary? The news of the Russian general mobilization moved the German government to act in behalf of military logic and to prepare for war with France and Russia. The Austrian decision for general mobilization was not linked to the Russian decision, as they were made simultaneously. The Austrians made their decision for mobilization against Russia without knowledge of the Russia switch from partial mobilization to general mobilization.

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Were the Russian statesmen aware that Germany would declare war on Russia and France if Russia mobilized totally? Yes, the Russian decision-makers were aware of the probable response the Germans would make to the Russian move.

The choice of general mobilization was chosen from what alternatives? Russia could continue to prepare for war, running the risk that these warlike preparations would result in war, or Russia could discontinue the preparations and accept the defeat and destruction of her ally, Serbia, and the diplomatic and military victory of the Central Powers, or Russia could continue with just partial preparations for war and run the risk of being unprepared for war with Germany if it came, or if, later on in the crisis, Russia had to decide for war or for preparations for general war, to see herself then hopelessly behind the Austrian preparations, and probably Serbia already vanquished and occupied.

Was it correct for the Russians to have concluded that general war was inevitable and to have decided to prepare for it rather than attempt any longer to avoid it by diplomatic measures? There is no proof for a negative or a positive answer. We can say that Austria was not prepared to compromise and it was not clear whether Germany was going to succeed in influencing Austria to compromise.

To have the time straight, the decision for general mobilization was taken on July 30th at 3 p.m., and the order was signed and sent to the proper channels at 5 p.m.

Let us clarify the relation between the Russian decision for partial mobilization and the Russian decision for general mobilization. Partial mobilization had been chosen for diplomatic reasons alone; mobilization against Austria alone made no military sense. If Russia chose to attack Austria, Germany, so the Russian leaders perceived, would go the help of her ally, and Russia would have to carry out general mobilization. Mobilization against Austria, both as a means of intimidating Austria and putting pressure on Germany, without bringing her into the conflict, was not perceived as preventing a subsequent mobilization against Germany as well, if it were to prove necessary. The choice for partial mobilization was made on the 28th, the day of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and announced on the 29th. It was then discovered that it was not possible to smoothly proceed from partial to general mobilization. If Russia carried out her partial mobilization, her capacity to carry out complete mobilization was affected detrimentally. Complete mobilization would then take longer. After Sazanov had been convinced of the inevitability of a war with Germany and Austria, it made no military sense at all to mobilize only against Austria. Continuation of the partial mobilization and postponement of the decision for complete mobilization might have allowed some more time to affect a peaceful settlement of the conflict, possibly on the grounds of the "Halt in Belgrade" proposal. But Sazanov was convinced that Austria would not compromise, and Germany's earlier deception about influencing Austria in favor of negotiations had led Sazanov to mistrust Germany's promises to gain Austrian agreement to a limited

military operation against Serbia. Given Sazanov's image of the diplomatic situation, of the intentions of Germany and Austria, there was no incentive for continuing the less provocative process of partial mobilization. It made neither diplomatic nor military sense to continue to hope for and work for peace.

9) The German Ultimatum to Russia

On July 31st, in response to the general mobilization of Russia, Germany proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war" and sent a 12-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding cessation of preparations on the German frontier, and Austrian frontier.

Was this a coercive move? Yes, but only partly so. It was not expected to have a coercive effect. It was expected that Russia would not give way and that therefore the "state of imminent danger of war" (preparations for mobilization) would be followed by mobilization and war. Bethmann, before Russia had received the note, had already written another note to Austria stating his expectation of Austria's immediate active participation in the war against Russia, as soon as it was declared, which would probably be 48 hours. Thus, the primary purpose of the ultimatum was not coercive, but deceptive or persuasive. The note served to focus attention on Russia, making it appear to Britain and to the German public, that it was Russia who had the last clear chance to prevent the war and therefore the last, precluding responsibility for war or peace. (Thus, I make my plea for the broadening of the project's typology of tactics; I suggest that we add a type called the propaganda tactic versus a bidding or a coercive or a communicative tactic.)

The ultimatum to Russia was accompanied by an ultimatum to France. Either France promised her neutrality in a Russian-German war or else Germany would declare war and open hostilities against France. The French answer was required at the end of 18 hours. The purpose of the French ultimatum was not coercive; it was to serve as a pretext for war against France if Russia did not stop her mobilization and satisfy the German demands.

The primary reason the Germans sent these two ultimatums was not coercive. If there was to be war, German military interests required that it come as soon as was possible. In the West, the Belgians had begun to fortify the forts which guarded the attack routes the German military plans earmarked for the approach to and attack at Paris. In the East, it was essential for the Germans to inform the Austrian Chief of Staff by August 1st whether he should convert his forces from attacking Serbia to attacking Russia. The two ultimatums were sent to speed up the coming of the war; if Russia did not answer in the positive; that she had decided to stop her mobilization altogether, then Germany would go to war against Russia.

The German decision for mobilization was not automatic, that is, not automatically contingent upon Russian mobilization. The Germans did not perceive that the Russians were aggressive; they did not fear an attack from Russia. The Germans chose to make the mobilization decision automatically related to the Russian mobilization because they did not want peace more than they wanted to avoid national humiliation and a diplomatic defeat of significant proportions (exactly the same kind of humiliation and defeat Germany

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had been planning for the Russians and for the Triple Entente). The Germans had expected the Russians to pay a price for peace which the Germans themselves would not pay. It is clear that the Germans recognized an alternative to immediate war, a freedom of choice. Germany preferred war to concessions.

What was the bargaining situation or diplomatic or strategic choice situation at midnight, July 31st, a week after the start of the crisis? Let us allow Bernadette Schmitt to summarize the strategic situation:

Austria-Hungary, rejecting the proposal for a 'Halt in Belgrade,' had decided to continue her operations against Serbia and to negotiate only if Russia suspended her military preparations; she had also ordered general mobilization. Russia had ordered general mobilization. Germany had decided for war, had notified her ally of this decision, had proclaimed 'threatening danger of war,' and had despatched ultimatums to Russia and France. France, on receipt of the German ultimatum, had decided for war, and was prepared to order mobilization on the following day. Great Britain, although unwilling to promise assistance to France, had raised the question of Belgian neutrality, which, unless all signs failed, would be violated by Germany; the British fleet had been sent to its war station. Belgium, in order to defend her neutrality, had ordered mobilization. Italy had decided to remain neutral. If the peace of Europe was to be kept, it could only be by a Russian acceptance of the German ultimatum, which was presented in St. Petersburg at midnight of 31 July. (Bernadette Schmitt, The Coming of the War of 1914, pp. 307-8.)

10) The German Declaration of War on Russia

The most important negotiations and bargaining moves and actions and decisions have been reported. The outcome of the crisis had now been determined. All the participants but England had either decided for war or for peace (Italy). The French, as a

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result of preceding developments, with the German ultimatum making war inevitable, given the value preferences of the several crisis participants, decided on the 31st of July to issue the mobilization order on the 1st of August. This in no way can be labeled and analyzed as a basic crisis move without considerable distortion of the causal chain of crisis events. The French mobilization is not a diplomatic move, with a function or purpose of coercion, persuasion, communication, concession, etc. The move is not intended to affect the actions of other statesmen so as to change their behavior. Mobilization in this case was a move to war and preparation for war.

At 7 p.m. on August 1st, Germany, having received no answer from Russia, declared war on Russia and mobilized. On August 3th, Germany declared war on France, on the pretext of frontier violations. In truth, the German action was due to military considerations and to the conviction that France would come to Russia's support in any case.

11) The English Declaration of War on Germany

On August 2, Germany began the invasion of Luxembourg and submitted to Belgium a demand for permission to cross Belgian territory, in return for a promise to uphold Belgian integrity. This was rejected by the Belgians.

On August 2, the British Cabinet, after many meetings and much disagreement regarding support of France, voted to give France assurances to protect the coast of France against German attack.

On August 3, Germany declared war on France and began the invasion of Belgium. It was in response to these two acts of Germany that England declared war on Germany on August 4.

The initial response of Foreign Minister Grey to the crisis between Austria and Serbia had been that the Austrian-Serbian conflict was of no interest to Britain and that no obligation or interest would cause England to intervene in any European conflict which it might set off. Grey's only interest was to have the conflict settled peacefully; the content of the settlement did not seem of importance to him. Britain's strategy in the crisis consisted of building bridges between the two European groups of Russia-France and Austria-Germany. Grey chose the option of putting pressure on both groups to make both ready to negotiate. Russia and France were threatened with English neutrality if a continental war developed out of the Austrian-Serbian conflict, while Germany and Austria were threatened with English intervention.

As the possibility of a violent outcome increased with the passage of time, the British Cabinet cautiously came to the conclusion that the injury which England would suffer by taking part in the war would not be much greater than if England remained inactive. The primary factor in the English decision to go to war against Germany was the English expectation and fear of a German victory over France and Russia. It was Grey's, and ultimately the Cabinet's, calculation

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that Britain could not continue to exist as a first-class state or international power under the circumstances of a German victory.

From 1871 to 1914, there had been crises but no wars in Europe. In the crises which had occurred before 1914, governments had not chosen the option of violence to obtain an acceptable distribution of the values at stake. But in 1914, all the powerful governments, with the exception of Italy, chose, with different degrees of freedom of choice, to go to war in pursuit of national values. To reach conclusions about why the statesmen of the 1914 crisis did choose to run the risks of war and defeat in the purpose of the next section of our report on the crisis bargaining of 1914.

In this part of the research report, we are required to provide a general explanation of what happened in each particular case of crisis bargaining. I wish to talk about the outcome via this series of empirical questions: why did Russia not deter Germany from supporting Austria and Austria from attacking Serbia; why did Germany and Austria not deter Russia from her commitment to Serbia; why did Germany fail to deter English intervention; why did England not succeed in deterring Germany from invading Belgium and going to war against France?

In my mind, my answers to these questions are largely mythical. Not necessarily untrue, but probably grossly inaccurate. My statements in this section are meant to be provisional and speculative, as befits an attempt to theorize about chaos. I make assertive statements, but only for the sake of order, not truth.

Austria was not one of the more active bargainers in the crisis of 1914; the Austrian leadership left the bargaining aspects of their choice to invade Serbia in the hands of the Germans. Austria expected Germany to create a repetition of the Bosnian crisis bargaining; Germany was to deter Russia from intervention, military intervention, in the Austrian-Serbian war. How was Germany to deter Russia from defending her ally, Serbia, against Austria? Russia was to be deterred by the threat of a German attack upon Russia if Austria were not allowed to defeat Serbia.

The German deterrence strategy failed because of miscalculation based upon misperception. The German statesmen forecast that the leadership of the Triple Entente in 1914 would value a continuation of peaceful relations more than they would value a diplomatic defeat of fairly major proportions. The Germans miscalculated the effects of domestic instability upon the international behavior of their adversaries. The governments of Britain, Russia, and France were not deterred from resisting the combined, coercive actions of Germany and Austria by their lack of domestic support. The Germans hypothesized a link between domestic unrest and international behavior that did not materialize.

Were the Germans so deluded in their calculating that a government faced by a military inferiority abroad and serious disturbances at home would be loath to choose to go to war? Unfortunately, the German leadership was without the advantage of social science information. In any case, Russia was not deterred by the prospects of internal revolution and a military inferiority versus Germany; France was not deterred by domestic turmoil and budgetary emergencies; England was not deterred by the Irish question and a Labor-dominated government's hopes of wide-ranging domestic reforms which would be aborted by war. These intranational developments go a long distance toward explaining why Germany and Austria failed to deter the Triple Entente from participation in the Austrian-Serbian crisis and war. The leadership of these governments behaved with some degree of independence from the constraints of internal political problems. Perhaps a profound lesson for international statesmen lies unhidden in this conclusion. It is a trying task to predict a nation's international behavior on the basis of its internal political situation.

*Not from cabinet
military politics,
but from mass
& party politics*

What hurt Germany's chances of deterrence success in the 1914 crisis was the French decision to support Russia's effort to resist the German coercion attempt. In addition, the British statesmen would not count themselves out of the possibility of war with Germany over the issue of a German war with France.

The solidarity of France meant that the Russian leadership could reasonably envision a stalemate outcome in the event of a war of Germany-Austria against Russia-France. The Russians could also fortify themselves with hopes of eventual British participation.

Perhaps Russia was not deterred by Germany because her statesmen could foresee a favorable outcome to a war with Germany. But what of the Russian attempt to deter Austria from the invasion of Serbia. To deter Austria, it was necessary for Russia to isolate Austria from German support. Why did Russia fail to persuade Germany not to support Austria? The German statesmen were not deterred by Russia because they could not foresee an unfavorable outcome to a war of Germany, Austria, and Italy against Russia and France. The Germans could calculate on winning the war if the crisis bargaining was unsuccessful.

But there is more to it this. The Russians failed to deter Germany because they failed to persuade the British that the best way to create a diplomatic compromise was to face Germany and Austria with the prospect of a united Entente front against coercion of Russia and Serbia. Sazanov's first efforts were to gain the solidarity of both France and England. If he had not failed in this effort, perhaps Germany would have been deterred from support of an Austrian invasion of Serbia.

The Germans would have been deterred because they were uncertain about the outcome of a Triple Entente war with the Triple Alliance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Germans do not appear to have been "high-risk" statesmen.

The explanation of why the British failed to deter the Germans from a war with France is complicated, even in summary form. Confusion perhaps is the best explanation. Why the British failed to deter the Germans from a war with France is best considered by examining the relations between Germany and Austria. After receiving the English threat to participate with France in a war against Germany, the Germans made an effort to persuade Austria into accepting a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the crisis with Serbia. But the effort was half-hearted. Perhaps it is better to put it this way; half the German government was deterred by the English threat (and the lack of Italian support). Half the German government advised Austria to yield; the other half advised Austria not to yield but to prepare for war with Russia. Austria chose to heed the advice of the belligerent half of the German government.

The British did, and did not, fail to deter the Germans. The British effort failed, at the next to last moment, because of the German head of government's subversion of the intentions of the German head of state, and at the last moment, because of the Chief of Staff's subversion of the intentions of the German

head of state and the head of government.

The immediate or tactical choice answer to the question of why the crisis bargaining of 1914 ended as it did lies in the timing of the bargaining moves. The time pressures on the decision-makers of 1914 are very unusual. Partly as a result of the pressure of time, the crisis ended in a whirlwind of confusion. Part of the confusion and most of the causation of the time pressures is explained by the alliance and armament restraints on the freedom of tactical choice. In the course of our analysis of the theoretical implications of this case study, we shall examine the armament and alliance constraints on the freedom of strategic choice.

At this moment, with empirical conclusions fresh in our minds, it might be best to consider conceptual conclusions. In other words, which of our models best orders the confusion of 1914?

~~Models~~ MODELS

MODELS

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Perhaps the previous 54 pages provide a fair and adequate presentation of the facts of the bargaining in the crisis of 1914. What we need now is a theoretical interpretation of the facts.

1) Prisoner's Dilemma Treatment of the Facts

My competence to assess the significance of a conception of the crisis of 1914 in terms of Prisoner's Dilemma is nil. Even my ability to conceive of the crisis in game theory terms is inadequate. Fortunately, Dr. Snyder has already analyzed the crisis in terms of Chicken and Dilemma games, and for the purpose of the checklist, I shall refer to his analysis.

The following quote is from Dr. Snyder's paper entitled, "Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics"

World War One has been described as a war which nobody wanted. The Statesmen appear to have become trapped in a spiral of action and reaction which led inexorably from a single assassination to general war. This spiral was fundamentally the result of two interlocking prisoner's dilemmas. The first was the product of the power configuration: a virtual equilibrium between two opposing alliances, each alliance being composed of roughly comparable strength, so that the continued allegiance of each member of each alliance was essential to the equilibrium. Hence, in terms of the prisoner's dilemma, the defeat or alienation of an ally was the worst possible outcome. Allies had to be supported, even at the cost of war. If Germany and France could have cooperated in restraining Austria and Russia, the war probably would have been avoided. But both feared that withholding support from their allies would result either the alienation or defeat of the ally. Consequently, both Germany and France made firm commitments to Austria and Russia (i.e. Both defected), which encouraged the latter countries to take actions which made war inevitable. Reinforcing this logic was another prisoner's dilemma which was inherent in the lead times for mobilization and in the prevalent belief at the time that mobilization meant war. Once one country started to mobilize, its rival feared the outbreak of war before it was ready. Therefore, it was driven to mobilize and attack first to avoid being caught at a disadvantage. When Russia, acting on rumors of German mobilization, began a general mobili-

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zation, Germany responded with mobilization and an ultimatum, followed by a declaration of war. Fearing the worst possible outcome of being attacked before they were ready, the two countries chose the second worse--war with some semblance of preparedness. (Quoted from page 5 of "Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics.")

I agree with this statement of Dr. Snyder, that the crisis of 1914 can be analyzed as an interaction of two prisoners' dilemma games, one referring to the arms and influence equilibrium between the two major alliances, the second referring to the mobilization measures of the crisis. Professor Schmitt, in her analysis of the crisis, has isolated these two variables, the alliance structure and the military measures taken in the course of the crisis, as being the two most important sets of facts. What I am at a loss to see is what the prisoners' dilemma conception adds to the traditional analysis of the events of the crisis of 1914. In 1914, the participants wound up in a costly state of conflict when cooperation would probably have yielded better mutual results. But does the PD game treatment explain this outcome?

What follows are random thoughts on a chicken or PD treatment of the 1914 crisis. Was the penalty for exploited cooperation worse than the penalty for mutual cooperation? No. Therefore, the PD game may not apply to the entire course of the crisis, but just to the decisions on mobilization. If I understand the PD choice situation, the interaction degenerates into costly state of the conflict against the will of the participants.

YES

(3)

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This was not the case in the crisis of 1914. A general war was not the first preference of the participants, but neither was mutual cooperation to avoid the possibility of a general war the first preference of the participants.

Perhaps the chicken game applies to the events of the crisis, taken as a whole, better than does the PD game. For the common interest, defined as the avoidance of a continental war, was not an outcome sought by all, but was something that was manipulated by a few as a means of coercion. The nature of the crisis did not altogether change from that of a contest in which each party or set of parties was trying to prevail over the other. Austria did not attempt to rescue itself at the approach to the brink of an alliance war. Instead, Austria and Germany manipulated the risk of a continental war to win the crisis confrontation.

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2) UTILITY MODELS, Checklist.

1. There is a bargaining range in the 1914 crisis interaction, i.e., bargaining space between two limits beyond which no agreement was reached and movement within the space, by reducing demands and exchanging concessions.
2. Attempts are made in the 1914 crisis to change opponents' utilities. Re-estimations of one's own utilities does occur. Clarification of relative preferences is also visible, as is a search for possible outcomes that are mutually acceptable.
3. The bargaining range, oversimplified, is one-dimensional and two-dimensional; there are more than two parties and two bargaining ranges and interactions.
4. There do not appear to be salient outcomes within the bargaining range.
5. Austria acted as a maximizer; the other participants acted more or less as neither disaster-avoiders or maximizers. Hardly any power was willing to avoid disaster at the price of a substantial diplomatic setback. The uncompromising actions of Austria subverted the serious disaster-avoiding motivated compromises of Germany, who switched in the middle of the crisis from the behavior of a maximizer to that of a compromiser and disaster-avoider.

Part 8 3) EXPANDED GAME MODELS, Checklist

Qu.

- 1. Are escalation and de-escalation important? Yes, escalation is important in the crisis of 1914. De-escalation is not.
- 2. I do not know how to use this question.
- 43. There are shifts of strategy toward more or less toughness in the crisis. The British government changed, as the crisis continued, to a policy of more toughness. Russia did the same. The policies of France and Austria remained equally tough throughout the crisis. Only the government of Germany shifted from a tough, uncompromising strategy to a less tough, more conciliatory strategy.
- 4. Yes, there are warnings of conditional shifts, but only from a conciliatory to a more uncompromising strategy. This is especially evident in the statements of the British and Russian statesmen.
- 6 5. Are there inducements offered for opponent's shift of strategy? Yes, particularly in the case of British and German interaction. The German government promised not to violate the territorial identity of France if England would not shift her strategy from one of non-intervention. Russia offered the inducement of peacefully acquiring security and status to Austria in return for an Austrian shift from a strategy of armed intervention against Serbia. The counterweight of the Russian inducement was the threat of Russian armed intervention against Austria if she continued in her strategy of invading Serbia.
- 7. Are there salient thresholds which limit or focus escalation-de-escalation? Yes. The thresholds involved the initiation of mobilization. The Austrian declaration of war against Serbia was also an important salient threshold of escalation.

8. Are there transitions from one game structure to another?

As far as I can comprehend, there is a transition from a chicken game structure to a prisoner's dilemma structure. This is a very tentative conclusion, however.

4) THE SUPER-GAME MODEL.

1. There is a supergame structure to the crisis of 1914.
2. A significant part of each participant's aims in the crisis of 1914 was either a relative increase in power or the prevention of a decrease. The crisis began because of the Austrian fear of a gradual decline in power and influence and because of the Serbian nationalist movement which sought to increase the power and influence of Serbia. France was concerned lest the outcome of the crisis decrease the power and influence of the Triple Entente in relation to the Triple Alliance. Germany was anxious to secure the Great Power status of her ally, Austria, against the Serbian nationalist movement. Russia's aim was to prevent an increase of Austrian and German influence in the Balkans at the expense of Russian power and influence in the Balkans.
3. Do cost estimates for choosing a strategy include prominently considerations of opponent's increased power or own decreased power including acquisition or loss of allies? The answer to question 2 can serve as an answer to question 3. The French decision to choose a strategy of support for Russia was partly motivated by the desire not to lose Russian support in the case of a future confrontation between France and Germany. The French decided that Russia would not support France against Germany if France did not support Russia against Austria. Likewise, a reason that Germany supported Austria against Serbia and Russia was to enhance the power of her ally and hence enhance her value as an ally. Britain's decision to intervene after the German declaration of war on France was partially influenced by the British

fear of a great increase in Germany's power and influence.

4. Is future relative strategic position estimated in strategic decisions including position in either the balance of capabilities or the balance of resolve? The strategic decisions of the crisis bargainers of the crisis of 1914 did involve estimates of the bearing of different alternative policies on future strategic status. The French and Russian statesmen were convinced that Germany would try to coerce them into a weaker and weaker strategic position if Germany discovered in 1914 that France and Russia would be deterred from resistance against an invasion of Serbia by the threat of war against Germany. The German statesmen estimated that an Austrian victory over Serbia would mean a diplomatic triumph for the Triple Alliance of such proportions as to allow the Triple Alliance to intimidate the Triple Entente for years to come.

5. Apart from the above, is the crisis one of a series of crisis involving the same players but different power positions? Yes, the 1914 crisis was one of a series of crisis involving the same players, but were their power positions different? I suppose not.

6. If so, are the power positions the outcome of the previous crises in the series? No. For example, in the Bosnian crisis of 1909, it was Germany and Austria who bested Russia. Yet, it was the Austrian position that had deteriorated in the Balkans in the intervening years of the Bosnian and 1914 crises. The power positions of 1914 were not due to the crisis of 1909.

5) THE CHICKEN-CRITICAL RISK MODEL

1. Can this model be empirically applied in the sense of our being able to determine at least roughly the critical risk levels of the parties and their ordinal relationship? Yes, this model can be empirically applied in the sense of our being able to determine at least roughly the critical risk levels of the parties and their ordinal relationship. Will these mathematical statements be any more precise than verbal statements of the same relationships, however? Or more useful?
2. Do the parties try to estimate the probability of the opponents' actions? How exactly? Or do they calculate in rather absolute, either-or terms? The statements of the participants in the crisis do not include probability statements of strategic choices of opponents. Their calculations of the opponents' intentions and probable actions are careful and thoughtful, but are not expressed in precise, exact terms.
3. Is there manipulation of the opponent's perception of one's own probable acts? In the crisis of 1914, there is manipulation of the adversary's estimates or perceptions of one's own probable acts, by deception, by persuasion, and by coercion. This question and questions 4 and 5 are treated in another section of the paper.
6. Is there manipulation of shared risk? There is definitely manipulation of shared risk in the crisis of 1914. Germany structured the crisis situation in such a manner that Russia could not stop Austrian assault against Serbia without creating the possibility of a generalized or continental war.

Russia manipulated the shared risk of a continental or alliance war with their general mobilization.

7. What specific tactics are used in the above manipulations? This question is covered in detail in the section on working paper #4.
- a) The threats in the crisis of 1914 were ambiguous rather than explicit. One exception to this statement is the German threat designed to end Russian mobilization; this threat tersely gave the Russian leadership the choice of war or of ending their general mobilization. The threats in the crisis communications were usually delivered at the highest echelon of government. The medium for the passages was the ambassadors in the adversary capitals.
 - b) The communication of commitments was not highly explicit. The governments did not make their commitments highly visible, even in interaction with ally governments.
 - c) The only instance of de-coupling that I can see in the crisis is the neutrality of Italy.
 - d) Germany was warned several times by English diplomats concerning the possibility of a dire outcome to the crisis and the possibility of English intervention on the side of France. Russian diplomats warned Austria of the dangers of her burning her bridges over the Serbian issue.
 - e) Arranging or pretending lack of control or lack of choice was a popular tactic in the 1914 crisis. Austrian statesmen stated

that they could not negotiate the Serbian issue without losing office. Germany communicated to Russia that her statesmen had no control over the military officials and mobilization measures. Germany also insisted that she could not persuade Austria to take a more amiable attitude toward outside intervention in the Serbian crisis. The English leadership declared that they could take no precise position on the changing character of the 1914 crisis because public opinion would not allow them to do so.

8. What is the relative effectiveness of each of these tactics?

England appears to be the only nation in the 1914 crisis whose threats and warnings were effective, that is, changed **adversary** behavior. The credible commitments of Austria failed to deter the Russian leadership from intervention in the Serbian crisis. The credible threats of Germany did not deter the Russian statesmen from mobilization. Nor did the warnings of Germany persuade the French from support of Russia in the confrontation with Germany. The English threat or warning of intervention in a war between France and Germany did persuade Germany to reassess her involvement in the crisis, her absolute support of a violent solution to the Serbian problem.

9. The responses to threats consisted of irritation and stiffened resolve to resist manipulation via threat. The only threat which did

not stiffen resolve to continue past behavior was the British threat of intervention. The British threat moved Germany to compromise her objectives in the crisis.

11 10. The responses to conciliation moves were various. The German diplomats viewed the conciliation moves of the Russian diplomats as indicating a propensity to compliance. The Germans perceived that the Russian eagerness to arrive at a peaceful solution to the Serbian problem revealed a Russian fear of the consequences of a war with Germany and Austria. The conciliation moves of the Russians made it more difficult for the Russians to convince the Germans of the credibility of the Russian commitment to Serbia.

The conciliation moves of England, more properly, the mediation moves of England, met with a response of deception. The Germans did not seriously consider the mediation moves of England. These moves encouraged the Germans in their estimation of England's low motivation to intervene in a military manner in the crisis. It appears from this data that unless a conciliation move is precisely tied to a serious threat in the event of a non-acceptance of the conciliation move, such a move encourages the opponent to belittle one's will to resist coercion.

6) THE CRITICAL RISK, CREDIBILITY MODEL

1. TACTICS TO INCREASE CREDIBILITY

A. Change one's apparent utilities

(TACTICS TO REDUCE THE COST OF WAR)

1. Increase capabilities and/or the readiness of capabilities: an example of this tactic in the crisis of 1914 is the Russian decision or move to mobilize troops on the Austrian frontier after the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. This move constituted an effort to convince the Austrians and the Germans that the Russians would carry out their threat to resist an Austrian attack on Serbia. Put in other terms, the Russian move to increase defensive and offensive capabilities was an attempt to make credible their commitment to defend Serbia against an Austrian invasion.

(TACTICS TO INCREASE THE COST OF COMPROMISE)

1. Make threats which engage prestige, honor, and future bargaining reputation: The Austrian diplomats made statements which implied that any compromise of their demands on Serbia would mean a decrease in their prestige. The German diplomats declared that an Austrian acceptance of outside mediation in the Austrian-Serbian crisis would do damage to Austria's status as a first-class power.

2. Link the present issue with other issues; make it appear as only one aspect of a larger confrontation:

a) "If I give in here, you'll expect me to give in on X." I did not find evidence of this tactic.

b) "If I give in to this demand, this will only embolden you to make further demands." The French leaders do appear to have conceived of their reaction to the Austrian and German effort to localize the Serbian issue in these terms. The French conceived of themselves as countering a diplomatic style of behavior, which if successful in the Serbian case, would be used again and again to split the Triple Entente and to establish the political supremacy of the Triple Alliance. But the French leaders did not communicate this calculation and motivation to the Austrian and German Leaders.

c) "I know that your ultimate aims are unlimited." The French and Russian leaders thought that the German and Austrian aims in the Balkan area were unlimited, but they did not communicate this estimation to the German and Austrians as a tactic of resistance, that is, to increase the credibility of a warning or a threat.

3) Cite the legitimacy or fairness of one's position.
One example of this tactic is the German communication to the Russian statesmen referring to the right and the necessity to apprehend political assassins. This communication implied that Russia ought to allow Austria to enter Serbian affairs in order to apprehend the assassin of the heir to the Austrian throne. The Russians, on the other hand, referred to the inviolability of Serbian sovereignty.

4) Invoke alliance obligations:
The Germans declared that they could not overtly pressure Austria to compromise because of their dependence upon the Austrian alliance.

5) Cite danger of internal revolution if one capitulates or compromises:

The Austrians used this tactic to avoid compromise, if not to increase the credibility of their statements, in their refusal to negotiate with Russia over the ultimatum to Serbia on the grounds that a compromise would see the Austrian government swept away by public anger.

B. Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs.

1. Automation:

No nation in 1914 physically eliminated the alternative of compliance or compromise. Germany did communicate to the Russians that the Russian decision for general mobilization automatically would mean a war with Germany. In one sense, this is the tactic of automation of stimulus and response.

2. Claim that one's constituency will not allow compliance or compromise:

A good example of this bargaining tactic is the Austrian message to Russia stating that a compromise over the ultimatum to Serbia would mean the demise of the government in Austria.

3. Emphasize uncertainties in the situation:

Both Germany and England emphasized the uncertainties in the crisis situation in 1914. Both stressed the likelihood of an alliance war resulting from a local war over the Serbian issue, Germany reporting this to Russia, Britain to Austria.

4. Express disbelief in the opponent's commitment or skepticism about his resolve:

German diplomats said several times to the allies of Russia that they did not believe Russia would intervene in the Austrian-Serbian situation.

II. TACTICS TO REDUCE THE ADVERSARY CRITICAL RISK

A. Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war.

1. Increase one's own capabilities and readiness:

Example of this tactic or move are the Russian and British mobilizations.

2. Stress the danger of escalation:

Every group of statesmen in the crisis communicated to the other participants their concern over the possibility of escalation.

B. Devalue the stakes for the adversary

3. Indicate that one's objectives will expand after the war starts:

Austria told Russia that if Russia did not oppose Austria, Austria would not partition or seize the territory of Serbia. But if Russia did oppose Austria, Austria would not promise not to alter the territorial area of Serbia.

Likewise, Germany sought to buy British neutrality by promising not to take territory from France or Belgium if Germany were victorious in a continental war with France and Russia. The implication was that Germany might seek territorial expansion on the continent if Britain intervened in the war.

B. Devalue the stakes for the Adversary

1. Provide a loophole or rationale which permits the adversary to back down or de-commit himself with minimum humiliation:

One example of this tactic in the 1914 crisis is the Kaiser's letter to the Czar stressing Russia's stake in the apprehension of royal assassins.

This was intended to allow Russia to decouple herself from Serbia.

2. Minimize the element of duress or provocation in one's threats and demands:

The Russian message to Germany explaining the Russian choice of general mobilization attempted to minimize the duress of the move for Germany by a promise that the Russians would not make the first military move, that the mobilized troops would remain inside Russian frontiers as long as negotiations continued.

3. Stress limited nature of aims:

Austria hoped to forestall Russian intervention in the Austrian invasion of Serbia by stating that Austria had no territorial interests in Serbia.

The German diplomats seemed convinced that an Austrian promise of a temporary invasion and occupation of Serbia would circumvent the Russian sense of commitment to Serbia, particularly if the cost of that commitment were to be a war with Germany.

4. De-couple the present issue from other or future issues:

Germany definitely attempted to persuade the Russians that the Austrian chastisement of Serbia had nothing to do with the balance of forces in the Balkans or with the balance of forces among the nations of the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance.

5. Stress the common interest in settling the dispute and avoiding war:

Germany sought to persuade Russia that the common interest in avoiding continental war far outweighed the slight advance in Austrian interests Russia would have to tolerate if Russia did not intervene in the Serbian conflict.

7) INFORMATION PROCESSING MODEL

1. Are images and expectations, misperceptions and interpretations important in determining the outcome, or is it determined by the basic strategic situation with misperceptions and images providing only mild deviations? This is a difficult question to answer, and to be honest, I feel that my answer must remain ambiguous. By basic strategic situation, I am referring to the actual military forces available to each participant. The basic strategic situation was one of equilibrium or equality. This strategic or military equality was an important influence on the expectations of the participants. Perhaps the equality of forces led each power to be reluctant to back down since each alliance stood a good chance of winning the war if hostilities come about as a result of mutual intransigence. Perhaps an equality of military force encourages a tougher attitude on the part of both sides to a dispute. Neither side is encouraged to sustain a diplomatic defeat in an equality of forces situation. Misperceptions were important in determining the outcome, the outcome being that all sides to the conflict and bargaining lost, to one degree or another. The Germans and Austrians miscalculated their ability to influence the behavior of Russia and France. The Germans misperceived the affect of domestic crises on the international behavior of England, France and Russia.
2. The Austrian and German statesmen misperceived the degree to which the Russian leaders were resolved to resist German coercion. Likewise, the French will to resist German coercion was underestimated by the Germans. The German statesmen estimated that the Russian leadership would want to avoid a war with Germany at almost any cost. How could a nation with a regime as

unstable as that of Russia undertake a major international military struggle over a peripheral issue?

The German leadership also misperceived the relationship of Britain to the alliance of France and Russia. German statesmen did not think that Britain would enter a continental war between Russia and France and Germany and Austria, particularly a war which began as a result of a Balkan issue. The decision-makers of Germany held no idea of how the German military plan calling for an invasion of Belgium would affect the British leadership and public. That the invasion of Belgium by Germany would so alienate the British public and statesmen flabbergasted the German Chancellor.

The German misperception of the intentions of her adversaries was an important factor in the escalation of a local conflict and war into a continental conflict and war. If the Germans had correctly perceived the crisis intentions of Britain and Russia, there might have been no war at all, local or continental. The Germans do not appear to have been willing to run the risks of a war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. The Germans probably did not conceive of such a war, of such an outcome to their initial choice of crisis strategy.

3. What happens when new information contradicts and expectation? Various things. It is impossible to generalize across all the cases which the crisis of 1914 contains without writing a book about it. Let us take the example of Germany. How did Germany react when Russia mobilized? As I stated in the section, "Hypotheses About Perceptions and Images," Germany did not expect Russia to mobilize or to resist German coercion. Instead, Germany expected the Russian statesmen of 1914 to react to German coercion in the same manner

as the Russian statesmen of 1909 reacted, in the Bosnian crisis. The Germans expected the Russians to bluff and to capitulate. The information of the Russian mobilization contradicted the German expectations. The Germans readily recognized their misconception of Russian intentions and issued a point-blank ultimatum to change Russian behavior if possible. The German leadership, with the exception of the Kaiser, recognized the increased Russian commitment to Serbia and to the status quo in the Balkans. The contradiction of German expectations did not lead the Germans to discount the credibility of the new and contradictory information.

But the German experience with the British was quite different. And for easily observable reasons. The contradictory information concerning the Russian commitment against German interests was a military move, an action which was quite visible. But the information which the Germans received from the British contradicting the German expectation of English behavior was only verbal and couched in the greatest subtlety. How could the diplomats who specialized in the ultimatum form of threat appreciate the diplomats who specialized in the innuendo form of threat? If the information from Britain had been wholly or visibly contradictory, I am sure the German statesmen would have altered their expectations and policy much sooner than they eventually did. My conclusion, which I hope these two examples serve to support, is that in most cases of unexpected or contradictory moves, the statesmen reacted by changing their images and expectations of what the future would hold.

4. Do basic images and expectations change during the course of the crisis? What seems to produce the changes? As I have reported in the hypotheses section, images, and expectations did change during the crisis. At the beginning of the

crisis, the English leadership had expected the Germans to behave as they had acted the two years before the crisis. In other words, the British expected the Germans to cooperate with the French and the British in working to avoid an escalation of a Balkan dispute and/or war. The Germans had restrained the Austrian diplomats during the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and the British expected that the Germans would do so again in 1914. But as the Austrian diplomats remained aloof and uncompromising during the course of the crisis, the British diplomats reached the conclusion that Germany could not be working to restrain and limit Austrian objectives. This negative information, along with other factors, led the British to look upon the Germans as an uncooperative adversary in the crisis.

Like the British, the Russian leadership at the initiation of the crisis expected the Germans to restrain the Austrian diplomats, to make the Austrians amenable to negotiations. Also like the British, as the crisis continued and the Austrians remained irrevocably committed to an attack on Serbia, the Russians changed their image of the German role in the crisis. How could Austria remain so intransigent without German approval and support? Thereafter, all but the Czar expected the worst of Germany, the most uncooperative behavior.

At the beginning of the crisis, Germany had expected the Russian leadership to vociferously protest the Austrian actions against Serbia, but when the showdown came, to allow Germany and Austria their way against Serbia. Germany saw Russia as a bluffer. The Russian mobilization changed the German image and expectations of Russia in a situation wherein Russia was faced with the possibility or certainty of a war with Germany.

The gradual change in the German image and expectations of Britain has already been reported.

5. Are perceptions influenced more by the other party's deliberate bargaining moves, or by other elements of his behavior not intended primarily for communication or bargaining (e.g., domestic events and public opinion, etc.) ? The British and Russian change of perception of Germany was due to the behavior of Germany's ally, above everything else. The German changes in perception were influenced by the bargaining moves of the British and Russian governments. The initial German perceptions of Russian and British intentions were heavily influenced by the domestic crisis in the British and Russian governments. The British and Russian initial perceptions of German behavior were based upon German behavior in the Balkan crisis of the prior two years.

~~was~~ were heavily influenced by the domestic crises in the British and Russian governments. The British and Russian initial perceptions of German behavior were ~~influenced~~ based ~~up~~ upon German behavior in the Balkan crises of the prior two years.

8) THE CATAclySMIC MODEL

1

1. Is a cataclysmic model relevant to a significant extent? Prof. Diesing has analyzed the 1914 crisis in terms of the slippery slope or cataclysmic model.

For example, in 1914 things got out of hand because of the automatic mobilization plans which could not be stopped once started, the nearly automatic need to counter-mobilize to avoid military defeat, the existence of only one German attack strategy, which meant that war with Russia would automatically mean an attack on France through Belgium the Austrian attack strategy through Bosnia which made the British suggestion of a halt at Belgrade impossible. ("Types of Bargaining Theory," p. 18)

Dr. Snyder has analyzed how the World War One mobilization race was fueled by cataclysmic factors ("Cataclysmic Factors in Crisis Behavior," p.6.)

Like Professors Diesing and Snyder, I think that the cataclysmic concept is useful in analyzing the 1914 crisis. In my summary of the violent outcome of the crisis, I have used the cataclysmic notion to explain why the choice between the localized war of Austria versus Serbia and a general European war did not exist, given a particular constellation of values. The cataclysmic concept is useful in treating the link between Germany and Austria's choice of a local war and the unintended outbreak of a war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

2. Are there automatic or semi-automatic linkages, e.g., contingent military plans? In the 1914 crisis, there were various automatic, preprogrammed military strategists, often without the knowledge of the diplomats. The nature of the

military plans has been treated in part one, subtitle 3, under the heading of military technology. Part one is titled, "Systemic Environment."

3. Are there decisions in which there is no real choice, only reluctance and inevitability? It is hard to say that there are decisions in which there is no real control. There is definitely a subjective sense of inevitability in many of the decisions and a sense of an inevitably violent outcome.

4. Are there statements of inevitability, hopelessness, getting out of hand? There were statements of regret, of hopelessness, of a fear that the statesmen would concoct an outcome none preferred. These statements were made privately within governments and were made as warnings or pleas to other governments.

5. Are there techniques for preserving control, such as hedging on commitments or threats, civilian control over the military? In all the participant nations, there was civilian control over the military, at least theoretically.

6. What conditions or factors lead to a loss of control?

Refer to the section on military technology in "Systemic Environment".

1. Rationality and Irrationality:

a) Are there obvious instances of irrational calculation and behavior?

I saw instances of miscalculation and misinformation (deception), but I saw no instances of irrational behavior (given the traditional values of international statesmen).

b) Is irrationality sometimes feigned for bargaining advantage?

No.

2. Is there a clear shift in bargaining behavior between "stages" of a crisis? I did not analyze the crisis in terms of stages.

3. What is the effect of "rising tension" on behavior? This question has been treated in the section on the project's hypotheses.

4. What is the relative importance and frequency of "symbolic acts" and "acts of harassment"? There were no visits by important officials to the crisis area nor were military men kept in prominent view during negotiations. Neither were there violations of normal diplomatic courtesies as an expression of contempt or dominance. Serbia and Austria recalled their ambassadors to each other and broke off diplomatic relations. Russia made a point of not recalling their ambassador to Austria after Austria declared war on Serbia. No individuals were appointed to key positions for the reason of their "toughness". There were no military displays and maneuvers, for there was a great value to military secrecy. England mobilized her fleet as a deliberate symbolic act designed to reveal how seriously she saw the situation.

Acts of harassment occurred frequently in the 1914 crisis. There were no economic reprisals, cancelling of cultural exchanges, restrictions on tourism, detention and harassment of the adversary's citizens, commando raids, sabotage, stimulation of subversion. There were spontaneous demonstrations, hostile press campaigns, and increased hostility themes in propaganda.

REPORT ON HYPOTHESES FROM WORKING PAPER NO. 3

A. HYPOTHESES RELATING SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT TO CHOICE OF TACTICS

1) Proposition: Bipolar crises are characterized by greater caution and moderation than crises in a multipolar system because of the greater potential costs of war.

Evidence: This is a comparative question, outside the data boundaries of a single case study.

2) Proposition: In a multipolar system the imperative of alliance cohesion exercises a greater effect on crisis bargaining tactics than in a bipolar system. Thus, in a multipolar system, states have less flexibility in their choice of tactics because of a need to accommodate the wishes of allies. In a bipolar world, great powers are less concerned about shaping tactics to suit allies because of their lesser dependence on allies; thus they can afford to be more flexible.

Evidence: This also is a comparative, not a case study question.

NOTE: Questions 3 through 11 are not case study questions but comparative questions.

12) In a multipolar crisis, the crucial uncertainty is the identity of one's opponents if war breaks out; in a bipolar crisis the identity of the opponent is clear and the crucial uncertainty is the likely degree of escalation if war breaks out.

Evidence: The uncertainty of alliance alignment was an important factor in the 1914 crisis; Germany was unsure about whether Britain

would support its ally or whether Italy would support Germany.

B. PROPOSITIONS ABOUT COERCIVE TACTICS

1). Proposition: Absolutely irrevocable commitments are rare.

Evidence: The evidence of the case of 1914 confirms the statement that threats are usually revocable.

2) Proposition: Threats are usually ambiguous or veiled rather than explicit.

Evidence: The evidence of the case of 1914 confirms the statement that threats are usually ambiguous or veiled rather than explicit. One exception is the German ultimatum to Russia demanding that Russia call a halt to her preparations for war or face a German declaration of war. The demands of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia were not ambiguous, but the sanctions for non-acceptance of the demands were not made explicit. The threatening element of the Austrian message was left implicit.

3) Proposition: The severest, most explicit threats are usually made by and to a) officials of medium or low status, and b) private individuals. I.e., the higher the official status of the communicator or the recipient, the greater the ambiguity and moderation of communications.

Evidence: The evidence of 1914 does not confirm the proposition that the severest, most explicit threats are usually made by and to either private individuals or to officials of medium or low status. The severest threat of the 1914 crisis was the German threat of war against Russia; this threat was sent to the highest official of the Russian government. The German ultimatum to France was also sent to the highest government official.

4) Proposition: Coercive moves are often given a non-coercive rationale to minimize the element of duress and minimize the costs of retraction.

Evidence: The evidence of the 1914 case confirms the proposition that coercive moves are often given a non-coercive rationale, but whether the purpose was to minimize the element of duress and minimize the costs of retraction is not clear. In most cases of what we would identify as coercive moves, the purpose of the move was usually given as being defensive, not aggressive. Perhaps defensive-aggressive is a better distinction than coercive and non-coercive for this particular question. For example, the mobilization measures at different periods of time were designated as defensive measures, not coercive measures.

5) Proposition: Parties will attempt to create loopholes through which the opponent can back down.

Evidence: The evidence of the case of 1914 suggests that the statement that parties to an international conflict will attempt to create loopholes through which the opponent can back down is not true. There were no obvious attempts to create loopholes in the 1914 data. One must remember however that most of the diplomacy of the 1914 crisis was secretive, not ~~open~~ public. Therefore, the need for loopholes may not have been important, for saving the reputation or "face" of the opponent.

6) Proposition: In making threats and other moves, parties will try to leave themselves an avenue for retreat.

Evidence: The evidence of the case of 1914 does not suggest the

truthfulness of the proposition that in making threats and other moves, parties will try to leave themselves an avenue for retreat. Threats were left so ambiguous in most cases that there was no need to have an avenue for retreat; the ambiguity itself provided a possible rationale for retreat from a position. Retreat implies the existence of firm, unambiguously communicated commitments. The instances of explicit commitments were rare in the 1914 case, and when these did occur, the possibility of retreat in a graceful fashion does not seem to have been a consideration in the communication of the threats. I.e., the German ultimatum to Russia and the ultimatum of France to declare her position in the forthcoming war of Germany against Russia.

7) Proposition: Nations make firm commitments and explicit threats only when they are clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation (e.g., relative fear of war, relative valuation of the stakes, relative capabilities).

Evidence: Does the evidence of 1914 suggest that nations make firm commitments and explicit threats only when they are clearly favored by asymmetries in the diplomatic situation? It is difficult to relate the evidence to this proposition because there was no highly visible asymmetry or imbalance in the ^{1914 crisis} situation. If Germany could engage in war more quickly, Russia had the larger army, etc. Germany was not clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation in 1914, but Germany did make a firm commitment to support Austria against Russian mobilization, and Germany did make an explicit threat against Russia as regarded continued Russian mobilization to war footing. Probably, the proposition is ^{not} confirmed by the evidence in 1914.

8) Proposition: The process of commitment is usually progressive rather "all-at-once."

Evidence: The data of the 1914 crisis agree with the statement that the process of commitment is usually progressive rather than "all-at-once".

9) Proposition: Tactics may be modulated in a crisis to keep in power, or bring to power, a faction more favorable to oneself in the adversary state, or to maximize the internal influence of that faction.

Evidence: The evidence of 1914 suggests the partial truth of the statement that tactics may be modulated in a crisis to keep in power, or bring to power, a faction more favorable to oneself in the adversary state, or to maximize the internal influence of that faction. The German statesmen chose certain moves to influence the faction of the British cabinet that favored non-involvement in the Serbian affair. But influencing the different factions of an adversary state does not seem to have been a factor in the Russian choice of tactics nor the French or Austrian or the British.

10) Proposition: Public communications are usually more ambiguous than private ones.

Evidence: The evidence of the case of 1914 does not bear directly on the proposition that public communications are usually more ambiguous than private ones. Very little of the diplomacy of 1914 was public.

11) Proposition: Tactics of "risk manipulation" tend to be least likely and least frequent in the high-tension phase of a crisis.

Evidence: The data of 1914 suggest that the proposition which

states that tactics of risk manipulation tend to be least likely and least frequent in the high-tension phase of a crisis is not true. But this inference depends on the particular identification of the high-tension phase of the crisis, which I identify as being the five days from July 28 through August 1. Risk manipulation tactics are very much in evidence in those five days, as much in evidence in that period of time as in any other period of time in the crisis.

12) Proposition: Moves in the early stages of a crisis will be relatively coercive and conflictful; in the later stages they will be more cooperative in nature.

Evidence: The data of the case of 1914 suggest that the statement which proposes that moves in the early stages of a crisis will be relatively coercive and conflictual but in the later stages cooperative is false. The moves in the later stages of the later stages of the 1914 crisis were not more cooperative but equally conflictual.

C. HYPOTHESES RELATING TACTICS TO RESPONSES

1) Proposition: Blatant, preemptory, openly aggressive demands and threats are more likely to be resisted than those presented in a "reasonable" tone.

Evidence: The evidence of 1914 does not suggest the confirmation of the statement that openly aggressive demands and threats are more likely to be resisted than those presented in a reasonable tone. Blatant threats and reasonably worded threats and demands were both resisted.

2) Proposition: Threats may have a provocative effect (stiffening the other's resolve) which undermines or offsets their coercive effect.

Evidence: The evidence of the 1914 case suggests the validity of the statement that threats may have a provocative effect which undermines their coercive effect. The Russians and the French were incensed at the Austrian and German attempt to coerce Russia from backing Serbia through the threat of an alliance war. The German threat meant to coerce Belgium into allowing German troops to pass through Belgium on the way to France provoked the Belgium government and stiffened the Belgium resolve to resist. But it is not the nature of the threat that seems to be important, whether the words are soft or strong, but the fact of being threatened, being coerced, that provokes resentment.

3) Proposition: Less provocation is caused by attempts to change utilities and utility perceptions than by outright threats.

Evidence: The data of 1914 suggest that less provocation is caused by the attempt to change utilities and utility perceptions than by outright threats.

4) Proposition: If a "rule of the game" is broken, the other party's resolve is likely to increase.

Evidence: The research guidance does not identify the "rules of the game".

5) Proposition: Decision-makers seldom think probabilistically, calculate "expected values" or "expected costs" of moves, etc; moves

tend to be rejected because they are "too dangerous", or undertaken because they are "necessary", without much careful estimating of the probabilities of various adversary responses.

Evidence: The data of 1914 suggest that statesmen do not use the terms "expected values" and "expected costs" in reference to tactics and strategy, but neither do they fail to estimate the enemy response to chosen moves. The responses are not thought of in terms of, "3 to 2, we'll get bombed after the next move," but the responses of the adversary are carefully considered. There is evidence of miscalculation, but not of sloppy calculation. The statesmen of 1914 certainly gave a good deal of thought as to the effects on the adversary of each of their own decisions.

6) Proposition: "Toughness" tends to breed toughness in the other; firm commitment generates firm counter-commitment; conciliation produces reciprocal conciliation.

Evidence: The data of 1914 suggest that firm commitment and toughness usually meet firm counter-commitment and toughness, while it does not suggest that conciliation produces reciprocal conciliation.

7) Proposition: Compellent threats stiffen the opponent's will to resist; deterrent threats do not.

Evidence: The 1914 case does not suggest any difference in the effects of a compellent versus a deterrent threat on the opponent's will to resist.

D. HYPOTHESES RELATING ENVIRONMENT, SETTING, AND TACTICS TO OUTCOMES

1) Proposition: When inherent bargaining power is relatively equal, salience will have maximum effect on the outcome; when there is inequality in bargaining power, bargaining power will overcome salience.

Evidence: What might be considered a salient outcome in the 1914 crisis? Perhaps the proposal to have the Austrians occupy Belgrade, the Serbian capital. No, that would satisfy neither the Russians nor the Austrians nor the Serbians. I do not perceive a salient solution in the 1914 crisis.

2) Proposition: Salience has little effect on settlements, but more effect in limiting tactics and restricting escalation.

Evidence: I cannot apply this proposition to the 1914 case for the absence of salience.

3) Proposition: Asymmetries in the systemic environment and bargaining setting (i.e., inherent power) have more effect on outcomes than bargaining tactics (tactical power).

Evidence: There is no total asymmetry in the systemic environment and bargaining setting in the crisis of 1914.

4) Proposition: Before the nuclear age, crises tended to be terminated by a formal statement if they did not lead to war; now they tend to fade away, ending in tacit acceptance of a de facto state of affairs.

Evidence: The crisis of 1914 ended in war.

5) Proposition: Miscalculations of other's intentions is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar system.

Evidence: Evidence from a case study cannot answer this question, which implies a comparative study of crises. The case of 1914 occurred within a multipolar system and did include miscalculations of intentions.

E. HYPOTHESES ABOUT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS AND ADVERSARY BARGAINING

1) Proposition: Firm commitment increases bargaining power vis-a-vis the opponent but decreases bargaining power vis-a-vis an ally.

Evidence: There is no evidence in the 1914 case that an ally loses bargaining power vis-a-vis his ally if he gives his ally a firm commitment. Germany and France, contrary to conventional wisdom, did not lose the ability to influence their allies after they gave firm pledges of support to their allies. Most later historians doubt that Germany attempted to influence Austria to agree to negotiation of the Serbian issue. In any case, the evidence is much too contentious ~~to~~ to either confirm or disconfirm this statement. As for France, there is no evidence that France sought to change Russia's behavior in the crisis of 1914. Therefore, we cannot say that France lost influence over Russia because of her firm commitment to Russia. The first attempts of Germany to "restrain" Austria were for propaganda purposes. The German attempt to get Austria to agree with Italy over the reading of the Triple Alliance treaty arrangements did not meet with

success. Whether this lack of success was due to the fact that the Germans gave Austria a firm commitment is difficult to say. The German attempt of the 31st of July to get Austria to agree to the "Halt at Belgrade" proposal was contradicted by opposing German counsel, i.e., Moltke's telegram informing Austria of the need to mobilize. Neither is it evident that Britain gained influence over France and Russia because she did not give either a firm commitment of support. The same goes for Italy in her attempts to work out a territorial agreement with Austria.

2) Proposition: Especially when the supporting ally values the stakes lower than the target ally, the supporting ally is likely to take a firmer position in communications with opponent than in communications with the target ally. (This follows from the tension between the desire to deter the opponent and the desire to restrain the ally.)

Evidence: This hypothesis is unclear to me. Do not allies usually take firmer positions in communications with opponents than they do with each other? In the 1914 case, it appears that neither Germany or France valued the stakes lower than Austria or Russia, so that the hypothesis is not applicable to these relations. It is applicable to the British-Russian relations in the crisis. The British did not use stronger language with Germany than Russia; the proposition appears then to be disconfirmed by the 1914 data.

3) Proposition: When allies value the stakes differently, the aggressor will modulate his demands to fall somewhere between the

maximum concession point of the target country and the maximum concession point of the supporting ally.

Evidence: Let us identify the participants; Germany and Austria are the aggressors and Serbia is the target country while Russia^{is} the supporting ally. Now, did Germany and Austria modulate their demands to fall somewhere between the maximum concession point of the target country (Serbia) and the maximum concession point of the supporting ally (Russia) ? No, Germany and Austria did not. This statement is not verified by the evidence of the case of 1914.

4) Proposition: Proposals emanating from the ally of the aggressor state are likely to be more acceptable to the target country than those coming from the aggressor himself because (a) the ally's endorsement enhances the power behind the proposals, (b) to some extent the ally may be able to assume the pose of a disinterested third party, and (c) there is less humiliation in conceding to the aggressor's ally than to the aggressor himself.

Evidence: Were the proposals which came from Germany more acceptable to Russia than those coming from the Austrians? Yes, on the whole, for reason (b), Germany assumed the pose of a more or less impartial third party. But the primary reason the German proposals were more acceptable to the Russians is that they were more accomodating to the Russian interests. The Germans talked about a negotiated settlement of the conflict while the Austrians did not.

5) Proposition: In a multipolar system there are likely to be greater differences in the allies' valuation of the immediate stakes than in a bipolar system, but this may be offset in part by the greater

value placed on alliance loyalty and alliance preservation in a multipolar system.

Evidence: This is a comparative, not a case study question. But let me address the question to my case. There does not seem to be a great difference in the valuations of the immediate stakes by France and Russia or by Germany and Austria. They ~~was~~ all agreed on the importance of the conflict and the values the conflict endangered. Only Britain and Italy differed from their allies in their evaluations of the issues at stake. England did not place a great value on the Russian alliance and did place a great value on the French alliance. Italy did not place a great value on the Austrian alliance and did place a great value on the German alliance (except in the cases where the German alliance brought Italy into conflict with France and England);

6) Proposition: If the protecting ally sees the issue as only part of a larger confrontation, his values at stake are more likely to approximate those of the target ally.

Evidence: In the French and the Russian case, France (the protecting ally) did see the immediate issue as part of a larger alliance confrontation and did offer Russia firm support throughout the crisis. Britain (the protector ally) did not see the immediate issue as a pawn in the alliance power relations (at least not initially, though there were members of the diplomatic service who did look at the crisis as an alliance crisis, a test of strength and commitment), and throughout the crisis, did not offer Russia firm support.

In the German and the Austrian case, the protecting ally (Germany) did see the issue of Serbia as an important element in the confrontation of the two alliances and did offer Austria full support. Italy saw the immediate issue as a part of an alliance confrontation, but did not offer support to Austria.

7) Proposition: In a multipolar crisis, as tension increases, commitments to allies tend to become firmer, for two reasons:

a) With rising tensions, countries become more fearful of losing allies; thus allies tend to be supported rather than restrained.

b) A belief that the best way to preserve peace is to deter the adversary by a firm alliance front.

Evidence: In the 1914 multipolar crisis, as tension increased, commitments to allies did not tend and did tend to become firmer. Germany's commitment to Austria did not become firmer and neither did Italy's commitment to Austria. France's commitment to Russia was equally firm throughout the crisis. England's support of France became firm only after the violent outcome of the crisis became clear, the variable of war being more weighty than the variable of tension. France expected war, not deterrence. England did not believe the best way to preserve peace was to deter the adversary by a firm alliance front. Germany was never fearful of losing Austrian support but was fearful of Austria's loss of power and influence, a loss which would make Austria a less worthy ally. In summary, the evidence of 1914 seems not to validate the proposition.

8) Proposition: The less confident a country is of the loyalty of an ally, the more reluctant it will be to restrain the ally in a crisis (especially in a multipolar system).

Evidence: Germany was confident of the loyalty of Austria and France was confident of the loyalty of Russia. The case of 1914 provides no evidence for this proposition in these two cases of alliance relations. The character of the British relations with France and Russia and the character of Italian relations with Germany and Austria do not epitomize the relations referred to in the proposition. Neither Italy nor England needed to be restrained.

9) Proposition: Collaboration between alliance leaders in a crisis tends to reduce cohesion in one or both alliances.

Evidence: In your paper on crisis bargaining, you referred to France and Germany as the leaders of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. France and Germany did not collaborate in the crisis of 1914, and thus, the case of 1914 does not allow speculation on the verity of this proposition.

10) Proposition: Since alliance cohesion is less crucial in bipolarity, the easier it is for alliance leaders to restrain lesser allies and collaborate to de-fuse a crisis between their subordinates.

Evidence: The case of 1914 is a multipolar crisis bargaining situation, and therefore, offers no evidence for or against this proposition.

11) Proposition: Small powers are more likely to take risks than their big power allies.

Evidence: Serbia is the only small power involved in the 1914 crisis bargaining, and she did not take greater risks in the bargaining than did Russia, her big power ally.

12) Proposition: Other things being equal, firmer commitments and stronger threats will be made by the more cohesive alliance.

Evidence: Was the German-Austrian alliance more cohesive than the French-Russian alliance in the crisis bargaining of 1914? No. Was the Triple Entente more cohesive than the Triple Alliance in the 1914 bargaining? No. The data of 1914 do not bear on this question.

13) Proposition: The target country's will to resist will vary directly with its perception of its supporting ally's resolve.

Evidence: Perhaps we can say that there are two target countries in the 1914 crisis, Serbia and Russia. Serbia had a high resolve to resist Austria and perceived that its ally, Russia, had a high resolve to resist Austria. Russia had a high resolve to resist Austria and Germany and perceived that her ally, France, had a high resolve to resist Germany. Therefore, the evidence appears to affirm a positive relation of these two variables, resolve and ally support.

14) Proposition: It is easier for great powers to control small allies in a bipolar system than in a multipolar system.

Evidence: This is a comparative, not a case study question. Serbia was the only small power in the crisis bargaining of 1914, and Russia, Serbia's stronger ally, had no difficulty in "controlling" Serbia.

F. HYPOTHESES ABOUT PERCEPTIONS AND IMAGES

1) Proposition: Actors tend to perceive what their images lead them to expect; incoming "signals" are interpreted to conform to the existing image.

Evidence: This is a very general or diffuse statement and my answer shall likewise be very general and diffuse. It appears from the data of the case of 1914 that states do have established images and expectations of other states, and that they do judge the credibility of the incoming messages according to the fit of the message to the prior image which sets in the receiver's mind the expected behavior pattern of the message sender. But the images are not all powerful determinants of the interpretation of the incoming signals. For instance, Germany came to the crisis of 1914 with the image of Russia as a nation which tended to make powerful, tough statements, but a nation which did not act powerful or tough, at least not in relation to Germany. Germany expected the Russians to have a big bark but no bite. And this image of Russia as a bluffer in international crisis bargaining situations led Germany to discount the Russian signals which said that Russia would resist not only Austria but also Germany in this particular crisis. Germany changed her mind about Russia's intentions when Russia mobilized. This was not something that Russia had been expected to do, to take an action that backed up the tough words, an action that entailed great risk. Germany (all but Kaiser Wilhelm, who was not kept abreast of events) changed their perception

of Russia as a bluffer.

2) Proposition: Historical experiences and traumas heavily condition images.

Evidence: Naturally, images are created from experience. What constitutes an international trauma? The images which the participants in the 1914 case had of each other before the start of the 1914 crisis did result from prior experiences with each other in previous crises. The Bosnian experience of Germany with Russia led Germany to infer that Russia could be manipulated by Germany if Germany threatened to go to war against Russia. If Russia told the German diplomats that she would resist Germany, even at the cost of a general Continental war, the German diplomats would tend to perceive such a communication as an attempt to bluff Germany from her chosen course of action. But the German image of what the rational response of Russia would be to a German threat of war over the Serbian issue was influenced particularly by the German perceptions of the poor internal situation of Russia in 1914, not just prior Russian performances in crises with Germany.

Another example would be the image England held of Germany. Germany had deliberately threatened the Triple Entente in the Moroccan crisis of 1911, but England had an image of Germany in 1914 as being cooperative, not belligerent. The experiences of cooperation with Germany in the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 had apparently erased the prior English image of Germany as threatening the security of England in almost everything she did in crisis situations.

Thus, the images international statesmen have of each other appear very changeable, not constant. But inferences of crisis behavior may be more lasting.

3) Proposition: Decision-makers tend to perceive adversaries as more hostile than they are in reality.

Evidence: The decision-makers of 1914 do not appear to have perceived adversaries as being more hostile than was really the case. In fact, it was the other way around. England and Russia initially both perceived Germany as being less than hostile, even though Germany was an adversary in the crisis by alliance logic. Germany underestimated the Russian hostility to Germany, if not to Austria. France did perceive Germany to be hostile, but not more hostile than Germany really was.

4) Proposition: Decision-makers over-estimate the degree to which adversaries are motivated by aggressive aims and under-estimate the degree to which they are motivated by fear.

Evidence: It does not seem that the decision-makers of 1914 over-estimated the degree to which their adversaries in the crisis were motivated by aggressive aims and underestimated the degree to which they were motivated by fear. Russia underestimated the degree to which Germany was motivated by aggressive aims. Britain did likewise. Germany overestimated the degree to which Russia was motivated by fear and the degree to which France was motivated by fear. The proposition does not appear to be validated by the data of the 1914 case.

5) Proposition: Expectations are more influential than desires in the interpretation of incoming signals and communications.

Evidence: This is a difficult question to answer. Conflicts between expectations and desires do not seem to be that prevalent in the 1914 crisis data. In the beginning of the crisis, Russia threatened to resist an Austrian invasion of Serbia, but Germany calculated that if she threatened to resist Russian action against Austria, then Russia would back down. Germany both expected and desired that Russia back down. This happened in most cases, expectations and desires were complementary, not contradictory. Germany both expected and desired that Britain would be neutral. Austria both desired and expected that Russia would be deterred by Germany. Russia both desired and expected that Germany would restrain Austria. France expected that Germany would not restrain Austria, but desired that Germany do so. But the French desire did not distort the interpretation of data from Germany about German intentions.

6) Proposition: The greater the ambiguity of incoming information and communication, the less impact it will have on pre-established beliefs.

Evidence: The crisis of 1914 contains behavior which appears to validate the truthfulness of this proposition. England sent ambiguous answers to Germany concerning the question of her eventual support or non-support of France in the event of a war between France-Russia and Germany-Austria. The Germans asked the British if they would remain neutral or if they would enter the conflict on the side of France.

The English answers were deliberately non-committal or ambiguous and were very difficult for the Germans to interpret. The Germans believed or expected or desired that the English would not intervene. The ambiguous messages of the British did nothing to change the pre-established beliefs of the Germans. So the hypothesis seems true in this one case.

7) Proposition: The higher the tension, the more rigid the images. Thus, the higher the tension in a crisis, the clearer one's communications must be in order to modify the adversary's image.

Evidence: This is a difficult question to answer because it is hard to hold other qualities constant. I am not altogether sure that the first statement is true; is the rigidity of images a function of tension? The data of 1914 suggest the opposite. In 1914, the statesmen changed their images at the height of the crisis tension. At the beginning, let us say that Germany had an image of Russia as a bluffer. Germany was convinced at the height of the crisis tension, that Russia would not be deterred by the threat of war, that she was not bluffing. The image of Russia as a bluffer did not become more rigid as tension mounted but less rigid.

Britain, going into the crisis, had gained in the two previous years, an image of Germany as being cooperative, not aggressive. She held this image through most of the crisis, until the tensest moments, when she changed this image. The British image of Germany did not become more rigid as the tension mounted, but more flexible. Incoming information began to be interpreted in the frame of a different image, one of Germany as a seeker of continental hegemony or dominance.

The same thing happened to Russia as happened to Britain. Russia at first held an image of Germany as being the restrainer of Austria in the Balkans, which Germany had truly been in the past two Balkan wars. But the incoming information soon suggested that Germany was not restraining Austria in the Balkans in the 1914 crisis, but even encouraging Austrian aggressiveness. This change in image came at the height of tension and suggests that the Russian statesmen's images were flexible, not rigid.

These examples suggest that this proposition does not apply to the case of 1914. Images did change as the tension increased. The images were not rigidly held, but on the contrary, were swiftly and accurately changed when incoming information contradicted the pre-crisis images.

8) Proposition: Statesmen tend to perceive their own alternatives as more restricted than the adversary's alternatives.

Evidence: There is not much information in the 1914 crisis that pertains to this question. Germany and Russia did tell each other that they had no alternatives but to do such and such, and that the only hope for peace was that the other would do such and such, implying that the other side had a greater number of options. But this does not mean that the statesmen actually thought that the other state had more options. It is more a statement of commitments, a conscious bargaining tactic, to relinquish the initiative to the other side.

9) Proposition: The adversary usually appears as more monolithic, with greater singleness of purpose, than one's own state.

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Evidence: There is no evidence in the facts of the case of 1914 to support this proposition and there is some evidence to contradict it. Of the crisis participants, Britain was the nation with the least singleness of purpose. Yet the British Foreign Minister referred to the difficulty that the German statesmen must be having with their military staff, to the strain upon Bethmann-Hollweg because of the contrariness of the German military leaders. Among the other participants, there is no reference to the more monolithic quality of the adversary.

10) Proposition: The greater the stature and the authority of the person making a declaration, the greater credibility will be attributed to it.

Evidence: The facts of the 1914 case as reported by the historians contain no information which would either support or not support this proposition. Most all of the international declarations were made from head of state and foreign minister to head of state and foreign minister through ambassadors and telegrams.

11) Proposition: The resolve of statesmen in a crisis will be heavily influenced by their perception of the adversary's ultimate aims--whether they are limited or far-reaching.

Evidence: This statement appears to be confirmed by the 1914 evidence. France's opposition to Germany and to Austria and her support of Russia was based on the calculation that the Serbian crisis was a test case. If France and Russia and Britain gave way on Serbia, France expected that such blatantly coercive and deceptive tactics would be tried

again and again. Were Austria and Germany's true purposes the punishment of Serbia or the devitalization of the Triple Entente? France thought that the German-Austrian aims were far-reaching, and on this basis, manifested a high degree of resolve.

On the other side of the coin, Britain did not perceive that the adversary's aims were far-reaching. Britain calculated that Germany would restrain Austria from taking any measure that would seriously upset the Balkan status quo. She did not see a German challenge to the Triple Entente or the Austrian move against Serbia. Thus, England thought that the aims of the adversary were limited, and she did not manifest a high degree of resolve.

Russia perceived, like France, that the adversary's aims were not limited, but included the propose of shifting the balance of power and influence in the Balkans from one side to the other. Russia did reveal a high degree of resolve.

G. HYPOTHESES RELATING INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING TO BARGAINING TACTICS

1) Proposition: Difficulty of changing an agreed position within a government lends extra resolve to resist the opponent's demands.

Evidence: The Austrians did say to the Russian government that any concession by the Austrian government to Russian demands would result in the popular removal of that Austrian government. But it is hard to guess whether this internal difficulty in changing policy lent extra resolve to Austrian policy because it is difficult to determine whether the statement was true or was merely a bargaining ploy by the Austrians.

2) Proposition: Lack of unity in a government increases the ambiguity of bargaining moves.

Evidence: There is little support for this proposition in the literature on the crisis of 1914. The governments with the greatest lack of unity were the British and German governments and their bargaining moves were not more ambiguous than those of the governments with more unity.

3) Proposition: The higher the tension, the greater the influence of emotion as compared to reasoned calculation.

Evidence: This statement is difficult to judge, given the nature of the reporting done by the historians whom I rely upon for the facts of the case. The emotional content of various decisions is not estimated, perhaps because of the difficulty of doing so. There were several outbursts of emotion reported among the different statesmen, but these outbursts do not seem to have changed policy. The emotions supported the policy determined by reasoned calculation. The only instance I can recall in which emotion and calculation were opposed is the Kaiser's response to the telegram from the Tsar informing the Kaiser of the Russian necessity of mobilization against Austria. The Kaiser, affected emotionally in a fearful and doubtful manner by an earlier communication from his ambassador in England informing him of a possible unfavorable change in British intentions, misread the telegram from the Tsar. The Kaiser thought that the Russians had taken precautionary military measures five days earlier than they had, and from this he inferred that the Russians had seen through the German policy of deception.

But the tension probably was partly to blame for the Kaiser's misperception.

4) Proposition: Urgency and time pressure in a crisis inhibits the search for alternatives and favors the selection of traditional, habitual or already-planned moves.

Evidence: The evidence of the 1914 case suggests that the proposition does not apply to the events of this case. The urgency and pressure in the 1914 crisis did not inhibit the search for alternative outcomes. The British and the Russian governments came up with proposal after proposal, alternative outcome after alternative outcome at the very height of the tension and anxiety. Kaiser Wilhelm thought of the "Halt at Belgrade" plan at the point of much pressure and urgency.

5) Proposition: The longer the duration of a crisis, or the lower its severity, the greater the influence of organizational roles on perceptions and evaluation of alternatives.

Evidence: This is a difficult hypothesis to work with, providing little research guidance. What do we know about the influence of organization roles on perceptions and evaluations of alternatives of foreign policy? Confined to a common-sense or common-knowledge reading of this variable, there is no evidence available in the records of the 1914 crisis which allows one to say that the short duration of the crisis did or did not affect the influence of organizational roles on perceptions.

6) Proposition: The greater the involvement of public opinion, the less the government's flexibility; this will reduce the government's capacity for accomodation and compromise but strengthen its bargaining

power behind the position it takes.

Evidence: Was the public opinion of England more involved than the public opinion of Germany or of France or of Austria or of Russia? How can we judge such a question? How can we measure such a variable? Where is the data on such a question? There is little. We are informed of people of the various nations milling and agitating at different times in the street. We are told that each government spoke of the people's support. But what does this tell us about the differences in the public involvement in each nation? Nothing. Do we judge public opinion involvement by scattered activities in the capital cities? Perhaps the question is meant to refer to the form of government as a variable; whether the parliament of each government is a powerful factor in the decision-making machinery. Perhaps the concept of public opinion involvement, since it is almost immensurable, or at least the research procedure for measuring it has not been given to us case studiers, might be changed to the concept of government responsibility to the public opinion. In that case, I think that we would be safe in saying that the British government was more responsive to public opinion than was the German government. Yet it was the British government which revealed the greater capacity for accomodation and compromise and flexibility. Certainly it depends upon the nature of the public opinion of the time. The proposition assumes that the public opinion will be bellicose, hostile to accomodation and compromise. In any case, in 1914 most of the crisis bargaining was not public and so this variable was not all that important.

7) Proposition: Decision-makers in the crisis area generally prefer a tougher line than decision-makers at home.

Evidence: What is the crisis area of the 1914 crisis? Serbia, Austria, Germany? It is more difficult to apply this concept to the 1914 crisis than it would be to apply the concept to the Berlin crisis, for example. It does not make that much sense to speak of decision-makers in a geographical crisis area in the 1914 area. Perhaps we can adapt the question to the 1914 crisis bargaining by speaking of the ambassadors in the different adversary capitals. Did the ambassadors (as decision-makers abroad) advise a tougher policy than the policy which the foreign ministers and heads of state eventually chose? Yes and no. In the German case, the German Ambassador to Russia advised a policy as tough as the official policy, while the German Ambassador to London advised a policy less tough. In the English case, the English Ambassadors to Russia and Germany advised a tougher policy than the policy which the British Cabinet decided upon. In the French case, the Ambassadors' advise and the policy of the top decision-makers were in perfect alignment. The same applies to the Austrian and Russian cases.

8) Proposition: Military men generally prefer tougher tactics than civilians.

Evidence: In the 1914 crisis, the difference of opinion between the different national military men and the civilian statesmen centered upon the question of mobilization. The military officials were responsible for the nation's defense preparations in the event of a civilian

decision for war. In the fulfillment of this responsibility, the military men pressured the diplomats for measures of war preparation after the diplomats had begun to use these measures as an index of resolve, as an instrument in the diplomatic competition. The military men had nothing to do in most cases with the choice of a tough or not-so-tough strategy. But they did bring pressure to bear on the diplomats to keep abreast of the general military preparations of the nations competing diplomatically, in case the diplomatic strategies backfired, and the diplomatic competition and test of strength turned into one of military competition and a test of arms. If these measures for military preparation were intended to be defensive, are they tougher measures?

Being more specific, General Conrad of Austria certainly advocated a tough policy against Serbia, but not any tougher than the policy of the civilians. And at the point of an actual commitment to arms, General Conrad advised a policy less tough, or shall we say, less aggressive, than the policy of the civilians.

In Germany, Moltke, the top German military official, did not prefer tougher tactics than did Kaiser Wilhelm, but did favor mobilization before Bethmann-Hollweg did.

In Russia, the three top military officials followed the lead of Sazanov, the foreign minister, and did not favor a tougher policy. In Britain, the military men did not suggest tougher policies, but the civilian chief of the navy, Chruchill, did.

In France, the top military official, Joffre, waited until the ultimatum note from Germany to press upon the diplomats the necessity of mobilization.

So through most of the crisis, the majority of the military men did not prefer tougher tactics. It does not appear that the military officials thought of military measures as diplomatic tactics. But at the end of the crisis, when war was considered inevitable by the diplomats, the military men did prefer instant mobilization.

H. HYPOTHESES RELATING OUTCOMES TO AFTERMATHS

1) Proposition: Weakness in one crisis creates an expectation in the adversary that one will be weak in the next.

Evidence: The crisis of 1914 offers unambiguous evidence on the validity of this proposition. Because of the Russian capitulation to the German threat of war in the Bosnian crisis of 1909, the Germans expected Russia to capitulate to a German threat of war in the crisis of 1914.

2) Proposition: A show of weakness in one crisis stimulates a desire to correct this image by toughness in the next.

Evidence: This proposition seems to describe one of the Russian motives in the 1914 crisis. The Russians did desire to show Germany and Austria that they could not be blatantly coerced by threats of war, and that not all Russian statesmen were prone to exaggeration or bluffing. Sazanov was determined not to be treated like Izvolsky had been treated in the crisis of 1909. Nor was Sazanov going to let himself be frightened out of his position by Germany.

3) Proposition: A demonstration of resolve in a crisis strengthens alliance cohesion; a show of weakness reduces cohesion.

Evidence: This certainly seems to describe what happened in the 1914 crisis. The Austrian demonstration of resolve in the crisis appeared to be the price of German support. The German statesmen had begun to doubt the value of Austria as an ally, and her show of determination against the undermining influence of Serbia increased the value of Austria as an ally in the eyes of the German statesmen.

The exact same relationship occurred between France and Russia. At the beginning of the crisis, France doubted whether the Russian statesmen had the fortitude to aggressively or firmly respond to what the French perceived to be a German threat to the Triple Entente and especially to the cohesion of the Russian-French alliance. Once Russia revealed her determination to resist coercion by the adversary alliance, the French were more pleased with the Russian alliance.

4) Proposition: In a multipolar system, a state's weakness in a crisis may stimulate a trend toward defection and realignment among its allies; firmer commitments to the allies may be necessary to counteract this trend.

Evidence: The crisis of 1914 data have little that is pertinent to this proposition. No state acted with weakness in the crisis, so it is impossible to judge the trend toward defection and realignment among allies due to this variable.

5) Proposition: Some crises leave an aftermath of hostility between the parties; others result in increased friendship or detente. Provisionally, we hypothesize that the result will depend on the

- following: a. The finality of the settlement
- b. The existence of another common adversary of the parties
- c. The provocativeness of the tactics used in the crisis
- d. The degree of humiliation suffered by the defeated side.

Evidence: The crisis of 1914 left an aftermath of the greatest hostility; war. In answer to the first variable, there was no settlement. Likewise, both sides were defeated diplomatically, both failing to deter the other. There was no other common adversary of the parties not involved in the crisis bargaining. And the tactics were provocative on both sides. Thus, the proposition, as stated, is not relevant to the crisis of 1914.

6) Proposition: The defeated side in a crisis will attempt to rationalize its capitulation in a way which minimizes costs.

Evidence: This proposition is not relevant to the 1914 crisis because there was no formal settlement and the violent outcome of the crisis defeated the diplomatic purposes of both sides. There was no capitulation.

7) Proposition: A strong show of resolve in a crisis enhances a state's attractiveness as a potential ally.

Evidence: The variables of this proposition are nearly the same as the variables of proposition 3 which suggested that a show of resolve strengthened alliance cohesion. The data of 1914 confirm the relation-

ship between an ally's crisis resolve and the ally's value as a partner in international political bargaining.

I. HYPOTHESES ABOUT BIDDING MOVES

1) Proposition: Concessions made in a crisis will be perceived as more costly than the same concession made in a non-crisis period because much of the cost of a concession made under duress is in terms of reputation for resolve. Thus concessions are less likely in a crisis than in "peaceful diplomacy."

Evidence: This proposition assumes the existence of similar tactics in crisis and non-crisis periods of international bargaining. The question is a comparative one and outside the scope of a singular case study of a crisis. I imagine it would be hard to find data to bring to bear on this proposition.

2) Proposition: An actor can help himself to concede by asking a quid pro quo which is relatively costless to the other side but can be rationalized as substantial to his own constituency.

Evidence: Such a tactic did not arise in the 1914 crisis.

3) Proposition: Losses from backing down in a challenge may be reduced by redefining one's vital interests.

Evidence: This proposition is not relevant to the case of 1914 because there were no losses from backing down.

4) Proposition: The higher the level of tension, the more likely that concessions will be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Evidence: This proposition is difficult to apply to the crisis of 1914 because at the highest point of tension, no meaningful concessions were made by either side.

5) Proposition: In a multipolar system, the maximum concession by the defending side will be the maximum acceptable to the most powerful supporting ally; in a bipolar system, it will be the maximum acceptable to the most interested ally.

Evidence: The crisis of 1914 has qualities of multipolarity and bipolarity. There was a rough equality of power shared by 6 European states, but these six states were organized into two fairly equal alliances. The international system at the time of the crisis was a mixture of multipolar and bipolar. We must be careful then in generalizing from the 1914 case as a sample of a multipolar crisis. In this light, what does the data of 1914 have to say about the proposition? There was an alignment or agreement between the maximum concession by the defending side and the maximum acceptable concession of the most powerful and most interested supporting ally.

6) Proposition: Concessions may first be offered in "sign language" to test the opponent's willingness to reciprocate; if no reciprocating signal is received, the first side will go back to its original position.

Evidence: There does not appear to be an offering of concessions in sign language in the crisis of 1914.

SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT

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CHECKLIST Part One.....THE SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT

1. SYSTEM STRUCTURE

In 1914 the international system was composed of six major powers or actors. Among these six nations of Europe, no one nation had a marked superiority in arms and influence. The distribution of influence and military capabilities was fairly equally divided between two alliances or coalitions, each alliance containing three of the continent's and the world's major nations. The nation-states of the period had evolved no international organization.

2. IDEOLOGICAL HOMOGENEITY OR HETEROGENEITY

Professor Richard Rosencrance has concluded that the international system of the years between 1890 and 1918 was not marked by ideological conflict. The national leaders of this period were divided not by ideology, but by the forces of nationalism and imperialism, according to Rosencrance.

3. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

What was unique or unusual in the military technology or organization or strategy of the period before the crisis at Sarajevo? What military factors had important determining effects upon the decisions, the bargaining options, of the participant statesmen? There are two factors we must mention: first, the existence of mass armies, the greatest part of which were inactive or held in reserve in times of peace, and second, the process by which this massive, inactive army was activated to combat status.

The mass army was an unwieldy military organization in a period in which communication was generally by telegraph and transportation was by train. Organization and transportation of the mass army could be handled only in an awkward and inflexible fashion. As worked out by the Germans, and used with great success in 1866 and in 1870, the reserve-dominated mass army required the creation, long before a war began, of detailed plans of mobilization and transportation. In most countries in 1914, the mobilization of the enormous reserve armies, the change from peace status to war status, took a good deal of time. The German strategist, Helmuth von Moltke, had found a way to speed up the mobilization process, and the Germans had put this method to good use in the victories of 1866 and 1870; in both cases the Germans had gained an important military advantage from the rapid change from peace to war footing. Moltke's method was to merge mobilization and attack into a single operation so that the final concentration of troops took place in the enemy country, practically on the battlefield itself, just before contact with the main military forces of the enemy. This merging of mobilization and attack characterized only the German plans of mobilization. The mobilization plans of the other European powers were not offensive maneuvers; they were defensive operations. The difference between the German mobilization operation and the other European mobilization operations was an important factor in the crisis interaction of 1914. We shall discuss the diplomatic implications in a moment.

Another important feature of the military technology and organization of the nations participating in the crisis of 1914 is the reliance of the mobilization of the reserve armies on the railroads. Once mobilization had been ordered the railroad equipment was not good enough to let the mobilizing armies disband without terrible confusion. If remobilization had to be ordered, and carried out quickly, it would have been impossible. Therefore, mobilization would be left temporarily defenseless in relation to a nation continuing mobilization and complete such.

If all the mobilization schedules of the nations of 1914 took an approximately equal time to complete, a premium was put by the military system on being the first to begin mobilization. During the military process, before completion, the army of a 1914 nation was unbelievably disorganized and therefore dangerously vulnerable. Once one nation began to mobilize, all the rest who were fearful of the hostility of that nation, had to mobilize in order to prevent a military disaster should that initiating nation choose to attack once mobilized. In the previous European wars, the victorious party had been the nation which had been the first to mobilize. Thus, the military system put something of a premium on a preventive war mentality and organization of strategy.

Add to the advantage of being the first to mobilize, the offensive, and not defensive character of the German mobilization operations, and you have an unstable military milieu in which to carry on crisis diplomacy.

What about the German mobilization strategy; why was it so destabilizing? The Germans were the only European nation faced with the possibility of a two-front war, being faced with the allied forces of France and Russia. The German officials foresaw that the only possibility of a victory in a war with France and Russia involved the exploitation of the lead time of a German mobilization over a Russian mobilization. The German army mobilized six weeks faster than the Russian army. The Germans planned to use this six weeks to concentrate their forces on France, hoping to neutralize the French military force before the Russian army was able to begin an attack on the eastern side of Germany. If the French army were neutralized before the Russian army attacked, the German military officials were confident that the Russian army could be defeated and swiftly. But the result of the German mobilization strategy was that it inevitably meant war, because the mobilized forces were finally organized on enemy soil. German mobilization plans left the German army in violation of the French frontier, in order to give the German army a head start on the ultimate goal of invading Paris. The German mobilization strategy was a destabilizing force on the diplomacy of 1914 because it left the German diplomats with one less option than the diplomats of France or Austria or Russia. The mobilization process of the Germans put them at a diplomatic disadvantage in relation to the other nations of 1914, the price they willingly paid in order to obtain the military advantages of the process. The Germans could not respond

to the mobilization of Russia or of France with a mobilization of their own, unless the Germans were prepared to go to war. Their mobilization process had no defensive dimension; their only defense was offense. The Russians could mobilize their army, transport the army to the frontiers of either Germany or Austria, and then wait. They could use mobilization as a diplomatic instrument, as a means of demonstrating resolve or commitment to an ally. The Germans could only use the threat of a mobilization to manipulate risks in a crisis confrontation with Russia or France. The Germans could not wait after mobilization; they could only make war.

But the difference in the German mobilization process had other implications for the diplomacy of 1914. That mobilization meant one thing for Germany and another thing for the rest of the European nations was a crucial factor of misunderstanding in the crisis of 1914. The Russian officials were not aware that the Germans could not answer an opponent's mobilization with a mobilization of their own, without this answer meaning war. Not even the German Foreign Minister, Jagow, was aware that he did not hold this option.

If the other nations in Europe in 1914 did not share the riskiness of the German military plans, the equation of mobilization with invasion, they did share the difficulties of mobilizing a mass army composed primarily of unactivated reserves. And the inflexibility and complexity of the mobilization plans of all the nations involved in the crisis of 1914 made it difficult to have any option between those of complete mobilization and no mobilization at all. Mobilization for all of the

nations of 1914 was an expensive affair and a military action with a very serious diplomatic meaning. For every nation save Germany, mobilization was the last act before war. Thus, the deterrent or compellent value of mobilization should have been very high, except for the peculiar nature of German mobilization.

Another influence of the military technology and strategy of 1914 on the diplomatic actions of the period before the First World War is the equalization of military strength involved in the mobilization process. The larger the size of the army to be mobilized, the more difficult and time-consuming was the process of mobilization. Thus a small army could mobilize more quickly than a large army and could reduce the advantage of size by administering a swift attack upon the larger army, perhaps even disrupting the mobilization of the larger army.

In calculating the influences of the mobilization organization of the European armies on the crisis moves of 1914, we must keep in mind a fact always overlooked by those scholars who talk about mobilization as a cause of war in 1914. It was not the mobilization practices themselves that made mobilization such a war-promoter, but the inclusion of rapid mobilization in a battle plan which emphasized an offensive strategy, a lightning war of invasion. It was the offensive strategy of Germany which took away the option of mobilizing without causing war, not the character of the mobilization of a mass army itself. Germany could have decided for a defensive mobilization plan rather than for an offensive mobilization plan. Nothing in the weaponry of the

period in itself favored the offensive strategy over the defensive strategy. This certainly was proven ex post facto by the subsequent course of the war. What did favor the offensive strategy for Germany was the geographic position of Germany's political rivals and their order of strength. Russia was the stronger in number but the weaker in transport and therefore the slower. The French could prepare for war more quickly than could the Russians and therefore had to be fought first. It was the geographic position of the enemies of Germany, one on each side, that made the offense the best defense for Germany, perhaps the only reliable defense. It was not just the mechanics of the general mobilization system. Germany's adaptation of the mobilization process to their particular military needs was what rendered the mobilization process so volatile a diplomatic deed. One can refer to the Austrian-Russian mobilizations of 1909 and 1912-13 to verify the unstabilizing influence of the German mobilization plans. These mutual mobilizations did not result in war.

But it is not our purpose to determine whether the extraordinary premium on pre-emptive war strategies was due to the influence of either the military technology or the mobilization operations or the particular war strategy or geographic position of Germany. It is our purpose to call attention to the intricate relation of military milieu to diplomatic option in the case of the crisis of 1914 and to call attention to unstable or war-promoting influences of the 1914 military milieu.

In a short analysis of the military milieu of the 1914 crisis bargaining, Professor Thomas Schelling emphasizes the fact that the steps by which a nation got ready for war were the same as the steps by which it would launch war and that is the way they looked to the enemy (Arms and Influence, p. 221). Schelling concludes that mobilization was provocative primarily for this reason. I tend to disagree that this quality of the mobilization practices was a meaningful determinant of the diplomatic choices of July, 1914. That Russia looked as if she were mobilizing for general, European war had little to do with the German decision to go to war against Russia and France. Any Russian mobilization so upset the German plan of offsetting the Russian superiority of size with German haste of organization that Germany would have gone to war whether Russia had partially or completely mobilized. Any Russian preparation for war was threatening to Germany. So, the Russian dilemma of choosing between partial and complete mobilization was a false or insignificant dilemma. And the fact that Russia looked as if she were preparing for war with Germany had little to do with the German decision for war. That Russia looked as if she were preparing to go to war against Austria was enough to set Germany on the decision for war.

Schelling is correct in emphasizing the fact that the mobilization process resulted in the 1914 obsession with the need for haste, "...to have an army at the frontier as quickly as possible, to exploit the enemy's unreadiness if the enemy's mobilization was slower and to minimize the enemy's advantages if he got mobilized on the frontier first (Arms and Influence, p. 222)."

But the need for haste in mobilization, which need took away the time for bargaining, was due to the German need to mobilize a good six weeks ahead of Russia so that Germany could defeat France before Russia could get ready for a full scale offensive operation against Germany.

In summary, the value of this background information on the military milieu of the crisis bargaining of 1914 is that it points out the military dilemma of the Germans before the combined Russian-French opposition and the diplomatic dilemma before the fact of Russian mobilization.

4. ALLIANCES AND ALIGNMENTS

What were the existing alliances and alignments in 1914? On paper, and over certain restricted issues, Europe was divided into two alliances, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. The Triple Alliance consisted of Italy, Austria, and Germany; the Triple Entente consisted of Russia, France, and Britain. The two alliances were a somewhat unique phenomenon in European international history. At no prior time had so many of the primary powers been engaged in such cohesive and enduring alliances. But as A.J.P. Taylor has noted (The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. 518+), it would be wrong to exaggerate the firmness of the alliance commitments. Taylor's interpretation of the events just before the year 1914 reveals the two alliances as being in a precarious state of uncertain alignment. Italy was in between the two alliances in terms of commitments and was not much more than a nominal member

of the Triple Alliance. In France the alliance with Russia was increasingly unpopular, with the socialist spectrum (Jaures, Caillaux) of the political system campaigning to put an end to the alliance. England and France appeared to be taking sides with Germany against Russia on matters concerning the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain and Germany had very visibly been moving toward an entente. Germany's ally, Austria, had been markedly resentful of the German exercise of restraint on Austrian policy during the Balkan wars. In summary, the two alliances marked an unusual phenomenon in European international relations because of their longevity. But the alliances were in an unstable state in the year 1914.

How were the different alliance members committed to each other? The Triple Alliance partners were committed to each other via a formal series of treaties dating from 1882. Italy was committed to defending Germany against an attack from France and vice-versa. Austria was to come to the aid of Italy in the event of a French attack (primarily in the form of aid to the Italian fleet). Italy was committed to a state of neutrality if Russia and Austria were to go to war, with the proviso that Italy might enter the war at a later date. But if Germany and Austria were attacked and engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers, the causus foederis would arise simultaneously for Italy with the outbreak of hostilities.

Germany and Austria were bound to each other against an attack from Russia by the treaty of alliance signed in 1879. In addition, if one of the two allies were attacked by someone besides Russia and

that someone obtained assistance from Russia, either by active participation or by military measures which constituted a menace to the partner attacked, then the partner not under attack was obliged to assist the other partner with its entire fighting force.

The commitments of the Triple Entente members were less certain and less specific than the commitments of the Triple Alliance nations. Like the Triple Alliance agreements, the Triple Entente commitments were kept secret. France and Russia were allied to each other through the Military Convention of 1894. The terms of the Convention stipulated that Russia must aid France to the amount of 700,000 to 800,000 men if France were attacked by Germany or if she were attacked by Italy supported by Germany. In return, France was obligated to employ all her forces to fight Germany (fixed at 1,300,000 men) if Russia were attacked by Germany or if Russia were attacked by Austria aided by Germany. Article 2 of the Convention spoke of mobilization and stated that if the forces of the Triple Alliance were mobilized, then France and Russia should mobilize immediately and move their forces as near to the frontiers as was possible.

The commitments of Britain to France and to Russia are difficult to understand because the commitments are not embodied in a formal treaty. The British refused to change the Entente Cordiale created in 1904 with France into a formal defensive alliance. But the British and the French did arrive at military arrangements so that in the event a British government decided to support France in a war, the two armies could cooperate effectively. But the British made absolutely

certain, from the very first of these military agreements in 1906, that France understood that British aid would depend upon the circumstances. Britain kept the option of not coming to the aid of France in the event of a war. But in 1914, the British Foreign Minister was of the opinion that, "if there is a war between France and Germany, it will be very difficult for us to keep out of it." But the French were not informed of this private opinion of Sir Edward Grey.

The British commitments to Russia on the eve of the crisis are more difficult to decipher than were the British commitments to France. There was little definition to the British and Russian commitments. British relations with Russia did not reach the same degree of closeness as British relations with France. In the spring of 1914, the Russians proposed that the Triple Entente be changed into a formal alliance and be made public. But the British decided against a precise definition of commitments, preferring to retain a great degree of diplomatic flexibility. The British and Russians did engage in naval planning for emergency cooperation in the manner of the British and French naval arrangements. Judging from Sir Grey's diplomatic notes before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was delivered, the British had no intention of engaging in military operations for the sake of Serbian independence or for the sake of Russian interests in the Balkans or in the Straits.

What then was the importance of the contemporary alliance systems in the crisis of July, 1914? A statement by Bernadotte Schmitt seems to

reliably correlate the factor of alliance relations with the bargaining of the crisis of 1914.

As one peruses the innumerable memoirs by politicians, soldiers, and sailors, from the German Emperor to obscure diplomatists, or tries to digest the thousands of documents published since 1918 from the archives, the conviction grows that it was the schism of Europe in Triple Alliance and Triple Entente which fused the various quarrels and forces into one gigantic struggle for the balance of power; and the war came in 1914 because then, for the first time, the lines were sharply drawn between the two rival groups, and neither could yield on the Serbian issue without seeing the balance pass definitely to the other side. (Schmitt as quoted in Manhart, Alliance and Entente, p. 1).

It is my opinion that the alliances might have acted to encourage extremism on the Serbian issue because a country with allies would be bolder than a country with no allies, and because allies in the long run would not act to restrain one another, either because they feared that lukewarm support to an ally in his dispute would lead to even cooler support from an ally in one's own dispute later on or because a restraining influence in an earlier dispute so weakened an alliance that it was necessary to give unrestrained support in a later dispute to save the alliance for the future. This is a sensible chain of reasoning connecting alliance calculations to the bargaining behavior of the participants of 1914, but whether it describes the case is impossible to say because the documents revealing the calculations of the participants are either unclear or silent on this point.

BARGAINING SETTING

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CHECKLIST, PART 2,
BARGAINING SETTING

1. The parties to the crisis;

Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, Russia, Serbia, and Italy.

2. Recent relations between the parties;

The shooting at Sarajevo of the successor to the Austrian-Hungarian throne was the culmination of an antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Serbia that had been growing for a generation. In 1859, the Austrians had been driven out of Italy by the Italian nationalist movement. In 1866, the Austrians had been pushed out of Germany by Prussian leadership of the German nationalist unification. From 1903, when the pro-Austrian king of Serbia was assassinated, the Austrians had been confronted with the Yugoslav nationalist movement. From this point on, the international relations of Serbia and Austria became hazardous. In the decade before 1914, it became evident that Yugoslav nationalism was gaining strength and that a confrontation between Austria and Serbia was probable. One of two outcomes appeared probable; either Austria would bring the Yugoslavs outside the Monarchy under Austrian authority or the Serbians (the only group among the Yugoslavs having an independent state) would detach the Slavs from Austria and would establish a unified Yugoslav state.

Thus it appeared that Austria-Hungary might have to fight once again over the question of resisting the creation of strong national

states around its borders and the possibility of another decrease in territorial authority and in international power and influence.

The governments in Austria-Hungary sought to prevent a Yugoslav repetition of the German and Italian experiences. The military officials, led during this decade of increasing confrontation and crisis between Serbia and Austria-Hungary by General Conrad, made no secret of their desire for a war against Serbia which would lead to a direct annexation of Serbian territory. The Austrian political leadership was more cautious, thinking in terms of a change of dynasty, or a customs union like the one that had ended in German unification under Prussian leadership. Either of these goals of the Austrian political officials might be achieved by non-violent means. Though the tactics differed, the goal was the same; to put an end to Serbian independence and thus eliminate the potential Prussia or Sardinia of the Yugoslavs.

The first step in the strengthening of the Austrian position versus Serbia was the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, two provinces with a mixed population of Croats and Serbs which had been under Austrian administration since 1878 but which were nominally still parts of the Ottoman Empire. This action resulted in a 6 month's crisis that almost ended in an Austrian attack on Serbia and was settled only after Germany had sent a quasi-ultimatum to Russia requiring a Russian recognition of the annexation without a European conference to sanction the Austrian action.

After Serbia and Austria-Hungary had locked horns over the annexation of Bosnia, relations between the two nations steadily grew more competitive and tense. Austria had to contend with the subversive activities of private action groups in Serbia who were working to free the Slavs who lived under

Austrian authority. Then in the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, Serbia emerged victorious and constituted a doubly worrisome threat to Austria. Austria's diplomatic actions during the two wars had done much to convince the Serbian population and leadership that Austria would continually frustrate Serbian goals. Before the crisis of 1914, Austria and Serbia were rather hopelessly caught up in a conflict of the rise of the European national state and the historic decline of the multi-national state.

The capsule summary of Austrian-Serbian relations before the crisis of 1914 serves as a background to the local war between Austria and Serbia that drew all of the powers of the continent into war. This treatment also perhaps explains why the Austrians were so uncompromising in the crisis bargaining of July, 1914; they felt that their existence, at least in their 19th century form, was at stake in the crisis.

The relations of all seven of the participants in the ten years preceding the 1914 crisis bargaining centered around a highly competitive battle for superiority of arms and influence. The Moroccan crisis of 1905, the Bosnian crisis of 1908, the Second Moroccan crisis of 1911, the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 illustrate the territorial and imperial conflicts of interest which produced this tense battle for dominance.

This tension and struggle resulted in the consolidation of the two opposing alliances. A schism had developed in Europe; the continent had become divided into two factions or coalitions, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. But in 1914, there seemed to be no immediate prospect of war. It was true however that a vague premonition existed in popular and leadership circles that the spiteful diplomatic competition between the two diplomatic blocs over such a broad range of issues made the future of peace look a little bleak.

In spite of the fact that the major states of Europe had been divided into two equal coalitions who competed over every conflict of interest, the alliance members had managed to keep out of participating militarily in the very important Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. A situation of mutual deterrence based on an equilibrium of power appeared to offer a firm and stable enough foundation for peaceful competition. In fact, cross-cutting diplomatic moves between the members of the two alliances seemed to bode well for the peaceful resolution of future crises; the probability of an alliance confrontation that might result in war appeared lower after the restraint and cooperation the Great Powers revealed in the Balkan wars.

What were the cross-cutting alliance moves? The British and German governments had reached an informal understanding concerning the construction of battleships in the ratio of 16:10. Germany and Britain had cooperated during the Balkan wars in restraining Russia and Austria. They had even negotiated two agreements ending their differences in Africa and over the Baghdad Railroad. Things had arrived at the point where it was not so certain that Britain would take the side of France and Russia in all matters in which France and Russia opposed Germany. To press the point further, not only Britain but also France had begun to reconcile her differences with Germany. Germany and France had come to terms on their respective shares in the economy of Turkey.

The danger to European peace appeared to lay in the Balkans and especially in the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Who would replace Turkish influence in the Balkans, Russia or Austria or neither? Russia and Austria

were far from reconciling their differences in the manner of Germany, England and France. Russia was promoting the formation of a coalition between Rumania, Serbia, and Greece. The existence of a Balkan coalition of Rumania, Serbia and Greece would serve Russia's intentions to resist Austrian efforts to expand her influence in the Balkans. Austria had also been attempting to create a Balkan coalition with the intention of isolating Serbia and allowing Austria to deal with Serbia more severely than she had been able to do in the Balkan wars. Although Rumania had been moving away from her attachment with the Triple Alliance, Bulgaria had been moving towards the Triple Alliance. Thus, a bipolar situation had been created in the Balkans.

What was the composition of the two Balkan blocs? Germany and Austria supported the Bulgarians and Turkey on one side; Russia and France supported Rumania, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro on the other.

This brief summary of the relations of the July, 1914 crisis bargaining participants in the years before the crisis is designed to serve as a setting for the more detailed bargaining analysis of the important month of July, in 1914.

3. The conflict of interests which underlies the crisis

Germany's interests to a great extent depended upon her ally's interests in the crisis of July, 1914. Austria's primary interest or goal in the crisis bargaining was to go to war against Serbia, defeat Serbia, and then dissolve Serbia. In this fashion, Austria sought to solve the problem of the Yugoslav nationalist movement. In the process, she would rehabilitate her prestige among the Great Powers and confirm her value as an ally to Germany.

The German government had been seriously alarmed by the internal condition of her ally, Austria. Unless Austria-Hungary continued as a strong and useful ally of Germany, Germany would find herself trapped and isolated between France and Russia. Germany was willing to challenge the Triple Entente to bring Serbia under Austrian control. If Serbia were defeated and dominated by Austria, the influence of the alliance would extend in an unbroken geographical line from Berlin to the Persian gulf. The alliance adversary in the Balkans, Russia, would find herself pushed out of the Balkans. If it happened that Russia and France backed down in the upcoming crisis planned by Germany and Austria, the result would be the diplomatic dominance of the Triple Alliance on the continent, definitely a German interest.

It was in Russia's interests in the crisis bargaining of 1914 to support Serbia against Austrian attempts at dominance. The Russians wished to avoid a renewal of the failures Russian policy had suffered in the Balkans in 1909 and in 1913 (the failure of Serbia to gain a port on the Adriatic).

The French interest in the crisis concerned the maintenance of the Russian alliance which was considered an indispensable counterweight to German influence.

The English interest underlying the crisis bargaining of July, 1914, was to maintain peace in the Balkans and in Europe.

4. What precipitated the crisis;

What precipitated the crisis of July, 1914, does not fit well into our categories; neither inadvertent events or a deliberate challenge or demand by one government upon another started the crisis. The political

assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a private action group from Bosnia (aided by officials of the Serbian government in the pattern of the United States CIA manipulations) was the seed of the crisis.

5. The immediate issue of the crisis;

The immediate issue of the crisis of 1914 concerned what would be the future form of the international relations of Austria and of Serbia. Would Austria seek to punish Serbia in manner that would result in the loss of Serbian sovereignty? But the nature of Austrian-Serbian relations was not the only issue immediately involved; Serbia occupied a key position in the competition between the two European security groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Involved in the issue of how Austria dealt with the latest manifestation of the Serbian nationalist movement was a test of strength between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, the outcome of which could affect the relative equality of power and influence that existed in July, 1914, between the two blocs.

6. The parties' relative valuations of the issues at stake.

Austria estimated that her future security depended more than anything else upon putting an end to the Serbian national threat to the Austrian multi-national existence.

Germany placed great importance on the rejuvenation of her ally. In a private letter of July 18, 1914, the German Foreign Minister, Jagow, put it the following way. (This passage is illustrative of the strategic calculation of the 1914 statesmen.)

But the fact remains that we have an alliance with Austria. Hic Rhodus, hic salta. Whether we have made a very good bargain in the alliance with that steadily disintegrating agglomeration of states on the Danube may be questioned....

Austria, whose prestige had suffered more and more from her failure to take resolute action, now scarcely counts any longer as a full-sized Great Power. The Balkan crisis has further weakened her position. This recession in the Austrian power position has severely weakened our alliance group.

...Austria recognizes that she has let many chances slip (to deal with Serbia), that she still has power to act but in a few years will no longer have it. She intends now to come to a settlement with Serbia...We have not now driven Austria to her decision. We cannot and must not tie her hands now. If we did so, Austria (and we ourselves) could rightly reproach us with having deprived her of her last chance to rehabilitate herself politically. This would only hasten the process of gradual extinction and decay from within. Her position in the Balkans would be gone forever. You will agree with me that a definite stabilization of Russian hegemony in the Balkans would indirectly be inadmissible for us. The preservation of Austria, and that Austria shall be as strong as possible, is essential to us on domestic and economic grounds....(quoted in Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, pp. 157-8)

Did Germany value the rehabilitation of her primary ally enough to risk a war with Russia and then France? Jagow in the same letter gives us the answer:

If localization is not attainable, and if Russia attacks Austria, then the casus foederis will arise, then we cannot sacrifice Austria. We should then find ourselves in a not exactly proud isolation. I have no wish for a preventive war, but if the fight offers itself, we dare not flinch. (Albertini, p. 158).

Thus what was at stake in the July, 1914 crisis for Germany and Austria was the following; the very continuance of Austria as a Great Power and the isolation of Germany if Austria did not continue as a Great Power. At least, this was the German and Austrian estimate of the situation. Both nations were willing to risk and fight a war with Russia and France to prevent the worsening of their power positions relative to France and Russia.

It is obvious that Russia judged that the interests at issue were worth a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Why? The territorial aims of the Russian statesmen were mainly directed toward Constantinople and the Straits. The Russians had proven before that they had no desire to risk a war on behalf of the Balkan countries. But if Austria were to crush Serbia, the predominance of the Central Powers in the Near East would become a threat to Russian aims in the Straits. Russia was willing to risk the uncertain price of war to prevent Germany from driving Russia out of the Balkan peninsula and replacing her influence with that of Austria-Hungary. In this deliberate repetition of the Bosnian crisis diplomacy by Germany and Austria, Russia foresaw the need for a counter demonstration of Triple Entente unity; otherwise, Germany and Austria would resort to this ultimatum diplomacy over and over again. The Triple Alliance statesmen had to be taught a costly lesson; that they would not be allowed to construct a superiority of power and influence through the threat of war.

It appears that France initially was more unwilling to accept a humiliation of Serbia and Russia than was Russia herself. It is clear that the French diplomats caught on to the significance of the German and Austrian challenge and accepted the costs of a continental war as the price for upholding the Entente interests more readily than did the Russian diplomats. That President Poincare's chief worry was that Sazanov would be too irresolute in facing the Central Power challenge to the status quo in the Balkans (the Bucharest Peace settlement) reveals the strong solidarity of the French-Russian alliance. The early French acceptance

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of the possibility of a continental war; as the price of resistance illustrates the high value the French put on the Balkan status quo and the general balance of power as it existed in 1914.

The British preferences are difficult to summarize. Were the British statesmen uncertain themselves of what was at stake and how what was at stake measured up against the price of a general war? The British appeared intent upon staying aloof from the whole question of a general war as if the prospect of such an outcome were too unbearable to face before the fact. This might well have been the case. Historians do not as a rule analyze in terms of game theory or in terms of a rational and precise ordering of preferences by statesmen. Perhaps it is because the historians conclude that the information of a statesman's preferences is unreliable or maybe the information is not available. Perhaps it is true that even power politicians would tend to flinch before a war involving all of Europe, especially given the arms that had been amassed in the previous decade. Perhaps the British statesmen were amiss in not thinking about the highly unpleasant if not unthinkable possibility of a war and the routes by which such a war might come about. Perhaps the truth is that Grey foresaw the possibility of a general war but concluded that the probability of continued peace was very high, high enough for great optimism and little concern.

The British did not see a German-Austrian challenge to the Triple Entente in the early crisis events. Neither did the British see an irreconcilable conflict of interests in the Serbian-Austrian dispute. They had no conception of the desire of Austria to annex and partition Serbia.

The British were not interested in preventing a repetition of the

Bosnian crisis outcome, that is, a diplomatic humiliation of Serbia and Russia. They were more interested in preventing the outbreak of hostilities over a Balkan dispute. Undoubtedly, Grey put great faith in the probability of a peaceful settlement of the crisis. But Grey did reach the conclusion early in the crisis that if the negotiations did not work out, and war did come, the British would not allow the Germans to defeat France in a devastating fashion.

7. Contents of the stakes for each party;

This question has been answered in the preceding attempts to answer the first 6 questions about the nature of the bargaining setting of the Sarajevo crisis. What will be attempted in this section is the bringing together of the different strands of analysis.

The territorial interests of each party are clear. Austria sought to destroy the authority and existence of the Serbian state and to divide the territory among the Austrian allies and perspective allies in the Balkans. Sharing in the Serbian territorial spoils would constitute quite a coalition incentive for several Balkan neighbors of Austria. The long-range territorial aim of the Serbians was to detach the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Austria and annex them. The territorial interests of Germany centered on the unfettered passageway to the Near East. Russia coveted the Straits while France and England had no territorial interests in the Balkans. Italy's interests in the territory of Albania and in the islands on the Adriatic and Aegean Seas were an important reason for her eventual non-support of her ally, Austria.

Austria, Serbia, and Russia saw their territorial interests at stake in the Austrian-Serbian confrontation. Italy was fearful of seeing any Austrian expansion. Germany saw the future of her expanding commercial aggrandizement in the Near East at stake in the crisis outcome.

The preservation of alliance unity and spirit was a paramount concern to all the parties involved in the crisis with the exception of Italy and the possible exception of Britain. The British were prepared to restrain, or at least to not encourage the Russians. The British were more concerned to preserve peace than they were concerned to enhance the unity of the Russian alliance at the cost of encouraging their ally to reckless behavior. The British had a much more relaxed attitude toward their alliance with Russia and France than did the other members of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. The British were not willing to buy alliance cohesion at the unilateral annexation of the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovian by Austria.

Unlike Britain, the primary reason for German and French support of Austria and of Russia was the preservation and enhancement of the respective alliances, the two dual alliances. Over the matter of the Serbian alignment with Russia, Russia was willing to let Serbia undergo the greatest of humiliations and outrages but not extinction or territorial reduction.

The declining prestige of Austria-Hungary and the questions concerning her capacity to take aggressive action in the Balkans were definitely a factor

of important dimensions at stake in the Sarajevo crisis. Could Austria prove to her German ally that she had not lost her strength and resolve to such an extent that she could not deal with the threat put to her by Serbia? German references to a possible turn to England as a substitute ally for Austria were a spur to the Austrian leaders.

Russia had repeatedly shown great prudence in the value which she placed in prestige, that is, in the comparison of a diplomatic defeat with the great possibility of a military defeat. But what was involved in the crisis of 1914 was the Russian bargaining reputation. The Russians had the reputation of being bluffers. The Russians were concerned about their future bargaining effectiveness and credibility.

The British seemed to have had great confidence in the European granting of credibility to British statements of intent; they do not appear to have worried themselves over their bargaining reputation or their reputation for resolve.

BARGAINING SETTING

Part 8
The Parties' Relative Military Capabilities, 1914 ¹

Country	<u>Population</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Cost \$</u>	<u>% of Army to Population</u>
Germany	65 million	761,000 planned 830,000	218 million	1.17
Austria-Hungary	51 million	480,000	156 million	.94
Italy	35 million	305,000	94 million	.87
France	39 million	740,000	240 million	1.87
Russia	136 million	1,300,000	400 million	.96
England	45 million	187,000	140 million	.4

NAVAL Strength

Country	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Cost \$</u>	<u>Submarines & Dreadnoughts</u>
Great Britain	138,000	255 million	85 & 31
Russia	54,000	120 million	14 & 4
Germany	73,000	120 million	37 & 21
France		98 million	76 & 7
Italy	42,000	55 million	25 & 4
Austria-Hungary	18,000	15 million	6 & 4

¹
Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.
See his appendix, pp. 117-20.

Cont. The Parties' Relative Military Strength,

<u>Country</u>	<u>National Defense Budget, 1914</u>
Germany	338 million \$
Austria-Hungary	171
Italy	149
<hr/>	
France	338
Russia	520
England	395
<hr/>	

9. The Parties' Relative Fear of War

The Austrian statesmen do not appear to have feared a war either a local or a general war. Whether Austria expected a general war is not clear from the archives. Did the Austrian statesmen think about a general war as a clearly defined possibility? It is my estimation that the Austrian statesmen thought in terms of the Bosnian experience. All they worried about was the character of German support; they appeared confident that Germany could keep Russia away from Austria. Their minds appeared to have been captured by the very great fear of Serbian influence over the future of Austria-Hungary. Perhaps it was reflex action on the part of the 1914 Austrian diplomats, for the same resort to violence in similar situations occurred in 1859 and in 1870 against Italy and Germany. There is a feeling of fatalism in the Austrian documents, as if fate had handed Austria a golden opportunity for a localized war against Serbia.

The German political leaders did not deliberately decide to engage Europe in war, but they did not shy away from this possible consequence of their diplomatic support of Austria. It appears that the Germans did fear a war of three against two, of the Triple Entente against Austria and Germany. But Germany did not seem to fear war if England were neutral and Italy and Rumania were committed to the Central Powers. The Germans had enough confidence in their army to risk such a war.

The Russian leaders feared the consequences of a war with Germany and Austria. They feared the effects of such a war on the internal stability of the regime; a defeat in such a war might result in a rebellion

against the Monarchy.

The French leaders, judging from the evidence of government documents and ex post facto memoirs, do not appear to have feared a war of France and Russia against Germany and Austria. The French were confident in the neutrality of Italy and were confident of the eventual participation of England upon the side of France and Russia.

The English leaders reveal no fear of a loss in a continental war. They were fearful of a German victory over France if a war between Germany and Austria and France and Russia occurred.

10. Commitments Prior to the Crisis

Refer to the treatment of alliance structure in the systemic environment section.

11. Asymmetries between the parties:

If we add together the sizes of the 1914 armies and navies of the members of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, we find that the Triple Entente members held a significant advantage over the members of the Triple Alliance. The armies of the Triple Entente added up to a total of over 2 million men while the armies of the Triple Alliances added up to only 1 and a half million men. With complete mobilization, the Triple Alliance would have 160 divisions against the 211 of the Triple Entente. Without Italy, the Triple Alliance would have 126 divisions. The navies of the Triple Entente contained a total of 175 submarines and 42 dreadnoughts to the Triple Alliance total of 68 submarines and 29 dreadnoughts. But the mobilization schedules of the Triple Alliance tended to outweigh the numerical superiority of the Triple

Entente. Germany could come to full strength almost instantly while Russia required six weeks to mobilize and transport armed forces beyond the Russian border.

Was there an asymmetry in alliance support; did the allies of Austria give greater support than did the allies of Serbia and Russia? No. Italy and England cancel each other out and so do France and Germany.

The values of the issues and interests at stake appear to be symmetrical. Britain was as anxious as was Italy to remain neutral and to affect a negotiated settlement to the Serbian dispute. France was every bit as determined as was Germany to support her ally. Russia valued the independence of Serbia from Austria as much as Austria valued the subordination of Serbian interests to Austrian interests.

12. Initial Images and Perceptions

The German statesmen estimated that Russia's immediate interests, in the context of the Austrian move against Serbia and the German support of the Austrian attack, would be the preservation of peace. The German leaders thought that the Russian leaders would not march into battle for the sake of prestige or honor or bargaining reputation. Would the defeat and prostration of Serbia prove fatal to the long-range Russian goals in the Straits of Turkey? Apparently, the Germans did not think so. The Germans hardly anticipated that leaving Serbia to the domination of Austria would deprive Russia of her historic claim to be the champion of the Slav nationalities or that it would eliminate Russia from influence over the Balkans.

To German eyes, Russian prospects appeared bright. In several years, the Russians would have a strong Baltic fleet with which to intimidate Germany and a complete strategic railway system which would allow Russia to take full advantage of her huge superiority in numbers of troops. Furthermore, it was apparent to the diplomats of every nation that the loyalties of the Triple Alliance were dissolving while those of the Triple Entente were prospering. Russia and the Triple Entente were growing ever stronger while Germany, in relation to Russia especially, was not growing stronger. Why should the Russian statesmen not wait until they had the military power to be able to make credible threats and ultimatums in the fashion of the Germans. Surely the Russians would not risk a fairly certain military and political superiority in the future for a highly unlikely political or military victory in the present.

The German leaders wanted the Austrians to move as rapidly as possible and to present Russia with a fait accompli. If Austria were bold, the Russians would be quieted, would not seek to reverse an already accomplished Austrian military occupation of Serbia. For an attempt at a reversal would mean only one thing, a general European war. Would Russia dare to choose a European war in order to save Serbia? Especially if she were not supported by her allies? Relying on past behavior, the Germans were positive that the French and the British would rein the Russians in if the Russians appeared to make serious counter-moves to the Austrian occupation of Serbia.

No, in the summer of 1914, the Russians would not be willing to go to war against Germany, but they would pretend as if they were willing

to go to war. But the Germans perceived that the Russians were domestically oriented.

The Germans overestimated the military strength of the Russian army; the Germans thought that the numerical strength of the army was 1,540,000 while in reality the Russian force consisted of 1,300,000. But the Germans were correct in their assessment of the deficiency of the Russian mobilization organization; the Russian lack of strategic railroads gave Germany a 4 to 6 week lead in the event of a war. The Germans perceived that their own military strength would defeat the Russian army.

The Germans estimated that the Russians would fear a European war because of internal turmoil and because of the external riskiness of a battle with Germany.

The Germans equated resolve with military power and rationality, that is, the certain relation of means to ends. The Russians could not be resolved to resist Germany because they had not the military strength to do so. The Russians would be certain to do some diplomatic blustering and bluffing, but nothing more.

If the diplomatic records are reliable evidence, the Germans did not waste much thought on the intentions, the interests, of the French. The Germans perceived that the French would want to restrain their ally least the Russians start a general war over a local conflict of little significance to the French. What was of significance to the French was their desperate financial situation. The French might want to risk a war in the future to deter the power and influence of the

Central Powers and to verify the value of the Triple Entente, but not in 1914. The French resolve would not be to deter the Germans and the Austrians, but to restrain the Russians.

The German military officials were relatively certain of the ability of the German army to register a quick victory over the French army. They envisioned a campaign similar to the one of 1870.

The Germans did not believe that the immediate interests or the long-range interests of the British had anything to do with Austria's relations with Serbia. Their only intentions would concern the localization of the conflict, which would be in accord with the British behavior in the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913. The British would not give their support to Russia so as not to embolden her. The German opinion of the British in 1914 was that they were "altogether peaceably minded."

THE INITIAL PERCEPTIONS OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS

Russia knew that the Serbian victory in the Balkan wars and the increasingly threatening character of the political participation of the private Serbian nationalist groups left Austria in a very poor political situation. Not surprisingly, the normal Russian preoccupation with Austrian intentions in the Balkans had not been so evident in the Russian diplomatic notes of 1914. The Austrians were a declining power no longer to be so feared. The new object of Russian attention was Germany, particularly German relations with Turkey.

The Russians were aware that the goal of Austria was to eliminate the opposition of Serbia.

The nature of the demands made on Serbia, the short time limit granted for unconditional acceptance, the presentation of the note at the very moment the French leaders were leaving Russia, indicated that this time, Austria had made up her mind to go to the extreme and destroy Serbia regardless of the interests and prestige of Russia as the ally of Serbia. There were no questions about Austria's fear of war or of her degree of resolve. Austria and Germany meant to have a local war, but local or not, the Austrians and Germans would not change their course no, no matter what the Triple Entente was capable of diplomatically. Sazanov's first response to the news that Austria had presented an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia was, "This means a European war."

The Russians thought that the Germans were behind the sudden boldness of the Austrian solution to the problem of the threat of Serbia. The Russians perceived that the Germans had chosen to turn the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand into an opportunity to crush the power and influence of France and Russia in the Middle East and in the Balkans.

There was no Russian doubt of the German resolve for victory or any Russian suspicion of a German fear of war. On the contrary, the Russians perceived that the Germans were chafing for a war, a preventive war before the Russian military development program would be completed in 1917 or in 1918.

INITIAL CRISIS PERCEPTIONS OF THE FRENCH DIPLOMATS

The French saw the German-Austrian behavior in the morning of the crisis revealed as a power-play pure and simple. The Austrians were tired of the Serbian provocations and were going to put an end to them once and for all. The Germans were delighted to see some sign of life in the Austrian-Hungarian leadership and would push the Austrians to choose a bold solution worthy of a Bismarck. France expected to find herself and the Triple Entente faced with the assembled armies of the Triple Alliance or at least the armies of the Central Powers. The French leaders thought that at the moment the German and Austrian armies were mobilized, the German-Austrian diplomats would attempt to give everybody the impression that they had prepared everything to support their policy by force. Then Germany would try the Bosnian strategy on Russia while offering to France and Britain to act as mediator between Russia and Austria. But the French perceived that the German leaders had no intention to play the role of mediator and would instead support Austria.

In fact, the French imagined that the Germans had begun to issue the first preliminary notices of mobilization, as during the period of tension in 1911 and 1912, before the Austrians had sent their ultimatum to Serbia. The French, before they knew anything of the nature of the Austrian demands upon Serbia, perceived that the international situation was extremely serious, that things were heading for war. The French leaders waited for the Austrian coup de theatre with a sense of impending calamity. The French diplomats were the only diplomats who at the start

of the crisis were pessimistic about the chances of a peaceful or a local settlement of the Austrian-Serbian differences.

There is nothing in the French correspondence to suggest that the French leaders suspected any fear of war in the Germans and in the Austrians or conceived of any lack of resolve.

The French overestimated the German army strength. In July, 1914, the German army contained 761,000 men while the French estimate set the German army at 870,000. The French correctly diagnosed the German and Austrian intentions in the crisis and were well aware of the mobilization moves taken by the Germans. The outcome of a European war or an alliance war was not clear to the French, but they did perceive that France and Russia did not have the military capability to defeat Germany and Austria without the complete participation of the British.

AUSTRIAN INITIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE CRISIS

The Austrian leaders knew what a blow an Austrian occupation of Serbia would be to Russian power and influence in the Balkans. They knew how difficult it would be for the Russian government to restrain the military and Pan-Slavic elements within Russia from clamoring for war with Austria to protect Serbia. The Austrians perceived that the Russians wanted to use Serbia as an instrument against Austria, in order to dissolve Austrian influence in the Balkans. The Austrians perceived that the Russians had promised the Bulgarians the Macedonia territory of Austria-Hungary and that they had also encouraged the Serbians to plan on the receipt of the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But whether the Russian plans in the Balkans would be so upset as to warrant a general war over the subordination of Serbia to Austria was a matter of doubt to the Austrian leaders. The precedent in the Austrian minds was the Bosnia experience. Why would the Russians not act the same way again in the face of a German ultimatum? Just in case, however, the Austrians were careful to wait until the French leaders had left Russia before they delivered their ultimatum to Serbia. The Austrians did not want to take the risk of heightening the probability of military intervention by Russia and France by making the delivery of the ultimatum look like an affront to the French and Russian leaders as they met together. Apparently the Austrians shared the German belief that the Russians were ill-prepared for a war and that they would allow Austria to violate Serbia without an armed conflict. But beneath the surface, the Austrian government was not completely confident that Russia would not intervene. Berchtold, just before he issued the ultimatum to Serbia, began to wonder whether the German army would intimidate the Russian rulers once again.

Pre-ultimatum references to England and to France are hard to find in the Austrian correspondence; they seem to have left France and Britain to the Germans to handle. There are references to the ambitious French President and to the immoderate pre-ultimatum French stand toward the Austrians in the Serbian dispute. The Austrians, unlike the Germans, did not expect the French leaders to exercise a moderating influence on the Russians after the ultimatum to Serbia was delivered.

BRITISH-INITIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE

The attitudes of the Germans and Austrians, the French and the Russians, were fairly clearly defined on the eve of the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Austria and Germany planned to overwhelm Serbia while France and Russia intended not to allow Serbia to be overwhelmed. Unlike the other participants, the attitude of the British was not formed before the Austrian ultimatum; their attitude was to wait and to see what the character of the ultimatum would be. The British perceived a storm on the horizon, but their leaders did not foresee a tempest that could not be handled by the Concert of Europe. The British did not conceive of the Austrian-Serbian-Russian crisis in the same light as they had conceived of the crises of 1905 and 1911. They saw no threat to themselves in the possible outcomes of the Serbian crisis.

The British were preoccupied with the Germans, and in the Serbian crisis, they saw no signs of Germany attempting to break or to test the strength of the British-French cooperation. Apparently, the British did not care much about the Russian coalition or feel obligated by it. The British perceptions were influenced by the desire not to lose any of the foundations for peaceful relations with Germany that had been gained in the two years before 1914. Also the British were much occupied with the question of Irish disorder and the fear of a civil war. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edmund Grey, was selectively attentive to the communications of the Germans. The German Ambassador, in a surprising conversation with Grey on July 6,

had revealed the entire crisis plans of the German and Austrian governments, but Grey seems to have completely ignored the pessimistic implications of the Ambassador's conversation. The British continued to quite comfortably doubt whether Austria would take any action of a serious character against Serbia. They preferred to listen to the information and judgments of the Russian Ambassador to London rather than to the German Ambassador to London. In any case, German-British cooperation would keep things right and avoid the outbreak of war among the Great Powers.

ITALIAN IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN-SERBIAN CONFLICT

The Italian-Austrian alliance was an alliance in name only. In truth, the Italians were as opposed to the Austrians as were the Russians. The Italians continued in the Triple Alliance in order to be allied to Germany and to prevent the possibility of an Austrian attack on Italy. As one author aptly described the arrangement, the Austrians and the Italians were allies in order not to be enemies. Their hostility broke out every year in spite of the alliance and the soothing intervention of Germany.

The Italians thought that the Austrian diplomats had no right to make demands on Serbia because the Archduke Ferdinand had not been murdered by a Serbian citizen. Nor did the Italian leaders think that Pan-Slavic propaganda was a reasonable grounds for intervention in the affairs of Serbia. Italy herself was on the side of nationalist movements and did not desire Serbian national aspirations to be suppressed by the Austrians. The Italian memories were not that short.

In capsule form, what were the perceptions the Triple Entente nations held of the Italian position before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia? The diplomats of the Triple Entente were aware of the Italian sympathy for Serbia and antipathy for Austria. They also knew that Italy feared the possibility of a German-Russian war over the Austrian treatment of Serbia, and that the Italians were working on both the Central Power side and the Serbian side to avoid the outbreak of war. The Triple Entente diplomats perceived that the Italians sincerely desired peace because they were going to be caught in the middle in the event of a war between the Central Powers and the Triple Entente.

FRAGMENTS

Loss of Control

Miscalculation

Germany's Brinkmanship Strategy

A Supergame Motivation

Comparison of Cuban Missile Crisis
and the 1914 Crisis

Local or Limited War as a Generator of Risk

The Lack of Cooperation in 1914

LOSS OF CONTROL

In the 1914 Crisis bargaining, there were "some clearly recognizable final critical steps that converted the situation from one in which war was unnecessary to one in which war was inevitable," and these steps were chosen in the full light of their consequences. The transition from peace to war involved conscious choice, not actions with unforeseen consequences or an inadvertant loss of control. The conscious, non-automatic choices returned an individually desired local war into a universally undesired alliance war. How? Things got out of hand, came to an outcome solution which neither side fully desired, because neither side would yield. Misunderstandings, miscalculations, misperceptions, there were, but their part in the outcome should not distort the fact of individual selfpossession and freedom of choice. The decision makers knew what kinds of risks they were running.

This is not to say that the crisis of 1914 involved a deliberate, premeditated individual decision for continental war. The war became desirable as the crisis developed from a local to an alliance crisis, and the cost of avoidance of violence became humiliation, a loss of status, a loss of one's reputation for fearlessness in the face of a coercive threat of war.

MISCALCULATION

The primary strategic miscalculation in the crisis bargaining of 1914 was the German overconfidence in the deterrent power of superior military strength. The Germans discounted the intangible element of the pride that resists coercion, bullying, as it were. The Russians calculated that their chances of military victory over Germany were not excellent, but they chose not to capitulate to diplomatic pressure, not to back down in the face of a challenge over an important interest, despite their military inferiority and domestic instability. The case of 1914 reveals the difficulties of deterrence, the difficulties of calculating an opponent's resolve. That resolve to win or not to lose is never a constant but changes according to the interests at stake, military preparedness, etc. The Germans tended not to appreciate the instability of a nation's resolve to resist coercion, to resist tactics of domination.

The Germans created a simplistic expectation of the Russian resolve to resist German brinkmanship tactics after the Russian capitulation in the Bosnian crisis. The Germans overgeneralized the Russian motivation to yield in a chicken situation vis-a-vis Germany.

GERMANY'S BRINKMANSHIP STRATEGY

Germany took the risk of a general war deliberately, but Germany did not want to provoke a general war. The Germans sought to use the diplomatic pressure of a threat of a continental war to coerce Russia into giving up something of major value. The plan was to force Russia to go to the brink of war if she chose to resist and then over the brink, and this necessity to go over the brink was to coerce Russia into ending her resistance at the verbal level.

Germany and Austria consciously maneuvered themselves into a high possibility of continental war situation in order to win a limited war, in order to keep a local war local.

What Germany did not foresee was that too much was at stake for the adversary to concede to such diplomatic pressure, no matter what risks of inadvertent war Germany might generate with her threats of mobilization.

Germany and Austria thought that the bargaining conflict they were structuring was one which they would win without the use of force because they were willing to fight a war to get what was at stake while they calculated that the adversary did not value what was at stake enough to fight a war to defend it.

A SUPERGAME MOTIVATION?

What was the motivation of the crisis bargaining of 1914? There was not a powerful motivation for trade or territory. The primary motive was to maximize one's chances of success in future crises or wars. The motivation was to make one's own nation stronger militarily than the adversary nation, or prevent the adversary nation from becoming stronger. The crisis bargaining, in the minds of all the principal participants, had a preventive, pre-emptive, or defensive character. The leaders chose to fight (rather than continue to bargain and compromise) in order not to find themselves in a more unfavorable strategic position in some future crisis or war. Hurrah for the supergame model!

Austria attacked Serbia because the Austrians believed that the Serbians were planning the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy. Germany supported Austria in this pre-emptive attack for fear that the Dual Monarchy would disintegrate in the absence of support and attack. France had long calculated that Germany, if Germany defeated Russia, would be strong enough to invade and destroy France. Great Britain feared that Germany, if Germany defeated France and occupied Belgium, would be strong enough to render England a second-class power. Russia was anxious over the leverage Austria and Germany would gain by a victory over Serbia.

COMPARISON OF CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND
THE CRISIS OF 1914
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Often the character of a crisis is brought into sharper focus by the process of comparison with another crisis. Perhaps a comparison of the 1914 crisis with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 will point out part of the uniqueness of the 1914 crisis.

Robert Kennedy has reported the strategic outlook of the United States decision-makers in the Cuban crisis:

Neither side wanted war over Cuba, we agreed, but it was possible that either side could take a step that--for reasons of "security" or "pride" or "face"--would require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring about a counter-response and eventually an escalation into armed conflict... (We should try not to precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended or anticipated (Thirteen Days, 62).

The strategic perspective of the Cuban missile crisis decision-makers appears to differ from the strategic outlook of the 1914 decision-makers. Only one side of the 1914 crisis was sure that the other side did not want war over the Serbian and alliance confrontation issues. All the powers of 1914 were concerned about an escalation into armed conflict, but were unequally concerned, which does not seem to be the case in the crisis of 1962. As it appears from a comparison of the 1914 and 1962 crises, the concern over escalation has to be mutual and comparatively or relatively equal in order for there to exist an effective restraint against a case of crisis bargaining and confrontation deteriorating into a situation of non-bargaining or violence.

relate this to pre-emptive strategy

The strategic motives of the statesmen of 1914 are different from the motives of the statesmen of 1962. In the crisis of 1962, neither of the parties to the crisis took advantage of the mutual anxiety over an escalation of a political conflict into war. In the 1914 crisis, Germany and Austria definitely used the opponents' anxiety over an escalation of a local or regional war into a continental or alliance war as an instrument of coercion. Germany created the risk of a general war in order to localize a regional war, one to be fought by its ally Germany accepted the risk of a continental war precisely because her strategists believed that the risk of a continental war was unacceptable to the other side.

CCR

If the Entente statesmen allowed the Germans to triumph by the manipulation of risk, by the taking advantage of the collective anxiety concerning the high (because of the mobilization practices) probability of Entente and Triple Alliance escalatory confrontations over peripheral issues, then the Entente statesmen foresaw a continual German and Austrian usage of this coercive tactic. Whenever trouble arose between the two alliances, the Germans would seek to gain bargaining advantages by taking advantage of the high probability of escalation, by trading on the Entente anxiety concerning unintended catastrophe. The United States and the Soviet Union statesmen were not faced with this problem, of resisting the adversary's coercive manipulation of escalation fears.

But they would be if Acheson had his way.

LOCAL OR LIMITED WAR AS A GENERATION

OF RISK

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The statesmen involved in the crisis of 1914 recognized that a local crisis held some danger of a continental or alliance war. None of the statesmen seem to have thought that one of the alliance members meant for a general or alliance war to happen. But the statesmen recognized that an issue might arise which could not be settled without a local war; the danger consisted of the possibility that the power equilibrium, the intense competition, and the mobilization procedures could mean that a local war would escalate to continental war.

The outcome of the 1914 crisis was not an outcome which was unforeseen or unforeseeable. The nature of local or limited war as a generator of risk was appreciated. Thus, I contradict my earlier comparison of the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the crisis of 1914.

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"It is sad to say that a war that nobody wanted was possibly being unleashed, as it were, by elemental forces, and by the long-standing state of exacerbation of one Cabinet against another." (Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of Germany, quoted in Albertini, vol. 3, page 17)

The answer as to why war came in 1914 rather than a peaceful settlement is not easy to treat in detail or easy to summarize. But let us say for the sake of speculative stimulation that the reason diplomacy ended in war, that diplomatic competition gave way to military competition, lies not in the give and take of the crisis of July, of the diplomatic actions of the month of July, 1914, but rather in the long period of intense and spiteful diplomatic competition which preceded that one month. There was no defense against a European war except the mutual dislike and fear of a general war (an alliance war). That one month of crisis bargaining must be interpreted in the context of the passions built up for at least a decade. Without taking into consideration the background of the "long-standing state of exacerbation of one Cabinet against another," the actions of July, 1914, appear akin to the actions of the characters in a contemporary theater of the absurd.

Perhaps war came in 1914 because the will to beat the other cabinet, the adversary diplomats, finally became stronger than the will to avoid a general war; perhaps the anxiety of a continental war outcome to a specific case of alliance confrontation no longer held the horror or dread in 1914 that it had held in 1913 or 1911 (when such a fine equality of arms and influence, of military potential, had not existed). If the will to avoid a general war had been greater than

Says
nothing

the will to conquer or best the adversary diplomats, then any one of several measures offered but not accepted by a majority of the concerned powers, would have been accepted and put to effective use. The bargaining (the strategic) problem was not a knotty one. But the passions of ten years carried over into July, 1914, and made dangerous moves appear warranted in the face of the dislike and suspicion each cabinet knew it was held in by some other cabinet. Paradoxically, war came in 1914 because the diplomatic wars of the earlier ten years had made a military war seem probable in the near future. The phrase that things could not go on as they had been going was on many people's lips and determined in part the reactions of the diplomats who shared this common sentiment about what would be the outcome of the nationalistic competition of 1904-1913.

These long years of tension and competition, of small losses and gains which held inordinate consequences (because of the equality of power of the blocs) had gradually come to corrode away that one sure defense against the eventual use of the armaments and alliances, the general dread of a large-scale war fought over a problem extraneous to half of the participants who would be pulled into the conflict nonetheless by defense agreements with allies for whom the conflict might be significant.

Towards the end of that decade of confrontation between the two camps of Europe, the diplomats began to expect a serious war. No one was taken back when the possibility of such a war arose in 1914, with the exception of the British. No one was so frightened that they put up and to their diplomacy of bad faith and deception, or put away the

possibility of humiliating their adversary or of gaining some commercial or territorial advantage.

Too many people in Eastern Europe were working at cross-purposes for peace to last there. But the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 had not involved the powers of Central or Western Europe in a competition of armies. We need another vital condition to explain the war outcome of the 1914 crisis bargaining. And that condition is the nature of the problem, the issues which the bargainers sought to resolve peacefully or locally. How were Austria and Serbia to get along? Would Austria get the outside support of Germany and Serbia the support of Russia? Both powers were seriously threatening the security of the other; this was no conflict of the imagination. Whether the Serbians were going to live under a large Yugoslav state or were going to be kept under the supervision of Austrians and Hungarians was finally important enough to persuade Serbia and Austria's allies to support, even to the point of going to war, the bargaining positions of Serbia and Austria. With an existing equilibrium of arms and influence so finely drawn, the issue of the status of Serbia was too important for either of the two camps of Europe to give way on.

In other showdowns in preceding years, no power or bloc of powers thought it could use force on the continent without risking the armed intervention of the adversary nations. But in 1914, this expectation changed. This change in the behavioral link of the murder of the Archduke on June 28 to the inclusion of all the major nations of Europe (with the exception of Italy) in war on August 5. Why did the Austrians and Germans believe that their coalition could use force to solve a problem inside Europe without being interfered with by the opposing coalition which had an important historical interest in the problem? How

did the Germans and Austrians misperceive their environment, misjudge their opponents?

The German strategists reasoned on the basis of precedents which no longer applied. The Germans and Austrians made a major strategic mistake in failing to understand how the Triple Entente had changed the conditions in which a German-Austrian war or threat of war was feasible arm of diplomacy. The alliance conditions of 1914 no longer permitted a "Bismarkian war". The target nation was no longer so easily isolated from the other nations of Europe. Once any power or coalition resorted to violence to solve some problem within Europe, a general or alliance war was likely, no matter how skillful the diplomatic team who started the violence.

To avoid a collectively catastrophic outcome, the 1914 powers had to cooperate in their competition for the individually defined optimum outcome. Why did they not cooperate? Perhaps this consideration of the ten years of competition preceding the crisis of 1914 offers something of an answer.