

THE AGADIR CRISIS

Systemic Environment

The systemic environment of the Agadir crisis was certainly multipolar. Eight states--Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, and the United States--might all be considered major actors in the system although the focus for the generation of international political issues seemed to be concentrated among the first five of these and the Agadir crisis involved, almost exclusively, the first three.

The distribution of conventional armaments during this period might be approximated as follows. Great Britain was the undisputed master of the seas. British naval forces came close to equaling those of all other powers combined. The United States, Germany, and France all had smaller but reasonably powerful navies. In terms of land forces, however, Britain was clearly less adequately armed than France and Germany which were the leaders in land armaments. Neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary was a military power on land or sea comparable to the first three states. Italy ranked still lower on the pecking order with only the Turkish state to stand as its whipping boy. The Japanese land and naval forces were probably as good or better than those maintained by any other power in the Far East. But Japan did not become embroiled in conflicts not involving the Pacific area. So too the United States, with a reasonable navy but almost no army, tended to remain aloof from the quarrels of Europe. There were no formal international organizations of any importance to complement these national actors except for

peculiar ones created intermittently to deal with particular problems. None were created for Agadir although the Algeciras conference, as will be set out below, did play a role in developing the political situation which exploded at Agadir. Informally there remained something of an interlocking directorate in terms of the royal houses of Europe. Yet by 1911 the impact of royalty on the foreign policy of the three actors most closely involved in Agadir was not very remarkable.

The formal alliance arrangements in this international system were quite complex. Basically the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy was matched against the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia. However, these groupings were rather flexible, and in addition a dispute between one member of each group did not always draw in all six parties. Also, there were a number of touchy areas around the globe which offered potential conflicts within the groupings. For instance, Great Britain and Russia were at odds with one another all along Russia's southern border, particularly in Iran and China. From India east Japan was allied with Great Britain, and presumably the only adversary this alliance could have would be Russia, Britain's European ally. Great Britain and France had long struggled for control of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, but this conflict had essentially been resolved in favor of the British at Fashoda in 1898. So in the Triple Entente only France and Russia had not been at one another's throat in the recent past.

The Triple Alliance had a somewhat firmer foundation. Germany seemed always to face the possibility of a two front war on the continent. Relations with France had not been easy since the annexation

of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Now with Russia as France's ally Austria-Hungary provided needed help with respect to the eastern front. Austria-Hungary's traditional battleground was with Russia in the Balkan peninsula, and Germany provided a needed ally with respect to this ever-simmering conflict. Italy, the weak third partner in the alliance, provided essentially safety from attack on the third exposed front although there was some hostility between Austria and Italy in the area of their common border.

The United States was little involved in European political struggles in 1911. It had been mildly interested and active in China since the Spanish-American war, but in general the United States was not included in the calculations of European foreign policy. The same was true for Japan except when the Far East was involved. The Turkish state which arose from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 was not particularly involved in greater European disputes until 1912. Spain, which is relevant to the Agadir crisis, was essentially allied with Great Britain.

The variety in the nature and firmness of the commitments involved in these various groupings almost defies description, and many of these commitments have only very limited relevance to the Agadir crisis. The commitments important in this crisis will be discussed later.

The international system could not be considered ideologically homogeneous. Yet, in terms of cross-national ideologies, the heterogeneity of the system did not seem to have a remarkable impact. Republican France and Britain were allied with Tzarist Russia and Britain, in addition, with Imperial Japan. The Triple Alliance was

perhaps somewhat more ideologically sound, but in the shifting alliances of the preceding thirty years or so the nature of domestic government seems to have been a rather ~~important~~ consideration. Disputes of left-right character tended to occur largely within rather than among nations. Liberal-conservative--and, less prominently, labour--disputes characterized British politics, but in 1911 these disputes were not remarkably influential in foreign affairs. Germany and, more clearly, France had more extreme left-right conflict domestically. However, only in France does this conflict seem to have had impact on foreign policy. Doctrines of nationalist and colonial expansion seem to be generally predominant in the foreign policies of these states.

The form then of ideology which was more important to the international politics of this period manifested itself in a variety of forms of nationalism. Diesing (1970) indicates that even in the contemporary international system liberalism and socialism serve only as ideal or long-range goals, and nationalism is the short-range goal which serves as a tool by which these long-range goals may be achieved. Thus Brezhnev maintains that world socialism requires the limited sovereignty of all states except the Soviet Union until the millennium. And, United States support of the Spanish and South Vietnamese regimes is necessary in order to reach a different millennium. I originally supposed that the perspectives of various parties in the Agadir system would show less incongruence than those in the highly heterogeneous system of the Cuban crisis. I have had to alter my views quite considerably as the perspectives of the various parties in the Agadir crisis were quite dissimilar. In part this may be due to the distrust

and uncertainty inherent in a decentralized system similar to Rousseau's stag hunt (Waltz, 1959). But an additional factor here was that each actor had a millennium of national grandeur. These nationalistic "ideologies" were transnational only in the sense of national colonial empires, but they seem to operate in a fashion similar to, although perhaps somewhat milder than, the contemporary transnational liberal and socialist ideologies. The difference then, if any, between the impact of ideology on perspectives in the Agadir crisis and that which Diesing describes in the Berlin case would be that the ideologies prominent in the crisis place nationalism somewhat closer to the "ends" end of the means-ends continuum in 1911.

Bargaining Setting

Although the outcome of the Agadir crisis had a rather direct impact on a number of actors, major and minor, only three--France, Germany, and Great Britain--were generally and continually involved in the activity of the crisis. The Agadir crisis was one of a series of crises concerning the fate of Morocco, and some historical background will make the activities of these three states more comprehensible.

France coveted Morocco as the final increment in its subjugation of northwest Africa. In addition the mountainous area of Morocco along the Moroccan-Algerian frontier provided a perfect base of operations for bandits and raiders. Thus the security of western Algeria would be enhanced by French control of Morocco and endangered in the event that Morocco fell into the hands of another European power.

Germany had been absent from the earlier colonial competition among the seafaring states of western Europe. When Germany finally joined the fray late in the nineteenth century there was not a great deal of potentially colonial territory left from which to build an empire. Morocco was one of the few promising locations which remained. The promise of Morocco was largely of mineral wealth--this promise proved to be greatly exaggerated--and good, strategic harbors located on both the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. But, as the German struggle for Morocco stretched out over the years national prestige became another and perhaps the preeminent element of the issue. It became more and more difficult for the Germans to accept defeat on the Moroccan issue. Settlement of German demands in the Moroccan question became more and more central to Germany's prestige as a great power and to its strategic position in European politics.

Britain's primary concern with respect to Morocco itself was that the coastline--particularly the Mediterranean one--remain unfortified and in friendly hands. If these conditions were not met, Britain's communications with its colonies in the Middle East and southern Asia would be endangered. This in turn would have a dramatic impact upon the security of the entire British empire. But Britain's presence in the Agadir crisis cannot be attributed to its interest in Morocco per se. Rather Britain's interest was in maintaining its alliance with France as will be examined more completely below.

Morocco itself existed in a state of semi-independence. Nominally, Morocco was ruled by its sultan. There were conditions on this rule, however, which tended to create its nominal character. First,

even without European intervention the grasp of the sultan upon his subjects in Morocco was rather tenuous. Moroccan territory was populated by a large number of distinct tribes, and the authority of the sultan was always pretty low among some of these. The sultan's power was often questioned as well, and civil war was not uncommon. Second, the European powers in general adopted policies with respect to their nationals in Morocco which reduced the power and authority of the sultan even further. Moroccan "public services" starting with harbor authorities and customs officials and gradually working up to the police, military, and financial authorities were under European guidance or more correctly control. In addition the various foreign legations and colonies were able to take Moroccan nationals in under their wing, so to speak, as protégés. These nationals were then protected in various ways such as being exempt from Moroccan taxation. Thus the general encroachment of the European powers on Morocco tended to reduce further the power and authority of the indigeneous regime.

The immediate background of the Agadir crisis begins I suppose with the initiatives of Delcassé, the French minister of foreign affairs, in 1901. Delcassé was an ardent proponent of the idea that France should add Morocco to its colonial empire. Delcassé began laying the ground work for this policy in 1901. He made his first deal with the Italians. The principle of this understanding was that, if the Italians would grant the French a free hand with respect to Morocco, the French would grant the Italians a free hand with respect to the Ottoman protectorate of Tripoli. The French promise was made conditional

upon France gaining Morocco before allowing the Italians freedom of action with respect to Tripoli.

Delcassé then turned his attention toward Spain. France apparently never hoped to get Spain to give up its colonial aspirations in Morocco entirely. Delcassé attempted to gain agreement on the nature of a future partition of Morocco between France and Spain. The general idea was that Spain would get the Mediterranean coast and a bit more and that France would get the rest. The issue was the depth of the Spanish portion. France was not merely being generous in considering Spain in this matter. Although Spain itself was rather unimportant in the councils of Europe, Spain was an ally of Britain. The British were interested in seeing the Mediterranean coast remain in the hands of an ally and preferably a relatively powerless one. Neither was Britain particularly anxious to see the northern stretches of Morocco's Atlantic coast fall into the hands of a powerful or adversary state. Hence the Spanish had an ally to fall back upon in their discussions with the French over the contemplated partition of Morocco. Thus, although agreement was avoided only through a change of ministers in Spain, the talks broke down in 1903 because the Spanish thought Britain's support might help them to gain considerably more sometime in the future than the French were then offering.

From these talks Delcassé moved on to Great Britain itself. There had been considerably rivalry in the recent past between Britain and France. Control of northeast Africa had been the issue five years before. This had been settled in favor of the British during the Fashoda crisis of 1898. Now the two began to move closer together

again. The result of this movement was the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904. With respect to Africa, this agreement allowed British freedom of action with respect to Egypt and its environs in return for French freedom of action with respect to Morocco in the case that the sultan's authority should disappear with the stipulation that Spain be allocated a territorial fringe in the north along the Mediterranean littoral and the northern section of the Atlantic coast.

Now Delcassé returned to discussions with Spain, and, fortified by the Anglo-French accord, he was able to drive a harder bargain than he had attempted two years earlier. Thus the depth of the potential Spanish protectorate in Morocco was reduced somewhat.

The state omitted from all this diplomacy was Imperial Germany. During Delcassé's discussions with various other powers Germany indicated an interest in sections of southern Morocco, particularly the Sous valley, if the status of Morocco as an independent state were to be altered. But, the French proceeded in their penetration of Morocco with little regard for German interests. The German Chancellor, von Buelow, was concerned partially because of German interests--economic and political--in Morocco itself and partially because he felt that the Moroccan case would set a precedent. If Morocco were divided among the European colonial powers through a process in which Germany had no voice, it would be even more difficult for Germany to gain a say in other and perhaps even more important matters. Germany's prestige as a power then in von Buelow's eyes was contingent upon gaining an input into the Moroccan question.

Thus Germany created what is known as the first Moroccan or Algeciras crisis in 1905 when the Kaiser's visit to Tangier essentially denied the continuance of the French policy of not consulting Germany on Moroccan affairs. This visit brought on the removal of Delcassé' from office and the Algeciras conference on Morocco.

The Algeciras conference on European affairs in Morocco involved primarily France, Germany, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, Russia, and the United States. Although Morocco and some smaller European states had delegates at the conference, they had a negligible impact. Germany, somewhat to its surprise, stood practically alone at the conference. Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the United States remained largely neutral while Britain, Spain, and Russia supported France.

The essential issues of the conference were the security and financial arrangements--particularly the police and the Moroccan state bank (Anderson, 1930). The police issue was decided such that France and Spain were charged with the organization of a Moroccan police force approximately within their potential protectorate zones although, as these zones were known only to France, Britain, and Spain, the other powers did not realize that this had occurred. A bank with an international directorate in which France played a prominent if not predominant role was set up as well. Nominally, the Act of Algeciras maintained the integrity of the Moroccan state and an economic policy of open door for all European powers. Practically, the act contributed to the dissolution of Moroccan sovereignty and independence and also to French and Spanish predominance in the area.

The Algeiras conference then was something of a defeat for the Germans. Not only were German colonial desires in Morocco frustrated, but discouraging battle lines had been drawn. France had been supported strongly by Britain and mildly by Russia. Germany's allies--Austria-Hungary and Italy--had provided almost no help at all. The French cry of isolation common around 1900 had now faded, and in its place arose a similar German fear of encirclement.

In Morocco meanwhile French penetration was perhaps slowed but certainly not stopped. A variety of conditions possibly including the sultan's obvious subservience to the French gave rise to civil war in 1908. And, although the issue was in doubt for some while, the pretender eventually gained the throne. This, in turn, led to a new European hassle over Morocco. The French wished to withhold recognition from the new sultan until he agreed to abide by certain "rules of the game" imposed by the European powers. They also felt that, since their prominence in Morocco had been recognized in 1905, the other powers should follow their lead. The Germans, anxious both to secure some succulent concessions from the new sultan and to defy this French notion of preeminence recognized the new sultan on their own initiative. Although hackles in France, Germany, and Great Britain rose momentarily, the affair died down when Mulay Hafid, the new sultan, agreed to the rules imposed by the French--the rules were largely those of the Algeiras conference plus reparations for damage to European property incurred during the civil war.

Again in November, 1908 conflict arose between France and Germany over Morocco. A German diplomat was caught by French military

officers trying to sneak six deserters from the French foreign legion aboard a German vessel. One of the officers threatened the diplomat with a revolver, and a relatively minor crisis ensued. Three of the deserters were German nationals, and the German government demanded their return. The matter was eventually consigned to an international arbiter.

The continual conflict to which the Moroccan question gave rise--the two examples above being only a particularly prominent pair--seemed to stir some interest on the part of both the French and the Germans to lend an aura of finality to the dispute. But other international developments impeded progress on this issue. Following the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 the Triple Entente was rather tacitly developed. Then in late 1908 the Bosnian crisis broke out. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian government was irate and was backed by Russia. Austria received pretty strong support from Germany while France and Britain seemed anxious to hold Russia back.

In 1909 after the Bosnian crisis attention was returned to Morocco. Discussions started between the French and the Germans, and in February an accord was reached. The substance of this accord was that Germany admitted to having no political ambitions in Morocco, and France in return for essentially being granted political predominance guaranteed Germany economic equality. It seems rather a waste of time to square this 1909 Franco-German accord with the Act of Algeiras. Regardless of how congruent the two are theoretically, neither statement seemed to have much impact upon the actions of the French or the Germans.

The enterprises in which the Germans were interested--primarily mines, public works such as harbors and railroads, and to a lesser degree loans--had broad enough political implications in the colonial development of Morocco to be guarded carefully by the French. The French claimed the sole right to build certain rail lines as military roads under their peace keeping prerogative. In addition, the French were adamant that the Act of Algeiras as well as the accord of 1909 forbade German participation in the operation of any facilities such as railroads or harbor installations built by them. Finally, even when agreement between the French and German foreign offices was reached, French functionaries on the scene in Morocco as well as their German counterparts seem to have been less than anxious to safeguard the economic rights of German entrepreneurs and the political dominance of the French respectively. Negotiations on railroads and mines were continued through the early days of the crisis before being broken off.

Perhaps before moving on to another aspect of the bargaining setting one other issue in the recent relations among the parties ought to be discussed. Germany and Great Britain had been involved in a naval arms race for about a decade by 1911. On several occasions negotiations had been attempted to slow down the competition, and Tirpitz' arms bills always raised a storm of opposition in the Reichstag. But these efforts were to no avail--the naval arms race continued essentially unabated.

There exists now enough background to attempt to define the issue of the Agadir crisis. Widespread civil disturbances broke out in Morocco during January of 1911. These grew in frequency and severity

until a condition of civil war was approached. In April the French sent an expeditionary force to Fez, the capital, in order to protect the European legations and colonies.

It is somewhat difficult to label this French move as either a deliberate act or an uncontrollable event. The French certainly made a deliberate decision to send the expeditionary force to Fez. Also, the French had certainly been active--along with other European powers--in destroying the sovereignty, power, and authority of the Moroccan state. So, the march to Fez was both an action congruent with the general objectives of France in Morocco--broadening control--and also an expected consequence of the policy which the European powers had been pursuing in Morocco for many years. However, by the middle of April, 1911 there was an opinion common to more than the French--the Germans being salient exceptions--that something needed to be done to protect the European nationals in the interior of Morocco. The French were the "natural" ones to be called upon to extend this "service", and in this sense the march to Fez might have occurred even if it had not fitted into the selfish interests of France's foreign policy. Grey, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, for one was in favor of asking the French to protect the foreign colonies in Fez. Thus the march to Fez might have occurred as a more or less inadvertent response to uncontrollable events. As things were, this would be a rather naive interpretation. But regardless of the manner in which France marched to Fez initially, a protectorate was the French policy by June.

Although the French claimed that they would leave when order was restored, the Germans realized that the sultan's authority and power had

been so eroded both by domestic incompetency and by foreign penetration that a French protectorate was inevitable. The Germans, having no incentive to struggle with the inevitable, simply accepted the notion of a French protectorate over at least part of Morocco. What they demanded was that Germany should receive some form of compensation since France had finally succeeded in adding at least part of Morocco to its colonial empire. Partially this demand for compensation came from the economic losses in Morocco which would accrue to Germany and to individual Germans as a result of the French protectorate there. But, far more importantly Germany demanded compensation because certain members of its decision unit felt that compensation was necessary to maintain German prestige and thus to assure Germany's seat of honor in the councils of Europe.

The issue for the French then was essentially control of Morocco, and the issue for the Germans was one of strategic position and prestige manifested in a demand for compensation. The crisis was kept alive by the compensation requested and by the tactics of the requests. For the British, as with the Germans, the main issues lay outside of Morocco itself. The German demands for compensation never touched on Britain's own interests in Morocco or elsewhere directly but acted instead through their impact upon France. The Anglo-Russian entente was a pretty shaky affair. The British had long feared and the Germans had occasionally seemed interested in a continental league organized against Britain. Now Britain had a powerful continental ally in France, and British decision-makers feared that, if Britain did not support France strongly, France would be driven into the arms of Germany--on the Moroccan

question and on other issues as well. The British concern then was the maintenance of the Entente Cordiale.

The valuation of the stakes, as in the Cuban crisis, is difficult to judge. Some things are clear. France valued control over Morocco more highly than either Germany or Britain. But these latter states had other values which they held dearly, so to speak. National prestige was felt to be on the line for the Germans, and the British emphasized another supergame aspect--the maintenance of an alliance.

The French went into the crisis the somewhat stronger party. They had the support of Britain throughout the crisis, and Germany could hardly hope to maintain an overseas position against British opposition. With respect to Morocco itself, the French surely held the advantage since they were already in physical control of much of its territory. Thus even the general unwillingness to go to war favored the French since they already had what they wanted. The balance of military capabilities would have depended upon who was drawn in on each side. Britain would probably have supported France all the way. Russia and Austria-Hungary were very reluctant to engage themselves with their respective allies in a struggle over Morocco although it is not clear that Russia and Austria would have remained aloof from a war among Germany, Britain, and France. Their reluctance in part was to restrain these states from acting in a fashion such that war would break out, and had one started, their attitude may well have been different. Italy flatly stated no interest in the matter whatsoever, and in this respect also Delcasse's diplomacy paid off. That the United States would be drawn into the conflict was probably not in the contingency scenarios of any of the three parties.

At a general level there are two important similarities between the images and perceptions of the Agadir crisis and their Cuban counterparts. The perspectives of the various actors in each case were so markedly different that it is difficult to imagine that the various parties are addressing themselves to a common situation. Also, there seem to have been similar distributions of national perspectives common to all the decision units in the two crises. The tails of this distribution in the Cuban crisis were called hard line and soft line positions, and the same terms seem applicable for the Agadir crisis. These general similarities manifest themselves somewhat differently in each national actor, however.

The dominant feeling among French decision-makers was that no general settlement of disputes with Germany was possible as long as Germany held Alsace-Lorraine. But, some French leaders were more willing to work toward rapprochement by settling lesser issues than others. Caillaux and Cambon were among those so inclined. It is somewhat unclear whether any real differences of ends existed between these individuals and men such as de Selves, Poincaré, or Clemenceau or whether these latter individuals were only less concerned with the means by which these goals were to be achieved. In any case the means prescribed by the respective groups in the Agadir crisis differed considerably. All were agreed that Morocco would become French; their disagreements then were over the tactics of achieving this goal including the price which was to be paid.

These differences seem in part to include varying images of Germany. Poincaré, for instance, saw Germany as a nefarious aggressor

which never missed an opportunity to insidiously wreak havoc upon France's interests. Caillaux and Cambon were far less inflexible in their perceptions and were capable of differentiating some German acts from the havoc wreaking variety and also capable of seeing some legitimacy-- or at least of seeing that the Germans saw some basis for legitimacy-- underlying German acts.

In general there seems to have been little overt hostility among the French with respect to the British. There was considerable uncertainty as to how strong Britain's support would be, and the information which the British got was edited somewhat to give the British the impression that their interests were endangered.

The German perspectives with respect to the French were dispersed along a similar continuum as those of the French with respect to the Germans. There were Germans--Class, the leader of the Pan-Germans, and other conservatives and colonialists--who perceived French activity in general to have the purpose of humiliating Germany and making Germany's path to "its place in the sun" as difficult as possible. There seem to have been no men of this mind in prominent positions during the Agadir crisis. The prominent hard liners were Kiderlen-Waechter, the minister for foreign affairs, and some of his colleagues in the foreign office--Zimmermann and Langwerth von Simmern particularly. These men had in general been aggravated by France's continual isolation of Germany with respect to Morocco just as many of the French were angered by continual German interference in an affair which, so they felt, did not concern the Germans. These individuals were hard line in their perception of the situation and in the tactics which they prescribed and

used. But they were not consistent Francophobes. They were merely applying their general hard line characteristics to a conflict situation which, to their minds, France had provoked.

A number of others, William II, Bethmann-Hollweg--the Chancellor, and Schoen, the German ambassador in Paris, disagreed with Kiderlen on either goals or tactics throughout the Agadir crisis. The Kaiser, for instance, was interested in better relations with France and Great Britain and doubted that Morocco was important enough to gain German involvement. Schoen thought that tactics were poorly chosen on occasion. Kiderlen seemed to have tremendous domestic influence; however, and the Agadir crisis from the German perspective was handled pretty much the way he chose.

The German perspectives on Great Britain were apparently quite vague. Kiderlen, through some logic, seems to have discounted the British interest in and possible impact upon the crisis. The Kaiser who had recently visited London seemed to feel that relations with the British were relatively harmonious and would be little ruffled by the Moroccan question. Even Metternich, the German ambassador in London, was rather nonchalant about British interest and the possible impact of Britain upon Germany's stance on the Moroccan question.

The British themselves were split into several different groups. Within the foreign office itself there were two basic perspectives (Nicolson, 1930, pp. 240-41). One was held by Nicolson and Crowe. According to this view Britain was forever imperiled by the possibility of a continental league united against her. The entente with Russia provided little relief from this threat both because of its shakiness

and because of Russia's weakness. The entente with France was the key to Britain's safety in this regard, and every move Germany made was interpreted as an attempt to break the Entente Cordiale.

Grey, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, headed the other school of thought within the foreign office. He had reasonable relations with Bethmann-Hollweg, and he failed to despair of peaceful relations with Germany. He was somewhat less willing to let France have a blank check of support as he feared that this would lead Britain into conflict for values which were rather exclusively French.

Outside the foreign office and to the left of Grey were the socialists who felt that what Grey feared had already occurred (Morel, 1911). That is, the Entente Cordiale was essentially a French ruse to bring the British navy into the process of building the French empire. These groups looked upon Germany's claims, particularly in the Moroccan crisis with considerable sympathy. Generally, Lloyd George fit in at the right extreme of this group and wound up therefore somewhat to the left of Grey. On the other side of Nicolson and Crowe were men such as Churchill who saw, not vague threats to Britain's strategic position arising from German activity, but who apparently expected to see the German army marching around the English countryside at any moment. In addition Churchill seemed actually eager for the confrontation and the game of war.

One result of these respective national images and their various subdivisions was that a climate of distrust and suspicion developed. As Barlow says, "This mutual suspicion . . . transposed every move into an

act of chicanery or trickery; and this in the eyes of the victim justified acts of reprisal" (Barlow, 1940, p. 145). This is, in essence, the story of the Agadir crisis.

Bargaining Process

CHALLENGE

The March to Fez

A rebellion broke out in Morocco in January, 1911, and throughout the early months of the year it grew in proportion until in April the Moroccan capital, Fez, was threatened. The French foreign office under Cruppi started laying the diplomatic groundwork for the contingency of the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Fez. The motivation behind this move remains somewhat cloudy to this day. Cruppi gave the impression that the force was to rescue besieged Europeans at Fez and to return rather directly upon the restoration of order--this latter was not anticipated to be a time consuming task.

In general the scenarios developed by others were somewhat less honorable or optimistic than Cruppi's own. Grey seems to have felt that there were Europeans in Fez who were endangered. And, it appears that he viewed the march to Fez as a necessity. Grey was far less optimistic, however, about the ease with which long-term order might be restored, and he also feared that Germany might react to this move as an infringement of the Act of Algeciras. Grey himself felt that the French had violated the act and that they would find it necessary to do so continually

until some new understanding involving compensation for Germany could be reached.

The Germans too viewed the situation somewhat differently than Cruppi. Cecil's (1927) comment that, "The French, in the process of assimilating African natives to European uses, had found it desirable to despatch a military expedition to Fez" (p. 330), must have approximated the German private perspective. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador in Berlin, had a series of meetings with Kiderlen and Bethmann-Hollweg in April to discuss Moroccan developments. Early in April Cambon met with Kiderlen to discuss recent occurrences and to sound out the German government on any possible police actions on the part of the French. Kiderlen originally urged that the French proceed with great caution so that certain German publics would not become aroused. Kiderlen also indicated that some of the French contingency plans squared poorly with the Act of Algeciras. On the following day--April 6--Kiderlen was somewhat more intransigent. The proposed occupation of Rabat and the possibly ensuing march to Fez violated the agreement made at Algeciras. But Kiderlen suggested that the basis for the Act of Algeciras--the sovereignty of the Moroccan state--was in any case a myth and that France could gain a free hand in Morocco by compensating Germany.

Kiderlen ended this session by emphasizing that he was certain that a temporary occupation of Morocco was impossible and by urging Cambon to be sincere. Cambon reported to his government that German consent for the French Moroccan program could probably be obtained at a price which he indicated would apparently be part of southern

Morocco. Later Cambon was to say that Kiderlen asked for the part of Mogador on April 6 although Kiderlen always denied this, and there is nothing in the German papers to indicate that Cambon's contention is accurate (Cf. Tabouis, 1938, p. 197; and Jaeckh, 1924, p. 146).

Later in the month Cambon broached the same subject with Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor's response: "I do not say no to you, because I do not wish to take the responsibility for your compatriots; but I repeat it, I do not encourage you . . ." (Barlow, 1940, p. 187)--seems to have had little impact. Less than a week later the French government informed the other capitals of Europe that the French expeditionary force was to move into position for a march to Fez. Zimmermann at the German foreign office responded that, although he did not question the sincerity of French motives, he thought that an occupation of considerable duration would leave the Act of Algeciras meaningless. Three days later on April 28 the march for Fez began, and Kiderlen's response was that a Moroccan order maintained by the force of French arms would leave the Germans free to act as they wished with respect to Morocco.

Even Caillaux, the French Prime Minister after June 23, 1911, felt that the French purpose in Morocco in the Agadir crisis was to make up for time lost through the protectorate-hindering Algeciras conference (Fay, 1930, p. 280). So, it appears that the motives given by Cruppi may have been something of a public relations front. In any case the expeditionary force was on the way to Fez, and attention shifted to dealing with the situation as it was rather than avoiding the contingency in the first place.

Cambon felt that the actions of French troops in and around Fez would probably precipitate some German response along the lines of finding an alternative to the Act of Algeciras as the basis for agreement over Morocco. The British were quite afraid that France would not be able to disengage itself so conveniently as Cruppi thought and were urging caution. But the initiative had really shifted to Germany. The statements of Kiderlen, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Zimmermann mentioned earlier have been generally interpreted as warnings to the French (Schmitt, 1916, pp. 313; and Sontag, 1933, p. 154). The notion here is that before France finally gained its prize in Morocco, Germany would have to be compensated just as Italy, Britain, and Spain had been. This is rather clearly the gist of Kiderlen's statements. France might get away with a momentary march to Fez, but, if this move were escalated--and Kiderlen was certain that it would, German consent would have to be purchased. Grey understood this clearly (Barlow, 1940, p. 201). But the French, particularly Cruppi, seemed to hope that things would work themselves out.

Early in May Cruppi impressed upon Schoen again that France would uphold its obligations under the Algeciras conference. Schoen wrote Bethmann-Hollweg that, while Cruppi might well be sincere, it would be difficult for him to control the situation. The French move might cause the smoldering civil conflict in Morocco to erupt into holy war against the Europeans. Or the French government might simply be unable to withstand the more militant domestic opposition. As it turned out these hazards were not the crucial ones. The French force was able to control the Moroccans in its immediate vicinity and was actually removed from

the area around Fez about the middle of June. Part of the problem was expressed by Schoen about the same time--the authority of the sultan had been destroyed and the French force was about the only effective order maintaining unit in Morocco. Thus Schoen felt that the sultan was dependent, not only militarily, but politically as well upon the French.

Spain too demonstrated France's lack of control over the situation. Late in May Spain began to occupy certain areas along the northern coast. France and Britain tried to forestall this move which broadcast even more blatantly the violation of Algeciras. But the Spanish were too concerned that they might lose their portion of Morocco if they did not actually have it in their possession.

Thus the late spring of 1911 found France in a somewhat difficult position with respect to the Moroccan question. The French dream of gaining a Moroccan protectorate was close at hand, but the consent of Germany--which was looming ever more necessary--to this change in the status quo had not yet been achieved. The German hints that a free hand for France in Morocco could be stayed through proper compensation had been to date ignored, and the French were still clinging to the facade, so to speak, that Morocco was a sovereign state and that no violation of Algeciras on the part of the French had taken place. This line was greeted with general skepticism even in Britain, and the Germans had not bought it at all.

Although it is somewhat unclear what the original intentions of the French were, it seems clear that by early June the French were pursuing a protectorate and had begun to interest themselves in placating

the Germans. It is conceivable that this interest in the German demands arose from a change in French intentions--a shift from rescuing Europeans to establishing a protectorate. It is even possible that this shift in intentions developed through the slow realization on the part of the French that near anarchy would reign in Morocco in the absence of their expeditionary force. The Germans would call this an incredibly naive interpretation, and so it may be. An alternative hypothesis would be that the French finally realized that a free hand in Morocco would require payment to the Germans--perhaps Kiderlen's hints began finally to sink in.

In any case the French interest in gaining an agreement with the Germans did develop. One way of examining this decision is to say that the French noticed that German preferences here were arranged in a Prisoners' Dilemma structure. That is, Germany considered the French move in Morocco to be a default move. This default could be corrected without being withdrawn only if compensation for Germany were added. If there was to be no compensation then, Germany would default as well. Germany preferred a double default to cooperating in the face of a compensationless French coup in Morocco. The degree to which this defaulting activity could be incremented or expanded from a peace-war dichotomy was probably somewhat vague. The escalation ladder of this period was far more precipitous than that in the Cuban crisis. Yet, I imagine the French did not expect a general German mobilization to be the next German move. Nevertheless, the French seemed to want to preempt this move--whatever it was--with conciliation on their part.

The French preferences at this time seem to have been worked out as follows. A French protectorate over Morocco was inevitable, but this protectorate should be procured as rapidly as possible. A return to the Act of Algeciras then was not desirable even if it was possible. The achievement of a Moroccan protectorate in the immediate future seemed to entail compensating Germany in some fashion or another. This was acceptable in principle. In practice the compensation acceptable would have to be limited. Morocco itself, for instance, could not be further partitioned. Even if this contingency were satisfactory to the French, the British would object, and the French would lose their support. Other colonial compensations might be possible, but it might be possible to avoid territorial compensations altogether, and this would be preferable. In general the notion of getting the Germans to state their demands rather than initiating offers seems to have been the predominant feeling among the French. Preferences then were left somewhat vague with the principle of compensation and the unavailability of Morocco as compensation material being the areas of clearness.

Following this path then Cambon began in June to query the Germans as to their preferences. Early in June Cambon visited Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor, upon being informed that the French expeditionary force was preparing to leave Fez, replied to the effect that, if the force left, it would have to return sooner or later--probably sooner. Cambon replied that the absorption of Morocco into the French colonial empire was inevitable. Cambon then suggested that a settlement of outstanding Franco-German differences which would allow the Germans to accept a French protectorate in Morocco might be discussed. Bethmann-Hollweg

suggested that the man to see about matters of this nature was Kiderlen. A conversation with Zimmermann confirmed that Kiderlen was the man to see.

Cambon reported these conversations to his government along with the words of the German crown prince with whom he had spoken at a social gathering. The prince had indicated that he was convinced that France, having such an excellent opportunity to form a protectorate over Morocco, would not relinquish its position. He further indicated that this would be satisfactory to the Germans as long as they received a share. Cambon reported that this opinion seemed to be generally held among the governing circles in Germany. It was his impression that French freedom of action in Morocco or the overthrow of the Act of Algeiras would have to be purchased. Cambon was further convinced that France could not afford to pay a price involving Moroccan territory, and he was equally sure that this was the price that the Germans were thinking in terms of. The further partition of Morocco would, firstly, negate the purpose of a decade of French Moroccan diplomacy. Secondly, it would be a severe blow to the entente with Britain and would thus leave France more vulnerable to German blackmail in the future.

Cambon journeyed rather leisurely to see the man who was apparently in charge of German affairs in the Moroccan question. Kiderlen and Cambon discussed the Moroccan situation for two days-- June 21 and 22--at Kissingen. The first day's work was rather minimal due to Kiderlen's taciturn attitude. But on the following day Cambon was able to engage Kiderlen more successfully. After some diplomatic fencing Cambon asserted a willingness to discuss all outstanding issues

which lay between France and Germany. Kiderlen agreed that it would be futile to limit the discussions to Morocco alone. Cambon then stated clearly that, if Germany had a desire for Morocco, it would be better left unstated. France would not give any part of Morocco in compensation. Cambon added carefully, however, that Germany could seek compensation elsewhere.

Cambon seems to have been sincere in these statements. Caillaux, Cambon, and Poincaré all agree that France would not give up a bit of Morocco to Germany. This seems to have been a firm constraint for the French throughout the crisis. War would be undertaken before Germany gained a foothold in Morocco although Cambon was careful to exclude any mention of war from the conversations with Kiderlen. It also seems that Cambon was sincere in offering compensation elsewhere. There were a series of domestic crises in France, and indeed the government fell the following day, so there is little evidence to suggest what France was, at this time, willing to offer Germany in compensation. It seems in fact that specific notions were relatively absent on this point, but the principle was sound--otherwise Cambon would surely have been far more careful in his choice of words.

The French then probably had no clear idea of compensation at this time. They may have wondered what the Germans had in mind. Cambon was surely hesitant to suggest an offer and probed Kiderlen for a suggestion. Kiderlen, apparently similarly motivated, was equally hesitant and responded to Cambon's statement that it was, of course, possible to look elsewhere but that France should explain what it had in mind. Cambon avoided this ploy by saying that he was not prepared

to be more specific because of the innovative character of the ideas being discussed. The discussion then drifted onto other matters, but as the conversation closed Kiderlen suggested that Cambon bring the Germans "something"--presumably a compensation offer--upon his return from Paris whence he was bound.

Both Barlow (1940, pp. 212-13) and Sontag (1933, p. 157) stress that Cambon and Kiderlen were each concerned that the other present the first specific offer or demand. Neither author is very coherent in his explanation as to why the actors felt this compulsion although it seems clear enough from the conversations between Cambon and Kiderlen in late June and early July that both men were so constrained. I am unable to answer this point with any great satisfaction or sophistication now. And, I shall delay a discussion of the advantages accruing to the party which receives an offer or demand until the instance actually arises below.

After his conversations with Kiderlen in Kissingen, Cambon traveled to Paris. When he attempted to present his report to Cruppi at the foreign office on the morning of June 24, he found that the Monis government had fallen the previous evening and that Cruppi was no longer foreign minister. Caillaux, the new Prime Minister, did not complete the formation of his ministry for several days, and domestic problems continued to plague the regime. In addition, there was some particular difficulty in filling the position of foreign minister. De Selves, the third man to whom the post was offered, finally accepted on June 29. The result of this governmental upheaval was that no action was taken with respect to the Moroccan issue between the Kiderlen-Cambon

meeting on June 22 and the end of that month. German reports indicate that Cambon returned to Berlin and that the Germans were discouraged by the absence of "something" as Cambon initiated no discussions over Morocco during this time. It appears that Cambon did not in fact return to Berlin until early in July, but, even if German statements are accurate, it is difficult to imagine that Cambon could have received instructions from his government before June 29. In the meantime the Germans had taken the initiative and were to announce it on July 1.

DENIAL

The Panther

The major mystery which remains, and is likely to continue to do so, about the Agadir crisis involves the intentions of the German decision unit--particularly Kiderlen. The general German interest in Morocco was examined earlier, and there is no reason to believe that these elements changed in any important fashion from 1905 to 1911. With respect to the Agadir crisis itself the important German policy papers for the early period of the crisis are those of Kiderlen of May 3 and of Zimmermann on June 12 (Lepsius, 1925, pp. 101-08, 142-49).

In his May 3 memorandum Kiderlen set out his thoughts as clearly as they appear anywhere. First, he gave his notion of the situation in Morocco. The basis for the Act of Algeciras--that Morocco was an independent, sovereign state--was a figment of the imagination. Morocco stood upon French bayonets. The French might be able to withdraw momentarily, but they would have to return. This then meant that Morocco was effectively a French protectorate. Kiderlen then discussed what

the German response to these developments should be. Germany should allow France to place troops in Fez. After a bit a polite query should be made of the French government as to how long the French troops would remain. The French would name a time period, and they would later be unable to stick to this schedule. At this moment Germany should declare that the Act of Algeciras was obviously no longer applicable. It should not protest the French troops in Fez then but stress the freedom of all the signatories to the Act of Algeciras to now act as they wished with respect to Morocco. Specifically, rather than protesting French gains the Germans should procure compensation commensurate with French gains. If the French could protect their nationals in Fez, then the Germans could protect theirs as well. Germany, Kiderlen went on, had great firms in both Mogador and Agadir. Ships could be sent to these ports to protect these firms and to assure that the ports would not be taken by other powers. In a draft version Kiderlen stated that these harbors would be secured as a pledge which would ensure compensation.

Kiderlen thought that the two harbors he had in mind were too far south from the Mediterranean coast to provide any threat to the British. Once anchored in these harbors then Germany could leisurely wait to see what France was willing to offer for their return.

A month or so later, after the Spanish landing in the north, Zimmermann wrote a similar memorandum. The French seemed intent upon bringing Morocco into their empire, and the Spanish appeared to be doing the same thing in the north. Although compensation for Germany had been discussed unofficially with Caillaux--then minister for finance, it was difficult to imagine that the French were going to spontaneously

offer compensation to Germany on an official basis. Germany then should acquire some security in southern Morocco which would ensure compensation. Germany should declare that the French and Spanish actions had overthrown the Act of Algeciras and claim the freedom of action for all the signatory powers in Morocco. To protect German interests warships should be sent to Mogador and Agadir--two ships for each port. Zimmermann thought that Britain would remain aloof if it became known that the Germans were interested in talking about compensation in the French Congo.

There is little to indicate that Kiderlen ever deviated very much from this original program although he filled in many points which were probably purposely left vague in May.

Kiderlen claimed to have received the approval of the Kaiser for his program early in May. Throughout May and until late in June then Kiderlen adopted a policy of watchful waiting. Although a discussion of the time period for which the French were to remain at Fez did occur between the French and the Germans, it was a rather low-key affair in comparison to the one described in the May 3 memorandum, and the French were in fact withdrawing from the area around Fez in the latter half of June. But the French intentions with respect to Morocco were clearer than ever, and Kiderlen seems to have stuck to his general plan. Even the talks with Cambon at Kissingen seem not to have impressed him very much. There appear to be two reasons for this.

One is set out in Kiderlen's reply to Zimmermann's memorandum of June 12. Kiderlen thought that reliance upon possible French generosity and good will was an insufficient safeguard for German compensation.

In this respect his attitude was similar to that of the Spanish, and the idea expressed in the memorandum was valid regardless, apparently, of French actions. This notion was that Mogador and Agadir would be "taken", so to speak, as hostages to ensure French good behavior with respect to German compensation. Thus this first consideration was one of a precaution of independent insurance regardless of the French attitude. German wanted to have some direct control.

The second reason seems to have been paramount and more widely held among German decision-makers. This was that the French would have considerable difficulty making a compensation offer unless they received some encouragement from the Germans. There were two sorts of difficulties. The French ministry might be unwilling to even offer compensation, although they might talk about it, spontaneously. They might have to be convinced that such an offer was requisite to the success of a French protectorate. In addition, the ministry might find it difficult to support a compensation offer against domestic opponents unless there was some obvious sign of its necessity.

Zimmermann and Langwerth particularly seem to have felt that placing warships in Moroccan harbors would ease the compensation decision for the French cabinet from the domestic angle. Kiderlen seems to have stressed the other consideration--that the French would not compensate, regardless of their words, unless forced to give something (Pick, 1937, pp. 326, 328).

Following his conversations with Cambon at Kissingen Kiderlen seems to have traveled to meet the Kaiser who was then out of Berlin to reobtain approval of his warship plan. This approval was received,

and the orders to the Panther were sent before de Selves accepted his post at the foreign office. According to Barlow (1940, p. 219) the Panther was ordered to Agadir before Cambon ever returned to Berlin. But, regardless of the exact chronology with respect to Cambon, it appears that Kiderlen did not really give the French a chance. Whether he would have been rewarded for his patience had he done so is, of course, open to question, but it appears that the Kissengen interviews did nothing to change Kiderlen's perspective that the French would offer compensation only under pressure. The Panther then was ordered to anchor in the fine natural harbor at Agadir.

In all three ships were involved in Moroccan waters during the crisis--the gunboats Panther and Eber and the cruiser Berlin (Gooch & Temperley, 1932, pp. 846-847). The movements of these ships were relatively unknown to the French and British at the time, and were perhaps relatively unimportant since it was the symbolic value of their presence which formed the important signal rather than the tactics of the ships. The choice of the Panther in this regard, however, may have been particularly unfortunate since it had quite a reputation as something of a provocateur (Vagts, 1956, p. 236).

On July 1, 1911 Schoen delivered a message to the French foreign office which read to the effect that in response to the requests of German firms located in southern Morocco a warship--the Panther--had been dispatched to Agadir to assure the safety of German lives and property. After he finished this official statement Schoen introduced again the notion that the Act of Algeciras was a dead letter and that a new agreement with respect to Morocco would have to be worked out.

De Selves indicated that he pretty much understood this, but that the German move to Agadir was hardly going to make negotiations easier.

On the same day Metternich, the German ambassador in London, delivered a similar message to the British foreign office. Grey was away from London at the time, and Metternich was received by Nicolson who expressed some incredulity that Germany should need to send a ship to a closed port where there were supposedly no Germans. Kiderlen's references to great German firms at Mogador and Agadir does seem something of an exaggeration although perhaps it was not one for Kiderlen. There were a few representatives of great German firms in these two localities but no great physical presence. Metternich added in fashion rather similar to that of Schoen in Paris that the Act of Algeciras was inoperable. He implied that the German move was to signal the German desire to negotiate a new basis for agreement in Morocco.

The German intentions with respect to France had been apparently to facilitate compensation both by showing the French cabinet that this was a necessity and by giving them a strong case against the more militant elements of their domestic opposition. The immediate intentions with respect to Britain were only vaguely expressed, but apparently no reaction from Britain was expected as long as German moves did not threaten the Mediterranean coast.

Both the French and the British were greatly surprised and somewhat dumfounded by the German move, and the character of their reaction was not evident or even known immediately (Poincaré, 1922, pp. 77-78). De Selves wanted to send a French ship to either Mogador or Agadir. Caillaux thought this unwise, and in cabinet sessions he was generally

supported--even by Delcassé, back in the ministry as minister of marine since early in 1911, who thought that sending a ship to Mogador would be cowardly and that sending one to Agadir would mean war. Essentially the French cabinet decided to consult its allies--Britain and Russia--before doing much of anything. Although de Selves, on his own initiative and without Caillaux's knowledge, asked Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London and brother of Jules Cambon in Berlin, to sound out the British on the sending of a ship or ships, the French leadership made no intentional move as yet.

The Russian response for the rest of the crisis can be taken care of briefly here. Russia had some empathy with Germany's claims, was discouraged by the poor French and British support it had received in the Bosnian crisis, and was not interested in becoming embroiled in a conflict over northwest Africa.

The British response was somewhat more encouraging to Caillaux. There were some initial mixups over the Caillaux-de Selves split about the advisability of sending ships. But, this was essentially cleared up on July 4 when Caillaux received Grey's message that the British cabinet thought this inadvisable. The British government was not willing to show its hand very clearly. Grey feared that the French might repartition Morocco so as to include Germany but not Britain. And, even Nicolson thought of this possibility and suggested that Britain lay down some guidelines or minimal constraints which would have to be met before any new agreement would be acceptable to her. There was also a suggestion that Britain and even Spain should enter into the negotiations. Caillaux thought that Franco-German discussions would be more successful,

but he did try to quell British fears of a repartition of Morocco by assuring Britain that Germany's compensation would not be in Morocco.

Germany, in sounding out its allies, had even less luck than France. Austria-Hungary gave Germany about the same reception that Russia gave France, and Italy was even colder to Germany's approach. At this stage then the crisis appeared to be a largely Franco-German one much as Kiderlen had anticipated. If another party was apt to join the fray, Great Britain appeared to be the most likely prospect.

Britain was about as reluctant at this stage to state a firm position vis-a-vis Germany as it was to state one with respect to France. When Grey returned to London on July 3 he met with Metternich. At this time he indicated only that any freedom of action with respect to Morocco which had been recently acquired by Germany could be exercised by Britain as well. Metternich inferred, rather correctly, that Grey feared a new Moroccan partition, and he forwarded this information to his government. The following day--July 4--Grey met with Metternich again. Grey's statements now were to the effect that Britain was not a disinterested party in Moroccan affairs. Britain's treaty obligations with France were mentioned as well as independent British interests, and Grey emphasized again that any change in the Moroccan situation would have to occur with the consent of the British.

The French position was evolving toward the notion that Germany, after having signaled the necessity for compensation so dramatically, should say what sort of compensation it had in mind. That is, the French had no planned strategy at this point other than letting Germany complete the initiative it had begun at Agadir by naming its price.

The threatening character of the Panther's spring came at a remarkably poor juncture in this regard. Even Schoen remarks that Caillaux was perhaps the French politician most favorably inclined toward Franco-German rapprochement, and prior to gaining the office of Prime Minister Caillaux had been involved in some informal conversations about possible compensation for Germany. Poincaré also mentions that compensation for Germany was not the issue--that issue had been settled in Germany's favor; the issue was the costliness of the compensation. Cambon and Caillaux were thus particularly discouraged by the Panther's move in that they both interpreted it as a signal that Cambon's position of no compensation in Morocco was unsatisfactory to the Germans. The French were thus quite wary, and the impact of the Panther's spring had precisely the opposite effect of that intended.

The Germans, it seems, were still waiting to hear about the "something" which Cambon was to bring back from Paris. So, for several days there was little activity between the Germans and the French. On July 6 Cambon and Schoen met in Paris. Cambon expressed both the negative impact of the Panther's spring and also his fear of German demands for Moroccan territory. Schoen did not confirm that Germany wanted part of Morocco but indicated that this would depend upon the degree to which France provided adequate compensation elsewhere. On the following day de Selves met Schoen. He tried to get the German ambassador to tell him what Germany had in mind in the way of compensation. Schoen countered that the place to learn this was in Berlin with Kiderlen and Cambon. This precipitated the pre-issue of where negotiations would take place and by whom they would be conducted. De Selves wanted Paris

as the location with Schoen and himself as the bargainers. Schoen stressed the propriety of Berlin with Cambon and Kiderlen--those with the greatest familiarity with the issue--as the bargainers.

The argument was repeated on July 8 when de Selves and Schoen also became involved in a discussion about the suitability of the French Congo as compensation for Germany. This was not the first time the idea had been broached. The idea of Congo compensation had quite a history in Franco-German affairs (Andrews, 1968, pp. 151-52), and both French and German newspapers had carried articles with the suggestion during the early weeks of the crisis, but this was the first time that French and German officials had formally discussed the possibility within the context of the 1911 crisis.

Germany won the pre-issuance of the negotiation place and parties, and Cambon and Kiderlen met again on July 9. But before moving into the confrontation stage a summary of the impact of the German denial move might be useful.

Kiderlen understood that Britain had independent interests in Morocco, and he knew as well of Britain's ties with France. He said himself that until the Moroccan affair was settled Britain would side with France on Morocco and on other matters. And, he later claimed that one purpose of Germany's Moroccan policy in 1911 was to settle the Moroccan question so as to clear the way for an Anglo-German entente. From his May 3 memorandum comes the impression that Kiderlen felt a German move in southern Morocco would not give the British decision unit the impression that its independent interests were threatened. Kiderlen seemed not to worry about the impact upon Britain which would work through

its relationship with France, and it appears as if he missed this consequence of his actions because he misunderstood completely the consequences his actions would have on the French decision unit.

With respect to independent British interests Kiderlen was reasonably correct. The British foreign office was not adamantly opposed to the Germans in southern Morocco if this would have no harmful impact on the Entente Cordiale. The British were reluctant to give this impression publically, however. They were reluctant to goad Germany on through their lack of interest because of the negative impact this would have on the entente, but Grey was equally unwilling to let the French know of the importance of the entente because he feared that France would act recklessly and drag Britain into a needless war. So on July 4 the British used their own independent interests as a guise for their uncertainty and also perhaps to cover the importance of the Entente Cordiale so that France would not become unmanageable.

The Germans apparently actually believed that their move in Agadir would facilitate a reasonably amicable settlement of the Moroccan question with the French. The precise nature of these perceptions were examined earlier (pp. 33-34). These perceptions were simply incorrect. The French seem to have realized the necessity of purchasing a protectorate in Morocco and more importantly they seem to have been interested in doing so. The Panther at best did not facilitate, but rather probably hindered this process. It altered the French (Caillaux's and Cambon's particularly) perceptions of what the Germans were after and thus hardened their attitudes (Gooch, 1928, pp. 139-40). In addition, it made compensation more difficult to sell to important

domestic publics since it appeared to many of these that France was backing down in the face of a German threat. Inasmuch then as Kiderlen misperceived the consequences of his actions on the French, he misperceived as well the impact his actions would have upon the British through their relationship with the French.

Kiderlen then obviously perceived the situation as one of Chicken for the French. If only Germany demonstrated clearly the intention of defaulting--by holding Agadir as hostage, the French would back down. This was a misperception from two bases. First, the French were humiliated by Kiderlen's gunboat diplomacy, and they became less favorably inclined toward compensation. Second, the French perceived this move as a demand for compensation in Morocco, and this was Prisoners' Dilemma for the French. War would precede a German foothold in Morocco.

CONFRONTATION

The German "Demand"

The first meeting between Kiderlen and Cambon after the Panther's spring started as a rather hostile affair. Cambon was angered by the German moves which seemed to him to represent a breach of faith in terms of the Kissingen sessions and a real obstacle in terms of German intentions to have part of Morocco. Kiderlen was harping on past French failures of good faith indicating presumably the necessity for Germany to take some security to assure compensation. Although the accounts of the two statesmen differ somewhat, the essential elements seem to be clear.

Cambon reviewed the substance of the Kissingen interviews and then suggested some minor, nonterritorial forms of compensation--perhaps as a ploy to draw out of Kiderlen what he wanted. Kiderlen rejected these as inadequate immediately. Then one of the two--each claimed it was the other--suggested the Congo as compensation. Kiderlen seems to have initiated the idea that the bargaining might be eased for the French if Germany offered some territory in exchange for territory in the Congo with the stipulation that the Germans would receive the disproportionately larger part of the territory exchanged. Details of this contemplated exchange were left undiscussed at this time.

Apparently an understanding which found favor with both diplomats was also reached that would allow the Moroccan negotiations to bypass de Selves and the French foreign office--thus Schoen or another intermediary would be able to talk directly to Caillaux. In addition both parties agreed that no other states should enter into the negotiations. After a hostile opening, a good deal of ground seemed to have been crossed.

The French government was rather relieved by this pleasant turn of events although they were anxious to hear the details. Not so, the Kaiser. William II wanted the affair settled, and Kiderlen received a blistering attack from him to get things under way. The Kaiser said that he had authorized Kiderlen to accept territory in the Congo early in June, and that he should simply do it.

Four days later on July 13 the French and German representatives met again, and the French tried to get the Germans to talk about details. Although the subject remained the same--French predominance in Morocco traded for territory in the Congo, perhaps in the form of a

territorial exchange--Kiderlen was unwilling to be very specific. On July 15 Kiderlen finally made his move. He showed Cambon on a map precisely what he had in mind in terms of Congo territory--see Diagram V-1, p. 45. Kiderlen had in mind a good bit of territory and certainly most of the prize land--the Atlantic coast and the part fronting on the Congo River. Kiderlen undoubtedly realized that this was a lot to ask, and he offered Togo and the northern part of the Cameroons in return as well as giving the French a free hand in Morocco. Cambon refused the German offer or demand on the spot, and this refusal was corroborated by the French foreign office two days later.

Again the French government had backed Cambon, and again Kiderlen had a domestic struggle on his hands. Kiderlen was of the opinion that Germany should anticipate French stubbornness and be prepared to act tough. Further he felt that this attitude should be indicated to the French in no uncertain terms. It is unclear what Kiderlen had in mind here. But, although he claimed that war was not on his mind--indeed war never seems to have loomed in German perspectives as heavily as it did in French or British--the Chancellor and William II were both quite upset by his remarks. Neither wanted a war over Morocco. Kiderlen upon hearing of this displeasure wrote a letter of resignation to Bethmann-Hollweg. He explained that the French Congo was the last opportunity for Germany to acquire new colonial territory without fighting someone for it. He said that the Congo could not be wrung from France if it was known to the French that Germany would not fight. Negotiations would be long and hard, but he anticipated no moves so provocative that any

important alteration in the situation--presumably the intervention of Britain on the side of the French--would occur.

Bethmann-Hollweg refused Kiderlen's resignation explaining that it would mean his own as well and tried instead to cool both William II and Kiderlen. Kiderlen then, to press his point, presented another letter of resignation which added little to the contents of the first. Bethmann-Hollweg then tried to secure approval of Kiderlen's plan of action from the Kaiser. He explained that, if France got away with only minor frontier compensation while gaining a free hand in Morocco, it would only increase the danger of a violent confrontation in the future since France would become dangerously overconfident. Also, Germany's willingness to be stepped upon would be noticed by other powers, and Germany's ability to handle future controversies in general would be adversely affected. Thus humiliation would be multiplied if a strong stand were not taken in the present. If the negotiations were cut off immediately, France would offer only unacceptable compensation, and this would mean that to avoid humiliation Germany would have to compel France to return to the Act of Algeciras. This latter endeavour might be quite difficult and dangerous in its own right. Thus allowing Kiderlen to continue his present course of action would avoid a humiliation-or-war decision. The Kaiser feared that prolonging the negotiations would increase the chance that Britain would enter the conflict on the side of the French, but he gave in and granted approval of Kiderlen's program. (Lepsius, 1925, p. 192).

Cambon thought that, after the French refusal of the German offer, the initiative to begin anew lay again with the Germans. However, on

July 20 he received instructions from de Selves to present a counter to Kiderlen's offer. This offer amounted to cutting down the size of the territory in the Congo quite considerably and lopping off the Atlantic coast and Congo River regions entirely. Grey also felt that, if the French could not accept German demands, it was time they suggested what they could accept.

On the same day Kiderlen and Cambon met again. Kiderlen was incensed by the French reaction to his proposal--the French press dubbed it an exaggerated trial balloon. Kiderlen explained that he was perfectly serious and that Germany would go to extreme lengths to achieve satisfaction. If adequate compensation was not forthcoming, Germany would see a return to the Act of Algeciras.

I spoke earlier of the advantages Barlow and Fay mention but decline to describe for the party receiving a demand or offer as opposed to the party issuing same. It remains unclear in my mind what the general mechanisms here are, if indeed there are any. The German demand seems to have proven advantageous to the French in this case, however. One of the reasons Cambon was willing to agree to bypass de Selves and the foreign office on occasion was that he despaired of the treatment delicate matters received in the Paris bureaucracy. So it was with the German offer. Cambon wanted, apparently, a settlement--an honorable one, but a settlement nevertheless. Some groups in the foreign office apparently wanted more. The German offer was leaked to the French press and communicated to the British in edited form. The reciprocal exchange of territory was not mentioned. What was communicated was that for a vague promise of French preeminence in Morocco--which the French already

had by virtue of the 1909 Franco-German accord on Morocco--the Germans were demanding all of the French Congo.

This announcement caused a flurry of activity among the more conservative elements of the French opposition which clearly made it more difficult for Caillaux to make any sort of concessions whatsoever. Not only had the Germans humiliated the French by forcing them to negotiate at gunpoint, so to speak, but now they were demanding an entire French colony in return for little more than the French already had--or so it appeared in the French press and in the British foreign office.

The reaction in Britain was perhaps even more important than that in France. Paul Cambon had told Grey on July 10 that the negotiations were evolving along the lines of a territorial compensation in the Congo. Cambon asked if the British had any objections. Grey replied that Britain had none and even said that an unfortified port on the southern Atlantic coast of Morocco was acceptable from the British perspective. The British foreign office was not of one mind about this. Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, Nicolson, and Crowe felt that France should receive stronger support. Crowe even developed an elaborate case for the duplicity of Caillaux who he felt was negotiating a Franco-German accord behind the back of the British.

Grey here was showing concern characteristic for him. He did not want Britain to have to pay the price for the aggrandizement of the French empire. Grey preferred the Congo as German compensation and thought that the French would too since they would have to return to the

prescriptions of Algeciras if they could not compensate Germany adequately.

The French in general were somewhat dismayed by Grey's attitude which they viewed as something of a change. Cambon and de Selves suspected Kiderlen was pursuing impossible demands in the Congo in order to work his way back into Morocco proper. They worked hard to convince the British of the damage which would accrue to British interests if Germany gained a good harbor on the Atlantic coast of Africa. In addition they failed to mention the full character of the July 15 German offer or demand.

Nicolson and Crowe responded to these French efforts. Basically they perceived that, unless Britain paid part of the cost or reduced the French compensation bill, France would be forced from the entente and Britain would be left to face an ascendent Germany on its own. Grey, however, remained largely unmoved and, as described above, suggested that the French initiate a counter proposal which they found acceptable. Grey's policy was essentially to give the French diplomatic support but to do so in a fashion which lent no support to escalation which would lead to acts of violence. Grey approved of the German demand for substantial compensation. In case of a deadlock on the compensation negotiations Grey supported and in fact suggested to the French an international conference presumably similar to the one at Algeciras. Grey reserved the British intervention proposed by Nicolson and Crowe for protracted German intransigence.

All this was, of course, quite disheartening to the French. Caillaux explained to Bertie that France simply could not accept a

German presence in Morocco, and, if Britain were to fail to provide support on this point, the entente would be severely strained.

Grey was aware of the possible strain in the entente, and this bothered him considerably. The information which the British had at this time about the German demands and de Selves' hypothesis that Kiderlen was trying to drive the subject of negotiations back to the partition of Morocco convinced Grey that something must be done to obtain information about German intentions. He requested a session with Metternich on July 21. Grey explained that Britain was concerned about German intentions at Agadir and actually seems to have said little else which Metternich could latch onto. Metternich got the impression, which was correct, that Britain thought that the Franco-German negotiations might fail and that in this event Britain would have to be admitted to the discussions of altering the status quo. There was nothing particularly new in this information, and Metternich gave it no special handling.

It seems proper here before continuing with the British to discuss Kiderlen's strategy to date. In early May Kiderlen was concerned about German prestige and Germany's long-term strategic position in light of the French coup in Morocco. At this time the concern was to move to protect this position. Kiderlen's decision was to occupy harbors in southern Morocco until France gave the compensation for which Germany was asking and thus recognized Germany's place among the great powers. The nature of compensation which was necessary was not even mentioned at this time. This vagueness was reduced about a month later in early June when imperial approval of the Congo area as acceptable for

negotiation was received. Then at the end of the month Kiderlen operationalized the signal he had devised almost two months earlier with minor changes. Two weeks later he presented his notion of adequate compensation. The careful manner in which Kiderlen worked out his strategy a bit at a time altering his abstract plan to meet perceived changes in the situation or unexpected problems prompted Wolff (1936, p. 43) to remark that, "It has to be admitted that our people made long preparation for their mistakes and went about their frivolous moves without any precipitation." This seems to be true. Kiderlen worked out a vague program in the beginning of the crisis. Then he filled in the blanks or even made minor changes as the exigencies of the immediate situation indicated.

The Mansion House Speech

In his session with Metternich on July 21 Grey represented one of the calm members of the British cabinet. Lloyd George, the chancellor of the exchequer, was certainly a bit more excited. Lloyd George was piqued by the fact that the Germans had not answered the British query about German intentions of July 4. The British statement of July 4 was not placed in the form of a question. The Germans claimed afterwards that they did not realize until after July 21 that the British had expected a response. The British statement of July 4 indeed does not seem a query of any sort, and the British had not subsequently clearly asked for specific information about German intentions, yet the British certainly felt that an explanation was owed them.

Taylor, (1954, p. 470) sees Lloyd George's ensuing behavior as directed against the French. This thesis is notable primarily because it is diametrically opposed to every other account of Lloyd George's and general British intentions--even Lloyd George's own and the labour chronologues which advocated opposition to the French. On the afternoon of July 21 after Grey's visit with Metternich Lloyd George consulted both Asquith, the Prime Minister, and Grey about the propriety of adding a short bit about foreign policy to a speech which he was to give before a London bankers' association that evening. The speech itself was rather unremarkable. Lloyd George stated that, although war was normally unthinkable in international affairs, there were humiliations which were worse than war. When nations sought to violate Britain's vital interests without consulting Britain, such humiliation developed. Britain would not tolerate such humiliation, but would go to war instead.

The impact of the Mansion House speech has puzzled almost everyone. There was in fact little in the speech itself which should have come as a surprise to either the Germans or the French although the source of the speech was somewhat surprising. Lloyd George was generally a pacifist and considered to be the most pro-German member of the British cabinet. For him to speak out against Germany and to mention a legitimate use of war were both unusual. Interpretations of the speech are difficult. The speech was made on Lloyd George's private initiative although it was cleared with Grey and Asquith. It was not then an official position of the British cabinet. The British press picked up Lloyd George's rather mild words and formed them into a belligerent threat. This was picked

up by the French and German press. There apparently was a period of time between July 22 and 25 when the British government considered stating that the speech was not an official cabinet statement rather than blindly accepting the interpretation of the British press. Metternich's July 25 rebuttal, however, ended this train of thought.

There are a variety of slight variations in notions as to the intentions with which this speech was delivered. Lloyd George, with a good bit of humility, added himself to the list of self-proclaimed savers of the peace in 1911. Germany he claimed was on the brink of war with France, and the Mansion House speech, which assured Germany that Great Britain would fight with France, caused Germany to draw back. Asquith had a similar although somewhat milder thesis. Germany's policy was to force France to make compensation in Morocco if Britain remained aloof and to accept compensation in the Congo if Britain sided with France (Asquith, 1923, p. 151). Thus, according to Asquith, the speech minimally saved Morocco for France.

Much of this British rhetoric seems to be ex post facto in origin. Grey at least seems not to have anticipated much of any reaction to the Mansion House speech (Gooch, 1938, p. 75). And, upon the early complaints of the Germans he was quite incredulous at its being considered a threat. It may well be, however, that the British who were more closely attuned to the German peril--Churchill, Nicolson, and Crowe--had foreseen and desired an impact similar to that which the speech actually made.

In Germany the impact was quite severe. The Germans had quite understandably interpreted the British statement of July 4 as a state-

ment of the British position rather than as a query about the German one. It is clear, however, that this British statement cast doubt upon Kiderlen's thesis that the British would not be concerned about their independent interests if the Germans restricted their moves to southern Morocco. Also, it should have been and appears to have been clear to Kiderlen by this time that France was not mildly accepting his activities. This might have caused Kiderlen to reevaluate the impact of his activities on Britain. But the Germans were in general curiously aloof to the possible intervention of Britain. Metternich rushed no urgent telegrams to Berlin after his conversation with Grey on July 21, and Kiderlen was seemingly unswayed by the Kaiser's fear of British intervention if negotiations continued.

Zimmermann had suggested in his memorandum that Britain could be held off if it was told that Germany was interested in compensation in the French Congo. The British had been told this on June 10, but by the French not the Germans, and the French had since had some doubts as to Kiderlen's intentions. Considering the importance of British nonintervention it is rather strange that Kiderlen did nothing to soothe possible British fears. As Barlow (1940) says, "Germany perhaps did not know that British temper was not inclined to tolerate further delay, but German success dictated that British temper should not be severely taxed" (p. 304). Brandenburg (1927) feels that Kiderlen felt whatever he told the British would fall into French ears as well. This is undoubtedly true, but Kiderlen was telling the French all he could have told the British anyway.

The press in Germany was inflamed by the speech as were conservative, nationalist, and colonial groups in the Reichstag. On July 24 Metternich delivered to Grey the German response to the July 21 meeting of the two. Kiderlen had issued this reply after he was aware of the Lloyd George speech but before he had received Metternich's full report on it. In this meeting on July 24 Metternich essentially brought Grey up to date on the Franco-German negotiations. Strangely, however, he apparently did not clear up the British misinformation about the nature of German demands. The British did not have this information until a July 24 report from Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, reached the foreign office. Metternich stated clearly that German ambitions lay in the French Congo rather than in Morocco. Grey asked if he could reveal this information in Parliament, and Metternich replied that he could not authorize such a move, but he would ask Kiderlen if it could be done. Grey also asked Metternich how Germany would view a conference if the Franco-German negotiations broke down.

Kiderlen's response to Metternich's report on the Lloyd George speech was quick and sharp. British interests had not been violated by Germany, but even if the British feared such an event, they should have used normal diplomatic channels rather than a warning which bordered on a threat. Kiderlen then denied Grey the right to divulge the substance of the July 24 conversation with Metternich to Parliament. Such a move after the Lloyd George speech would appear as a German capitulation or so Kiderlen thought. In addition Kiderlen denied that a conference was necessary. Germany, he answered, could gain its compensation on its own.

The following day--July 25--then found Metternich again with Grey at the foreign office. This meeting was a bit more exciting than the one the previous day. Metternich communicated Kiderlen's message. Grey protested that the Mansion House speech was hardly a threat against Germany. Metternich remained unconvinced. And, that Germany was threatening British interests, Metternich claimed, was a figment of the British imagination. He closed with the line that the more Germany was threatened, the more firm the German response would be. Grey reacted to this conversation with a panic. He literally ran about London telling people that, from the words of the German ambassador, the British fleet might be attacked at any moment. The panic spread rather quickly, and Churchill was soon sending units of troops here and there in Great Britain to ward off the imminent invasion of the British Isles.

Kiderlen after quieting down termed the Mansion House speech a bluff, but he did not sound very convinced. He attributed it to the frantic crys of the French chauvinists. He held fast to his earlier position that patience and a hard stance would win Germany what it wanted, or at least this was his outward appearance.

The French met the speech with mixed emotions. They were no doubt pleased to get some stauncher support than Grey had been offering to date, but Cambon was distressed at the impact the speech had on the more extreme French views, and he felt that it would be even more difficult to arrive at a compromise solution with Germany or to support such a compromise domestically. Caillaux was uncertain that the speech demonstrated British support in the manner the French colonialists thought. In this respect his interpretation of the speech was similar to that of

Grey. Caillaux wanted to hear such a commitment directly from the British, but none was forthcoming. At this point Caillaux seems to have thought that things were pretty close to out of control. The images of the various parties had been--and to large extent remained--too inaccurate or disparate, and actions which bound parties to incompatible actions under pain of national humiliation had been all too common.

I think this is as good a time as any to discuss the use of threats so far in the Agadir crisis. In the Cuban crisis threats were found to be quite functional communications. This is less true in the Agadir crisis. In part the functional character of the threats in the Cuban case was attributed to the fact that the threats there were merely signals of preexisting commitments--warnings--and they were largely perceived as such. Of the five threats mentioned so far--the French Moroccan coup, the Panther's spring, Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statement, the Mansion House speech, and Metternich's July 25 rebuttal--three, the Mansion House speech and Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statement excluded, were threats of this type. The French Moroccan coup was withdrawn rather voluntarily by the French by their offer of compensation although the Germans seemed not to recognize this. Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statement was interpreted by the French as a bluff, and I shall cover it a bit later. Metternich's rebuttal was perceived as intended although perhaps with more vigor than Metternich had hoped. The two remaining threats caused most of the trouble in the Agadir crisis. One of these was correctly perceived as a Type I threat or warning. So the fact that it aroused great resentment seems somewhat

unexpected in light of the Agadir experience. The other, the Mansion House speech, was probably a Type III threat although the Germans seem to have interpreted it as a Type I threat, and it too aroused great provocation. Both of these threats then provoked their recipients in a lingering fashion not found in the Cuban crisis.

This provocative character seems to stem from another aspect which was more carefully managed in the Cuban case. Both threats involved public humiliation where none was needed. The French had already come around to the compensation notion as Cambon demonstrated at Kissingen, and the Germans were not planning the destruction of the entente nor were any of the other British fears in danger of imminently being proved founded as Metternich explained on July 24. In terms of humiliation these threats were the functional equivalents of some of the escalated alternatives which Kennedy avoided in the Cuban crisis.

The Panther's anchoring at Agadir gave the French the feeling that they were being forced to bargain with a gun at their heads with the world looking on. This was an unnecessary public humiliation which embittered them both during and after the crisis. The Mansion House speech, while being somewhat more tactful in some ways, was even less tactful in others. The British explained publically that Germany had better play the game the way the British wished or face the wrath of the British navy. Kiderlen's response to this is perhaps equally applicable to the French response to the Panther as well if the names of the relevant states are substituted. Kiderlen said that Germany was not interfering with British interest and that British fears were unfounded. But, the least the British could have done, even with their imaginary

fears, would have been to express their anxiety through regular diplomatic channels where their fears could have been eased with no humiliation to either side rather than humiliating Germany with a public, "watch your step" threat.

Return to the Franco-German Controversy

On July 23 Cambon and Kiderlen met again. Cambon thought he detected a change in Kiderlen's attitude--an honest desire for an amicable settlement which differed from the sessions since July 15. But Kiderlen's terms were unchanged even if he did recognize the situation as more dangerous than he had before. Cambon seemed to have some empathy for the German claims but stressed that no French parliament would ever submit to the effective loss of a whole colony. In addition the French foreign office did not want Togo, and without this element the exchange was rather too lopsided. The French opinion on Togo was apparently partially due to the fact that Lindequist, the Germany secretary of state for colonies, had opposed the cession. He had received some Reichstag support for this gesture as well.

By July 27 German relations with Britain had calmed down somewhat. Kiderlen had agreed to allow a statement in Parliament that British interests were not being endangered. Asquith in his speech before Parliament on July 27 emphasized this and also that the British had little inclination to enter the dispute further if those more directly involved could come to a satisfactory agreement.

In the next Cambon-Kiderlen discussions on July 28 Kiderlen returned to his position of July 20 and again stressed that Germany was

willing to go to "extreme lengths". Again this discouraged not only Cambon but Bethmann-Hollweg as well. Cambon felt that a failure in negotiations would lead to a conference like the one six years earlier at Algeciras. And, such a notion was even more repugnant to the French in 1911 than it had been in 1905. Caillaux felt that an alternative to a conference--war--was intolerable as well particularly since he despaired of help from the British.

Between the meeting of Cambon and Kiderlen on July 23 and the later one on July 28 a series of supposedly secret meetings occurred between Lancken of the German embassy in Paris and Fondère, who was nominally in charge of navigation on the Congo River but who seems to have spent a considerable amount of time in Paris. Lancken served as an emissary for Kiderlen, and Fondère spoke directly for Caillaux. These meetings continued intermittently until early in October, but the most important sessions--from the perspective of the future of the Caillaux cabinet--occurred here in late July. According to Lancken (1931, pp. 101-03) Caillaux offered a considerably more generous compensation offer in the Congo than the French foreign office was then offering. This still fell short of Kiderlen's demands, however. The French Prime Minister also stressed the importance of speed. His idea was that, if an agreement could be reached quickly during the August lull period, so to speak, then both the French and the German governments could present their parliaments with fait accompli which would have to be ratified.

Caillaux apparently gained the impression that Kiderlen would cut his demands to meet Caillaux's proposal. But, when Lancken went to Berlin to speak with Kiderlen on July 29, Kiderlen stood firm. He

thought that Caillaux as well as Cambon were of the impression that he was bluffing in his present demands, but, so he said, he was not. When Lancken returned to Paris he found that Caillaux, on the excuse of the passage of time, had hardened in his position as well.

Problems later developed around these discussions. Their purpose was to bypass de Selves and perhaps even Cambon as well, but when Schoen sent reports of the discussions back to Berlin in a code which the French had deciphered, de Selves learned of the meetings. The meetings came up also in a series of letters which Kiderlen wrote a mistress. Kiderlen is thought to have been aware that his letters were being forwarded to the French government, and he is supposed to have used them to help convince the French of his firmness on the size of the Congo concession. But this is pretty conjectural. In general these activities play more of a role in Caillaux's fall than in the negotiations over Morocco.

After the rather discouraging meeting of July 28 Kiderlen and Cambon both received new instructions from the Kaiser and Caillaux respectively. Cambon was filled in about the Lancken-Fondère conversations. It is not known what transpired between the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Kiderlen, but the next meeting with Cambon brought a change in Kiderlen's stand. In addition to providing Cambon with new instructions Caillaux sent an advance notice to the French military that a mobilization order might come at any moment. These instructions were apparently part of a bluff and were for the benefit of German spies rather than the French military. The idea was that these spies would inform the Germans that France could not be pushed too far. But, the

French press found out about the mobilization part and not its purpose, and the stories were convincing enough that Caillaux had to deny the validity of the orders to the Germans and to the French public.

Kiderlen and Cambon met again on August 1. Cambon offered an abbreviated version of the earlier German demand in Morocco which was considerably more substantial than any other French offer so far. Essentially this amounted to an extension of the Cameroons' eastern and southern borders from the Sanga River to the Atlantic coast between Libreville and Rio Mundi. In exchange France was to acquire a free hand in Morocco and to obtain the Bec of Canard. Cambon was authorized to offer certain islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans in exchange for Togo if it were offered again. This latter exchange seems to have been dropped rather quickly, however. Kiderlen finally modified his own demands of July 15. But he was concerned to procure greater access to the Atlantic than the French were offering and also access to the Congo River. Kiderlen then suggested that France compose a draft form of a Moroccan agreement.

In the ensuing days there was some confusion within the French government as to concessions in the Congo. De Selves seems to have approved German access to the Congo on August 2, but Caillaux refused to approve this on August 3. Barlow (1940, p. 340) indicates that the difference between the two ministers was not one of substance, but rather one of timing. I think, however, that her opinion is speculation. Cambon and Kiderlen met again on August 4, but no progress was made. Kiderlen wanted an extension of the Congo compensation further to the

south, and he withdrew the Bec of Canard offer. But the important matter seemed to be German access to the Atlantic and to the Congo River.

On the same day Fondere told Schoen that Caillaux thought France could make no concessions from its present offer and that, if agreement were not reached within a few (eight) days, French and British warships would be sent to Agadir. There had been a number of military activities since the Panther dropped anchor at Agadir. The British and German fleets had been undergoing maneuvers in the North Sea in July. The German army had conducted annual operations on the Belgium frontier too. And, French troops had been dispatched to areas near the German border in order to quell domestic disturbances unrelated to the crisis. For the most part these and other activities bore little direct relation to the crisis--an exception in this regard were some defensive preparations taken by the British. Now the threat of confronting ship with ship at Agadir caused a stiff reaction in Germany. Kiderlen instructed Schoen to have no further relations with the French government. Then Kiderlen changed his mind and instructed Schoen to inform Fondere that, unless the threat was withdrawn, negotiations would be stopped. William II was even more irate and urged stronger action on Kiderlen.

On August 8 Schoen reported that the threat was, according to Caillaux, a misunderstanding. He had only remarked that the irate publics made negotiations and concessions difficult, and he may have said that irresponsible people might favor sending ships; he did not.

Several additional sessions between Kiderlen and Cambon occurred between August 9 and August 17 when Cambon returned to Paris. They involved discussions of details within the basic context of the situation

as of August 4. Little if any progress was made, and the conferences seem relatively unimportant.

On August 13--during these above sessions--Cambon informed de Selves of rumors that the Germans were going to land troops at Agadir. In fact some German business firms had dispatched provocateurs to Agadir who were trying to get themselves into a position in which a rescue would be necessary. De Selves was quite worried. He thought again that Germany was returning to Morocco for compensation since it found no satisfaction in the Congo. He addressed a query to the British as to their attitude toward sending ships if such a landing was made. Grey suggested a conference first, and discouraged the French from taking such an action as sending ships. Caillaux tried again on July 20, but he got the same disappointing response from his ally.

On August 18 Cambon returned to Paris to consult with his government. Kiderlen closeted with Bethmann-Hollweg, the Kaiser and some other German decision-makers for a few days and then went on vacation-- he went to visit a mistress in France. This action aroused a good deal of anger in France which was not helped by Schoen's silly statement that Kiderlen "had inadvertently overlooked the fact that Chamonix was on French ground" (Schoen, 1922, p. 151). This period was also disrupted by an "interview" which heated up Anglo-German relations again. An article was circulated in the German press which purported to be an interview with the British ambassador in Vienna, Cartwright, who said some pretty mean things about the German's Moroccan policy. Bethmann-Hollweg demanded to know if the statement was official British policy. The matter was pretty much cleared up by Grey's denial that the article

was in fact an interview with Cartwright. Grey also denied that the views expressed in the article coincided with official British ones.

Domestic opposition in France had risen to a fever pitch by this time. Caillaux was struggling against some of his own ministers for control--de Selves and Lebrun, the colonial minister, were among these. Schoen warned that, if Germany pressed too hard, the present government might fall, and its successor was apt to be even more difficult to deal with from the German perspective. But the French government finally began to work out a program. Cambon was to first secure what France wanted in Morocco. This essentially would allow the open door to private businesses of the various European states, but complete French political predominance was to be obtained. Thus only the French could operate public works such as railroads, and the protégé system was to be abolished. Only when Morocco was secured in a specific fashion completely suitable to the French was Cambon to turn to the Congo. Here he was to get off as cheaply as possible, but he was allowed to offer Germany a strip of coastline between Libreville and Kio Mundi as well as access to the Congo River. This latter involved splitting the French Congo or, as it came to be called, French Equatorial Africa into two parts with a thin slice of German territory. This was to be avoided if at all possible.

As Cambon and Kiderlen returned to Berlin, talk of war was everywhere--in the press, in the parliaments, among the military, and among the diplomats and heads of state. The first meeting, scheduled for September 1, was postponed until September 4 because Cambon pleaded illness. The German stock market suffered a minor crash

at the news. Economic conditions were poor across Europe in the summer and autumn of 1911, and historians vary considerably as to the relationship of the German financial problems to the crisis. (Turner, 1912, p. 31; Barlow, 1940, pp. 351-55). But, the shaky financial conditions did add to the difficulties of the crisis.

Before leaving the confrontation I want to discuss rather briefly the failure of the threats in the period following July 25. These include Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statement again, Caillaux's mobilization bluff in late July and early August, and Caillaux's "eight days" threat in early August.

Kiderlen's threat here, as before, failed basically on the basis of credibility. The French thought that Kiderlen was exaggerating his Congo goals and/or he was trying to be impossible in the Congo so as to get the French to consider compensation in Morocco. Kiderlen's threat here was never taken seriously by the French. The French appear to have been accurate in their assessment of the threat itself. Although the "extreme lengths" statement was issued in support of the July 15 demands to which Kiderlen may at that time have been committed, the statement itself appears from internal German documents to have been a bluff.

Caillaux's mobilization threat was a bluff which was essentially called by the French press. Caillaux's "eight days" threat is far more interesting. It provides an interesting example of two of the notions of losing control I discussed in my Cuban case. For the Kaiser this was loss of control through losing the bargaining framework or a spasm situation. The Kaiser was angered with the German press for labeling

him "William the Timid". He was angered by the threat. He considered the fact that Caillaux had left Paris for a few days after the issuance of the threat to be a personal insult. He wanted retribution. Kiderlen, however, held him back. For Kiderlen this was Prisoners' Dilemma. Kiderlen probably thought Caillaux was bluffing, but Kiderlen had to default as well. If it turned out that Caillaux meant what he had said, Kiderlen would still have taken the action he preferred. Caillaux backed down; this particular sequence was Chicken for him. He blamed a misquote for the entire incident. The difference between Kiderlen's actions and those of the Kaiser were similar to the differences between Kennedy's original notions of an air strike as the only solution and the eventual use of a blockade. For all three men there was a realization that the action of the adversary could not be accepted. However in each case some deliberative activity mitigated the manner by which this commitment was signaled. In each case the bargaining mode of activity was retained through such deliberative activity.

BREAKDOWN

The Moroccan Accord

When Cambon and Kiderlen met again on September 4, Cambon presented the French Moroccan program. Kiderlen objected to many particular points, but the two diplomats apparently reached agreement that the general French plan--settle Morocco first and then take up compensation in the Congo--would be followed. The German foreign office studied the French Moroccan proposal with care then and drew up a counter proposal for the meeting of

September 7. This German proposal showed rather clearly that the open door was of concern to the German government only with regard to Germans. It effected essentially a Franco-German economic oligarchy by which other European states would be barred from economic freedom in Morocco. This put France in the rather favorable international position of guarding the rights of European states in general--at least for the duration of the open door period in Morocco.

The issues on which these two proposals differed were many. Perhaps the two most important were the future of the protege system and the operation of public works--including railroads. Germany wanted the protege system continued and wanted German control of public works in southern Morocco as well. France realized that, regardless of the wording of an agreement, its political control of Morocco would be unsatisfactory if Germany were allowed such concessions. On September 16 Kiderlen agreed to give in on some issues including the protege system if France could get the rest of the powers to agree as well. On September 19 he essentially gave in on most of the remaining areas of disagreement including the operation of public works. The remaining differences were gradually erased until on October 12 Cambon and Kiderlen announced that they had reached agreement on a Moroccan accord.

This Moroccan agreement gave France what it desired--political freedom in Morocco. The French had won Morocco then, and Germany agreed to help the French gain the assent of the other powers to the new agreement which overthrew the Act of Algeciras and the earlier Convention of Madrid of 1880. Attention now shifted to Germany's

compensation. This effort was begun on October 15 after the interpretative letters which accompanied the Moroccan accord had been completed.

The Congo Agreement

The French cabinet had agreed in their August sessions that the German compensation was to be viewed as an independent exchange of territory rather than as the purchase price for Morocco. The general French offer involving German compensation in the Congo had been explained to Kiderlen by Cambon on September 4. In the meantime various French groups had become even more incensed at the notion of compromising with the adversary. Early in October, before the Moroccan accord was signed, Lancken was approached by Caillaux's independent agents in Paris with a plea that Germany accept colonial compensation somewhere other than in the French Congo particularly if Germany was going to be persistent about demanding access to the Congo River. French aid in procuring Spanish Guinea and the Belgian Congo were mentioned as possible alternatives. Also, for close to two weeks Caillaux urged speed upon the Germans daily under the warning that, if negotiations dragged out much longer, his cabinet would fall and be replaced by one led by Clemenceau.

Kiderlen, however, had some domestic problems of his own. The conservative, nationalist, and colonial groups in Germany had a virulent press and a good following in the Reichstag, and they were screaming for greater compensation not less. Grey indicated that both governments--the French and the German--were more anxious for a peaceful settlement than either acted. Both governments, Grey thought, were constrained by


domestic oppositions to present harder fronts than they desired (Grey, 1925, p. 223).

On October 15 then Kiderlen explained that access to the Congo River was essential to a settlement. This was what the French now felt it so important to avoid and what Caillaux had been telling Lancken for two weeks must be avoided. The French felt that the Caillaux government could not withstand French Equatorial Africa being cut in two. Kiderlen too was adamant, however. He told Cambon that, if access to the Congo River were not forthcoming, discussions might as well be dropped, but he did offer to accept somewhat less territory overall in order to gain access to the Congo (Tabouis, 1938, p. 224).

Cambon thought there might be an attempt here to swing the discussion back onto Morocco and to gain an agreement more suitable to the needs of the Pan-Germans in this locality. On October 21, however, Caillaux wrote Cambon a proposal which he suggested Cambon show to Kiderlen. Caillaux in the proposal asked for some greater German frontier rectifications so that he could present a respectable exchange of territory. Kiderlen replied that such a demand would be met only if German demands were met. In return for these increased German concessions Cambon then granted Germany access to the Congo River. This split French Equatorial Africa into two pieces--Diagram V-2, p. 71. There was apparently some final dickering about a few minor issues after France yielded on access to the Congo River on October 24. Kiderlen, for instance, seems to have pressed Cambon pretty severely on one occasion about right in the Belgian Congo. But these sessions seem to have been relatively unimportant. On November 2

Diagram V-2

MAP V



Area ceded by France to Germany under the Convention of November 4, 1911
 Area ceded by Germany to France under the same Convention - - - - -

the Congo agreement was signed. Two days later the Franco-German treaty was completed.

Outcome and Aftermath

The settlement of the Agadir crisis then involved the following transactions. France gained the protectorate over Morocco for which it had struggled since 1901. It also received a small bit of territory between the Shari and Logone rivers--Diagram V-2, p. 71. Germany gained an enlargement of its Cameroons to the east and south. The enlargement involved a short stretch of Atlantic coastline between Libreville and Rio Mundi as well as rather brief access to the Congo and Oubangi rivers. This agreement was formalized in the Franco-German treaty of November 4, 1911.

The battle for ratification of this treaty then began. There was actually little problem getting the agreement accepted by other states, and this came as an unexpected blessing. Britain agreed to the treaty as long as the open door remained. Austria was more hesitant, but early in 1912 it agreed to the treaty as well. Russian approval came easily as did approval from Italy which had begun a war with Turkey over Tripoli. France did not make a final agreement with and thereby did not gain the approval of Spain for about a year. But this disagreement was important really only to the Franco-Spanish partition of Morocco not to the Franco-German crisis and the general acceptance of its settlement.

The domestic trials to which the treaty was subjected in France and Germany proved to be far more severe than the international problems.

Regardless of Kiderlen's intentions several powerful German groups had expected Germany to gain part of southern Morocco. This had developed into a reasonably popular goal during the months of the crisis, and the advertisements of the Pan Germans' propaganda pamphlet, West Morocco German, had appeared even in Vorwaerts, the SPD newspaper. When the crisis appeared settled and all Germany had to show for the bother was an extra bit of swampland, these groups were exasperated. The domestic situation was not helped by the resignation of the colonial secretary, Lindequist. Lindequist had differed with Kiderlen about both the demands to be made upon the French and the concessions to be allowed them. He had submitted his first letter of resignation early in August, but the Chancellor and the Kaiser had managed to keep the incident a private affair until negotiations with the French were completed. Now in early November Lindequist submitted his resignation again, and this time it was accepted.

After the early defiant moves of Kiderlen and the relentless propaganda of the press, the November treaty seemed to many groups to be a national disgrace. Britain, they thought, even more than France had humiliated Germany again. The speeches in the Reichstag tore at the Chancellor's defense of the government's actions from all sides. But the treaty was ratified remarkably quickly in the middle of November although debates continued intermittently on the wisdom of Kiderlen's actions for several months.

In France the situation was even worse. First the Germans had taken Alsace-Lorraine; then they had anchored their gunboat at Agadir and made France negotiate at gunpoint for rights France already had by

virtue of the 1909 accord. Finally, to humiliate the French even further, they had driven a wedge into French Equatorial Africa so that it fell apart into two pieces. Such thoughts were common in France and were expressed in the parliamentary debates with great frequency. In addition the intergovernmental conduct in France was even worse than the humiliation imposed by the Germans. The British foreign office thought that Caillaux had tried to dump the entente with Britain. Caillaux had consistently undercut his hard line foreign secretary and thus embarrassed him before the Germans. These notions too were common. When the secret treaty with Spain was announced and the nation learned that all this humiliation had been endured for a territory which had already been partitioned and had to be shared with Spain, the thunder of dissent became even more deafening. About the middle of November Caillaux asked Kiderlen to withdraw the Panther in order to improve the government's position. Kiderlen did this near the end of the month. On December 20 the Chamber of Deputies ratified the treaty in spite of the violent dissent. The measure then went to the Senate. On January 11 during the course of these debates the Caillaux ministry fell. Poincaré, the new Prime Minister, gained passage in the Senate on February 10, 1912.

Although the treaty received ratification then, great hostilities were left in the wake of the negotiations. French antagonism was directed largely at the Germans. Poincaré became Prime Minister on the theme of "no more Agadir's", and both the British and the German leaders commented on the hard line government which developed in France out of the humiliation of the Agadir crisis.

French relations with Britain seemed strengthened by the crisis, however. Although the support France got from Britain was somewhat less than that which Caillaux desired, the British support was far better than the responses received from Russia. The Entente Cordiale then held up.

This relationship was strengthened by the setback which Anglo-German relations suffered. In general the British were not particularly hostile toward the Germans--Churchill might be an exception here, and they attempted to renew arms limitation talks with the Germans with the Haldane mission in 1912. But, the Germans were pretty irritated with what they viewed as vicarious British intervention into German affairs, and Tirpitz rather than Haldane had his way. Grey retained a friendly and trustworthy relationship with Bethmann-Hollweg, but, as Grey viewed the situation, the reasonable leaders similar to the Chancellor were simply overwhelmed as the ranks who advised the Kaiser were swollen with Germans who swore, just as their French counterparts did, that there would be no more Agadir's.

In general then the battle lines for the great war in 1914 were drawn somewhat more sharply. Attempts were made to patch the weaknesses which had appeared in both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. In many respects though the same problems of misperception and uncertainty were to plague Europe in the summer of 1914. Germany thought then too that Britain would not enter the fray. Then too Britain was hesitant to come forcefully to the aid of France. Lloyd George found the similarity close enough to wager that a Mansion House speech in 1914 would have averted World War I (Lloyd George, 1933, p. 43).

Conclusion A

The Agadir crisis, like the Cuban crisis, opened with a set of actors involved in shadow relations with one another. Kiderlen felt that Germany's prestige required that Germany be paid for the French acquisition of Morocco just as Italy, Britain, and Spain had been paid. Bethmann-Hollweg was adamant that Germany was only defending its position among the nations of the world (Bethmann-Hollweg, 1919, p. 30). It was France that was taking part in aggressive activity. From the German point of view then the crisis had been precipitated by the power or powers which had attempted to keep Germany from its rightful rewards. In darker moments there appeared to be an international conspiracy which kept Germany from achieving its place in the sun and which was in the process of encircling the fatherland.

The French, on the other hand, saw little legitimacy in Germany's continual interference in Moroccan politics. In France the 1909 accord was generally felt to be an admission that France would be preeminent in Morocco, and the French expected little further trouble from the Germans on this score. The German hints early in 1911 that a French protectorate in Morocco could be purchased by compensation to Germany similar to that received by other states then were either missed altogether or were viewed as the illegitimate rebirth of a settled and buried issue. Thus they were not felt to merit a response.

According to the French their attitude changed between April and June, and the evidence for this is the comment by Cambon at Kissingen that Germany could seek compensation outside of Morocco. It is difficult to say what altered the French perceptions and intentions.

The British, who had a somewhat different point of view than that of Crunpi at least may have had some impact here. The deteriorating situation in Morocco may actually have changed French intentions, and this in turn may have altered their perceptions of what must be done with respect to the Germans. It may also be that the ominous silence which characterized Berlin on the Moroccan affair gave the French a hint that they had missed something in past communications, and, upon going back to look, they found compensation. Perhaps all three of these mechanisms worked together in the change.

Kiderlen seems, however, to have been unconvinced that the Kissingen conversations altered the situation with which he was dealing. Here Kiderlen seems to have misperceived the actual intentions of the French. He had developed a plan to gain compensation from a recalcitrant France; he put it into effect without waiting to hear what Cambon might bring back from Paris, and the Panther dropped anchor at Agadir.

Two important questions arise from this action. The first is what sort of compensation Kiderlen was after. The French and British perceptions will be examined shortly. For now it will suffice to say that the French, some British, and some Germans thought Kiderlen was after southern Morocco. Kiderlen always denied this--both during and after the crisis. There is little in the foreign office memorandums and nothing in Kiderlen's private papers to indicate that Kiderlen ever expected compensation in Morocco. In the foreign office memorandums of May 3 and June 12 Kiderlen and Zimmermann both dwelt strangely on the merits of southern Morocco, but neither stated that this was where compensation was desired. In fact both indicated that compensation

was the goal. The evidence which does exist that Kiderlen had southern Morocco in mind is limited to Cambon's statement that Kiderlen asked for Mogador on April 6 and the testimony of Glass, the leader of the Pan-Germans, that Kiderlen had told him that southern Morocco was the goal. Kiderlen denied making either statement.

This paper is not meant to be a document of history which settles intriguing historical questions. Rather history is important only to the development of the theory related primarily in the nonhistorical chapters. But, even for this purpose, it is necessary to take some stand on Kiderlen's intentions. Reputable historians are split on this issue. I think that this may be an obvious instance of theory providing insight into history rather than history providing insight into theory as has been the major flow of this study. Several of the strategy notions which I mentioned in earlier chapters may be of some use here. Kiderlen dealt with his problems as they came up. After the march to Fez began his concern was to develop a plan to signal German concern credibly to the French. The result of this was the May 3 memorandum. In this memorandum Kiderlen is very vague about the nature of compensation. His mind is on other matters; it is essential to the German strategic position to get the principle of compensation accepted by the French. This is his concern on May 3; details can be worked out later. Most historians, strangely enough, have assumed here that Kiderlen had all these details worked out carefully in advance in game theory fashion.

From remarks of the Kaiser and Zimmermann's memorandum of June 12, it appears as if the area of the French Congo was approved as a

general compensation goal early in June. Kiderlen set about operationalizing his plan with minor variations to meet the demands of perceived changes in the situation. His major move in this regard came on July 1. It would appear that the German leadership in general did not have Morocco in mind as a compensation site. Kiderlen may well have had Morocco in mind in April, but even he seems to have lowered his sights by July. Kiderlen probably formulated his July 15 position early in July when it became obvious that the French were not going to initiate an offer acceptable to the Germans. And, he seems from the story told by internal German documents to have been serious about this offer for the second half of July. That is, the French interpretation that either Kiderlen was trying to turn the conversations back to Morocco or he was exaggerating what he really wanted in the Congo was incorrect. Kiderlen later, of course, did lower his aspirations in the Congo.

The second question is more important. This is why Kiderlen went about obtaining his concession in the manner in which he did. To some degree I suppose that this move is attributable to the fact that Kiderlen missed the French signal of willingness to offer compensation. But there seems to be more than this alone. Kiderlen, Zimmermann, and Langwerth all seem to have been pretty much of one mind about the way in which compensation could be wrung from the French from the very beginning, and their images may shed some light on why the French signal was missed in the first place. The comments of some German historians as well as comments made by Kiderlen himself reveal something of Kiderlen's conception of bargaining. Brandenburg (1927), at the end of a rather long inditement of Kiderlen's methods in Agadir, indicates

that this method of putting a pistol to the other fellow's head was Kiderlen's general bargaining technique (p. 384). Wolff (1936) notes that Kiderlen was oblivious to the impact his actions were actually having on the French. According to him Kiderlen did not realize that he was making the domestic position of the French government precarious and thus hindering his own desires for compensation (p. 66). Kiderlen adds to this picture as well. Most of his comments are oriented specifically toward the French in Morocco, but in his first letter or resignation of July 17 he seems to be offering his general philosophy when he states that a willingness to fight is a necessity for obtaining goals in politics (Jaeckh, 1924, p. 130). Applied to Agadir this meant Kiderlen had to show the French clearly that Germany would take what it wanted if the French were not willing to give in peacefully.

The major noteworthy aspect of the somewhat parochial views of the German foreign office is that they were mistaken. First, the French were apparently willing to offer territorial compensation outside of Morocco although it remains open as to how generous their offers in this respect might have been. Second, the French stand on compensation toughened considerably as a result of Kiderlen's actions at Agadir. There were several reasons for this. The Panther's spring was humiliating to the French leadership, and a concession given under the threat of "gunboat diplomacy" would carry rather different connotations about the French resolve in general than a freely given concession. Also, the Panther's move altered French perceptions of what Germany was after. Cambon and Gaillaux apparently never doubted after the incident that Germany was really after part of Morocco. That the

move was a signal of the necessity of compensation elsewhere appears to be a notion not entertained by them with any seriousness. Finally, the domestic situation became far more difficult to manage through the Panther's move

The offers of Cambon then in this conversation with Kiderlen on July 9 were recognized by each party as merely ploys. Cambon was trying to appear tough and to draw out of Kiderlen what precise manner of compensation Germany had in mind. The demand of all of the French Congo on July 15 startled the French even further. It completed the alteration in their policy from a stance of initiative in settling the Moroccan dispute to a stance of letting the Germans come to them. Caillaux's reckoning of Germany's preferences after this move was set up like this. Germany was after southern Morocco and probably some of the French Congo as well. If this failed, the Germans would try to force a return to the Act of Algeciras. If this in turn worked out unsuccessfully, war would ensue (Caillaux, 1931, p. 329).

Cambon's perceptions were a little different. He too was sure that Germany was after southern Morocco, but he felt from the beginning that the Congo demands could be whittled down quite considerably. Cambon held out little faith in a conference and a return to the Act of Algeciras. He thought that, if negotiations failed, Germany would occupy southern Morocco. This would then mean war (Tabouis, 1938, pp. 209, 215; and Gooch & Ward, 1923, pp. 450-51).

The original French challenge had placed Kiderlen in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation. There were several ways out of this predicament--a return to the Act of Algeciras, for instance, but Kiderlen preferred

gaining compensation. This would be a compromise solution of German cooperation with regard to the French coup and French cooperation with regard to making this coup acceptable to Germany. The French were willing to do this, but there were some manners of compensation which were so severe as to place them in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation as well although they were generally in a Chicken structure. One of the boundaries here was compensation in Morocco. The French might try to reduce Germany's demands in the Congo, but the game here was basically Chicken; in Morocco it was Prisoners' Dilemma.

About this time the British were beginning to get excited too. The salience of the general alternatives is really remarkable in this case. Grey perceived them to be France obtaining Morocco while maintaining the open door and by paying Germany a price, a return to the Act of Algeciras or gaining some new international agreement, or war. Grey's policy was one of supporting the French against the German attempts at humiliation while approving of substantial compensation to Germany. He favored a conference if the two parties could not work out the first alternative satisfactorily. And, he seems to have favored British intervention only if it were provoked, so to speak, by German intransigence (Gooch, 1938, p. 78). Grey's perceptions of German demands were never as grandiose as those of the French, and he had no qualms about German compensation in the French Congo or in southern Morocco as long as the entente could be maintained. Grey was somewhat irritated that the French were so reluctant to offer counter proposals to the German demands which they found so unsatisfactory.

Other British leaders were not as sanguine as Grey about the situation, however. They perceived that the Germans' intransigence with respect to Britain in terms of not explaining their activities was sufficient to provoke a British response. Crowe and Nicolson were probably more concerned about supporting the French than they were worried about the danger to peculiarly British interests. But, Lloyd George and Churchill were among those characterized by resentment with the German silence. The answer was the Mansion House speech. The impact of this speech seems to have come as a real surprise to Grey. It may well be that, in spite of the elaborate motives which now exist for the speech, its great impact came as something of a surprise to all concerned although Lloyd George who viewed it as an act of British intervention into the Franco-German crisis was probably less surprised than Grey who had not viewed it as such. The general reaction though of these British leaders was that the Lloyd George statement came as a complete surprise to the Germans and that it would force Germany to recognize the seriousness of the situation (Churchill, 1923, pp. 406-07).

This is in fact to some extent what happened. Cambon's remarks about Kiderlen's attitude at their July 23 meeting do give the impression that the seriousness of the situation was beginning to dawn on Kiderlen. It is also interesting to note the difference between the Germans' reaction to a perceived threat and their perception of how a threat would operate on the French. Metternich's reply to Britain was that, the more Germany was threatened, the tougher it would stand. This, of course,

was the French reaction as well, but the German foreign office did not seem to ever recognize this.

Kiderlen, however, was not about to give up so easily, and the British leftist critique that the British paid part of the bill for a French victory by reducing German goals at the expense of creating great antipathy with Germany had not yet been completely fulfilled (Morel, 1912). Kiderlen returned to his hard stance on July 28. At the beginning of August Kiderlen began to soften somewhat, however. His motivation here is attributed to various sources. Some say that the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg had gotten the message of the Mansion House speech and that they simply would tolerate Kiderlen's attitude of stubbornness no longer. An alternative notion is that Kiderlen was reacting to some rather specific offers which Caillaux was putting forth in his independent conferences. This assures then that Cambon was correct in his assertion that Kiderlen was not serious in his demand for the whole Congo, and Kiderlen denies this in his first letter of resignation in which he states that all of the Congo must be obtained or a return to the Act of Algeciras must be effected. Little further movement on either side occurred before Cambon left for Paris in the middle of August.

This disengagement period seems to mark another stage shift. Caillaux thought that the stiffest month of the crisis lay from the middle of July to the middle of August with the peak of the tension coming late in July. In late July the French papers and parliament were filled with the cry that the Germans would knuckle under if the French stood fast, and the pressure on the Caillaux government was

severe (Brandenburg, 1927, p. 382). And, about the same time von Molke, the German chief of staff, said that, "If we slink out of this affair with our tail between our legs, and if we do not make a deal which we are prepared to enforce with the sword, I despair of the Empire's future" (Carroll, 1938, p. 684). Bethmann-Hollweg was relatively unconcerned about the eventual outcome once negotiations were resumed in September, however. Although suspicion was still quite high as to intentions--de Selves and Cambon, for instance, still saw a German bid for Morocco around every corner, the basic outlines of the settlement were accepted from early in September on. In the middle of August the French government once again felt confident to take the initiative with the formation of their settlement proposal, and Kiderlen felt the situation was calm enough to go vacationing in France. Once negotiations began again in September Kiderlen and Cambon were essentially working out only the details.

At the end of his chapter about Agadir Grey (1925, pp. 237-39) spends some time on a discussion he had with the successor to Metternich at the German embassy in London. This conversation is, I think, worth mentioning here. The discussion evolved around the opinion that, "It is not hard to tell the truth; the difficulty is to get it believed." Grey's own ex post facto assessment of German intentions in the crisis is adequate evidence that this proposition ought to be looked at further. (Grey, 1925, pp. 230-32; Cf. Lutz, 1928, pp. 132-33). The French and the British points of view differed a good deal, but the most marked differences in perspective were the French-German and the British-German disparities. The three states, or at the very least the two sides, were

simply not dealing with the same situation. The issue here is not really whether statesmen exaggerate the truth--they do of course. Grey's memoirs differ from his foreign office missives, for instance; Kiderlen meant to mislead the French about German willingness to fight, and the French edited the German demand of July 15 when they told the British about it.

Yet beyond these superficial differences there lie deeper and more honest discrepancies in perspective. Each state seems to have its own parochial view of the conflict. This makes the management of such conflicts more difficult as it is not simply different notions of the proper solution to a common set of issues that must be resolved but rather each side has its own conception of the issues which are involved. Thus Grey sees a grandiose plot where none exists, and Kiderlen's explanations give rise only to more distrust and suspicion. Often it appears that greater difficulties arise because parties to such conflicts do tell the truth--as they see it--rather than attempting to fool the other fellow. And, indeed, it appears that it is often more delicate a task to pass off the truth as the real thing than it is to gain the credibility of a fake.

Conclusion B

Working Paper #3

III. Hypotheses

A. Hypotheses relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

1. We have not formalized the notion of caution well enough so that I am able to compare this case with the Cuban crisis with any great rigor. In the Cuban crisis caution was manifested primarily in, firstly, a willingness to search between stark options such as capitulation and war and thus to operationalize commitments incrementally and, secondly, a willingness to alter preconceived perspectives and strategies. Grey in his suggestions to the French about strategy alternatives appears to present a good example of the former, and Kiderlen perhaps represents both inasmuch as his preconceived strategy was a rather general one which left a number of details to be filled in incrementally as he went along. In this sense it would be rather difficult to state which crisis was more characterized by caution.

The two crises are dissimilar, however, in that the Cuban crisis involved an overt clash of principles. And, the Soviet Union's notion of reciprocity was completely unacceptable to the United States. The Agadir crisis, on the other hand, involves misperceptions which appear to have lingered further into the actual crisis than was true for the Cuban case. Thus, although Germany signaled that compensation would win German approval of a French protectorate in Morocco, the French realized this only in June; although France did then accept the principle of reciprocity the Germans had in mind--compensation, the Germans seem to have failed to notice this, and they needlessly threatened France with the Panther; and although the Germans appear to have been engaged in none of the activities which the British suspected and by which they felt threatened, the British rather needlessly threatened the Germans.

I noted many times in the Cuban case that the use of threats in the crisis was masterful and functional. I need not restate this thesis at length now. In comparison the use of threats in the Agadir crisis was clumsy indeed, and in this respect the Cuban crisis seems a far more cautious affair.

The misperceptions I have stressed are important to this lack of caution. I imagine also the costs of war did not seem as repugnant to the decision-makers of 1911 as they did to those of 1962, but I have really no firm basis for saying this. As I recall total war was somewhat less developed in 1911, and the Germans, for instance, expected a quick struggle as in 1870 rather than the protracted affair in which they found themselves in 1914. But these reduced costs of war seem to me to be more closely associated with weaponry and perhaps also ideology of a transnational character than with the polarity of the international system.

2. The Cuban crisis clearly shows the independence from allies in a bipolar system. Germany, in the Agadir crisis, was fairly independent of allies as well primarily because Germany's general allies were uninterested in the crisis. France and Britain provide substantiation for the proposition, however. Britain's primary interest in the crisis was the maintenance of the Entente Cordiale, and the French (Caillaux, for example) felt constrained by Britain's hesitancy to agree to back France regardless of what France did. The situation was altered for Germany, of course, with the British intervention on the side of the French.

3. This proposition is certainly congruent with the British perspective on the crisis. The British might never have become involved in the crisis had it not been for their desire to preserve the Entente Cordiale. The French attitude here is somewhat difficult to determine. Caillaux hinted a time or two that Morocco was more valuable to France than the Entente Cordiale and that, were the entente unable to gain Morocco for the French, new alliances might be considered. Years after the crisis Caillaux claimed that he had not been this severe in his treatment of Britain and that such perceptions were due to unreasonable fears on the part of Bertie and Crowe. Even if Caillaux made the remarks Bertie suggests he did, he may have been bluffing. But minimally the dominance of the value of the Entente Cordiale over that of Morocco was less distinguishable for France than for Britain. In either case such alliance values were probably more prominent than in the bipolar Cuban crisis. With Germany alliance values were relatively isolated from the crisis perhaps even more so than was true for the United States in the Cuban crisis.

4. It is true that ally-adversary relationships tended to shift so that, although France confronted Britain in 1898, it was supported by Britain in 1905 and 1911. It is also true that ally-adversary relationships were not across-the-board matters in the systemic environment of the Agadir crisis. Britain and Russia were allies in Europe yet veiled adversaries in Asia. Thus the lines of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente could be expected to shift over time and to be decoupled on specific issues--Austria and Italy on Morocco, for instance. Yet France and Germany had been involved in a rather

protracted struggle over Morocco. And bargaining reputations seemed to be important for both. One reason for this might be that in a multipolar system where the importance of allies seems to be increased somewhat over that characteristic of bipolar systems the importance of the bargaining reputation may be enhanced by a desire to fend off the flight of present alliance partners and to facilitate the accrual of other partners in the future. Since this concern may be less severe in bipolar systems, the effects of (1) and (2) in the proposition may be to some degree canceled. All in all I am unable to state whether bargaining reputation or prestige were more important in one crisis or the other. These considerations were certainly important in both crises.

5. It seems to me that exaggerating the stakes appeared infrequently if at all in the Cuban crisis and that it may well have been more common in the Agadir crisis. The British seemed to use this technique in the July 4 response to Germany because of their uncertainty with respect to France. Both the French and the Germans made demands in the compensation negotiations which later appeared to be either exaggerations or limits created by constraints which were more ambitious than those finalized in the crisis settlement. Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen both used this technique to some degree to gain imperial approval of Kiderlen's Moroccan program. Domestic oppositions used this tactic as an everyday weapon--the Pan-Germans claimed that, if France obtained Morocco, dark Moroccan soldiers would be used against Germany in order to win back Alsace-Lorraine.

6. Given the qualifications I have already placed on this proposition with respect to the Cuban crisis, it appears as if the

proposition is largely substantiated by the Agadir crisis. The British, the French, and the Germans were all generally vague in their verbal threats. The idea was that they might fight. Generally only one type of fight was anticipated--a European war. Thus the escalation chain presented a pretty precipitous slope indeed. The placement of French and/or British ships in the harbor at Agadir, for instance, was thought to be dangerous not from the aspect of precipitating a local conflict which might escalate. Rather such a move was dangerous because it would precipitate a general war in Europe.

7. The threats in the Agadir crisis were certainly less explicit in general than were the threats in the Cuban crisis. But, in general the threats seem to have been more bellicose and crude in the Agadir crisis. This statement must be supported by some sort of index, however crude in itself, of crudeness and bellicosity. I mean here something similar to the clumsiness I spoke of in (1) above. The threats in the Agadir crisis appeared bellicose and crude to the recipients at least partially because calmer, milder, less humiliating communications would have served the purpose that the threats were supposed to serve. I suppose that I ought to first delineate the threats in the crisis here. The French move in Morocco in the absence of an accompanying compensation offer to Germany was the first. The Panther's spring and the Mansion House speech were the two threats perhaps most outstanding from the perspective of crudeness and bellicosity. Then Kiderlen's statements delivered between July 20 and July 28 about going to "extreme lengths", the early August statement attributed to Caillaux that ships would be sent to Agadir in eight days, Caillaux's mobilization bluff in late

July and early August, and Metternich's July 25 reply to Grey complete the listing.

The Panther's spring, the Mansion House speech, and Caillaux's "eight days" statement were the most bellicose and crude here. The first two seem simply to have been unnecessary signals which created a furor rather than, or at best, in addition to gaining their desired ends. The Caillaux statement was a bluff which was called immediately. Caillaux's mobilization bluff was called in the French press. Kiderlen's own threats were called over a longer period of time as the French gradually wore down Kiderlen's aspirations. The original threat in the crisis was altered by the French themselves into a move supposedly acceptable to the Germans. And, Metternich's threat was, I suppose, a warning to the British to use less dramatic methods in the future and was a response to the Mansion House threat just received from the British.

In terms of types the original French coup was a rather undefined commitment (Type I) which was later altered to make it acceptable to the Germans. The Panther and Metternich's rebuttal were both Type I and were, I think, recognized as such. The Mansion House speech may have been of this variety too, but I think it is more likely that it was a Type III threat in which the commitment was generated largely by a somewhat unanticipated press interpretation. Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" threats were bluffs (Type II). Caillaux's mobilization and "eight days" threats were bluffs too. All of these bluffs were recognized by the recipients as such.

In general these threats then were either useless or dysfunctional. This appears to be a function of the crudeness of the threats in terms of their bluff character which made them simply signals of the other side's treachery and deceit--Caillaux's and Kiderlen's statements--or of the unnecessary public humiliation which was imposed upon the recipient--the Panther's spring and the Mansion House speech. This humiliation contributed to the perceived bellicosity of these latter threats as well.

8. Physical actions played some role in the Agadir crisis--the French move in Morocco and the Panther's spring. It appears, however, that this was the limit to which physical moves could be utilized. Further physical moves--sending French and/or British ships to Agadir, or starting a German move into the Sous--were perceived as leading directly to a general European war. A mobilization, for instance, similar to the one undertaken by the United States for the contemplated Cuban invasion would appear to have been a far more dangerous act in the Agadir crisis. There seems then to have been somewhat less opportunity for physical moves in the Agadir crisis although the strength of the proposition ought to be made contingent upon, first, the fact that what opportunities there were in the Agadir crisis were utilized, and, second, that it is not clear that nuclear weapons alone are responsible for the increased range of physical moves available to actors today.

9. It appears to me that the Cuban crisis is better characterized by subsidiary confrontations than the Agadir crisis although I am not too keen about describing these subsidiary confrontations as minor ones

The task in the Cuban crisis was to increment the conflict, so to speak. This led to two high points instead of one. There appears to have been a single peak in the "tension curve" of the Agadir crisis. This single peak was, however, marred by several bumps here and there--the Cartwright interview, for instance. If such occurrences count as minor subsidiary confrontations then the proposition appears more accurate although some of these bumps were not conscious tests of resolve.

10. I am not sure I see the causal connection here, but I think I have given my answer in (7) above. Briefly the systemic environment of the Cuban crisis was more heterogeneous on about any index than the systemic environment of the Agadir crisis--the ideological dimension included. The threats of the Cuban crisis were often more explicit and generally less bellicose than the threats in the Agadir crisis.

11. In the Agadir crisis there seems to be some evidence that this tactic is in use although no examples were found in the Cuban crisis. Certainly not all of the moves demonstrate this even in the Agadir crisis. The French coup in Morocco was altered by the French probably because they perceived that it had this character as long as compensation was not offered. The Mansion House speech, if we can believe the British, was meant to save the peace not to increase the risk of war. Metternich's July 25 statement was an attempt to recover from the humiliation of the British threat, and it is difficult to view it as a purposive tactic of increasing the shared risk of war although its impact, like that of the Mansion House speech, involved perhaps increasing the risk of war.

The Panther's spring comes closer with its message of compensate of go back to Algeciras. But Kiderlen seems not to have initiated this move with the idea of increasing the risk of war in mind. In fact, Kiderlen took this move because he perceived in it no risk of war but rather a French capitulation. Kiderlen's and Caillaux's bluffs are closer to what Schelling has in mind here. Essentially these three-- Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statements, Caillaux's mobilization bluff, and Caillaux's "eight days" threat--were rather ineffective because they were bluffs and were perceived as such. But they do seem to represent tactics approximating what Schelling discusses under this heading. To the degree that this is an acceptable interpretation of these activities then, the proposition stands unconfirmed and in doubt.

12. The main thrust of this proposition seems to be confirmed by both the Cuban and the Agadir crisis. In Agadir Kiderlen had evidently hoped that Britain would not be engaged, so to speak, by the crisis, and the intervention of Britain certainly made his plans no easier to carry out. And, had war ensued from the crisis, Britain's intervention would have placed Germany at a considerable disadvantage. It is reasonable to assume then that Kiderlen would have acted somewhat differently had he been able to foresee more adequately the identity of his opponents. Most commentators on the Agadir crisis in fact make particular notice of Kiderlen's rather sloppy handling of Britain. Apparently Kiderlen failed either to recognize the crucialness of this question, or the plausible British perspective on his activity with respect to France, or both.

B. Propositions about coercive tactics

1. I want to draw upon rather than reproduce my discussion of this proposition which appears in my Cuban case study. Basically the distinction drawn there was between commitment to a specific state of affairs and commitment to act in a specific fashion. The former was found to be common; the latter was felt to be rather rare. There is little in the Agadir crisis which would cause me to alter this general thesis. France, Germany, and Britain all seem to have certain states of affairs to which they were committed in that drastic action might be taken to ensure that none of the minimum constraints which defined this goal would be broken. For the British the obvious example is the demise of the entente. For France it is a German foothold in Morocco. It is less clear what the precise dimensions of this commitment are for Germany. Vaguely they amount to compensation, but the definition of this compensation varies a good deal over time, and the Germans themselves appear to be somewhat uncertain from one time to another as to what they need.

The type of commitment which forecloses all action alternatives except one does appear in rather mild form. Caillaux's "eight days" threat was an example of this. It was rather vague what amount of progress in the negotiations would deactivate the threat, and in this sense it was vague. But more importantly it was a bluff which provoked the Germans into purposely calling it with almost no regard for its credibility.

2. Generally this proposition seems to be congruent with the data of the Agadir crisis. Threats were not so much veiled as they were

ambiguous. The only example of an explicit threat would be Caillaux's "eight days" bluff, and the vagueness which appeared even in it was described in (1) above. Explicitness was less needed, however, given the rather ungraduated escalated ladder of the period. Violence meant a general European war, and, since this was generally known, there was no need to try to humiliate the other side with an explicit expression of it.

3. The severest threats of the crisis were perhaps the French move in Morocco, the Panther's spring, and the Mansion House speech. The first two of these were physical actions directed at no specific individual in Germany or France, respectively. But the announcement of these actions was managed through regular diplomatic channels-- foreign secretary and ambassador. The Mansion House speech was made by the chancellor of the exchequer and was directed at no specific German audience. Metternich's rebuttal on July 25 was within regular diplomatic channels; Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statements were also. The most explicit threat of the crisis, Caillaux's "eight days" bluff, was communicated by Fondere to Schoen. So the use of Fondere here lends some credence to the proposition.

4. Although no supporting evidence was found for this proposition in the Cuban crisis, there appears to be some in the Agadir crisis. The French used the cover of saving the Europeans at Fez to gain a military presence throughout Morocco. The Germans claimed that they were doing essentially the same thing--protecting their countrymen-- at Agadir. Neither claim was particularly convincing although the

French were more subtle than the Germans, and both states dropped these excuses pretty quickly.

5. The evidence for this proposition is in general not as clear as it was in the Cuban crisis, and it is rather mixed as opposed to being almost completely positive. The Kissingen conversations seem to be an attempt of this sort on the part of the French. Carbon thought that the Germans wanted a partition of Morocco, and he probably felt that he was offering a way out of a dilemma by stressing that compensation elsewhere would be favorably considered by the French. The Germans with the Panther's spring and the British with the Mansion House speech were neither very cognizant of the impact these public maneuvers would have on the press and the domestic opposition in France and Germany. During the conversations early in July Kiderlen did suggest an exchange of territory to ease colonial losses for the French, and this surely is an example of leaving a loophole. The British apparently saw an international conference as such a device to avoid the humiliation which might occur in a deadlock and which might then bring on a war. But, neither the French nor the Germans seemed to be very interested in such a conference. Germany may have suggested returning to the Act of Algeciras in this vein, but this would seem to be a rather naive interpretation.

6. The British were quite congruent with the proposition through their vagueness. Caillaux was never certain how far Britain would go in its support of France. And, it was unclear exactly what German actions might precipitate further British intervention. The French certainly left themselves no avenue for retreat with respect

to a German foothold in Morocco. Their avenue for retreat--as well as the German loophole, I suppose--was the Congo where they finally consented to a few salient German demands. The Germans themselves maintained such an avenue through what appears to have been a relatively flexible and open strategy on the precise nature of compensation. Caillaux, when his "eight days" threat was called, used the avenue or loophole that he had been misquoted.

7. The answer, even a tentative one, to this question is contingent upon the notion of commitment which is used. In terms of a state of affairs the British were committed to maintaining the entente; the French were committed to keeping the Germans out of Morocco; and the Germans were committed to the principle of compensation. Some of these commitments were held perhaps in accordance with various notions of asymmetries. The French had been recognized as having a special relationship with Morocco at Algeiras. The 1909 accord added to this impression. And, France certainly held the upper hand in Morocco in 1911 with its expeditionary force. Germany claimed as its asymmetry that its status among the great powers would be endangered if everyone except Germany were to benefit from the settlement of the Moroccan question. This principle was supported by Grey and was apparently seen as legitimate by the French in June.

In terms of commitments which eliminate alternative types of actions the only real example would be Caillaux's "eight days" bluff. An argument for the position of strength from which this commitment came could be worked out, but apparently Caillaux himself did not think his position here very strong.

8. I think I have really little to add to what I said about this in the Cuban case study. In general the commitments to a state of affairs were developed over a period of time. In the German case there were some rather rapid shifts in the operationalization of the principle of compensation. I think as before, however, that there is no general rule or regularity which is followed here.

9. In general tactics were not so modulated in the Agadir crisis. British, German, and French commentators agree that the activity of the crisis helped to bring a hard line minority into power in France and strengthened the position of German hard liners such as Tirpitz. About the only modulating tactic I can pick out of this crisis is Kiderlen's suggestion that territories be exchanged so as to ease the burden on the French government.

10. This proposition seems to describe the Agadir crisis pretty well. Most of the important conversations were private and somewhat secret--the French, for instance, did not tell the British everything. And, the public declarations--government presentations to parliament, for example, or the Mansion House speech--were generally rather vague in comparison to the diplomatic conversations.

11. In (A-11) above I labeled the Panther's as a questionable and Kiderlen's and Caillaux's bluffs as more realistic "manipulation of risk" activities in the Agadir crisis. The Panther's spring came rather early in the crisis. However, the other three activities came right at the peak of the tension in middle to late July and early August. So this proposition seems somewhat in question.

12. Again, I think I have little to add here from the Cuban case. The stage model which I have used is basically congruent with this hypothesis. And, I have been able to fit the Agadir crisis into the model without doing either an injustice, or so I think.

C. Hypotheses relating tactics to responses

1. I think the Agadir crisis lends considerable credence to the notion I expressed in the Cuban case that "blatant, preemptory, openly aggressive demands and threats" are pretty rare inasmuch as it will be difficult to convince an actor which has issued a threat perceived by others as being of this type that he has, in fact, done what they say he has--Grey's reaction to the Mansion House speech is an example here. The original French move in Morocco, the Panther's move, the original Congo demands of the Germans, the Mansion House speech, Metternich's July 25 rebuttal, and Caillaux's bluffs were all perceived as being blatant, preemptory, and openly aggressive. Yet the initiators of these acts were largely surprised at these receptions and pictured themselves as only mildly resisting in their actions the unwarranted aggression of others. It is, however, pretty clear that demands or threats which were perceived as blatant, preemptory, and openly aggressive were irritating to their recipients, and I think it is fair to say that they were resisted more than "reasonable" counterparts would have been. Kiderlen said that the Germans would have been quick to sooth British fears had the British used regular diplomatic channels, and indeed Metternich had already done this to some degree on July 24 before Kiderlen was fully aware of the nature of the Mansion

House speech. The French also indicated that compensation would have been given more lightly had the Panther not intervened. While the hypothesis seems to be confirmed then, there is often apt to be some disagreement about the actual character of any given threat. Thus I should say that the hypothesis ought to be altered to read: "Demands and threats which are perceived by their recipients as being blatant, preemptory, and openly aggressive are more apt to be resisted than those which are perceived as being presented in a reasonable tone".

The leaves another problem which has not been handled to my satisfaction yet and which may remain as something of a thorn in our side long after the project is completed. Why were the threats in the Cuban crisis--some of which, the blockade, were surely perceived as being blatant, preemptory and openly aggressive like the Panther or the Mansion House speech--somewhat more effective or functional. I tried to point out the strengths of the threats in the Cuban crisis in my earlier case study. Briefly these were, first, that the threats here were credible and were perceived as warnings or danger signals, and second, that they were delivered in as mundane a manner as possible given the necessity of maintaining their credibility. Some of the threats in the Agadir crisis fail on the first criterion. Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" threat, and Caillaux's mobilization and "eight days" threats were all essentially treated as bluffs. These simply added to perceptions that the other side could not be trusted and that treachery of this nature was all that could be expected to come from such a source.

Other Agadir threats fail on the second criterion. The Panther's stirring and the Mansion House speech were both inflammatory methods of getting a signal across which existed side by side with others which were less inflammatory. Both the French and the Germans had in fact already received the signal through these other means and were in the process of complying to some degree. These two actions--the Panther and the Mansion House speech--were then cases of literally adding insult to injury where only the injury itself was necessitated by the purposes of the parties issuing the threats.

2. 2. I think I have pretty much gone over this proposition in (1) above and in (A-7).

3. The Germans did not partake in very much activity designed to change utilities and utility perceptions apart from threats. The territorial exchange idea which was adopted by the French would be one possible example which was certainly not provocative. The French tried to alter the British perception of how British interests would be hurt by particular German demands. These attempts were remarkably unsuccessful. The British tried to convince both the Germans and the French to take the negotiations to a conference if a stalemate developed. Their suggestions too seem to have fallen on deaf ears. But neither set seems to have been particularly provocative. When Cambon tried to explain to Kiderlen that the French were acting within the bounds of the Act of Algeciras and the 1909 accord, he was not only unsuccessful but aroused some resentment as well. In general tactics such as these seem to fail unless they actually do help the other fellow--as with the territorial exchange idea. And they may well arouse resentment if the

arguments are perceived as attempts to "pull a fast one" or to deceive the other party.

4. This proposition receives some rather strong confirming evidence from the material of the Agadir crisis. Part of what incensed the Germans about the French move in Morocco was that the French were breaking a rule--the Act of Algeciras and the 1909 accord. Far more important, however, was the fact that France had purchased exemption from this rule from several states but had left Germany out in the cold. This made the Germans fear that they were of no importance, and thus the German notion of reciprocity among the great powers was slapped in the face. The Panther's spring and the Mansion House speech, as I mentioned in (1) above, were particularly distasteful to the French and to the Germans respectively because they broke the rules of normal diplomatic interchange. They embarrassed the two governments before their own press, before parliamentary oppositions, and before the world. And, this was considered an unwarranted intervention into the domestic affairs of a foreign government as well as the violation of a code of international activity.

5. This proposition also seems to be substantiated by the material of the Agadir crisis. The general tenor of the policy processes in the Agadir crisis seems to be one of avoiding action options which are too dangerous and consequences which are unacceptable or necessary to avoid. I think that I tend to disagree, however, with the opinion that the implications of this tentative confirmation point toward a reduction in the relevance of theoretical perspectives such as games in general and Prisoners' Dilemma in particular. I agree then with

the statement that the Prisoners' Dilemma perspective violates the perspectives of the actors, but I disagree that this necessarily negates the relevance of the perspective of Prisoners' Dilemma for the study of such situations. My argument here goes as follows.

To begin with any social scientific or philosophical theory of social action is likely to violate the perspectives of the actors to some extent. This is apt to be the case even for work which, like mine, is based upon the notion that men in society or political man has a knowledge of social and political phenomena. The major disadvantage of this knowledge from the perspective of the social scientist or the philosopher is that it is generally knowledge of an implicit, unorganized or even incoherent, and very complex form. One of the things a theorist does when he works on social action is to simplify it by pulling out the essential elements, another is to organize it or to make it coherent, and yet another is to make this simplified, organized theory explicit. Thus inherently, the product of social theory is apt to violate the actors' perspective or the actors' own social or political knowledge in these three ways.

But I suspect that the crux of the opinion that I am taking issue with is not that the scientist's social theory must retain inviolate the theory of the political actor but rather that a social scientist must be careful when he violates the actor's theory in order to hang onto the crucial elements even in simplified form and that the perspective of Prisoners' Dilemma, for example, does not do this for the actors in international crises. More importantly then it is not clear to me that the necessity of working with concepts such as "too dangerous" or

"necessary" as opposed to "probability" and "utility" necessitates or even mildly prescribes the utility of a flight from models such as game matrices and the formal solutions associated with some familiar payoff patterns.

An article I read recently did use these models ridiculously from the perspective of understanding the processes through which the actors go in making their decisions. I have tried carefully to demonstrate that the decision processes of game theory are not used in international crises and that the processes suggested by Simon and others and exemplified in pure form in the expanded, normal form matrix form a considerably more perfect fit. However, this judgement does nothing to deny that in some situations a party will back down before a default--threatened or enacted--and in others it will not. These decisions represent Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma structures respectively. The impact of the Simon process shows itself in a desire to break down disaster-humiliation dichotomies, however, by searching for options which fall in between and perhaps by implementing commitments incrementally. In this fashion the game theory process either overlooks or misinterprets the behavioral process of the actors. But the process which the actors use leaves the essence of the preference patterns inviolate although two-by-two matrices often become expanded.

6. The Agadir material presents some rather mixed data on this hypothesis. In the years before the crisis toughness did seem to breed toughness. This was true for parts of the crisis as well. Early French toughness on Morocco led to the Panther's spring. This in turn led to a rehardened French position. Perceived German toughness led to the

Lloyd George speech which in turn lead to Metternich's rebuttal. Yet there came a point when toughness on the one side led to a partial withdrawal, so to speak, on the part of the other side. Then the firm commitments generated by both sides began to break down ever so slightly. This might be viewed as a mutual process. The historical record is simply not very clear here. But sometime in about a ten day period in late July and early in August the Germans came to accept the idea of something less than their demands of July 15 and the French came to accept the idea of giving up something more than minor border rectifications. This was a rather hostile form of conciliation, but I suppose that it is proper to say here that conciliation produced reciprocal conciliation. Early German and French attempts at conciliation--the German hints in April and Cambon's hint at Kissingen--did not lead to reciprocal conciliation, however. This pattern is essentially the one expressed in the stage notion. It posits a process which may be symmetrical throughout within the limits prescribed by the model although breakdown can be rather onesided. The Cuban crisis was an example of largely one-sided breakdown with only minor concessions on the part of the United States. The Agadir crisis also represents a rather asymmetrical process early in the breakdown period, but the physical separation of the two parts of French Equatorial Africa came to be such a salient point that the French advantage was reduced quite a bit.

7. The original French move in Morocco is difficult to classify as compellent or deterrent, so I will skip it. Incidentally, this appears to me to be a point in favor of Diesing's argument with respect to the initiation of a crisis. The French move in Morocco was not

directed against the German in the perceptions of the French. This and also the initiation of the Cuban crisis seem more congruent with the initiation described in Diesing (1970) than with the tone of earlier working papers of a crisis starting with an explicit demand by one party upon another. The Panther's spring was essentially a compellent threat. In Kiderlen's thoughts it took a hostage to compel the French to give compensation. Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" threats were compellent as well with the same object in mind. The Mansion House speech was a deterrent threat if one chooses to believe Lloyd George and a compellent threat used to reduce the French price from the perspective of the British socialists and the Germans. Metternich's rebuttal is difficult to classify too, but I suppose that it is deterrent in character. Caillaux's bluffs were obviously compellent. So the subtotals are four clearly compellent and two seemingly deterrent threats--one of which was definitely perceived by the recipient as being compellent. Of these the Panther's spring and the Caillaux "eight days" bluff clearly strengthened the recipient's will to resist. The Mansion House speech and Metternich's rebuttal certainly aroused resentment, but it is not clear that they increased the will to resist. It is uncertain that Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" threats had much of any impact at all although the Kaiser thought they would aggravate the situation. After all this I am not certain of what I can say about the hypothesis. An increase in the will to resist seems at best to be only weakly related to the compellent or deterrent nature of threats within the crisis. As I recall, this was my conclusion in the Cuban crisis as well. In the comparison of two crises, however, I find some substantia-

tion of my notion from the Cuban crisis that compellent threats are more difficult to deliver in a credible fashion. Only the Panther amounted to a credible compellent threat in the Agadir crisis, and I also indicated in the Cuban crisis the enhanced, inherent credibility of physical moves like the Panther's spring. Compellent moves do seem to arouse resentment even if not resistance, and a comparison of the relative frequency of compellent and opposed to deterrent threats in the Cuban and Agadir crises might offer a clue as to the hostile aftermath of the latter crisis.

D. Hypotheses relating environment, setting and tactics to outcomes

1. I still cannot formalize or operationalize the notion of inherent bargaining power very rigorously. I am assuming here that asymmetries in inherent bargaining power are attributable to other asymmetries which were noted earlier in the discussions of the systemic environment and the bargaining setting. France had an interested ally in Great Britain. Britain was a particularly useful ally to have in a colonial dispute because of its powerful navy. Germany could not possibly hope to assert itself in the colonial world without first gaining European--British--approval. That is, a violent colonial conflict would be impossible for the Germans to sustain unless they had first neutralized in some fashion the British fleet. This factor tended to support but appears to be independent of the precipitous escalation sequence which was perceived by the actors in the crisis. With respect to Morocco France had the upper hand as well. And, it may be that the expeditionary force "overcame" the salience of the Act

of Algeciras and the 1909 accord. I think this would be difficult to judge very accurately, however.

In the Congo Germany's case was somewhat stronger. The principle of compensation was recognized by all the parties to the crisis. After Germany's original demands floundered, the salience of access to the Atlantic coast and to the Congo River emerged quite clearly. These points were prominent enough to allow Germany to dig its heels in, so to speak. The French eventually gave in here even though this was a solution which split French Equatorial Africa into two pieces, and this became a very prominent consideration from the French perspective.

In the Cuban case I mentioned that salience or prominence is somewhat trickier than Schelling implies because different solutions will appear prominent from different perspectives. In general the French were favored by important asymmetries in the crisis, and the solution of the crisis demonstrates this or supports the French view of salience--Morocco French, for instance. A comparison of Diagrams V-1 and V-2 will demonstrate that even on the compensation issue Germany was able to hold out in a minimal fashion only on the most salient of points.

2. In the Agadir crisis salience seems to have had a good deal to do with the solution. The Act of Algeciras and the 1909 accord pointed out the prominence of French ascendance in Morocco. In the Congo the Sanga River provided the original point of salience. This was effectively whittled down by the French to minor frontier rectifications plus narrow strips of territory providing access to the Atlantic

and to the Congo River. The salience of these two points is demonstrated by the weird shape of the concession in Diagram V-2.

A good deal of the trouble in the Agadir crisis developed because conventional or salient patterns of behavior were not observed. France began by violating the Act of Algeciras. Both Germany and Britain realized this although Britain thought the action was justified by necessity and Germany thought it could be legitimized only through compensation to Germany. Then Germany violated the norms of diplomacy by anchoring the Panther in the closed port of Agadir. And, Britain followed suit here with the Mansion House speech. Beyond these moves there seemed to be a rather salient barrier to further escalation, but the severity of the conflict in the Agadir crisis is largely due to the digressions from customary diplomacy indicated above. This proposition then seems to describe the Agadir crisis in a rather minimal fashion.

3. In the Cuban crisis I was unable to come to much of a conclusion on this proposition. The issue appears to me to be much clearer in the Agadir crisis. A difference in tactics in the Agadir crisis might have reduced the severity of the conflict considerably and have left a less bitter aftertaste, so to speak, but it is reasonably clear that about the only outcome which would have differed significantly from the one which arose out of the crisis would have been one derived through war. Of course, had the tactics been different enough, there might have been a war in 1911. This is perhaps more prominently displayed in the Cuban crisis. What I have in mind here is that the rather coercive means applied in the Agadir crisis seemed to cancel one another and bring about, not a more favorable settlement

to one party or another, but rather a harsher aftermath for both Germany and France. The inherent bargaining power of France due primarily to its relationship with Britain, its (then) existing position in Morocco, the tradition of Moroccan ascendance, and, strangely enough, its virulent domestic opposition seem to have had more of an impact upon the outcome than the tactics which were used.

4. As was the case for the Cuban crisis the Agadir crisis is congruent with this proposition. The proposition itself still bothers me, however. I fail to see the causal connection between nuclear armaments and the formality of settlements. Surely other systemic factors such as the ideological heterogeneity are as closely related to the nature of settlements as the style of armaments.

5. Miscalculation of others intentions seems to have characterized both the Cuban and the Agadir crises. I think it is true that the dominant elements of the decision units in the Agadir crisis misperceived the situation for a greater period of the crisis--all of it in some cases--than was the case for their counterparts in Cuba. The first two moves in the Cuban crisis seemed to get the situation pretty much straightened out for Kennedy and Khrushchev. The first two moves barely got the misunderstanding underway in the Agadir crisis. I think that this adds credence to the proposition.

E. Hypotheses about connections between alliance relationships and adversary relationships

1. Although this proposition would appear to make sense, there is little evidence in the Agadir crisis which may be used to judge it.

Britain did not provide France with a firm commitment. Although the French press interpreted the firm British stance against Germany as a firm commitment to France, Caillaux did not, and Grey certainly encouraged Caillaux's perceptions here.

2. This proposition is isomorphic with British activity during the Agadir crisis. The motivating principle given in the proposition appears to be that actually used by Grey. He was somewhat more firm with respect to the Germans in order to discourage them from pressing the entente with France too severely. He was quite hesitant to give the French the firm support that Crowe, Bertie, and Nicolson requested. Grey feared that France would use this support to drag Britain into an even more dangerous situation for the aggrandizement of French colonial interests.

3. I suppose that the proposition will best fit the Agadir crisis if I label Germany the aggressor. Britain, the supporting ally would have not objected to Germany gaining a foothold in southern Morocco as long as no ports were fortified. And, Britain had no objection to Germany gaining all of the French Congo as long as such a gain would not destroy the entente. Because of this consideration, however, Grey eventually accepted compensation such as a German foothold in Morocco and the Congo from the coast to the Sanga as unrealistic. After the Panther's move, France, the target ally, considered nothing more gracious than the compensation Germany finally received. Germany's original concession suggestion then did fall between these two and it was subsequently decreased to the position of the final settlement. So, the proposition is congruent with this crisis.

The proposition cannot be applied to the Agadir crisis if France is considered to be the aggressor. This is certainly the interpretation which the Germans had, and this interpretation would be more congruent with the stage model I have suggested.

4. If as in (3) above Germany is considered to be the aggressor, this proposition cannot really be applied to the Agadir crisis. If France is considered to be the aggressor, the proposition would describe the Agadir crisis inaccurately. If anything Germany was more reluctant to concede in the face of humiliation prompted by the British than in the face of that promoted by the French.

5. The first notion in the proposition is difficult for me to judge accurately. I am rather dubious about the utility of trying to generalize about such differences, and in specific cases--France-Britain compared with the Soviet Union-Cuba, for instance--I find it extremely difficult to judge these differences. The second idea expressed in the proposition is, I think, substantiated rather clearly by the Agadir crisis, however. I discussed this rather unwittingly in (3) above. Britain, on its own, had no objection to a German presence in southern Morocco or to the German Congo demands of July 15. Grey eventually had to label these concessions as unacceptable, however, because of the damage the entente would have incurred had Germany received such compensation.

6. This proposition too seems to be substantiated by the material of the Agadir crisis. Grey and the British foreign office in general had fears of German ascendance on the continent. It was necessary to give France enough support so that the French would not

decide that an alliance with Germany would be more profitable than one with Britain. This fear of losing the French support for future conflicts was at the base of British acceptance of French compensation constraints as described in (3) and (5) above.

7. It appears that Grey did not increase the firmness of his support of the French from Caillaux's perspective. In early August Caillaux was fearful that, if violence broke out, Britain would not support France. And, both de Selves and Caillaux attempted to stir up British support for a naval demonstration about the same time, but neither had any luck at all. The Mansion House speech was of course delivered at a relatively tense juncture, and it was apparently delivered with the intention of explaining that, if British interests were effected, Britain would fight. And, one of these British interests was the maintenance of the entente. So, the material here then is rather conflicting with respect to the hypothesis. That Hypothesis 2 in this set seems to be a higher order or dominant hypothesis would be one explanation here.

8. I think this proposition is sustained by the Agadir crisis. Within the British foreign office Crowe, who was openly suspicious of French loyalty to the entente, and Nicolson and Bertie, who were more subtle in their fears, wanted to give France stronger support than Grey was providing. On the other side Grey, who seemed rather convinced that France's intentions were loyal, muted Britain's support from the level suggested by those who were more suspicious.

9. The only example of activity of this type tends to negate the proposition. Crowe believed that Caillaux's secret and independent

negotiations had the purpose of forming an alliance with Germany. Once this alliance was formed, France would drop the alliance with Britain. There is no evidence that this was in fact true, and it appears to have been a paranoid fantasy on the part of Crowe. But Crowe's reaction was interesting. He recommended that Britain give France stronger support in order to preserve the existing entente. This reaction runs counter to the one expected from the hypothesis.

10. I think this hypothesis is probably correct, but the material on it in the Agadir crisis is rather sparse. If the entente had a leader, I suppose it was France, and France did not attempt to restrain Britain in the Agadir crisis. If, for the sake of argument, Britain is considered to be the leader of the entente, then the proposition applies most questionably to the Agadir crisis. I am not at all certain that Britain had more difficulty restraining France than the Soviet Union had in restraining Cuba. And, Britain was not very successful in defusing the crisis.

11. This proposition is not really applicable or relevant to the Agadir crisis.

12. The Entente Cordiale was unquestionably the more cohesive alliance in the Agadir crisis. The commitments of this side seem to have been held more rigidly or firmly as well. I am uncertain as to which side issued the stronger threats.

13. The French will to resist a German foothold in Morocco was apparently so strong that Britain's support had little impact here. The French did not perceive Britain's support and, I suppose, resolve to be as high as they would have wished. But, Britain was certainly

performing better on this score than Russia was. It may be that French resistance in the matter of Congo compensation would have been somewhat less staunch had Britain not given the support it did, but a more lenient Congo policy might have found little domestic support and might well have led to the fall of the government which advocated it.

14. The relevance of this proposition to the Agadir crisis is rather vague. Britain and France were relatively equal, and I have already stated (10) above that control of allies in the two cases I have done does not seem to be remarkably easier in a multipolar than in a bipolar system.

F. Hypotheses about perceptions and images

1. There certainly appears to be no problem with this hypothesis in the Agadir crisis. Kiderlen, through years of experience expected the French to be unwilling to grant Germany compensation with respect to the Moroccan question, and he apparently missed or underestimated the French signal that compensation would be granted. Crowe, suspicious of Germany and France, interpreted Caillaux's independent conferences as attempts to sell out the entente. The existence of various national perspectives and of elements held in common among slightly different versions of a single national perspective corroborates this as well.

2. The decade of conflict over Morocco had certainly conditioned French and German images about this issue. In general I suppose that I have assumed that this proposition was accurate. That is, I have implicitly included a process such as this in the formation of images. It is somewhat unreasonable to assume that the experiences of life are

isolated from the image formation process, but surely this proposition is rather vague, and clear cut examples which would help to verify it do not leap out at me from the materials I have used with respect to the Agadir crisis. Kiderlen used the example of Britain's "temporary" occupation of Egypt to ridicule French claims that their occupation of Morocco would be limited. Other than that I think the impact of the activity I reported in the bargaining setting section on the images of French and German decision-makers is about the best I can do. The immediate background of the crisis here led each side to expect stubbornness and treachery from the other.

3. This proposition certainly describes the Agadir crisis accurately. This misperception was common to the British, the French, and the Germans. I think that I have discussed these misperceptions adequately in a number of places above, and I have nothing to add here.

4. This proposition states a mechanism basic to the conflict generated in the Agadir crisis. The Germans seemed to have overestimated the aggressive aims of the French. The French then overestimated the aggressive aims of the Germans and continued to do so throughout the crisis. A similar pattern was shown in Anglo-German relations with the Mansion House speech and Metternich's rebuttal. In actuality most of the parties were acting defensively from their own perspectives. This defensive perspective is difficult to see only in the original French move in Morocco. Here the French were trying to bring about a consolidation of their north African empire which would enable them to protect and bring law and order to western Algeria. The Germans felt that their strategic position was threatened and had to be protected. The British

seemed to have had a similar fear. Each was reacting to provocations of the other parties which it viewed as endangering its own security.

5. This proposition is difficult to answer since sometimes expectations and desires will coincide but differ from incoming signals. I will use a series of examples to demonstrate the various possibilities here. The Germans desired compensation from France; they did not expect this compensation to come spontaneously. Thus, Kiderlen seems to have missed Cambon's signal at Kissingen. This is an example of the hypothesis substantiated. Kiderlen both desired and expected Britain to remain aloof from the conflict, yet he had no difficulty in interpreting a signal of British intervention. This example is irrelevant to the hypothesis, but it is a common example. An example countering the hypothesis would be Kiderlen's crisis scenario of May 3. Here Kiderlen explains that he expects Britain to remain aloof if Germany restricts its demonstrations to southern Morocco. Almost everyone besides Kiderlen who has ever dealt with this crisis finds this a strange expectation considering the existence of the Entente Cordiale. Perhaps this is an example of desire fathering the expectation.

6. This proposition certainly seems plausible, but the supporting examples in the Agadir crisis are not the best. The Panther's move certainly left less doubt as to the German desire for compensation than did the weaker signals in April, but the French seem to have come around to the compensation notion at Kissingen before the Panther's move. The Grey-Metternich interview on July 21 involved a clearer picture of concern on the part of the British with respect to German intentions than did the interview on July 4, but the Germans were

allowed no time for a reply as the Mansion House speech came the same evening.

7. I find no obvious evidence of image rigidity being positively associated with tension levels. The threats made in the crisis were concentrated in the high tension period, and, although only one of these--Caillaux's "eight days" bluff--was very explicit, threats do tend to be recognized as such, and in this sense I suppose these signals were particularly clear. In general, however, I would say that image rigidity was almost inversely associated with the tension level during the crisis. The highest levels of image rigidity came early in the crisis and with the aftermath. The period of late July and early August was reasonably flexible in comparison.

8. This proposition is certainly substantiated by the Agadir crisis. The British viewed the available alternatives most broadly. The French were willing to accept fewer alternatives both procedurally and substantively. They were unwilling, for instance, to see Britain or Spain enter the negotiations or to call a conference. And they were unwilling to concede part of Morocco to Germany or agree to early German demands in the Congo. With respect to the British the Germans were most restricted procedurally in that they too wanted neither the British nor the Spanish in the negotiations. In addition rather than a new conference, the Germans favored a return to Algeciras--the British were cognizant of this alternative too.

The Germans apparently viewed the basic choices as being three--a satisfactory compensation, the return to Algeciras, and war. These choices starkly outlined the alternatives consistent with German national

honor. All France had to do was to choose one--they were ranked in order of descending preference--from this list. It was easy for France from Kiderlen's perspective.

For France the alternatives were pretty stark too. A return to Algeciras appeared both unacceptable and impossible. A new conference was a minimal choice. France essentially had to have Morocco, and more importantly Germany had to be kept out of Morocco. The price which the Germans were callously forcing France to pay for Morocco--which was an unwarranted activity in light of the Act of Algeciras and the 1909 accord--was to be kept as minimal as possible. The Germans could ease the situation by accepting any number of minor and equitable compensation offers which the French had submitted, but they would not in their obstinancy do so.

9. The Germans were aware that Lloyd George and Crowe, Bertie, and Nicolson were generally of different factions. They apparently did not distinguish between Grey and the rest of the foreign office group. They also recognized Caillaux as differing from Clemenceau. The French seem to have been rather undifferentiating in their estimates of the Germans, but they recognized the British foreign office difference between Grey and Nicolson-Crowe. The British, or at least Grey, differentiated Bethmann-Hollweg from Kiderlen. Crowe and Nicolson may not have done this. But these two certainly picked up the difference between Caillaux and men like Poincaré, Clemenceau, and Delcassé.

Although such internal differences were picked up from one state to another, they seem to have remarkably little impact on the

substance of the proposition which appears to be substantiated by the Agadir crisis. Grey (1925, pp. 230-32) explains how the Agadir crisis fits into a mammoth plan of German ascendance in Europe. Kiderlen did not alter his plan of forcing the French to compensate when Caillaux, who was known to favor such compensation, took over the government in France (Cf. Wolff, 1936, p. 66). The French viewed almost every demand Kiderlen made as an attempt to get the discussion of compensation back to southern Morocco.

10. There is little evidence to support this proposition if the notion is that the statements of those with the greatest authority will be the most credible. Kiderlen's April hints were not picked up. Cambon's Kissingen statements were ignored as well. Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statements appear never to have bothered the French much, and certainly Kiderlen's statements that he was not after part of Morocco, but that he wanted part of the Congo instead, were never really credible in the eyes of the French. The Mansion House speech and Metternich's rebuttal apparently were credible. Caillaux's bluffs were not, but one of these was delivered through Fondère, and this instance is then consistent with the hypothesis.

11. This proposition surely represents the British point of view. Had it not been for long-range goals, the British would probably never have become involved in the crisis at all. French resistance was stiffened by the French perception that Germany was really after Morocco rather than compensation elsewhere which was all the French could give. Germany's interest in the conflict was heightened by a decade of Moroccan diplomacy in which Germany had been continually

rebuffed. The Germans viewed the conflict to some degree as a long-term policy on the part of the French to carry on European politics without them and thus to remove a German input in European affairs.

G. Hypotheses relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics

1. This proposition is congruent with the French position particularly after the middle of August when the French government had a coherent program worked out. But the difficulty of changing the position within the government or the decision unit was only part of the problem. Another problem was defending the position of the decision unit to oppositions of one variety or another outside the government, and this latter problem seems to have been more important for the Caillaux cabinet in providing an incentive for tough bargaining vis à vis the Germans. Kiderlen seems not to have had this severe a problem. Kiderlen pursued a harder line than either Bethmann-Hollweg or the Kaiser really desired, so he could generally back down somewhat without running into trouble within the government although the German government had to take some cognizance of parliamentary and press opposition. In addition, Kiderlen's program or strategy seems to have involved considerable flexibility on the issue of compensation. Grey seems to have had little trouble in this respect until the Mansion House speech. After this the British cabinet apparently felt that the speech would have to be lived up to. But again domestic opposition in parliament and a generally favorable and hard line press plus the "German menace" may have been stronger considerations than possible opposition within the cabinet.

2. It is not clear to me that this proposition describes the Agadir crisis very well. First, disunity with the governments themselves did not provide the most prominent source of domestic criticism. In late July Kiderlen may have finally been harnessed, so to speak, by the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg although it is not clear that pressure from this source brought about the change in Kiderlen's compensation policy. Caillaux had somewhat more difficulty. But even in Caillaux's case the threat to the government's position came primarily from the outside. Second, although there were some ambiguous moves during the crisis, it is difficult to relate these to disunity in the governments which issued them. Some, like the German compensation hints in April and like Cambon's compensation hints at Kissingen seem to have been purposely subtle bargaining tactics aimed at avoiding signals of the Panther variety. Others like the British statement to Germany on July 4 may have been ambiguous partially because of governmental confusion but not necessarily division.

3. I would say that behavior in the Agadir crisis was rational in terms of being preceded by a deliberative process within the bounds of the perspectives of the participants. These perspectives were in the beginning greatly out of touch with one another, and this contributed to the irrational appearance of activity at some junctures. In addition, some of the images--Kiderlen's, for instance--seemed to be only tenuously connected with general processes of human interaction. Over time the accuracy of the images improved only a little--definitely not as much as nor for as long as they did in the Cuban crisis. The one example of rather clearly irrational behavior was the Kaiser's, not

Kiderlen's reaction to Caillaux's "eight days" threat. This proposition then describes the Agadir crisis quite poorly.

4. The urgency and time pressure which characterized the Agadir crisis were certainly less severe than those which characterized the Cuban crisis. The Cuban crisis lasted about two weeks with the loose ends of the breakdown trailing out about a month thereafter. The Agadir crisis spanned almost six months were needed to clear up all the trailing ends. It is clear, however, that prominence in terms of precedent or visibility played quite a role in forming the alternatives the crisis participants viewed. Germany wanted compensation partially because for nine years France had been handing compensation to everyone else. The Panther action may have been partially prompted by a visit of a French warship to Agadir in the previous year which was attacked in the German press and Reichstag. The idea of a Congo exchange had been mentioned here and there since 1901. When untenable situations presented themselves search struck these alternatives--salient or prominent from the aspect of current visibility or tradition--first. I have indicated throughout my papers that search has many guides and that notions of conventional or prominent responses are not contradictory to the notion of search. The rather obvious British search for alternatives to avoid war, for instance, landed on the notion of another conference like the one held at Algeciras.

5. The information available to me on the Agadir crisis does not equal that available for the United States side of the Cuban crisis. French ministers were used to many hats, and this proposed relationship seems not to hold for them. De Selves was perhaps more militant than

the French military. In Britain, Churchill's hard line attitude got him into the military bureaucracy rather than his role there altering his perceptions. The hypothesis seems quite plausible, however, and perhaps I ought simply to admit that I cannot do it justice from the sources I used. But I must say that the Agadir crisis was long in duration and low in severity for much of its six month duration, and evidence to support the proposition strongly does not leap to the observer.

The one positive example I have here is not remarkably well documented. I get the impression that the ambassadors of this era could see the two sides--that of the state they represented and that of the state in which they were stationed--far better than the foreign offices or the national governments in general. Cambon, Schoen, and Metternich are so characterized at least. Churchill (1923, p. 52) tells an interesting story of Metternich in this regard which provides the best concrete example of this notion which I have found.

6. With mild reservations I think this hypothesis is amply substantiated by the Agadir crisis. The best example of this is the case of France. French governments were notoriously unstable and the ferocity of the parliamentary, interest group, and press attacks the Caillaux regime underwent did seem to strengthen the French position vis-à-vis the Germans. Cambon and Caillaux used the excuse of parliamentary disapproval as well. Caillaux's cabinet seems to have actually fallen, however, not over the nature of the settlement with Germany, but rather over the one of how Caillaux went about gain the settlement--the independent negotiations with Fondère and Lancken.

In Britain Grey and presumably some other cabinet members as well were somewhat surprised by the reaction which the Mansion House speech had on the British press and upon the French and the Germans. The British cabinet seems to have decided to refuse to acknowledge the speech as a threat but to stand on its contents of fighting before accepting the humiliation of damage to British interests. To some degree a strong interpretation of the speech seems to have been enforced upon the cabinet by the British press which simply preempted them in its interpretation.

Both Barlow (1940, *passim*) and Taylor (1954, p. 473) stress the importance of public opinion in all three states. Kiderlen certainly withstood this onslaught more successfully than Caillaux. The Pan-Germans were the primary instigators of opposition to the government's policy although the Mansion House speech and the Cartwright interview aroused a much wider range of protest. Nothing much seemed to come from these protests, however. The Reichstag ratified the November treaty quite quickly. And, although speeches against Kiderlen continued through February, 1912, nothing other than talk seemed to occur. And, Kiderlen did not seem to use the domestic opposition as a bargaining tactic although Cruppi, when he was in the French foreign office, and Grey both felt that Kiderlen was constrained by the Pan-Germans.

7. This proposition is reasonably consistent with the activity surrounding the Agadir crisis. Barlow suggests that the 1909 accord failed, not so much because the French and German foreign offices wanted it to fail, but because functionaries on the spot in Morocco on each

side wanted more than the principle of the accord allowed. Both Schoen (1922, p. 145) for the Germans and Poincaré (1922, pp. 76-95) for the French stress the unreasonable and vicious attitude of the other side's functionaries in Morocco. All this relates to the pre-crisis period except for the French and German agents in Morocco who respectively begged for and ridiculed the necessity of the French march to Fez early in the crisis. The British agents were in between these two extremes. Once the march had begun, functionaries in Morocco had very little relevance to the Agadir crisis. There was perhaps a narrow escape from escalation, however, when several German businesses sent provocateurs to Agadir so that the Panther would have some German nationals to protect.

8. The evidence in the Agadir crisis relevant to this proposition is not quite as clear as that for the Cuban crisis--the United States side at least. In France the military does not appear to have been among the leaders of the hard line policy. Most of these were parties or pressure groups advocating colonial grandeur, Alsace-Lorraine French, or general conservatism. The army was probably in sympathy with most of these groups, but it does not appear to have been anxious to go to war with Germany. In this respect de Selves was probably the hardest hard liner around. He was certainly more extreme in this regard than Delcassé, the minister of marine.

In Germany about all the concrete evidence I have is the von Molke quote presented earlier--If we slink out of this affair with our tail between our legs, and if we do not make a demand which we are prepared to enforce with the sword, I despair of the Empire's future"

(Carroll, 1938, p. 684). But here too the army was not prominent in the domestic opposition which consisted of the Pan-Germans, the colonialists, the eastern conservatives, and some of the industrialists. The industrialists, however, seem not to have been eager for war. Also, as in France the army was probably in sympathy with these groups on many issues, but the German army probably had less policy input, regardless of its sympathies, in Germany than the French army in France. Kiderlen ran the German side of this crisis pretty much on his own.

In Britain the military had elaborate contingency plans some of which had been worked out with the French. The military does not seem to have advocated a tougher policy, however. If anyone did it was Crowe, Nicolson, and Bertie in the foreign office and Churchill, secretary of state for home affairs and the later first lord of the admiralty. Churchill seemed actually eager for the conflict although his part in precipitating one seems limited to a role similar to that of Tirpitz in Germany--advocating greater preparedness.

H. Hypotheses relating outcomes to aftermaths

1. The crisis which was perhaps the most relevant predictor for the Agadir crisis was the Algeiras crisis of 1905-06. Here, although Delcassé had been turned out of office and Germany had achieved an international conference, France won the issues the conference dealt with. Thus, if any party was weak in the Algeiras crisis, it would appear to be Germany not France. Yet the French leadership had no perception that Germany would back down easily and in fact may well have been more obsessed with the fear of war than the German leadership.

according to Brandenburg (1927, p. 382) the French opposition press was full of hard line perceptions that, if the French stood fast, the Germans would back down straightaway; this was, however, not the government perspective. Kiderlen, on the other hand, felt that the French would back down, and he seems to have persisted in this belief to and perhaps even through the August 1 shift in his Congo demands. The British had the same idea as they had in the earlier crisis that the Germans would not press the French beyond endurance if the Germans knew that Britain stood by France. The French-German perceptions tend to support the idea I discussed in the Cuban study that decoupling from one time to the next is sometimes easier than it actually appears in the present.

2. This may come close to representing Kiderlen's strategy with respect to the Agadir crisis. France had been pushing Germany around for a decade with respect to Morocco, and now this pushing was going to stop. If this was Kiderlen's or the general German idea it might help to explain the bitterness after the crisis on the German side. This proposition would not explain why Kiderlen thought France would be so easy to handle though.

3. The British were not particularly concerned that France show resolve with respect to the Germans. A German foothold in southern Morocco and early German demands in the Congo were satisfactory to the British. Britain was concerned that France might leave the entente or partition Morocco anew neither of which would have been satisfactory to the British, but the fears about these alternatives were either relatively short-lived or limited largely to rather suspicious elements

like Crowe and Nicolson. The fact that the French did neither certainly did not reduce the cohesion of the entente.

The French desired a little greater show of support from Britain than they got. But this does not seem to have adversely affected the cohesion of the entente. Britain was perhaps helped somewhat here because the support it gave France was so much stronger than that provided by Russia.

4. There seems to have been some fear of this on the part of the Germans in vague, long-term notions that they could not stand further humiliation by the French. But, other than these vague perceptions, there is little in the Agadir crisis relevant to this hypothesis.

5. The Agadir crisis definitely left an aftermath of hostility primarily in the perceptions of the French perceptions of the Germans and the German perceptions of the British. The crisis involved the final settlement of the Moroccan question, but I fail to see how this relates to the hostile aftermath. There was no common adversary between France and Germany although France and Britain had a common foe. The provocativeness of the British tactics certainly seemed to be related to the hostile aftermath in Anglo-German relations. The German tactics with respect to France had probably a similar although perhaps milder effect. The humiliation suffered was, of course, the intervening factor, but the issue is what caused the humiliation.

For the French I think the following items are the most important. German gunboat diplomacy made the French feel as if they had knuckled under or been made to "hollar Uncle". And, while the principle of compensation was accepted by the government and to a lesser degree by

other groups as well, no one in France had thought of a compensation similar to the July 15 German demand. Also the final settlement involved splitting a colony in two, and this came to be a salient point of objection. Finally, there was the Caillaux cabinet's--and primarily Caillaux's--handling of the affair. Suspicion had been created in the mind of the British ally, and the French foreign secretary had been ridiculed before the Germans.

On the part of the Germans British tactics with the Mansion House speech and the Cartwright interview were infuriating. Caillaux's rather obvious bluffs in late July and early August and Cambon's refusal to take the German July 15 demand seriously all gave the Germans the impression that they were being taken less than seriously. The rather small reward which such tremendous effort had taken contributed as well. In addition as I mentioned above (2) and as Gooch (1938, p. 223) points out, there had been a general public expectation that Kiderlen would get more than he actually got. Gooch implies that Kiderlen himself wanted not much more than he got but was criticized for not wanting more. And finally, it was humiliating for Kiderlen to have to lower his demands as much as he did. His July 15 demand was not as whimsical as Gooch and the French seemed to think.

6. The fit of this proposition depends upon which side is considered to have been defeated in the Agadir crisis. The British thought the Germans got the short end of the deal. I agree with this interpretation in general as do most historians. The French opposition thought differently, and it proceeded to drag the government through a senate investigation. This investigation was concerned, as I have

mentioned before, not so much with the actual outcome--the treaty of November 4, but with some of Caillaux's methods in arriving at the treaty, and it eventually brought about the fall of the Caillaux cabinet. Although French activity does not seem then to match that proposed by the hypothesis too well, this may be because the government did not view itself as having been defeated and the investigation concentrated its powers on a seemingly more important issue. The German government's behavior approximates the hypothesized behavior more closely. Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen had a standard line which they used against the criticism--primarily from the Pan-Germans. Germany had obtained what it had set out to obtain comprised the substance of the defense. This statement is somewhat difficult to believe today with access to foreign office files. But as Gooch (1938, p. 223) indicates, even if this statement were true, the opposition would not have been silenced. Its criticism was that Germany ought to have sought more than than it had sought.

7. Here again a discrepancy arises between the perceptions actors have in the present about decoupling and the actual facility with which decoupling may be managed from one time to another. Russia gave France almost no support at all during the Agadir crisis, and the Russians even suggested that Austria be nominated as an impartial arbiter between France and Germany. Yet France did not go about attempting to replace Russia in the Triple Entente. Neither France nor Germany seems to have been particularly surprised that Russia and Austria were less than eager to go to war over a bit of northwest Africa. That is, it was easy for Russia and Austria to decouple here.

Coming at the proposition positively is somewhat more difficult. The French, British, and German governments all thought they had demonstrated resolve in the crisis, yet the oppositions within France and Germany felt differently. The support which Britain gave France certainly did the Entente Cordiale no harm although it was hardly its baptismal fire, so to speak. The same was probably true for France with respect to Britain. Yet the level of support provided seemed to give Caillaux the impression, not particularly of the attractiveness of Britain as an alliance partner, but rather that the entente was not clearly inadequate. There is little to indicate that the crisis had much bearing on Germany's attractiveness as an alliance partner.

I. Hypotheses about bidding moves

1. I found this proposition to fit the Cuban case quite poorly. I think it fits the Agadir crisis somewhat better but still rather poorly. Peaceful diplomacy would have been a rather unromantic method of gaining the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba and the guarantee of Cuba against invasion on the part of the United States. These moves were taken under the necessity of disaster avoidance. It is conceivable and perhaps even probable that the only item in the treaty of November 4 which would have been difficult to achieve through peaceful diplomacy was German access to the Congo River. The fit of this proposition is still rather poor then. Enough fear of disaster was generated in the Agadir crisis to gain a salient point which would have been very difficult to gain without coercion. Germany might have

been able to gain more square miles of swampland peacefully, but probably not access to the Congo River.

2. This happened in the Agadir crisis, but in the major example Kiderlen initiated the idea for the French. The French notion was to separate the Moroccan accord from the Congo accord as much as possible so as to submit to the French parliament first a great gain in Morocco and then an independent territorial exchange. But, it was Kiderlen who initiated this idea in the July 9 discussion with Cambon. The French only worked out the details of the plan. There are, I suppose, numerous other lesser examples. Although I confess to being unfamiliar with all the details of the very complicated Moroccan and Congo accords, I shall sight a pair of examples with which I am familiar. After Kiderlen finally lost the Moroccan railway issue on September 19, he was able to obtain an agreement that German firms could build trunk lines to main lines or to harbors in their vicinity. And the French, after agreeing to German access to the Congo River, gained from Germany the right to cross the slice of German territory which now split French Equatorial Africa.

3. This is essentially how the German opposition perceived Kiderlen's and Bethmann-Hollweg's attempts to rationalize their actions. It is probably the way the French viewed these activities as well. The line that Kiderlen and Bethmann-Hollweg used was that they had obtained what they had sought. This was rather clearly an attempt to decouple from a humiliating defeat from the perspective of the Pan-Germans. It probably was in fact exactly that. Although the French perceptions of German demands were exaggerated, Kiderlen's first letter of resignation

of July 17 and his conversation with Lancken on July 29 indicate pretty clearly that he wanted to do better in the Congo than he actually did. The German government, before the Reichstag in November, essentially denied that it had ever been serious about the demand of July 15. In the middle of July, however, Kiderlen had sounded quite serious. He had thereafter to lower his aspiration level, and to his domestic critics he was presenting this as a redefinition of interests partially for the purpose of decoupling this defeat from further German actions.

4. The first and most dramatic concession the Germans made came very near the height of the crisis on August 1. This concession, like the decision on the part of the Soviet Union not to run the United States blockade was a predictor, but not necessarily an irreversible one, that the French--or the United States--was gaining the upper hand. That this concession or the Soviet one indicated general German or Soviet weakness rather than simple recognition that in this conflict too many asymmetries were unfavorable is highly questionable. Although there is perhaps more reason to believe that the adversary's leadership perceived it as a sign of weakness in the Agadir crisis. Caillaux issued his "eight days" threat three days later on August 4. The German response to this demonstrates clearly that there were limits beyond which Germany could not be pushed and that general weakness would be too grandiose an interpretation for the August 1 concession.

5. I have indicated before this proposition is not very relevant to the Agadir crisis. As long as Morocco was not repartitioned--an action inimical to the French as well--Great Britain did not really care what the French gave up as long as the entente did not suffer.

6. At the very beginning of the Kiderlen-Cambon talks in July there was some activity along these lines with respect to initial demands or offers. A suggestion would be offered hypothetically so that it could be withdrawn with as little injury as possible if necessary. If sign language is again, as it was in Cuba, interpreted broadly, the Lancken-Fondère conversations in late July offer another example here. Caillaux was willing to offer a greater concession through this medium than he was through the regular bureaucracy. He dropped this offer though when Kiderlen returned to his July 15 tactics on July 28. The later concessions in the crisis do seem to follow a tortuous pattern of reciprocal concession. Also the language which was used by the diplomats was largely devoid of brutal, direct affronts. Kiderlen spoke of "extreme lengths", and Cambon spoke of not raising issues. This made the Lloyd George speech quite direct and humiliating in comparison particularly since it was a public utterance.

Working Paper #6

A. Utility Models


I now find that the Agadir crisis belies somewhat my rather negative prediction of the congruence which utility models will show with respect to crisis bargaining. I think the utility model offers a somewhat misleading interpretation of the Agadir crisis, but it is much easier to place this crisis in the utility mold than was the case with Cuba.

1. There is a bargaining range in the Agadir crisis. The French limit is control of Morocco. The German limit is a rather vague price which must be paid before German acceptance of French control of Morocco will be granted. One of the questions of the crisis is whether there is any bargaining space--that is, is the top French compensation price higher than the bottom offer the Germans will accept. The crisis activity consists then largely of mutual coercive attempts which eventually drive the Germans down to and the French up to a common common compensation point.

2. The bargaining range is discovered in that at the beginning the only point which is really known is that Morocco will be French and none of it will serve as compensation to the Germans--this may be known only to the French. The space between the limits of the range which approximates a single point is created by a series of mutual concessions. This movement involved some effort to change the opponent's utilities--Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" statements and Caillaux's bluffs--which are not very successful. Primarily it involves reestimation of the party's own utilities through a process of clarifying relative preferences as the situation changes. As I discussed above the British became involved in a search for mutually acceptable alternatives on a broad scale. The French and the Germans are more localized, and they work basically within the Moroccan-French, compensation-to-Germany alternative. Basically they try to find a mutually acceptable outcome by cutting the distance between what France is willing to give and what Germany is willing to accept.

3. I still find it easier to think of this in terms of a single dimension with a separate perception of that dimension for each party. But, for variety I will accept the two dimensional notion for a moment. Diagram V-3 below shows the impact of the territorial exchange in two dimensions. Incidentally, the only difference between the dual

Diagram V-3



party, single dimensional model I suggested in the Cuban crisis and this two dimensional model is the manner in which the preference orderings are displayed. I envisioned a set-up like Diagram V-4 (p. 140) in the Cuban case. If the least preferred ends are placed coincidentally on one point, then one preference schedule may be rotated through any

Diagram V-4

	most preferred		least preferred
U. S.	-----		
	alternatives		alternatives

	least preferred		most preferred
U. S. S. R.	-----		
	alternatives		alternatives

number of degrees as Diesing suggests in Working Paper #5 and, I think, demonstrates in Diesing (1970). Diagram V-3 shows a rotation of ninety degrees then and this is rather arbitrarily chosen.

Moves in the Agadir crisis were mutually beneficial only to the degree that they avoided war for both sides. In this sense the representation shown in Diagram V-4 represents the Agadir crisis well; this presentation does have the disadvantage, however, of not representing well the sort of evaluation shown in V-3.

4. I have been over the salient outcomes rather thoroughly in Working Paper #3, D-1, D-2.

5. The "is there a difference" part of the main question here bothers me in the Agadir crisis. It would be quite possible to make the following case. Item (d.)--the (d.) in the original checklist not the one in the March 26 addendum--still seems to state the crux of the matter although the shift from maximizing to disaster avoidance is less prominent and more dilatory than it was in Cuba. (a.) describes the challenge stage. (b.) represents one alternative of the German denial although the preferred alternative was another (a.) to match France's. After the beginning of August (c.) seems to describe the activity although these concerns seem less overwhelming in Agadir than they did in Cuba perhaps because war never looms quite as prominently in Agadir to begin with and perhaps also because the length of the breakdown dampened the effect of the high tension period in late July and very early August. Through this interpretation then disaster avoidance began, not as in Cuba in the denial stage, but rather late in the confrontation stage.

Characteristically, I suppose, there is an alternative thesis which I prefer. (c.) is the primary motive in the German denial. What the Germans fear here is being left out in the cold again. Neither German prestige nor the German long-term strategic position can take another such snub. The problem is to avoid this humiliation which will lead to disaster if it occurs. The French must be signaled strongly that they cannot get away with forgetting about Germany again. This is why the basic German document--Kiderlen's May 3 memorandum--is so vague about compensation. The particularities of compensation are not important at this stage. What is important is that the humiliation of being pushed aside again be avoided. If this were the original

motivation, it would naturally have been easier for the government to claim after the crisis that it had achieved what it sought.

Also this interpretation places the Agadir crisis in a mold more similar to that of the Cuban than does the alternative examined above. After an original challenge which was not perceived by the challenger until too late as injurious to the denier, disaster avoidance concerns are prominent. The similarity is muted perhaps by the two factors mentioned above--war appeared less imminent and the "crisis schedule" was less hurried--and also by a third factor. About the middle of July Kiderlen had to become more precise about compensation. His signal had registered. The French were ready to deal. The fear of being left out in the cold was greatly diminished, and Kiderlen simply could not resist adding concerns of type (a.) to his agenda. This is the Acheson reaction--"as long as we've got the thumbscrew on them, give it another turn"--as opposed to the Kennedy reaction--"I'm not going to push them an inch further than necessary". Kiderlen was closer to the Acheson type all through the crisis than to the Kennedy type, and I think that this latter interpretation meshes more adequately with the activity of the crisis. It may well be, however, that I have drawn the similarity between Cuba and Agadir too strongly.

Before leaving this model I want to discuss two points a bit more. The first of these is the imminence of war and the other is the misinterpretation involved in the use of utility models in this case. The two are related, and I want to discuss them through preference structures. For the moment I want to limit Prisoners' Dilemma to a situation in which a default on the part of one party--either enacted or credibly

signaled--will evoke a default on the part of the other. Chicken is then represented by a situation in which the same default will bring compliance or cooperation from the second party.

Now with respect to the imminence of war the Cuban crisis was Prisoners' Dilemma in these terms for the United States from the very beginning. The problem was to signal this in such a manner as to keep the game Chicken for the Soviets once they understood the predicament for the United States. The imminence of war arises here from the danger of both parties becoming locked into a default sequence. This escalation sequence is the functional equivalent of the iterative plays in the games of Rapoport and Chammah (1965). In the Agadir crisis Prisoners' Dilemma was somewhat more remote and thus so was the imminence of war. The boundaries of the Prisoners' Dilemma area may actually have never been crossed in the Agadir crisis. Although, through misperceptions, the Germans, the French, and then the British thought that they were in such predicaments in the early part of the crisis, the latter stages were essentially Chicken with an everpresent risk of going over a boundary into Prisoners' Dilemma but with these boundaries rather clearly marked off.

A related issue is the manner in which the utility models distort somewhat the bargaining process in the crisis. As these models are explained by Iklé (1964) and in the labor-management literature in general, the parties begin playing a game of Chicken with exaggerated claims. Only later does the game change to Prisoner's Dilemma or disaster avoidance. Both the Cuban and the Agadir crises involved the denial party in a perceived Prisoners' Dilemma situation from the very

beginning. The problem was to structure a new situation so as to deflect oncoming disaster. Chicken creeps into these crises only after the boundaries of Prisoner's Dilemma have been discovered. I do not claim this as a generalization for all crises, but only for the two crises upon which I have done case studies.

B. The "chicken-critical risk" model

1. I think I have nothing to add here to my comments in the Cuban case.

2. I covered this in Working Paper, C-5 and also in the Cuban case.

3. Such manipulation is attempted. Much of it fails, however. Caillaux's bluffs in late July and early August are conspicuous examples here. In general I think I have been over the material of this query adequately above--or I will cover it adequately below in (7).

4. This is what Kiderlen tried to do with his "extreme lengths" threats. He wanted to convince the French that fulfillment of his July 15 demands was essential. This was unsuccessful.

5. Any concession, I suppose, decreases the adversary's cost of compliance. So also did Kiderlen's suggestion that there be an exchange of territory, and Kiderlen differentiated this category of operator from a concession, I think.

6. I went over this in Working Paper #3, A-11 and B-11.

7. I shift now to Working Paper #4.

I. Tactics to increase credibility

A. Change one's apparent utilities (payoffs)

Reduce the apparent net cost of war

As in the Cuban crisis only two of these tactics--(2) and (3f)--were used. Except for an unusual deployment of the British navy and some annual, scheduled maneuvers of the German army, however, most of the "increase readiness of capabilities" tactics were paper preparations for various contingencies. The British army even halted annual maneuvers early so that energy and money could be channeled into the preparation of contingency plans which remained on paper rather than being operationalized--until 1914 at least. Some of these plans were worked out jointly between the French and the British. And some of the British even informed colleagues or, perhaps better, counterparts in Germany of the general nature of what they were doing in an attempt to make the Germans realize that they were serious. The British themselves thought that the Germans discounted such information, and I think their perception is probably accurate.

As far as I know the precise words "the issue is so important to us that we are willing to fight over it" were never spoken. They were signaled, however. This was the gist of the French position over a German foothold in Morocco. This was the British position over maintaining the entente, and perhaps the Lloyd George speech at Mansion House comes as close to these words as can be hoped. This was William II's position over a retraction of Caillaux's "eight days" bluff in August, and it comes close to being Kiderlen's position on gaining

retrieved, and, I suppose, that this might be considered holding the status quo conditionally inviolate.

4. This is quite similar to (3) above in the Agadir crisis. International law or agreements in the form of the Madrid Convention of 1880, the Act of Algeciras (1906), and the Franco-German Accord on Morocco of 1909 were examples of codified moral principles. The notion of reciprocity among the great powers was another which was not codified, and a single notion of reciprocity was far more easily accepted in principle--although its operationalization was difficult--in the Agadir crisis than was true for the Cuban crisis. There was no common idea of reciprocity in the Cuban crisis. But, when the principle existent in the Agadir crisis had to be operationalized, the operationalization violated the principle from the perspective, at least, of the German and French oppositions.

5. I have nothing to add to (4) above.

6. Grey did use this very mildly before the Mansion House speech in his explanation of the British position to the Germans. Starting with the Mansion House speech this consideration was implicit.

7. This seems quite similar to (2) above, and it was not used in interparty bargaining to the best of my knowledge.

8. Internal revolution perhaps not, but certainly the French--Cambon and Caillaux--indicated at a variety of junctures with reasonable success that the government, if not the regime, could not be pressed further and yet stand domestically.

9. This was done by the Germans before the march to Fez to counter the French state ents that, if an occupation occurred, it would

be withdrawn quickly. Germans--Kiderlen, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Schoen--all came back with the "temporary" British occupation of Egypt and other historical examples.

B. Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

1. This view was expressed by the Germans, the British, and finally the French with respect to the duration of the sojourn of the French expeditionary force in Morocco. The idea was that, even if the French wanted to, they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to leave. Almost any act of commitment except those perceived as bluffs exact automation to some degree. The Mansion House speech is an interesting example here. In the Cuban case I felt that there were few, if any, and certainly no prominent Type III threats. The Mansion House speech may well represent one, and the manner in which the press preempted the government's interpretation here was partially responsible for this. In Cuba I mentioned that the Soviet perceptions of credibility of the United States blockade were probably strengthened by the support the United States received from the rest of the hemisphere. It would have been all the more humiliating for the United States to back down with the hemisphere urging it on.

The British cabinet members who were aware of the speech in advance of its delivery were probably not anticipating the extreme press response in Britain, Germany, and France which followed. They awoke, so to speak, to find the British and French press congratulating them for putting the Germans in their place, and there seemed to be little they could do but accept that interpretation--particularly

after the stiff German reaction was received. The difference between these two instances was that the United States was definitely committed in advance and issued a Type I threat or warning. The British may well not have been so committed in advance, and the public statement of the position probably had committal as well as communicative value. With the Cuban blockade then the public reaction may have had some impact upon the credibility of the threat in the eyes of the recipient. With the Mansion House speech the public reaction may have had some impact upon the committal value of the signal.

2. To the best of my knowledge no such tactics were used in the Agadir crisis. In rather the reverse of this there was apparently some movement among the British decision-makers to explain that the Lloyd George speech was not an official statement of the British cabinet--as indeed it was not. This movement was stopped by Bitternich's July 25 rebuttal. After this the British thought that if would look as if they had capitulated if they made any explanation of the Mansion House speech, and the matter was dropped quickly. Also in France Caillaux claimed that lower officials were misquoting him in the "eight days" bluff affair.

3. The whole crisis was handled in this manner in Germany with Kiderlen at the controls, so to speak. In France Caillaux did not threaten the Germans with de Selves and often intervened to reduce the influence of de Selves.

4. This tactic was not used in the Agadir crisis.

5. This technique was used by France with some success. Cambon used it with respect to Kiderlen's July 15 demands. Caillaux used it

several times from late July to late November to get talks speeded up, to reinforce particular French positions, and to gain the removal of the Panther from Agadir. In general this tactic seems to have been credible and reasonably successful.

I recall no instance of the use of this tactic by the British during the crisis although Bertie had apparently made some comments throughout the years of the Franco-German conflict over Morocco that British public opinion would not allow Britain to stand idly by if Germany pushed France too hard over Morocco.

Other than some grumbling in response to Cambon, which seem to have neither been made nor taken seriously, Kiderlen seems not to have used this ploy.

6. This was not done aggressively by the governments involved in the Agadir crisis. If anything the government press in France and Germany tried to defend the rather mild (comparatively) position of the government against the virulent and extreme oppositions.

7. Some of these may have occurred. There were a number of government explanations to parliament in Britain and Germany, and some, particularly in Britain, may have involved a vote. If such instances occurred, they were so lacking in prominence and importance that no historian of the crisis with whom I am familiar--including Barlow--mentions them.

8. I went over this in Working Paper #3, A-11 and B-11.

9. I think this was not done during the Agadir crisis.

10. This tactic was, to the best of my knowledge, not used during the Agadir crisis.

11. I find little evidence of this in the crisis.

12. The Panther's spring would be a minimal example of this.

The mobilization bluff would be a better one. The French contemplated sending ships to Agadir twice during the crisis, but did not do so partially at least because British support was lacking. Caillaux did not seem really eager to do this regardless of the British, however.

13. Cambon did this with respect to Kiderlen's demand of July 15, but I think he was honest in his incredulity. He thought that Kiderlen was either exaggerating or trying to move the subject of compensation back onto Morocco. Kiderlen stated that the Lloyd George speech was a bluff, but, as Lloyd George proudly noted, "it was a bluff he (Kiderlen) was not prepared to call" (Lloyd George, 1933, p. 43).

14. This was not done during the Agadir crisis. The closest example would be Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" threats which got him nowhere, but I think these were less grandiose than what is meant here.

II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's critical risk

A.. Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

1. This was covered above in Working Paper #4, I, A, Reduce, 2.

2. I think this was not done in the Agadir crisis.

3. Germany recognized that France had allies more interested in the conflict than those of Germany. But I think no one, including the French, used this overtly as a tactic.

4. Except for vague references such as Lloyd George's fight-before-accepting-humiliation speech this was not a tactic used. All the

decision-makers were aware of the precipitous escalation ladder, and few if any mentioned it.

5. The Pan-Germans wanted to annex part of France once the war broke out, but again, although it was understood that a war in Europe would have more as its aim than the settlement of the Moroccan question, statesmen did not threaten one another with this escalation in goals.

B. Devalue the stakes for the adversary (decrease his cost of compliance)

1. Kiderlen's territorial exchange idea might well be interpreted in this fashion. Other than this instance, I can think of no use of this tactic which stands out prominently. Some of the final concessions on the details of the Moroccan accord might be interpreted in this fashion--building trunk lines, for instance, but these were very minor.

2. This was the basic mechanism of the crisis. For Morocco France offered a quid pro quo of compensation. This compensation was then altered into a territorial exchange--another quid pro quo.

3. Some comments about peace must have occurred, but they so lack prominence and importance that they seem not to have survived and gained entry into the historical record.

4. At one juncture in the negotiations over the Moroccan accord France took the position that the German draft would amount to a Franco-German economic oligarchy; whereas France was supporting the open door for all nations--at least for a while. This placed France in the favorable position of supporting the international institution of the open door.

5. Germany, of course, did this by claiming that France had violated the Act of Algeciras in the march to Fez. Both France and Britain claimed that Germany had done the same thing with the Panther. Kiderlen seems to have been correct in his May 3 memorandum, however, when he labeled these as empty tactics.

6. I suppose that what I said in (5) above applies here too, but in the May 3 memorandum Kiderlen stressed that this would be a barren tactic. The German policy was essentially to accept the violation of the Act of Algeciras and to ask for compensation instead. Later, returning to the prescriptions of the Act of Algeciras was an alternative used to intimidate the French to give compensation.

7. I think I have said enough about this elsewhere. In a sentence, very little effort was expended to limit the duress or provocation in demands and threats. This happened largely because misperceptions made the situation appear graver than it actually was.

8. The Germans perceived that the French were using "salami tactics" in their penetration of Morocco. First the French troops occupied Casablanca; then they were moved to Rabat as well; finally the march to Fez began. I can think of no other use of such tactics in the crisis.

9. I think this tactic was neither used nor could it have been credibly used in the Agadir crisis. Neither the French nor the German colonial appetite had yet been satisfied, and there remained the issue of Alsace-Lorraine.

10. Decoupling was difficult in this crisis since for France it culminated a full decade of diplomacy, and for Germany this was the

final confrontation of a six year struggle. I know of no overt attempts on the part of either side to decouple or to show the other that he could do so during the crisis. Kiderlen made use of decoupling in a post-crisis explanation made to the domestic opposition. I covered this in Working Paper #3, I-3.

11. France, early in the crisis, spent some time arguing that under the 1909 accord Germany had relinquished all except economic interests in Morocco. But this argument had no impact, and the French soon dropped it. Germany tried to use this tactic in Metternich's July 24 talk with Grey. The essence of this argument was that Metternich understood that Britain would fight to protect its interests, but, as Germany was not harming Britain's interests, there was no need for Britain to be hostile.

12. This common interest was certainly recognized but it does not seem to have formed the basis for the tactic suggested here..

13. I think this was not used in the Agadir crisis.

14. This was not done. The Mansion House speech was not prompted in any direct fashion by the French, and it seemed to provoke the Germans more than any French move of the crisis except perhaps for the impact of Caillaux's "eight days" threat on William II.

I now return to Working Paper #6, B-7. It appear to me as if I have covered either in the Working Paper #4 discussion above or elsewhere-- primarily Working Paper #3, A-7, and section B--the questions under (7).

8. I have included this information in earlier discussions-- primarily (7) above and Working Paper #3, A-7, and section B.

9. This too I have discussed rather completely in Working Paper #3, section B.

10. In the Cuban crisis where the vast majority of the threats were warnings of existing commitments this question was largely undifferentiated from (9) above. There were a number of Type II threats or bluffs in the Agadir crisis, and commitments seem to have done better than threats in general in Agadir. Under the category of communications of Type I threats or signals of commitment with only communicative value I include the French commitment to avoid a German foothold in Morocco, the British commitment to rescue the entente if necessary, and the German commitment to compensation plus specific German commitments to access to the Atlantic coast and to the Congo River as the successful ones. Perhaps the only commitment of this variety of the crisis which failed was an earlier German commitment to a more generous compensation; this was reevaluated by the Germans, and they lowered their expectations. This commitment was never perceived as credible by the French, and it may be that Kiderlen's superiors were less than serious about it as well. The lack of groundwork both with respect to the French and within the German government and perhaps also Kiderlen's "extreme lengths" bluff seem to have led to Kiderlen's failure here, and he had to increment his expectations downward.

11. After the early part of August conciliation on one side generally met with conciliation on the other. Before then conciliatory signals were either unnoticed or purposely ignored--the German April hints and Cambon at Kissingen--or were viewed as signs of weakness or disrespect--the Lancken-Fondère attempts of late July.

12. I have discussed these before, but I will go over them again briefly. In general loopholes are not as prominent in the Agadir crisis as they were in the Cuban. Kiderlen's suggestion that territory be exchanged is the only example of note which comes to mind. Barker (1911, p. 228) suggests that the German announcement of the Panther's move of July 1 might contain a loophole in that the Germans claimed that the Panther was sent at the request of German firms and, if a diplomatic storm were raised, the German government might withdraw the ship under the guise of finding little substance to the request of the firms. This is something of a fantasy on Barker's part. As he demonstrates clearly in his article the entire note of explanation about the Panther's move was a farce, and both Schoen in Paris and Metternich in London added explanation to the note verbally. Caillaux used the loophole of being misquoted in his "eight days" threat.

C. Expanded game model

1. Escalation and de-escalation are important but I think less so than in the Cuban crisis or perhaps in slightly different ways. Kiderlen more or less preempted a show of force on the part of his adversaries with the Panther. This was definitely an escalation from the hints of April, and it rather effectively precluded, from the French and the British perspectives, any parallel escalation of matching ship to ship. The Lloyd George speech was the other example of and perhaps the only remaining available means of escalation--verbal public humiliation. The escalatory character of this move was contained primarily in its disregard for traditional diplomatic conventions

particularly courtesy in terms of not inflicting public humiliation upon the adversary.

2. I think these choices were available and were used.

Essentially the choice was among conventional diplomacy, unusually blatant signaling--the gunboat diplomacy of the Panther or the public humiliation of the Lloyd George speech--and actual hostilities or war. In this schema the conferences in which the British were so interested would fall into regular diplomacy.

3. The choices certainly had an impact on the aftermath and left quite a bit of latent hostility. I have gone over the rather minor differences in the outcomes in Working Paper #3, I-1. But, another aspect for which the choices had some relevance was the perception of the imminence of war. Certainly the Panther's move and the Mansion House speech brought war closer than regular diplo acy would have.

4. I have covered this several places above.

5. The Germans gave no warning about the Panther--none at least between April 28 and July 1. Grey's conference with Metternich on the afternoon of July 21 might have given Metternich a hint that something was amiss, but it was not a very explicit hint, and it failed to give the Germans time to do anything to sooth the British before the Mansion House speech that evening. The shift toward conciliation in August was rather gradual and was probably recognized as approaching--Carbon, for instance, decided to take two weeks to go to Paris to work out a settlement program, and Kiderlen went on a vacation to France.

6. In the final conciliation process the concessions were made on a largely mutual basis.

7. There were thresholds--see (1) and (2) above.

8. The Agadir crisis could have become Prisoners' Dilemma at any number of places--if the Germans had demanded Morocco, if the French had refused compensation and had been unable to return to Algeciras, even perhaps if the French had refused to grant Germany access to the Congo. And, all three parties actually perceived the selves in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation at one time or another. The Germans responded with the Panther, the British with the Mansion House speech, and the French by dropping their initiative and forcing Germany to come out into the open, so to speak, as the demander. In general these perceptions were in error and the provocative acts unnecessary. As it occurred then, I think the Agadir crisis was essentially a game of expanded Chicken--one, however, which was played within narrow boundaries imposed by areas of Prisoners' Dilemma. This Chicken character is what I have had in mind when I have said that war did not loom so ominously in the Agadir crisis as it did in Cuba. In Cuba an act which made the game Prisoners' Dilemma for the United States was the first move of the crisis. The point of the crisis was to get this move, which was not a misperception, withdrawn.

D. Super-game model

1. There is such a structure. I have gone over this before, and I have only one thing to add here. In Agadir, as in Cuba, the supergame aspects seem more pronounced for the denier than for the challenger.

2. In the form of a desire for position and prestige this seems to have motivated these actors.

3. Fears of maintaining or losing a position or prestige are more prominent than overt fears of decreased power. However, lurking behind the facade of position and prestige are surely fears of power loss. In this crisis these may have included mild fears of allies bolting an alliance or entente. The French senate investigation seems to have had fears of this sort.

4. Such deliberations are made by Kiderlen in his resignation letter of July 17 and in Bethmann-Hollweg's attempts shortly thereafter to gain imperial approval for Kiderlen's policy.

5. I would say that power positions relative to the issues of the Agadir crisis had remained relatively constant since the formation of the Entente Cordiale (1904) although the Agadir crisis was indeed one of a series of crises over rather similar issues.

6. This is not really accurate either. France obtained a dominant position with respect to the Moroccan question with the diplomacy of 1901-1904. All this was then completed before the first Franco-German crisis over Morocco.

E. Information Processing model

1. In the Cuban crisis I was at something of a disadvantage in presenting a different perspective of the crisis for each participant. There is not much material on the crisis from the Soviet perspective. And that which exists--some letters which Khrushchev wrote during the crisis and a domestic speech he made afterward in December--are, of

course, subject to the charge that they are simply communist propaganda. I admit that the Soviet perspective which I developed in the Cuban crisis was largely speculative--I said so several times in that case study. I also recognize that it differs somewhat from the perspectives which more recognized academicians have developed. Partially I suppose this difference may be attributed to personal preference, subjectivity, or indiscretion. Partially, it may be attributed to a desire to objectively analyse the Soviet perspective from what the Soviets themselves had to say about their point of view. When an American scholar reads a Soviet interpretation of Soviet political action, finds that it differs from his own interpretation of that same action, and therefore dismisses the Soviet interpretation as an attempt to disguise actual Soviet intentions, he utilizes several assumptions the validity of which ought at least not be allowed to go unquestioned.

In these two case studies I have tried to develop the crisis as the actors themselves perceived them. There are problems with this. For one thing, actors lie. Grey, Kiderlen, and Caillaux have all misrepresented some aspects of the Agadir crisis. Sometimes this may be done unwittingly merely through parochial national perspectives, but occasionally misrepresentation occurs purposefully. I suppose then that there are problems with the existing perspectives of the Cuban crisis. Allison (1969) helps to show that the administration writers have not told the whole story from the United States perspective. Therefore, I suppose, that what the Soviets have had to say about the Cuban crisis has been altered somewhat to reduce both domestic and international criticism. Before the Soviets own perspective may be objectively

dismissed entirely, however, it must be demonstrated that it is sufficiently more biased and misleading than other national perspectives as to make it relatively **useless** for presenting what the Soviets thought they were about. And, it must be demonstrated that American academicians do a better job of presenting what the Soviets were really about than the Soviets themselves do.

Well, enough said. The Agadir crisis demonstrates quite clearly the variety of perspectives which I was unable to generate very successfully in the Cuban case. For France the crisis arises from German initiative and aggression. Europe agreed in 1906 that France was to be predominant in most of Morocco. Germany itself agreed three years later. Now the Germans are once again trying to humiliate the French with gunboat diplomacy to get France to pay for the exercise of its legitimate activities. The Pan-Germans are screaming about another annexation of metropolitan France and drumming up fears in the German public that hords of Moroccan blacks will descend upon the fatherland if Morocco becomes French. It is obvious what the Germans are up to. They want Morocco. At every turn in the negotiations Kiderlen tries to make a return to Morocco as a compensation site more agreeable to the French by making all other compensation even more costly.

For the Germans the crisis is about quite something else. For ten long years now Germany has watched French penetration in Morocco. France has had to purchase the freedom to act in this manner. It has paid the Italians, the British, and the Spanish. France thinks it can exclude the German voice from European affairs. But France is wrong. The power, the might, the pride, the dignity of the German Empire will

not be so brusky and rudely handled. Germany must be paid as well. Pride, dignity, and its ability to participate in future European decisions demand German action. Germany is only defending its place in Europe. The aggressors are those who wish to weaken Germany's position, and they have identified themselves by callous disregard for German interests and by ignoring polite German requests to cease and desist.

I still remain uncertain as to what the "basic strategic situation" is. Perhaps it is Britain's perspective that both sides are too extreme and that the "truth" lies somewhere in between. The situation the Germans deal with is the one their images, expectations, perceptions, and interpretations show them. And, the same is true for the French. To the degree that these national perspectives differ there will be misperceptions, missed opportunities, needless harangues, and unanticipated consequences of action. The activity of the crisis might well have been different had the French been able to see the German perspective and had the Germans been able to see the perspective of the French. The outcomes might not have been remarkable different. Ambassadors are interesting in this regard. Metternich, Schoen, and Cambon seem to have had a more cosmopolitan understanding of the crisis than foreign office personnel in general. This shows, I suppose, partially the impact of role. I think the tactics of the Agadir crisis would have been somewhat milder had these men formulated policy. But, essentially Germany wanted something that France did not want to give up, and perhaps this is the basic strategic situation. This structure would undoubtedly have caused some trouble regardless of who was formulating policy.

2. I am not sure of the nature of this question, but I think I have said about all I wish to about misperception. I admit what I have said is not going to form the basis for a text in cognitive psychology.

3. See Working Paper #3, F-6.

4. See Working Paper #3, F-5.

5. I think in general I have little to add to the rather poor discussion I had of this question in the Cuban case. I could I suppose repeat the apology which appears there as well.

6. It would simply be pretensions of me to try to answer this.

7. In general I would say that basic images and expectations changed very little during the crisis and this lack of change contributed to the hostile aftermath. Essentially all the crisis did was to add specific varieties of humiliation to the basic perspectives described in (1) above. I think images of (a.), (b.), and (d.) remained about the same although with the passage of time they were relevant to different specific issues. Images of (c.) changed once the crisis was over. During the crisis images of (c.) changed from move to move as has been described above.

8. All three of the states involved in the Agadir crisis had some pressing domestic difficulties during the crisis. France had a railway strike which was severe enough that army units occupied certain sections of France in an attempt to prevent further sabotage of the rail lines. In Britain the House of Lords was being effectively removed from the legislative process and there was a dock strike. In Germany the financial crisis was quite severe. These events seem to have had no greater impact upon the crisis, however, than to distract the

attention of decision-makers. In fact impact may have gone the other way. The British government intervened in the dock strike and got the workers back on the job under plea of national emergency due to the possibility of a war with Germany. In France troops were used to run and protect trains, and this brought some activity to the lethargic French forces.

In addition the more militant and on the continent generally rightest press and opposition did cause some concern. Cruppi mentioned in April that, while he did not fear the intentions of the German government, he was alarmed by the German press and business circles. Cambon was alarmed by the British, German, and particularly the French press and parliamentary reactions to the Mansion House speech. The Pan-Germans were able to get a lot of press and parliamentary publicity from rather mild incidents such as the Cartwright interview. Barlow (1940, passim) spends a tremendous amount of time and space on events such as these presumably because she thinks them important to the crisis. I think that in that they were important in the following ways.

Domestic groups such as the Pan-Germans lent all the more credence to French fears of German aggressive intentions, and this is probably a common factor in crises. Khrushchev, for instance, said that, although he was pleased with the results of the Congressional elections of 1962, he was greatly disturbed by the rhetoric of Nixon and Goldwater. Second, these domestic groups raised expectations among important publics such as the colonialists and industrial associations so that the eventual settlement was considered a humiliation by many on both sides. Third, and primarily with respect to France, these groups had some domestic

power which could be used to bring down a government which dealt too leniently with the adversary, so a vital aspect of the settlement was the ability of the French government to get it accepted in France. once it was accepted by Germany. Fourth, when particularities of the bargaining became public--the French leak of the German July 15 demands and the Mansion House speech--government positions could be undercut by domestic groups.

After all this I would say that Franco-German and Anglo-French relations in the crisis were influenced primarily by deliberate bargaining moves. And some of these moves utilized--either honestly or deceitfully--some of the considerations just discussed. In Anglo-German relations the prominent move is the Mansion House speech, and, although it is unclear that the speech deviated greatly from the official British position, it is equally unclear that the British government purposely tried to generate the impact which this speech had on Anglo-German relations. The British, French, and German presses here had much to do with interpreting the speech and forming its impact. Even here, however, there was apparently a willingness on the part of the British to disclaim the extreme interpretations of the speech until Metternich's rebuttal, a purposive move, intervened.

9. I think I have gone over this before. Essentially both France and Germany felt that they were only defending legitimate positions and that the other side was the aggressor.

F. Cataclysmic model

1, 2, 3, and 4. I think the model is relevant, as it is in Serajevo, with respect to mobilization and the escalation sequence in general. I imagine that Yena will go into this in detail, and, I will yield to his discussion. Cataclysmic events specific to the Agadir crisis exist too. The ability of the French to withdraw their expeditionary force from Morocco was questioned first by the Germans, then the British, and finally by the French. Although France was hardly disappointed at the recognition, the prevalent value systems of the time essentially made French withdrawal impossible. Cambon indicated to Bethmann-Hollweg that French control of Morocco was inevitable. In addition the French government seems to have been at the mercy of domestic groups so that it could actually not gain the acceptance of certain types of settlements. I think it would be unwise, however, to emphasize too heavily the difference between settlements acceptable to the Caillaux cabinet and those capable of gaining parliamentary approval. Finally the British government was somewhat overwhelmed by the responses of the British press, the French, and the Germans to the Mansion House speech. The speech had not been the result of a cabinet decision to warn the Germans with the threat of war. Yet, particularly after Metternich's rebuttal, to deny such an interpretation too energetically would appear an act of cowardice which would shake the entente.

5. I would say that vagueness and flexibility would be the primary control devices. The military was, apparently, no real threat to control in the Agadir crisis. Subordinates such as de Selves,

Churchill, and even Kiderlen did at times present something of a problem to prime ministers, chancellors, and heads of state.

6. Two of the mechanisms I discussed in the Cuban crisis--provocation eliciting either a "gut", spasam or a deliberate escalation--are important in the Agadir crisis. The Kaiser's reaction to Caillaux's "eight days" threat is an example of the former. The danger involved in the French mock mobilization plan is an example of the latter. The third danger I mentioned in the Cuban case--coordinating a mutual deescalation was not very important because no party viewed it as possible. The escalation ladder had too few rungs, and most of the existing rungs involved irreversible physical actions--mobilization, and war.

There are three other examples which offer new variations of this notion which did not appear in the Cuban crisis. First, there is the French government's limited ability to maintain its domestic position. Also, there is the inability of France and Britain to keep third parties--Spain in this case--from aggravating the situation. Finally, there is the inability of the French--in addition to their disinclination--to meet two constraints which would have avoided the crisis altogether--having no French soldiers in Morocco and yet maintaining social conditions which could support European economic life in Morocco.

F. Miscellaneous

1. I think I covered what I want to say about this in Working Paper #4, I, A, Increase, 3, 4, and 5.

2. The only instance of irrationality I can think of was William II's reaction to Caillaux's "eight days" threat. This apparently coincided with several newspaper articles about "William the Timid". Interestingly Kiderlen, who was generally far more aggressive than the Kaiser, made a rather calm, mild, yet firm response here. I think the Kaiser's irrationality was not feigned.

3. I think the stage discussion I have had covers this query.

4. This comes from Working Paper #4

Of the symbolic acts listed here four were considered or used during the Agadir crisis and one during the immediate, pre-crisis period. The entry of Delcassé into the Monis cabinet as minister of marine early in 1911 might be interpreted as "appointing to a key position an individual known for his toughness". Actually Delcassé was not particularly tough or hard-line in the Agadir crisis.

During the crisis four other tactics at least received consideration. The violation of normal diplomatic courtesy of the Panther and the Mansion House speech have already been noted. Kiderlen seriously considered a break of diplomatic relations with France after Caillaux's "eight days" threat. In fact he actually sent such instructions to Schoen, but he altered his instructions later the same day. There were some military maneuvers during the crisis, but these were scheduled, annual events, and they seemed to arouse no great anxiety. The Panther was, I suppose, a military display, and the French and the British contemplated sending ships to Agadir on two occasions during the crisis.

The impact of the crisis upon negotiations on other issues is rather complex and not perhaps of enough importance to warrant the space below.

The French and the Germans had had both private and public groups negotiating a variety of issues--loans in Morocco, mining concessions in Morocco, Moroccan public service concessions such as railways and harbors--in the period preceding the crisis. The loans issue had been largely settled before the crisis. The mining issue had broken down due to the intransigence of private German interests. The French government had been rather harsh and stubborn on some colonial matters outside of Morocco and on the railway issue in Morocco. The railroad negotiations stopped early in May with Cambon and the German government in agreement. But the approval of the French government could not be obtained. De Selves tried to get Cambon to bring the subject up again in July, but Cambon refused. Both Caillaux and Cambon offered as concessions at various times during the crisis vindication of the German point of view on a number of minor Franco-German colonial disputes outside Morocco. Germany was adamant in keeping the subject on Morocco and territorial compensation in the Congo, however.

By 1911 Anglo-German naval arms negotiations had been going on intermittently for about a decade. The Agadir crisis seems to have coincided with a periodic lull in these talks. I think this was a tacit rather than a formal lull, but I am not sure about this. The naval arms negotiations were resumed with much fanfare in 1912, however, with the Haldane mission to Berlin.

Two and possibly three of the techniques listed under acts of reprisal were used during the Agadir crisis, and one was definitely avoided. The questionable one is economic reprisal. The French

opposition press claimed that the weakness of the German stock market and economy in general was due to the withdrawal of French loans to German concerns. The Germans denied that their economic crisis was worse than anyone else's and also felt that there was more free capital in Germany than in France. Caillaux assured the Germans several times in his independent meetings that there was no governmental policy to withdraw funds from Germany.

In terms of a spontaneous demonstration some workmen in Alsace-Lorraine tore down a German flag in August. This demonstration appears to have been spontaneous, however. I suppose the Mansion House speech would have to go under the category of bellicose speeches on the basis of its impact and the norms of the time rather than on the basis of its wording. Finally, the German, French, and British governments did not stimulate hostile press campaigns. In fact the government press generally was in the position of having to defend the government's rather mild position against extreme positions. The opposition presses certainly showed hostile propaganda themes though.

5. See Working Paper #4 I, A, Increase, 3, 4, and 5.

I return now to Working Paper #3. It appears as if I have answered the questions in section II of this paper. In section I 14 is missing; 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 have been answered already; 1 and 2 have been answered rather informally. This leaves 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, and 20 which I will take up now.

4. A coherent answer to this question is made exceedingly difficult by the confounded nature of the three variables or dimensions

here. Bipolar and nuclear systems essentially coincide for instance. Multipolar and conventional or non-nuclear systems then do too. Ideological heterogeneity is generally coincident with both bipolar and nuclear systemic attributes although there is a period between 1917 and 1945 where this is not true, and two of our case studies will cover this period. Anyway, my judgements here would probably shock an experimentalist like Professor Pruitt--as would some of my statements on the hypotheses, and I admit that these are essentially educated guesses.

With respect to bipolarity the hypotheses in section III of Working Paper #3 seem generally to get the implications I have noticed. Essentially de Gaulle stated one distinction here quite nicely when he asked Acheson if he were being consulted or advised. The French had to consult with the British in Agadir. The United States advised the French in the Cuban case. This is, of course, only one aspect. I have provided answers to relevant hypotheses where possible, and I now find that I have little more to add.

With respect to the nuclear technology of the Cuban crisis as opposed to the technology of 1911 I think the most noticeable differences lie in the ability to escalate. There was no question in 1911 but what overt violence would lead to a more or less general European war. It was not certain who exactly would take part. France and Germany would. Britain was a likely addition. Russia and Austria might join in too. In Cuba there was great fear that violence would be uncontrollable, but the certainty that it would be so was not as deeply felt at least on the United States side. United States surface vessels harassed Soviet submarines; a United States plane was shot down; a general state of

military readiness was attained on both sides, and a mobilization of an invasion force was undertaken by the United States. None of these precipitated total war.

To some degree this change represents the impact technology has had upon warfare. There are simply more ways to fight now than there were in 1911, and this creates more rungs on the ladder. Also, the importance of mobilization has been decreased since 1911 through changes in weaponry which manifest themselves in strategy. But, in addition, I imagine that the cost of war among nuclear powers has precipitated a search procedure for new rungs to expand choices such as humiliation-disaster dichotomies. This has been prominent in the academic study of strategic theory. In 1962 both the United States and the Soviet decision unit seemed somewhat skeptical about the higher rungs mentioned in academic circles, but they searched for their own at a lower level of escalation.

With respect to the heterogeneity of the system there appear to have been generally accepted standards of diplomatic behavior which were universally recognized. These rules provided a way around the precipitous escalation ladder in that in moments of necessity they could be violated to signal unusual circumstances. Today the rules of diplomacy seem far less rigidly codified and observed. A speech such as that delivered at Mansion House would hardly arouse a ripple of a reaction today. There may be a number of factors involved in this change. Society today is probably generally less formal than it was in 1911. But, the ideological war between the socialist and the liberal, parliamentary world has surely broken down the old diplomacy as well.

6. The methods of striking this balance in the Agadir crisis are mildly different than those used in Cuba. The firm commitment part is the same. States set minimal constraints which they must meet-- Morocco must be kept out of German hands, the entente cannot be allowed to flounder, and compensation must be gained. Preserving options is handled somewhat differently, however. The general methods are, I think the same--vagueness, incremental operationalization, and reevaluation, but they are enacted somewhat differently. I have been over vagueness above. There seem to have been two major reevaluations on the part of the parties in the Agadir crisis. The French apparently reconsidered the advisability of dealing with the Germans on a compensation basis. As I have mentioned previously their intentions here are not known with any certainty. It could be that between April and June French intentions actually changed from those of restoring order to those of procuring a protectorate. It may be that, although the French had been pursuing a protectorate all along, certain events--the Spanish move, for instance, indicated to them that they would not be able to proceed as subtly as they had hoped, and, therefore, they were apt to make more ripples than they had anticipated. Another alternative is that perhaps with British help they finally got the gist of the German hints in April. In any case the French had recognized by June that compensation was a problem they were going to have to deal with. And, they may have involved lowering early aspirations of getting away with Morocco scott-free.

As in the Cuban crisis the major example of incrementalism lies on the part of the denier. The Germans were worried about the serious impact they perceived a French coup in Morocco to have on their general

strategic position in Europe. The first part of their plan, worked out in early May, was to "occupy" a harbor or harbors in southern Morocco in order to signal the French the necessity of compensation. Then in early June Kiderlen apparently obtained imperial approval for the French Congo as a general area of compensation. On July 1 the Panthers move was operationalized. Two weeks later Kiderlen made his Congo demands--from the coast to the Sanga. This demand seems to have surprised even the German government. The Kaiser was upset and the colonial minister tried to resign. Kiderlen, in a domestic power play, turned in a resignation too.

For another two weeks Kiderlen stuck to this notion of a settlement. It appears from correspondence within the German government that Kiderlen was serious about his demand in this period. Around August 1 Kiderlen seems to have had to reevaluate his position. Perhaps the result of a conference held between Kiderlen, Bethmann-Hollweg, the Kaiser, and a few others at the end of July forced this reevaluation upon Kiderlen; perhaps it came on his own initiative due to changes in his expectations about the French behavior. From here on out the only rigid points in the German demands were points of salience such as access to the Atlantic coast and to the Congo River.

7. I have not much further to say about this question. There was, as I have mentioned earlier, some risk manipulation activity in the Agadir crisis. Some of these activities--Caillaux's bluffs in late July and early August--seem to have been used in the absence of a general French strategy as stopgap measures. There were also provocative signals

which increased risk--the Panther's spring. The Panther's move is, like the Cuban blockade, less properly considered a risk manipulation tactic in that it was perceived by the initiators as being a lamentable yet necessary method of gaining rapport with the adversary.

12. Non-verbal activity was rather less prominent in Agadir than in Cuba. But in general I think that what I said about this distinction in the Cuban case still stands. I would like to add one aspect here, however. When ordinary signals fail or when states perceive they would fail if used, decision units naturally use extraordinary means. In the Cuban crisis this amounted to physical or non-verbal moves. The Panther is an example of this in Agadir. The systemic environment of the Agadir crisis allowed other extraordinary means, however. Public threats or warnings are an example of this. These were felt to be rather normal and ineffectual in 1962.

13. I want to say just a bit more on this query. In general I think what I said in the Cuban case about the credibility of physical moves still stands. An aspect of their credibility which I think I did not notice at that time was that in addition to the credibility inherent in accomplished physical deeds some credibility may be attributable to such deeds due to their unusual or extraordinary diplomatic character. Any signal of unusual or extraordinary character may carry this credibility which arises first from the fact that such means would not be used except for desperate communications, and second, from the fact that the prominence which is attached to such moves would make backing down all the more humiliating.

20. I said nothing at all about this question in the Cuban crisis. I now want to say something relevant to both the Cuban and Agadir crises. Nicolson (1930, p. 242) discusses the difference between democratic (Britain and France) and oligarchic (Germany) regimes and determines that secrecy can be better utilized in the latter. Secrecy, of course, is a requisite for international bargaining for Nicolson.

I think it is true that control of information facilitates sharp changes in strategy arising from reevaluations of ends. The United States might have found it difficult to alter its strategy as the Soviet Union was able to do in the Cuban case. And, to the degree that this was perceived by the Soviets--little, if at all, I would guess, this would have been an important asymmetry.

In Agadir, for instance, the resignation of a German secretary in early August was not even known generally until November. A similar incident in France might well have brought the fall of the government as de Selves resignation in fact did later on. Yet when the resignation of the German colonial secretary did become known in November, the authority of the German regime and government was strong enough to take the blow whereas that of the French government was not. So, the ability to keep matters secret may be only one aspect of a government's strength in international bargaining. The authority to gain approval of things known is another. In this respect Germany was more capable than France although this weakness became a source of strength in the relations with Germany over Morocco. Khrushchev may not have had the domestic position which the German government had in the Agadir crisis, and here domestic position may actually have been dependent upon information control.

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