

THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905-1906

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### I. Systemic Environment, Bargaining Setting, Domestic Politics

The structure of the international system in 1905 was multipolar, i.e., there were eight major actors whose military power was of roughly similar order of magnitude: Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, the United States and Japan. All of these powers with the exception of Japan played some role in the Moroccan crisis, although France, Germany and Great Britain were the principal protagonists.

In this system around the turn of the century there were two quite distinct "arenas" of competition, the imperial and the continental. The imperial arena was in Africa, Asia and the Middle East; here the great powers competed for economic gain, political domination and prestige. The continental arena was of course Europe itself. Here the competition centered on national security, security against the implicit or explicit threats which the powers posed toward each other. The Moroccan crisis occurred at a time when the foreign policy concerns of the major powers were in process of shifting from an imperial to a continental orientation, chiefly because of the rise of Germany as a military threat on the continent, the near-completion of the carving up of Africa, and the blocking of the Russian imperial drive in the Far East as a consequence of the Russian-Japanese War. The interplay between the traditional imperialist focus of preceding twenty-five years or so, and the emerging concern for security on the continent forms a fascinating aspect of the crises.

The behavior of the actors in the crisis was strongly conditioned by the existence of three formal alliances and an informal entente. The Triple Alliance bound Germany, Austria and Italy in a defensive compact directed against Russia and France. (Italy's loyalty to this alliance was quite tentative and uncertain, however). The Dual Alliance was the Franco-Russian counter to the threat posed by the Triple Alliance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewed and somewhat broadened in scope after the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05, was an instrument for protecting the interests of these two countries in the Far East against the Russian threat.

The Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France, signed in April, 1904, deserves fuller explanation because of the important role it played in the crisis itself. From the British point of view, this arrangement was an aspect of Britain's shift from "splendid isolation" to a more active and committed role in world

politics, particularly continental politics. Around the turn of the century, the British Conservative government of Lord Balfour, with Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Minister, began to realize that the country's interests abroad, and the threats to those interests, were greater than British resources alone could protect. In short, Britain was over-committed. This condition arose from two primary causes: the Russian pressure against British imperial interests in India, China, Afghanistan and Persia, and the rapidly growing German navy. A further cause of concern was that France, although her resentment over the Fashoda affair had largely worn off by 1901 and relations between the countries had improved somewhat, was still a potential rival in the imperial arena by virtue of her colonial holdings and ambitions in Africa, and her alliance with Russia, which might bring her into conflict with Great Britain in the Far East. Traditionally, Great Britain had maintained a navy according to the "two-power standard"--i.e., strong enough to deal with the navies of at least two other major powers. In recent decades, the yardstick for naval expenditure had been the navies of France and Russia, Britain's chief rivals in the imperial realm. But now the burgeoning German navy appeared as an additional threat. Judging by statements in the German press, the German navy appeared to be intended for action against the British navy, and even, in the minds of more extreme British worriers, for an invasion of the home islands themselves. Early in 1903, however, Ritchie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the Cabinet that politically available resources simply could not support both a navy large enough to fight three other naval powers and an army strong enough to defend British interests and imperial holdings in Asia.<sup>1</sup>

Another contribution to the darkening outlook was the experience of the Boer War, which revealed serious weaknesses in the British military establishment and also activated a high degree of popular hostility against Britain in other countries, particularly in Germany, but also in France. Finally, there was the specter of a "continental coalition", a union of the Triple and Dual Alliances against England, which was known to be a favorite project of the German Emperor and given a certain degree of plausibility by the persistent ideological affinities between the German and Russian regimes.<sup>2</sup>

The prognosis which was derived from all this was that Britain could no longer go it alone. She needed desperately to do one of two things, or both: strengthen herself against her rivals by making an alliance with some other power, or reach a settlement with one or more of the rivals to reduce the degree of external threat, or possibly both. Lansdowne tried the alliance

route first, turning to Germany and initiating discussions about an Anglo-German alliance limited to the Far East. But the Germans asked too high a price--full British membership in the Triple Alliance. Next, in 1901, the Foreign Secretary approached Russia, attempting to negotiate a settlement of difference concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and China. Again, he was rebuffed. Turning back to the alliance route, he was successful finally with Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 committed the partners to come to each other's aid if either were to become involved in war with two enemies over China or Korea, and to remain neutral in case of war with only one opponent. But this alliance did not fully solve Britain's problem of getting her external threats and commitments in balance with her power. It protected only British interests in China against Russia. Britain still needed a settlement with at least one rival to reduce causes of conflict and reduce the degree of external threat.

The only other possibility was France, and here the scene shifts to Morocco and French policy.

Delcasse', the French Foreign Minister and former Minister of Colonies, combined in about equal measure a concern for French imperial glory and for France's security and power on the home continent. Frustrated in 1898 in a drive to the east, he was now determined to make France the greatest Mediterranean power and to round out the French empire in northwest Africa. Morocco, virtually surrounded on the land side by the French colony of Algeria and with both an Atlantic and a Mediterranean coast which formed one side of the narrow and strategic western gateway to the Mediterranean, was the last piece in the French imperial jig-saw puzzle. But Fashoda had taught Delcasse' that France could not make further imperial gains against the opposition of England; British consent had to be obtained.

In the other arena that of continental realpolitik, Delcasse' was of course aware of the rising power of Germany and the threat this meant for France. He saw clearly that no serious rapprochement with Germany was possible because of the festering sore of Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, he harbored in his own breast a generous amount of the revanchist sentiment which was still strong in French politics. A reckoning with Germany would come. Meanwhile, France must mend her fences. The fences were not in very good repair at the moment because France's Russian ally had turned her diplomatic energies to the Far East and became involved, early in 1904, in a costly and debilitating war with Japan. This war created a serious risk of involvement of Britain and France on opposite sides because of alliance obligations. The French military establishment was badly organized and inefficient, and its morale was low in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair. The situation clearly dictated closer relations with Britain, an alliance if possible, but at least some sort of understanding. Completing Delcasse's grand design was a desire to bring about a settlement between Russia and Britain, liquidating conflicts between these two countries in Asia, which would permit Russia to focus her energies on the continent, and forge a powerful triplix against the German threat.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the twin objectives of colonial acquisition and a new balance of power against Germany were to be achieved simultaneously by a diplomatic policy of persuading other interested states, particularly England, but excluding Germany, to acquiesce in the establishment of French control over Morocco. The other most interested states were Italy and Spain. In 1900, France negotiated a secret accord with Italy which recognized preponderant Italian rights in Tripoli and French rights in Morocco. This was supplemented two years later by a secret Italian pledge to take no aggressive action against France should the latter become involved in war. This was a flagrant contradiction, in spirit

at least, to the Italian obligations under the Triple Alliance; henceforth Italy's formal ties to the latter were regarded by sophisticated statesmen as no more than nominal. In 1902, Delcasse' also opened negotiations with Spain which, although frustrated at first, ultimately bore fruit later during the crisis in an agreement which delimited the two countries spheres of influence in Morocco.<sup>4</sup>

Delcasse' and his resourceful ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, approached England circumspectly, fully aware that the Conservative government was still oriented primarily to British imperial interests, was not as concerned about the German menace as was France, and had interests of its own in Morocco which would require delicacy in assimilating with the interests of France. Cambon first broached the subject with Lansdowne in the summer of 1902, suggesting that both countries should be "prepared for eventualities" in Morocco and consider the contingency of "liquidation". Lansdowne would have none of it, insisting that the status quo in Morocco must be maintained. His position stiffened in October when the War Office and the Admiralty reminded him that French control over the Mediterranean coast of Morocco would jeopardize British access to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar. Lansdowne began to bend in December when a new outbreak of rebellion in Morocco made clear to him that some sort of European intervention was going to be necessary to protect European lives and property. On December 31, he agreed with Cambon that if intervention became unavoidable, it should be conducted by the most interested parties, France, Great Britain and Spain (i.e., excluding Germany).<sup>5</sup>

During 1903, Anglo-French relations became increasingly friendly in a variety of small ways. Most important was the visit of King Edward to Paris in early May. The monarch's charming, easy-going personal style captured the hearts of the populace and his statements about his distrust of Germany and desire for friendship between England and France were sweet music to the ears of the political leaders. A return visit two months later by President Loubet, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, provided the occasion for the start of serious negotiations between Delcasse' and Lansdowne. This initial exploratory discussion covered a wide range of issues besides Morocco--Siam, Nigeria, the Newfoundland fisheries and, most notably, Egypt. It was clear that both parties wished a general settlement of all their outstanding imperial differences, not just a Moroccan settlement. Lansdowne laid down three conditions concerning Morocco, to which Delcasse' agreed: neutralization of the Mediterranean seaboard of Morocco, recognition of Spanish interests, and guarantees for the protection of British commerce.<sup>6</sup>

With the details of subsequent negotiations during 1903 and early 1904 we need not tarry, except to point out that they were dominated by the British insistence that their acquiescence to French preponderance in Morocco was contingent on French recognition of British control of Egypt, a demand to which Delcasse' finally agreed. In the final accord, signed on April 8, 1904, France relinquished her political rights and interests in Egypt in favor of Britain and Britain hers in Morocco in favor of France. Despite a pious statement that France had no intention of altering the political status quo in Morocco, it was recognized that France had the right to "preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require".<sup>7</sup> The French promised to permit full commercial liberty for all countries for thirty years. She further promised to negotiate a settlement with Spain over Morocco, and a secret clause specified that the Mediterranean coast should go to Spain if Morocco were ever partitioned, thus assuaging somewhat the anxieties of the British military and naval leaders about a strong power being located across the Straits of Gibraltar. Other secret clauses spelled out that France and Britain would each have a "free hand" to introduce further changes in Morocco and Egypt, respectively. Subsidiary documents settled a number of other minor colonial disputes.

Probably the most important statement in the agreement was the following: "The two governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco".<sup>8</sup> This was the only recognition in the text of the Entente's larger significance--i.e., the significance which it later acquired as an informal alliance creating expectations of mutual support between France and Britain over much larger questions than Egypt and Morocco themselves. Undoubtedly, the negotiators had Germany in mind when they wrote these words. Yet the casualness with which this clause slipped into the agreement at the last minute, almost as an afterthought, suggests strongly that neither of the parties expected a challenge from Germany of crisis proportions. Lansdowne recognized that "we shall have to reckon with Germany", but he did not seem greatly concerned, and apparently he had in mind trouble with Germany over Egypt rather than Morocco.<sup>9</sup> One might have expected Delcasse' to be more perceptive, but in fact he accepted the "diplomatic support" clause only reluctantly, under pressure from Lansdowne, who in turn was reacting to pressure from Cromer, his High Commissioner in Egypt. The British first proposed only French support for the British in Egypt; when Delcasse' accepted the extension without hesitation.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to mis-predicting the severity of the German challenge in Morocco, the parties did not see themselves at the time as forging an instrument for general collaboration against the German threat. The agreement was perceived as not much more than it seemed on the surface: a settlement of colonial differences. At least this was so for the British; Delcasse' probably viewed it as a basis for a future expansion of Franco-British collaboration against Germany; he certainly did see it as a useful precedent which might encourage a similar Anglo-Russian settlement. For Lansdowne and Balfour, to the extent that the pact had larger significance, it was in the context of a general policy of conciliating France and Russia, made necessary by British weakness. Fear of Germany was only in the back of their minds; Russia was in the forefront. The Entente would be a stepping stone toward a settlement with Russia which Lansdowne had been trying to bring about for some time, in addition to its immediate value in liquidating colonial conflicts with France. In short, the Conservative Party leaders were acting out their traditional imperial orientation. They were engaged in conciliating old opponents in the colonial arena, not making an alliance against a new opponent in the continental arena. For them, Germany was a vague source of uneasiness, nothing more.<sup>11</sup>

This was not true, however, of an influential group of professionals in the Foreign Office. This group was oriented toward continental politics rather than imperial politics and viewed Germany as England's foremost enemy. They were pro-French and pro-Russian. They saw the entente as an incipient alliance with France against Germany more than as an agreement about colonial issues. They consistently advocated a hard line against Germany, as the main threat to the balance of power on the continent, and the fullest collaboration with France in dealing with this threat. The principal members of this group were Bertie, an Assistant Under Secretary of State and later ambassador to France; Hardinge, also an Assistant Under Secretary and later ambassador to Russia; Mallet, assistant secretary to Lord Lansdowne and later secretary to Lord Grey when the latter succeeded Lansdowne as Foreign Minister; and Crowe, Nicolson and Spicer, lesser officials in the Foreign Office. Among other members of the bureaucracy, with different views, who played influential roles in the crisis were Sanderson, Permanent Under Secretary, who was pro-German, favored a conciliatory line towards Germany and was skeptical about the entente and collaboration with France; and Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord, who was extremely anti-German even to the point of advocating a preventive naval war against Germany. Top officials of the British War Office and army were not as militantly anti-German as Fisher but they



did see Germany as the principal threat to Britain and welcomed the entente with France.<sup>12</sup>

On the French side, the domestic political and bureaucratic scene was curious and complex and not very favorable to the anti-German policy of Delcasse'. The government was in the hands of the Radical-Socialist party, the strongest party in Parliament. This party was oriented chiefly toward domestic affairs and rather indifferent to foreign policy. Many of its members held pacifist views. Groups on the extreme right--nationalists, militarists and clericals--were both pro-empire (and thus anti-British), and strongly anti-German: the fire of revanche still burned brightly in their breasts. Thus, Delcasse's policy agreed with their views; yet, as we shall see, they turned against him at a critical moment, largely because of their opposition to the government on domestic matters. At the other end of the political spectrum were the Socialists, who were rather pro-German and idealistically-inclined in foreign policy. They had supported Delcasse's foreign policy prior to the spring of 1905, but also turned against him during the crisis for his failure to make advances to Germany concerning Morocco. Another important political force was the colonial group, composed of diverse elements in French society and politics. The colonialists, consistent with their imperial orientation, considered England to be France's chief enemy and favored collaboration with Germany, since Germany was not a colonial competitor. Yet they welcomed the Entente with Britain in its imperial aspect--as a settlement of outstanding imperial disputes with England--since it seemed to neutralize British opposition to further French expansion. But they opposed the Entente's anti-German continental implication, for they believed Germany was in sympathy with France's Moroccan program and her imperial aspirations generally. Somewhat like Lansdowne and the Conservatives in Britain, they did not think of the Entente as an informal alliance directed at Germany, but as simply a settlement of colonial differences with Britain. They wished to maintain good relations with Germany and hence they opposed Delcasse' when the Entente and the foreign minister's Moroccan policy aroused the antagonism of Germany. They preferred a "continental alliance" with Germany and Russia, directed against England, rather than an alliance with England. This preference, as the following narrative will show, also had influential proponents in Germany and, to a lesser degree, in Russia.<sup>13</sup>

Rouvier, the French premier and Delcasse's principal domestic antagonist, might be described as a French Neville Chamberlain. He had little understanding of the realities of power politics and sought to use business methods in the

conduct of foreign relations. He preferred conciliation to coercion and deterrence as means of dealing with international disputes. He distrusted Britain, suspecting her of trying to use France as a "cats-paw" against Germany. While not strongly pro-German, he wished to maintain friendship with Germany and favored treating Germany and Britain alike. He was inclined to be pacifistic, as were many in his party, but when his moral indignation was aroused he fought tenaciously.<sup>14</sup>

Divisions in German and Russian domestic politics will be treated incidentally in the crisis narrative which follows.

Comparative capabilities. I have not taken the time to research in detail the comparative military strengths of the parties, but the following general statements can be made. Germany was easily the strongest land military power. Her army was numerically superior to all others except perhaps Russia, it was efficiently organized, well-armed and well-prepared in terms of both training and planning. The French army was in bad shape, its numerical strength weakened by the substitution of a two-year conscription law for the previous three-year term, and its morale shattered by the Dreyfus affair. There were serious differences within the high command over strategy to be employed against Germany. The British army was small and serious inefficiencies and deficiencies in leadership had been revealed in the Boer War. Many of the weaknesses had been corrected by 1905, however, and the British army could be fairly rapidly expanded in an emergency. Russia at this time was extremely weak militarily because of her defeat by Japan in 1904-05 and the subsequent outbreak of revolution.

England was by far the strongest naval power. After the defeat of Russia by Japan, the British fleet of 46 battleships was larger than the French, Russian and German battleship fleets combined. The French had 18, the Germans 17 and the Russians 5. It was clear to all that in case of war between Germany, France and England over Morocco, the German fleet could be easily destroyed or neutralized. Any German hopes for victory would have to come from her superiority over France in land warfare. Both Germany and France appear to have been quite uncertain, until well along in the crisis, about the British military capabilities in a land campaign.

Comparative stakes. The stakes of the parties in the Moroccan crisis can be separated into four kinds of values or interests: economic, prestige, strategic, and "supergame".

The economic stakes, probably the least important, were largest for Great Britain and France. Great Britain, in 1903, did 41.6 percent of the trade with Morocco; France and Algeria 31 percent. Germany's trade, by contrast, was insignificant at 9 percent, about the same as the Spanish, at 8.4 percent.<sup>14a</sup>

Of course, trade aspirations probably more closely represented the economic "stakes" than actual trade. By this criterion, the German stakes perhaps approached the French and British. Nevertheless, the small size of actual German economic activity tended to undermine her claim to have a share in the maintenance of "law and order" in Morocco to protect economic interests.

Prestige interests were very important for France. The French had long aspired to take over Morocco; this seemed to be a "natural development in view of the contiguity of other French territory in northern and western Africa. Having suffered a grievous blow to their prestige at Fashoda, they thirsted for Morocco as a means of repairing the damage. Prestige was also import for Germany in a somewhat different way. They had come late into the imperial carving-up of Africa and had little to show for their efforts. Some German leaders were extremely sensitive about this; they were determined to share in any further European acquisitions. And of course, considerations of prestige were prominent in German international behavior in a more general sense, for reasons too complex to go into here. For England, prestige was of little consequence; her overseas empire was the greatest of all and she could afford to rest on her laurels.

Morocco had strategic significance because of its geographic location on the Straits of Gibraltar, its proximity to French and Spanish possessions, and its shoreline on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The strategic interest was strongest for Britain, with her concern for her naval strength and control of access to the Mediterranean through the Straits. Consequently, Britain always insisted that if Morocco were to be taken over by European powers, the Mediterranean shoreline opposite Gibraltar should go to Spain, a weak power. Germany at this time engaged in a naval-building race with Britain, had a counter-strategic interest in gaining control over some part of the Moroccan coast, for naval stations to extend the range of her fleet. For France, the strategic interest might have been larger if she had conceived herself as a naval rival of Great Britain; however the Entente had made this possibility remote, so the strategic stakes for her were small.

The "supergame" stakes refer to the possible consequences of various crisis outcomes for European alignments. These stakes were by far the greatest for Britain, although the value placed on them by the British was only moderate at the beginning of the crisis and did not become fully developed in British thinking until mid-crisis. The stake, of course, was the preservation of the entente with France as protection against the German threat. The French seem to have placed

change of valuation

G. threat alliance; noted in March '14.

less value on preserving the entente: they already had Russia as an ally, and they seem to have felt less anxiety about desertion by the British than the British felt about defection by the French. The German supergame value was the obverse of the British: breaking the entente would remove the threat of "encirclement" and perhaps make France available as an ally to Germany.

## II Challenge

While greasing the diplomatic skids, the French were also beginning their advance into Morocco itself by a policy of "peaceful penetration". That country was in chronic state of anarchy, accentuated in 1900 when a new, young and incompetent Sultan, Abe-el-Aziz, assumed authority. Although he professed intentions to reform his kingdom, his love of luxury soon exhausted his treasury, disorders became more frequent and severe, and opportunities for European intervention more plentiful. Since Morocco was completely surrounded by Algeria on the East and south, France was the natural intervenor, and Delcasse' played his favored position well. The boundary had always been ill-defined, giving France ample occasions to protest against raids by the wild Moroccan tribesmen and make demands for police reforms in Morocco. Delcasse' negotiated a border arrangement with the Moroccans in 1901 which explicitly kept the border uncertain. Two further agreements in 1902 provided for cooperation in policing the frontier and the development of commerce between Algeria and Morocco.<sup>15</sup> The Sultan made almost immediate use of the police clauses by requesting French permission to send Moroccan troops to the frontier through Algerian territory, and also French instructors for the troops. Of course the ever-helpful Delcasse' obliged.<sup>16</sup>

After signing the agreement with Britain in April, 1904, the French government dispatched a mission to Fez, the Moroccan capital, to inform the Sultan. He was given an exact Arabic translation of the document. Count St.-Aulaire, head of the mission, explained its import in soothing terms: reforms were needed in Morocco, and France offered her friendly cooperation in devising and executing them. The Sultan was wary--he neither accepted nor rejected the agreement--but he did want to strengthen his government so as to preserve its independence, and he badly needed funds. He asked the French for a large loan and again of course, the latter were obliging. A consortium of eleven French banks extended a loan of 62,500,000 francs. The load was guaranteed by customs duties in all the ports of Morocco, the Sultan was prohibited from using customs receipts to guarantee loans from any other countries, and the collection of customs was to be supervised by French officials.

Acts of banditry against Europeans brought panic to the foreign population of Tangiers, who demanded protection. Consequently, the French government secured the appointment of French officers over the Tangier police. The work of "peaceful penetration" was proceeding admirably.

In what was to be the crowning move, the French made preparations early in 1905 to send a larger mission to Fez, to obtain the Sultan's approval of a specific program of reforms. The mission's task was to secure French control of police in other towns, extend Franco-Moroccan cooperation in the border area, and gain the Sultan's acceptance of a state bank controlled by France, construction of transportation and communications facilities, improvement of harbors, spread of the French language, and settlement of French claims for damages from border incursions. It was a program which would effectively end Moroccan independence. The Sultan balked at first, but after French threats, agreed to accept the mission and "to welcome all French counsels and to accept all the reforms". The French victory was to be postponed, however, for a powerful champion was about to spring to the Sultan's side.<sup>17</sup>

### III Denial

The German reaction to the Anglo-French goings-on about and in Morocco was at first confused and divided. Apart from some early tentative soundings from Delcasse', Germany had been excluded from France's diplomatic program. Although the German government had learned of the Anglo-French negotiations during 1903, its reaction at first was casual; it thought the two powers were merely negotiating another colonial agreement. Anything like an alliance or even an entente between France and Britain was considered impossible because of the Russo-Japanese conflict in the Far East, which ranged France and England on opposite sides. Any thought of a new triple alliance or triple entente between France, Britain and Russia was ridiculous.<sup>18</sup>

However, after the Anglo-French agreement was published in April, 1904 and its larger implications began to sink in, the Germans began to experience some anxiety. Here indeed was a problem; a new grouping, gravely disadvantageous to Germany, was at least incipient. The government was divided about how to deal with the problem. German foreign policy at this time was chiefly in the hands of three men: the Kaiser, who had more influence in his government than most other monarchs of his day; Bulow, the chancellor; and Holstein, long-time political adviser at the Wilhelmstrasse. Holstein's prescription was coercive: smash the new entente by strong pressure on France, by war if necessary. Otherwise Germany was destined to be surrounded by a ring of hostile states. Kaiser Wilhelm preferred accommodation;

conciliate France on Morocco, draw both France and Russia away from England, unite the Triple and Dual Alliances in a grand "continental alliance" against Britain. Bulow thought a policy of quiet waiting was best, but he was forced into action by the others; generally he tended to follow the advice of Holstein.<sup>19</sup>

The Kaiser thought that the Russo-Japanese War, which began in February, 1904, provided the golden opportunity to realize his grand design. He reasoned that the Tsar must surely resent the lack of support from his French ally, the British support of his opponent, and the French flirtation with Britain. If Germany supported his Far Eastern ambitions, he would welcome an alliance with Germany. Once this was accomplished, Russia could persuade France to join. Germany could facilitate this by letting France have her way in Morocco.

Holstein thought most of this was moonshine. In one of his few incontestably correct judgments, he saw that an alliance between Germany and France was absolutely barred by the Alsace-Lorraine issue. Friendly gestures toward France on Morocco would merely convince her that Germany was frightened of the entente. But the entente could be broken by coercion against France in Morocco. Britain would offer only verbal support, France would have to give way, she would see that the entente was useless and dangerous, turn against Britain and try to conciliate Germany.

As for German interests in Morocco itself, the government was also divided. The Kaiser could not have cared less about Morocco a feeling which he shared with the great majority of his countrymen, who had little stomach for colonial adventures. Bulow and Holstein, however, saw the French move, and failure to consult with Germany in advance, as a grave slight to German prestige which somehow had to be redressed. Further, they did harbor more positive colonial aspirations. This split, especially between the political leaders and public opinion, was to have a considerable effect on German tactics during the crisis.

In sum, as with France, the Moroccan issue had for Germany both a local aspect and a larger element of Weltpolitik. The local aspect involved almost entirely considerations of prestige; the larger aspect had to do with power and security-- i.e., prospective re-alignment in the international system. The government was divided about how to deal with both aspects; unfortunately for Germany, Holstein's coercive prescription was to prevail.<sup>20</sup>

Bulow's first impulse after the signing of the Anglo-French accord had been to try to negotiate a general settlement with Britain similar to the French one. By thus joining in the entente movement the larger political significance of the British-French agreement, especially its anti-German caste, would be erased. The opportunity came when Great Britain asked other powers on May 1 to approve the declarations about Egypt which France had accepted in the declaration of April 8. Bulow replied

that Germany must receive the same guarantee of her rights in Egypt as France had received, and that the negotiations should be broadened to include a variety of other outstanding colonial issues between Germany and England. Lansdowne refused, calling the proposal "a great piece of effrontery" in a letter to his ambassador in Berlin. Holstein considered the occasion a "test of strength" in which Germany should stand firm. But, upon the advice of the German ambassador in London, who saw that Britain would never endanger the Entente Cordiale by treating Germany in the same way as France, Bulow compromised, accepting a guarantee of German commercial interests in Egypt in return for an acceptance of French obligations there.<sup>21</sup>

After an unsuccessful attempt to involve Germany in the Moroccan settlement by intervening in the negotiations between France and Spain, Bulow then shifted to the Kaiser's tract of approaching Russia. An auspicious occasion seemed to be presented by the Dogger Bank crisis in October between England and Russia, touched off when a Russian naval squadron, on its way around Africa to Far Eastern waters (where it would be promptly sunk by the Japanese) sank a number of British fishing trawlers in the belief they were Japanese ships. For a week or so, Britain and Russia seemed dangerously close to war. Bulow and Holstein quickly composed a treaty draft which was sent off to the Tsar with a letter from the Kaiser. The Tsar, seeing the war going badly and with revolution threatening at home, was inclined to accept, perhaps perceiving in "Willy", his nephew his only real friend in the world. But his less sentimental foreign minister Lamsdorff, of course saw at once the contradiction with the Franco-Russian alliance, and was unwilling to exchange this for a German one. In effect, he killed the project, temporarily at least, by insisting that the French be brought into the final drafting of the treaty.<sup>22</sup>

*research*  
Thus the Germans had used diplomatic means to test, first, the Entente Cordiale in Egypt and then the Dual Alliance in the Far East, and found both of them unyielding. The only remaining alternative, it appeared, was Holstein's track of direct coercion of France in Morocco.

*Speak  
Lansdowne*  
Toward France during the latter months of 1904, the German government had played the part of the sphinx, limiting itself to hints by low-level diplomats that it did not recognize the exclusive right of France and Britain to decide and carry out "reforms" in Morocco and wished to be in on the proceedings. However, the dispatch of the French mission to Fez in January, 1905, made clear that the French had no intention of sharing this burden. With unofficial encouragement from German representatives in Morocco, the Sultan resisted the reform program

and convened an assembly of Moroccan notables, many of them anti-French, to discuss the program. At this point, imprudently, the head of the French mission sought to intimidate the Sultan by stating that the reform program had the support of all the interested European powers. This remark raised a furor in the German press and provided the Germans with a perfect pretext for intervention. Bulow announced in the Reichstag on March 14 that Germany would defend her economic interests in Morocco. Five days later it was announced that the Kaiser would visit Tangier during his forthcoming cruise in the Mediterranean.<sup>23</sup>

The Emperor was distinctly lukewarm about this project for using him as a tool for a policy with which he had, basically, little sympathy. Bulow had to apply his persuasive talents to the full. "Your majesty's visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcasse', thwart his plans, and be of benefit to our economic interests in Morocco," he pleaded. "Apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion of all non-French merchants and promoters from Morocco. . . would signify an important economic loss for Germany, it is also a want of appreciation of our power when M. Delcasse' has not considered it worth the effort to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. Delcasse' has completely ignored us in this affair."<sup>24</sup> When the monarch still objected to making the visit a formal affair, Bulow finally persuaded him by arguing that if the formal ceremonies were called off, the French could claim they had accomplished this by pressure applied in Berlin.<sup>25</sup>

Landing at Tangier on March 31, the Kaiser made a splendid appearance astride a white horse, in full military uniform, and followed by about twenty attendants, also on horseback. His reception from the populous was joyous, noisy, exuberant and punctuated by much shooting in the air by half-wild Kabyle tribesmen. The Emperor became excited by all this acclaim and allowed his statements to exceed somewhat the instructions which Bulow had prepared for him. He referred repeatedly to the Sultan as an "independent ruler" and told the Sultan's representative that he hoped "that under the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco would be opened to the peaceful competition of all nations without monopoly or exclusion."<sup>26</sup> His visit, he said, was "aimed to assert that German interests in Morocco would be protected and preserved." Speaking directly to the French representative, he stated, according to the German account that "he would treat directly with Sultan as a peer. . . that he would know how to assert his just claims and expected that these also be respected by France.

The Kaiser's words exploded like a bombshell in the headlines of Europe, and the world knew that a major crisis was at hand.



#### IV Confrontation

The confrontation stage of this crisis contained three phases: the fall of Delcasse', the French acceptance of a conference, and negotiations preliminary to the conference. A crisis atmosphere pervaded each phase, with a peak of tension being reached just before the "resolution" of each one. The resolution stage proper (the conference) which followed the three confrontation phases, unlike some of our crises, also was suffused with tension and fear of war which was resolved only with the final concession which produced the settlement. The following narrative will follow this pattern.

##### A. The Fall of Delcasse'

The German move took the French by surprise. Apparently they had expected some "difficulty" with Germany, but nothing as dramatic as the Kaiser's visit. The move forced Delcasse' to open negotiations with Germany. On April 7, he stated in the French Chamber that France was "willing to dissipate any misunderstanding." He repeated this statement to the German ambassador, Radolin, expressing a willingness to open negotiations bilaterally. He told Radolin that Taillandier, the French representative in Morocco, had never claimed to have the mandate of all Europe for the French reform program. He attempted to excuse his failure to transmit the Anglo-French agreement officially to the German government and said that freedom of commerce for Germany and all nations had been safeguarded in that agreement.<sup>28</sup>

Delcasse's overture sorely tempted Bulow, but Holstein was firmly opposed to any bilateral talks. So for several days the German government said nothing. Actually the German leaders had no clear idea of what precisely they had been trying to accomplish by the Kaiser's performance other than to assert German "rights" and put spokes in the French wheels. They had not thought through just what they would do after the visit, so a policy had to be improvised. The Kaiser's somewhat injudicious words forced them to formulate demands somewhat more positive and far-reaching than they had probably anticipated. In other words, they had to formulate demands consistent with the magnitude of the Kaiser's threat. What Bulow and Holstein came up with was a demand for a conference of all the signatory powers of the Treaty of Madrid of 1880, which had laid down certain rules concerning Moroccan affairs. The conference would of course take up the whole question of Moroccan "reforms" and formulate its own program as a substitute for the French one. The French were to be frustrated by "Internationalization."

Bulow and Holstein thought that the proposal for a conference would put them in an unassailable position. It had an aura of legality, legitimacy and disinterestedness in plain contrast to the extra-legal, self-interested activities of the French and the British. Evidently the German leaders hoped to up-grade the status of the Moroccan issue from "power politics" to the level of the European "community" or "concert"; they hoped, in other words, to mobilize the powers' latent sensitivity to the "rules of the game" at this higher level, in the service of German interests. Although the objective of breaking the Entente was not prominent in German thinking at first, the usefulness of a conference for this purpose quickly became apparent; if Britain should fail to support France, it would at least be gravely weakened.<sup>29</sup>

There was another reason why the Germans favored a conference over bilateral talks with the French. The logical outcome of bilateral negotiations, Bulow reasoned, would be some kind of territorial compensation for Germany, either in Morocco or elsewhere in the colonial world. But both the Kaiser and German public opinion were at this time opposed to further colonial acquisitions. "In reality," he said, "we are confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now to France without adequate compensation to Germany, or of working for the extension of life of the Sherifian Empire in the expectation of a turn of events favorable to us." Thus the task was to "hold the future free" until something happened to turn public opinion into the imperialistic channel. The conference idea was therefore in part a dilatory tactic designed to prolong the crisis while time and events generated support for Bulow's and Holstein's own imperialistic aims.<sup>30</sup>

The conference proposal was brought forward gradually and unofficially through comments in the controlled German press. The foreign office felt that public opinion had to be carefully prepared; it might react unfavorably if the demand were sprung suddenly and the country confronted with the menace of war. Further, in order to avoid irritating French national feeling, at this time quite pacifically inclined and favorable to Germany, the press was told to direct all its criticism and attacks on French policy directly at Delcasse' himself rather than against the French nation or government. This foreshadowed what was to become an important subsidiary German aim to get rid of the "systematically anti-German, insolent and inept" French foreign minister, who the Germans perceived to be the principle if not the only obstacle in the French government to the achievement of their goals.<sup>31</sup>

Time -  
delay -  
outstanding  
at F.

This perception and this aim seemed pretty well grounded in certain French "indices" which the Germans were reading. Delcasse's policy was not popular in France, neither in public opinion nor in governmental circles. Public and press opinion was profoundly pacific and when the Kaiser's visit to Tangier raised the specter of war, public fears became transmuted into wrath, not against the threatening Germany, but against their own foreign minister, who, it was believed, was solely responsible for bringing on the crisis. Delcasse' had blundered in failing to consider German interests and to consult Germany in carrying out his Moroccan policy; Germany now was quite properly and legitimately seeking to defend her interests. Rouvier, the premier, and most of the cabinet, also sympathized with this view and believed that Delcasse's tough line was too dangerous; the best held suspicion in public, press and government, that Delcasse' had become the tool of England, that the Entente was in reality an English instrument for fomenting trouble between France and Germany and using France to "pull British chestnuts out of the German fire."

Press attacks against Delcasse' along these lines spilled over on April 19 into a savage, bitter debate in the French Chamber. So devastating were the attacks on Delcasse' that the government almost fell; only Rouvier's intervention saved it. He quelled the uproar by assuring the Chamber that Franco-German negotiations were in progress and that henceforth he would assume control himself over French foreign policy. Delcasse' then submitted his resignation, but was induced to withdraw it by Rouvier, Cambon and President Loubet.<sup>32</sup>

The Germans had no doubt that their proposal would be accepted and that the conference would refuse to turn Morocco over to France. Bulow explained it complacently to the Kaiser

in case a conference meets, we are already certain of the diplomatic support of America in favor of the open door. . . Austria will not quarrel with us over Morocco. . . Russia is busy with herself. . . the English government--between Roosevelt and those English groups which think as the Morning Post, Manchester Guardian, and Lord Rosebery--will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and also has a strong party in favor of the status quo. We shall certainly be able to hold Italy in order, if necessary by a gentle hint that while we settle with France, Austria will perhaps settle the irredentist question. . . If France refuses the conference, she will put herself in the wrong toward all the signatory powers and thereby will give England, Spain, and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw.<sup>33</sup>

The Chancellor's optimism must have been at least tempered by the responses he received when he attempted to sound out the other powers concerning the conference proposal. Both Austria and Russia indicated disapproval. The Spanish government replied that it would accept a conference only if France and

Britain did so. Italy, despite Bulow's threat of breaking off the Triple Alliance, replied similarly: direct bilateral negotiations between France and Germany were preferable to a conference. Furthermore, the Italian government indicated, it would not support Germany at a conference unless Britain failed to support France.

Thus the key to whether a conference would be held, and probably also to the outcome of a conference, was the attitude of Great Britain. Balfour and Lansdowne were at first inclined not to take the German move at Tangier very seriously. As usual, they were still preoccupied with the imperial arena where Russia, not Germany, appeared as the principal threat to British interests. Despite some uneasiness about the German Navy, they still thought of the Entente chiefly as a simple colonial settlement rather than as an incipient alliance against the German threat on the continent. A much different view was held, however, by the anti-German, continentalist group in the Foreign Office, the principal members of which were Crowe and Mallet, chief clerks, Bertie, the ambassador to France, and Hardinge, the Ambassador to Russia. They believed that Germany was the principal threat to England and saw the Entente as an essential bulwark against that threat. They perceived the crisis as a German attempt to break the Entente which must be frustrated at all costs. Their efforts in government decision-making were therefore directed chiefly toward persuading Lansdowne and Balfour, first, to support France in her resistance to a conference, and second, to pledge military support to France in case of war, whether or not a conference was held. Their views were generally supported by press and public opinion in England, which, besides feeling generally resentful about the German high-handedness, became even more exercised about a possible German attack on Great Britain, a fear which had been steadily rising with the growing strength of the German navy.<sup>34</sup>

Lansdowne gradually moved toward the more serious view of the crisis and the more positive view of the Entente which was held by the anti-German clique. He agreed to support Delcasse' in opposing the German demand for a conference. Two factors were important in pushing him toward this decision. One was the sequence of events in France: Delcasse', the French architect of the Entente, was in grave danger of being thrown out; this, along with Rouvier's statements that he intended to negotiate with Germany, presented a serious political threat to the Entente. The second was apprehension that the Germans might demand and get a port in Morocco in negotiations with France.<sup>35</sup> Thus emerged the two primary interests which were to guide British conduct throughout the crisis, although the emphasis on one or the other was to shift with the exigencies of

cf. Germany's indifference  
on gov. of a port,

domestic politics. While gradually more appreciative of the political value of the Entente, Lansdowne's own pre-occupation was chiefly with the more concrete and empire-oriented interest of preventing German acquisition of a port which would threaten Britain's control of the Straits of Gibraltar.<sup>36</sup>

The port issue was brought to the forefront at the initiative of Louis Mallet, a member of the Germanophobe clique in the Foreign Office. Mallet approached Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, who said "of course the Germans will ask for Mogador and I shall tell Lord L. that if they do we must at least have Tangier--of course it is all rot and it would not matter to us whether the Germans got Mogador or not but I'm going to say so all the same." Mallet commented to his friend Bertie that Fisher "is a splendid chap and simply longs to have a go at Germany".<sup>37</sup>

Fisher then wrote to Lansdowne immediately that the Germans would certainly demand a Moroccan port and that this would be "vitally detrimental" to British interests. The letter galvanized Lansdowne into action. After obtaining Balfour's approval he instructed Bertie in Paris:

It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the Moroccan coast.

You are authorized to inform Minister Foreign Affairs that we should be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government will afford us a full opportunity to conferring with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.

German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcasse's attitude and we desire to give him all the support we can.<sup>38</sup>

Bertie, in communicating this to Delcasse, on April 25, inverted the order of the sentences so that the last one containing the phrase (in Bertie's version) "all the support in its power" came first and the sentence about opposition to a German port came second. Thus he gave it a force and generality which Lansdowne's message had lacked. The emphasis was changed from opposing the German acquisition of a port to supporting France against Germany on the whole Moroccan question; the former could be read as simply an example of the latter.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, French policy toward Germany was proceeding along two tracks, the hard line of Delcasse' and the soft line of Rouvier. Although Delcasse's position had been weakened by public and parliamentary opposition and Rouvier's taking over general supervision of foreign policy, he was still Foreign Minister. Strengthened by Bertie's aide memoire he continued to oppose capitulation to the German demand for a conference or any significant concessions to Germany. But Rouvier offered a variety of concessions to Germany, though short of agreeing

to a conference. Another significant difference between the roles assumed by the two men was that Delcasse' carried on most of the communication with England, while Rouvier took the lead in discussions with Germany. In fact, Delcasse' was not even informed of most of Rouvier's overtures to Germany.

On April 26, Rouvier told the German ambassador, Radolin, that he appreciated Germany's defense of her Moroccan interests and said: "We will do everything possible and will give every desired explanation and satisfaction."<sup>40</sup> He followed this with a proposal for a settlement via an exchange of notes between France and the other powers; if a majority opposed the French program in Morocco, it would not be carried out. Receiving no response to these overtures, on April 30 he endorsed the Emperor's statements at Tangier and offered to make an agreement with Germany similar to the Anglo-French one, "where all doubtful points, including Morocco, would be settled." He would be willing to include in the settlement such questions as the adjustment of French and German colonial boundaries in Africa and the German project of a Berlin-to-Bagdad Railway.<sup>41</sup>

Distressed by the German government's rejection or lack of response to all these offers, and increasingly fearful of war, Rouvier then decided to respond to increasing crescendo of demands in the German press for the resignation of Delcasse'. Through private intermediaries, he informed German officials early in May that he hoped to bring about the Minister's downfall over some domestic difficulty in the next three or four weeks. He further stated that although the French government was certain of British support over Morocco, it would not seek this support. If Germany would agree to direct settlement, she could have a coaling station and also a strip of land on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.<sup>42</sup>

Holstein replied that a direct settlement was impossible, since the German government did not trust Delcasse' sufficiently to negotiate with France. The Foreign Minister's policy toward Germany, he asserted, had been "dishonest," "hostile", insidious" and "disrespectful." On May 16, Radolin made the point crystal clear to Rouvier personally: . . . "the prerequisite for the rapprochement desired by him/Rouvier/ is for us to have full trust in the foreign policy of France. . . .After what has happened, this trust is lacking." The Premier replied: "I understand you fully. Leave it to me."<sup>43</sup>

The main thrust of German policy had now emerged more clearly; to the Germans themselves at least, if not to the French. Germany was not interested in becoming a minor accomplice of France in the partition of Morocco, or in getting the plums of compensation elsewhere, however large and juicy, that Rouvier was offering. Her sights were set higher: to frustrate France in Morocco entirely; to do this in humiliating way, by hauling France before a

a tribunal of the European powers; and in the process to destroy the Entente Cordiale. The first step, in fact the key, to this program, was to force out the hostile French foreign minister, who, the Germans perceived, was both the chief obstacle in France to the conference project and the symbol, in Britain's eyes, of the viability and cohesion of the Entente. Delcasse', the Germans knew, was extremely vulnerable domestically. If his fall could be brought about through German pressure, the French soft-liners would gain complete control and agree to a conference, and the British would lose confidence in French fortitude, the Entente would thus become devalued in their eyes and they would play at most a neutral role at the conference.

The Germans also hoped to influence the British through the U.S. President, Roosevelt, and on at least two occasions asked him to advise the British government to accept the conference proposal warning of the possibility of war if the conference were not held. Roosevelt made clear that the United States had no direct interest in Morocco, but did offer to serve as a mediator and to advise the British "to arrive at an understanding over Morocco and to work in harmony " with Germany.<sup>44</sup> The British politely but firmly rejected this advice, but Germany at least had the satisfaction of seeing the U.S. president more or less lining up on their side.

Delcasse' sensed, of course, that the Germans were after his head. His line of defense was to try to get a firmer commitment from Great Britain, by which he could demonstrate to his wavering and fearful colleagues that the Entente was firm enough to force the Germans to back down. On May 17, Cambon, in London, made a bid for a stronger affirmation of British support.

At this time the British attitude toward Morocco and the Entente had shifted somewhat as the result of events in the Far East. A series of Russian defeats made a smashing Japanese victory appear imminent. Thus the British fears of Russia--still the main preoccupation of the Conservative government--appeared about to be relieved. With the Russian navy shattered, Britain could deal with the German navy herself, so the entente with France had lost some of its attraction. Still, the British were concerned about Rouvier's overtures to Germany. It was distinctly possible that France would make a bargain with Germany at Britain's expense particularly by granting Germany a Moroccan port by concessions elsewhere, e.g. in Asia Minor.

With these considerations in mind, Lansdowne was moderately responsive to Cambon's overture. He told the ambassador that the two governments "should discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted." He reminded Cambon of his earlier communication

through Bertie "at a moment when an idea prevailed that Germany might be on the point of demanding the cession of a Moorish port." He told Cambon plainly of the British anxiety lest the French "be induced to purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we were not likely to regard with favor in other parts of the world."<sup>45</sup>

Despite this clear warning, Cambon misinterpreted the intent of these statements, which were intended to forestall a Franco-German imperial compromise at Britain's expense. Apparently swayed by wishful thinking, and perhaps also having in mind the more forceful tone of Bertie's earlier edited version of Lansdowne's words, he perceived these remarks as virtually an offer of alliance. He reported to Delcasse' "we have serious reasons to believe that in case of an unjustified aggression on the part of a certain power, the British government would be fully ready to concert with the French government on measures to take."<sup>46</sup>

When Cambon sent his account of their conversation to Lansdowne on May 24, the latter immediately saw that he had been misunderstood. The danger of which he had spoken was not so much a German aggression against France as a French bargain with Germany at Britain's expense. He wrote at once to Cambon to clear up the misunderstanding:

I do not know that this account differs from that which you have given to M. Delcasse', but I am not sure that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there should be full and confidential discussion between the two governments, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another power, as in anticipation of any complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period through which we are at present passing.<sup>47</sup>

But Cambon continued to misperceive Lansdowne's intent. He interpreted this latest statement as an extension and amplification of Lansdowne's earlier one. Lansdowne had given the British commitment "a larger scope", he told Delcasse'; he had gone beyond a mere entente to a proposal for "an immediate discussion and an examination of the general situation." This, Cambon regarded as "a general understanding which would constitute in reality an alliance."<sup>48</sup> As Monger observes, the misunderstanding was probably a result of the differing pre-occupations of the two men. Lansdowne was concerned with restraining the French from making certain kinds of concessions; Cambon was pre-occupied with getting a stronger British commitment. Lansdowne thought he was communicating his concerns; but Cambon interpreted it in terms of his.<sup>49</sup> Put another way, Lansdowne did indeed intend to broaden the scope of the understanding to include issues outside of Morocco, but in order to forestall French concessions



on such issues, not to increase the English commitment to fight with France in case of war. But for Cambon, such an enlargement of the issues covered by the agreement "qui constituerait en realite une alliance". In his eagerness, Cambon allowed himself to confuse "scope" and "degree of commitment"; to believe that the one implied the other. His mistake was to have a considerable effect on the future career of his superior, Delcasse'.

Delcasse' naturally took Cambon's interpretation at face value. Reassured by the thought that a full-fledged alliance with Britain was to be had for the asking, he took an even more intransigent position toward the insistent German proposals for a conference. He was convinced Germany was bluffing. Rouvier, on the other hand, who was on the receiving end of all the German threats and had seen all his conciliatory initiatives rebuffed, took a different view. He thought a continued firm stand would very probably bring war for which neither he nor the country had any stomach. Far from being shored up by Delcasse's assurances of British support, he was even more disturbed. Rouvier, like many of his countrymen, mistrusted the British, was skeptical of their promises and motives. He suspected they were trying to incite France to provoke a war with Germany; this accomplished, they would stand aside, or limit themselves to naval action, and let the two continental powers exhaust themselves while the British gobbled up their empires. This was the typical "perfidious Albion" image of the British which was fairly widespread on the continent. The domestic tension in France was fast approaching a climax. On May 28, the Russian fleet was defeated at Tsushima, thus neutralizing what many considered France's only reliable ally. On the same day, the Sultan rejected the French program of reforms and under German pressure at Fez, issued a call for an international conference. These developments brought a stepping up of German demands for Delcasse's dismissal. Perversely, the Cambon-Lansdowne conversations, rather than strengthening the Foreign Minister's position, actually weakened it, since many Frenchmen believed that an alliance between France and England would provoke a preventive attack by Germany. A rumor that the Germans had threatened this threw the Chamber into near-panic on June 5.<sup>50</sup> Actually, the threat, which was uttered in Rome by the German ambassador and passed on to the French ambassador, was to the effect that if France attacked Morocco, Germany would attack France.<sup>51</sup> Rouvier decided at this point that Delcasse' must go and on June 6 laid the matter before the cabinet.

At this dramatic meeting Delcasse' defended himself valiantly, insisting that the Germans were bluffing, and urging acceptance of the supposed British offer of an alliance. If France failed to exploit this opportunity, he warned,

London might turn to Berlin, the Entente would be destroyed, and France, with Russia prostrate, would be isolated. "If today you yield, you will be compelled always to yield, and you do not know whether you will always have, as you have today, the almost unanimous agreement of the world,"<sup>52</sup>

Rouvier asserted that Germany was not bluffing. He said that Germany knew the present moment was a good one for war with France and said he had been told on high authority that if France signed an alliance with England, Germany would immediately "entrera chez nous." A conciliatory policy, on the other hand, would produce an honorable agreement with Germany. Turning to the ministers of war and the navy, he asked whether French military forces were prepared for war. "No", they both replied. Rouvier also rehearsed his skepticism about British aid accusing the British of trying to incite war between France and Germany. The British fleet would then destroy the German navy and German commerce, which would be all to the advantage of England, leaving France to carry on the struggle on land--a very unequal one--against Germany. Thus England had everything to gain and little to lose by an alliance and subsequent war, while the French would be taking great risks.<sup>53</sup>

Rouvier accused Delcasse' of having provoked Germany's hostility by estranging other powers from her. "You have succeeded too well in the policy you have embarked upon in regard to Germany. You have detached Spain from her, you have got hold of England, you have debauched Italy." At this point, Delcasse' interrupted: "Pardon me, I was entrusted with the conduct of French foreign policy and not with the supervision of the policy of Germany."<sup>54</sup> Delcasse' was not supported by a single minister, so he resigned, and Rouvier took over his portfolio. Before leaving the room Delcasse' prophetically warned that German demands would become "more insolent and more exacting than ever"; they had not demanded his ouster because of resentment against him personally, as they implied; but to prepare the way for larger objectives: defeat of France in Morocco and the destruction of the Entente.<sup>55</sup>

The significance of this event was not lost on the other powers. The German ambassador noted that there was an "under-current in France which wishes . . . a satisfactory settlement with Germany" and that there was hardly a newspaper in France which did not censure "the anti-German policy of M. Delcasse". He further pointed out to his government that despite "continued and almost importunate offers of English aid, . . . French public opinion has never shown a real inclination to accept this support."<sup>56</sup>

The British were dismayed. The government had tried hard to save Delcasse' by indicating strong diplomatic support, for it was sure of his loyalty to the

Entente, while it was dubious of the pro-German Rouvier. Lord Balfour expressed the general reaction:

Delcasse's dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German government displayed a weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not at present be counted on as an effective force in international politics. She could no longer be trusted not to yield to threats at the crucial moment of a negotiation. If, therefore, Germany is really desirous of obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French assistance that we must look for our protection.<sup>56</sup>

cf. pp. 19-20  
to part issue  
of p. 39.

This ended the first period of the crisis. The Entente had suffered a hard blow. Germany had achieved her objectives of overthrowing the hard-line leader in the French government, of blocking the Sultan's acceptance of the French "reforms" and inducing him to call a conference. Undoubtedly, German leaders thought they were on the way to success. They were wrong, however, for the most acute phase of the crisis was yet to come.

B. French acceptance of a conference

This second phase of the crisis opened with both the French and the German governments holding wildly inaccurate expectations about the other. Bulow thought that the acute phase of the crisis was now over; that with the belligerent Foreign Minister out of the way and soft-liners in control, the French would quickly agree to a conference. Rouvier, on the other hand, misperceiving that his policy of bilateral negotiations had been rebuffed by the Germans simply because they found Delcasse' personally offensive, thought that these negotiations would now bear fruit in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and good will. Both sets of expectations were soon dispelled.

To Rouvier's surprise and dismay the German government did not relent on its demands for a conference, and Bulow began to use even more threatening language to him than he had toward Delcasse'. Immediately after Delcasse's resignation, Bulow dispatched a circular note to all the signatories of the Convention of Madrid, informing them of Germany's acceptance of the Sultan's invitation to a conference and urging them to do the same. He argued a fairly good legal case: since the Convention had guaranteed "most-favored-nation" treatment to all the signatories, any "reforms" in Morocco had to be approved by all the signatories. Short of this, the legal status of Morocco must remain unchanged; the opposition of any single Power would block the execution of any reforms. It was evident, Bulow went on, that France sought to control Morocco completely and unilaterally, just as she did Tunis: and this would be a violation of the treaty.<sup>58</sup>

The responses of the other powers to this airtight legal case were not at all satisfactory to Germany. The Russian, Austrian, Italian, Portuguese and Danish governments replied evasively, leaving the initiative to the states directly concerned, France and England. Lansdowne generally indicated disapproval of a conference but gave no definite answer.

Rouvier's answer was to express the hope that the resignation of Delcasse' would enable the two countries to negotiate a bilateral understanding, and he promised to show the "greatest conciliation" in such negotiations. He endeavored, in several diplomatic moves, to find some way of satisfying Germany while preserving France's position in Morocco and the agreements with England and Spain, and avoiding the humiliation of a conference. He repeated his offer for a general colonial settlement with Germany, not only over Morocco, but also over such matters as the Bagdad Railway and Far Eastern affairs. The Kaiser was quite willing to accept these offers, but the German political leaders were otherwise inclined. They responded either with silence or with statements that they "would not desert the Sultan." Nonplussed and discouraged, and despite a series of German threats, Rouvier rejected the proposal for a conference because it was unacceptable, he said, to French public opinion.<sup>60</sup> The German expectation of a quick French cave-in was thus confounded.

*explain*  
In England, confidence in French resolve slowly recovered as the British leaders learned of Rouvier's firmness on the conference issue. The latter, rebuffed in his efforts to strike a bilateral bargain, began to turn more and more to Britain and kept the British government informed of every move in his communications with Germany. Rouvier was informed on June 16 that Britain would follow the French lead on Morocco; if France continued to refuse the conference Britain would do so too.

Perceiving that France and England were not going to agree to a conference as meekly as he had hoped, Bulow turned to a more conciliatory line. The conference proposal, he told the French was "merely a question of etiquette and delay," so that Germany could keep her word with the Sultan and disengage herself from the position into which Delcasse' had forced her--in other words, it was no more than a face-saving device for Germany. He offered on June 12 to negotiate with France over the program to be considered at the conference (thus receding from his earlier position that all matters be left to the conference itself) if France would first accept the Sultan's invitation to a conference.

But the German ideas for the conference "program" were not very palatable to M. Rouvier. There would be police and military "reforms" internationally

organized by a division of the police mandate (France would be responsible only for the area along the Algerian frontier); and there would be financial reforms, likewise internationally executed by a state bank in which capital and management would be divided equally among the central banks of the great powers. Economic enterprise in Morocco would be open to all in accordance with the principal of the "open door". The outlining of this program by the German ambassador in Paris, Radolin, was accompanied by vague threats of war uttered by German representatives in other capitals.<sup>62</sup>

The French response on June 21, in effect, accepted the conference in principle but at the same time invited Germany to negotiate directly so as to reach a settlement which would make the conference unnecessary. Further, since Radolin had advanced the German program "unofficially" Rouvier asked the German government to declare officially "the precise points which will be treated at the Conference and the solutions which it will offer there." The French government could not formally accept the conference, he said, without a "previous accord."<sup>63</sup>

Bulow's response was hostile and threatening. He rejected the overture for prior negotiations and again demanded quick French acceptance of a conference. He warned Rouvier against resuming Delcasse's policy. "The situation is serious," he declared. "With a little good will and decision we may emerge from it." But "one should not play with fire; it is a dangerous game which might lead further than you and I wish."<sup>64</sup>

The German government still believed that the French would back down if confronted with a firm stand. "Rouvier. . .we know does not wish a conflict with us," Bulow wrote to the Kaiser on June 22. "The Chamber of Deputies wishes above all to avoid war." And to the German ambassador in Paris: "The sooner we make it clear to him /Rouvier/ what results the French refusal of the conference. . .must have, the more we diminish the dangers of the situation." Holstein wrote: "I consider the danger of war for Germany at the present moment vanishingly small. It will be still more diminished if a conviction of our firmness prevails. We know for certain that in the last ministerial council Delcasse' declared: 'Germany will not dare to fight, it is all bluff.' This doubt about our determination could have led to a conflict if the other ministers had shared Delcasse's views."<sup>65</sup> We can interpret this remark as indicating a German perception that both France and Germany were in a game of "chicken"; but that (if Holstein's statement can be considered reliable) the Germans were nevertheless ready to commit themselves to fight in the confident belief that the French would knuckle under before such a commitment.

Bulow also played upon the danger of war in communications with the U.S. and Britain. Hoping to mobilize Roosevelt, who had earlier displayed mild pro-German sympathies, to mediate the dispute, he reported to the President the rumor of a British offer of alliance to France had raised the specter of a war between these two countries and Germany. To preclude this, he urged Roosevelt to advise France to accept the conference and not to make an alliance with Britain. Roosevelt agreed to do this.

To the British ambassador, Holstein asserted ominously that a war between England and Germany "could no longer be considered impossible," citing as evidence the bitterness of the British press toward Germany and the reported British offer of an alliance to France. Lansdowne denied that Great Britain wanted war or had offered such an alliance.

In France, meanwhile, the attitude of government, press and public toward Germany had completely changed in the few weeks since the resignation of Delcasse'. *SL awakening*  
It was now generally realized that the price of "friendship" with Germany was to come much higher than merely the cashiering of a foreign minister. As a German representative put it to his government: "The feeling of resentment against Germany on account of her present action is very strong and the spirit of the 'revanche' is awakening; the French have pulled themselves together wonderfully after their first panic and they now seem prepared to face calmly the contingency of war in the future if the pretensions of Germany continue."<sup>66</sup> After his hopes for conciliation had been dashed by German intransigence, Rouvier had, in effect, reverted, with minor modifications, to the firm line of Delcasse' and had his country thoroughly behind him. Significantly, although the German representatives in Paris clearly recognized this and reported it to their government, the German leaders continued to profess to believe that France would yield before German firmness. *HL dismissed of neg. info.*

Observing this French transformation, along with the threatening posture of Germany, the British government lost its earlier fears of a Franco-German compromise at Britain's expense and began instead to fear the opposite danger of a Franco-German war. Their diplomatic efforts shifted from the earlier line of trying to curtail Rouvier's conciliatory tendencies to an effort to deter Germany. To the German ambassador, Lansdowne declared on June 28 that "British diplomatic support was assured to the French by the Anglo-French accord." No formal alliance had been offered to France, he said, but "he would not conceal his belief that in the event that Germany 'lightheartedly' made war upon France, . . . it was not to be foreseen how far British public opinion would force the Government to support France."<sup>67</sup> This was the strongest warning Britain had yet made to Germany.

The British statement was instrumental in breaking the deadlock between France and Germany over the question of which should come first, formal acceptance of a conference or negotiation of a "program" to be discussed at the conference. Also helpful was President Roosevelt's mediation. He suggested: "Let France and Germany go into the conference without any programme or agreement; but to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco; save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."<sup>68</sup> This formula caught the essence of the French position, that the conference would be barred from questioning the terms of the Franco-British Entente. Apparently its ambiguity also helped Bulow to climb down, which he now realized he must do in view of the French and British firmness.

On July 8, the French and German government finally reached an agreement under which France agreed to the conference but with certain important stipulations safeguarding her interests. Germany promised to pursue no goal at the conference which would challenge the "legitimate interests" of France or be "contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties or arrangements." She also recognized France's "special interest" in Morocco resulting from "the contiguity, over a long stretch, of Algeria and the Sherifian Empire," and the "particular relations which result therefrom. . . ."<sup>69</sup>

The agreement, which relieved the tension of this most acute phase of the crisis, can most fairly be described as a compromise, with pluses and minuses for both parties. Superficially, Germany had the advantage since she had achieved her objective of forcing France to the conference table. But the price had been high: recognition of the French special interest in Morocco and the legitimacy of the Anglo-French Entente regarding that land. By rejecting Rouvier's early offers of accommodation, Germany had given up the chance for valuable colonial gains and perhaps a political rapprochement with France. By insisting on dragging France before the "court of Europe", she had unified the French nation behind a policy of firmness and solidified the Entente with Britain. What is most puzzling is that she did this even though she might have known, by the time the conference agreement was made, that her chances of success at the conference were very slim.

### C. Pre-conference bargaining

After Germany had forced France to agree to an international conference, the French position hardened further. Having capitulated or compromised twice (on Delcasse', and the conference issue) she was in no mood to yield further on the

SL strategy: opp's turn to yield. If he doesn't, he must follow the rules.

substantive issues. Rouvier was no longer willing to give Germany a share in Morocco or to grant "compensation" elsewhere. Now fairly confident of British support and somewhat heartened by German concessions in the pre-conference agreement, he now hoped to obtain the maximum French objective of virtually complete control over the military, policy and financial "reforms" in Morocco. In effect, he resumed the original "hard" policy of Delcasse'.

Rouvier opened negotiations with the German government in July over the program and arrangement for the conference. The two governments soon found themselves deadlocked; although Germany had already agreed to consider France's "special interests" in Morocco, her view of what those interests were <sup>was</sup> quite different from the view of the French. The German goal, formulated internally but not yet communicated to the French, was that the policy and military mandate in Morocco should be given to France only for the southern and eastern frontier with Algeria; Germany would be in charge in the towns on the Atlantic coast. Presumably, Spain would get the mandate for the Mediterranean coast.<sup>70</sup>

The most pressing issues were the choice of a meeting place and the individual negotiators at the conference. Without consulting the French, Germany appointed Count Tattenbach, its representative in Tangier, as its chief delegate, though knowing that he was highly objectionable to the French. Bulow demanded of Rouvier that he exclude as French delegates "M. Delcasse's followers", specifically Cambon and Revoil, the latter a former governor of Algeria and reputed Germanophobe. As a conference site, the Germans favored Tangier, to take advantage of the anti-French and pro-German sentiments of the Moroccans.

Rouvier chose Revoil as the French representative nevertheless and urged the choice of some European town, preferably in Spain.

During July and August, the Franco-German discussions were over-shadowed and somewhat influenced by other events in world politics, notably the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan. The fertile brain of the German Kaiser conceived the idea of using Russia's humiliation in defeat to make an alliance with that power as the first step toward fulfilling the persistent German dream of a "continental alliance" against England. He invited Czar Nicholas to meet him in Bjorko Bay in the Baltic during their respective summer cruises. The details of the highly emotional and somewhat pathetic shipboard meeting of the two monarchs need not concern us. They did in fact sign a treaty of alliance which provided for the later association of France. Both sovereigns were under the impression that the Moroccan crisis had been settled by the pre-conference agreement of July 8, and that the way was thus cleared for a Franco-German rapprochement and French adhesion to the Bjorko treaty.



The German political leaders had agreed only reluctantly to the Kaiser's enterprise, but once accomplished, they began to see some potential in it. They, too, had often longed for a Russian-German-French combination. They saw the obvious logic of the new situation: let France have Morocco so that she might be induced to join the new alignment. They must have realized that the chances of this happening were at least problematic in view of the Alsace-Lorraine obstacle, but it seemed at least a possibility. Bulow instructed the foreign office as follows: "We must reserve the possibility of permitting France a free hand in Morocco at the moment in which she has to decide about joining the Russo-German understanding. A better use of Morocco we could hardly find and that would be by far the most favorable close of our Moroccan campaign."<sup>71</sup>

But the Germans did not act decisively on this logic by immediately undertaking major conciliatory moves toward France. Instead, Bulow counseled merely a policy of delay and avoidance of threats. He did not seem to realize that such a policy would merely prolong the crisis and fail to allay French suspicion and hostility; moreover, Holstein, who was left temporarily in charge of the Moroccan negotiations proved utterly unable to disengage himself from the previous line of policy and became deeper embroiled with the French in abrasive haggling over details. When Rouvier submitted his proposals for a conference program in August, the Germans accepted certain points but refused to permit France to settle the policing of the Algerian frontier directly with the Moroccan government. They insisted on leaving this matter for negotiation at the conference, even though the pre-conference agreement had already virtually conceded this area to France. Moreover, they continued to refuse Tangier as a meeting place.

Bulow then intervened, sending a special representative, Rosen, to Paris to clear up the negotiations, and declaring "we need above all to extricate ourselves from this Moroccan affair, which has apparently become confused, in such a way as to maintain our prestige in the world and to preserve the German economic and financial interests intact as much as possible." He instructed Rosen to yield on the frontier and meeting place, if France would yield in turn on some minor economic details.<sup>72</sup>

Rosen, however, when he learned that France expected to obtain at the conference a general mandate for the financial and police reforms in all of Morocco, refused to yield on the frontier question until the French renounced this intention. Rouvier, of course, rejected this demand, whereupon Rosen threatened to break off the negotiations. The French press became aroused and began to denounce German tactics, which led Bulow to warn Rouvier that "if the

French imagine that they can intimidate us or even publicly humiliate us, they are playing a dangerous game which can lead to war."<sup>73</sup> Tension and fear of war on both sides had risen again almost to the level of three months before.

The intervention of the Russian finance minister, Witte, who was soon to become Premier, helped to break the deadlock. In Paris to plead for a French loan to Russia, he was told this was impossible until the conflict with Germany was settled. Witte was also inclined to favor the project for a continental alliance against Britain. Witte went to see the German ambassador in Paris, Radolin, urging acceptance of the French position. Germany was protected against the French claim to police the western part of Morocco by the requirement of unanimity at the conference, he argued; Rosen was making a needless demand. Radolin agreed and Witte then journeyed to Berlin to complete his task. He was completely successful with Bulow and the Emperor; the latter expressing himself in characteristically vigorous fashion to Bulow: "Bring Rosen to reason so that that disgusting quarreling in Paris will cease. I am completely fed up on it. . . France must now be shown friendship and be permitted to save her face so that she will remain withoutrancour and will complete the turn necessary to bring her into our alliance."<sup>74</sup>

So, as a result of Witte's intervention, the two countries reached an understanding on September 28. The conference would discuss police reform in Morocco, except in the frontier region where this should remain "the exclusive affair" of France. A Moroccan state bank would be established. The conference would meet at Algeciras in Spain. In return, France made minor concessions concerning a German loan to Morocco and a German construction concession.

Although the German concession was chiefly motivated by the desire to bring France around to continental alliance scheme, it entirely failed in this objective because of the German procrastination and the minor and grudging nature of the concessions--if indeed the idea was realistic at all. The Bjorko treaty itself also foundered on the objections of the Russian foreign minister, Lamsdorff, who was staunchly pro-French and clearly saw the incompatibility between the Emperors' compact and the Franco-Russian alliance. He brought Witte around to this view and persuaded the Czar to repudiate the treaty unless the German government would agree to a supplementary declaration that it was not directed against France and did not override the Franco-Russian alliance. Of course, the German government rejected this and the treaty quietly died for lack of official ratification. Thus ironically, a pro-German Russian, Witte, was the prime mover in giving the continental alliance project whatever meagre life it might have had, while a pro-French Russian, Lamsdorff, was chiefly

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responsible for scotching the project. The most significant consequence of the affair was that it somewhat alienated Russia and Germany, drew Russia closer to France, and made her look with more favor on overtures for an entente from England.

Britain continued to give France full support in her negotiations with Germany. However, neither country was interested at this time in strengthening the entente in the direction of an alliance, but for different reasons. Lansdowne, though quite reassured by Rouvier's new show of determination, still felt some lingering doubts about the steadfastness of the French nation after the Delcasse' incident and was thus disinclined to make any promises beyond "diplomatic support." Moreover, he was, as usual preoccupied with Far Eastern affairs. The French government, on the other hand, was by now fairly confident of British loyalty under the existing informal arrangement. Moreover, German-English antagonism had been rising steadily, independently of Morocco, as a consequence of the naval race and a "press war" between the newspapers of the two countries. (In fact, there were rising fears in both countries of a surprise attack by the other, although neither had any such intent. This was a classic "security dilemma" spiral, fueled chiefly by military preparedness measures. Although its causes were separate from the Moroccan crisis, it interacted significantly with the latter, chiefly by raising the general level of tension). The French government, feeling secure enough for the present, preferred now to avoid a formal alliance with England for fear of being drawn into a possible Anglo-German war. Rouvier, however, formerly dubious and indeed alarmed about British friendship when he was pursuing an accommodating policy towards Germany before Delcasse's fall, had now become converted into a loyal supporter of the Entente. Inept German diplomacy had succeeded in transforming the colonial arrangement into an instrument of cooperation nearly as effective as a formal alliance. Its strength was dramatized by an exchange of visits between the French and British fleets in early August.

*Reverse  
Here*

The changing perception of the Entente in England--from merely an instrument for conflict-reduction with France to an informal alliance against Germany--was reflected in new departures in British military planning. Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, who as early as April had viewed the crisis as "a golden opportunity for fighting the Germans in alliance with the French", initiated a re-study of war plans in the Admiralty. Previously, naval planning had emphasized overseas attacks against German or French colonies (whoever the enemy might be). The Moroccan affair now for the first time raised the possibility of helping France rather than fighting her; of fighting Germany with France as an ally rather than alone. Naval predominance against Germany

was now assured. So, the naval planners concluded, England could afford to contemplate something more than just naval battles, specifically raids along the German coast. However, the Navy's plans for land operations did not go beyond such raids; the war was to be won by the British and French navies, combined with French operations on land; the British army would play only a supporting role.

However, the Moroccan crisis also provided the British army with the prospect of a strong continental ally against Germany. In the early stages of the revised planning, the army went along with the navy's ideas of coastal raids only, but soon the General Staff began to revise its assumptions and enlarge its ambitions. Amphibious raids no longer were satisfactory; the army began to consider the plan for a more ambitious role: fighting in Belgium and France with substantial forces alongside the French army. This shift in the army's strategic thinking set off a prolonged debate with the Admiralty which was eventually resolved in the army's favor.<sup>75</sup>

Late in 1905, as the date of the conference approached, Bulow logically should have been profoundly discouraged. The French had shown extreme firmness in the bargaining over the conference program and apparently intended to demand complete acceptance at the conference of their own reform program, excluding Germany altogether. And the available evidence seemed to show they would have British support. His own representatives in Paris told him in December and January that the French government was resolved not to recede and was making military preparations. Nevertheless, Bulow was optimistic. He placed high hopes on the influence of President Roosevelt, who had earlier indicated pro-German sympathies. Russia was exhausted. Austria had pledged to stand by Germany. Spanish jealousy of the pre-eminent French role, as compared to Spain's, in the French program, might be exploited. Italy, with its ambivalent stance in world politics, might be induced to press France to accept German terms so she would not be forced to choose sides.<sup>76</sup>

But the chief reason for Bulow's optimism was a change of government in England. A Liberal government had replaced the Conservative one in December. Bulow did not believe the new government would support France as firmly as the previous one had done. He interpreted the overwhelming Liberal victory as a clear rejection of chauvinism and a demonstration of popular desire for peace. Therefore, he expected the British government to play the role of mediator rather than protagonist.

Thus, the Chancellor expected the French to concede to the German position and he did not anticipate a war. He regarded the reported French fears of war

as "ludicrous, bordering on insanity." He notified the German military that no precautionary measures need be taken; in fact the government took special pains to avoid giving the impression that it was preparing for war. Nevertheless, he apparently thought it prudent to issue a few threats for insurance. He informed the French government late in December that Germany would never permit France a general police mandate, that if France insisted on this a "very critical situation would arise" which "would inevitably lead to a grave conflict." He also told a private British representative and French military attaché in Berlin that although "there is absolutely no cause for any war". . . she /France/might, relying on certain aid from England, conduct herself toward us so ill-manneredly and provocatively that finally our national honor would come into question, for the sake of which we should have to resort to arms. . ."<sup>77</sup>

Bulow's expectations about the French were not shared by some of his important advisers. Moltke, the chief of staff, wrote on Jan. 23: "In my opinion the French now consider further concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcasse' fall. They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to be armed against an attack from Germany."<sup>78</sup>

Radolin, from Paris, wrote in a similar vein that the French felt "grave anxiety over the possibility of warlike complications. . . In press and public it is said that Germany wishes war, that France has receded . . . on all points, but without satisfying Germany." The French expected the Germans to make demands at the conference "which would be contrary to her honor and her traditional policy in Morocco. France must defend herself and be prepared for any eventuality. . . Germany makes no secret of her armaments, and therefore it is imperative for France also to keep her powder dry."<sup>79</sup>

All the evidence indicates that these perceptions by Moltke and Radolin were accurate. Rouvier was resolved to get at the conference essentially a ratification of the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish accords putting France in control of the Moroccan police and economy, with Spain as a junior partner, although he was prepared to make minor concessions to achieve this end. He was willing to have the conference break up rather than recede from this goal, and if Germany wished to make war in consequence, so be it.

These French aims and expectations were supported by action. The Ministry of War was granted 200 million francs to strengthen defenses on the eastern frontier. Food and munitions stocks were increased, reserves were called up and assigned to the frontier forces, trial mobilizations were held.

Thus, theoretically speaking, the French perceived themselves in a (weak) prisoner's dilemma. War was preferable to yielding. On the German side it is a little harder to separate bluff (or plain uncertainty) from real values and intentions. Possibly, the Germans perceived themselves in a prisoner's dilemma, too, on Bulow's assumption that the British would not fight. I.e., the Germans, too, may have preferred war with France over yielding to the French terms. However, Bulow could not have been certain of his assumption about British intentions, based as it was on a very superficial image of differences between the British political parties. In fact, throughout the crisis thus far, Bulow's images of other countries seems to have been based much more on wishful thinking than on close analysis of information. Thus if Bulow in private was more clear-headed and tough-minded than he appeared in his statements to others (a moot point) he probably was uncertain whether the situation for Germany was chicken or prisoner's dilemma, simply because he could not be sure of British intentions. If he had been sure the British would fight on the side of France, he almost certainly would have perceived it as a game of chicken for Germany: she would have to yield if the French were firm.

The French, on the other hand, were quite sure of British support, so their perception of being in prisoner's dilemma, in contrast to the Germans', was unequivocal.

As for each party's perception of the game the other was playing: the French were pretty sure Germany was playing chicken; i.e., that she was bluffing or that her threats would turn out to be bluffs once the firmness of British support to France became clear. Yet the fact that Rouvier took military measures preparatory to war, measures which were intended as real preparedness rather than mere signals of resolve, shows that he was not entirely certain. He realized that it was going to be difficult for Germany to retreat after all that had gone before. He also held some fears of "complications" which might develop if the conference failed and broke up, complications leading to war as a result of unilateral moves by the parties within Morocco itself. Although at this point he apparently had not developed a very precise scenario of how such complications might develop, he had in mind here "cataclysmic" factors which might drag the parties into war regardless of their actual utilities and perceptions (i.e. regardless of the calculated "games" they were in), and it is perhaps such considerations that motivated his preparedness measures and his rather high expectation of war. Nor should it be ruled out that he was preparing for the contingency that England might not support France at the conference to the extent of pledging herself actually to fight; Germany might then not be in a chicken

game and France, having committed herself, would find herself fighting Germany alone.

On the German side, Bulow believed that France was playing chicken: she would back down in the face of strong German pressure. This opinion was not shared by Moltke and others. But for them, French behavior was not dependent upon whether France, by a cool calculation of her interests, was in either "chicken" or "prisoner's dilemma". They feared that France would stand firm because of the absolute imperative of "national honor". (Of course this would not be inconsistent with a prisoner's dilemma model of French attitudes.) Bulow, incidentally, while believing himself that England would not fight, nevertheless feared that France might perceive otherwise and behave so "provocatively" as to engage German "national honor", in which case Germany would "have" to fight.

Since both the French and the German assessments hinged so crucially on their perceptions of British intentions, we must now turn to British political scene and the signals which Britain was giving off to both of the central protagonists.

Lord Balfour's Conservative government fell in December, 1905 and a new Liberal government under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman took over. This event, it will be recalled, was a considerable reason for Bulow's optimism and it was also the cause of some concern among the anti-German group at the British foreign office. The Liberals had a general reputation of "softness" in foreign policy, an idealistic and philanthropic world view, and mild sympathies toward Germany. However, this description fitted only the "Radical" wing of the party, which included the Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, and certain other figures such as Morley, Lloyd-George, and Herbert Gladstone. The other wing was the "Liberal Imperialist" faction, including most prominently Grey, Rosebery, Asquith and Haldane. This group was more inclined to a realpolitik tough stance in foreign policy. In this general sense they were quite similar in outlook to the Conservatives; they differed from the latter, however, in being much less interested in the glory of empire and more focused on the politics of the continent.

In the maneuvering and bargaining over the allocation of Cabinet posts, Campbell-Bannerman was forced to give the Imperialists the three foremost places in the cabinet other than his own. Lord Grey went to the Foreign Office (although it had been assumed long before that he would assume this position), Asquith to the Exchequer and Haldane to the War Office. Thus the three ministries with most influence on foreign policy fell into the hands of "hard-liner". Not that the three saw entirely eye-to-eye. Significantly, Grey was the only one

who sincerely desired to follow the main lines of Lansdowne's policy toward France and Germany and who was determined to base British foreign policy squarely on the Entente with France. But Asquith and Haldane, although they were a little "soft on Germany" and placed less value on the Entente, always followed Grey's lead in foreign policy. The promotion of two men from the foreign office anti-German faction, Hardinge and Mallet--Hardinge to the Permanent Under-Secretaryship and Mallet to Grey's private secretary--further strengthened the French position and weakened the German in British bureaucratic politics.<sup>80</sup>

The new government took office at a time of great international tension. The Moroccan conference was scheduled to begin at Algeciras on January 16, and it was clear that neither France nor Germany was in an accommodating mood. The first act of the government was to declare its adhesion to the Entente, which Campbell-Bannerman did on Dec. 21. Grey instructed Nicolson, the chosen British representative to the conference, to give cordial support to the French at the conference and to keep the Spanish in line with France and Britain.

Some important changes in the British priorities, as compared with those of the previous government, soon took form, however. As international tension steadily rose around the turn of the year, Grey began considering possible concessions to Germany which would prevent the conference from collapsing. He hit upon the solution of granting Germany a port on the Moroccan coast. "I am not an expert on naval strategy," he wrote Campbell-Bannerman, "but I doubt whether it is important to us to prevent Germany getting ports at a distance from her base. . . . It may, for instance, turn out that a port for Germany on the west Atlantic coast of Morocco would solve all the difficulties of the Morocco Conference."<sup>81</sup>

This was a sharp departure from the policy of Lansdowne, who had been willing to fight over the German demand for a Moroccan port and who had devoted considerable diplomatic energy to persuading the French not to make such a concession.

Although Grey thus placed a lower value on strictly British strategic interests in Morocco than had Lansdowne, he placed a higher value on preserving the Entente. He wrote Nicolson on Dec. 21 that he would support France's aims in Morocco because "If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a great success for the Anglo-French Entente; if she fails, the prestige of the Entente will suffer and its vitality will be diminished."<sup>82</sup> By this and other similar statements Grey displayed a subtle but important change in attitude towards the Entente, as compared to Lansdowne's. While Lansdowne too had

L. imperial interest in sea lanes, pub. to be insured, independently if poss.  
G. continental interest in balance of power incl. interest in Entente.



followed a generally pro-French policy, this was because imperial interests seemed to require it; Grey on the other hand, viewed the Entente much more as an arrangement for preserving the balance of power against Germany on the continent.

On December 19, the German ambassador, Metternich, broached the Moroccan question with Grey for the first time, expressing the hope that Britain would play the part of conciliator at the conference. Grey replied that the conference filled him with concern. He had studied the documents of the previous government thoroughly, he said, and found that Lansdowne had stated to Metternich "that, in the event of war between Germany and France, public feeling in England would be such that, in his opinion, it would be impossible for England to remain neutral." This statement, Grey said, he made his own. The British government "wanted to avoid trouble between Germany and France", but since the Entente was very popular in England he "really thought that if there was trouble, we should be involved in it. . . . It was not a question of the policy of the government," he added. "What made a nation most likely to take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that it would be impossible to be neutral."<sup>83</sup> Actually, Grey's warning was more comprehensive than Lansdowne's. Lansdowne had referred only to British support in case Germany "light-heartedly" attacked France, but Grey did not specify any particular cause of war. Metternich immediately noticed the difference and remarked upon it; Grey merely repeated his words. Grey attempted to balance his blunt words with conciliatory ones: Britain was not motivated by any hostility toward Germany, but simply by a desire to remain on good terms with France. If Germany was conciliatory at Algeiras, he promised that Anglo-German relations would improve.

The German government's response was to reiterate its firmness on Morocco, warn of the danger of war, and attempt to persuade Britain to restrain France. Bulow told the British government on Jan. 11 that Germany would not accept a general police mandate for France. Holstein spelled out a war scenario for the British ambassador: France, relying upon British aid, might, if dissatisfied with the results of the conference, "seek to create a fait accompli by invading Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor and war would be the result." This danger could be averted, Holstein said, if the British would hint to the French that, in the event of their invading Morocco, it was doubtful that Britain would support France militarily.

Grey's response to this was curt and to the point: "I hope the result of the Morocco conference will prevent the contingency, which Herr von Holstein contemplates, from arising. Should it however be otherwise we cannot deprecate any action on the

part of France which comes within the terms of the Anglo-French declarations of April, 1904. Herr von Holstein should know this."<sup>84</sup>

French confidence in British support must have been enhanced by the fact that the two governments cooperated fully in planning a negotiating strategy for the conference and in drawing up instructions for the French delegates. These instructions, in general, were to insist on French control of the state bank to be established, and French and Spanish control over the police, and consequently to reject German suggestions either to divide Morocco into sectors among the Powers or to "internationalize" the policing function.

Of even greater significance in Franco-British communications was the initiation of military staff conversations between the two countries about December 20, 1905. Military planners on both sides were by now fully aware of the possibility of a Franco-British war against Germany. They had each developed strategic plans for the use of their own forces in such a war and had made certain unilateral estimates of the deployable military strength of the other. Major Huguet, for example, the French military attache' in London, had informed his superiors in November that the English could probably land an army of 100,000 to 120,000 men on the continent in the event of war. The interest of the French military in the size and nature of a British military contribution was paralleled in Britain by the growing belief of the British General Staff that Britain's proper military role in case of war with Germany lay in major operations on the continent rather than in colonial forays or hit-and-run commando-type raids. The Army-Navy dispute over this point was still unresolved at the highest levels, but the General Staff continued to plan on the assumption of a continental campaign alongside the French. Unilateral plans were not enough, however. Effective intervention on the continent required co-ordination of strategy, deployment, mobilization schedules, and so on, with the prospective partner. Both military bureaucracies felt a common need for information about the plans and forces of the other and they proceeded to get it without benefit, at first, of the official permission of their political leaders.

The first contact took place, "apparently by chance", according to one authority on the subject, between Major Huguet and Major General Grierson, the British Director of Military Operations, on Dec. 20 in Hyde Park. Grierson admitted, under Huguet's close questioning, that the General Staff had recently considered the problem of intervention in the continental war. He confirmed Huguet's estimate of British approximate troop strength. He did not commit himself as to how a British force might be deployed, but ridiculed the notion,

which had been widely rumored (and favored by Navy planners) of a raid on Schleswig-Holstein. The men agreed to meet the next day.

At the second meeting, Grierson gave more details about the size and nature of British forces and their timetable for deployment, indicating they could either fight in Belgium or alongside the French army in France. He cautioned Huguet, however, that his giving such information "could not prejudice the decision that the Government would take at a given moment."

On December 28, Huguet had dinner with Colonel Repington, the Times' military correspondent, whose sympathies were strongly pro-French. Huguet remarked that his superiors were disturbed about Grey's failure so far to affirm explicitly Lansdowne's statements about British support for France. Repington the next day sent a letter to Grey, reporting this concern. The Foreign Secretary replied immediately: "I am very interested to hear your conversations with the French Military Attache. I can only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it."

The journalist next contacted Sir George Clarke, the Secretary of the Committee on Imperial Defense, and found the latter very receptive to the idea of joint staff talks. Clarke wanted military information from the French and realized the French likewise needed information from the British. After further discussions early in January, with Repington acting as intermediary between Huguet and the British military authorities, Clarke drafted a set of eleven questions dealing with French plans for the defense of Belgium, various technical problems of Anglo-French military collaboration, and the probable nature of German war plans. Repington carried the questionnaire to Huguet, who took it to Paris on January 7.

Two days later, Clarke revealed to Grey his contacts with Huguet. Grey approved and remarked that it was impossible to approach the French officially, "as this would give the idea of an offensive and defensive alliance which does not exist." Grey also agreed with Clarke that, for the present, the contacts should be concealed from the prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman.

Huguet returned on January 11 with the French response to Clarke's questionnaire. It had been studied carefully by Rouvier and other civilian ministers as well as by military leaders. The French answers expressed the hope that one or two British divisions could arrive in France the 5th or 6th day after the outbreak of war. They wished the British troops to be directly joined

with the French armies and placed under French command; in return, all naval action by both fleets would be under British direction. They opposed the idea of British raids on the German coast. They provided certain estimates of German war plans, but gave no information as to their own, except for vague generalities. Thus, while the information provided was limited, it was very helpful to the British planners and was to be enlarged upon considerably in subsequent exchanges which became more and more detailed and intimate right up to the outbreak of war in 1914.<sup>85</sup>

When Huguet informed his ambassador, Cambon, about these military communications, the latter was so struck by the fact that the British military were studying problems of operations on the continent that he immediately decided, and Rouvier gave his approval, that Grey should be approached for a firmer commitment at the political level.

Cambon saw Grey on January 10. He began by saying he did not believe the German Emperor desired war, but that he was pursuing a "very dangerous policy." By inciting public and military opinion in Germany he had created a risk "that matters might be brought to a point in which a pacific issue would be difficult." Cambon recalled that Lord Lansdowne had suggested that the British and French government discuss "any eventualities". At that time it had not seemed necessary to discuss the eventuality of war, but now it seemed desirable that this eventuality be considered. Then Cambon (in Grey's words) "put the question to me directly and formally." It was "of great importance," the ambassador said, "that the French government should know beforehand whether, in the event of aggression against France by Germany, Great Britain would be prepared to render to France armed assistance."

Grey replied that he could not give a definite answer until after the up-coming elections, when he could consult the cabinet. He did state as his "personal opinion" that "if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement/i.e., the Entente/. . . public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favor of France." Cambon said that "nothing would have a more pacific influence on the Emperor of Germany than the conviction that, if Germany attacked France, she would find England allied against her." Grey answered that he thought that "the German Emperor did believe this, but that it was one thing that this opinion should be held in Germany and another that we should give a positive assurance to France on the subject."<sup>86</sup>

Sanderson, the mildly pro-German Permanent Under-Secretary, who was present at the interview attempted to qualify Grey's sweeping statement that public

opinion would support France, by saying that "the attitude of the British government and the disposition of English opinion would depend on the causes of the rupture, and that the support of England would without doubt be given if the conflict concerned the Anglo-French accords."<sup>87</sup>

Cambon replied that he would repeat his request after the elections. But he asked that military conversations already underway unofficially be permitted to continue with the understanding that they did not bind either government.

In contrast to Sanderson the pro-French clique in the Foreign Office thought Grey had not gone far enough. Mallet, writing to his friend Bertie in Paris, declared: "There is no possible risk in taking this engagement. There will certainly be no war and we stand to gain heavily in France and everywhere by pursuing a logical course. It is expected everywhere abroad. If we refuse on the other hand we shall lose at once all that the Entente has given us--be looked upon as traitors by the French and needs be despised by the Germans." He urged Bertie to write a strong letter to Grey along these lines and also to alert Hardinge to "do everything he can to buck up these miserable creatures."<sup>88</sup>

Hardinge and Crowe, other members of Francophile group, agreed that if England stood solidly with France, Germany would shrink from war.

Bertie did write to Grey, not in a private letter, but in an official dispatch of Jan. 13. He warned the Foreign Minister that if he could promise Cambon only diplomatic support, or neutrality in the event of war, "there is serious danger of a complete revulsion of feeling on the part of the French government and of public opinion in France. The government would consider that they had been deserted and might, in order to avoid the risks of war without an ally, deem it advisable to make great concessions to Germany outside Morocco in order to obtain liberty of action in that country."<sup>89</sup>

Grey wrote Bertie that he feared that a pledge of the sort demanded by Cambon would "change the Entente into an alliance, and alliances, especially continental alliances, are not in accordance with our traditions." He did add, however, that "if France is let in for a war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about Morocco we cannot stand aside, but must take part with France."<sup>90</sup>

Both Grey and Haldane, the Minister of War, felt that although the government could give no binding political commitment to France, the military conversations should continue so that Britain would at least have the practical option of coming to France's assistance in time in case of war, should that be the decision. With this argument they persuaded the Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, to authorize their continuance although he did so with reluctance.

"I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations," he wrote to a friend. "It comes very close to an honorable undertaking: and it will be known on both sides of the Rhine." He agreed only on the condition that they be considered merely "provisional and precautionary measures," not binding the government. The military staff talks thus emerged from their covert character and became "official".<sup>91</sup> Even so, the talks were carefully kept secret, even from some members of the British cabinet. Aside from fearing domestic trouble from his "radical" colleagues, Grey wanted to avoid provoking Germany. In fact, Grey took special precautions to avoid any military or naval action which might be considered "provocative". He instructed the Admiralty:

Any movement of our ships which could be interpreted as a threat to Germany would be very undesirable at this moment and most unfortunate so long as there is a prospect or even a chance that things may go smoothly at the Morocco Conference. . . I hope therefore that the Admiralty won't plan any special cruises or visits to foreign ports or unusual movements of squadrons without consulting the Foreign Office as to the possible political effect.

I assume that the present disposition of the Fleet is satisfactory as regards possibilities between Germany and France; if so the quieter we keep for the present the better.<sup>92</sup>

When Cambon repeated the question to Grey again after the elections, Grey had not consulted the cabinet on the matter, so his answer did not have the full, official authorization of the government. He began by reminding the ambassador that considerable progress had been made in joint military planning so that "no time would have to be lost for want of a formal engagement." He also informed Cambon that he had told the German ambassador that in case of an attack upon France by Germany arising out of the Anglo-French agreement on Morocco, "public feeling in England would be so strong that no British government could remain neutral." This he said had already produced in Germany the "moral effect" which Cambon had urged as the principal value of a formal alliance between Britain and France. At present, he went on, French policy was absolutely free within the wide bounds of the Entente, but in case of a more formal undertaking, Britain would demand the right to press for concessions or alterations in French policy when negotiating with Germany. Grey said he could give no such undertaking without the consent of the cabinet and "though I had no doubt about the good disposition of the cabinet I did think there would be difficulties in putting such an undertaking in writing." He asked Cambon whether "the force of circumstances bringing England and France together was not stronger than any assurance in words which could be given at this moment."<sup>93</sup>

Cambon asked whether Grey could at least express to him the same "personal opinion" that he had expressed to Metternich--that Britain could not remain neutral in case of a German attack upon France. Grey replied that there was a difference between saying this to the German ambassador and saying it to him

because, supposing it appeared that I have overestimated the strength of feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany; but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France, because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must keep well within the mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the war broke out between Germany and France.

For example, he pointed out, the British people would be unwilling to fight in order to put France into possession of Morocco. But if "it appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French Entente, public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France." He added, however, that British sentiment was much adverse to war, and that it was not certain whether this aversion would be overcome by the desire to aid France.<sup>94</sup> On this ambiguous note the conversation ended, with Grey inviting Cambon to reopen it at any time in the future.

Cambon must have come away from this exchange with the feeling that he had a somewhat stronger commitment from the British government than he had after the earlier conversation on January 10, in fact a very strong one, if he discounted much of Grey's ambiguity in the light of his delicate position in his own government. Although Grey had not, in the diplomatic code language of the day, gone further in directly committing himself to France than he had in the earlier conversation, and although he had been somewhat more definite in declining the French request for a formal military pledge or alliance, he did explicitly underscore two related items of communication--the military conversations and the strong statements made to Metternich--in such a way as to indicate that the whole package, in toto, constituted, in his mind, the functional equivalent of an alliance. Yet, in refusing Cambon's direct request that he repeat, directly to him (Cambon) the stronger language used with Metternich, Grey planted just enough uncertainty in Cambon's mind to prevent the French from being too overconfident.

Aside from his domestic problems, Grey faced, in these communications with the Germans and the French, the classical problem of a third party to a conflict: that of deterring the opponent while at the same time restraining the ally. To the Germans, he emphasized the high probability of British armed support of France in case of war. To the French, however, he promised only "diplomatic" support,

Grey's dilemma

refusing to give an explicit pledge of armed assistance, while nevertheless permitting joint plans for such assistance to go forward at a lower, bureaucratic level. He did weigh the balance somewhat on the side of deterrence, sacrificing something in restraint of the ally, but making the military talks "official", by emphasizing the political implications of these talks to Cambon, and by revealing to Cambon the strong statements made to Germany. He probably felt he had instilled in French minds about the right amount of certainty (or uncertainty) of British military support to make France firm on the main issues in the forthcoming negotiations, but not so intransigent as to be willing to provoke or precipitate war over some small issue. Towards Germany he had been less ambiguous in the interest of deterrence, but ambiguous enough that the political losses would be minimized in case Britain, for domestic reasons, decided to stand aside in case of war. Most importantly, perhaps, he kept British hands relatively free. With British military power not explicitly and publicly committed, Britain would have maximum political power at the conference with respect to both of the main protagonists. Finally, Grey nimbly, though perhaps not quite honorably (only a few members of the Cabinet were told of his talks with Cambon) finessed his domestic problem.

#### V Resolution

The Conference of Algeciras opened on January 16, 1906. There were three distinct groups: the German, the British-French-Spanish-Russian, which generally supported the French position, and the American-Italian-Austrian group, which played a mediating role. The principal delegates were von Radowitz and Tattenbach for Germany, Revoil for France, Nicolson for Great Britain, White for the U.S., Venosta for Italy and Welsersheimb for Austria.

The conference quickly settled a number of minor issues before turning to the troublesome ones: the organization of the police and the establishment of a state bank. Of these two, the police issue was the most important, since its disposition would determine which outside powers would control the instruments of physical coercion in the major Moroccan cities, and from this control many other benefits would automatically follow.

Prompted by the other delegates, Radowitz and Revoil began direct conversations on the bank and the police on January 25. The French delegate made his proposals first. The main points concerning the bank were that capital subscriptions should be divided among France, Spain, Great Britain, Germany and Italy, with France providing slightly more than any of the others (27%) and France and Spain together subscribing 50% and that French banks should have a preferential right to make loans to the Moroccan government or to the bank. On the police, Revoil



proposed, naturally, that the entire control be given to France and Spain. As a slight concession, Revoil said that "all desirable international agreements could be made" to insure that no other rights beyond policing could be deduced from this control, and to guarantee complete commercial equality." He also said that France might agree to the addition of a third country to control the execution of the police mandate.<sup>95</sup>

The Germans, believing that the conference "so far as grouping and general course are concerned, is turning out favorably for us," proposed an equal division of capital for the bank and rejected the French demand for preference in making loans. On the police, they presented three options: (1) each of the interested Powers might participate equally in the reorganization of the police, with each in control of certain ports, (2) one or several smaller countries, not directly involved in the dispute, could assume the duty, or (3) the choice of foreign officers for the police could be left up to the Sultan. The German government at first pushed for the third option, expecting, of course, that the anti-French Sultan would grant a considerable role to Germany.<sup>96</sup>

However, the German delegates found that the Italian, American, Russian and British delegates all supported the French proposal, and therefore they advised their government to compromise. Disapproval of the German plan was expressed by the home governments of all the important Powers. Of special significance was the attitude of Austria. Goluchowski the Foreign Minister, told the German government that both plans 1 and 3 were hopeless, that "Morocco was not worth a war".

The German government was in a minority of one, but still hoped to win by a show of determination and threats. Telegrams were sent to all the participating Powers threatening to break up the conference as a "lesser evil" than sacrificing German interests. Rouvier was told that Germany had agreed (in the pre-conference bargaining) to French control of the frontier with Algeria under the expectation that France would agree to German terms for the rest of Morocco. Moreover, if the conference failed, the legal status of Morocco would revert to that of the Convention of 1880, the German government declared; the subsequent special agreements between France and England and France and Spain would be null and void.

The other powers all reacted unfavorably to this German move. Austria and Russia asked President Roosevelt to exert his influence with the German Emperor to moderate the German demands and he agreed. Roosevelt who was thought to have considerable influence with the Emperor earlier had tended to support the Germans on Morocco, but now had come around to the French side. As he saw it, France was the protector of Morocco's integrity, against the German imperialist

aim of dividing Morocco up into sectors. Germany, he thought, was playing the "big bully", with Russia temporarily neutralized by revolution: he even had visions of Germany defeating the British navy and conquering England.<sup>97</sup>

Rouvier firmly rejected the German claim that he had agreed before the conference not to ask for French and Spanish control of the ports. He had agreed, he said, that the solution of the police question "should be international in principle, namely by conference," but not so in "execution." A formal French reply to the German proposals was given on February 16. It did contain some minor concessions, but without sacrificing anything of the essence of the French position. France had no objection to the "organization" of the police in the ports by the Sultan, so long as the foreign officers he chose would be French and Spanish. Nor did the French object to some sort of international "surveillance" of the police. The details of the French counter-proposal were presented to the German government by the American government, which also recommended the plan as its own. The men and officers of the police in the ports would be Moors, but "duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assisting in management and control" would be entrusted to French and Spanish officers. (This introduction of the word "instruction" instead of "command" or "control" was an apparent French concession). The French and Spanish instructing officers would report annually to the government of Italy, which would have the right of inspection and verification. Finally, France and Spain would guarantee and "open door" for trade and competition for public works and concessions.<sup>98</sup>

Bulow refused completely the proposal as it was communicated in general terms by the French, but when the American government presented the detailed plan, with the authority of Roosevelt behind it, he receded on some minor points. He agreed, for example, that the Sultan might place Tangier and perhaps one other port under the control of France alone, but that in other ports, officers of various nationalities should cooperate.<sup>99</sup> All the other parties realized that this would be unacceptable to the French.

Then on Feb. 19 and 20, the Russian government made an interesting move toward Germany, raising again the old vision of the "continental alliance." If Germany persisted in refusing the French proposals, Lamsdorff told the German ambassador, the conference would break up, and Germany would be blamed for the continuance of tension. The Bjorko ideal should be kept alive, he urged, and for it to be realized it was necessary that France and Germany become friends.

Witte, the Russian premier, urged the German government and the Emperor personally to permit a speedy settlement of the dispute on the French terms. Until then, he argued, the continental grouping could not be formed. Although

Lamsdorff had always opposed the idea of the "continental alliance" and Witte had by now realized its impracticality, the idea was a useful "carrot" to hold before Germany as a means of persuasion.

Lamsdorff elaborated further on the costs and dangers which would arise should the conference fail through German "obstinacy". There would be a crisis in French government, with the probable downfall of Rouvier and his replacement by a more intransigent person. There would be anarchy in Morocco "which might bring forth bellicose complications at any moment," in which England would fight on France's side. A war would kindle new revolution outbreaks "which would also lead to difficult times for Germany." But the worst outcome "would be that the foundation for the peace program agreed upon by the two monarchs/the Bjorko agreement/ should be destroyed. . . .<sup>100</sup>

These Russian warnings and enticements apparently had no effect on the German government.

Great Britain also gave her fullest support to the French proposal and also, like the Russians, made use of both carrots and sticks in communicating with the Germans. Grey repeated to Metternich on Feb. 19 that British public opinion would demand active support of France in case of war. This, of course, would force postponement of an Anglo-German rapprochement. He promised the ambassador that if Germany gave way on Morocco, he would work for such a rapprochement.<sup>101</sup>

Grey at this point was pessimistic about the conference being able to reach a settlement and fearful of the consequences if it should break up without result. He hoped that France could be induced to make some concessions to prevent this. His thoughts, contained in an intra-governmental memorandum, are worth quoting at some length.

If the conference breaks up without result the situation will be very dangerous. Germany will endeavour to establish her influence in Morocco at the expense of France. France to counteract this or even simply to protect herself and a neighbour from the state of disturbance, which is now chronic in Morocco, will be driven to take action in Morocco, which Germany may make a casus belli.

If there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for us to keep out of it. The Entente and still more the constant and emphatic demonstrations of affection . . . have created in France a belief that we should support her in war. . . If this expectation is disappointed the French will never forgive us. . .

On the other hand the prospect of a European war and of our being involved in it is horrible.

I propose therefore, if unpleasant symptoms develop after the conference is over, to tell the French ambassador that a great effort and if need be some sacrifice should in our opinion be made to avoid war. To do this we should have to find out what compensation Germany would ask or accept as the price of her recognition of the French claims in Morocco. . . .I should myself be in favour of allowing Germany a port or coaling station, if that would ensure peace; but it would be necessary to consult the Admiralty about this, and to find out whether the French would entertain the idea, and if so, what port?

The real objection to the course proposed is that the French may think it pusillanimous and a poor result of the Entente. I should have to risk this. I hope the French would recognize that in a war with Germany our liabilities would be much less than theirs. We should risk little or nothing on land, and at sea we might shut the German fleet up in Kiel and keep it there without losing a ship or a man or even firing a shot. The French would have a life and death struggle and that expenditure of blood and treasure with a doubtful issue. They ought therefore not to think it pusillanimous on our part to wish to avoid a war in which our danger was so much less than theirs.

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I have also a further point of view. The door is being kept open by us for a rapprochement with Russia; there is at least a prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good terms with her. An Entente between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be done. The present is the most unfavorable moment for attempting to check her. Is it not a grave mistake, if there must be a quarrel with Germany for France or ourselves to let Germany choose the moment which best suits her?

There is a possibility that war may come before these suggestions of mine can be developed in diplomacy. If so it will only be because Germany has made up her mind that she wants war and intends to have it anyhow, which I do not believe is the case. But I think we ought in our minds to face the question now, whether we can keep out of war, if war breaks out between France and Germany. The more I review the situation the more it appears to me that we cannot without losing our good name and our friends and wrecking our policy and position in the world.<sup>102</sup>

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This statement is quite revealing of Grey's thinking on a number of points:

1. He realized that Britain was fully committed to fight with France by the values she would lose if she did not fight, even though a formal pledge had not been given to France. These values were almost entirely "supergame" values--preserving the Entente and Britain's general bargaining reputation and reputation for trustworthiness.

2. But he wished desperately to avoid war, and was willing to risk antagonizing France by suggesting French concessions to preserve peace.

3. Concessions were particularly necessary since, with Russia weakened by revolution, the present time was less favorable for risking a war with

Germany than later after Russia had become stronger and a Franco-British-Russian Entente had been established.

4. Grey believed that war would come only if Germany positively wanted war. From this one might infer that he believed that French (and British?) firmness was fully credible to the Germans. But he did not think Germany wanted war, implying thus that he thought of Germany as being in a chicken game, rather than prisoner's dilemma. On the other hand, the possibility of war was very real to him, and there is some evidence in his statement that he saw this possibility arising not from the reasoned calculations of the parties (bargaining) but out of circumstances following the break-up of the conference which might get out of the control of the parties (cataclysmic).

5. Grey did not think in terms of an absolutely firm Franco-British stand as a means of preserving peace. The way to do this was to make concessions. His determination to stand by the Entente in case of war was motivated not by deterrent considerations but by the need to preserve the allegiance of France and the other supergame values mentioned above. But if he thought of Germany in a chicken game, as he implied, then uncompromising firmness would seem to be a better alternative than conciliation. A possible reason why he did not advance this alternative is that he was not sure of his judgment that Germany was playing chicken. Or possibly that he thought of coercion as being irrelevant for preserving peace (possibly counter-productive) since war, if it occurred, would arise out of emotional, non-rational "cataclysmic" elements. Or possibly because he knew he could not make an absolutely firm commitment because of the division in his cabinet, and that because of this division, British intentions must always be uncertain in the minds of the Germans. Finally, he might have been simply reflecting a "soft-line" personal disposition to prefer accommodation to coercion.

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There are certain other inconsistencies and ambiguities in the statement worth pointing out. Grey felt it would be better to postpone war with Germany until formation of the Triplex Entente. But a war avoided in the present as a result of French concessions under British pressure might destroy the chances for any Triple Entente at all because of the demonstration of British weakness. This is a dilemma which is of course inherent in multipolarity: nations may have to fight wars under disadvantageous conditions in order to protect their alliance value. Incidentally, Grey's logic that the French could not consider the British "pusillanimous" in advocating concessions, since British war costs would be less than the French, seems very weak; the very opposite would be much more plausible. And further, Grey's belief that the British might escape

710. "without losing a ship or a man" seems to contradict his belief that war would be "horrible" for England. The statement that Britain would lose "little or nothing on land" is inconsistent with the fact that British war planners were already planning for a major campaign on the continent. It is conceivable that Grey had not yet learned of these plans. He had authorized joint military conversations but he might not have yet been informed of their content.

The essential contradiction in Grey's policy, however, was that he wanted to support the Entente and at the same time urge concessions upon the French which they were unwilling to make. It was simply logically impossible for him to do both successfully. A show of support for the Entente sacrificed his leverage upon the French in urging concessions, pushing for concessions with a hint of withdrawal of support endangered the Entente. As we shall see, Grey's total commitment to the Entente, and the French knowledge of it, completely vitiated British attempts to persuade the French to be conciliatory.

*Alexis Dilemma*  
The British dilemma was neatly illustrated in an incident which occurred very soon after Grey wrote his memo. Grey's proposal for conceding a port to Germany met, surprisingly, with no opposition from the Admiralty. But when a rumor reached French ears that the British Admiralty was willing to let the Germans have the port of Mogador, Cambon made anxious inquiries at the Foreign Office. Grey had already been told by his Foreign Office hard-liners that the Germans would interpret such a concession as a "sign of weakness." Now, seeing the adverse reaction of the French as well, he withdrew the proposal, making clear he was doing so for fear of antagonizing France not for fear of encouraging Germany. He asked Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, to conceal the fact that the concession had even been contemplated, and Cambon was given a categorical denial of the rumors he had heard.<sup>103</sup>

Meanwhile, Germany was feeling heavy pressure from her ally, Austria. Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, urged Berlin to accept the French offer of Feb. 16 and seek compensation on the question of the bank. Emperor Francis Joseph himself intervened on Feb. 23. He told the German ambassador that while Austria would loyally stand by Germany at the conference, it appeared that they would be isolated if matters came to a vote. This would be bad enough, but if the conference failed, a new diplomatic alignment would appear, with Russia disassociating herself from the other two eastern monarchies and lining up with Great Britain and France. This, he declared, it was necessary to avoid. Thus, Austria, too, had hopes, if not of realizing a full-fledged "continental alliance" against Britain, at least of realizing something from the Bjorko agreement and weakening the ties between Russia and the western powers.<sup>104</sup>

It is worth pausing a moment to examine the difference between the Austrian and the British positions vis-a-vis their allies. Both of these countries were thinking principally in supergame terms: the consequences of the conference's outcome on the alignments of the powers. But for the Austrians, their own alliance was not at stake; for the British it was. The Austrians need have no fear of being deserted by the Germans, for the German dependence on Austria, her sole ally, was as clear as anything could be in the pervasive uncertainty of a multipolar system. But the French were not so dependent on Britain, for they had Russia. Thus the British fears of French desertion were quite plausible. Because of this difference in utility to their allies, the Austrians could be much more blunt in pressing concessions upon the Germans than the British could upon the French. In fact, Austria's opposition to the German proposals was made quite clear throughout the conference, and while she promised to support Germany in an ultimate vote, she played a mediating role and often a pro-French role in the negotiations.

By the end of February the conference was approaching a break-down and tension and fears of war were again rising. France decided to force the issue by demanding that it be debated in a formal plenary session, rather than in informal discussions as heretofore. In a vote taken on March 3, the German proposals were supported only by Austria and Morocco, and in a later vote, March 5, she was deserted even by Austria. Germany then decided to retreat and allowed the Austrian delegate, Welshersheimb, to propose a compromise. The police command would be French and Spanish in every port except Casablanca, where a Swiss or Dutch officer would be in charge. The latter would have the power of inspection over all the police and would report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier.<sup>105</sup>

This was indeed a major concession, which was greeted with relief and supported by all delegates and governments except the French and Spanish. The British government put considerable pressure on the French to accept it. Nicolson told Revoil that there could be no thought of allowing the conference to break down now with a favorable result so nearly reached and Grey expressed himself similarly to Cambon. Nicolson reported, however, that the French believed the Germans could be squeezed still further. Grey wrote that the German concession "really gives them/the French/ the substance" and that "it would be a great pity if France sacrificed the substance to the shadow."<sup>106</sup>

Now it was the French who were isolated, but they refused to budge. They were handicapped by the fall of their government on March 7 over a domestic issue, so they had no authority to make concessions, but they probably would not

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have made any in any case. On March 13, Rouvier demanded modifications in the Austrian plan. The police instructors at Casablanca must be French or Spanish as at the other ports. There could be an inspector from a neutral state, but with no command powers and he would report to the Sultan rather than to the diplomatic corps at Tangier.<sup>107</sup> This was virtually equivalent to the original French proposal.

The German delegates' response to this was that the neutral inspector had to have a port and be in command of the police there; this was a sine qua non condition; they had spoken their last word.

A new French government was formed on March 14 with Sarrien as Premier and Bourgeois as Foreign Minister. Although Bourgeois was known to be a conciliatory man interested in harmonizing international relations he could hardly begin his governmental career with a concession at this crucial point in the negotiations, one which was certain to be unpopular at home. He therefore renewed Revoil's instructions, refusing to compromise on the police question in any manner.

In view of the perceptions and sentiment in the French cabinet, and the apparent line-up of the Powers at the conference, this was a bold and somewhat risky move. The French government knew that the Russian, Italian, British and Austrian governments disapproved. Because of British statements in London and Algieras that France should accept a neutral police at Casablanca rather than allow the conference to break up, there was considerable apprehension in Parliament and in the cabinet that the British were about to withdraw their support, even that they were about to come to some arrangement with the Germans.<sup>108</sup>

Nevertheless, the move succeeded. As soon as the uncompromising new French instructions were published, Grey was again faced with the choice between supporting the Entente at all costs, or continuing to press the French to compromise at the risk of damaging the Entente. Again, he chose the former course and informed the French government that Great Britain would support its position. Indeed, when he heard of the French doubts about British aid, he was driven to new effusions of loyalty. With some indignation, he told Bertie in Paris to tell the French leaders that "there has never been any question here of discontinuing our support to France. . . Any advice Nicolson has given to Revoil has been on the understanding that this support would be continued, and if he has given advice freely it has been because of his complete confidence that this was understood by his French colleague. The same is true of my conversations with Cambon." Grey made similar statements to the other governments and even had the French paper, Le Temps, publish his instructions to Nicolson so that the French public could see how complete the British support was.<sup>109</sup>

*Grey's Dilemma*



It is interesting that the hard line (pro-French) coalition in Britain began to crack at this point. Grey, who earlier had shown considerable "softness" or at least moderation on concessions to Germany, had now, because of his extreme commitment to the Entente, become locked into a policy of unequivocal support for France on all issues. This was too much for some members of the hard line group in the Foreign Office. From Moscow, Hardinge telegraphed to Nicolson his opposition to Grey's instructions, arguing that the French should not be supported at this juncture if it meant allowing the conference to break down. Nicolson shared this view: he told Grey that although the Germans were willing to make concessions to achieve a settlement, the French "apparently do not care if the conference does break down." Hardinge and Nicolson were overruled by Grey, however, with Britain again standing clearly and firmly behind her, France was again in a strong position. Bourgeois told the German ambassador on March 17 that France would not recede. It was "a question of principle" he said, "a vital question for France and her prestige in Algeria," that the neutral inspector not have any command functions.<sup>111</sup>

The Germans must have known by now that there was no hope for them; yet they held on doggedly and kept probing for some formula which would not have the appearance of a complete French victory. Welshersheimb and Revoil had a long private conversation on March 23 in an attempt to find a solution. Welshersheimb said Germany would give up her demand for neutral police at Casablanca if France would make a reciprocal concession. Revoil agreed to reduce somewhat the French shares in the state bank, and a settlement of this issue was reached on those terms. But there were other issues. How much international control should be established over the police and the bank and how the police should be divided among the various ports, and on these, the two men failed to reach an understanding. The German government demanded that the neutral inspector should be responsible to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, but Revoil rejected any involvement of the diplomatic corps. On the bank, the Germans also wanted the diplomatic corps to have supervisory authority; again Revoil refused. As to the allocation of ports, the Germans wanted the conference itself to make the division; France insisted that France and Spain should determine this themselves in consultation with the Sultan.

The conference was again in deadlock, over what seemed on the surface to be very picayune matters, but of course it was now prestige that was at stake, and prestige was important, especially for the Germans who were desperately trying to avoid complete humiliation. They felt they had to be firmer after the publication in Le Temps of the very pro-French instructions to the Russian

delegate, which, following upon the publication of the British instructions to Nicolson, made it appear that the German government was being coerced.

Finally, the mediating delegates were able to force a settlement on March 26. Germany agreed that France and Spain could divide up the ports as they wished, provided they submitted their decision to the conference for approval. Both Germany and France made concessions on the control of the bank, such that it would have a weak form of international supervision. On the problem of the responsibility of the neutral police inspector, it was agreed that he should report to the Sultan but send a copy of his reports to the dean of the diplomatic corps, so that that body might confirm that the police were "functioning in conformity with the decision taken by the conference. . ."112

After clearing up a variety of minor details, the delegates signed the Act of Algeciras on April 7, 1906 and the conference was over.

FOOTNOTES

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79. Ibid., p. 320.
80. This description of the new Liberal government follows Monger, op. cit., pp. 257-260.
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## CONCLUSIONS

A major theme of our book will be the relation between system structure, bargaining or strategic interaction, and internal politics and decision-making. I will therefore write this analytical conclusion in this framework. Systemic forces and domestic politics are the external and internal conditioners, respectively, of the bargaining process and the bargaining behavior of the parties. It is convenient, then, to begin with a discussion of these two parameters before moving to the bargaining process itself.

### I. Systemic Factors

#### A. The logic of multipolarity

I have not fully worked out this logic, so the following remarks are tentative and preliminary. In very abstract and idealized terms, a multipolar international system follows the logic of an n-person game. In such a game, the chief concerns of the actors are two: to be in a winning coalition, and to maximize their own share of the payoff to the winning coalition. In the international game, the payoffs come in the currency of security and power, minus various kinds of costs and risks.

Continuing to reason abstractly, each actor can logically form an alliance with any other actor or actors. Each actor tries to be a member of coalition which is strong enough to deter, or win a war against, the largest possible opposing coalition. (William Riker has advanced the "size principle" which states that the size of coalitions will be limited to that necessary to win; when this point is reached the cost of acquiring new allies is greater than the benefits the latter can contribute. However, it seems likely that in international politics, largely because of uncertainties about others capabilities and intentions, larger than winning coalitions may often be formed.) There is great fluidity and instability of alignment: defection and realignment of any actor is always possible. This consideration is always present in the calculations of the actors, both as to the gains which an actor can itself secure by realignment, and as to the dangers that another member of one's alliance may defect.

This extreme fluidity in the abstract is considerably inhibited in reality, however, by the presence of certain tangible conflicts of interests between pairs of actors, or by affinities and disaffinities of ideology and sentiment, which place obstacles in the way of certain alliances which may be abstractly possible. Considerations of spatial location and the reluctance of some powers to "play the game" also introduce modifications. This can be illustrated by the system that existed in 1905, a system of eight essential actors: Germany,

France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Italy, Japan and the United States. An alliance between Germany and France was hardly possible because of the depth of lingering hostility in France over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Similarly, an Austro-Russian alliance was unlikely because of the specific conflicts of interest between these countries in the Balkans, even though monarchic government in both countries created a certain sense of ideological brotherhood. The United States, protected by the Atlantic Ocean and the fragmentation of power in Europe, felt no need to play the alliance game. Japan wished to play it only in Asia where her own tangible interests were located.

A multipolar system is a system of "anarchy" in which each actor is potentially a threat to the security of every other actor. Each actor is in a "primary supergame" of prisoner's dilemma with each other actor (see my article on "Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Models. . .for the distinction between the primary and secondary supergame).<sup>1</sup> At one logical extreme, each actor is in the DD cell in each of its games with other actors--i.e., each state is competing for power and security with each other state separately. Logically, another extreme would be for all actors to move to CC in their games with the other actors. Institutional manifestations of this might be either world government or a collective security system; more realistically, it might be an all-around settlement of all outstanding disputes.

Each of these polar opposites is logically untenable. This is so for all-around CC because of pervasive mistrust. All-around DD is unstable because there are potentials for alliance with some other states which yield (in the short-run at least) a competitive advantage in the DD cell vis-a-vis the most threatening opponents. In general, when alliances are made, the parties move into the CC cell in their game with each other and strengthen themselves in the DD struggle with their common opponent(s). However, with respect to any other actor, there is an area lying between full CC (alliance) and full DD (enmity and struggle) which is characterized by such things as settlement of disputes, reduction of tension, arms agreements, spheres of influence, detente, entente and so on.

When a crisis arises between any two states in such a system, other states tend to become implicated as allies, potential allies or as mediators. The preservation and perhaps the enlargement of one's own alliance, and the disruption of the opponent's alliance will be important stakes, perhaps more important than the immediate issue in dispute. The direct protagonists must calculate their degree of allied support in deciding to challenge or deny, and at every subsequent move of the confrontation. Supporting allies face a dilemma between pledging their aid to the ally directly involved, to promote the latter's



victory, and withholding such a pledge in order to restrain the ally and encourage him to compromise. Each course has its characteristic risks: full support, that of a war which, for the supporting ally, may be more costly than warranted by the immediate issue at stake; withholding of support, that of possible alienation of the ally and his defection and realignment after the crisis is over. Which course is chosen will depend on the value of the immediate stakes plus the alliance (supergame) stakes for the supporting ally, compared to the cost and risk of war.

Ordinarily, the immediate stakes will be less for the supporting ally than for the ally directly involved. Hence the opponent will try to formulate his demands so that their acceptance is less costly for the supporting ally on the other side than either the cost-risk of war or the cost-risk of losing the allegiance of the "target" ally. Then the supporting ally may be able to withhold support and thus force acceptance upon the target ally. However, if the supergame values of preserving its alliance are very high for the supporting ally, its stakes may be just as high or higher than those of the target state and this tactic of splitting the opposing alliance by playing upon an asymmetry of interest may not be possible.

In a multipolar crisis, when alignments are given, the range of options for the parties is narrower than in a bipolar crisis. This is because the power of each actor, both in the immediate crisis and in the long-run, is critically dependent on the allegiance and support of allies. To put it another way, a large portion of the military power potentially available to support threats is controlled by another government or governments (in obvious contrast to bipolarity). Hence demands, resistance-points, concessions, and threats must have the credible support of the supporting ally to be tenable. In short, the bargaining range (if any) is restricted to the limits of tolerance of the supporting allies on each side. On the other hand, the supporting ally may find its options restricted by the supergame imperative of preserving the alliance; if so, and if perceived by the target ally, the latter's options will be increased.

However, if alignments are not absolutely firm, the options of the protagonists may be increased by adding the possibility of engineering a realignment during the course of the crisis. Hence one of the protagonists may be willing to yield on the issue in dispute if this promises to transform the rival into an ally. The gain in the supergame more than offsets the loss on the immediate issue. Conceivably, yielding might also be motivated by a desire to show the opponent that there is no basic hostility or conflict between him and oneself; that

therefore his alliance with another state is unnecessary; thus perhaps leading to a weakening or break-up of his alliance--a supergame gain for oneself.

Images of "resolve" are likely to be less important in a multipolar system than a bipolar one because of the greater fluidity and uncertainty in the identification of other states as friends or foes. A show of weakness toward the antagonist of the moment may not necessarily be taken as a sign of weakness toward all possible opponents. Concessions in a crisis may not indicate general weakness, for they may be intended as a prelude to realignment, with the opponent transformed into an ally. A state's resolve in a crisis will depend greatly on the degree of support it receives from its allies; hence its own past demonstrations of weakness or toughness are less reliable predictors. In a bipolar system, by contrast, enemy and ally identifications are relatively permanent, the superpowers are in conflict over a wide range of issues over a long period of time, their resolve is less dependent on the vagaries of allied support, and crises are likely to be viewed as linked episodes in a general global confrontation. In this system, it is more plausible that commitments and images of resolve will be "interdependent," that the parties will extrapolate demonstrated weakness or toughness from one situation to another.

#### B. The logic applied

The logic outlined above (admittedly very incomplete) can now be related to some aspects of the Moroccan crisis. Looking first at the challenge by France, this was undertaken only after the systemic groundwork had been laid by a series of agreements with other powers. Spain was bought off by making her an accomplice. Italy and England, both formerly rivals of France in the imperial arena, were "neutralized" by tie-in agreements which settled sources of conflict with them. In prisoner's dilemma terminology, France moved to the CC cell in its imperial games with Italy and England, where formerly she had been competing with them in the DD cell. The movement was more limited in the case of Italy than with England. Italy remained an ally of Germany but the cohesion of this alliance had been weakened. The arrangement with England was not a formal alliance, but it was an incipient one, or at least it had strong alliance overtones. In short, with Italy, France guaranteed herself against opposition; with England she did this plus gaining some degree of active support.

Germany had four "systemic" options in response to the Anglo-French Entente, as follows.

1. Negotiate a similar Entente with England, a settlement of outstanding

colonial issues. This would have meant moving from DD to CC in the PD with England, not "all the way" in the sense of contracting an alliance, but perhaps accompanied by a reduction in the naval rivalry. This would have strengthened Germany in her DD competition with France, by implicitly eliminating the alliance overtones of the Anglo-French agreement.

2. Conciliate France on Morocco and negotiate a similar entente with her on all outstanding colonial issues. This might have demonstrated to France that Germany was friendly, persuaded her that an alliance with England was unnecessary, and induced her to join a new alignment with Germany and Russia against England. This would have meant moving toward CC with France, either partway (settlement of disputes and weakening the Anglo-French Entente) or all the way (alliance).

3. Coerce France to give up her Moroccan plans, demonstrate that Britain lacked the will to support her, thus break the Entente by revealing its uselessness to France. This meant gaining a victory over France in the DD competition and weakening her in future DD competition by killing her incipient alliance with Britain.

4. Coerce Britain on some other issue (Egypt?); demonstrate French faithlessness to England; thus break the Entente. This meant a direct gain in the DD competition with either France or England. This option is mentioned only for completeness; it was not seriously considered by Germany.

As the preceding narrative has related, Germany first tried option 1, which failed because Britain was unwilling to trade the competitive benefits of her Entente with France for a reduction of conflict with Germany.

Thereafter, Germany was torn between options 2 and 3: conciliating France as a prelude to formation of a continental league against Britain, or coercing France and hopefully destroying the Entente in the process-- although the second (option 3) was dominant through most of the crisis. Both strategies had the common aim of "breaking the ring" which the Germans saw taking shape around them, but they were contradictory in terms of means. Caught in this contradiction, the German government was at first simply immobilized by indecision, then it vacillated between the two strategies. Option 2 was tried first in late 1904, before the Morocco issue had flared to crisis proportions, in an abortive move toward alliance with Russia which France was expected to join. After that, during the crisis, Germany followed mainly the coercive track, but tried to switch to the accommodative tract in the late summer of 1905 with the Bjorke Treaty and certain conciliatory gestures to France.

The attempt failed again because Russia was unwilling to trade her existing alliance with France for one with Germany and insisted on French adherence or at least approval. But France by this time was in no mood for accommodation. Germany might have realized the accommodation option earlier if she had accepted Delcasse's offer of "satisfaction" or Rouvier's more explicit proposals for a general colonial settlement. But at this point Germany was committed to the coercive course. Thus when France was ready for accommodation, Germany was not, and when Germany was ready (having seen roadblocks ahead on the coercive tract) France had lost interest. The Kaiser, incidentally, was not told of the early French offers and said later he would have accepted them had he been informed.

Each of the German strategies undermined the other. Accommodation failed because of French stiffening in reaction to earlier German coercion, because the accommodative moves were only half-hearted, inhibited as they were by the government's basic inclination toward coercion, and because they were blocked in implementation by a reluctant Foreign Office bureaucracy. Coercion ultimately failed, basically, to be sure, because the French and British values at stake were greater than the German, but also in part because the hesitant accommodative gestures had created an impression of weakness.

German strategy towards England was also beset by contradictions stemming from these two systemic options. A full accommodation with England was ruled out by the autonomous tension and rivalry between the two countries which antedated and paralleled the Moroccan conflict. But any hope of successfully coercing France rested on at least moderating the Anglo-German hostility in order to weaken the British incentive to support France. This in turn required alleviation or termination of the naval arms race, but the Germans could not bring themselves to drop their cherished naval plans. Consequently, the British were driven more and more to identify Germany as their enemy and to cleave ever more closely to France.

The German naval building program was consistent with the strategy of accommodating France and organizing a "continental league," for both would be directed against England. In fact, the naval program had been predicated on the political assumption that conflicts between Britain, and France and Russia, were so deep-seated that Britain would never align with either of these countries and therefore would be unable to concentrate her entire fleet in the North Sea. The Anglo-French Entente had undermined this assumption and the logical German strategy in the Moroccan crisis, from the point of view of their naval objectives, was to conciliate France so as to weaken the Entente at least to the point where

Britain and France might once again perceive themselves as potential enemies. But of course the actually dominant German strategy in the Moroccan affair only served to strengthen the Entente, enhance the prospect of British alignment with Russia, and frustrate the achievement of German aims on the sea.

In sum: The naval rivalry made the continental league desirable for Germany. But it also made it less possible because it increased England's valuation of the Entente and her commitment to France, which in turn increased the attractiveness for France of a strategy of resistance rather than accommodation with Germany. Thus the naval program helped to defeat both the coercive and the accommodative German strategies. In turn, the coercion of France backfired on Germany's naval goals by exacerbating passions and fears in England and goading her to greater armament efforts.

The mutual fear and hostility between Germany and England which focused on the naval race was a case of the classic "security dilemma." Neither country had any thought of attacking the other (except for a few extremist individuals) but each suspected the other of aggressive designs. These suspicions not only increased the apparent urgency of the shipbuilding programs but also led to mutual fears of preventive attack, fears which reached their height, particularly on the German side, during the Moroccan crisis. Many Germans concluded that the only way to meet the British threat was to ally with Russia. This was the real genesis of the Bjorko Treaty and the subsequent tentative moves to conciliate France.

Through Bjorko, the naval race also linked up with Germany's drive to oust Delcasse". One motive for this was the belief that Delcasse' was behind the Russian government's reluctance to ratify the Bjorko Treaty and its insistence on French adherence. Thus the objective of removing Delcasse' was consistent with both the accommodative and coercive strategies: the coercive because it was thought Delcasse's successor would be more likely to capitulate on Morocco; the accommodative because the successor would be more responsive to overtures for French and Russian realignment with Germany. The elimination of the French foreign minister was the only German objective during the crisis on which the hard-liners and soft-liners (i.e., anti-French and pro-French) found themselves in complete agreement, although for quite different reasons.

The British "systemic situation" may be recapitulated as follows. Four or five years prior to the crisis, Britain faced up to a problem of too many enemies and not enough power. Several moves were designed either to neutralize an enemy or gain more power or both. After trying Germany first, unsuccessfully,

she gained power in her DD competition with Russia in the Far East via the alliance with Japan. An attempt to move toward CC with Russia (a colonial settlement) failed, but attempts continued which were to bear fruit in 1907. She moved to CC with France in the Entente accord of 1904. The alliance overtones of this agreement strengthened her in her DD conflict with Germany, although this effect was not fully intended or appreciated in Britain at first.

The Entente had three sorts of values for Britain: (1) reduction of conflict with France, (2) stepping-stone toward reduction of conflict with Russia and (3) more power in the conflict with Germany. The British appreciation of (3) gradually increased during the crisis as the nature of the German threat became clearer, and with the advent of a new government more oriented toward continental politics and less interested in empire. The value of the Entente was heightened further by the alliance with Japan and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. The alliance created a danger that France and Britain would become involved in the war on opposite sides and an important function of the Entente was to preclude this. The sum of all these "supergame" stakes drove Britain to unflinching support of France even though she had little or no intrinsic interest in Morocco itself.

Unlike Germany, Britain had no further "systemic options". The United States was not "playing the game" so alliance with her was not possible. The naval rivalry with Germany made an alliance with her unlikely though not impossible. Britain did hold out the possibility of a rapprochement as a "carrot" to Germany, during the crisis, as an inducement to yield. France at one point began to fear a possible British realignment with Germany, and almost, in consequence, accepted the German-Austrian compromise proposal. Essentially, however, Britain was completely dependent on the Entente. She was therefore committed by her interests to lend military support to France, and this commitment (and France's knowledge of it) prevented Britain from exerting any significant leverage on France during the crisis.

For France also, there was an interaction between system options and bargaining strategies. During the period when Rouvier was bent on accommodating Germany, the Entente had relatively low value for France. When these overtures failed and France shifted to a strategy of resistance, the value of the Entente went up. Rouvier's image of England shifted radically: she was no longer a nefarious inciter of conflict but a bulwark of French security. (Rather hesitantly, I advance the hypothesis here that images of other countries may be a dependent variable, dependent on the country's role in one's bargaining

strategy.) At any rate, the effect of Germany's coercion of France was to enhance the value of the Entente to both France and Britain and strengthen its cohesion.

It is interesting that during the early period when France was taking an accommodative stance toward Germany and the British Conservative government was only mildly committed to the Entente, the British sought to restrain France from making concessions at British expense by expanding the scope of the Entente and implicitly warning of withdrawal of support (although this intent was not perceived by the French). Later when France had shifted to a coercive stance, the British Liberal government began to fear the opposite danger of a Franco-German war and urged French concessions to avert it, including some which the Conservative government had considered "vitally detrimental" to British security. The attempt was unavailing because by this time the French were well aware of the increased value of the Entente to Britain.

Grey tried to leave some uncertainty in French minds about British military support by refusing to give an explicit pledge; he spoke more explicitly to Germany, whom he was trying to deter, than to France, whom he was trying to restrain. It is my guess that the French were not very uncertain. Yet Grey's behavior shows he was aware of the dilemma of restraining an ally and deterring an opponent at the same time, and further, that breaking a commitment made to an ally would be more costly than reneging on a threat made to an opponent. Apart from moral considerations, it is probably typical of a multipolar system that reputation with allies is more valuable than bargaining reputation vis-a-vis opponents. A damaged resolve image with a possibly temporary adversary will seem more acceptable than the enormous loss of power incurred by the defection of a disillusioned ally. The exact reverse is likely to be the case in bipolarity where (for a superpower) the ally's power contribution is a trifle compared to the value of a reputation for firmness in the eyes of a relatively permanent opponent.

To complete the systemic picture, Russia had the option of alliance with Germany and her pro-German leaders carried her quite far along this track, but the pro-French, pro-British foreign minister blocked this movement. Like Britain, Russia (with Lamsdorff's insincere approval) did dangle the carrot of possible realignment before Germany as a reward for yielding. But on the whole, Russia's support for France was unswerving, for she recognized that the French connection, of long standing and supported by a close coincidence of interests, was of much greater value than problematical alliance with Germany, which would be based primarily on sentiment and marred by interest conflicts between Austria

and Russia. Throughout the crisis, Russia was residually in a competitive DD relationship to England, but the show of British solidarity with France undoubtedly helped to move the two countries toward the later CC settlement of 1907.

Systemically, Austria's mediating role at the conference, and failure to support Germany in the crunch, was made possible by the very solid character of the Dual Alliance and the heavy dependence of Germany upon Austria. Austria could play an independent role without fear of Germany leaving her in the lurch, in contrast to England, who could not play such a role because she was so much less sure of France.

Italy could withhold her support from Germany for a different reason--not that she was sure of Germany's support, but that she had other options, which she had already begun to activate before the crisis: namely a tacit alignment with Britain and France.

## II. Internal Politics and Decision-Making

The bargaining behavior of a state cannot be satisfactorily explained and understood if it is assumed that the decision-making group, or the body politic as a whole, is "monolithic"--i.e., free of dissension about such things as values, interests, perceptions, ends and means. Typically, the government, political parties, press and public are divided in their perceptions of the situation, preferred objectives, and preferred strategies and tactics. Particularly relevant to the multipolar context are divisions about the identity of foes and friends and alignment preferences. Actual bargaining behavior is often the result of compromises between the different factions and views, reflecting their relative strength. Official policy may shift from one line of action to another as the internal power of various groups or individuals waxes and wanes. Or the state may pursue different and perhaps contradictory strategies simultaneously, with a different faction in control of each strategy. Or the state may simply be immobilized as the conflicting factions checkmate each other.

In a multipolar system, systemic structure interacts with internal politics via the variety of alignment options. This variety gives rise to "phobias" and "philiias" toward other states in the system as different individuals and factions identify different countries as enemies and friends and develop different alignment preferences. More directly related to the bargaining process are conflicts over the adoption of "hard" (coercive) vs. "soft" (accommodative) strategies. (I have attempted elsewhere to describe the various components of the "hard-line" and "soft-line" points of view).<sup>2</sup> It is not always easy to distinguish alignment preferences (phobia and philia) from strategy preferences (hard vs. soft) because an individual may advocate a "soft" policy toward a



particular country not out of a general preference for an accommodative stance but because he favors alignment with that country, this preference being a component in an essentially "hard" attitude toward another country which is identified as the enemy. Another dimension of internal conflict turns on the question of the "arena" of world politics to which different factions think their state should devote its primary attention and energy. In the time period of the present case, the competing arenas were the "imperial" and the "continental".

France.<sup>3</sup>

French internal politics may be considered in two states--before and after the resignation of Delcasse. In the first phase, the "hard-line" leader was Delcasse. He was anti-German and pro-British. His geographical orientation was primarily towards the continent and the German threat, but he had colonial ambitions as well, as is obvious from his Morocco policy. Delcasse's preferred response to the German coercion was simply resistance: if France stood firm, Germany would back down, especially if resistance was supported by a firm commitment from Great Britain, if possible an alliance. Under pressure, he was willing to accommodate Germany but only superficially, par pourboire, not fundamentally. His attitudes toward Germany and England were partly a reflection of his strategic orientation, but also partly a function of personal prejudice.

The soft-line leader in the first stage was Rouvier. Rouvier at this time was mildly pro-German and anti-British. He had no particular preference for a continental or a colonial orientation; in fact he had little interest in foreign policy. It would be most accurate to describe his international orientation as pacifist and idealist. He wanted to avoid war, to accommodate the interests of other states, to avoid alliances and treat all other countries with an even hand. He was not sensitive to French strategic interests, or to the logic of realpolitik. For him, the main concerns in foreign policy were economic and affective. That is, the main causes of conflict in international politics were clashes of economic interest and emotionally-based antagonism arising out of "provocation". Thus he favored a policy of concessions to Germany in the colonial realm (conceived as economic values) and a generally accommodative stance to avoid provoking a German attack. His opposition to an alliance with England stemmed from these same roots: an aversion to international conflict as such and an insensitivity to strategic concerns based on conflict, a belief that the alliance would stimulate antagonism and provoke an attack by Germany, and an image of England as a grasping, untrustworthy,

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mercantilist nation who sought to incite conflict between other countries in order to gain a free hand for her colonial exploitation.

The fall of Delcasse'--the event which ended the first phase of the crisis--was a result at least as much of the general domestic political situation in France as it was of German pressures and the foreign policy differences between Rouvier and Delcasse'. French politics were deeply split between Left and Right, and the Center was weak. It was the misfortune of Delcasse', essentially a man of the pragmatic center, to run afoul of the Left and Right simultaneously. The government was in the hands of a coalition of the Left--Radicals and Socialists. The opposition was composed of monarchists and conservative-nationalists.

The men of the Left held attitudes similar to Rouvier's. They were domestically oriented, with little interest in or understanding of world politics. Their dominant concern in international politics was to avoid war. They had supported Delcasse's policy of "pacific penetration" of Morocco on high moral grounds--civilizing the natives, etc.--but they deserted the foreign minister when his policy threatened to produce war. They had also supported the Entente in its aspect of reducing conflict with England, but when its anti-German aspect was revealed during the crisis, they turned against it. They did so, not so much because they were pro-German, but because they disliked alliances and international conflict in general. As a strictly colonial agreement, the Entente was consistent with both leftist idealism and morally-motivated imperialism. But as a tentative alliance against Germany, it became an instrument of coercion and Realpolitik, which was contrary to the philosophy of the Left.

The Monarchists and Nationalists had opposed the Entente from the beginning on largely emotional grounds--they could not forget Fashoda. They wanted nothing to do with "perfidious Albion"; the Entente was an English trick intended to seduce France into serving British interests. Furthermore, it was provocative of Germany. They pointed to the danger of taking sides in the Anglo-German rivalry. Chiefly, however, the Right opposed Delcasse' on domestic grounds--the government's anti-clericalism, manifested in foreign policy towards the Vatican.

An important group which drew membership from both Left and Right was the colonial group--not a political party but a loose association of persons and groups interested in colonial expansion. Prior to 1903, the colonial group favored collaboration with Germany rather than England; England was still cast in the role of the traditional colonial rival, while it was thought that Germany sympathized with France's ambitions in Morocco. Late in 1903, however, this

group lost some of its antagonism toward England (which had been especially strong during the Boer War) and accepted the Entente as a useful means of promoting colonial expansion. However, they did harbor some bitter feelings against Delcasse', because they thought France had got the worst of the Moroccan bargain. Furthermore, they deplored Delcasse's policy of ignoring Germany. Uninterested in continental politics, they did not conceive of the Entente as directed against Germany but only as a colonial settlement with England. When its anti-German face became more prominent in the spring of 1905, they turned against Delcasse' because they still believed in German benevolence and wished to improve relations with Germany.

Thus, during the June parliamentary and cabinet crisis, Delcasse' was opposed by the Right largely on anti-British grounds, by the Left out of idealism and fear of war, and by the colonialists out of their imperial bias and somewhat pro-German attitudes. All parties (with the exception of the Republicans in the center) found common ground on the theme that Delcasse had erred grievously in ignoring the legitimate interests of Germany, and had needlessly brought the country to the brink of war.

Another factor (some authors say the most important one) which contributed to Delcasse's fall from power was a personal one long antedating the crisis. Delcasse' had conducted foreign policy "close to the vest." Aloof, secretive and somewhat arrogant, he apparently considered foreign policy to be his own personal preserve, and this had alienated not only his cabinet colleagues but politicians in the Chamber as well. Some writers attribute his political demise mainly to this factor and other factors in domestic politics, rather than to German pressure or deeply felt objections to his foreign policy. From this point of view, Delcasse' fell from power chiefly because he failed. When he was moving from success to success, the latent opposition was appeased, but as soon as he ran into trouble, carrying with it a risk of war, all the various currents of resentment and antagonism, heightened by fear or war, burst forth in a near-universal denunciation of his "mistakes".

The most important fact about French internal politics after the fall of Delcasse' is that even though a soft-liner assumed control of foreign policy, he quickly reverted to a hard-line policy. This was paralleled in the body politic as a whole, as those who had earlier criticized Delcasse' for failing to conciliate Germany shifted to a hard attitude of resistance. Several factors account for this shift. First, Rouvier's overtures produced no accommodative German response. As one might predict logically, when a soft policy failed, the French reverted to the hard alternative. Secondly, the tone of German communications, pushy and blustering, produced an emotional French reaction

in favor of resistance. Thirdly, it became clear to all segments of French opinion that the aim of French accommodation--compensation to Germany--was not on the same dimension as the German aim--humiliation of France at a conference, and the latter was distasteful to all parties. Fourth, even though Rouvier had replaced Delcasse' as foreign minister, the conduct of foreign policy was still in the hands of bureaucrats in the Quai d'Orsay, and they believed in the policy of Delcasse'. There is considerable evidence that Rouvier became, if not the "captive" of the Quai d'Orsay, at least considerably influenced by it. It would have been surprising if he hadn't, since he was naive about foreign policy and thus vulnerable to influence. He would have had to be a man of very strong and confident opinions to resist the phalanx of experts, which he was not. The fact that Germany devoted considerable diplomatic effort to prevent the selection of "Delcasse's followers" as French delegates to the conference shows that they knew that although Delcasse' himself was politically dead, "Delcasseism" was not. This is one instance of the relevance of the "bureaucratic politics" theory (particularly Allison's Model II) to this crisis.<sup>5</sup>

#### Germany<sup>6</sup>

German decision-makers were united only on the ultimate aim of their foreign policy during this period--to break through the "ring of encirclement" which they saw being forged by the evil machinations of Edward VII and Delcasse'. On the means to this end, the government was deeply divided.

The Kaiser favored an alliance with Russia, to which he hoped France would adhere, a "continental league" implicitly directed against England. Russia, frustrated in the Far East by England and Japan, and resentful at the niggardly support given by her French ally and the latter's flirtation with England, would turn to Germany, her only friend. France would have to be conciliated in Morocco, in order to convince her of Germany's friendship, show that the Entente with England was unnecessary, and allow her latent imperial rivalry with England to rise again to the fore. For the Kaiser, the dominant arena in world politics was the imperial one, and here France, Russia and Germany had a common interest in opposing Britain. The Kaiser was pro-Russian, pro-French and anti-British. In the narrow context of the Moroccan crisis, he was a "soft-liner" (i.e., toward the French). However, it must be noted that his softness toward France was a function of his strategic preferences, not of an idealistic world-view, as was the case with many of the French soft-liners and the radical imperialists in Britain.

The leading "hard-liner" was Holstein. Holstein thought the Kaiser's project was both undesirable and impossible to realize, at least so far as it

contemplated the inclusion of France. It was undesirable because a Russian alliance would provide little security for Germany against England and would involve Germany in Russia's conflicts with England in the Far and Near East. It was impossible because it was inconsistent with the Franco-Russian alliance and it could never surmount the Alsace-Lorraine obstacle. Moreover, in the context of Morocco, any move to conciliate France would be interpreted as general weakness. Holstein favored a policy of coercing France so as to block her aims in Morocco and break the Entente, by demonstrating to France the unreliability of British support. He further imagined that once this demonstration was made, France would realize that her success in foreign policy depended on collaboration with Germany, not opposition to her. Thus his ultimate aim was the same as the Kaiser's--realignment of the continental powers against England--but he proposed to reach it by coercive rather than accommodative means. He preferred to fight over Morocco rather than accept French and Spanish control, but he believed a firm German stand would reveal British timidity and cause the French to yield.

Bulow might be described as a "middle-liner" towards France. Although he was considerably influenced by Holstein, he did not share Holstein's preference for war rather than letting France have Morocco--i.e., he was "chicken" while Holstein was not. Nor did he share the Kaiser's enthusiasm for alliance with Russia and France, although he did support this project at certain junctures during the crisis. In general, he favored Holstein's coercive policy, but when it ran into difficulties, he shifted to the Kaiser's formula. He believed he could improvise an optimum combination or sequence of the coercive and accommodative strategies--keep the pressure on France over Morocco, but then remove it in a magnanimous gesture of conciliation when France was confronted with the decision whether to join the "continental league".

These conflicting prescriptions kept German policy essentially hamstrung during 1904 and go far to explain the puzzling German inaction for almost a year after the signing of the Entente Cordiale. Coercive ventures proposed by Holstein and others (e.g., naval demonstrations) were regularly vetoed by the Kaiser. The Foreign Office, where Holstein's influence was strong, refused to initiate any accommodative settlement which would amount to recognizing French predominance in Morocco. Immobilized on Morocco, the political leaders went along unenthusiastically with the Kaiser's attempt to negotiate an alliance with Russia after the Dogger Bank affair in December, 1904. When this failed, they were able to convince the Kaiser that the reason was Delcasse's veto in St. Petersburg, and thus to gain his support for the objective of purging

Delcasse' from the French government. Hard and soft liners found common cause on this issue but for different reasons. Bulow was able to override the Kaiser's reluctance to make his display at Tangier only by stressing its utility for getting rid of the obstructionist French foreign minister.

Although the conference idea may have originated at lower levels, it was pushed in high-level decision-making by Holstein. Bulow was at first cool to the idea. Before the fall of Delcasse' he at least gave tentative consideration to Rouvier's informal suggestions for a Franco-German Entente. However, probably influenced by Holstein, he accepted the Sultan's invitations to a conference the day before Delcasse's resignation, thus eliminating any prospect of a bilateral agreement. Bulow continued on the hard-line track for a while after Rouvier took over the foreign minister's portfolio in France, rejecting the latter's continued overtures and heading off interference from the Kaiser by the simple expedient of keeping him uninformed.

When the French proved to be intransigent about agreeing to a conference, Holstein continued to be optimistic about a tough line. Even if war with France and Britain resulted, Germany would win. But Bulow now became worried. It was he who made the decision, over Holstein's objections, to give a general guarantee of French interests in Morocco, as a condition for French acceptance of the conference.

As evidence gradually accumulated that the conference might prove disastrous for Germany, Bulow welcomed the Bjorko meeting between the Kaiser and the Tsar and began to think more favorably of the Kaiser's grand design. Following the signing of the treaty, he embraced enthusiastically the idea of buying French adherence by a grand gesture of accommodation on Morocco. However, perhaps restrained by the Foreign Office, he did not take this step immediately, but merely instructed his diplomats to mark time in the negotiations then proceeding about a conference program. Or perhaps he felt the moment was not yet ripe for presenting France with the momentous choice. At any rate, the activities of the Wilhelmstrasse bureaucracy prevented the "favorable moment" from arriving. The diplomats' obstinate haggling over the conference program, and their extraction of certain economic concessions from the Sultan sent French blood pressures so high that they were in no mood for a grand accommodation (if, indeed, they ever might have been). Bulow belatedly stepped in, took the reins from Holstein's hands, agreed to the French proposals for the conference agenda, and offered a "rapprochement". But it was now "too little and too late."

The accommodative tract having failed, Bulow had no alternative but to go through with the conference, shift back to Holstein's hard line and hope for the

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best. With Holstein in charge of the negotiating strategy, the Germans hung tough and a deadlock was soon reached, Holstein still preferring to let the conference fail than make any significant concessions. This was not Bulow's preference, so he took over from Holstein again and ordered a major retreat which produced a settlement. Holstein resigned in protest.

It should be clear from this summary that the German bargaining behavior was heavily affected by internal cleavages. It did not follow a single, planned coherent strategy but shifted from one direction to another as one faction and then another gained the upper hand. To highlight the importance of internal factors it suffices only to state some "might-have-beens". If the Kaiser had been fully in charge and fully informed, the early French overtures for a bilateral settlement would have been accepted and there would have been no crisis. If Holstein had been in complete control there would have been no toying with the "continental league," no accommodative deviations, and the conference would have broken up, with war a possible result. If Bulow had been a stronger and wiser man, he might have realized that both the Kaiser's realignment schemes and Holstein's prescription for breaking the Entente through coercion were exercises in futility, and he might have chosen a more realistic and modest course: perhaps a moderately-worded protest immediately after the signing of the Entente agreements, followed by an agreement with France combining economic guarantees in Morocco with compensation elsewhere. Then with luck, the Anglo-French Entente might have withered away through lack of challenge.

One or two final points about Germany are worth making. The "hard-line" and "soft-line" division followed the lines of the "systemic options" open to Germany; it was not a division between different general orientations toward world politics, as in France. All the Germans were essentially "hard" in this latter sense. The Kaiser's "softness on France" was only incidental to his "hard" orientation toward England. He shared with the others a general preference for power and coercion over conciliation.

As in France, the gravitational pull of a committed bureaucracy was evident. The Wilhelmstrasse and its diplomats in the field were generally committed to the Holsteinian philosophy, which explains the generally coercive tone of German diplomacy through the crisis, despite the dissension at the top. "Soft" deviations initiated at the top, as in the late summer of 1905, were overwhelmed by the momentum of a bureaucracy committed to another course. Thus, when Bulow ordered the diplomats to avoid "pushing or threatening," they simply continued pushing, as they had been doing all along.

A final word about "national style". German diplomatic style, at least during this period of her history, was markedly characterized by an exaggerated

belief in the efficacy of threat, a tendency to over-state threats and warnings in a provocative way, a monumental blindness to the likely emotional reactions of others to their words and acts, a curious tendency to believe that other countries could be pressured into friendship, and an overweening concern for status and sensitivity about "national honor." All of these characteristics helped shape German behavior during the crisis.

### Great Britain<sup>7</sup>

In England, too, the internal divisions tended to reflect the nation's systemic role and alignment options, although there were general philosophical differences as well. The Entente had strong support in the Foreign Office and most of its leading figures were therefore pro-French and "hard-line" towards Germany. They also favored an Entente with Russia. The technical alternative of alignment with Germany had few influential supporters, but some, like Sanderson, the Permanent Undersecretary, wished to remain at least on good terms with Germany and avoid too strong a commitment to France. We can apply the term "soft-liner" to these individuals. An extreme hard-liner was Fisher, the First Sea Lord, who advocated preventive war against Germany, and he had some cohorts in naval circles.

As for the politicians at the top, Lansdowne and Balfour in the Conservative ministry may be considered "moderate soft-liner". They negotiated the Entente, but not primarily as an anti-German instrument. While vaguely anxious about the German naval program, they did not perceive Germany as a serious threat. They were oriented toward the imperial arena rather than the continental balance of power and therefore visualized Russia as England's principal enemy.

In the Liberal ministry which followed, Grey and several others may be characterized as "middle-liners". Grey focused his attention more on continental politics than on empire. Much more than Lansdowne, he considered the Entente to be a pseudo-alliance against Germany. Preserving the Entente was his overriding value, much more important than any particular arrangements in Morocco. Yet he was not truly "anti-German" or "hard-line". He harbored no ill-feeling toward Germany (as did many of the Foreign Office hard-liners) and thought good relations with her might be possible in the long-run; the Entente was necessary, however, as insurance. He preferred conciliatory rather than coercive methods in foreign affairs generally, although he was forced to take a tough stance during the crisis by the logic of England's position.

Another group of Liberal politicians, the "Radicals" like Campbell-Bannerman were soft-liners, but unlike Sanderson, their "softness" stemmed from their philosophical orientation to world affairs rather than strategic or



alignment preference. They were inclined to be pacifist, idealist, and domestically oriented, with little interest either in imperial or continental foreign affairs. Philosophically, they were the British counterparts of the Radicals and Socialists in France, and the opposites of the hard-line Realpolitikers in the Foreign Office. They disliked alliances, were suspicious of the Entente, opposed commitments to France and favored accommodation with Germany.

British attitudes thus divided along three dimensions: Philosophical, orientation (i.e., general preference for tough or conciliatory strategies), enemy identifications and alignment preferences, and imperial vs. continental preoccupations. Except for the Foreign Office militants, the three dimensions do not correlate consistently for particular individuals; hence the "hard" and "soft" labels over-simplify considerably.

Both British governments were more or less united on the general point that broad systemic forces required Britain to shift from her traditional policy of "splendid isolation" and imperial preoccupation, to a policy of imperial retrenchment and continental involvement. The differences were over how fast and how far this shift should go and what specific form it should take. The Conservative government began the shift but still perceived the world largely through imperial lenses and was vague and uncertain about continental policy--specifically what attitude to adopt towards Germany and how firmly to commit England to France. The Liberal government carried the process further by specifically identifying Germany as the principal enemy and France and Russia as actual and potential friends, by hardening the commitment to France, and later, by further liquidating imperial burdens in the 1907 Entente with Russia. To some extent, this shift was simply the gradual working out of systemic logic and compulsion over time. To some degree, however, it reflected genuine differences in values and outlook between the Conservative and Liberal parties.

Of the groups and individuals discussed above, by far the most influential, aside from the Foreign Secretaries themselves, were the anti-German hard-liners in the Foreign Office. Their influence was effective on certain important British moves during the crisis, as they persistently pressed for unconditional support of France and a tough line towards Germany. They argued that Germany would back down in the face of Franco-British solidarity and warned that France might defect from the Entente if she were not given unflinching support. Sometimes their methods were less than completely straightforward. An example would be Mallet's successful manipulation of Lansdowne through Fisher. As related earlier, Mallet told Fisher the Germans were about to demand a port in

Morocco and asked him to persuade Lansdowne to resist this on strategic naval grounds. It was a shrewd move, for it both mobilized military authority behind the desired diplomatic stance and appealed to Lansdowne's own naval preoccupations. Mallet's friend Bertie, the ambassador in Paris, then edited Lansdowne's subsequent communication to the French government in such a way that it was subject to interpretation as an offer of alliance. Thinking wishfully, Cambon and Delcasse' did so interpret it. Perversely, this interpretation contributed to Delcasse's own fall from power, but it also gave rise to persistent rumors in European chancelleries that Britain had in fact offered an alliance. Although later denied by Lansdowne, these rumors undoubtedly gave pause to Germany and helped to remove French uncertainties about Britain's loyalty.

Lansdowne and Grey were, of course, under pressure from the "softs" as well as the "hards". But the soft influence was much weaker, for several reasons. Sanderson constantly sought to parry the influence of his more militant colleagues and steer Lansdowne and Grey along paths which were least provocative to Germany and least committing to France. But he was aging and he represented only a minority faction in the Foreign Office. Grey had to keep in mind the isolationist sentiments of his Radical colleagues in the Cabinet. However, this was not too severe a constraint because they did not hold posts relevant to foreign policy and were not very interested in foreign policy. Further, Grey was able to neutralize them simply by not informing them fully about some of his important moves. Their influence was chiefly the passive one of foreclosing the kind of formal, explicit commitment to France that would require a Cabinet decision.

Although Grey was less anti-German, sentimentally, than the Foreign Office militants, and more inclined, personally, to conciliatory modes of diplomacy than the latter, his decisions and communications during the crisis were quite consistent with the hard-liner's desires. Grey seems to have moved in their direction less because of their influence than because the logic and momentum of his own policy inexorably pulled him that way, sometimes against his personal inclinations. The only point at which Grey was at odds with some of the "hard" diplomats was when, near the end of the conference, he continued giving unconditional support to France when the French were making what both Grey and the diplomats considered exorbitant demands. Systemic logic and his own high valuation of the Entente had made him, briefly, "harder than the hards".

The role of the military bureaucracies should not be overlooked. The Navy's impact during the crisis came chiefly via the arms race with Germany which not only increased hostility between the two countries and foreclosed

the option of entente with Germany. It also increased the urgency of standing by France, for the naval balance between England and Germany would tip more in England's favor to the extent she was able to leave the Mediterranean unguarded. Also, the Navy's pressure for maintaining the "two-power standard", and occasional incautious statements by naval figures implying thoughts of preventive war, helped turn German thoughts toward alliance with Russia and the accommodation of France in Morocco.

The Army's impact on the crisis came through the military conversations with France. These talks, so important in convincing France of British seriousness, were initiated on the British side by military figures, seconded and aided by the staff of the Committee on Imperial Defense. Informally approved and then officially sanctioned by Grey and the Prime Minister, the talks gave tangible evidence of British intentions which enabled Grey to convince the French of England's loyalty while avoiding an explicit commitment.

All the actors were quite ignorant of, or they held over-simple and inaccurate images of the internal divisions and political currents in other states. Germany did correctly divine the domestic weakness of Delcasse', but after he left the scene, Germany failed completely to predict or understand subsequent developments in French politics. The French leadership had little or no insight into the deep divisions in the German government. Germany did not understand the attitudinal cross-currents and balance of forces in the British Liberal government and consequently underestimated British firmness until quite late. The British and French perceptions of each other were somewhat more accurate and discriminating, as might be expected between allies, but still over-simplified.

### III. Bargaining

I will first try to describe the general structure of the crisis from the bargaining perspective; then analyze the bargaining process in terms of our checklist.

The overriding issue at stake in the crisis was who should control the Moroccan police and economy. The French, supported by Britain, demanded full control for France and Spain. The Germans demanded either a substantial share for themselves or some kind of "internationalization" of Morocco which would deny complete control to France and Spain. This was the "immediate" issue, the outcome of which would have prestige, economic and strategic payoffs primarily for France and Germany (and, lest we forget, for Morocco). Linked to this issue, and dependent largely on its outcome, was a "supergame" issue: would the Anglo-French Entente survive? Britain's prospective payoffs were

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almost entirely in terms of this issue, although it entered into the "payoff bundles" of France and Germany as well.

Subsumed within these large issues, and preliminary to them, were several subsidiary issues which were the objects of bargaining in the early stages of the crisis. The first was the question of whether a conference should be held. Related to this as an instrumental German demand, was the issue of the tenure in office of the French foreign minister, Delcasse. A third subsidiary issue was the question of the pre-conference "program" or agenda which established the items which were to be negotiable at the conference. The French lost on the Delcasse' issue, the conference issue was compromised, the French gained an advantage in the agreement on the conference program, and of course the French were almost completely victorious at the conference on the main issue. The Anglo-French Entente emerged from the crisis stronger than before. Except for the dubious gain of having forced the French to submit to "European" judgment and ratification of their designs, the Germans utterly failed to achieve their objectives.

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The primary reason for the outbreak of the crisis was the German belief that they could coerce France into giving up their plans, or into giving Germany a share, by threatening war. The primary reason for the outcome of German defeat was the firm support given to France by Britain. Germany gravely and persistently under-estimated British resolve until very late in the crisis. Had it not been for the British support, the French undoubtedly would have had to capitulate. Had the Germans not corrected their misperception of Britain at the last minute, the outcome could have been war.

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Challenge

It could be argued that the real "challenge" for Germany was the signing of the Entente agreement in April, 1904. Bulow's initial complacent response (Germany's interests were only economic, and there was no reason to suppose they would be infringed) probably was intended to quiet public opinion and head off criticism of the government. In reality, the government was quite alarmed and angered. Not only Germany's economic interests but also her legal rights had been rudely ignored. Her amour-propre had been insulted; her prestige would suffer if she stood by with folded arms. Her reputation for resolve internationally would suffer. To quote Holstein: "We have long believed that France would seek an understanding with the interested powers. As far as Germany is concerned, that is not the case. If we let ourselves be trampled on in Morocco, we invite similar treatment elsewhere. Not for material reasons alone, but even more for the sake of prestige, must Germany protest against

the intended appropriation of Morocco by France." The only question, he said, was at what moment and in what form the protest should be made.<sup>8</sup>

This language, with its emphasis on prestige and resolve, implied coercive action against France, and this was the dominant tendency in German thinking from the start. Logically, however, Germany also had the option of accommodating to the French moves. This option was moderately attractive to the German government in the context of a new alignment of Russia, Germany and France. It was tried in the fall of 1904 but was aborted by Russia before any conciliatory moves were made toward France. Short of such a systemic realignment, Germany had the moderately accommodative option of simply asking France for guarantees of Germany's commercial interests. This was considered briefly, but rejected in the summer of 1904 because it was considered doubtful of success and beneath German dignity. If France had offered such guarantees early it is quite possible the Germans would have accepted them as sufficient "compensation". But for Germany to ask for them would be humiliating, and furthermore, would constitute gratuitous recognition of the French right to control Morocco.

The Germans thus "decided" late in the summer of 1904 (to the extent one can speak of "decision" in this divided and incompetent government) that they were going to frustrate France by a policy of coercion. The problem was that they lacked an occasion or pretext for initiating such a policy. On the surface the Entente agreement pledged support for the status quo and protection for the commercial interests of all powers. Thus it did not overtly damage German interests or violate German rights. Before Germany could take coercive measures, France had to perform some action which would serve as a pretext for, and legitimize, German intervention. It would have to be an act which (1) made crystal-clear, to Germany and bystanders, that France intended to establish control in Morocco without consulting Germany, and (2) clearly violated German "rights" and engaged German honor and prestige.

It was partly for this reason that Germany delayed the application of coercive pressure till the spring of 1905. There were other reasons as well. There was some hope that France would seek some understanding with Germany before carrying out her plans. Germany was inhibited from vigorous protest by the fact that the Kaiser had proclaimed German disinterestedness in Morocco, except for commercial interests, both during his Tangier visit and during an earlier visit to the King of Spain. Further, the German government was hobbled by internal conflict, with the hard-liners and soft-liners restraining each other.

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At one point during the fall, Bulow proposed sending an ultimatum and naval demonstration to Morocco, demanding the settlement of certain German economic claims. But the Kaiser vetoed such belligerent action, as he had done once before; he preferred a diplomatic approach. Probably for the same reason, a Foreign Office plan to seize the port of Agadir also came to naught. On the other side, when Baron Richtofen, the Foreign Minister (who was so curiously absent from most German decision-making during the crisis) proposed an ordinary diplomatic initiative toward France, this was scotched by the Holstein group.

I conclude, therefore, that the making of the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France did not by itself constitute an operational challenge for Germany. It created an unsatisfactory diplomatic situation and signalled a French and British intent which, if carried out, would damage German interests. But it contained neither the concreteness nor the element of provocation which are associated with crisis-initiating challenges. The operational challenge was to come later.

Essentially, the German reaction to the Entente was a policy of "watchful waiting" as Bulow phrased it, waiting for some pretext which would justify a "denial" move. Officially, the government assumed the lofty stance of simply ignoring the Entente. They had not been formally informed of its signing, so officially for them it did not exist.

The operational French challenge was the dispatch of the Taillandier mission to Fez, in January, to present the Sultan with a specific list of demands, combined with Taillandier's statements, when presenting the demands on Feb. 22, implying at least that he spoke as the mandatory of all the interested European Powers. Here was the occasion or pretext for which the Germans had been waiting. Or, to put it more charitably, this was the French move that released the German inhibitions and shifted the internal German balance of forces in favor of those who stood for tough decisive action.

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Germany regarded the Taillandier mission as challenging or provocative for three reasons. First, the detailed list of "reforms" clearly added up to a French protectorate and thus officially and publicly confirmed what the newspapers had only speculated about. Presentation of the demands was an overt act which signalled that France was now cashing in on the Entente agreement--without consulting Germany. Second, Taillandier's statement that he acted on behalf of all European powers was regarded by Germany as a lie intended to intimidate the Moroccans. Germany was not only being ignored in the proceedings, but her name and power were being implicitly and fraudulently invoked in the service of French aims. More than anything else, this provided the emotional

charge necessary to galvanize Germany into action. Third, newspapers all over Europe referred to the French program as "another Tunis" or the "Tunisification" of Morocco. Whatever the accuracy of the parallel, or whatever the German government might have thought about its accuracy, this public invocation of a symbol of recent French imperialism further sharpened the challenge to German honor and prestige.

It is worth asking what the French expected to be the consequences of their action. Did they conceive of themselves as "challenging" Germany? Did they realize they were initiating a crisis or were they surprised at the German response? If they were surprised, how did they expect Germany to respond? The evidence leaves room for four possible sets of expectations:

1. Germany was not interested in Morocco and would not react.
2. Germany was interested and would protest diplomatically, but would go no further in view of Anglo-French solidarity.
3. There would be an unfortunate crisis, but Germany would be faced down.
4. There would be a desirable crisis which France would win; i.e., the French deliberately provoked a crisis in order to cement the Entente.

The historical evidence, taken at face value, gives most support to interpretations (1) and (2) or a combination of them. Delcasse' seems to have been genuinely surprised and unnerved by the gravity of the German response, as shown by his rather frantic belated efforts to "explain" his policy to German officials. Support for interpretation (1) is given by several French statements that they took the official German silence over the preceding months as evidence of lack of interest. For example, when the German charge' at Tangier told the French charge' in February that Germany did not recognize the agreements about Morocco and did not consider herself bound by the semi-official French press retorted that this was a complete reversal of German policy, which by previous silence had tacitly accepted the agreements. In response to the German claim of "official ignorance" French diplomats, and Delcasse', cited a Delcasse'-Radolin conversation of March, 1904, as constituting official notification. They also cited speeches by Bulow and the Kaiser indicating disinterest in Morocco beyond the protection of commercial interests.

On the other hand, there is some inconclusive evidence that Delcasse' expected a crisis and in fact deliberately sought to provoke one, in order to bind England closer to France. One exhibit here is the Foreign Minister's studious exclusion of Germany from his previous negotiations over Morocco, even though he must have known that Germany had interests and legal rights there and that she was sensitive and defensive about her "Great Power" status

and hence not likely to suffer affronts lightly. It is hard to believe that Delcasse', a sensitive and experienced statesman, could have been blind to these things. Exhibit "B" is Taillandier's statement that he spoke for all the interested Powers of Europe. Taillandier, also a seasoned diplomat, might have been guilty of hyperbole or a slip of the tongue in the heat of oratory, but it does not seem likely.

However, one is forced to conclude from the weight of the evidence (as virtually all historians do) that the French leaders did not expect any serious opposition from Germany and were genuinely surprised when it occurred. If so, the French of course seriously misperceived German values and feelings. Was this a "justified" misperception in light of the German signals and indices which the French were reading? Or did the French selectively interpret and attend to these signals and indices so as to produce the expectation they wanted to hold--i.e., were they guilty of wishful thinking? (The French did receive warning signals from minor German diplomats during the fall of 1904 but, in one case, the signal was not reported to the Foreign Office and in others they were apparently discounted.) If the French are given the benefit of the doubt, did the Germans deliberately lull the French into complacency by their policy of official silence, hoping thus to induce an overt act which would justify German intervention?

None of these questions admit of conclusive answers and none further will be attempted here.

### Denial

Having decided they had been provoked, the Germans still faced the problem of what to do about it. Their first actions were quiet and indirect, aimed at stiffening the Sultan's resistance to the French demands. Early in February, after the arrival of the French mission in Fez, but before Taillandier had presented his demands, the German representative in Morocco "unofficially" assured the Sultan that Germany had a political interest in the Moroccan question, that she had not yet taken the question into consideration in its existing form, that she would not use force in support of Morocco, but that France would hardly dare to attack Morocco with a silent Germany on her frontier. About this time also a German warship appeared casually in Moroccan waters. Holstein instructed Kuhlmann, the German representative in Tangier, to avoid official utterances toward France "until we are more certain about the attitude of the Sultan;" for, "according as the Sultan shows himself firm or yielding, German policy will endeavor as much as possible to strengthen his back or will confine itself to defending German economic interests." Bulow sent a note to the Sultan stating



Germany's disapproval of any change in the existing conditions in Morocco but without committing herself to any action.<sup>9</sup>

This language seems to indicate that the German government was still undecided, was not yet emotionally engaged, and that whether they assumed an accommodating or coercive stance would depend on how the Sultan reacted to the French demands at least in part.

When the Sultan did resist by convening an assembly of (anti-French) notables one prerequisite for a tough German reaction was met. However, it appears that the Germans were not decisively precipitated into action until March 10, when they first heard about Taillandier's statements to the notables to the effect that he bore the mandate of all the interested Powers. It was this event, involving an affront to German national honor, which finally pushed the Germans over the brink--from ordinary diplomacy to more dramatic measures.

*ult.* The idea of the Kaiser visiting Tangier was improvised from materials that happened to be available. The Emperor had been planning a Mediterranean cruise for some time. Apparently Kuhlmann, the Charge' at Tangier, was responsible for proposing that Tangier be included in the itinerary. Bulow accepted the idea as politically useful but he did not at first realize its full significance or realize that it would precipitate an international crisis. Only when he observed the strong opposition which the announcement of the impending visit aroused in the French and British press, did he determine to exploit it to the full.

With the Kaiser's visit to Tangier the Germans threw down the gauntlet. But they still had no clear idea of what it was they wanted to obtain. An injury had been done to their prestige but the redress of this injury dictated no particular tangible goal other than frustrating France. The Germans were in a dilemma: they had disclaimed any territorial interests in Morocco; yet the Kaiser's visit implied that they wanted a share in its governance. Perhaps they also had in mind the larger strategic objective of "breaking the Entente" by demonstrating British weakness to the French or vice-versa although this motive does not appear prominently in the early German decision-making. They were also interested in preserving their resolve image. But these latter aims, too, failed to point to any particular goal.

The other powers, especially France, were understandably puzzled. If Germany wanted only to safeguard her economic interests, as previously indicated, why this dramatic gesture? Bulow did nothing for some time to relieve their puzzlement. He instructed the Foreign Office: "If the diplomats ask about Tangier and Morocco, please do not answer them, but keep a serious and impassive

face. Our attitude on the question should be that of the sphinx, which, though surrounded by curious tourists, betrays nothing."<sup>10</sup> In part this instruction was necessary because Germany as yet had no goals which her diplomats could talk about; in part perhaps it was designed to increase French and British anxieties by keeping them in the dark.

After three days of discussion, the German government reached a decision on April 3 to demand a conference. Given the German values and the position in which they found themselves, this was a logical demand. The Germans really wanted mainly to frustrate and humiliate France; they wanted to exercise their power successfully, to assert Germany's status as a great Power. They were interested more in means than in concrete ends, but some end had to be devised to justify the application of the means. In the absence of specific substantive objectives, the conference demand filled the bill admirably. There were sound legal grounds for it in the Madrid Convention of 1880, which established the principle of "European" responsibility for Moroccan affairs. In taking their stand on the principle of collective responsibility, the Germans gave their policy an aura of moral legitimacy which it would not have enjoyed if they had demanded simply a piece of Morocco. If successful, German prestige would have been doubly enhanced: she would not only have demonstrated her power and resolve, but would have done so on behalf of disinterested and lofty principles of "community" and "due process." This shift in the "rules" might enable England to pretend that the "concert of Europe" had taken over from the Anglo-French Entente as the proper instrument for arranging Moroccan affairs, and thus get her "off the hook" with France. Even if Germany lost out at the conference, she would at least have the satisfaction of having "participated in the decision" as an equal, according to decision rules dictated by herself. Germany would still have to decide what goals to pursue at the conference, but this could wait.

#### Game Models

In describing the structure of the crisis in terms of game models we must distinguish between the games which each of the parties (France, Germany and England) was objectively playing, as suggested by their comparative payoffs, and their subjective perceptions of the other parties' payoffs and game structures. A further distinction must be made between the game structures with respect to Germany's procedural demand (demand for a conference) and her substantive demands. Where necessary, still further distinctions must be drawn between the parties' games for different periods of the crisis, and between the games involved for different factions within the governments.

Objectively, Germany was in a chicken game throughout the crisis except perhaps for a short time after the Liberal government came to power in Britain and before it made its intentions clear. Basically, in other words, Germany preferred to yield to French terms rather than accept the risks and cost of "no agreement" in all phases of the crisis. Of course, she hoped and tried by threats and bravado to convince the French that she would fight (that she was in a prisoner's dilemma) but the evidence shows that Delcasse' was right--it was all bluff. An exception to this was Holstein: he would have preferred to fight rather than yield.

France was in a prisoner's dilemma with respect to Germany's demand for a conference; both Delcasse' and Rouvier preferred to see the negotiations collapse and "events take their course" rather than accept a conference without pre-conditions which protected essential French interests. With regard to Germany's substantive demands for a substantial share in control of Morocco, in the period before June 6, 1905, Delcasse' saw France in a prisoner's dilemma but Rouvier was playing a chicken game--he probably would have given Germany most of what she asked for rather than accept the risk of war. After Delcasse's ouster, however, Rouvier shifted to a prisoner's dilemma--he then preferred to risk war rather than yield to the German demands.

England's game structure was a little more complex. There were three sequential games for England, on whether a conference should be held, on Germany's substantive demands, and on the question of whether to aid France militarily in case of a Franco-German war. Her game structures for the first two issues depended on whether she preferred French capitulation to the German demands over the risks of "no agreement", -- i.e., failure of the negotiations about whether to hold a conference, or break-up of the conference without agreement. On the third issue, her game structure depended simply on whether she preferred to fight or see France defeated in war.

Regarding the German demand for a conference, England was in a prisoner's dilemma: she would rather see these negotiations fail rather than see her ally suffer humiliation and possible losses at a conference. With respect to Germany's substantive demands in Morocco, the Conservative government probably was in a prisoner's dilemma--it preferred no agreement rather than substantial French concessions, particularly the granting of a Moroccan port or ports to Germany. However, the subsequent Liberal government probably was in a chicken game on this issue--it preferred substantial French concessions, perhaps even total French capitulation, to a break-up of the conference, so long as the French concessions could not be charged to British lack of support and provided they

How did they reach this decision?

Does this say anything?

would not lead to a weakening or break-up of the Entente. On the other hand, should the crisis have ended in a Franco-German war, both British governments would have gone to the aid of France (assuming that the foreign policy decision-makers could have carried the cabinet with them.)

A verbal description of the parties' subjective perceptions of the games in which the others were involved would be too involved and tedious. I resort, therefore, to a diagrammatic presentation. Of course, each parties' subjective perception of its own game structure is the same as the objective structures just described.

German perceptions

	German demand for conference	German substantive demands	Franco-German war
Germany	Chicken	Chicken	
France	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch. ----- By July 8: PD	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch. ----- Till March 5, 1906: chicken; then PD.	
England	Before June 6: Chicken ----- By July 1: PD	Uncertain	Till mid-March, 1906: chicken (but uncertain). Thereafter: PD

French perceptions

	German demand for conference	German substantive demands	Franco-German war
Germany	Before Delcasse: Ch. June 6: Rouvier: PD ----- After June 6: PD, but somewhat uncertain.	Before Delcasse: Ch. June 6: Rouvier: PD ----- Thereafter, till March 6: uncertain; then chicken	
France	PD	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch. ----- Thereafter: PD	
England	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch ----- Thereafter: PD	Uncertain	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch ----- Thereafter, till Jan. 31: Uncertain; then PD

	German demand for conference	German substantive demands	Franco-German war
Germany	Uncertain	Uncertain	
France	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch. ----- Thereafter: Chicken, shifting to PD	Before Delcasse: PD June 6: Rouvier: Ch. ----- Till July 8: Uncertain; thereafter: PD	
England	PD	Lansdowne: PD ----- Grey: Chicken	PD

I am not sure the enlightenment conveyed by these matrices is worth the effort of constructing them, or the reader's effort in deciphering them, especially since the judgments in some of the boxes are rather speculative. However, it does not seem that the complexity can be avoided if game matrices are to be applied at all in this case. A few verbal comments on how the parties' subjective perceptions of the others' game structures differed from their objective structures may be helpful.

The Germans wrongly perceived, in the period before June 6 (ouster of Delcasse') that Rouvier would accept a conference unconditionally. They also misperceived, during this period, that England would not object to a conference. They mistakenly believed, until late in the conference, that France was in chicken; she was actually in PD. They were also very late in recognizing, for sure, that Britain would aid France in a Franco-German war.

As for the French, Rouvier erroneously believed, in the early period, that Germany was in PD with respect to the holding of a conference and also re: her substantive demands. Even after Germany accepted the severe French pre-conditions for a conference (a fairly obvious cue that she was playing chicken on the substantive issues) Rouvier was at least uncertain about the German game (though they might fight rather than yield: PD) until their major concession late in the conference made clear they were playing chicken. Rouvier also at first entirely misperceived the British intentions with respect to supporting France in war, then was uncertain for several months, and apparently did not realize clearly that England was in a PD on this issue until Cambon's conversation with Grey on Jan. 31, 1906. A.D.

The British gave more credence to German threats than the historical evidence justifies (i.e., thought they might be in PD). They under-estimated French resolve on both the procedural and substantive issues for a short time after Delcasse' was cashiered; but by mid-summer, 1905, they were quite sure the French would hold firm on the substance (were in PD) especially if they had British support.

In general, the British perceptions and (less so) the French perceptions of the payoff structures of other parties were more accurate than the German perceptions.

(Note: The "games" just discussed are not to be confused with the "super-games" discussed earlier in the systemic section. The crisis was a "sub-game" in an ongoing supergame, chiefly involving France, Germany and Britain, and other powers to some extent.)

### A. Utility models

I find a utility model useful for mapping accommodative moves in the several negotiating phases of the crisis. However, it is difficult to locate a "bargaining range" in any of these phases because of the great difficulty in locating the minimum positions of the parties. For a bargaining range to exist, of course, the minimum positions of the parties must overlap, so that there is some range of settlements which both parties would rather accept than face the consequences of "no agreement". It is clear that at least a bargaining "point" existed in each of the phases, since agreements were reached, but whether the parties had in mind minimums on either side of the point representing further concessions which they would have been willing to make must remain speculative. It is probably most accurate to say generally that the parties moved toward each other along a bargaining dimension until one or the other became willing to accept the other's "last offer", but, with one or two exceptions, they did not have any clear idea of the minimum they would have been willing to accept.

I will attempt to apply this model to two sets of negotiations: (1) those over whether a conference would be held, and (2) negotiations over the substantive issues both before and during the conference.

The issue of whether a conference was to be held was, of course, a procedural issue, although it had substantive overtones. A subsidiary issue was if a conference was to be held, whether a "program" for it should be negotiated before or after the French acceptance. The salient moves are listed below, beginning after the downfall of Delcasse'.

June 6: Bulow dispatches circular note to Powers requesting acceptance of conference.

June 7: Rouvier rejects conference and suggests bilateral negotiations.

(These two moves may be said to represent the "maximum" positions of the parties).

June 10: Rouvier says conference might be possible if there is "previous understanding" (vague French concession)


June 12: Bulow offers to negotiate a program prior to a conference if France will first accept the conference (German concession).

June 14: Radolin: Program would assure "no prejudice to the independence of Morocco and no injury to the prospects of France." (vague German concession)

June 21: Rouvier accepts conference in principle but demands, before firm acceptance, a "previous accord . . . which would not infringe upon those already concluded. . ." (French demand for prior German recognition of terms of Anglo-French Entente.)

- June 22,23: Bulow refuses prior negotiations and demands quick French acceptance of conference.
- June 24: Bulow refuses to negotiate a program prior to French acceptance but admits that "France has a very legitimate interest in maintaining order in the territory bordering on the frontier." (German concession on substance of program).
- June 26: Roosevelt suggests compromise: No prior program; conference could discuss all questions "save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."
- June 27: Rouvier tells German ambassador there must be a previous understanding, prior to French acceptance, in which France is assured of control of police on Algerian frontier, but nothing definite is said about the rest of Morocco.
- June 30: Bulow denies to French government that Germany means to question the Anglo-French accord.
- July 1: Rouvier agrees to accept conference on condition of simultaneous declaration incorporating concessions already made or suggested by Germany.
- July 8: Accord reached guaranteeing French rights resulting from other "treaties or arrangements", and implicitly guaranteeing French control of frontier with Algeria. Agreement to negotiate a more detailed "program" on this basis.

The essential moves can be mapped as follows:



Thus, as noted above, all one can say with certainty is that both parties moved in a converging direction along a bargaining dimension until they met a point which was acceptable to both. The historical accounts do not show whether there was a "range" on either side of the point--i.e., whether one or both parties would have conceded more. Perhaps the French might have accepted a conference with only one of their two prior conditions; perhaps the Germans



FR. close  
to minimum.  
might have ultimately accepted further conditions. We don't know. It is more plausible that the Germans would have conceded more than the French would have. One gets the impression that the Germans were simply stuck with their conference demand; having made the demand, the conference had to meet. At this point at least, they were probably less concerned about the substantive issues than they were about the procedural one; they were willing to concede quite a lot on the substance in order to get themselves off the hook on procedure. As for the French, they were determined that if there was to be a conference, the humiliation of being dragged into it must be offset by a very good prospect of achieving all their substantive aims. The accord, indeed, did virtually grant them all their objectives in a general way, since the Entente agreement of 1904 had specified that France and Spain were to be in charge of all police and military "reforms."

The point of agreement (if not a bargaining range) was both "created" and "discovered". It was discovered in the sense that the French, by examining their own values and interpreting communications from the Germans, arrived at a proposed arrangement which was at least better for them than the collapse of negotiations, and the Germans likewise, gradually picking up cues from the French about their conditions for accepting the conference and examining the costs of these conditions for themselves finally decided they could accept them. But it was not just a matter of both sides gathering information. The agreement point was also "created" by two means: a shift in the perceived balance of bargaining power during the month of negotiation, and changes in the parties' utilities. The power shift was perceived by the Germans when they learned late in June that the British government (spearheaded by the hard-line Germanophobe, Bertie, in Paris) was strongly urging the French not to accept the conference. This made the Germans apprehensive that they might not get a conference at all and probably accounts for the fact that the greater concessions were made by them. Conversely, it probably accounts as well for the rather tough French behavior, although a "non-power" and "non-rational" factor-- increasing French resentment at Germany bullying--played a part too.

Changes in utilities are a little harder to pinpoint. The empirical materials do not provide many clues for discriminating between changes in utilities and decisions to sacrifice utilities. Rouvier provides the clearest example of a change, in his radical shift from a soft to a tough posture after the removal of Delcasse'. Before that event, he appeared to place little value on French objectives in Morocco, little value (in fact a cost) on the British Entente, and viewed the prospect of war with great trepidation. These values were

all revised in the subsequent period, for reasons that are not fully clear. Probably there was a considerable "psychological" element involved: the German rebuffs to his generous offers of compensation and their arrogant, blustering behavior may have simply gotten his dander up. Or perhaps it is typical of the pacifist, non-power-oriented personality that when his conciliatory moves are met with hostility, he tends to shift to the opposite extreme. Another interpretation, advanced by some accounts, is that the Germans had injected the element of "national honor" into the French utilities.

Of course the utility of the event "conference" for the French was a function of their expectations concerning its probable outcome. Rouvier's decision to accept a conference turned in part on a change in these expectations. The firmness of British support was gradually becoming clearer and Rouvier remarked to the British Charge' on June 28, just before making his final proposal, that "France would go into it with the support of England, Spain and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be alone." Once the "present difficulties had been more or less tided over at the conference, it would be possible to see that Germany did not get too much in Morocco."

There were also some German attempts to change the French utilities which might have had some effect. For example, Bulow stated at one point that the conference was only a face-saving device for Germany, implying that France could have what she wanted at the conference if she would only accept it. On a similar theme, he told the French ambassador on June 28 that once the conference met, Germany would be free from her obligations to the Sultan and could follow her own interests, among which Morocco occupied "an infinitely small place." He coupled this with a threat that if France refused the conference, there would ensue a condition of la paix armee.

There is little or no evidence of changes in German utilities during this particular period of the crisis. We can only speculate. Once the French firmness, with British support, became clear, did Bulow then devalue the German substantive aims at the conference and thus become willing to accept the French pre-conditions? Or, without changing their value, did he decide he had to accept some jeopardy to these aims in order to get a conference? When he said the conference was just a face-saving device for Germany, had he really come to believe this (with its implied low valuation of gains at the conference) or was this just a bargaining ploy? Logically, of course, the growing evidence of British and French toughness and cohesion should have devalued the event "conference" for him by reducing his expectation of gain. Perhaps so, but the holding of a conference, whatever its outcome, still had sufficient honor and prestige value for him that he could not

drop the demand. The German statements about their "moral obligation" to the Sultan, incurred by the Kaiser's statements in Tangier and other declarations should not be entirely discounted.


One or two remarks can be made about "salience". The French conditions of guarantees for the Entente and French control of the Algerian frontier were certainly salient points. The French could state their demands and dig in their heels on them pretty effectively; the Germans might have been asking themselves, "If not here, where?" Roosevelt's mediation is also worth mentioning in this connection. His "compromise" proposal had a bit of casuistry about it; it was not really a compromise by a restatement of the French demand for guaranteed inviolability of the Franco-British Entente. But since he called it a "compromise" and it had a superficial aura of splitting the difference in proposing "no program" when the French and Germans had been proposing alternative versions of a "program", it did have the effect of precipitating an agreement. Both parties, the Germans especially, could pretend that they were accepting a "neutral" and "fair" proposal from an outside source.

(I will treat checklist item A.5, about "maximization" vs. "disaster-avoidance" under the "cataclysmic" heading.)

A utility model might also be applied to the pre-conference bargaining about a "program" which followed the French acceptance of the conference, but I will not attempt it in any detail here. The issues in this phase were rather artificial, more or less trumped up by the Germans to try to salvage something from their capitulation to the French conditions in the July 8 accord. The Germans claimed that France, having been granted the exclusive right to the police command on the Algerian frontier, was barred from demanding any of the coastal ports at the conference; and that the details of the French policing of the Algerian frontier must be taken up at the conference. Of course the French rejected these claims. Other minor issues were the choice of meeting place and a dispute over a German loan and construction concession in Morocco which the French wished to nullify. The bargaining pattern in terms of bidding moves was very similar to that preceding the June 8 agreement. The Germans, after much haggling, finally agreed to the French terms, with the French making minor face-saving concessions. However, the reason for the German concessions was somewhat different in this situation. Whereas they had conceded earlier because of French and British firmness, they did so in this second round because of a desire to appease France preparatory to luring her into an alliance with Germany and Russia. In other words, they did not (ostensibly at least)



Then there was a small concession by Germany: France could have two ports to herself, the others were to be shared, with police "instructors" of several nationalities. This, too, may have been just window-dressing. This situation at this point might be portrayed as follows.



It is probably more appropriate to call the French concession "sham" than the German, for the French conceded nothing of the essence of their opening position, whereas the Germans offered something of substance, exclusive French control of two ports. Yet it is hard to believe Bulow thought he had moved anywhere near the French minimum. It is not easy to say just what was in the German minds in bargaining terms. Bulow and Holstein may have still doubted the Liberal government would give military support to France, and so may have felt that once France realized this, substantial concessions from them would be forthcoming. I.e., they may have thought a bargaining range would open up if they waited. More likely, the Germans, in their secret thoughts, although less certain than the French about British intentions, probably thought it quite likely that Britain would stand firm. In that case, they may have had a minimum in mind to which they would eventually retreat. But there is no evidence for this.

Further German movement (not reported in my narrative) occurred on Feb. 20-22, when Holstein proposed to a French envoy in Berlin the following terms for a direct agreement between France and Germany--i.e., outside the context of the conference: the governments would make a temporary settlement to last for four or five years; France would be given one port to police alone, the other seven would be policed by various nationalities including French and German; France would be granted a slight advantage in the bank. If France would accept this internationalization for the time being, in a few years Germany would agree to leave Morocco entirely to France in return for compensation elsewhere. This proposal, which Rouvier rejected immediately, was hardly a "concession", since France was offered now only one port instead of

two. Yet Holstein evidently thought of it as a concession because of the promise to give Morocco entirely to France in five years. This move is significant mostly for what it reveals about the German interests at stake. If it was sincerely meant, it shows that the Germans were not really interested, intrinsically, in having a share of Morocco; the stakes for them were chiefly prestige and "supergame" (breaking the Entente) and their realization required only that France be frustrated in some way by the application of German power.


The deadlock was broken by formal votes on March 3 and 5, which showed Germany she was isolated. All other countries, including Austria, supported the French position. The French and British delegates, Nicolson and Revoil, had predicted the outcome of the vote correctly; it was because they were confident of their prediction that they pushed the matter to a formal vote. They wanted to make the balance of power clear to Germany. In this they were successful so far as the German delegates were concerned. Both Radowitz and Tattenbach urged Berlin to recede for they were now sure that France would not. However Nicolson and Revoil did not think the German government would recede, at least not enough to permit agreement, and they predicted the conference would break up at its next session.

Bulow, however, had no intention of letting the conference break up and made a major concession by accepting the Austrian proposal: French and Spanish control of all ports except Casablanca, where the police would be commanded by a French or Dutch officer with powers of inspection over all the police. The German, Austrian and Italian delegates all declared this was the least the French would accept; in other words, they identified this plan as the French "minimum position". They may have been right for a brief period when the new French cabinet began to have doubts about British support. But when Grey reaffirmed this support in the strongest terms, the French minimum shifted (if in fact it had moved at all) somewhere to the "right": a neutral inspector but without command powers. This provision had been in the original French proposal at the beginning of the conference, so the French were, in effect, still standing firm on their original demand.

An agreement was reached when the Germans accepted this French demand, with the French making some very minor face-saving concessions on other issues.

Can it be said that a "bargaining range" existed at any time during these negotiations in the sense of the French and the Germans holding overlapping minimum positions? Very probably the answer is no. The French had a clear minimum position in their own minds; they stated it as their opening demand and simply stuck to it all the way through. The Germans did not have a clear

minimum position in mind: a position which they would hold at the cost of breaking up the conference rather than recede from it. They were simply not willing to have the conference break up and were willing to give the French everything they wanted rather than have this happen. The Germans were uncertain about the French minimum early in the conference and this probably is why they "hung tough" until early March. But that the French demands were in fact their minimum position became clear to them after the votes of March 3 and 5 and the British declarations of support had clarified the power distribution. Then they had to accept the French position. Thus, as in the earlier negotiations over the holding of a conference, settlement was reached at a "point" rather than somewhere within a "range." The negotiations, in toto, may thus be diagrammed as follows:



The point of agreement was "discovered" by the Germans as they gradually became clear about French firmness and British support of the French. The German concessions were attempts to locate the French minimum position. They thought they had found it with the Welshersheimb proposal but they were wrong.

There were several attempts by the French side to change the German utilities. The most prominent of these were the Russian arguments made to Germany: conciliation of France might realize the "Bjorko ideal"; failure of the conference would bring harder-liners to power in France; failure would bring "cataclysmic" complications in Morocco; a war might lead to revolution in Germany. Austria warned of a French-Russian-British alliance if the conference should fail. The French themselves do not appear to have bothered to try to change the German utilities.

The "concession" by Holstein might be interpreted as a German attempt to change French utilities--i.e., it was an attempt to lower the French perceived costs of accepting the German terms now by a promise that she would be allowed to realize her own objectives ultimately.

"Saliience" was less important in the conference negotiations than in the earlier negotiations about whether to hold a conference. Perhaps there was

some salience at the level of "principle": full Franco-Spanish control, sharing with Germany, control by neutrals, etc. But the concrete issue of how many ports the French and Spanish were to have, was pretty much on an even continuum: the Germans could offer one port, two ports, three ports. . . up to seven ports; there was no conspicuous point on which they could dig in and hold. The Austrian (Welshersheimb) proposal was not "salient" because there was no inherently good reason, according to any commonly recognized principles of "equity", etc., why the neutral inspector should have any command powers. Thus the Germans could not argue persuasively that this was somehow a "correct" or "fair" solution and were forced to retreat further.

B. Coercive tactics and the "critical risk" model

(In this section I will first answer questions "1" and "2" on the checklist, then shift to the list of coercive tactics in Working Paper No. 4 as a substitute for questions 3-7, then shift back to the checklist.)

Since the critical risk model technically is tied to a game of chicken, it is applicable in the full mathematical sense only to the German side. That is, I believe that with respect to all the "sub-games" in the crisis--whether to hold a conference, the program for a conference, the conference itself, and the underlying "naked" power situation in case any of the three negotiating situations had ended in "no agreement"--the French were in prisoner's dilemma, except for the early period prior to and immediately after the resignation of Delcasse'. The French preferred "no agreement" in each of the negotiating phases to acceptance of the German maximum demands, and if the conference had broken down, they would have preferred war to accepting those demands. The Germans, on the other hand, preferred accepting the French maximum demands over "no agreement" in each of the negotiating phases, with the exception of the first, where they preferred to let the negotiations break up rather than accept the initial French position. In the underlying basic situation, the Germans also were in chicken: they would have preferred to let the French have Morocco rather than initiate war. Of course, after the Germans reduced their demands in each of the negotiating phases, e.g., after the Germans advanced the Welshersheimb proposal at the conference, the French game probably shifted to chicken with respect to the modified German positions. But for our purposes, it is probably best to limit the application of these models to the initial demands of the parties.

However, although it is not possible, even in principle, to postulate critical risks for the French during most of the crisis, since they were not in a

*you're saying that the French maximum  
fall between the initial & final G. positions*



chicken game, this does not diminish the relevance of the various coercive communication tactics which we have linked to the critical risk model. The French still faced the problem of convincing the Germans that they were in prinsoner's dilemma, or at least of strengthening the credibility of their declarations of firmness so that it was higher than the German critical risk. In other words, the relevance of coercive tactics for any party does not depend on the party's perception of it, or uncertainty about it. Since the Germans were uncertain about the French payoffs, coercive communications to affect the German perceptions were, in principle, relevant for the French.

On checklist question "2": I find little evidence that the parties tried to estimate precise probabilities for the opponent's actions. The estimates took two forms, either (1) and "absolute" judgment that the opponent would or would not stand firm, break off negotiations, or fight; or (2) vague expressions of "danger" or "riskiness", more indicative of a diffuse feeling of anxiety than of even a rough probability calculation.

The "absolute" category contains the following items:

1. The French judgment (if their statements are taken at face value) that Germany would not seriously resist their designs in Morocco.
2. Rouvier's judgment, early in the crisis, that Germany would attack if a full alliance were concluded between England and France, or if France persisted in her Moroccan take-over without consulting or compensating Germany.
3. Delcasse's judgment that the Germans were bluffing.
4. Bulow's belief that after Delcasse's fall, the French would quickly agree to a conference.
5. Bulow's belief, just before the conference, that France would back down under strong German pressure.
6. Statements by the pro-French Foreign Office group in Britain that if England stood solidly with France, there would be no war.
7. Grey, during the conference: If the conference breaks up Germany will try to establish her influence in Morocco. Then France will be driven to take action.
8. Bulow's confident prediction of support from other countries at the conference.
9. Moltke's equally confident prediction that the French would not make any concessions at the conference.

Examples of the vague, uncertain type of estimate:

1. Lansdowne's anxiety that Germany might ask for a port.

2. Rouvier, before acceptance of conference: Present situation is "excessively dangerous." If conference is not accepted, Germany would make demands on the Sultan and the situation "would become far more critical".

3. Grey: Germany might make it a casus belli if France takes action in Morocco following break-up of conference. Grey's fear of "complications".

4. Cambon to Grey: Because of German policy, "there was a risk that matters might be brought to a point in which a pacific issue might be difficult".

I find only two examples of contingency estimates which did introduce a certain degree of precision in the range of probabilities between 0 and 1. They are:

1. Holstein's statement that the danger of war was "vanishingly small". (This connotes a probability close to zero but not quite zero.)

2. Moltke's statement that in case of war between Germany and England, French neutrality was "not entirely impossible even if the probability is small".

After scanning this list, I think the only further generalization of interest is that many of the "absolute" statements occurred in a context of domestic policy debate where there was a need to make strong arguments. The actors' "real" or private expectations might have contained some degree of uncertainty.

This evidence does, of course, invalidate the application of the critical risk model in its precise mathematical form. However it is possible to observe some of the gross processes portrayed by the model. For example, the Germans behaved as if, early in the crisis, the credibility of French firmness was lower than their critical risk but that this relationship was gradually reversed as evidence of French and British resolve accumulated. Further, it is plausible to say that the coercive bargaining tactics employed by the parties were designed to accomplish gross changes in the opponent's payoff and probability estimates in the way the model postulates.

I will now turn to Working Paper No. 4 and cite examples of tactics in the categories listed therein.

#### Tactics to increase credibility

##### Change one's own apparent utilities

There are only two examples of increasing the size or readiness of capabilities to reduce one's own war costs. These are the movement of the British Mediterranean fleet to home waters, and the French readiness measures taken just before the opening of the conference. Both of these measures were apparently taken chiefly for preparedness rather than for bargaining effect. However, they probably did have some bargaining effect, but not so much in reducing the British and French potential war costs or the probability that they would win, as in indicating their

readiness to fight. The influence effect on the Germans, in other words, stemmed from the communication of British and French intentions, rather than from an increase in their capabilities.

In the working paper, "threats" are included among tactics which change the utilities of the threatener. Threats engage the prestige, honor and bargaining reputation of the threatener so that it is more difficult for him to back down. It is impossible to say, but unlikely, that the parties intended this effect in issuing their threats. The intent was more accurately, simply to communicate an already existing value structure (either actual or pretended) such that a party was determined to fight or could not avoid fighting in certain contingencies, rather than to engage new values. However, the cumulative effect of each parties' threats was to engage new values which increased the difficulty of backing down, and this effect was sometimes recognized by the threatener's opponent. For instance, Rouvier recognized, in agreeing to go to a conference, that German "honor" had become involved as a consequence of German threats and other communications.

Most of the threats were issued by Germany to France. Germany also made two mild threats to Britain and Britain issued two major threats to Germany. As far as I can see, the French issued no threats at all. Since they were in the role of defender or resister, it was enough for them merely to state their determination not to yield to the German threats.

All of the threats were less than completely explicit, and they carried varying degrees of bellicosity or severity according to the diplomatic code language used. It is interesting to note that all of the German and British threats implied "no choice" or restricted choice: the government would be forced to carry out its threat by the engagement of certain absolute, overriding values, or by circumstances external to itself and more or less beyond its control.

Thus, Bulow told the French in December, 1905 that if they insisted on a general mandate in Morocco, "a critical situation would arise which. . . would inevitably lead to a grave conflict." The "conflict" (i.e., war), would "inevitably" follow from the "situation", not from deliberate German choice. Or take Bulow's threat that if the French tried to "intimidate" or "publicly humiliate" Germany, "they are playing a dangerous game which can lead to war". This could be taken to imply that "humiliation" would engage German emotions in such a way as to make her behavior quite unpredictable. The idea of compulsion from the engagement of absolute, overriding values was the theme in Bulow's threat that if France behaved so "provocatively that finally our national honor would come into question," Germany would "have to resort to arms".

British threats to Germany cited "public opinion" as the source of compulsion, rather than national honor. Neither Lansdowne nor Grey threatened that Britain would aid France as a deliberate governmental decision; they said that "public opinion" or "public feeling" would make it difficult or impossible to be neutral or to avoid fighting on the side of France.

It is worth noting that the severest, most pointed German threats--those issued to France just before the fall of Delcasse', were uttered by ambassadors and lower-ranking Foreign Office officials, rather than by governmental leaders. Furthermore, the threats made by ambassadors were issued in capitals other than Paris, so that reports of them reached the French government at second or third-hand. Bulow deliberately selected the councillor at the Paris embassy, Von Miguel, to make the most pointed threat to Rouvier, because the ambassador's official position made it inappropriate for him to do so. He probably had in mind that such language used by the ambassador, who was conventionally bound by certain rules of politeness, would be excessively provocative to France and would involve the government's official prestige more than he wished.

German threats were effective in the early stages of the crisis in persuading Rouvier to drop his foreign minister and agree to a conference; after that they had the perverse effect of stiffening French resistance by arousing French resentment.

As for other items under "increasing one's apparent valuation of the stakes":

2. There were no attempts to "link the present issue with other issues", in the sense of indicating concern for one's resolve image in future conflicts. The British and German governments were in fact both concerned about this, but it was mentioned only in internal discussions, not in inter-state bargaining.

3. The Germans emphasized strongly the "legitimacy" and "legality" of their demand for a conference, and denied the legitimacy of the British-French bilateral arrangements for Morocco.

4. The Germans also sought to tie their position to the moral principle that all interested powers had a right to be included in any disposition of Morocco. They also invoked moral principle in their statements that they "could not desert the Sultan."

5. Covered under "3"

6. No instances

7. No instances

8. British leaders invoked historical tradition in resisting the French request for a firmer commitment: this would violate the British tradition of avoiding absolute commitments for hypothetical contingencies.

B. Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs.

(There are no examples similar to items 1-4)

5. Lansdowne and Grey several times told the German ambassador that "public opinion" or "public feeling" might force the British government to support France in case of war. However, I think the motive here was not so much to convince the Germans that the British government would lose its freedom of choice, but rather to minimize the provocativeness of threats, and introduce ambiguity so as to avoid absolute commitment. (Saying "public opinion won't let me," or "public opinion will force me" was popular diplomatic code language of the day. However, it was not all pretense. Governments were extraordinarily attentive and sensitive to public opinion and were often considerably influenced by it. In the Morocco crisis, this was particularly the case in France. The radical shift in the French government's bargaining posture, from very soft to very hard, was in large part the consequence of a change in the attitude toward Germany by the French press and public. Curiously, the press seems to have been both more controlled by, and influential upon, governments than is the case today. Governments "used" the press a great deal to send out diplomatic signals, but they were also considerably affected by press sentiments. An almost continuous Franco-German "press war" from the summer of 1905 to spring, 1906, was not only an accurate barometer, but also to some extent a cause, of the rise and fall of hostility and tension between the governments. An Anglo-German press war was also a significant factor in the high degree of hostility and fear that developed more or less autonomously during the crisis as a consequence of competitive navy-building.)

Rouvier also cited public opinion in France (in communicating with Germany) as an absolute barrier against French acceptance of a conference.

6. I find no evidence that any government deliberately sought to manipulate its own public opinion as a commitment device. They occasionally used the press to communicate demands, proposals, threats, etc. to other governments but not to whip up domestic support. They followed public opinion more than they manipulated it.

7-10. No instances.

11. The German and British governments both cited uncertainties in the situation, or the unpredictability of their own pressure, as a coercive tactic. Bulow said on one occasion to the French that they were "playing with fire"; on another that they were "playing a dangerous game". He also said that if France rejected a conference, a state of "armed peace" would result. However, it is impossible to say whether his purpose in using these phrases was to communicate that the situation might get out of control, or that German policy was unpredictable,

or that these statements were merely a way of using bellicose language without committing Germany. I favor the later interpretation.

The principal example for the British was Lansdowne's statement to the German ambassador that "it was not to be foreseen how far British public opinion would force the government to support France." Lansdowne probably was uncertain, but the mention of the possibility that Britain would fight undoubtedly increased its likelihood in German estimates. And of course, British tradition and the British cabinet system required that all threats be couched in uncertainties rather than certainties.

12. There were no force demonstrations intended to coerce. The British redeployment of the fleet and the French mobilization measures were undertaken for preparedness, not for coercive bargaining.

13-15. No instances.

## II. Tactics to reduce adversary's critical risk

### A. Increase adversary's estimate of his costs of war

The only example which fits this category were statements in the German press to the effect that if war came the English navy would of course defeat the German navy but France would be occupied, since England could not help France on land. This was elaborated in what became known as the "hostage theory": in case of war, France would be occupied and held as "hostage" against British exploitation of their naval victory by taking German colonies. As with virtually all the German threats, these statements, far from intimidating the French, only infuriated them. And of course they can be considered as a bargaining tactic only if the statements were instigated by the government, which is not clear.

B. Devalue the stakes for the adversary (change his utilities so as to decrease his cost of compliance).

1. No significant instances.

2. Rouvier, early in the crisis, offered various forms of quid pro quo to Germany, for German acceptance of French control over Morocco. These were offers of "compensation" to Germany in other areas, to be worked out in detail in bilateral negotiations. The offers were refused, first, because German values were best served by frustrating France rather than making a deal with her, and second, because, once having taken a stand on a conference and the principle of "European" responsibility for Morocco, Germany was absolutely barred, on moral grounds, from making a private deal.

Rouvier's other statements, to the effect that France would be very generous and conciliatory in bilateral talks, were designed to raise the utility, for the

Germans, of accepting this mode of settlement. But again, this was ineffective because of the absolute German commitment to collective responsibility. However, only the German hard-liners felt bound by this "moral imperative"; the Kaiser would have accepted the French advances. This suggests there was a tactical element in the German protestations of moral rectitude. Furthermore, the Germans seriously considered, in the fall of 1905, granting France a free hand in Morocco in return for French adhesion to the Bjorko treaty. We do not have the details of the intra-German debate at this point; presumably the hard-liners emphasized the moral responsibility of following through with the conference, while the soft-liners emphasized strategic "supergame" considerations.

3-6. This group of tactics were all involved in Germany's demand for a conference and the arguments adduced in its support. For example, the German circular note urging a conference played hard on the legality or legitimacy of collective European settlement and stressed the illegality and illegitimacy of the French designs. These arguments were directed mainly at other countries than France, particularly Britain; it was thought that because of the high value placed by the British on international law, collective settlement of disputes, "Concert of Europe", etc., the British could be induced to accept the conference, and could themselves use such legalistic arguments to disengage themselves from their obligations to France. The attempt failed because other British values--moral commitment to the French and the strategic value of the Entente--were stronger.

The Germans may have felt also that they could modify French utilities with these arguments. At a conference, even if the French got less, substantively, than they had planned, they would get it in a context of "morality" and legitimacy". Such community values would offset the more tangible French losses. The hope was vain, of course. "Conference" had a negative utility for the French (being "dragged into court") rather than a positive one and they agreed to it only after considerable German concessions on the substance.

7. All governments "minimized the element of duress or provocation" in their communications, in the sense that their statements were less pointed or bellicose than they might have been; they used diplomatic "code language." However, the Germans were much less careful about this than the others (it is probably tactically necessary for an aggressive power to use extra strong language, especially when it is bluffing) with the consequence that the French did feel provoked and bullied. The peremptory tone of the German language was an important factor in stiffening French resolve.

8. No instances, but it is possible that if the French had used more gradual "salami" methods in penetrating and taking over Morocco, an appropriate occasion

for a German challenge might not have arisen.

9. Bulow tried to impress France with Germany's limited aims, and thus to make the conference more acceptable to the French by saying that, for Germany, the conference was merely a question of "etiquette", of fulfilling a formal obligation to the Sultan. Once this obligation was met, Germany could follow her own interests, among which Morocco occupied "an infinitely small place". This language was obviously intended to reduce the French expected cost of agreeing to a conference, by convincing them that they would get all they wanted there. (It is quite possible, however, that this was not intended to be deceptive--i.e., the German leaders (Bulow in particular) may have felt at this point in the crisis that simply holding the conference was enough to make their point and they might have been quite sincere in saying they had only a procedural obligation to the Sultan. Later on, after the conference was accepted, the logic of the German position forced them to make substantive demands, but they might not have thought this through in early summer, 1905). As a tactical ploy, this move may have had some effect in eventually persuading Rouvier to accept a conference, even though he did insist on a written guarantee of French interests as collateral against the German professions of substantive disinterestedness.

Under the heading of "changing adversary's utilities" we can also place several communications which stressed the "supergame" values or costs of certain outcomes. For example, Grey told Metternich that Anglo-German relations would improve if Germany were conciliatory at Algeciras. These relations were so bad at this point that the statement had little effect; German supergame designs alternated between "breaking the Entente" by coercion or forming a "continental league" against Britain. However after these two projects collapsed, the idea of an entente with England might have helped Bulow decide to give way at the conference.

During the conference, Austria sought to raise the German expected cost of holding firm (and thus to induce German concessions) by citing the danger of a new alignment between England, France and Russia if the conference should break up through German obstinacy. Circumstantially, this consideration (if not the Austrian mention of it) probably helped convince Bulow that he had to give way. But of course the new alignment took place anyway, partly because of excessive German coercion prior to the conference.

Less realistic, and no doubt ineffective, was Russia's invocation of the "Bjorko ideal" during the conference to impress Germany with the supergame value of capitulation. This probably had no effect because, by this time, Bulow knew that the continental league was a deadletter. Russia sought further to influence



German utilities by pointing to the danger of a harder-line government in France should the conference fail, and the danger of revolution in Germany in case of war.

10-14. No instances, although some of Germany's communications could be interpreted as "stressing the common interest in avoiding war." (#12).

C. Expanded game models

Not relevant to this crisis.

D. Supergame model

The relevance of this model is obvious but all the significant "supergame" points have been discussed already under "I. Systemic factors."

E. Information-processing

Misperception was rife during this crisis and was critically important in determining the parties' behavior. The most important of them were as follows:

1. German misperception of British support of France

Throughout the crisis, the Germans under-estimated the degree of British commitment to France: both the British willingness to support France diplomatically at the conference, and their resolve to fight with France in case of war. The misperception of the Conservative government may have been partially corrected by the time it left office in December, 1905, but it was succeeded by a deeper misperception of the intentions of the Liberal government which was not corrected until well into the conference negotiations.

We can only speculate about the causes of these misperceptions. Undoubtedly they were influenced by a German image of England built up during the earlier period of British "splendid isolation." Thus the Germans probably believed the British were not interested in allies and would not fight for the interests of allies if she made alliances. England was "perfidious Albion", a country which made alignments with other countries only to serve her own interests, and if her own interests were not in jeopardy would leave the ally in the lurch. Hence, since the British had no important interests in Morocco, they would not fight to save the interests of France. The British had not made a continental alliance for a long time; thus the Germans found it difficult to accept evidence that British foreign policy was in the process of major transformation from isolation to continental involvement. The Germans therefore probably underestimated the value to the British of the alliance aspects of the Entente. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the German aim of breaking the Entente. The Germans did perceive the alliance overtones of the Entente and saw that it was at least an incipient alliance which posed some threat to Germany. But their image of England told them that it was a very fragile connection which could easily be

broken; the British would try to disengage at the first sign that they might have to go to war. The fragility of the Entente was further underlined by the perception that England and France were traditional imperial enemies.

This image was influential in German thinking because they received relatively little hard information which contradicted it. The flow of diplomatic communication during the crisis was mainly between France and Germany on the one hand and France and England on the other. There were relatively few signals on the German-British channel and most of them emanated from Germany rather than Britain. For the most part, the signals from Britain to Germany were conciliatory or at least non-committal rather than threatening. The main exceptions were Lansdowne's threat that if Germany "light-heartedly" attacked France, British public opinion might force Britain to support France (hardly a "severe" threat), and later, Grey's stronger statements that it would be impossible for England to be neutral in a Franco-German war because of "public feeling". The Germans apparently took Lansdowne's threat seriously, however; it probably contributed to German acceptance of the French pre-conditions for holding a conference. But their image of the Liberal government was not corrected until the conference was well underway. It is also worth noting that the Germans were not aware of the Anglo-French military conversations.

Certain psychological mechanisms tending to preserve images, such as selective attention and cognitive consistency, seemed to be operating on the German side. A good example of selective attention would be Bulow's reference to the Manchester Guardian and Lord Rosebery (both anti-French and pro-German) as indicators of British intentions. The drive for cognitive consistency probably was generally operative in the following way: Having decided that France could be successfully coerced on Morocco, it was necessary also to believe that Britain would not support France to the point of war.

What might seem to contradict this speculation is the considerable popular hostility between England and Germany which developed out of their naval rivalry. There was a more or less continuous "press war" going on, with the press on both sides expressing apprehensions that the other was building up for an attack. However, although the governments were not unaffected by these fears (illusory on both sides of course) they tended to discount them as press extremism and popular emotion, although the Germans occasionally referred to the popular antagonism as a bargaining device, to play upon the dangers of war in communicating with the British, and with the Americans. Impressionistic evidence leads one to speculate that to the degree that governmental leaders were actually affected by this "hostility spiral" it did not seem to spill over much into their

calculations concerning each other in the Moroccan crisis; it was largely an autonomous process.

It is worth noting, finally, how simple and undifferentiated the German image of the Liberal government was. The Germans seem to have constructed their image of the Liberals entirely from the attitudes of the "radical" wing of the party; there is no evidence that they realized there were two wings of the party, and that it was the "tough imperialists" who were in charge of British foreign policy.

## 2. German misperception of French resolve

The first item here is the German misperception of the meaning of the "softness" of the French government and public (with the exception of Delcasse') in the early period of the crisis. In very general terms, the image was correct: Rouvier and almost all French politicians wanted to come to an understanding with Germany and thought Delcasse' had slighted the legitimate interests of Germany. The image was confounded however, because it was too simple and undifferentiated. The French were willing to give the Germans a great deal in bilateral negotiations, but being hauled to a conference like criminals in the dock was quite another matter.

Another item is the German misperception until well into the conference that they would score significant gains. This was not so much because of a misperception of French resolve per se (by the opening of the conference their image of Rouvier probably was corrected) but a misperception of the attitudes of all the other parties. Just before the conference opened, Bulow professed to believe that France would be isolated, that all the other governments would either stand aside or support Germany in the crunch. Thus the French would have to back down. He continued to hold this belief, although it may have gradually been transformed into a "hope" rather than a "belief", until well along into the conference, despite contradictory evidence and opinions coming to him from his advisers. Although British "diplomatic support", at least, of the French, must have been clear early in the conference, it took the votes of March 3 and 5 to correct his misperceptions of the others.

Again, I speculate: In any international conflict situation, the information level about other parties' intentions may be so low that several alternative expectations about them may seem plausible. A party which has strongly engaged its prestige behind an objective may then simply choose those alternatives from the set which are favorable to attainment of the goal. Put simply, this is just plain "wishful thinking" or in more technical terminology, "cognitive consistency". The crucial point is that there were plausible reasons for believing that Austria

would automatically support Germany, that Italy could be coerced, that Spain's conflicts with France could be exploited, that Russia's enthusiasm for the French alliance had cooled, that the U.S. would be pro-German, etc. There were plausible reasons for believing otherwise too, but these reasons were ignored.

3. German misperception of Russian and French willingness to enter "continental alliance".

Here the reference is to the German soft-liners, headed by the Kaiser, although the hard-line people (Holstein) and middle-liners (Bulow) were not unaffected.

It is curious that the Kaiser did not appreciate the depth of feeling in France about Alsace-Lorraine and therefore did not see that this presented an insuperable obstacle to a continental alliance. Nor did he recognize that the Franco-Russian alliance presented another difficult obstacle. He seems to have drawn his expectations from the imperial arena, where the traditional rivalry of France and Russia with England seemed to make them natural allies with Germany against England. He seems also to have been affected by the ideological "brotherhood" between Germany and Russia and memories of past German-Russian collaboration.

It is even more curious that Bulow and Holstein seemed to have shared the Kaiser's fantasies during the period between the negotiation of the Bjorko treaty and the opening of the conference--when they were negotiating a conference "program" with the French in the fall of 1905. They felt, apparently sincerely, that conciliating France on these rather minor procedural issues might seduce her into German arms--even though they still intended to drag France to a conference and presumably oppose her there. Following their own logic, what they should have done at this point was to call off the conference entirely and give Morocco to France. Anything less would certainly have been insufficiently seductive. But they were committed to a conference and a policy of coercion, and it was simply impossible for them to disengage from the logic of coercion and shift to a reverse logic of conciliation and realignment. One gets the impression that at a sub-conscious level the Germans were searching for a way out of their predicament. They thought they saw a way out at the level of "high politics" and allowed this fantasy to affect their behavior briefly, until the Russians rudely pricked the bubble.

4. French misperception that Lansdowne had offered a full alliance

It will be recalled that Lansdowne offered to "discuss contingencies" with the French government, having in mind particularly the contingency of a German demand for a Moroccan port. His purpose was to head off a French concession to

this demand, or any other demand adverse to British interests, but Cambon and Delcasse' interpreted it as an offer of alliance. Bertie's editing of Lansdowne's first communication, and the foreign minister's own vagueness, certainly contributed to the French misunderstanding. A deeper cause, however, lay in Cambon's and Delcasse's desire to get a stronger commitment from England. Lansdowne's vague language was subject to several interpretations; the French ambassador and foreign minister simply chose the interpretation which fitted what they wanted to hear from Lansdowne. The general point is that when ambiguous diplomatic "code language" is used, the sender thinks he is communicating what is on his mind, but the receiver interprets it according to what is on his mind.

A further misperception in this episode was Delcasse's belief that a firmer commitment from England would strengthen him in his struggle for political survival at home. His logic was that his hard-line policy would be more acceptable domestically if it could be shown that in case of war France would have an ally. However, he seems to have misperceived the attitude towards England of his soft-line enemies. To them, an alliance with England was one of the worst things that could happen, since it would provoke a German attack on France. Thus the supposed English offer of alliance contributed to Delcasse's downfall rather than helping him.

Delcasse's fall was in part the result of his misperception of England interacting with Rouvier's quite different misperception. Rouvier did not disbelieve that an alliance had been offered but he interpreted it as a British attempt to incite war between France and Germany. This interpretation was a function of his broader image of England as an untrustworthy country which desired conflict between other European powers, so they would be weakened and England would profit from their weakness.

Further contributing to Rouvier's misperception was an even broader image or theory about international politics which was the direct opposite of Delcasse's. Delcasse's theory was that peace is preserved through power; the aggressive opponent is deterred by confronting him with a preponderance of power. Rouvier's theory was that the accumulation of power causes a spiral of mutual hostility which produces war. Peace is preserved by conciliation. Specifically in the situation then confronting France, attempting to resist Germany by power and threats would provoke her to attack, not deter her. It is interesting that he even extended this reasoning to Delcasse's diplomacy with Italy and Spain. The latter's success in alienating these countries from Germany and drawing them toward France Rouvier viewed not as a gain in power for France but as a cause of German antagonism, and thus a cost, not a gain.

Thus the personal confrontation in the turbulent cabinet meeting of June 6, 1905, was also a confrontation between two theories of international politics which have been in opposition since the beginning of international history. Delcasse' represented the school of "realism" or realpolitik, which sees conflict of interest as the norm and the chief cause of war as the failure to balance aggressive power with countervailing power. Rouvier represented the "idealist" school which views harmony of interest as the norm and sees conflict and war either as illusory or the result of emotional, affective "hostility" rather than a conflict of real interests. This theoretical opposition is manifested today in the arguments between the deterrers and disarmers, the power balancers and the "mirror image" or "hostility spiral" theorists. It is often an important ingredient in the dichotomy between "hard-line" and "soft-line" decision-makers.

As noted earlier, for reasons that are somewhat obscure, Rouvier's world-view and his specific images of Germany and England changed radically after the firing of Delcasse' failed to produce a relaxation of German coercion. Germany then appeared as a bully who had rejected France's sincere offers of accommodation and was interested only in pushing France around and humiliating her. England was transformed from a Machiavellian schemer to a sincere friend who would help France teach the bully a lesson.

After the Delcasse' affair, the French became gradually surer of British loyalty. They had a much more confident and accurate perception of the British will to fight in case of war than the Germans had. The chief reason for this, again, probably is that the British were doing a great deal more communicating with the French than with the Germans. Although Grey made a somewhat more explicit verbal commitment in talking to the German ambassador than he did in speaking to Cambon, the French received many more signals and were tuned into several channels of communication besides the ambassadorial one--e.g., the military conversations, collaboration in planning negotiating strategies, collaboration between Nicolson and Revoil at the conference, etc.

Although Rouvier's image of Germany's general character and aims did change radically soon after the ouster of Delcasse', his perception of German resolve to fight did not change so much. In the early debates with Delcasse', he stated confidently that Germany was not bluffing. Later, he apparently became less certain about this judgment but still, until quite late, thought it quite possible that Germany would make war if she failed to achieve her aims at the conference table, or that she would set in motion a train of events by actions in Morocco itself which might precipitate war. Only when Germany made her major concession at the conference (Welsersheimb proposal) did Rouvier and the French

government apparently reach the conviction that Germany was bluffing and would accept the entire French position rather than see the conference fail.

F. "Out-of-control" effects

(Until we can think of a better term, I have substituted this for the term "catclysmic", which has misleading connotation.)

I postulate that a crisis can get out of control in four ways: (1) bureaucracies get out of control; (2) governments are forced to act in certain ways by entities outside themselves (e.g., public opinion) (3) governments themselves become seized by "absolute imperatives" which seem to leave them 'no choice', and (4) emotional behavior takes over from calculated behavior. Bargaining is calculated behavior and when the dominant mode of interaction is bargaining the crisis is still "in control", even though war can result from bargaining moves and especially commitments. However, the line is not sharp: out-of-control elements may affect calculations and color bargaining behavior, and, at the extreme, may supplant bargaining as the dominant mode of interaction.

There are three broad questions to be asked about the out-of-control aspect:

1. Did the crisis get out of control in any sense?
2. Did the participants fear loss of control and how did this affect their behavior?
3. Did the participants manipulate these fears of loss of control for bargaining purposes?

This crisis did not get out of control in any of the senses described above. Military bureaucracies were kept well in hand; the statesmen were affected by their own emotions and by public pressures but not controlled by them. Some of the values at stake approached the character of "absolute imperatives" but luckily these imperatives were felt on subsidiary issues or by only one side.

However, the behavior of the governments was in some respects significantly affected by elements beyond their control. This was particularly so in the case of France, where public emotions, reflected and exaggerated in the press, importantly influenced the government's policy at crucial junctures. Just before the fall of Delcasse', and contributing to that event, the French press and parliament were seized by near-panic arising out of fear of an imminent German attack. Rouvier and other governmental figures both shared in, and were influenced by, this condition. The removal of Delcasse' largely appeased these fears, and then, within a few weeks, the attitude of the French press and public shifted radically to a mood of hostility and resentment because of German bullying tactics, a mood which contributed to a stiffening of the government's policy. Later waves of public indignation followed Tattenbach's concession deals with

the Sultan and Bulow's fatuous offer of a rapprochement after he had coerced France into accepting a conference. It was these manifestations which, as much as anything else, led Russia to conclude that France would never join a German-Russian alliance, and thus, in effect, to reject the Bjorko treaty. French firmness at the conference was in part the result of a strong "never again!" sentiment in the press and public which was largely an emotional reaction--after two backdowns on Delcasse' and on accepting the conference, there would be no further yielding.

The most important German emotional reaction was the righteous indignation which followed Taillandier's statement that he spoke for "all the interested powers." This provided the emotional trigger for the German denial move which opened the crisis.

The only values which approached the character of "absolute imperatives" were the German commitment to a conference and the British commitment to support France. However, neither of these was quite absolute. The Germans did consider dropping the conference, apparently, at one point when the payoff from doing so was perceived to be quite high, Grey was willing to suggest French concessions even at the risk of weakening the Entente, and there was some talk in Britain of withdrawing support from France during the final days of the conference.

Throughout the crisis, the parties did indicate real fears that it might go out of control, and these fears induced considerable caution and restraint. For instance, Bulow, out of fear of provoking an emotional reaction in his opponents, or a spiral of military escalation, notified the German military not to take any special preparedness measures and the German government took special pains to avoid the impression that it was preparing for war. Similarly, Grey instructed the British navy not to undertake any unusual fleet movements which might be interpreted as a threat to Germany.

All parties seemed to share the belief that any new alignments or alliances effected during the crisis could provoke the target country to attack. Thus Rouvier believed that a full-fledged alliance between France and Great Britain would provoke a German attack, and German leaders entertained some fears that an alliance with Russia would provoke an attack from England. The "provocation" envisaged was apparently a strictly emotional one; otherwise it is hard to see why the target state would rationally calculate that a large increment of power to its opponent was the appropriate occasion for starting a war. An alliance was apparently considered a very hostile act which, in a time of tension, might cause the opponent to precipitate violence simply out of anger. Perhaps there was an element of strategic calculation also envisaged--better to attack now before the alliance becomes consolidated--but there is no evidence for this.



There was also a strong "out-of-control" flavor to the parties statements about what might happen if the conference broke up without a settlement. They tried constructing rough scenarios, which usually involved either France or Germany doing something in Morocco which would leave the other "no choice" but to fight. Even in these scenarios there was an out-of-control element in the notion of "no choice". But their real feeling was simply that the situation would then become very much more dangerous and less controllable. It would be a "new situation" since the parties would then be reduced to raw coercion, having exhausted the chance of accommodation. It would be less bound by diplomatic convention, more subject to emotional escalation, threat and counter-threat, engagement of prestige, etc.-and thus less restrained and controlled and less predictable. Such feelings were to a considerable degree, responsible for Germany's decision to capitulate rather than allow the conference to fail, and for Grey's attempt to persuade France to make face-saving concessions to Germany at the end. They were also an important element in Rouvier's decision to accept a conference earlier in the crisis.

The diplomats played upon these "out-of-control" fears in their communication and threat strategies. Bulow pointed out to France that she was playing a "dangerous game" and "playing with fire". He also used this gambit in urging President Roosevelt and the British leaders to exercise restraint on France. Cambon, in pleading for a stronger British commitment, expressed to Grey the fear that otherwise the Kaiser might allow an excited public opinion to push him over the brink.

All parties, particularly France and Germany, exhibited an intense consciousness of "national honor". National honor was an absolute imperative; once it was engaged a country would have to stand firm and fight if necessary. This belief was expressed in intra-governmental discussions, so it was evidently sincere. The fact that the belief was shared made it also a useful bargaining weapon: the message was, of course "It is dangerous to push me too hard and too far; I'm a cool rational bargainer now but if you engage my honor I'll become something radically different."

Footnotes for Conclusion

1. Glenn H. Snyder, "' Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International Politics," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, March, 1971
2. Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," Special Studies, No. 1, Council on International Studies, State University of New York at Buffalo, July, 1971.
3. This summary of French internal divisions is taken chiefly from Bertha R. Leaman, "The Influence of Domestic Policy on Foreign Affairs in France, 1898-1905," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 14, 1942, pp. 449-479; and from Oron J. Hale, Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), Ch. V.
5. Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3, Sept., 1969, pp. 689-719.
6. This summary of German internal divisions is taken chiefly from Hale, op. cit.; and R. J. Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904-1906," American Historical Review, January, 1928.
7. The principal source for this summary of British internal politics is George Monger, The End of Isolation (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1963).
8. G. P. Gooch, Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1936) Vol. I, p. 247.
9. Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), pp. 183-185.
10. E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 87-88.