THE CUBAN CRISIS

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Preface

This is a first draft, so I anticipate that there will be some changes made. I will be happy to listen to any criticism in this regard. It was my understanding that the case researchers were to be cognizant of and sensitive to the work of their colleagues on this project. The only case study available when I was writing this was Diesing's. I have used, cited, corroborated and disagreed with Diesing in a number of locations in this study. This was particularly easy since Diesing's case is particularly relevant for mine and since I agree with Diesing on a good many matters--or so I think. I hope that neither Diesing nor any other case researcher will be offended at the liberal use I have made of his insight.

THE CUBAN CRISIS

The Systemic Environment

The Cuban crisis occurred in what is generally held to be a bipolar system, and to a considerable degree the international system was organized around the two superpowers. The preeminance of these two states may be attributed, at least in an immediate rather than causal sense, to their nuclear and conventional forces which vastly outstripped the corresponding capabilities of all other states with the possible exception of China's conventional land forces. The inability of forces of this nature to handle nonconventional adversaries such as guerrillas, at least in some circumstances, had not yet been as conclusively demonstrated as it has today, and the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union were clearly on the peak of the system's hierarchy. The Soviet Union's conventional land forces were probably superior to those of the United States. The United States probably had superior conventional sea and air forces. A nuclear or strategic balance existed in that neither state had a "first strike" capability, but the United States did possess quantitatively and qualitatively--in terms of hardness--a superior nuclear force.

Each of the superpowers was a bloc leader of sorts, and the blocs manifested themselves in a variety of groupings ranging from rather nebulous conglomerates such as the "free world" or the "communist camp" through general regional organizations similar to the Organization of American States to reasonably coherent and purposeful alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw Pact. The nature

and firmness of the commitments the bloc leaders had toward the lesser members of their respective coalitions varied a great deal among these various groupings, and the considerations involved in particular commitments appear to have been complex and disparate. Each of the superpowers was, however, losing its unquestioned status as bloc leader. China had for several years been engaged in challenging Soviet leadership within the communist bloc, and France, under de Gaulle, had been vociferous in questioning the purpose and character of the Western alliance in general and specific organizations such as NATO in particular. Both China and France had suggested that their respective titular bloc leaders were not serious enough in their tasks, and de Gaulle had even questioned the necessity of a general organization for the defense of Western Europe. In addition a collective conscience was beginning to develop in the third world which was attempting to shake off the chains of a variety of forms of imperialism--of primarily Western origin. This conscience was displayed clearly, for example, in the United Nations, the most prominant international organization of global scope.

This third world conscience was perhaps more relevant to the ideological heterogeneity of the system than to the distribution of power within it. The bloc leaders carried the banners of cross-national ideologies as well, and the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a world-wide ideological struggle for which the third world had served as a common battleground. But with respect to the Cuban crisis the primary relevance of the ideological disparity between the two superpowers lay in its impact on the images each power had of the

other. The ideological schism made the development of empathy and reasonably accurate images between the superpowers difficult to achieve under conditions of normal interaction. Thus the expectations of each about the intentions of the other were rather incorrectly formulated.

Diesing (1970, pp. 3-26) has, I think, quite accurately set out the particulars of this problem between the United States and the Soviet Union, and what he finds in the case of Berlin may in large part be transposed onto the Cuban crisis. The members of the decision units of each state operated under general theories of history which provided different and contradictory interpretations of various activities. Thus, generally in the pre-crisis period the United States and the Soviet Union did not really communicate with one another. Each communicated with a "shadow" which amounted to its image of the other. In addition, the split internal to each of the states between hard and soft liners which Diesing so eloquently examines appears to continue on through the Cuban crisis pretty much as Diesing depicts it in Berlin. And, I have found that President Kennedy shared Diesing's assessment of the United States hard liners as madmen (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 760). It appears that in the Cuban crisis the soft liners on both sides had less rigid images--particularly of the adversary's bluffing character--than Diesing describes in Berlin. There are several possibilities here. Diesing may be incorrect--perish the thought; I may be incorrect; there may have been a general shift on this aspect on the part of these individuals over time, or the Cuban crisis may present significantly different "stimuli" than Berlin. I tend to think the last alternative is correct although the second may provide a fallback position.

The Bargaining Setting

Although the outcome of the Cuban crisis had a direct impact on minimally three states--the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, only two of these were actually involved in any but the most minimal fashion. Both the United States and the Soviet Union managed to work around rather than with Cuba, and thus Cuba was largely excluded from the action of the crisis.

In the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union the crisis came at a point which is now generally considered to have been an early stage of the end of the old cold war. The sixteen some years since the end of World War II had seen the two states continually at odds with one another. Conflict over the division and regimes of Europe and Korea had dominated the Stalin era. Since then, the major bone of contention between the two was the status of West Berlin, and this issue had precipitated conflict throughout 1960 and 1961. In addition a series of less persistent issues--Hungary, Suez, U-2 flights, Laos--had caused periodic difficulites between the two.

The nature of the issues at stake in the Cuban crisis will be examined more fully in the bargaining process section. For now it is adequate to say that the Soviet Union decision unit appears to have been spurred by a number of factors--strengthening its leadership position within the socialist world, exposing the United States as a "paper tiger", improving the Soviet strategic weapons position, and defending Cuba--to take the action which initiated the Cuban crisis. This action was the deployment of certain strategic weapons--medium and intermediate-range

nuclear missiles and medium-range bombers--which the United States viewed as "offensive".

The issue, so to speak, then of the crisis was the deployment of these weapons. Basically, the United States wanted them removed and appears to have been willing to pay whatever price necessary to gain their removal. The importance of this issue to the United States was not primarily due to short-term military considerations although, inasmuch as the missiles severely reduced the Strategic Air Command's warning time and circumvented most United States air defense systems, these were of some importance. The real import of the Soviet deployment for the United States decision unit seems to have lain in the long-term, political arena. The Soviet move violated a number of long-standing, sphere-of-influence conventions dealing with the relationship of the United States and the rest of the Americas. The first of these was perhaps the Monroe Doctrine and the most recent a series of policy statements Kennedy had made about the United States acceptance, or rather lack of same, of the contingency of Cuba as a Soviet strategic weapons base in the months preceding the crisis. In effect the United States had a long-standing public commitment to deny such moves as the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba, and Kennedy and the members of the group which advised him felt that the implications of the acceptance of this Soviet move on United States influence in Latin America and, indeed, on the credibility of United States commitments in general would be disastrous.

In contrast the Soviet Union, at least in retrospect, a pears to have been far less commited to some of its several objectives which

presumably approximate those outlined above. The only objective to which the Soviets had a public commitment of any sort was the defense of Cuba. A number of other asymmetries may have been influential in this skewed or imbalanced situation. United States strategic forces were larger and better protected than their Soviet counterparts. The United States superiority here was probably not sufficient to upset the balance of terror--that is, the United States would have suffered grievously in nuclear war, but the Soviets would hardly have held a nuclear edge even after some of the weapons in Cuba were operational. Also, the crisis took place in an area in which the United States enjoyed the supremacy of its conventional forces. The naval, air, and land forces which the United States could bring to bear in the Caribbean were surely capable of overpowering the Soviet and Cuban forces there. In addition, the United States was able to generate considerable support from relevant "allies"--namely the other states of this hemisphere; whereas, the Soviet Union and Cuba were rather isolated. The Warsaw Pact, of course, sided with the Soviet Union as did the NATO countries with the United States, but the impact of Bulgaria and Greece on the crisis was rather small. Finally, the crisis involved an area clearly within a generally accepted sphere of United States influence and an action which was rather obviously relevant to United States security.

Given these asymmetries it seems somewhat strange that the Soviets initiated a crisis in Cuba in the first place. It now appears as if the Soviet Union greatly misperceived the impact its move would have on the United States and thus the rigidity with which the United States would hold to its objective of keeping Soviet strategic weapons

out of Cuba. The Soviets surely doubted neither the objectives nor the military power of the United States; what was questioned apparently was the willingness of the United States to take risks to achieve its objectives, and it was the demonstration of this lack of resolve which was probably one objective of the Soviet deployment in Cuba. The United States also misperceived its adversary and thus did not fully realize that it had presented such an irresolute image to the Soviet Union that the latter had come to doubt its fibre so seriously. In addition, the United States misjudged Soviet intentions in that United States intelligence presumed that the Soviet Union would be unwilling to deploy its strategic weapons outside of its own borders.

Diesing, in his aforementioned examination of the Berlin crisis suggests that any theory which postulates one party or side as the initiator of the crisis is inadequate in that each side will consider that the provacative activity of the other has precipitated the crisis. In theory I think Diesing is correct. That is, I have viewed a crisis as essentially a challenge denied where the challenge is an attempt to alter an unsatisfactory status quo and the denial is an attempt to frustrate the challenge. It is clear that challenges may be and, from the perspective of the challenger usually are, provoked by some activity of the denier. My point in terming the stages as I have is one of obtaining analytic simplicity rather than attributing blame. It seems to me that any objective standard of fairness would find the Soviet deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba in 1962 quite legitimate. The Soviets were reacting against biased standards imposed by United States military

power. Yet I still find it useful to speak of the Soviet challenge as initiating the crisis.

My reasons for feeling this way are these. In order to limit the material involved in analysing crises an initial provocation has to be adopted. That is, the American activity which provoked the Soviet deployment was undoubtedly provoked by some prior Soviet activity and so on back in time. This chain of provocation has to be cut somewhere. The issue is where, and it may be that the two criteria I adopted on the basis of the cases I chose for analysis are not adequate for Berlin or other cases. One of the criteria was the specificity of the conflict. In the Cuban case the Soviet Union's deployment seems to me to have been provoked not by any specific United States action or issue but rather by a general climate of stubbornness with which milder Soviet attempts to manage Soviet-American conflict had run into. The specific conflict of the crisis--the issue of strategic weapons in Cuba--began only with the Soviet deployment.

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The second criterion derives from the manner in which the term crisis seems to be used by national decision-makers. Here a crisis is essentially the confrontation and breakdown stages of what I have termed a crisis. What I have done here is to include the actions which lead to confrontation, and I have viewed confrontation as the intersection of challenge and denial. I think these criteria work pretty well with the empirical cases I have chosen to do. But, it may be that these are cases--Berlin--for which they will not work at all.

Many specific confrontations over Berlin in 50's

The Bargaining Process

CHALLENGE

The Soviet Deployment

The intentions of the Soviet decision unit and the details of the Soviet decision process remain an enigma, and I shall have to work largely from some ex post facto speculation by United States intelligence analysts. Thus I will never really break away from the perceptions of various United States personnel. The best accounts of this character with which I am familiar are Hilsman (1964), the Wohlstetters (1965), and Horelick (1964). Two of these--the Wohlstetters excluded--are pretty hardline speculations.

There seem to be a number of components which could have been involved in the Soviets general decision to deploy strategic weapons in Cuba. The Soviets might have been looking for some form of triumph in foreign policy. Such an event would perhaps have rejuvenated Soviet prestige in a manner similar to that of the original space acheivements which had, by 1962, lost much of their impact and in a fashion more successful than the Soviets dubious foreign economic aid ventures. One relevant basis here would have been the impact of a foreign policy triumph on the Soviet leadership position within the socialist world. The Chinese had been harshly critical of the Soviet Union for its relatively complacent attitude toward the West, and a triumph would have demonstrated clearly the wisdom of the Soviet leadership. Another basis might have been to demonstrate clearly before the entire world the apparent belief of the Soviet decision unit that the tide of the world

struggle had turned against the United States. Not only were the forces of the Soviet Union approaching equality with those of the United States, but the United States did not have the resolve to use its power. The new Soviet position demonstrated by this challenge would then form the basis for redress of further Soviet grievances around the world.

But neither of these components would have necessarily turned Soviet attention toward Cuba which was, firstly, geographically isolated from other socialist states and well within the United States traditional sphere of influence and certainly within a zone of American military superiority, and secondly, governed by an independent leader who showed, minimally, no great deference for conventional communist parties in Cuba or elsewhere. In fact these considerations might have turned attention away from Cuba. Other reasons must have indicated Cuba. One of these may have been that the Soviet Union did suffer from something of a missile gap. Hilsman (1964) explains this aspect rather thoroughly. The essence of this speculation is that the Cuban deployment offered not only the opportunity of a triumph in foreign policy but a solution to the short-term strategic gap as well. Missiles which the Soviet Union already had could be used to temporarily redress this situation and promote Soviet security. Thus scarce montary resources could be funneled elsewhere rather than being wasted as the United States was doing on a series of obsolete-before-completion missile projects.

Another component which is not really taken seriously by the largely pro-administration writers on this subject is the Soviet desire to deter a United States or other American based attack on Cuba. In

general this component is viewed with suspicion since, so the story goes, Kennedy had no intention of invading Cuba. This is probably an accurate statement of Kennedy's intentions. But, there is no good basis for believing that such a statement could be expected to convince Khrushchev and other Soviet decision-makers. Kennedy had attacked Cuba once less than two years before. He had admitted that this particular attempt was an error, but Khrushchev must have wondered whether the error in Kennedy's mind lay in invading at all or in not completing the job. And, to add substance to Khrushchev's doubts there was always a clamor from prominant Americans such as Senator Goldwater to invade Cuba and get rid of Castro.

The speculative substance of these latter components fits relatively well against the heuristic search procedure of an earlier chapter. That is, given a general desire to better their position internationally plus the specific constraints of gaining a more favorable strategic balance without bankrupcy and of defending Cuba from capitalist aggression, the development of the general Soviet option of placing strategic weapons in Cuba seems reasonable. The Soviet deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba then met some constraints of the Soviet Union, but the actual bargaining constraints have not yet been broached. How would the Soviet Union manipulate the United States into accepting the presence of these missiles and at the same time avoid some form of mutual hostilities detrimental to the interests of both sides?

Here the Soviet image of the United States decision unit came into play. It is difficult to imagine that the Soviet estimates of the strength of the United States forces were very inaccurate. Neither is

it plausible that the Soviets calculated that the United States would be completely indifferent to the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba. What the Soviet decision unit obviously missed was the importance that this deployment had for the United States, and this misperception led to a miscalculation of the willingness of the United States to take risks to gain its objectives. There seems to be no uniform or even coherent opinion as to precisely why the Soviets missed the impact of their move, but the entire analysis is symptomatic of hard line images. Reston (1964) and Horelick (1964) place the source in the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Khrushchev's subsequent meeting with Kennedy in Vienna. Abel (1966) suggests that both de Gaulle and Acheson concurred in the opinion that United States resolve was held in low repute by the Soviets, but he gives no concrete reasons for their beliefs. Perhaps by these chronicles the Berlin wall or something in the Laos settlement and a number of other small indices--some probably predating the Kennedy administration--had simply been interpreted in a congruent yet misleading fashion. Kissinger (1962) provides a long list of possibilities such as these. In any case Khrushchev's interview with Knox (1962) leaves hardly any question but what the Soviets were still unaware on Tuesday, October 23, of the full impact of their action on the United States.

The Soviet decision to deploy strategic weapons in Cuba bears the stamp of Soviet hard line influence from a variety of aspects. If there is anything to the foreign policy triumph idea, this was probably a hard line aspiration. The desire to reveal the United States as a paper tiger would be largely a hard line aspiration as well. Cuban defense and improving the security of the Soviet Union in light of the antics of

United States hard liners would have appealed to a broader segment of the Soviet decision unit, but the crucial arguments about United States acceptance and acquiescence must have been hard line. They probably approximated closely Le May's argument that the United States could placidly take out the Soviet strategic installations in Cuba since the Soviets would offer no response to this move. This mentality--the very opposite of Huntington's (1957) notion of professionalism--appears to have existed on both sides of the Cuban crisis and was not limited to military personnel.

The Soviet plan probably involved then completing the installation of the strategic weapons, announcing their presence in one fashion or another, riding out the diplomatic storm raised largely by the United States, and then continuing with whatever was the next item on their foreign policy agenda. That is, the Soviets planned a fait accompli. They included in this general option deception by denying until very near the end of the crisis the presence of strategic weapons in Cuba, secrecy in terms of keeping Cubans away from the deployment operation and using night convoys for the transportation of materiel, and speed through careful planning and implementation of a complex logistic and construction project (Hilsman, 1964). One consideration which was not used here was camouflage, and of course this neglect led to the discovery of the operation by the United States.

Speculation as to why camouflage was not used seems somewhat futile. Since the Soviets were surely aware of the possibility as they did camouflage some installations after their discovery and were obviously desirous of secrecy, the general conclusion suggested is that

they purposely chose not to camouflage their installations. The specific reasons remain obscure. Perhaps the Soviets were unaware of the effectiveness of United States air reconnaissance, or perhaps the advantages to be gained through camouflage came at too high a cost in terms of speed. In any case, a far more interesting question from a bargaining perspective is the Soviet choice to attempt a fait accompli in their bid to alter the status quo.

The Soviet plan was evidently to spring the completed plan upon the United States, and they expected acceptance, albeit gradual and unwilling, but acceptance, nevertheless. There appear to be two primary factors which recommend this general option as a challenge device or bid. First, a fait accompli involves physically altering a situation rather than demanding that the situation be altered and backing that demand perhaps with a sanction for noncompliance. The verbal method seems generally less effective as a situation structuring device. In order to be effective the verbal challenge must both pose a choice which the adversary will accept in the challenger's favor if the threat is credible. And, it requires that the contingent threat of disadvantage be credible. This is simply a difficult mechanism to operate. Verbal bids of this nature tend to engage other values of the denier, and this makes posing an adequate choice difficult (Sorensen, 1965, p. 772). Also credibility seems often to require some physical activity for proof. In addition, the verbal form alerts the adversary in advance, and thus it allows him time to prepare and perhaps to preempt the challenger's demand. This can be done either by countering with verbal commitments to the existing state of affairs, or by physical preparations such as

shifting troop concentrations so as to bring the outcome of the challenger's tentative plans into doubt, or by actual preemptive operations which frustrate the challenger's intentions.

Second then, the fait accompli allows a party to physically structure a situation as it pleases before revealing that structure to the adversary. This means that, by the time the adversary gains the initiative in terms of structuring the situation to his own advantage, he is working with a situation which is stacked against him. This does not always mean the doom of the fait accompli's victim as the Berlin blockade demonstrates clearly. But, in the case of Cuba a fait accompli might have been more effective. Depending perhaps upon the manner and substance of the Soviet announcement of the deployment, the United States might have been rather reluctant to attack the contemplated Soviet installations in their completed form. Although the initiation of violence might not have been necessary to gain the removal of the weapons, the United States would have had to start somewhat higher on the escalation ladder than it did. A blockade, for instance, would have had to have been more inclusive and directed against the Cuban economy as well as the Soviet forces in general.

The fait accompli element of the Soviet deployment did not, in this instance, really conflict with an incremental implementation of Soviet policy. The Soviets had been involved in minor forms of military aid to Cuba for some time, and the particular arms buildup which was to culminate with the introduction of strategic weapons took place over a period of months. Horelick (1964) suggests that the Soviets may have read the feedback of United States reactions to earlier arms shipments

as indicating a lack of concern over the growing Soviet military position in Cuba.

It is difficult to imagine exactly how the Soviets could have picked up this response, and the problem seems to have been somewhat different. Kennedy's statements had always indicated the salience of the distinction between defensive and offensive forces although his strongest and clearest statements of September 4 and 13 probably came after the actual shipment of missiles had begun. Knorr (1964) suggests a problem similar to that invoked by Diesing--simple failure to communicate at all on this issue. In any case the Soviets were clearly not sensitive enough to the salience which the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons had for the United States. The Soviets termed their strategic weapons defensive; whereas, the United States termed them offensive. Both of the terms were masks. The Soviet Union knew what sort of thing Kennedy had in mind when he spoke of offensive weapons. The Soviets simply did not recognize the full impact of the salience which this distinction had for the United States decision unit in this particular instance.

There may have been two particular problems involved here aside from the general shadow communication problem. The members of the Soviet decision unit had lived their lives in a battleground, and that battleground was now surrounded by United States strategic bases which were for the most part no less "offensive" in character than the contemplated Soviet installations in Cuba. It was probably difficult for the Soviet decision unit, without a tradition of hemispheric insularity, to imagine the range of values which their deployment would engage for the

United States decision unit. The other problem was the double standard the United States was attempting to apply. To the extent that the Soviet decision unit might have been aware of the concerns of their United States counterparts in this regard, the concerns would surely have lacked legitimacy and would probably have aroused little empathy. I speculate that these extenuating circumstances are helpful, however, only in explaining why the Soviet soft liners were persuaded by their hard line colleagues. What process the hard liners of either side go through remains a mystery to me.

Although the deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba did have a concrete impact on the military security of the United States, the United States decision unit was indeed more deeply concerned with the political considerations--namely the credibility of United States commitments. In other words the Soviet Union's decision unit misperceived the impact of its action on the United States not in that it did not recognize the distinction between the defensive and offensive weapons but in that it did not feel that the values engaged by the deployment of the latter weapons would be sufficient to cause the United States to meet the challenge in any strenuous fashion. If this latter interpretation is correct, the Soviet Union thought that it was playing Chicken; whereas, it was actually playing Prisoners' Dilemma--soon to be made extended form. The deployment appeared a satisfactory option from the standpoint of the bargaining constraints primarily because of this misperception of the expected United States response.

To sum up the general considerations so far then the Soviet Union, prompted by a variety of objectives, became interested in the

deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba. This seemed to be a satisfactory option from the standpoint of the bargaining constraints primarily because the Soviet decision unit expected no response outside of diplomatic protests if the deployment was handled properly--that is, by a fait accompli. The problem of manipulating the United States to give up value and also of avoiding a dangerous confrontation was thought then to be manageable through a secret Cuban deployment because the Soviet Union misperceived the nature of the situation for the United States decision unit.

DENIAL

The Cuban Blockade

When dealing with the Soviet Union about all it is possible to do is to develop a set of considerations which would have produced the action which actually occurred. Fortunately, the United States decision unit's deliberations over the Cuban crisis are recorded with uncharacteristic detail, and it is thus possible to demonstrate the relevance of the theoretical work of earlier chapters far more clearly.

United States intelligence had not been unaware of the possibility of a Soviet attempt to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba. But, as Hilsman (1964) notes, the expectations of such an action were not high enough but what some bits of intelligence data were simply not noticed and others were fit into alternative perceptual frameworks somewhat more congruent with past Soviet behavior. The major assumptions upon which intelligence analysts appear to have based their expectations are, first, that the Soviets would realize that the United States could not accept

deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba and thus would not initiate such a deployment, and second, the belief that the Soviets would not attempt such a deployment anyway since they had never allowed their strategic weapons off their own soil. When the analysis of U-2 film revealed that the Soviets had actually taken such action, the first concrete step taken by an administration official, McGeorge Bundy, was a more thorough analysis of the evidence. Kennedy was not informed until the following morning. At that time he called an advisory conference for later in the day, and it was primarily in the sessions of this advisory group that the groundwork for Kennedy's decisions was laid.

The activity which started the first and each of the succeeding sessions of this group was a perusal of the information available about the situation and a request for more information. The film analysts at that time were uncertain about a variety of details, but there was, according to them, firm evidence to indicate clearly that multiple surface-to-surface missiles with enough range to strike large areas of the United States were being installed in several locations in Cuba. While an action of this nature had been a possibility of which all the members of the decision unit were cognizant, none of them had really expected the action to occur, and ther was some uncertainty as the the meaning of the deployment.

The attempt was then made to ascertain Soviet motivation and also to assess the impact of this action on United States interests. A number of possibilities similar to those discussed earlier were suggested. According to Sorensen (1965) the opinion at the time centered on a

general probe of the United States will to resist with the defense of Cuba and the redress of the strategic imbalance as subsiderary incentives. This interpretation had a great impact on the manner in which United States interests were affected. The problem of Cuban defense or even of redeployment of missiles might have caused considerably less incompatibility with United States objectives. Under the interpretation derived, however, the crisis became a test of United States will and credibility everywhere.

This tendency to voluntarily couple one issue with all issues had been a keystone of United States cold war policy for many years. The basis of the domino theory was essentially an undifferentiated coupling of any given instance of conflict will all future possibilities for conflict. Thus regardless of the usefulness or the empirical validity of the United States pattern, the Soviet notion that the United States would back down seems to have been rather naive. It may well be true that, had the United States tried to decouple its commitment to keep Soviet weapons out of Cuba, success would have been difficult to achieve. Cuba's propinquity to the United States, its isolation from the Soviet Union and the socialist world in general, a long tradition of United States dominance in the Americas, and some recent statements by Kennedy relating specifically to the Soviet deployment of strategic weapons all tended to reinforce the importance of the United States credibility in the Cuban crisis to United States credibility in general. Yet the United States decision unit was worried about whether the states of Latin America or even its allies in Western Europe would recognize the the necessity for action, so the decision unit must have recognized that

decoupling was not impossible. Nevertheless, it was not the alternative which the decision unit wished to take. In fact, according to Robert Kennedy, "We all agreed in the end that if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear war, and that was that. So we might as well have the showdown then as six months later" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 758). There is some reason to doubt the authenticity of this quote, but, regardless of whether or not Kennedy actually said this, it appears to represent well the intentions of the United States decision unit. The strategic weapons had to come out of Cuba one way or another.

"If he wants war"

There never was then really much doubt among the members of the advisory group that the United States could not simply acquiesce in the face of the Soviet challenge. The problem was the particular form which nonacquiescence should take. Ball (1962), one of the participants in these conferences, makes some interesting comments about the nature of this problem which vindicate the relevance of the bounded rationality assumptions explicated earlier. "The problem, therefore," writes Ball, "was one of several dimensions, calling for a solution that met and balanced many simultaneous objectives, not one simple objective" (p. 989). In addition, "The choice of available responses covered a broad spectrum . . . . That broad spectrum offered a large number of possible variations and combinations" (p. 989). The problem then was one of an "equation of compound variables and mutliple unknowns (p. 989). Ball also states succinctly the essential bargaining problem as manifested in this case. "It was not difficult to devise a military plan that would quickly have achieved the elimination of the offensive weapons. But it had to

be a plan that did not block the road leading back from the use of force to a political solution" (p. 989). And, Ball becomes almost too good to be true as he outlines a series of constraints which guided the search for such a plan--minimum risk to the United States and its allies, minimum danger of escalation toward higher orders of violence, consistence with treaty obligations, and adherence to the principles for which the United States stood (Cf. Cleveland, 1963).

Whether the particularities of Ball's remarks are accurate or not, the general outline of the situation seems difficult to question and is clearly a bounded rationality situation of problem solving character. The problem is difficult in that there are a variety of discrete objectives and in that a broad range of alternatives which can be implemented in a variety of fashions suggest themselves as solution paths. Further the solution is derived by using a set of guidelines in the form of constraints upon the consequences of action. The important question here, however, is not the veracity of the earlier assumptions but the impact they have on the bargaining process. Specifically, the question is whether or not the considerations introduced by a problem of this character lend themselves to the sort of tactics which Schelling prescribes.

Perhaps the first decision made with respect to a solution to the problem was to maintain the veil of secrecy about the United States awareness of the Soviet deployment and the deliberations about the appropriate response. The concern here was for initiative. The general plan was to confront the Soviet Union with a situation structured so that the Soviets would prefer to alter their uncompleted plans with

respect to the deployment of strategic weapons. The United States announcement of this restructuring was to take the Soviet Union by surprise so that the Soviets would be able neither to preempt nor to prepare for the United States action. Great importance was placed on gaining advantage in this fashion. Relinquishing initiative only after the United States had contrived a situation favoring its own objectives appears to have been a very important consideration. Thus the United States decision unit planned to frustrate the attempted Soviet fait accompli with a fait accompli of its own (Cf. Sorensen, 1965, p. 775).

Given then this general assessment of the problem, a search began for a plan of action which would achieve the objectives. Several variations of "diplomatic" approaches--an appeal in the United Nations, a summit conference with Khrushchev, and other variations of these basic ideas--were suggested. All were found unsatisfactory with respect to manipulating the Soviets to remove their strategic weapons. That is, the manipulative side of the bargaining problem here for the United States reduced nicely to the removal of the Soviet strategic weapons, and the various diplomatic approaches which were suggested were simply felt to be inadequate for the task. Another alternative involving an independent approach to Castro failed essentially on the same grounds. It was the Soviet Union which had placed the weapons in Cuba, and presumably their removal would be a matter for the Soviet rather than for the Cuban government. Working with the Cuban government would only obfuscate the nature of the issue and thus provide the Soviets with a variety of delegation tactics and delaying arguments.

Another alternative failed immediately in terms of the other general conflict management constraint of avoiding mutual disaster. This was an invasion of Cuba and the removal of the Soviet strategic weapons and Castro as well. The disaster avoidance constraint was somewhat more complex than the manipulative constraint. It was not clear what the Soviet response to particular United States actions might be. But, it was felt to be almost a certainty that an invasion would precipitate a rapid escalation in violence which would be very difficult to stop. The invasion involved a dangerous escalation of objective in that the Soviet Union had publically commited itself to the protection of Cuba on September 11. In addition, the invasion would involve the confrontation and destruction of Soviet forces.

The elimination of these alternatives, minimally as initial measures, left two prominant suggestions between which most of the subsequent discussion raged. These were an air strike on the Soviet strategic installations and a blockade of Cuba. Both of these alternatives had advantages and drawbacks. The air strike had the advantage of dealing directly with the strategic weapons in Cuba. That is, it took care of the manipulation part of the bargaining problem. Its drawbacks were several and were generally related toward the general disaster avoidance constraint.

First, the air strike was not the panecea with respect to the strategic weapons that it appeared at first glance. The air force was firm in its argument that it could not be certain that all of the missiles and bombers would be destroyed, and, of course, any which escaped the attack might be fired upon the United States. In addition,

the nuclear warheads, housed in protective bunkers, should be destroyed as well, and the air strike was a dubious alternative for accomplishing this. Also, the air strike was likely to prompt reprisals in the form of Cuban air strikes on Florida or air strikes and bombardments of Guantanamo, so the Cuban fighter planes and artillery installations would have to be included in the air strike. One way or another the air strike appeared to involve escalation which led to the invasion alternative. Recently some criticism (Allison, 1969; and Acheson, 1969) has been raised against these deficiencies of the air strike alternative. These arguments are not particularly cogent criticism. Sorensen (1965) implies that these deficiencies in the air strike argument were actually used to bolster the invasion alternative, but regardless of the air force's devious motives, the statement that no guarantee of complete destruction of the strategic force could be given seems quite plausible as does the necessity of a broad rather than a surgical air strike.

Second, the air strike involved both practical and ethical problems of advance notice. If advance notice were given to the Soviet Union, the message might trigger a spasm or even a rational preemptive launching of the Soviet strategic forces in Cuba or elsewhere. If no warning were given the United States would initiate a surprise attack against a small nation which would entail the death and suffering of not only Soviet forces but innocent Cuban civilians as well. Robert Kennedy seems to have picked up an argument advocated initially by Ball that such an action was unacceptable in terms of ethical principles. Kennedy apparently argued that, "our struggle with Communism throughout the world was far more than physical survival--it had as its essence our

heritage and our ideals and these we must not destroy" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 39). In other words an American politician had noticed that a tentative foreign policy action--the air strike--would destroy the very values which United States foreign policy was supposedly representing or protecting. In addition, he was concerned to the point of arguing that the action should not be taken. Acheson, of course, considered this entire argument nonsense, but, although few seem to have thought in these terms before Kennedy emphasized the matter, many including the President seemed to agree with his position.

Third, the air strike would involve the destruction of Soviet men and materiel, and this was no matter to be taken lightly. "They, no more than we," said the President in response to LeMay, "can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 36). Essentially President Kennedy recognized the Prisoners's Dilemma structure of the situation. Although the Soviet Union might well prefer retreat to nuclear war or even to limited war, it might well not prefer the humiliation which an air strike would generate to these alternatives just as the United States preferred, apparently, to go to nuclear war rather than to accept the humiliation of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba. Lippmann emphasized this same point after the crisis. "A great power," wrote Lippmann, "if it is cornered, if all exits are barred, if it is forced to choose between suicide (nuclear war) and unconditional surrender (unacceptable humiliation), is quite likely to go to war. . . . There is a line of intolerable

provocation and humiliation beyond which popular and governmental reactions are likely to become uncontrollable" (Lippmann, 1963, p. 57).

The great advantage of the blockade was that it signaled the United States commitment to the removal of the strategic weapons without inherently involving a military action apt to engage Soviet values in a dysfunctional fashion. In addition, the blockade allowed increased flexibility in terms of maintaining a number of subsequent alternatives. As Sorensen put it, "President Kennedy, aware of the enormous hazards in the confrontation with the Soviets over Cuba in October, 1962, made certain that his first move did not close out either all his options or all of theirs" (Sorensen, 1963, pp. 20-21).

The major drawback of the blockade was its relevance to the Soviet weapons in Cuba. The blockade would keep additional strategic weapons out of Cuba, but it did nothing directly about the strategic weapons already there. This crucial matter would be left up to the Soviet Union, and there was considerable doubt among members of the advisory group that the blockade would be a strong enough signal to coerce the Soviets into withdrawing the strategic weapons on their own.

The battle between the proponents of these two alternatives raged for four days. Few members of the group seemed to have maintained consistent views throughout this period. As Robert Kennedy says, "there was no obvious or simple solution" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 44). The desired state of affairs involved conflicting constraints, and the search for a satisfactory alternative was fraught with uncertainty. The final recommendation of the advisory group was an amalgam of the two alternatives. It was felt that the initial step should be the blockade. The

risks involved in this alternative appeared to be less severe than those inherent in the air strike. If the blockade were successful, a military struggle would be avoided. But, the blockade choice maintained the option to escalate either by stiffening the blockade or through the air strike and invasion route if the original choice of action were unsuccessful.

Although the assessment of the consequences of various alternatives had involved some implementation considerations, the alternative of the blockade-air strike progression was still a rather abstract idea. Attention was now turned to practical planning of the alternatives and preparations for various contingencies based upon the estimates of the Soviet response.

The military apparently already had Cuban inbasion contingency plans. So, the air strike-invasion part of the policy amalgam presented fewer difficulites than the blockade. Strike squadrons were alerted and prepared, and a large invasion force began to gather in the southeastern United States in accordance with these existing plans.

The blockade now presented a number of problems which had previously gone largely unnoticed. The list of quarantined articles was drawn up and was limited initially to strategic weapons and their immediate support equipment. This decision both left stiffening the blockade as an alternative available for future escalation and directed the blockade specifically at the Soviet strategic weapons rather than at the general Soviet presence or the Cuban economy.

In addition, the attempt was made to link the blockade to principles broader than United States self-interest. It was termed,

for example, a quarantine not a blockade, and OAS approval was to be sought in order to make the blockade something of a hemispheric rather than a United States project. This was to be done by announcing the intention to blockade Cuba on Monday, October 22, and then waiting for the result of an OAS meeting on Tuesday before making the blockade effective on Wednesday. Also a diplomatic attack on the Soviet Union was to be launched in the United Nation on Tuesday. Here the Soviet Union was to be indicted as an international criminal because of the swift and secret--and therefore "illegal"--redeployment of its strategic force. As little mention as possible was to be made through all this of Guantanamo or of United States strategic weapons installations which were located on foreign soil. When pressed later, the United States responded that these weapons were different in that they had been installed publically over a period of time.

I want to break from the narrative for a moment here at the point of the United States general denial decision in order to pull together some aspects relevant to the earlier chapters. The United States learned of the Soviet strategic deployment in Cuba before the Soviets could complete that project and before the Soviets were ready to announce the restructured situation to the United States. Although the Soviets did misperceive the impact their challenge would have on the United States and thus would have faced an unexpectedly severe confrontation in any case, the unexpected discovery of the Soviet operation by the United States at a stage when deployment was only partially completed was probably crucial to the relatively quick and easy solution to the crisis. This demonstrates the importance of

initiative in terms of structuring the situation. The discovery allowed the United States to confront the Soviet Union with a fait accompli rather than vice versa. Thus many fait accompli advantages went to the United States rather than the Soviet Union. Rather than announcing its completed strategic installations to a startled and shaken adversary, the Soviet Union was itself startled and shaken from its complacency by an interdiction which made its projected installations untenable. To understand how the initiative of the United States so dominated the situation, however, its denial activity must be analysed.

The United States decision unit recognized rather early in its deliberations that the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons was an unacceptable activity. So unsatisfactory was this state of affairs that the United States was apparently willing to go to nuclear war if necessary to avoid it. The United States then was commited to the removal of the strategic weapons one way or another. The problem was to communicate this commitment to the Soviet Union in such a fashion that the desired state of affairs might be achieved. The violent responses such as the air strike or the invasion seemed tied together in an escalation sequence which would be difficult if not impossible to stop once initiated and which involved very severe costs. These responses then were viewed as total operationalizations of the United States commitment, and their excessive costs suggested an incremental or partial operationalization of that commitment instead. The various diplomatic approaches which were mentioned earlier were correctly judged to be inadequate in that they would fail to structure the situation so

that the Soviets would prefer to alter their deployment plans. In this perspective the blockade presented a viable partial operationalization of the United States commitment. As Gilpatric said, "Essentially, Mr. President this is a choice between limited action (the blockade, and unlimited action (the air strike and beyond); and most of us think it's better to start with limited action" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 782). In other words, rather than treating the situation as a two-by-two game with cooperation--the diplomatic approaches--and defect--the air strike escalation sequence--as the alternatives, the United States decision unit looked into the space on the escalation continuum between essential cooperation with the Soviet move and those alternatives tied rather closely to total defection or nuclear war and operationalized its commitment in partial form. The blockade was simply the initial increment--a signal in the form of a warning--of the United States commitment in the Cuban crisis. The hope was that it would signal the nature of the general commitment to the Soviet Union while avoiding the dangers inherent in more escalated operationalizations.

The importance then of the United States "premature" discovery of the Soviet deployment is that it enabled an incremental operationalization of the commitment. Had the United States not known of the deployment until the installations were completed, the alternative of working first on the continuing introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba and then on the removal of those already there would have been unavailable. A blockade would have had to have a far more general orientation which would have been more difficult for the Soviet Union and particularly Cuba to shrug off. This, of course, was precisely

what the Soviet Union wanted to do--to confront the United States with a situation toward which all available alternatives were either ineffectual or too dangerous to initiate. Another, and probably less important, aspect of the early discovery was that whatever military impact the strategic weapons in Cuba would have had on any confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was reduced and largely eliminated by initiating the denial stage before the challenge was completed.

Thus, had the United States gained the initiative somewhat later in the crisis, the outcome might have been considerably different. The early initiative enabled the United States to communicate its commitment functionally in a gradual or incremental fashion. An analysis of the dysfunctional aspects of a less gradual operationalization of commitment will reveal some interesting aspects of the general payoff patterns of crises as well as some senses of the notion of losing control.

In one sense a crisis is a challenge denied. That is, it was the denial on the part of the United States of the Soviet deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba that actually provided the Cuban crisis. This denial occurred because the United States preferred, apparently, any other consequences to those of acquiescing to this challenge. That is, the United States preferred the costs of mutual defection to those involved in accepting the Soviet defection. Thus with respect to the denial decision the structure of the situation resembled Prisoners' Dilemma rather than Chicken.

The problem for the United States defection move was to place the Soviets in a position in which they preferred to withdraw their Cuban

challenge rather than to escalate the level of the conflict. Kennedy was well aware that, if he responded to the Soviet challenge in a fashion which the Soviets found too provacative, the level of conflict activity would escalate.

Kennedy's concerns here seem to be of two distinct types. First, he seemed to fear that his action would turn a potential Chicken situation into Prisoners' Dilemma by engaging a number of Soviet values similar to those which the Soviet challenge had engaged for the United States. In other words the air strike might engage such values of prestige or face that the Soviet Union would prefer to escalate the conflict further even though disaster looned ahead rather than to accept the humiliation of the air strike.

Another fear Kennedy obviously had was the fear of a spasm response which might be different and harsher than the rational, deliberate Prisoners' Dilemma alternative just suggested. Kennedy realized how easily this could happen as his own initial reaction to the Soviet challenge had been to respond with an air strike. And, the Senators whom he briefed shortly before he publically announced that challenge and the character of his denial activity had reacted in the same way. The time Kennedy had taken to deliberate on the proper response to the challenge had not changed his opinion about the unacceptable nature of the challenge, but it had mitigated the character of his denial move.

There are two distinct fears then. One that the adversary will be so provoked by one's own activity that he will escalate the conflict in a spasm without pausing to consider carefully the implications of his

action. This actually takes the conflict out of the rational, bounded rational, or game mode of activity. That is, this would no longer be bargaining. The other is that even after a rational analysis of the situation a party may feel the necessity to escalate because of the unsatisfactory consequences of nonescalatory responses.

With respect to the first of these then the fear is essentially one of leaving the bargaining process behind, and with this process goes the rational, value sustaining deliberation which provides some management function in terms of trying to avoid disastrous consequences. The fear is not only that a bargaining orientation toward the conflict will be lost but that it will be lost with such vigor and provocation that it can be regained again only after much havoc and suffering. This havoc and suffering is normally called war. Losing control here means simply giving tit for tat while accepting great costs. The mechanism which throws action out of a bargaining context is unacceptable provocation. Presumably, it is the point of Kahn (1965) that, if awareness of the differentiations among action alternatives in this area of provocation increases, this will facilitate retention of control or retention of a bargaining framework somewhat further along an escalation ladder.

But control can be lost in slightly different senses within the bargaining framework as well. Control is in one sense synonymous with initiative. That is, a party controls the situation as long as it structures the situation. Thus, as will be discussed shortly, Kennedy felt that he had lost control of the Cuban crisis once he had effected the blockade and the Soviet ships were still steaming toward it. It was then up to the Soviet decision unit to stop or steam on--the

influence which Kennedy had exerted on this Soviet decision had been exhausted.

Control is lost in still another sense in crises. Even if escalation takes place within a bargaining frame of reference, the stakes are increased with the escalation. And, even if both parties would prefer to take some sort of minor loss to get out of their present situations, it may well be that neither can bring about such an outcome on the basis of its own efforts alone. Here the problem is one of coordinating a deescalation among multiple parties.

But, to get back to the Cuban crisis, all of these considerations were active in the United States decision to signal the Soviet Union with a blockade. The idea was to show enough resolve to indicate to the Soviet Union the nature of the United States commitment and yet not to provoke the Soviet Union to the degree of driving them from a bargaining perspective of the conflict--in other words, to warn them credibly--and thus to face them with a Chicken rather than a Prisoners' Dilemma situation. When Kennedy and other participants spoke about leaving bridges along which the Soviet Union could retreat, this is essentially what they had in mind--allowing the Soviet Union to recognize the United States position and to maintain control of their response.

CONFRONTATION

The Implementation of the Blockade

Kennedy announced the blockade part of the result of a week's deliberations to a largely unsuspecting world on Monday, October 22, 1962. He said nothing directly about the intention to escalate to an

air strike if necessary. Rather he introduced the blockade as an initial measure, stated that a Soviet missile launched from Cuba toward any target in the Western hemisphere would be considered a Soviet attack on the United States which would receive a full retaliatory response, but he was silent on the possible nature of United States escalation with respect to the continued presence of existing Soviet weapons in Cuba.

The next target for United States activity was to gain the broadest possible support for the blockade or, as it was called, the quarantine which was after all a flagrant violation of conventional freedom of movement on the high seas and thus of international law (Gerberding, 1968). The major forums for this diplomatic offensive were the OAS and the United Nations. The OAS met on the following day, Tuesday, and somewhat surprisingly endorsed the United States announced action unanimously. The United States initiated that same day a legal assault on the Soviet deployment in the Security Council of the United Nations. Here the Soviet move was denounced as illegal although the logic behind this accusation was as flimsy as can be imagined. In addition to these two major diplomatic undertakings the United States action was explained or justified to foreign leaders all around the globe. In a few instances actual assistance was requested--the closing of airports to Soviet aircraft bound for Cuba in Canada, Guinea, and Senegal, and these requests were in each case granted.

The impact of these efforts to disguise the blockade in one fashion or another were surely a total failure as disguises. The Soviet Union certainly did not miss the fact that the blockade was a blockade

simply because it was called a quarantine, nor were the Soviets in all likelihood convinced that the United States was not guilty of violating legitimate Soviet rights on the high seas because the OAS had endorsed this act as right and proper. It is even doubtful as to whether the Soviets viewed a statement of the OAS as any more an independent point of view than their United States counterparts would have viewed a statement of the Warsaw Pact an opinion independent of the Soviet Union. The diplomatic offensive probably did have some marginal impact, however. Since even the United States did not anticipate the favorable response it received, it is hardly likely that the Soviets, with a diametrically opposed view of legitimacy or what ought to be supported, anticipated that the United States would be so broadly and fervently supported. The support which the United States did receive must have added to the shock and disorienting impact of the United States fait accompli. In addition the favorable response probably added positive reinforcement to the confidence and faith of the United States decision unit. The United States, unlike France and Great Britain in the Suez crisis of 1956, did not really need the physical support of its allies in order to carry out its plan of action, but the members of the United States decision unit were surely thankful for the psychic boost the favorable response provided their confidence and moral. Had the nations of the Western hemisphere come out strongly in support of the Soviet deployment, and had they castigated the United States intervention on the high seas, the United States might have been somewhat more hesitant in its action and the Soviet Union somewhat more bold in its. But, as will be discussed a bit later, the most important

impact of this allied support was probably the boost it gave United States credibility.

The blockade was effected or actually made operative on Wednesday, the following day. Although the actual location of the blockade line remains somewhat obscure, Kennedy attempted at the last minute--Tuesday evening--to draw the blockade line back toward Cuba in order to give the Soviets more time to deliberate. With Wednesday then came the first of two harrowing experiences of the week. The Soviets had a line of ships strung out across the Atlantic--some of which would reach the blockade zone on Wednesday, and there were reports that these Soviet ships had been joined by Soviet submarines. As Robert Kennedy said, "President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 71). Or, as Abel put it, "The ball was in Nikita Khrushchev's court" (Abel, 1966, p. 109). In other words Kennedy had structured the situation as best he could, but now his influence on this aspect of the crisis was exhausted, and it was the other side's turn to see what it could do. If the blockade were not a credible signal or warning of the United States commitment or if it was too provoking the the Soviet Union and Khrushchev tried to run it, the situation would surely escalate dangerously. President Kennedy at this moment busied himself with preparations for a Soviet blockade of Berlin.

The Soviet Blockade Response

It is somewhat uncertain whether Khrushchev and other Kremlin leaders knew of the United States awareness of strategic weapons in

Cuba before the blockade announcement. Hilsman (1964) indicates that someone who knew about the strategic deployment and who read reports coming from Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, or the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, who had visited Kennedy during the week of deliberation would have had little trouble determining that the United States was aware of the deployment. Hilsman seems to attribute almost superhuman acumen to Soviet intelligence, but in any case, if the Soviets knew, it appears that they were rather lulled by the absence of an immediate response because the Kennedy announcement seemed to arouse great surprise and confusion within the Kremlin.

The first response of the Soviet Union was a public broadcast which accused the United States of piracy--a seemingly appropriate accusation--and which denied the strategic deployment. One indication of the confusion and turmoil which reigned was the apparent lack of knowledge about and instructions for the situation which the Soviet personnel at the Washington and New York embassies had to work with. In Washington Dobrynin claimed that he was unaware of the presence of weapons similar to those which the United States was upset about. In addition he was unaware of any change in the orders of the ship captains which would lead them to respect the blockade zone rather than going on through to Cuba. Dobrynin made these points in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy early Tuesday evening, and then later at a Soviet embassy reception he stood by as a Soviet military man explained to guests that the Soviet ships would refuse to recognize the blockade. When questioned about the validity of the statement he neatly delegated the problem by explaining that the military, not he, knew what the

military would do. After the crisis Robert Kennedy seems to have developed the notion that the Soviet deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba was so secret that Dobrynin actually did not know about it. In addition, Dobrynin was probably playing the situation by feel so to speak in that he probably did not yet know what the Soviet Union was going to do about the situation.

In New York the Soviet United Nations delegation was equally adamant about the defensive nature of the armaments being shipped to Cuba. It is somewhat difficult to determine whether this was a dispute over semantics or over what items were being shipped to Cuba, and this same confusion probably existed at the time. Probably both issues were being argued in simultaneous and undifferentiated fashion. Zorin, for example, denying the presence of offensive weapons in the Security Council may have been denying that weapons such as those which Stevenson had mentioned were actually going to Cuba or he might have been arguing about the label "offensive" which Stevenson had attached to the weapons. Meanwhile, at least one lesser member of the Soviet delegation was wandering the corridors threatening nuclear war if the United States stopped Soviet ships on the high seas.

In Moscow on Tuesday afternoon Khrushchev called a visiting American businessman, William Knox, to the Kremlin for a discussion. Here Khrushchev did try to argue that the weapons the United States was terming offensive were actually defensive. The argument over this distinction did not change the views of either Knox or Khrushchev over the nature of the weapons being shipped to Cuba, however, In addition, Khrushchev warned that Soviet submarines would sink United States

blockade vessels if they interferred with Soviet convoy operations. Khrushchev reiterated this general point several times subsequently. It seems as if he was trying to signal that one United States action which would engage Soviet values to the degree of making the future dangers of escalation preferable to the humiliation of the present was the boarding of a Soviet ship. Whether Khrushchev was bluffing on this point will probably never be known, but he came back to it time and again as if he really wanted Kennedy to understand. The danger involved in boarding a Soviet ship, of course, was quite obvious to Kennedy although he may have underestimated it slightly, and the message of Kennedy's own signal was that in order to avoid such a dangerous situation it would be necessary for the Soviet decision unit to stop the ships.

But the Soviet ships kept coming, and they were joined by Soviet submarines. Then, essentially at the last moment, some of the Soviet ships, presumably those carrying quarantined articles and including those nearest the blockade line, stopped or started sailing in circles. With respect to the introduction of additional missiles into Cuba Kennedy had won his point. The crisis was hardly over in terms of points to be won, but it seems proper to examine here the considerations which prompted Khrushchev's decision not to run the blockade.

George (1969) suggests that the crucial signal which convinced the Soviet decision unit that the United States meant business with the blockade was the harassment which United States surface vessels withered upon Soviet submarines. This is a rather interesting and hard line thesis, but even George admits that it is a pretty long shot. George's

guess may well be as good as anyone else's here, but there seems to be more involved than the harassment of submarines--although this may well have been one element of Khrushchev's deliberative process.

The entire Soviet deployment was surely based on the assumption that the United States would not react in a fashion similar to that in which it had already reacted. Khrushchev could not possibly hope to support the deployment operation given a strenuous response without escalating the conflict either in terms of weapons or geography. Now that the United States had in fact responded in a fashion which made the Soviet's original plan ineffectual and which had quashed the prevailing Soviet perception of the United States resolve, the Soviets had to test their objectives against the situation in order to determine what sort of future actions or aspiration shifts might be necessary. In this process the influence of the hard liners in the Kremlin seems to have been checked rather severely.

One impact of the United States action on the Soviet decision unit seems to have paralleled a similar Soviet impact on the United States unit. The United States action was apparently quite incongruent with Soviet perceptions. The Soviets seem to have realized that their earlier perceptions were blatantly inaccurate. One signal which did probably filter through all the United States rhetoric was the notion that the Soviet Union had invaded, so to speak, the United States sphere of influence or an area with which the United States had a peculiar dominance relationship. The Soviet decision unit then recognized that they were treading on thin ice, or, as Schelling puts it, on the slippery slope, and a good deal of caution was called for. The Soviet caution

manifested itself in unwillingness to escalate the situation. The essential guideline which appears to have been active in Soviet policy from this point on in the crisis was to obtain as much from the situation as possible without provoking escalation involving a military confrontation. In other words aspirations were reduced, and a search was begun to see what could be salvaged from the situation and how.

In showing this caution the Soviets were maintaining a bargaining perspective. Although, once film from low level Cuban overflights began to be analysed, it became evident that the Soviet forces in Cuba were far stronger than originally realized, the United States military superiority in the Caribbean was basically unaltered. This left the Soviets only two choices with respect to possible escalation strategies. First, they could counter United States activity in the Caribbean with their own activity elsewhere. The United States decision unit had, in fact, thought some form of retaliation--in Berlin, or Turkey, or Iran--possible in response to the blockade and a certainty in response to the air strike. Although Pachter (1963) does report some Soviet threats of reprisal in Turkey, later and more complete works on the crisis contain little evidence that the Soviets seriously considered this form of escalation. Schlesinger (1965), for example, reports that Gromyko spoke in Berlin on Tuesday, the day following the announcement of the blockade, and made no mention of Cuba. Also, Zorin later in the week began assuring other United Nations delegates that the Soviet Union would not fall into the United States' Cuba-Berlin trap.

Second, the Soviet Union could attempt to achieve its objectives, at whatever level, through the credibility of threats to escalate to

nuclear war. In fact, the Soviets actually used these threats only in a form which Kennedy already recognized as reasonably credible. There were certain forms of action which would represent unbearable humiliation for the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev used his threats, or perhaps better, warnings to outline these areas. Essentially, they involved those areas of which Kennedy was already well aware--the killing of Soviet personnel or the destruction of Soviet materiel. But Khrushchev tried to couple the boarding and inspection of Soviet ships to this category of actions as well, and it is uncertain whether this coupling originally was or ever became credible in the perceptions of the United States decision unit. The danger of damaging a Soviet ship was, of course, recognized, but milder forms of interference seem to have been viewed with less horror.

There seems then to have been little effort on the part of the Soviet decision unit to escalate the conflict. The blockade appears to have been a credible signal that the United States would not tolerate the further introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba. The question is what aspect of the blockade created this Soviet perception. George suggests the harassment of Soviet submarines, but admits that there is only the barest evidence that this activity took place in time to have an impact of the Soviet decision. President Kennedy himself suggested that the strength of the blockade may have been somewhat hidden in that what the Soviets really feared was the capture of their secret strategic weapons by the United States. These suggestions may have had a marginal impact on the Soviet decision unit. But it appears as if the Soviets had more compelling signals to go on.

The simple movement of the United States naval vessels into an interception line was probably the crucial signal. The Soviet perceptions of the situation must have been jolted severely by this action and probably also by reports coming from Dobrynin about his conversations with Robert Kennedy. The Soviets must have realized that the United States would not construct a blockade line only to admit that the whole operation was a bluff shortly thereafter. To withdraw the blockade in this fashion would simply be too humiliating. Kennedy's September statements, his blockade announcement, and a long series of geographical and political asymmetries were gradually becoming clearer. The blockade was recognized as a warning or a Type I threat (Snyder, 1969). That is, the shock of the United States blockade was having a similar impact on the Soviet decision unit as the shock of the Soviet deployment had had on their United States counterparts. Perceptions were being cleared, and a bit of empathy was developing on both sides.

Another factor which probably had some impact on the credibility of the blockade move was the largely favorable international response it received. The hemispheric response was particularly strong, and the humiliation of the United States in backing down would surely be all the greater in view of this rather general support. This is just one, but perhaps a particularly prominant if not compelling, asymmetry which favored the United States.

The blockade then was credible because the Soviets could understand that the United States simply could not tolerate withdrawing it rather than for any particular actions which resulted from the general decision. Schlesinger (1965) reports that Averell Harriman

came to a similar conclusion about the Soviet decision. Harriman cited the visit Khrushchev paid to a visiting American opera star on Tuesday evening in Moscow, his Tuesday reply to a telegram of Bertrand Russell suggesting a Soviet-American summit conference, and his strange discussion with William Knox which also occurred on Tuesday. Harriman thought that Khrushchev was signaling that he wanted off the hook, so to speak, and he felt that Kennedy ought not to ignore these signals as he thought Eisenhower had done in the past. The hard liners of course viewed the situation somewhat differently. Acheson, in a fashion somewhat similar to George viewed Khrushchev as "super rational man". This character was calmly "testing us to the last minute" (Acheson, 1969, p. 71). But, Kennedy was helped by the mysterious demise of this creature by Khrushchev's "loss of nerve" at the last minute as Khrushchev "went to pieces when the military confrontation seemed inevitable" (p. 46). This interpretation fits poorly with the facts, any serious introspective endeavor, and the excellent self-images which Diesing (1970) has worked out.

With the blockade credible and the Soviet decision unit unwilling to escalate the conflict, the question for the Soviet Union was what to do next. Some of the original objectives were now beyond reach. An adventurous challenge had received a stiff United States denial rather than displaying for the world the United States lack of resolve as the Soviets may have anticipated. Almost anything the Soviets did now that they were in trouble was likely to generate harsh criticism from their rivals in China. The strategic weapon deployment was certainly endangered, and the particular method by which the Soviet Union had chosen to defend

Cuba seemed a dubious means at best. The Soviet decision unit seems to have decided to attempt to rescue these last two objectives if it could be done without creating a military confrontation.

To this end the Soviets decided to halt, at least temporarily, the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, and to attempt to use those already in Cuba as a bargaining tool. Thus on Wednesday some of the Soviet ships in the Atlantic stopped, sailed in circles, or turned about for home, and work was begun on the missile sites in Cuba on a twenty-four hour basis. Also on Wednesday the Soviets enthusiastically accepted a proposal by U Thant that the Soviet Union suspend its arms shipments and the United States suspend its blockade. This suggestion allowed the Soviets to look as if they were complying with the initiative of an impartial body rather than backing down. The following day, apparently under needling from Hall and Harriman exerted through Stevenson, U Thant altered this suggestion slightly to form a temporary holding area or sanctuary beyond the blockade zone for Soviet ships. This was necessary because the United States found the Wednesday suggestion unacceptable.

The Soviet decision to try to complete their strategic installations in Cuba probably had two basic incentives. First, the completion of the sites might give the Soviets more to bargain with. That is, an offer to dismantle and remove completed strategic installations might be traded for more if these installations could obtain the salience of a new status quo than simply offering to ship the pieces of unconstructed installations back to the Soviet Union. Or the completion of the installations might provide enough salience that the Soviets might gain the acceptance of the installations already there. Second, the Soviets might have felt

that the completed weapons represented less of a risk of escalation than their component parts. It was probably not yet clear to the Soviets that the United States would actually strike the completed installations if they were not removed, and the Soviets may have thought that they were actually reducing the chances of escalation by completing the missile sites as rapidly as possible.

The United States then had won a point, and the issue of further shipments of strategic weapons to Cuba seemed settled for the moment. But the basic issue of the crisis remained. Cuba still represented a Soviet strategic base, and the objective of the United States was to bring about the end of this state of affairs. The blockade, as its opponents had feared, had not been an adequate signal of the United States commitment to gain the removal of these weapons. Thus the United States decision unit still had quite a problem on its hands.

"Turning the Screw"

With its basic objective still unachieved then the United States decision unit started deliberating on further actions which the hard liners termed "turning the screw". The actual turning done by the United States was pretty minimal in that the Soviets simply preempted the coercive deliberations of the United States with a concession offer. But the deliberations are instructive with regard to the general response pattern.

The first Soviet ship to enter the blockade zone was a Soviet tanker. On Thursday morning this ship was hailed and followed, but, since the tanker could not carry any of the quarantined items, Kennedy decided

not to actually stop it. This pattern was repeated with an East German passenger ship later in the day. Allison (1969) reports that another Soviet vessel did reach Cuba by slipping through the blockade line. It was not Kennedy's intention to allow this, and it is uncertain whether he even knew about it--assuming the event actually occurred. By Friday, however, Kennedy felt it was time to demonstrate the blockade. The navy stopped a ship of Lebanese registry under contract to the Soviets. A boarding party made a partial search which revealed no quarantined cargo, and the ship was allowed to pass.

But overall attention was increasingly focused on the Soviet installations already in Cuba. Low level photography which had been initiated after the President's announcement of the blockade had revealed that the Soviet forces in Cuba were more numerous and possibly far better armed--with tactical nuclear weapons--than had been evident perviously. In addition, several of the medium range missiles were completed or would be within hours. Both of these developments tended to discourage the immediate use of force along the air strike-invasion track. Not only did these options now carry the same escalation dangers as they had before, but they now appeared to be more costly even if escalation was avoided. McNamara estimated later that the United States would have sustainted 40,00 to 50,000 casualities in the air strike-invasion alone.

With the air strike-invasion course looming more ominous, several other escalation procedures were considered. Adding items to the quarantine list was one alternative. The Cuban economy could be destroyed if petroleum products and other necessities were kept from reaching

Cuba. Another idea was to light up the strategic installations at night with flares. This was apparently intended partially to serve an intelligence function by providing twenty-four hour progress reports and partially to embarrass the Soviets with the vulnerability of their strategic installations. Another alternative considered was a propaganda campaign involving air dropping leaflets designed to influence the Cuban people. This last alternative, apparently designed to embarrass the Cuban government, might or might not have been combined with an approach to Castro. The general fantasy character of these alternatives as well as the retrogression to an alternative--appeal to Castro--already dismissed as irrelevant to the removal of Soviet strategic weapons shows the reluctance of the United States decision unit to initiate the violence involved in the air strike-invasion track.

It seems, however, that most of the aforementioned screw turning was rather irrelevant to manipulating the Soviet decision unit. In the southeastern United States forces for the air strike and invasion were being collected and prepared. The Strategic Air Command moved out of the area to provide more room for tactical aircraft, and Florida beaches were literally swarming with a potential invasion force. The Kennedy administration essentially ignored this activity in its public statements. In fact, when a State Department press officer hinted to reporters on Friday that the blockade was only the initial step and that, if the Soviet installations were not removed, escalated activity might be forthcoming, an enraged Kennedy made a series of telephone calls through the hierarchy of the State Department explaining that he, not the press officer or the State Department, was running the United States side of

the crisis. Yet in the absence of accurate, plausible statements about the activities of these forces coming from the administration rumors started circulating around Washington that an invasion was imminent. Some newspapers picked up the rumors and the stories grew. It appears as if Kennedy did not want to explicitly confront the Soviets with an air strike or invasion prematurely, and thus he wanted as little publicity as possible about the military preparations in the Florida area. It appears also as if this was a very clever, albeit unintentional, tactical maneuver.

BREAKDOWN

The Soviet Proposals

Had the United States stressed its preparations in Florida in its official statements or if it had presented the Soviet Union with an early ultimatum, it might have been difficult for the Soviet decision unit to remove the missiles. The hard liners would surely have been clamoring that the United States was merely bluffing and that the bluff had been precipitated by the Soviet retreat on Wednesday. In addition, an ultimatum might have engaged the face or bargaining reputation of even the Soviet soft liners to the point of being unacceptable. The rather quiet buildup allowed the Soviets to deliberate without the necessity of including such dysfunctional factors.

By Friday the Soviet decision unit must have made its decision that the costs of maintaining the strategic installations in Cuba were simply too high and that the costs involved in their removal under certain conditions were referable. Certainly, this was true by Saturday.

Khrushchev said later, "In the morning of October 27 we received information from our Cuban comrades and from other sources that this attack (the United States air strike-invasion) would be carried out within the next two or three days. We regarded the telegrams received as a signal of the utmost alarm, and this alarm was justified. Immediate actions were justified in order to prevent an attack against Cuba and to preserve peace" (Horelick, 1964, p. 368). Rather than "bringing the aggressors to their senses" (p. 368) as he had hoped the deployment seemed to be precipitating the very action it was meant to deter. This decision, however, posed two problems. One of these was the nature of the reciprocal concession to be demanded of the United States. The other was the manner of broaching the deescalation process with the United States. The Soviet answers to both these problems were soon to become clear.

On Friday afternoon John Scali, a reputable television reporter with contacts in the State Department, was contacted by Aleksander Fomin of the Soviet embassy. Although Fomin's official title was of a rather unassuming, Clark Kent variety, he was suspected by United States intelligence of being the chief of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. Fomin came straight to the point. He wanted to know whether the United States would be interested in a solution along the following lines. The Soviet Union would remove the strategic weapons from Cuba, allow United Nations inspection of the removal, and pledge not to reintroduce the weapons at a later date. In return the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba.

Scali took this query to the State Department. Apparently the offer was similar to some hints dropped at the United Nations that same afternoon. And, after consultation with the President and others, Rusk asked Scali to meet Fomin again and to tell him that the United States saw "real possibilities" in the suggestion but that "time was very urgent" (Hilsman, 1964, p. 218). This second meeting took place early in the evening, and Fomin suggested that the United States delegation to the United Nations would find their Soviet counterparts interested in talking in this vein. Fomin then rushed off to communicate with his own superiors.

About the time of the second Scali-Fomin meeting Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev. Although the letter was long, rambling, and rather vague, it seemed to indicate a general desire for a peaceful solution and included some hints similar to Fomin's initiative earlier in the afternoon. The United States decision unit considered the two as a package. Khrushchev's letter indicated a general willingness to do business, but it contained no concrete proposals which could be later thrown back in his face. The Fomin-Scali conversation, in an informal fashion which could be disclaimed if necessary, filled in the specifics of what doing business meant. Strangely, the United States decision unit ignored hints both from Fomin and Khrushchev to take the trouble to the United Nations. It is unclear whether this was simply an oversight or a conscious omission on the part of United States decision-makers. And, if it was the latter, motivation is unclear. Also rather strangely, the United States did not respond to the Soviet Union Friday evening. That is, after explaining to the Soviet Union that time was very urgent--

less than fourty-eight hours, the United States simply sat on the Soviet offer overnight. Supposedly State Department experts were perusing Khrushchev's letter for hidden snags.

Partially this delay was due to another hard line-soft line struggle for control. Acheson argued here that, "So long as we had the thumbscrew on Khrushchev, we should have given it another turn every day. We were too eager to make an agreement with the Russians" (Abel, 1966, p. 162). This is seemingly typical of hard line thinking. It concentrates on winning. Miraculously, the adversary always picks humiliation over mutual disaster and backs down. It is fortunate that President Kennedy and other important advisers took soft line stands on the Cuban affair. Essentially these stands included a concern for disaster avoidance which the hard liners pretty much ignore. The two groups then generally differ not so much in ends but in the method by which such ends should be achieved. Robert Kennedy does, however, mention that, even after the Soviets had agreed to withdraw the strategic weapons in Cuba, one of the military men present wanted to go ahead with the air strike and invasion and another felt "betrayed" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 119). Presumably these ends were not generally desired; President Kennedy, Diesing, and, I rather imagine Khrushchev after this experience, have a word for these men--mad. As Diesing points out this madness does not manifest itself in images of a difficult to discern reality which are always clearly incorrect. It was, after all, McCone of the Central Intelligence Agency who had most correctly perceived what the Soviets were actually doing in Cuba. Rather the madness manifests itself in

peculiar value or perference structures of which, as Diesing points out, Sidney Hook's must represent the extreme case.

The United States was still mulling the Friday proposal on the following morning when several incidents provoked the second harrowing experience of the crisis. First, the Soviets issued another offer which exacted a considerably higher price for Soviet compliance. Now the Soviet Union wanted to trade the strategic installations in Cuba for similar United States installations in Turkey. Second, a United States U-2 was shot down over Cuba, and its pilot was killed. Third, a single Soviet ship began to move from the holding area which had been created Thursday at the suggestion of U Thant toward the blockade line.

Interpretations of these actions are somewhat difficult. The ship which caused only a momentary flurry anyway stopped Sunday morning before it actually reached the blockade zone. It has never been clear whether the U-2 was shot down by Cubans or Soviet personnel. Dobrynin in a conversation with Robert Kennedy Saturday evening hinted that it had been done by Cubans. In either case it seems to be an example of loss of control by high civilian politicians over military functionaries on the spot. Surely Khrushchev who had turned his ships around in the Atlantic and who was about to remove his strategic weapons from Cuba was not interested in provoking a confrontation at this point. Even Kennedy, who probably had a far better communications system, had difficulty controlling his military functionaries, and Khrushchev can hardly have had an easier time. Fortunately, Kennedy held back an immediate military response on the SAM system.

The two offers are somewhat more important and somewhat more intriguing as well. The consensus of "authoritative" speculation now seems to be that the Soviets sent the messages in the order in which they were received. Presumably they did so in order to obtain a better settlement from their point of view. They might have had in mind the actual acceptance of their second offer, or they might have hoped that a tougher stand might precipitate the acceptance of the more lenient first position.

It may well have been that the Soviets were discouraged with the United States response or lack of same to their initiative and wished to prompt the United States a little. Scali, upon the request of the decision unit, checked with Fomin Saturday morning. Fomin was rather despondent. He suggested that his report of the favorable United States reaction had arrived too late in Moscow to stop the issuance of another offer. Scali exploded at this and at Fomin's subsequent justification of the Soviet second offer. Fomin later told Scali that his explosion had helped Khrushchev to understand United States preferences and thereby helped him in his decisions (Hilsman, 1964, p. 222). The Soviets may actually have been unaware of United States preferences. The United States had not responded to the first offer, and the Soviets may have been searching for an offer which would find acceptance. Several sources including Walter Lippmann in the Washington Post had suggested the fairness of the "Cuban-Turkish" missile trade, and the Soviets may have simply been following these cues. Even Robert Kennedy admitted that, "The fact was that the proposal the Russians made was not unreasonable and did not amount to a loss to the U. S. or to our NATO allies" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 94).

The United States Choice

The receipt of the Soviet's first or Friday offer lifted the spirits of at least the United States soft liners. Various hard line interpretations called for more screw turning to elicit greater concessions or viewed the offer as simply an attempt on the part of the Soviets to buy time until their installations in Cuba were finished. The receipt of the Soviet's Saturday offer, however, brought general gloom as this was a solution unacceptable to all but a very small minority of advisors. The second offer was unacceptable from two aspects. First, it involved the violation of an ally brought about through the manipulative activity of an adversary. Although the United States intended to violate this particular ally anyway, it was apparently important to the decision unit that the violation occur on the United States own initiative rather than being prompted by the manipulation of an adversary. The latter, it was felt, would bring the credibility of United States commitments into doubt, and it was to sustain those commitments that the United States was engaged in the crisis in the first place. Second, the trade would set up something of a dangerous precedent. Mutual withdrawal from established positions would be one thing, but to trade incumulated Cuban bases for established Turkish ones was another. The Soviets might get the impression that all they had to do to gain a United States retreat was to advance themselves temporarily and then offer a trade.

Certainly one impact which the second offer had, whether it was intentional or not, was to lower the aspirations of the United States decision unit. On Friday there had apparently been considerable opposition to the Soviets first offer. But, when on Saturday Robert Kennedy

interjected into a discussion of what response should be given the second offer the suggestion that the first offer be accepted, there seems to have been little opposition. A concrete proposal along the general lines of Khrushchev's Friday letter and quite similar to Fomin's proposal--with more emphasis on an immediate work stoppage on the strategic installations--was sent out.

In order to be particularly sure that the United States position was understood Robert Kennedy took a copy of the United States offer over to Dobrynin personally. Now Kennedy explained that the strategic weapons had to be removed. "We had to have a commitment (The commitment Kennedy spoke of here presumably had to be made credible by the physical move of immediately stopping construction of the strategic weapons and their installations.) by tomorrow (Sunday) that those bases would be removed. I was not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact. He (Dobrynin, and presumably Khrushchev as well) should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 106). Dobrynin then asked what the United States was willing to offer in order to gain such a commitment. Kennedy stated the terms of the letter which had just been sent to Khrushchev. Dobrynin, of course, queried Kennedy about United States Turkish installations. Kennedy responded by saying that the missiles would not be removed by Soviet manipulation. He somewhat untruthfully claimed that the removal of the missiles was, in any case, a NATO, not a United States, decision. But, Kennedy did add that the President had ordered the removal of the Turkish missiles some months ago and that the missiles would probably be removed in the months subsequent to the crisis. Kennedy ended the meeting

by stressing that, "We needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Union. I said that we must have it the next day" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 109).

The Soviet Acceptance

The Soviets were by this time surely concerned that leaving the conflict unresolved in principle much longer would lead to needless violence. Moscow radio carried a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy early the next morning which accepted the President's offer. The crisis was essentially over.

Over the course of the next few weeks United States and Soviet delegates met to work out the details of the solution. There were some snags. Castro refused to allow on-site inspections in Cuba. Cuba had been pretty much forgotten by both of the other two parties. Here Castro had a chance to exert some influence, and he took it. Both U Thant and Mikoyan attempted to change his mind, and both failed. Eventually other satisfactory schemes of inspection were worked out between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The medium range bombers proved to be another problem. The Soviets felt that these were not part of their arms buildup but rather were gifts to Castro's government and, therefore, not part of the deal. Kennedy stuck to his original position with considerable tenacity. He actually contemplated and was apparently prepared to heat the crisis up again in the latter half of November. Eventually the Soviets agreed to remove the bombers as well. Kennedy lifted the blockade on November 20. At the same time Kennedy rather hinted that the United States would not allow the actual invasion of Cuba. This was to serve as the United

States pledge of noninvasion. The Soviets, not surprisingly, were not satisfied with Kennedy's pledge (Kennedy, 1969, pp. 217-218). Kennedy maintained that he did not have to do better with respect to the solution of the crisis unless the Soviets came through with on-site inspection. These issues were never really resolved, and, as Sorensen says, they eventually "silently sank into limbo" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 812).

Outcome and Aftermath

In summary then the Soviet Union withdrew all the weapons which the United States found offensive. Although on-site inspections never took place, United States air surveillance continued, and there is no reason to believe that any of the offensive weapons remained on the island or were later reintroduced. The United States lifted its blockade and rather half-heartedly pledged that Cuba would not be the victim of military agression.

Within the Soviet Union the crisis seemed to strengthen the hand of the soft liners. The army chief of staff lost his position and prominance rather shortly after the crisis. And, eventually even the political leadership fell into the hands of rather unadventurous men. Essentially, the images which the hard liners had of the United States were discredited. The Soviets in general realized that the United States was willing to respond with a military confrontation if important values were endangered. The prudent course for Soviet policy then was to refrain from provoking the United States by threatening its important values.

Within the United States the support which most prominent political figures gave to President Kennedy until the Soviets agreed to remove the missiles evaporated quickly thereafter. It was, of course, an election year. When on-site inspection fell through the Republicans in general were up in arms. The election itself went surprisingly well for the Democrats, and even Khrushchev indicated that he was pleased with the elections although disturbed by the rhetoric of Republicans such as Nixon--who lost the gubernatorial race in California--and Goldwater. It may have been that Kennedy's reluctance to issue a stronger pledge of noninvasion with respect to Cuba grew partially out of the political hay such an announcement would have given the Republicans or hard liners in general. Eventually, however, the status of Cuba seemed to stabilize itself in American politics.

In a broader sense the outcome of the Cuban crisis did not seem to result in the same rather unadventurous foreign policy in the United States that it seemed to in the Soviet Union. With respect to Soviet-American relations the crisis did seem to have quite a beneficial impact. As Sorensen says it was "the Gettysburg of the Cold War" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 715). A soft line position emerged in the United States momentarily at least with respect to the Soviet Union. A few minor achievements such as the Washington-Moscow hot line were achieved rather early. Then after President Kennedy's American University speech in June, 1963 which Khrushchev called the best speech by any President since Roosevelt came the test ban negotiations. The United States negotiators were led by Harriman, a soft liner, and were successful in July in achieving agreement with the Soviet Union on a limited Test Ban Treaty. Other signs of

detente were visable as well. In June, 1963 the Soviets stopped jamming Western broadcasts into the Soviet Union. Then later in the year an agreement was made by which the United States sold surplus wheat to the Soviet Union.

In general the underlying conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union remained pretty latent through the Johnson administration. The Soviet Union has only recently turned again to adventurism in foreign policy outside of areas immediately contiguous to its own borders. Soviet pilots now seem to be involved on the Arab side of the continuing Middle East conflict. The United States has avoided direct confrontations with the Soviet Union, but, unfortunately, the United States has simply displaced its adventurism to areas outside the Soviet's sphere of influence since the Cuban crisis. The euphoria of victory which Kennedy so feared with respect to the Soviet Union did not arise. That is, there seemed to be a general understanding that certain asymmetries--local military superiority, traditional dominance, clear and important interests, etc.--had favored the United States, and the outcome of the Cuban crisis could not be generalized to future Soviet-American confrontations. Yet bases of United States strength to which Kennedy attributed victory in the Cuban crisis--the ability to handle a wide variety of military confrontations--began to be used on a regular basis for a broad spectrum of tasks for which they were woefully inadequate. In fact the American appetite for conflict seemed to be whetted by the Cuban victory as long as such conflict avoided confronting the Soviet Union. But, the direct confrontations have been curbed since Cuba in in 1962. In the year preceding the Cuban crisis, the United States and

the Soviet Union confronted one another on Berlin and Laos as well. Such confrontations have simply been nonexistent since Cuba, and part of the reason for this is that the Soviet Union has simply been unwilling to be dragged into a confrontation with the United States when the area involved has been some distance from the Soviet Union's own borders.

The Cuban crisis only added fuel to fire the Chinese-Soviet rift. The Chinese termed the deployment of the strategic weapons in the first place adventurism. Then they ridiculed the Soviets for capitulating to the capitlaists by removing the weapons once they were in Cuba. Soviet-Cuban relations suffered something of a short-term setback as well. In time relations between these states seem to have recovered, but Castro was pretty upset for some time after the crisis by the Soviet handling of the conflict. Presumably Castro wished to have had some voice in the Soviet decisions although it is unclear whether he disagreed with the substance of those decisions. Soviet relations with the remaining socialist states in Eastern Europe were relatively unaffected by the crisis.

The impact Khrushchev's actions had on the third world outside of the Western hemisphere were probably pretty well balanced between positive and negative. Foreign military bases of Western or Western variety had begun to be commonly unpopular throughout Africa and Asia. And, the fact that Khrushchev was engaged in developing such an installation probably won him little applause in these areas. On the other hand Khrushchev could rightly claim to have saved the peace through his withdrawal of the installations, and this undoubtedly won him some praise.

The impact of the crisis on the Western Alliance particularly NATO was not very remarkable. The United States failed to bring true the dire predictions of de Gaulle that, when the chips were down, the United States would desert its European allies. But NATO had multiple problems, and the United States decision to keep Turkey inviolate regardless of Soviet manipulation perhaps only prolonged NATO's death throes. The staunch support of the OAS was unexpected, somewhat puzzling, and rather momentary inasmuch as, once the immediate crisis was past, the unity of the hemisphere behind the United States disappeared rather rapidly.

The activity of the United States probably generated mixed third world reactions similar to that of the Soviet Union. It is hard to imagine that the idea of the United States threatening the entire world with nuclear destruction because its rival dared to undertake an activity identical to its own everyday activities won much heartfelt approval in Africa and Asia. On the other hand, given his values, Kennedy's handling of the affair was truely masterful, and this aspect must have generated some admiration and approval.

Conclusion A

I have interrupted the narrative at a number of locations to interject comments about the processes involved in the Cuban crisis. I want to pull these threads together here. A number of models have been useful in the examination of the crisis. The supergame provides an explanation of reference structures. The cataclysmic notion explicates one meaning of uncontrollable escalation. I have concentrated in earlier

chapters on the expanded game and a model of bounded rationality. I have done so primarily because they provide both distinct alternatives to Schelling's work and explanatory relevance to the Cuban case. I have pretty much ignored two models similar to or congruent with Schelling's conceptualization of bargaining--utility models and "chicken-critical risk". I shall justify this exclusion and indicate my opinion of the bounds of relevance for these models somewhat later as a discussion of these matters here would not be particularly germane to my argument.

The utility of the expanded game is its ability to represent the flexibility of the overall strategies of the parties in the Cuban crisis. These strategies amounted to a chronological series of partial strategies in which future actions were not mapped out completely or were changed because of changes in the situation which made previously chosen alternatives inefficacious means to ends. I think little need be added here in support of this general point. The United States did not plan its post-blockade strategy until the result of the blockade was known on Wednesday. The Soviet Union seems not to have planned its further activities in full when it decided to avoid a confrontation at sea. The Soviet Union obviously changed its planned strategy with respect to its installations in Cuba. And, the United States altered its existing contingency plan when a U-2 was shot down. I think these examples speak rather clearly.

Another advantage of the expanded game is its ability to display the decomposition of simple, dichotomous choices such as peace or war, or humiliation and disaster. Essentially, the Cuban crisis is a case of decomposing such alternatives into a set of less severe decisions.

The original choice for the United States between doing nothing and instituting an air strike, for example, was decomposed in this manner. Eventually several choices or options interposed themselves so that the starkness of the choices and the provocation of the actions were reduced.

But, it is difficult to picture the expanded game as actually providing as explanation of these activities. Rather it simply models them more effectively than the limited, complete strategy games Schelling uses. The explanation of these and other activities lie rather in a model associated more closely with activity than situational structure. The model I have used here is derived from the bounded rationality concepts of Simon. And, it seems to me that the model accounts nicely for the disparities between Schelling's observations and prescriptions and the activity of the Cuban crisis.

The decomposition of stark alternatives is one of the notions derived from this bounded rationality model. When existing alternatives seem unsatisfactory, a search begins for more satisfactory options. In the Cuban crisis the promising search area seemed to lie between do nothing and the air strike since the air strike and more severe alternatives seemed bound together in an escalation sequence.

This leads to the other concern mentioned above--namely flexibility and the maintenance of options. Schelling stands rather clearly on early committal to a complete strategy through the elimination of alternatives. The Cuban crisis is a denial of this observation and admonition. Although I have not been remarkably successful so far in working out the general implications here, the importance of flexibility and maintaining options in the Cuban crisis seem pretty clear. The

Cuban crisis was essentially a signaling operation for both sides. Each party had irrevocable commitments in the crisis. Fortunately these did not overlap. The problem was one of signaling these areas of commitment to the other side. The threatening signals then had communicative rather than committal value--that is, they were warnings. The danger of inflexible strategies which eliminate alternatives in a situation such as this is that disaster is inevitable if the signal fails. This is what Kennedy went to great lengths to avoid. When Soviet and United States ships were about to confront one another on Wednesday, he wondered if it were not possible to signal again so that Khrushchev would finally understand. When a U-2 was shot down over Cuba, Kennedy disengaged an earlier contingency plan to take out all or part of the SAM system and was determined to "try again" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 101) where try again means to attempt to gain Soviet understanding of the situation.

With this general introduction then, let me reconstruct rather tersely the mechanisms of the Cuban crisis. The Soviet deployment was a defection in a game of Prisoners' Dilemma for the United States. The Soviet decision unit was apparently browbeaten by its own hard liners into believing that the game was essentially two-by-two Chicken and that, once the Soviets chose defect, the United States would have no choice but to choose cooperate. Since the game for the United States was not Chicken but rather Prisoners' Dilemma, it is fortunate that the Soviets also misconstrued its two-by-two character as well. The game was more complicated than two-by-two not because of any inherent property in the situation but rather because the predominant majority of the United States decision unit wanted to signal the United States commitment to

the removal of the strategic weapons in a gradual or incremental fashion. As Robert Kennedy said, "The group needed more alternatives: surely there was some course between bombing and doing nothing" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 735).

The two-by-two Chicken which the Soviets anticipated probably involved a United States invasion as defection and the cooperation alternative could have involved a variety of "diplomatic" actions--a protest in the United Nations, special emissaries to Khrushchev, etc--which would be unsuccessful in gaining the removal of the strategic weapons. Defection in this case must have been considered highly unlikely. The reason for Soviet lack of interest in the alternatives beyond the intersection of deployment and invasion and Kennedy's desire to find an alternative between doing nothing and bombing had some similar elements, however. Both sides recognized that, once the intersection of deployment and military attack was reached, there was little hope of managing the conflict so as to avoid a number of disastrous consequences.

This intersection appeared to both sides then as a crucial point beyond which neither would be able to control the situation. I dealt earlier with a variety of meanings of loss of control. I think all three elements discussed earlier played a part here. There was a fear that the actions of each side would become so provocative to the other that the bargaining framework would simply be left behind. I have understood the character of conflict of this sort to be in Rapoport's (1960) terms a fight, but I am not wedded to this label if it causes difficulties. The idea is that the deliberative process which precedes action in a game or bargaining situation is forgotten, and the actors react in spasm

fashion. Obviously, another way of looking at this process is to consider it a cataclysmic process. The fears in the Cuban case were, however, not limited to leaving a bargaining situation. Kennedy certainly realized that, when faced with certain alternatives, even deliberating actors might choose escalation alternatives which were dangerous both from the standpoint of their immediate costs and in that they would make deescalation initiatives harder to formulate.

The United States then was faced with the peculiar situation that the solution which appeared immediately and obviously to its national security managers (Barnet, 1968) was, upon close inspection, doomed to failure. That is, the removal of Soviet strategic installations through the air strike-invasion option seemed to lead inexorably toward disaster. And, the ineffectualness of various diplomatic signals were correctly perceived by the United States decision unit. What was needed was a signal with some punch but not too much punch. To this end it is extremely fortunate as I mentioned before that the United States discovered the Soviet deployment before its completion. Completion of the strategic installations would have made the development of an efficacious signal short of the air strike a very difficult task. The blockade then may be viewed as a partial or incremental defection involving, not the full compellent, but only a partial deterrent act. The idea was that the initial measure would simply make the Soviet defection ineffectual. It was hoped that the Soviets would then prefer to remove the strategic weapons on their own. That is, the partial defection on the part of the United States was designed to get the Soviet Union to "chicken out". By starting with relatively mild coercion the United States decision

unit hoped to construct a Chicken rather than a Prisoners' Dilemma situation for the Soviet Union. If this initial action proved ineffectual, then the United States could effect its commitment in full by removing the installations with the air strike-invasion.

The trick was "to cut the chain in time" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 759). The Soviets had to be signaled in such a manner that Soviet prestige and face were not involved to such a degree that the Soviets preferred escalation to retreat. The incremental operationalization of the United States commitment kept the escape bridges from crumbling (Kennedy, 1969, p. 97). To maintain these bridges throughout the crisis demanded considerable flexibility rather than the rigidity which Schelling prescribes. For instance, before the U-2 was shot down over Cuba, the United States decision unit had discussed this contingency and had decised that a SAM sight would be destroyed once verification of the manner of destruction of the plane was completed. Once the event actually occurred, however, Kennedy checked this process thus holding off retaliation and facilitating the Soviet withdrawal.

There are now a few items which seem not to fit in elsewhere which I want to go over before I quit, so to speak. Schelling (1966) views the expanded game, firstly, only implicitly and, secondly, as essentially a competition in risk taking exercise. Jervis (1966, p. 21) differentiates between competition in risk taking and signaling. Although I disagree somewhat with Jervis' distinction and his conclusions, I do agree that a distinction between the two processes is needed. The parties to the Cuban crisis seem to have been more concerned with signaling. Khrushchev's original challenge may have been a competition in risk taking endeavour

in a mild way, but, once images cleared up a bit, signaling took over. Robert Kennedy's description of the President's reaction to the narrowly avoided confrontation at sea on Wednesday shows this clearly. The United States had, at this point, lost control in that the immediate crucial decision was the Soviet Union's. President Kennedy was lamenting this loss of control in that there was no time, "so we can send another message to Khrushchev and perhaps he will finally understand" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 70).

The distinction here is primarily one of motivation. Kennedy and somewhat belatedly Khrushchev were trying to solve a problem. They wished to indicate the nature of that problem to each other. This process was particularly difficult since their respective problems interacted so that the solution of one if not handled carefully might only aggravate the other. The moves and messages which the parties undertook were largely attempts to get the other party to understand the nature of the problems involved so that the party could act rationally and manage the conflict.

The competition in risk taking which Schelling discusses is essentially a technique to callously force humiliating retreat upon the other fellow. This is what Acheson wanted--the thumbscrew turned as far as possible, and according to Robert Kennedy some military advisors wanted this as well. The President did not. "I am not going to push the Russians an inch beyond what is necessary," he said (Kennedy, 1969, p. 127). Kennedy's concern was that for a variety of reasons--short-term military, long-term strategic, and domestic political--he could not live with Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba. He did his best to communicate

this in an efficacious yet minimally provoking manner to the Soviets. The purpose of the blockade was to reduce risks rather than to compete in taking them, and any risks associated with the blockade were deplored rather than welcomed.

I have rather slighted the Soviet decision unit's activities throughout the crisis. This is due primarily to the lack of material on this activity. A brief speculative discussion may be helpful here. The decision to deploy strategic weapons in Cuba was operationalized as the final increment of a general Soviet arms buildup on that island. Soviet counterparts of LeMay must simply have browbeaten the generally more responsible but discouraged (Diesing, 1970) Soviet leaders (Cf. Harriman's view in Schlesinger, 1965, pp. 750-51). The blockade announcement probably took the Soviet leadership completely by surprise and aroused a good deal of resentment. The time Kennedy allowed the Soviets seems to have allowed tempers to cool, however, and the Soviets got around to deliberating rather than fuming about the situation. From this point on the Soviet soft liners seem to have had the upper hand. These men were willing to retreat as long as the United States did not burn the Soviets bridges by adding insult to injury through provocative acts. I have speculated at several points throughout the narrative about the specifics of Soviet deliberations. These speculations may, of course, be in error, but the basic outline of Soviet activity--not expecting a strenuous United States response and then the shift to soft line control--seems clear.

Finally, with respect to Schelling, it seems as if he is not incorrect descriptively for a certain sample of actors who do or would

like to follow his prescriptions. LeMay and Acheson, for instance, would have chosen the air strike invasion and stuck unswervingly to a turn-the-screw course throughout the crisis. The Soviets seem to have a similar group. It appears that the Cuban crisis does not in general exhibit the characteristics of Schelling's models because there are other and generally more prominant people involved in the crisis. For these actors the bounded rationality assumptions provide more accurate action guidelines than Schelling's version of rationality. And, the expanded game seems to be a more useful way of expressing the flexible incremental bargaining strategies of these actors than the limited, complete strategy matrix.

Conclusion B

The pages above represent the Cuban case study which will appear, in revised form, in my dissertation. The section below is not part of the dissertation but is part of the project case study. I answer below the propositions and queries in Working Papers 3, 6, and 4.

Working Paper #3

III. Hypotheses

A. Hypotheses relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

1. The Cuban crisis certainly seems to be characterized by caution after the initial Soviet challenge. The primary example is, of course, the United States search for an alternative between doing nothing and the air strike-invasion option. It is unclear to me why the potential costs

of war should be higher in bipolar than multipolar systems--I am not really argueing, just wondering, but it is clear that caution pervaded the Cuban crisis after the Soviet challenge.

2. This hypothesis is certainly congruent with the Cuban crisis. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union consulted with its allies about decisions made during the crisis. Rather, each informed its allies in an ex post facto fashion. The most dramatic instance here might be the Soviet Union's handling of Cuba with respect to the decision to remove the strategic weapons. The United States decision unit was, I believe, sincerely concerned about the reaction of Latin American and Western European allies, but these men were not concerned enough to consider a foreign input into the decision process even after the original secrecy requirement was unnecessary. In spite of all this, the crucial impact of the Soviet deployment and the later second offer on the United States decision unit was the negative reppercussions they might have on alliances which the United States used in a very minimal fashion when the chips were down, so to speak.

3. As mentioned above (2), the most important impact which the United States decision unit perceived in the Soviet deployment was that it would bring into question the credibility of United States commitments--the basis for alliances--in general. As the President said, "If they get this mean on this one in our part of the world, what will they do on the next" (Kennedy, 1969, p. 67). Later in the crisis one of the considerations involved in refusing to accept the Soviet's second offer was the negative impact that offer would have on NATO. Yet the support which the United States received from Western Europe and Latin America in the crisis

was almost completely limited to verbal support. Several of the individual participants for the United States have stressed the importance of this verbal support. But, I tend to think that, as I have discussed above, this influence was rather marginal.

4. The terms bargaining reputation and resolve are not used by any of the participants. I personally prefer to shy away from the term resolve as much as possible. But obviously bargaining reputation, or prestige, or, as the participants say, pride or face are important in the Cuban crisis. This crisis on the basis of some sixteen years of experience was viewed as one of a long series of Soviet-American confrontations, and both sides surely felt that their activity in one such confrontation would serve in developing the adversary's image of its stance in future confrontations. The United States was particularly adamant in this regard. The hard liners in the United States refused to decouple on even the most obvious cases--Hungary in 1956. The Soviet Union seems to have displayed somewhat greater flexibility and concomitantly somewhat less concern with pride or face. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, that the Soviet Union could have been successful in preventing the installation of United States foreign bases in the same manner as that used by the United States in Cuba.

5. There is little evidence that either party in the Cuban crisis consciously exaggerated its valuation of the stakes. Dobrynin may have done this with Robert Kennedy in their evening meeting on Saturday, and Khrushchev may have been doing this with respect to his early messages regarding the boarding of Soviet ships at sea. But, in general communications about values seem to have been fairly honest attempts to show the

adversary the nature of the problem the parties were dealing with. The ideological disparity between the two groups led to some peculiar reward structures particularly among the hard liners, but the nuclear aspect of the environment does not seem to have been active in this regard.

6. Contrary to my earlier expectations there were several actions which might be considered threatening declarations in the Cuban crisis. In his blockade announcement the President said that a missile launched from Cuba against any target in the Western hemisphere would be considered a Soviet attack on the United States which would merit a "full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 790). The blockade, of course, involved something specific--stopping ships, but the actual forms of violence which the navy was instructed to use against Soviet blockade runners--disable not sink--were not transmitted to the Soviets. Khrushchev's threatening declarations of retaliation in response to interference with Soviet vessels on the high seas were sometimes specific--retaliation on United States blockade vessels by Soviet submarines--and sometimes vague--some form of escalation. Both the Chairman and the President recognized and communicated to the other their pessimism about controlling escalation once violence broke out. In perhaps the clearest threatening declaration of the crisis Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that, if the Soviets did not agree to remove the strategic weapons within twenty-four hours, the United States would remove them. Kennedy also indicated that the United States was willing to pay the consequences of the escalation which might follow. In summation then sometimes a specific manner of fighting was included, sometimes not. In general,

however, it was not necessary to add that a particular conflict would escalate to nuclear war. Both sides were well aware of this.

7. With the possible exception of Kennedy's blockade announcement threat mentioned above (6) and Khrushchev's early statements about the blockade, there were no bellicose threats in the Cuban crisis. The hypothesis seems to stand up, however. These early threats were probably less credible than the later ones. After Tuesday every threat made was credible--they were warnings and perceived as such, and these threats were delivered in informative, problem definition fashion.

8. Physical actions short of violence--the Soviet deployment, the United States blockade, the United States invasion buildup, the Soviet withdrawal--were clearly prominent in the Cuban crisis. In this respect the Cuban crisis represents, I think, almost an ideal type for an escalation model. How typical this is of nuclear age crises or how atypical for pre-nuclear age crises is another issue upon which I am far more uncertain.

9. I am not certain I understand the proposition. The Cuban crisis was characterized by two confrontations neither of which was exactly minor. Neither it seems to me involved tests of United States resolve so much as the clarification of United States intentions although these purposes may be viewed as similar or even identical.

10. This is a pretty difficult proposition to write about on the basis of a single crisis. As I mentioned above (7), there were a few bellicose threats early in the Cuban crisis. After Tuesday there were seemingly none of this character. The bellicosity seems to be associated with the transition from the shadow bargaining with an image (Diesing, 1970)

which preceded the crisis and lingered through the early stages and the reasonably accurate communication which characterized the latter stages of the crisis. Both parties were undoubtedly shocked by the transition in that neither seemed to realize that it was so far out of touch with the other.

11. I have mentioned this topic before, but I think it is important enough to go over it again. It would be my guess that Schelling's "manipulation of risk" is not a very frequent tactic. The only tactic in the Cuban crisis which seems to me to fall into this category is the initial Soviet deployment, and the Soviets presumably thought this was a very minor manipulation of risk. The United States blockade was intended more as a signal of the United States commitment to gain the removal of the strategic weapons, and its risk manipulation aspects were lamentable for and minimized by the decision unit. The later United States invasion buildup seems not to have been used consciously by the decision unit as a bargaining device. The two U-2 incidents appear to have been essentially accidents from the perspectives of the national decision units.

12. There was certainly no problem with adversary identification in the Cuban crisis. The likely degree of escalation presented a variety of problems. There was uncertainty as to the degree of escalation with which the adversary would respond to various options. There was uncertainty as to whether a deliberative process could be maintained above a certain level of escalation. Thus there was also uncertainty as to whether an escalation sequence could be reversed short of general nuclear war once violence had actually broken out. The uncertainty on these latter two points seems to have been of a very pessimistic variety for both

Khrushchev and Kennedy. Each was almost certain that the answer was no in both cases.

B. Propositions about coercive tactics

1. This is a difficult question for me to answer because I seem to use the term commitment with respect to actual crises somewhat differently than Schelling or Snyder do. Consider for the moment that a commitment in an intention to achieve a particular state of affairs. In this sense the United States had an absolutely irrevocalbe commitment to the removal of the Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba. The Soviets obviously did not have an absolutely irrevocable commitment to keep their strategic installations in Cuba. But the Soviets did have absolutely irrevocable commitments to other states of affairs such as the nonacceptance of the humiliation of a United States attack on those bases or defending Cuba from imperialistic aggression. In this sense then absolutely irrevocable commitments are not really rare. For every state, decision unit, or individual there are a variety of states of affairs which are totally unacceptable.

In the apparently more accepted sense of the term commitment meaning an intention to act in a particular fashion which forecloses all alternative forms of action the proposition is much more accurate. Goal states are normally the most important aspects of crises. Often there will be a variety of courses of action by which a particular state of affairs may be achieved. Ruling out some of these options may be needless or even dysfunctional in some cases. In general an absolutely irrevocable commitment in this sense probably occurs only when a single

alternative is perceived as capable of achieving the desired state of affairs. There seems to have been at least one example of this in the Cuban crisis. Kennedy's threat or "statement of fact" to Dobrynin Saturday evening amounted essentially to this. The United States was determined to gain the rapid removal of the Soviet strategic installations in Cuba. The United States had tried a variety of activities to obtain this goal; now unless the Soviet Union would give assurances within twenty-four hours that they would remove the installations themselves, the United States would take military action to remove them. That is, after twenty-four hours the United States would be committed to an air strike-invasion option. Kennedy's statement may have been a mild exaggeration, but it is conceivable that such a commitment could have characterized the United States decision unit.

Also, part of the danger in the escalation process was that each side recognized that under certain conditions the other would feel the necessity to respond in a particular fashion. The exact nature of the action to which the other side would be committed was generally uncertain, but the general type--violent escalation--was clear. Kennedy, for example, felt that the Soviets would be committed to some form of violent response in the contingency that the United States carried out the air strike-invasion option. "If we had invaded Cuba . . . I am sure the Soviets would have acted. They would have to, just as we would have to. I think there are certain compulsions on any major power" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 759).

To use the term commitment with respect to an action like the blockade seems to me to be both difficult and relatively useless. The

United States enacted the blockade. There was never any thought of removing it if Soviet ships actually attempted to run it. And, after early Tuesday there seems to have been little doubt in the Soviet's mind about this either. The blockade is, I think, best interpreted as a partial operationalization or signal of the United States commitment to gain the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba .

2. This proposition seems to be an inaccurate description of the Cuban crisis. Kennedy's blockade announcement threat was explicit; Khrushchev's no piracy threats varied somewhat but some were quite explicit, and Robert Kennedy's statement of fact to Dobrynin was quite explicit.

3. This proposition also is somewhat at odds with the Cuban data. It is true that there was a relatively explicit threat of nuclear war if Soviet ships were molested delivered by a lesser Soviet United Nations delegate to a United States counterpart of similar status. Also, a military man attached to the Soviet embassy in Washington told a number of guests that the Soviet ships would run the blockade. Finally, Khrushchev did threaten Knox, an American businessman, that United States vessels which interfered with Soviet convoy operations would be sunk by Soviet submarines. But, the first two instances here seem to be petty officials playing the situation by ear rather than on Kremlin directions. In addition, I mentioned above in (2) that there are several instances of high officials giving other high officials explicit, severe threats.

4. There appear to be no instances of non-coercive rationale covers for coercive actions in the Cuban crisis.

5. The United States and the Soviet Union both attempted to create loopholes for each other in the Cuban crisis. The whole effort behind the incremental signaling of the United States commitment was to allow the Soviet Union to back down without too much humiliation. The Soviets tried to convince the United States that it was upset about nothing since there were no strategic weapons in Cuba. Then they they tried the tact that the strategic weapons in Cuba were defensive not offensive. Finally, near the end of the crisis the Soviets tried the approach that the Cuban-Turkish missile exchange suggestion had been initiated by neutrals and Westerners.

6. In the Cuban crisis threats seem to have been unencumbered by avenues for retreat. This may be somewhat unusual, but I think the reasons here are rather obvious. First, almost all of the threats handed out in the Cuban crisis were warnings rather than bluffs. That is, had the contingencies with which they were concerned arisen, there is a high likelihood that the threatened activity would have taken place. With a few exceptions--Kennedy's full retaliation threat in his blockade message and Khrushchev's Tuesday no piracy threats--which were Type II threats or bluffs or at least so perceived, most of the threats in the Cuban crisis were accepted as warnings. Second, the threats were not used carelessly in the Cuban crisis. Rather they were used as honest communications to indicate areasof sensitivity and to clear up confusion about intentions.

7. The United States, which perhaps issued the predominant threats of the Cuban crisis, was clearly favored by the asymmetries of the situation. The Soviet Union was, however, undoubtedly committed to react

violently to certain provocations--firing on a Soviet ship or the air strike, and it did issue some rather explicit threats indicating the nature of these commitments.

8. I am uncertain whether this proposition refers to the process of preference change within an actor or to the process of communicating committed states of mind to an adversary. The question is difficult to answer in either case, however. Individuals do tend to develop preferences over time, but sometimes choices must be made quickly. In some instances a commitment is signaled incrementally--the blockade, but I am far from certain that this is an ironclad regularity. I think that I cannot make blanket statements of regularities on this proposition. The dissertation section of this case study does have some material relevent to the proposition, however.

9. This concern seems to have had some importance at various points during the Cuban crisis. The Soviet challenge disregarded this concern completely. This move was hard line dominated. Relatively soft liners, however, dominated the United States decision unit. Some of the concern in provoking the Soviet Union was to avoid increasing the militancy of the Soviet decision unit by decreasing the influence of its hard line faction (Cf. Harriman in Schlesinger, 1965, p. 751). Khrushchev then indicated after the crisis that he was pleased by the elections in the United States in which the Democrats fared pretty well and in which Nixon lost. It is difficult to say whether these concerns had any important modulating impact on the short-run activity of the crisis, but I tend to think not. That is, there were more important modulating constraints in the crisis itself.

10. This like many of these propositions really requires more than I have--namely an operational definition of public and private communications and an index of ambiguity. About the best that I can do on this one is this. Although in general the private communications in the Cuban crisis do not seem to be less ambiguous than the public communications, the participants did on three very important occasions go to private communications to insure clarity. The United States did this twice with Robert Kennedy talking privately with Dobrynin on Tuesday and Saturday evenings close to the major confrontations of the crisis. Kennedy's purpose both times was to reinforce and clarify the United States position in a private, personal manner. Also, when the Soviet Union first sought a compromise solution, the Scali-Fomin conversation was a private and specific means of probing the United States.

11. Other than the original Soviet challenge I think there were no conscious risk manipulation tactics. The blockade as I have indicated above (A-11) was not an attempt to manipulate risk. The buildup of the invasion force was not even directly communicated to the Soviets. The U-2 incidents seem to have been loss of control over subordinates. So the proposition seems to describe the Cuban crisis pretty accurately.

12. I think that I have said about all I have to say with regard to this proposition in the dissertation section of this case study. My stage notion is a bit more complex than the proposition here, but the two are basically congruent.

C. Hypotheses relating tactics to responses

1. The Soviets were offered no opportunity to actually present their challenge in the Cuban crisis, so I can only conjecture as to how they might have made their challenge. I would guess that in general "blatant, preemptory, openly aggressive demands and threats" are simply not made. That is, when a challenge like this is issued, it has been preceded by activity on the part of those being challenged which has provoked the challengers. Of course, the disparate images and theories of history which characterized the two parties in the Cuban crisis made recognition of this aspect difficult if not impossible. The United States decision unit perceived the Soviet challenge as an outrage. Although the United States had strategic bases literally ringing the Soviet Union and other military installations in Cuba and Berlin, the Soviet challenge was not merely perceived as an unfavorable strategic move but a moral outrage. The Soviet decision unit, I am sure, had a quite different perspective on the moral ligitimacy or the outrageous character of its move as well as on the legitimacy of the United States blockade. In any case the Soviet "outrage" certainly met a stiff response from the United States. However, the Soviet hard liners were probably able to sway the judgement of the rest of the Soviet decision unit because, as Diesing explains, any sort of bid the Soviets made, reasonable or openly aggressive, ran into the same brick wall of United States opposition. This reisitance should not be construed as a one sided affair, however.

2. I started this case study with the notion that this proposition was correct. I have had to alter my views somewhat since then. There is obviously a fear among decision-makers that threats can

be dangerous and dysfunctional (Sorensen, 1965, p. 772). That is, the careless use of threats may indeed have such a provocative effect as that postulated. In the Cuban crisis, however, threats were used in a very helpful manner to indicate areas of sensitivity--the boarding of Soviet ships on the high seas--and to clear up intentions and preferences--the United States need for rapid removal of the strategic bases. Threats delivered in an honest, factual, and low-key fashion seem to have been some of the most useful communications of the crisis. I think one aspect of the threats which made this possible was that the vast majority of the threats issued during the crisis were credible. Rather than being a bluff and brag experience, both parties recognized the crisis as a serious problem, and each seems to have interpreted the threats of the other as warnings useful in delineating the precise dimensions of the problem.

3. The major provoking acts of the Cuban crisis were the Soviet deployment and the United States blockade. Each of these actions was perceived by the party against which it was directed as a threat. In addition to provoking, however, these acts served to jolt the images of both the parties from a shadow bargaining perspective to a reasonably effective problem solving relationship. The other threats in the Cuban crisis seem then to have been largely nonprovocative. There was no great effort to alter the utilities and utility perceptions apart from threats, and that attempts there were appear to have been minimally unsuccessful and occasionally dysfunctional in that they were provoking. The Soviet Union did on several occasions try to convince the United States either that there were no strategic weapons in Cuba or that such weapons were

defensive rather than offensive. Such attempts failed miserably, and did arouse considerable resentment when they took the form of outright lies--no strategic weapons in Cuba. The Soviets dropped these tactics reasonably quickly, however. They were used on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday by Soviet representatives who may have actually thought they were factually correct for all or part of this time period. Later in the crisis a mild attempt was made to gain a more receptive United States perception of the Soviet second offer. Fomin pointed out to Scali that the idea had been advnaced by neutrals and even Walter Lippmann in the Washington Post. This suggestion certainly provoked Scali who exploded. The United States seems to have used threats--the blockade and, perhaps unwittingly, the invasion buildup--to alter the Soviet utilities. Stevenson's addresses in the United Nations were surely unsuccessful in altering Soviet utilities and also surely aroused some resentment as a pack of decadent, capitalist lies in Zorin's mind as Stevenson went over the impeccable behavior of the United States throughout the cold war.

4. The Cuban crisis presents somewhat conflicting data on this aspect of aspiration rigidity. Surely part of the tremendous impact of the Soviet deployment on the United States decision unit was due to the fact that, although several membersof that unit were aware of the possibility of such a deployment, none of them ever really thought that the Soviets would be so foolish as to actually undertake such an activity in rule breaking. The rule in this case was essentially the Monroe Doctrine.

The rule which the United States broke, of course, was freedom of the high seas. Several spokesmen for the Kennedy administration including Vice President Johnson had in the weeks before the crisis ridiculed the Republican demands for a blockade around Cuba as a demand for an act of war. The Soviets were obviously provoked by United States piracy, but they calmed down enough to recognize the signal fairly quickly, and they then altered their aspirations in light of the signal.

5. I think this proposition describes quite accurately the activity on both sides of the Cuban crisis. I have found only one reference to probabilistic thinking in the Cuban crisis. After his blockade announcement Kennedy seemed to feel that the probability that the Soviet Union would go all the way to war were "somewhere between one out of three and even" (Sorensen, 1965, p. 795). In general actors try to achieve certain states of affairs, and, as Murdock has pointed out to me, generally in crises even this process is thought of in negative terms. That is, the constraints which define the desired states of affairs are, for example, avoiding the continued presence of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba, avoiding humiliating Khrushchev, and other avoidances. After the crisis these participants may look back positively at their accomplishments--saving the alliance or gaining the removal of Soviet strategic weapons, but the Cuban crisis seems to have been an avoidance exercise. Sometimes the response of the adversary is disregarded. In his Saturday conversation with Dobrynin Robert Kennedy said essentially that the United States would remove the strategic weapons early in the week if the Soviets did not agree to do so first

regardless of the Soviet response. But this is a last ditch effort. There is normally an attempt to anticipate the adversary's response, and, when contemplated actions are apt to draw costly responses, a search for less costly alternatives normally develops. But, this process is rather crude. The term expectation seems to describe this process better than probability. A dichotomous deliberative process seems to develop as Snyder has pointed out before. An action is expected to draw a particular response or at minimum a particular class--say violent or nonviolent--of response. Another response or class thereof would then be unexpected as was the Soviet challenge.

6. This proposition is intuitively pleasing. It states essentially the soft line image of normal politics, and is rather the opposite of the hard line image. It does not, however, seem to hold up during the Cuban crisis. The reason for this appears to me to be that crises, or at least the Cuban crisis, are not normal international politics. The disaster avoidance concerns are simply too strong, and a problem solving perspective seems to negate the proposition. In the pre-crisis period a pair of shadow relationships gave each party the impression of toughness in the other, and this image was then reciprocated. It is not clear that these shadow relationships actually misperceived the tough attitudes regularly. Neither side really seemed ready to do business with the other. But during the crisis the Soviet challenge was met by a firm commitment operationalized in two basic steps. Each time the Soviet Union backed off once the signal of the United States commitment was understood. Conciliation initiative begun by the Soviet Union was, strangely enough, picked up rather slowly by the United States and was

then reciprocated. Certainly after the crisis a process of mutual reciprocation began.

7. I have had some difficulty categorizing the threats of the Cuban crisis into compellent and deterrent types, and I am sure that others, particularly Murdock, will disagree with my assignment. The typology seems somewhat irrelevant with respect to the Soviet deployment, so I will skip it except to say that it was a deterrent move. Kennedy's blockade announcement threat of full retaliation on the Soviet Union for a missile launched from Cuba against a Western target is clearly deterrent. And, there is no evidence to indicate that this was interpreted as anything other than propaganda by the Soviet Union. The blockade itself, although a signal of an underlying compellent commitment, seems to me to be a deterrent activity, and it certainly aroused resentment as described above (1-4) although it did not strengthen the Soviet's will to resist on Wednesday. The Soviet threats about interference with their ships were deterrent, and they seem to have generated little response at least in their early rather belligerent form. By Friday these threats had calmed down and were, I think, both less necessary and considered more seriously. The United States threat of strategic weapon removal was clearly compellent, but it did not stiffen the Soviet's will to resist. I have gone over my notions of why several times above. Regardless of this ambiguity with respect to the proposition I think compellent threats are more difficult to initiate successfully. Rather than stiffening the will to resist, however, the major problem seems to be lack of credibility. This is why the ultimatum to remove the missiles could be given after part of

the United States commitment had already been operationalized in deterrent fashion to lend credibility to the whole but not before (Cf. Sorensen, 1965, p. 772).

D. Hypotheses relating environment, setting and tactics to outcomes

1. There appear to be two examples of salience with respect to the outcome of the Cuban crisis each perceived by different groups at different times. One of these was the status quo. This was salient for Kennedy, and I rather imagine that Kennedy felt he achieved the status quo in the end. The rather minimal noninvasion pledge which Kennedy gave probably differed not at all from his pre-crisis intentions. The only problem was that the explicit guarantee as opposed to the implicit intentions gave the Republicans, or at least some of them, a good deal of political hay. The other example of salience with respect to the solution were varying notions of reciprocity. Stevenson suggested the neutralization of Cuba--the Soviet Union and the United States both pulling out. Some neutrals, Lippmann, and the Soviets suggested the Turkish-Cuban missile trade. The asymmetries of the situation tended to reinforce the United States perspective here.

It is difficult to know how much to say about salience or prominance with respect to other aspects of the crisis. Almost all the alternatives the United States considered in its search process, for instance, were prominant from the standpoint of publicity or because they had been publically discussed in recent months. Hilsman (1964, p. 203) states that one of the concerns which haunted the United States decision unit was that the alternatives it chose in this, the first nuclear crisis,

would set precedents for future nuclear crises. That is, the United States solution to the management of conflict of this type would be a prominant solution in future, similar conflicts.

2. Salience appears to have had considerable impact on the search for various solution proposals and on contingency estimation in general in the Cuban crisis. Salience is unfortunately a more complex subject than it appears to be in Schelling's simple examples, however. That is, there may well be several points of prominance, and different points of prominance may appeal to the varying perspectives of multiple parties. But, with respect to the proposition, the influence of prominance in the settlement process appears as I indicated above (1) to have been considerable. And, the United States decision unit was struck by the lack of precedent which could guide limiting tactics and restrict escalation. In the end the alternatives considered were largely those which had entered the public, or private, discussions over Cuba in the months before the crisis. I have suggested (1) that, in the absence of precedents, these served as a prominant sample of options. There was, of course, some precedent for the diplomatic offensive in the United Nations and for avoiding the use of violence.

3. Superficially, the Cuban crisis seems to support this proposition. It appears to me now that the asymmetries which favored the United States were helpful in achieving a solution favorable to the United States only because the tactics of the United States utilized these asymmetries in a particular manner. That is, had Acheson been responsible for the United States decisions, these asymmetries would have been utilized in a different fashion, and it is doubtful whether this

use would have achieved the United States objectives. I realize that what I am saying--both "inherent" and "tactical" power are important--is not very helpful. But it seems unfortunately to be true. Kennedy himself stressed many times the importance of both factors in gaining such a favorable outcome.

4. I am not certain why nuclear weaponry should lead to de facto as opposed to formal settlements, but in a purely associative, rather than causal, sense this proposition seems to be sustained by the Cuban crisis. The original terms of settlement were written out formally and made public, but some improvisation had to be applied to these terms subsequently as I have explained elsewhere. The actual settlement was then a matter of simply forgetting the remaining loose ends.

5. The Cuban crisis fails to sustain this proposition. The hard liners who surely exist in multipolar as well as bipolar situations seem to have an infinite capacity to misconstrue the opponents intentions. Sometimes, they seem, unfortunately, to be correct as McCone was about the Soviet intention to deploy strategic weapons in Cuba. In this crisis, as Diesing explicates clearly, communication had simply broken down between the two states, and miscalculation characterized almost everyone's estimate of the other group's intentions. So, empirically there seems to be conflict between the proposition and the Cuban crisis. The problem may lie in the cause of the misperception which seems to me to be at least as closely related to the conflicting ideologies in this case as to the polarity of the system. That is, misperception stems from a number of sources, and it cannot be neatly linked to the distribution of power in the systemic environment.

E. Hypotheses about connections between alliance relationships and adversary bargaining

1. As nearly as I can determine there was very little if any bargaining among allies in the Cuban crisis. The United States engaged itself in a debate to draw and maintain the support of its allies, satellites, and neutrals as well. The Soviet Union did the same thing on a somewhat lesser scale. But, with the possible exception of Soviet-Cuban conversations with respect to on-site inspection and the medium-range bombers, there seems to have been no allied bargaining, and the details of any bargaining which occurred between Cuba and the Soviet Union are not public. The outcomes, of course, are. Cuba won the issue on which the Soviets needed Cuban cooperation to win, and the Soviets won the issue on which the Cubans needed Soviet cooperation to win. So, any bargaining which went on here may have been unsuccessful, and this is, I suppose, congruent with the proposition. But, in general, the proposition is irrelevant to the Cuban crisis.

2. The proposition seems to be irrelevant to the Cuban crisis. There were no supporting allies of any real importance. And, although some minor allies may have sent messages to the United States or to the Soviet Union--certainly this was done in the form of Security Council debates--little heed seems to have been paid to such messages.

3. Again, this proposition seems to bear little relevance to the Cuban crisis.

4. The only thing which I can think of to say about the Cuban crisis with respect to this proposition is that along the lines of (b) the Soviet Union seemed anxious to use the auspices of the United Nations

whenever possible in its withdrawal process. This seemed to have the effect indicated in (c)--namely reducing the humiliation involved.

5. Although the United States decision unit feared greatly that the states of Latin America and Western Europe would value the stakes so minimally as to not be capable of perceiving a Soviet challenge, this, strangely enough, turned out to be incorrect. It remains unclear in my mind, as it does obviously in the minds of several members of the decision unit, why these states did support the United States so unquestioningly. Perhaps the states of Latin America actually felt threatened by the presence of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba or by the possibility that Castro might gain control of such weapons. A more plausible explanation with respect to Western Europe is simply alliance loyality. It is questionable how much this largely moral support meant. De Gaulle, for instance, apparently made an instantaneous decision to support the United States in Acheson's presence. This would seem to indicate that he felt either that he had no choice or that he was agreeing to something relatively costless. Either perception would indicate the tremendous lack of influence which allies of the two superpowers had in this crisis.

6. Although the United States did certainly view the Cuban crisis as part of a larger confrontation and this did greatly increase its perception of the stakes, I really cannot relate this proposition to the Cuban crisis.

7. The Cuban crisis is not a multipolar crisis although the basic proposition is congruent with respect to the Cuban crisis.

8. Again I have trouble relating this proposition to the Cuban crisis. Although the Soviet Union probably knew that there was no loyality in Cuba to Soviet imperialism, the Soviet Union probably did not doubt Cuban loyality to a rather abstract notion of world socialism or to a Soviet hard line in the Cuban crisis. And, the Soviet Union probably tried to restrain Cuba with respect to United States and United Nations inspection and certainly with respect to the removal of the medium-range bombers. So, I suppose that this fits with the proposition, but the proposition does not really fit the crisis.

9. The actual collaboration between Khrushchev and Kennedy seems to have begun after the crisis as a result of the crisis and other recent conflicts. It is true that hard liners in the West such as Adenauer were very suspicious of such moves. But I am not certain that such collaboration caused a reduction in alliance cohesion. Soviet collaboration with the United States or even the silent acceptance of United States adventurism since the Cuban crisis seems to have had little impact in the long run on Soviet-Cuban relations which are a rather minimal alliance of convenience to begin with.

10. In the Cuban crisis it was certainly easy for the United States and the Soviet Union to work around rather than with Cuba in reaching a settlement. I have been over this point several times.

11. There is not much data relevant to this proposition in the Cuban crisis. It is highly questionable whether any power other than the United States would have denied the Soviet challenge or even have perceived that action as a challenge in the absence of United States action. On the other hand Cuba seemed to be somewhat more hard line in

its policy than the Soviet Union. This, of course, does not really indicate a greater willingness to take risks than that exihibited by the Soviet Union since it must have been obvious at the time that Cuban statements had little impact on the crisis.

12. I am not sure what other things would have to be equal--a crisis with no other asymmetries seems unlikely. Neither am I certain which alliance was more cohesive--although I think that, if cohesive means having similar preferences, I would pick the Western with respect to the crisis itself. Finally, I am not certain which side's commitments were firmer and which side's threats were stronger. Obviously the United States commitment to gain the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba was firmer than the Soviet desire to have them there, but the Soviets had firm commitments to other objectives--defending their installations and Cuba from United States aggression. The threats of the United States may have been somewhat stronger both in that they involved physical moves and in that the United States had local military superiority, but this latter negates the other things being equal notion.

13. The members of the United States decision unit have all emphasized the importance of the support which Latin America and Western Europe provided. It seems clear, however, that this support did not alter the preferences or intentions of the decision unit. That is, it appears as if the United States commitment to gain the removal of the Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba was unaffected by allied support. However, as I have mentioned, this support may have been helpful in increasing the credibility of the United States commitment to the Soviet

Union, and thus it may have had an impact on the outcome of the crisis by causing the Soviet Union to act in a milder fashion than it would have if the United States had lacked allied support.

14. With the possible exception of the U-2 which may have been shot down by Cubans the Soviets seemed to have been able to handle the Cubans with respect to the crisis. Of course, the Soviets were not able to obtain Cuban cooperation on some solution elements, but they simply worked around the Cubans instead. The United States had simply magnificent control over its allies in the Cuban crisis.

F. Hypotheses about perceptions and images

1. I think this hypothesis cannot be justly answered short of reorienting the entire project around it and then presumably qualifing the model suggested in the hypothesis in a book-length work. However, I shall attempt to pull together here what I have had to say about this hypothesis in my case study. As Diesing explains so well, the building block of the relevant images are disparate notions of liberty and theories of the dynamics of history which lead to conflicting interpretations of human activity. To a certain degree then signals will be interpreted in terms of these basic images. But, and again as Diesing points out, there seems to be considerable variation within the basic socialist and "liberal" perspectives. There seems to be a doctrinaire, dangerous group within each camp. They are doctrinaire in that signals seem to have little impact in altering their images. They are dangerous minimally from the perspective of being poor conflict managers in terms of limiting the disastrous consequences of conflict. There seem to be other individuals

on both sides who are more flexible and problem oriented. The images of these men seem to be altered by signals (Harriman). In addition, they appear to be less dangerous in that they are more concerned with limiting the disastrous consequences of conflict. This concern exhibits itself in a problem solving orientation toward the manipulative situations of international crises. This amounts to showing some flexibility in both means and ends. As Diesing says Schelling's books disregard flexibility not because flexibility is disregarded by everyone, but because Schelling is--or at least was--one of those who does disregard it--a hard liner.

2. This again actually requires a reorientation of the project and a new book on socialization and perception. But succinctly the answer is yes. The Soviet decision unit seems unable to gain the perspective of their United States counterparts except in a limited fashion under extreme duress--the confrontation and breakdown stages of the Cuban crisis. The reverse is true as well. Psychologists probably have some social background predictors for the sort of image stability which characterizes the hard liners. And, surely the values of such men are products of peculiarly warped lives.

3. This is certainly true of the hard liners. It seems also to have characterized the others as well before the Cuban crisis. In the latter stages of the actual crisis some individuals seem to have overcome this tendency.

4. This again is a central element of the hard liners misperceptions. Even when they guess activity correctly, I imagine they tend to misperceive intentions somewhat. The motives leaned upon most heavily

by these analysts to explain the Soviet challenge do not, as I mentioned earlier explain why the Soviets chose Cuba. I think the postulated phenomenon was characteristic of most perceptions in the Cuban crisis. After the original Soviet challenge, both parties were simply trying to get out of the situation without too much humiliation; yet perceptions of aggressive intentions continued. President Kennedy on the whole seems to have been remarkably good at recognizing these misperceptions and limiting the provocation involved in United States action.

5. I interpret this proposition to mean that decision-makers in general accept bad news when such is congruent with their expectations rather than hearing what they want to hear. This seems to be characteristic of the participants in the Cuban crisis. As Robert Kennedy says, "He (the President) had not abandoned hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours. It was a hope not an expectation. The expectation was a military confrontation by Tuesday . . ." (Kennedy, 1969, p. 109). I think this is relatively characteristic of the participants in the Cuban crisis although expectations of the consequences of various contingencies varied a lot.

6. This proposition seems sustained as well. I will use only one example. As Hilsman (1964) points out, evidence that the Soviets were deploying strategic weapons in Cuba was in fact acquired. Because of its ambiguous character it was not interpreted properly. In addition, some potential evidence was not even noticed because the existing images did not select it for attention focus. However, when unambiguous evidence appeared, beliefs were reversed immediately.

7. I find little evidence that image rigidity is positively associated with tension level.. As I have mentioned some individuals seem to have relatively rigid images regardless of the tension level. Before the Cuban crisis almost all the participants seemed to have developed rigid images. The early, unambiguous moves of the crisis seem to have broken down the rigidity of some individual's images. The moves conflicted so dramatically with prior images that the individuals were forced to reevaluate. There seemed to be considerable flexibility on the part of several important decision-makers--Kennedy and Khrushchev for example--during the tensest parts of the crisis. In fact the problem after the denial stage seems to have been largely uncertainty on both sides as to what the other fellow was about.

8. This proposition certainly seems to characterize the United States decision unit. The blockade, for instance, was irrevocable whereas the Soviet deployment was not from the perspective of this unit. I have had some trouble with this before, and, as I mentioned then, about the the best I can come up with here is the force of asymmetries. In addition, the United States decision unit apparently considered a number of Soviet responses for various contingencies as possibilities; whereas the ideas were pure fantasy from the Soviet perspective. Robert Kennedy's comments about both the crucial points in the crisis--the confrontation at sea on Wednesday and the United States demand for work stoppage and removal on Saturday--indicate that disaster could be avoided only by Soviet flexibility. American flexibility had already been expended in both instances. The details of Soviet perceptions remain unknown, but it is obvious that the Soviets did not

take a similar attitude with respect to the two confrontation episodes. This may be partially due to some asymmetries. It may also be that, in spite of Diesing's remarks (Diesing, 1970, p. 27), there may be something to my rather asymmetric stage notion. In any case, the Soviets accepted the restriction of United States alternatives twice during the crisis and responded with humiliating withdrawals each time. Thus they demonstrated their own flexibility.

9. This is a difficult proposition to answer on the basis of Cuban crisis data. Each decision unit on the whole was aware of the existence of a hard-soft continuum in the other. In addition, some members of the United States decision unit were aware of the nonmonolithic character of the socialist world. Yet when the Chinese apparently precipitated a border incident with India during the crisis, there was fear, albeit relatively momentary, that a coordinated, multiple location attack on the "free world" was being undertaken by the international communist monolith. It seems to me that such fears are the result of uncertainty. Decision-makers often seem to respond to uncertainty by fearing and preparing for the worst. Acheson (1969), however, reads as a perfect example of the validity of this proposition.

10. This seems to be generally sustained by the activity in the Cuban crisis. Almost all of the major communications of the Cuban crisis were made by Khrushchev and Kennedy themselves. Robert Kennedy supplemented some communications with his talks with Dobrynin. Fomin and apparently Zorin supplemented Khrushchev on one occasion. And, as has been mentioned repeatedly, all of these communications were credible. Lower level communications such as the threat of nuclear war issued by

a Soviet United Nations delegate and the military man with Dobrynin at the Soviet embassy appear to have been given only token if any consideration by the United States decision unit. The single, possible contrary example I know of is Fomin's post crisis conversation with Scali in which Fomin relayed Khrushchev's thanks to Scali for providing information upon which to base a decision. Fomin said that the information included Scali's explosion on Saturday.

11. It is doubtful whether either the Soviet Union or the United States decision unit was naive enough to consider its adversary's long-term aims as limited. It appears as if it was this perception which created an issue of such importance for the United States. The Soviets, however, in this respect were far more pragmatic. Their idea was to extradite themselves from the situation and to carry on the struggle by less dangerous means--that is, means which did not lead to mutual destruction. The asymmetries which in many respects favored the United States in this crisis also made the issue too important for such pragmatism. United States prestige was simply too involved. But, the United States had followed a policy of coupling for many years. That is, the United States had been reluctant to adopt the pragmatism of the Soviet withdrawal in Cuba at any time. This reluctance grew out of a self-image of the United States as both the fountainhead of the legitimate domestic political structure and also as a nonaggressive state in international politics. Thus the Soviet Union was viewed as solely responsible for continual provocations which if decoupled would lead only to greater provocations. This position has now been reached domestically in American politics. The established injustices are

simply not seen by authority, and attacks on these injustices are viewed by authority as wanton, unprovoked attacks on authority.

G. Hypotheses relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics

1. This proposition works pretty well for the United States side of the Cuban crisis. Kennedy realized that great domestic problems would plague his administration if he consented to allow Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba. It is perhaps incorrect, however, to view general sentiment on this issue as pushing Kennedy to work for a position which he himself did not believe in. That is, Kennedy and, to my knowledge, all the members of his advisory group shared this view. The Soviet Union did not attempt to use internal excuses as a front or a position with respect to the strategic deployment.

2. The ambiguity of the bargaining moves in the Cuban crisis was relatively low. There was also considerable difference of opinion as to the nature of the moves that ought to be taken--probably within both units but minimally within the United States decision unit. The manner by which these hypothetically--from the proposition--incongruent aspects were melded on the United States side of the crisis was by developing an alternative which could receive a near consensus before taking action (Hilsman, 1964). The blockade and the air strike-invasion, for example, were finally amalgamated into a single escalation option. It is not known how the Soviet decision unit handled its hard liners on the issue of the decision to remove the strategic weapons in return for an American noninvasion pledge. But, probably the hard liners had been somewhat discredited by the United States premature discovery of the

installations and its disturbing response, and they may have been simply overlooked in the development of a solution to the crisis.

3. I assume that emotion refers to what I have been calling nondeliberative responses; whereas reasoned calculation refers to actions preceded by a deliberative process. There was definitely a fear on both sides that, if violence or hostilities broke out, actions of the former character would replace the deliberate, bargaining process. As it was, both sides retained this latter framework throughout the tensest moments of the crisis.

4. Although both sides in the Cuban crisis were pressed for time, this burden fell far more heavily upon the Soviet Union and it is difficult to judge how precisely the Soviets went about their search process. It is, however, a mistake to assume that traditional or habitual methods of dealing with problems or even pre-planned alternatives for various contingencies are antithetic to the search process. Search is guided by a number of considerations. Certainly the prominance of tradition or precedent and of the existing institutional arrangements for dealing with problems are two. But, the problem with the Cuban crisis was that it was really without precedent, and the institutional arrangements were largely for a level of escalation which was never reached. To some degree contemporary political arguments served as a source of prominance--the blockade, for example. Reciprocity and the status quo provided prominent settlement suggestions. Robert Kennedy's suggestion with respect to the two offer dilemma appears to have been an example of innovative genius. Both states used the United Nations somewhat, and this was perhaps a traditional mode of response. But, in general

the immediate context of the crisis provided the dominant sample of alternatives which the search process picked up.

5. The Cuban crisis was short and severe, and except for the military the influence of organizational role on perceptions and evaluations of alternatives seems to have been minimal. So, the Cuban data is pretty congruent with this proposition.

6. Public opinion was not really much involved in the crisis on the Soviet's side, so this proposition really has no relevance here. Kennedy was careful to plan United States actions as much as possible before the Soviet deployment was revealed. When Kennedy broke the news, the general response was one of silent support or better. Once the crisis was over on Sunday, however, this breadth of support disappeared, and critics arose in all corners. This outcry might have strengthened Kennedy's position with respect to the medium-range bombers. But, aside from this, public opinion in the crisis seems to have had little impact. Partially, as I mentioned above (1), the absence of impact due to basic congruence in terms of desired outcome states between Kennedy and a variety of publics.

7. This also is a difficult proposition to relate to the Cuban crisis. The only decision-makers in the crisis area were the Cubans and the military--Soviet, Cuban, and American. Presumably these individuals were tougher, but they were not so much tougher that higher decision-makers could not compensate for the lack of control which arose from this difference. In addition it is unclear that it was closeness to the crisis that caused these individuals to urge a tougher line (E-11 and G-3).

8. The answer here is an easy yes. The military in certainly the United States (Kennedy, 1969) and perhaps the Soviet Union (Schlesinger, 1965) as well seem to be more characteristically hard line than civilian members of the decision units.

H. Hypotheses relating outcomes to aftermaths

1. The United States certainly feared that this proposition was correct with respect to its own interests. Cuba may have been a special case in this regard as I have indicated before. That is, it might have been difficult for the United States to decouple a soft stance in Cuba from its general stance. Yet, in the post-war period it is difficult to view the United States position as having ever been soft. It is strange, however, that Kennedy immediately decoupled the rather flexible position of the Soviets for them. He pointed out that the favorable outcome the United States had obtained was probably contingent upon a number of asymmetries which favored the United States in Cuba and that at other points around the world the United States could not expect the Soviet Union to be so flexible. The Soviet Union surely viewed the matter similarly. This strange double standard, as I have indicated above (F-11), seems to be derived from the peculiar national self-image that the individuals who have made United States foreign policy since World War II have held (Barnet, 1968).

2. Since there has been no Soviet-American crisis since the Cuban, the proposition is somewhat difficult to relate to the Cuban crisis. The United States certainly wanted to appear tough in the Cuban crisis. The United States hard liners assumed that the crisis

had been precipitated by past demonstrations of weakness. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, backed down in the Cuban crisis although it had been flexible in the Berlin crisis as well. United States toughness in the Cuban crisis may have been marginally due to previous indecision with respect to Cuba in the Bay of Pigs.

3. This proposition seems largely unsustained by the Cuban crisis. The only really negative impact the Cuban crisis had on the socialist world was to give the Chinese fuel for their dispute with the Soviets. This was not really reducing the cohesion of an alliance. Rather it was driving a wedge further between two quarreling groups. The impact of the Cuban crisis on hemispheric and NATO cohesion seem to have been relatively minimal. NATO's problems might have grown more severe if the United States had withdrawn missiles from Turkey under Soviet manipulation, but NATO's problems were severe enough. After the United States gained the removal of strategic weapons which, had they fallen into Castro's hands, would have caused widespread anxiety among the rightest governments in Latin America, the unity which existed during the crisis disappeared. I would guess that this unity was pretty minimal anyway. The concern of the United States was the Soviet Union. The Latin American governments were surely frightened by Castro.

4. There seems to be little support for this proposition in the data of the Cuban crisis (3).

5. The Cuban crisis did for a while seem to lead to peaceful competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. The adventurism of United States foreign policy under Johnson and Nixon has dampened this trend a good deal. But, my purpose here is to analyse

the characteristics of the crisis which led to this detente. The settlement appeared somewhat short of final at the time. The Soviets appeared to live up to their side of the bargain. They removed their strategic weapons, and these weapons have not been reintroduced. They were unable to gain the on-site inspections which the United States curiously wanted, but they allowed inspection of the materials on the return voyage to the Soviet Union. It was the United States really which failed somewhat. Since there were no on-site inspections, air reconnaissance of Cuba continued with the stipulation that, if United States aircraft were shot down, the United States would retaliate as it saw fit. This, in effect, made whatever noninvasion pledge the United States made contingent upon Cuban acceptance of violation of its air space by the United States. The noninvasion pledge Kennedy gave was a rather backhanded one. He never really pledged not to invade Cuba although he did pledge to continue the political and economic struggle against Cuba. All this appeared rather dubious to the Soviets at the time. I suppose that I should add that the United States has stopped some groups from engaging in military sorties into Cuba. Cuba is, nevertheless, continually bothered by such groups, and some of these groups surely have some form of covert, official United States support. Overall, however, the security of Cuba from foreign invasion seems to have been secured. The role the Cuban crisis played in gaining the security is questionable, though. Cuba was probably secure from large scale invasion before the crisis.

Although there may well be groups which view the United States and the Soviet Union as common enemies, it is very dubious that either

the Soviet Union or the United States has perceived of the two as having such an enemy. Therefore, this factor cannot have had much to do with the Soviet-American detente following the Cuban crisis.

The tactics used in the crisis were perhaps, given the nature of the Soviet's initial challenge, as nonprovacative as possible. These tactics probably allowed not only the peaceful settlement of the crisis but facilitated the detente which followed as well.

Regardless of the care which the United States took to minimize Soviet humiliation while gaining its own objectives, the crisis was a humiliating ordeal for the Soviet Union. The Soviets backed away from two confrontations which they must have viewed as being provoked by the folly of degenerate capitalist imperialism. This is to say that, given his values, Kennedy managed the crisis masterfully, but his values and those of the Soviet decision unit were so incongruent as to be almost inexplicable the one to the other.

I would like to add a bit here about the factors which generated the detente. Kennedy and Khrushchev seem to have shared the feeling that the international system was simply getting too hot to handle. In the space of one year the United States and the Soviet Union had confronted each other three times--Berlin, Laos, and Cuba. There seems to have been a common perception that the manner in which the conflict between the two states manifested itself had to be altered, or mutual disaster would be the result. On the basis of this reasoning there was, I think, an honest attempt on both sides to channel the conflict into less disastrous forms.

6. This proposition seems fairly congruent with the Cuban crisis. The Soviets welcomed the United Nations initiative on Wednesday and Thursday which allowed the Soviet Union to halt its ships under United Nations arrangements. The Soviets tried and perhaps quite sincerely to use the United Nations in the actual weapon withdrawal offer and implementation. Their efforts here were frustrated by both the United States and Cuba. Khrushchev spoke after the crisis of the heroic move of the Soviet Union to save the peace and perhaps humanity as well. This statement, regardless of how it was belittled in the West and in China, is reasonably accurate.

7. There is little data in the Cuban crisis to sustain this proposition. It is not at all clear that the strong stand the United States took in the Cuban crisis increased its attractiveness as a potential ally (3 and 4).

I. Hypotheses about bidding moves

1. I want to preface what I have to say about this proposition with a word or two about the term resolve. Resolve has cropped up repeatedly in this list of propositions. I have been wildly critical of its use before. Here I want to circumscribe its utility as I see it. Resolve as a general attribute of a nation-state exists only in the perceptions of hard liners. For LeMay the degenerate communists are always bluffing and will back down when their bluff is called. The Soviet Union has similar creatures among its leadership. To a lesser degree resolve has been an element of the peculiar national self-image of United States leaders which I have mentioned before. However, this

seems to be a more circumscribed, less stable characteristic. The general notion of resolve which seems to characterize Soviet leadership except for hard liners is that resolve varies from issue to issue. The aspiration of the United States to gain the removal of the Soviet strategic weapons was very firm or stable. The Soviet aspiration to maintain such installations was not this stable, but this does not indicate that the Soviet Union has no aspirations which are firm. Their resolve to retaliate in the contingency of a United States invasion of Cuba was quite firm. This is what the hard liners cannot seem to understand. Resolve is not constant. Some values receive better support than others.

Now for the proposition. The United States was indeed unwilling to consent to either Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba or to the reciprocal removal of such weapons from Turkey and Cuba as a means of settlement. The reluctance with respect to the former was not contingent upon Soviet manipulation or coercion. In the case of the latter it was. This reluctance, nevertheless, was due to the fact that the United States perceived the issue in each case to be a very important one--the credibility of United States commitments in general. This can be squared with the previous paragraph only by noting, first, the asymmetries of this crisis which actually made it perhaps as important for the United States as the United States made all crises, and second, the rather peculiar perception process which I have spoken of before. In spite of United States crisis intransigence, however, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin on Saturday evening that the missiles in Turkey would probably be removed soon after the crisis.

Now, the action of the Soviet Union is far less congruent with the proposition. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets could have been persuaded by "peaceful diplomacy" to unilaterally withdraw their strategic weapons from Cuba while the United States maintained missiles in Turkey and forces at Guantanamo. The Soviets withdrew under threat of disaster, and in this respect the crisis precipitated concessions which would have been unlikely under any other conditions.

2. The assessment of this proposition seems to be included in the working paper for my crisis. I have no disagreement with the interpretation given in the working paper, so I will leave this one alone except to say that a similar interpretation might be applied to the second offer as well.

3. This proposition expresses in somewhat different terminology the idea that aspirations shift somewhat with the ease or difficulty of achievement. I have discussed this matter in several locations above, and I think I have nothing more to say.

4. Concessions in the Cuban crisis were not interpreted as a sign of weakness except by the hard line fringe regardless of the level of tension. All concessions seem to have been interpreted as a sign of weakness by the hard liners regardless of the level of tension.

5. The concessions made by the superpowers in the Cuban crisis were made without consultation with interested allies. The Soviets obviously violated what was acceptable to Cuba--their most interested ally. It is difficult to know which state was the most interested ally on the United States side. If this state is considered to be a member of NATO, then the United States refusal to remove its missiles from

Turkey under Soviet manipulation might be viewed as a confirming instance for the proposition. Otherwise it is difficult to relate this proposition to United States activity in the Cuban crisis.

6. This proposition seems to be quite consistent with the Cuban crisis if "sign language" is construed rather broadly. Khrushchev's Friday letter was vague enough so that, if the United States was unreceptive, Khrushchev would remain unhumiliated. The concrete proposals were carried by Fomin to Scali and apparently also by Zorin to U Thant. Certainly the former of these which received greater consideration was informal enough to be repudiated by the Soviet Union if rebuffed by the United States. The United States seemed interested, but, although it indicated that time was very short, it appeared to be in no hurry to respond concretely to the Soviet proposal. The Soviets then issued a second and more demanding offer rather than going back to any vague original position. I can only speculate as to the nature of the Soviet deliberative process at this juncture. I have done so earlier, and I will not repeat that speculation here. The general notion of moving on to something harsher when a concession offer meets only a lukewarm response, however, seems vindicated.

I shall now move to Working Paper #6. When I have finished with the questions in #6, I will come back to Working Paper #3 to see if any of the questions in parts I and II remain unanswered. Also, I will interrupt #6 during section B to take up the relevant questions in Working Paper #4.

Working Paper #6

III. The Bargaining Process

A. Utility models

1. It is my own opinion that the utility models simply miss the boat with respect to the Cuban crisis. This feeling has apparently labeled me one of narrow mind. So, I shall do my best to fit the Cuban crisis into the utility framework, and let others make of it what they will. The bargaining range lay between the removal of the Soviet strategic weapons on one side and the price for such removal on the other. The price involved essentially a minimal amount of humiliation. Presumably this amounted, first, to an absence of negative items--searching Soviet ships on the high seas, sinking such ships, an air strike, an invasion--and, second, the presence of some positive quid pro quo involving minimally a pledge about the security of Cuba. These limits were unknown at the outset of the crisis, and the crisis activity involved essentially clearing these limits. As the limits or the nature of the problem was defined a bargaining space developed. Toward the end of the crisis there was some action which might be interpreted either as movement within the space or as discovery of one end of the space.

2. I am not sure what the difference between creating a bargaining range and discovering one is. So, admitting that I do not really know what I am doing since creating a bargaining range floods my frame, it certainly appears to me that the bargaining range was discovered. I commented avove (WP#3; b-5 and c-3) about attempts to change the adversary's utilities, and I have nothing to add here. There appear to

have been no reestimations of utilities on the part of the United States. There certainly was a reassessment on the part of the Soviet Union due to United States signals, and this reassessment created, I suppose, the bargaining range which then had to be discovered by both sides. This amounted to a clarification of relative preference process. The latter part of the crisis did involve some search for mutually acceptable outcomes.

3. One major problem with the utility model with respect to the Cuban crisis is the dimensionality problem. Diesing (1969 and 1970) suggests and uses the two dimensional space with the basic confrontation being settled first and then a search developing for cheap concessions. The importance of this model is that it is precisely the reverse of the rationality model, and it represents clearly the order of activity in the Cuban crisis. It may well be my lack of enthusiasm for this model which then turns me away from this suggestion. It seems to be to be indisputable that outcome states involve discrete, independent, and conflicting components. The utility model then essentially involves calculating a weighed summation of these components and expressing this summation in a homogeneous utility value. The approximate level of the stakes as well as an ordinal ranking would be the minimum scale of any use. A scale which showed something about the differences between various outcomes would be far more useful. On this space then the important limits such as the removal of strategic weapons from Cuba would have a number of variations--and trade for noninvasion pledge or trade for United States missiles in Turkey--strung out around it on a single dimension. The search for mutually beneficial moves which does

take place and the search for moves which benefit one party greatly at slight costs to the other which also occurs would have to be expressed by separate presentations of the single dimension for each party. Diesing's scheme seems more elegant than this although I myself find the above scheme easier to use than his diagrams (Diesing, 1970).

4. I think I have said about all I want to say about salience above (WP#3; D-1 and D-2).

5. It seems to me that both Schelling and George have conceptualized poorly in this regard. (a) and (b) are both positive goals associated most closely with what I have called winning and with what is called maximizing in this question. (c) is, of course, the disaster avoidance concern. It is true that one element may be dominant at one time and the other at another as in (d). (There seem to be two (d)'s as one was added in the checklist clarification and revision of 26 March 1970. This latter (d) seems to be the equivalent of (5) itself, and I am speaking of the one in the original working paper.) The general characteristics of this shift (e) have been indicated in my four stage model earlier. The challenge (a) and denial (b) stages are essentially winning attempts. The confrontation stage in the Cuban crisis is mixed winning (a and b) and disaster avoidance (c). The breakdown in the Cuban crisis is dominantly disaster avoidance (c). Yet the stages are simply not this clear cut. The denial in the Cuban crisis is tempered severely by disaster avoidance concerns, and the breakdown occurs within the general context of winning for the United States.

B. The "chicken-critical risk" model

1. I have spoken before of my idea of the utility of the "chicken-critical risk" model. Briefly, this model provides a very useful typology of a wide variety of tactics under a rather hard definition of the bargaining problem. In terms of being empirically applicable then the answer is yes with two qualifications. First, the use of this model may lead to some misinterpretation or noninterpretation if the bargaining problem in the empirical instance differs from the bargaining problem in "chicken-critical risk". Second, the actual derivation of interval, homogeneous utility values and thus of C. R.'s for actual cases is both impossible and unimportant. The important contribution of the model is the tactic typology which is valuable apart from the calculation of actual critical risk values.

2. I have discussed this above (WP#3; C-5).

3. There are attempts to communicate to the adversary certain danger areas. That is, "we, will do x if you do y," where "x" has undesirable consequences for "you". I have been over this before.

4. Again there are attempts to show danger areas or areas which involve unacceptable outcomes.

5. There is manipulation in the sense that attempts are made to indicate that certain actions will draw reactions which will give these actions undesireable consequences. This is very similar to (3, above. (In general the specifics relative to 3, 4, and 5 above have either been given earlier or will follow shortly or both. Thus I have provided rather bonehead responses to these three questions.)

6. I have discussed this above (WP#3; B-11).

7. I shift to Working Paper #4 for this answer.

Working Paper #4

I. Tactics to increase credibility

A. Change one's apparent utilities (payoffs)

Reduce the apparent net cost of war

1. Building the strategic installations would be a tactic of this type.

2. Dispersing the SAC bombers to civilian air fields, keeping loaded SAC bombers in the air at all times, freeing some air fields in the Southeast for tactical air forces, extending tours of duty, assembling an invasion force in Florida, reinforcing Guantanamo, and evacuating dependents from that base would all fall under this category.

3. The only tactic from this list used in the Cuban crisis was (f). Both sides used it with respect to different elements of the outcome state as has been described many times above.

Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes (increase apparent costs of backing down)

1. Threats, of course, were made by both sides. But the vast majority were issued and perceived as warnings--Type I threats. Kennedy in his blockade announcement and a Soviet United Nations delegate each made a Type II threat. Khrushchev's early (Tuesday) statements about

United States interference with Soviet ships were perceived, I think, as bluffs (Type II) but may well have been Type I (warnings). Khrushchev, I think, originally perceived the blockade as a Type III, although it was actually a Type I, and I think this eventually became evident in the course of the crisis. Thus the committal value of the threats in the Cuban crisis was very low.

2. This was done by the United States as has been discussed often above. Both (a) and (b) were feared by the United States, but (a) was the primary fear. (c) was not explicit but known by both sides.

3. Each side primarily, but not exclusively, in the United Nations exalted the legitimacy of its own actions and castigated the other for illegitimate acts. Neither (a) nor (b) was the specific ploy used, however.

4. This was more implied than explicit in the arguments over legitimacy and legal rights.

5. This technique was also used in the Cuban crisis by both parties and again primarily but not exclusively in the United Nations. Actually the basis for the legitimacy mentioned in (3) above was generally international law. For the details of this activity as well as an accurate--I think--and pessimistic assessment of the activity see Gerberding (1968).

6. The Soviet Union had a public commitment to defend Cuba from aggression, and it made the most of this commitment in explaining its activity in the Cuban crisis. Satisfying this constraint also seemed to be the minimal acceptable solution from the Soviet perspective. The United States was concerned about and fell back upon treaty

commitments and alliance obligations such as the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Treaty (1947) and, with regard to the removal of missiles in Turkey, NATO. In general alliance obligations seemed to be taken quite seriously by both sides in the Cuban crisis.

7. I nearly as I can determine this ploy was not used by either side in the Cuban crisis.

8. This concern was not mentioned publically although Kennedy and his administration would probably have been in severe domestic political danger had Soviet strategic weapons remained in Cuba. The means, however, would probably have been constitutional--election and impeachment--rather than revolution although, with the Kennedy family, assassination seems indemic. Not in '62.

9. This one seems to be answered in the working paper itself.

B. Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

1. there are several examples of varying importance. The blockade was one example as were most of the threats or warnings of the crisis. The idea here was that the United States preference structure was such that removing the blockade was impossible, so the Soviets had to bend. A similar idea was expressed by Robert Kennedy in his conversation with Dobrynin on Saturday evening. The strategic installations simply had to come out soon. And, if the Soviets would not remove them, then the United States would have to remove them. On the Soviet side the remarks by the military man at the Soviet embassy reception in Tuesday followed by Dobrynin's reply that the military, not he, knew what the military would do is an example. The mutual distress at the thought of escalation

is another example. Escalation beyond the threshold of violence was not perceived as a very manageable but as a rather automatic process.

2. The Dobrynin example above (1) fits here as well or perhaps better than above.

3. This technique was not used or threatened in the Cuban crisis unless Dobrynin's remarks in (1) above are to be construed in this fashion.

4. The only example of something like this was Robert Kennedy's statement to Dobrynin on Saturday evening that the decision to remove missiles from Turkey was not a United States but a NATO decision. Kennedy's statement, incidentally, was minimally an exaggeration.

5. This claim was not made by either Kennedy or Khrushchev. Kennedy, however, and probably Khrushchev as well must have felt pressure of this sort (Kennedy, 1969, p. 67).

6. This was certainly attempted on a number of levels. Both the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to influence the opinions of their allies, satellites, and neutrals both in the United Nations and without. In addition Kennedy tried to generate Congressional, Cabinet and mass public support domestically. I have mentioned these matters earlier, however.

7. This technique was not used in the Cuban crisis.

8. I think this was only an undersirable consequence of some signaling activity, but I have expressed my ideas on this thoroughly earlier.

9. Kennedy may have done this in his full retaliatory response statement in his blockade speech. Khrushchev's Tuesday piracy threats may fit here as well.

10. Both sides did this to some degree. The United States structured two confrontations which had this implicit character--Wednesday and Saturday.

11. In general the communications tried to emphasize the predictability of certain responses rather than unpredictability. Some unpredictability was associated with the references to escalation of the conflict, but this was not an important tactic in the Cuban crisis.

12. I suppose that the blockade and the invasion buildup qualify here although I am somewhat uncertain about what is meant.

13. I think this tactic was used not al all during the Cuban crisis.

14. This comes close to the United States position, but it was not exactly the tactic used.

15. This tactic was not used in the Cuban crisis.

II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's critical risk

A. Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

1. The readiness of the United States was increased, and the invasion buildup seems to have been particularly influential. The Soviets presumably increased their readiness too--the movement of submarines into the Caribbean is the only example I know of, but this seems not to have had any influence on the United States decision unit.

2. This was done prior to the crisis by the Soviet Union but was not, to my knowledge, done by either side during the crisis.

3. This was not done during the Cuban crisis.

4. This was clearly done, but I think that I have said all I wish to say on this subject.

5. This was not done during the Cuban crisis.

B. Devalue the stakes for the adversary (decrease his cost of compliance)

1. This was the basic strategy of the United States, and it manifested itself in several manners--beginning with the blockade rather than the air strike, implementing the blockade slowly, not destroying the SAM sights after a U-2 was shot down. The asymmetries of the crisis made this tactic of little use to the Soviets except in terms of utilizing the United States initiatives along this line in their withdrawal.

2. The Soviet Union used this to initiate deescalation.

3. This was done by the United States but only rather vaguely. The Cuban strategic deployment was a threat to peace; thus the withdrawal of these weapons would surely help the cause of peace.

4. This was done by both sides, but I think I have already said enough about the use and impact of this tactic.

5. This was done primarily but not exclusively--Khrushchev's second offer is an exception--in the United Nations as part of each sides diplomatic offensive which has been discussed earlier.

6. I have discussed this before under (WP#4; I. A. Increase; 3, 4, and 5). I think this tactic as well as (5) above were more appropriately considered under this earlier heading.

7. As I have explained at some length, this tactic was certainly used and was quite important although, as my earlier discussion

show, none of the three specific tactics listed under this heading were used in the Cuban crisis.

8. The gradual Soviet arms buildup might be considered an example of this. Otherwise I think there were no "salami tactics" in the Cuban crisis. The medium-range bomber controversy and the failure to gain on-site inspection were undoubtedly viewed as such by United States hard liners, but I think these perceptions are in error.

9. With respect to the crisis itself both sides did profess limited aims. The Soviet Union stressed that it was interested only in the defense of Cuba. The United States stressed that it wanted the strategic weapons, not Castro, removed.

10. The United States certainly tried to couple the Cuban crisis issues to its general bargaining stance vis a vis the Soviet Union. Only after the crisis was over did Kennedy decouple the issues for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union itself did not make any use of this tactic in the Cuban crisis.

11. In effect this was the principle of the crisis settlement, but this notion--that the strategic deployment was necessitated to procure security for Cuba and that an American pledge of noninvasion would make this deployment unnecessary--was initiated, not by the United States, but by the Soviet Union itself. The Soviets also attempted unsuccessfully to convince the United States both that weapons of the nature the United States was calling offensive were not in Cuba and that such weapons were not offensive but defensive.

12. Statements such as this were made by both sides, but they seem to have been relatively unimportant and minor.

13. If this tactic was undertaken by either side, it was certainly minor and important.

14. This tactic was not used in the Cuban crisis.

Working Paper #6

B. The "chicken-critical risk" model continued

7. I think that I have now in one fashion or another answered items (a) through (f) with respect to the Cuban crisis.

8. In general I think I have answered this question both in the remarks in (7) above and in other places in the case study. I want to add just a bit here, however. The tactics in Working Paper #4 come under two general headings--tactics to increase credibility and tactics to reduce the adversary's critical risk. In general the tactics in the latter group were little used and were ineffective in the Cuban crisis. Exceptions to this dictum are A-1, B-1, and B-7. In general then the tactics under the former heading were more common although section B under this heading is pretty irrelevant to the Cuban crisis. The most important tactics in section A were Reduce-2 and Increase-2 and 6. Increase-3 and 5 were also used, but their impact was rather marginal. In general, however, the critical risk framework twists tactics so they do not fit the Cuban crisis. For example increasing the readiness of capabilities was not used as a tactic to reduce the apparent net cost of war but rather to increase the credibility of United States signals--physical actions--and to increase the cost of war for the Soviet Union. Even more blatantly tactics such as II. B-2 and 11 which were quite important do not

fit into the scheme at all since they were initiated by the Soviet Union with respect to the Soviet Union rather than by the United States. I will have something more to say about this later.

9. I have had to change my ideas on threats a good deal during the course of this case study. With respect to resistance, there is a definite fear that threats will strengthen the resolve of the other (Sorensen, 1965, p. 772). Yet I am unable to find a single instance of this occurrence in the Cuban crisis. The original impact of the blockade on the Soviet decision unit may have been of this nature, but the members cooled down very quickly. In general threats in the Cuban crisis brought compliance or simply had no impact at all. I think there are two factors involved here. First, and as I have indicated several times before, most of the threats made during the crisis were Type I threats or warnings, and they were perceived as such by the threatened parties. These threats were actually then signals of the nature of the problem which the two parties faced. Second, in general, particularly on the part of the United States, there was a concerted effort to make these essential warning signals as nonprovocative and nonhumiliating as possible.

10. Since to my mind none of the threats in the Cuban crisis had any committal quality at all but only communication value (Snyder, 1969), so this query is undifferentiated from (9) above. The commitments communicated through warnings in the crisis were credible. They defined the nature of the problem, and the response was to avoid actions which would lead to the implementation of the sanctions involved in the commitments.

11. I have been over this several times before. Essentially the United States hesitated when the Soviets offered a conciliatory bid and then accepted when prodded by the Soviets.

12. Loopholes were used most effectively by the United States. The basic notion was to refrain from provoking the Soviet decision unit into escalating the conflict. The idea was that it was possible for the Soviet's to withdraw from their present position and that their position should be made so untenable that they would do so. Provoking the Soviets into some form of escalation would only crumble the bridges leading out of the crisis.

The Soviets tried three different loopholes all of which failed because of the nature of the United States commitment. They tried the ploy that there were no strategic weapons in Cuba, then that such weapons were defensive, and finally that the Turkey-Cuban trade of the Soviet second offer had actually been initiated by an American journalist.

C. Expanded game models

I used this model rather implicitly and extensively in the dissertation part of the case study. Looking over these eight questions now, I find that I have nothing more to add. I think that I have answered all of them adequately.

D. Super-game model

1. Although the Soviets denied the supergame character of the Cuban crisis, the United States decision unit perceived one, and I am

certain that they were correct. I have gone over the details of this aspect in the dissertation part of the case study.

2. I think the answer here is yes for the Soviet Union.

3. There is some of this activity. It is described in the dissertation part of the case study.

4. I think the answer here is affirmative also--at least for the United States. I again refer to the dissertation part of the case study.

5. Basically yes, although the power positions do not change very much due to the earlier crises. See the systemic environment and bargaining setting sections of the case study.

6. Not really in that none of the previous crises had altered the basic power positions.

E. Information processing model

1. I am not sure I understand this question. Of course images, expectations, perceptions, and interpretations are important in determining the outcome. I am not certain what the "basic strategic situation" was or how it differed from the above. On second thought, I suppose this distinction derives from the Sprouts' notion of perceptions and the like governing action, and the actual situation governing the outcomes. This distinction has never been particularly central to my belief system nor valid in my cognitions. Actors act upon their images, etc. They have nothing else upon which to base their actions. Sometimes, perhaps often or generally, these images and the like are incorrect or incomplete. This gives rise to consequences from action which are

partially or completely unanticipated. The more accurate images and the like are presumably the less significant the realm of unanticipated consequences. The signaling involved in the Cuban crisis was an attempt to reduce this realm. It largely succeeded in that action derived most of its intended consequences and unanticipated consequences of disastrous proportions were largely avoided.

2. I think I have covered this before.

3. and 4. These were worked over in WP#3; F-6 and F-5 respectively.

5. The data available on the Cuban crisis are not really good enough to handle this question with any sophistication. This is particularly disheartening since I imagine that the Cuban data are better in this regard than those available for any other crisis. In addition, or perhaps at the crux of the problem, I am really not familiar enough with a number of areas of psychology to provide a sophisticated answer. The interpretation of signals is done in the light of an image or images of actors or activities relevant to the signal. But the images of various individuals seem to vary a good deal. There seem to be minimally three sources of variance among individuals. First, individuals have different experiences and are thus cognizant of different things. This means that when historical analogies are used, they may be different ones, and different conclusions may be drawn. The classic example here, I suppose, is Chamberlin's domestic policy experience and Churchill's foreign policy experience. But an even greater gap would appear between the descriptions a Khrushchev and a Kennedy would give to any given political activity.

Second, different experiences arouse differing evaluations. Some of the military advisors in the Cuban crisis, for instance, seem to have felt that a nuclear war with the Soviet Union was in the national interest. This evaluation was fortunately at variance with that of most of the other members of the decision unit.

Third, whatever images are built up through experience in terms of cognitions and evaluations, the images seem to vary in their rigidity with respect to each of these other aspects. The cognitive world of the hard liners is a very simple place. It resembles a very degenerate form of "chicken-critical risk" in which the other side's critical risk always approaches zero and the hard liners own critical risk always approahces one. This means that hard liners are apt to misperceive the situation unless it is coincidentally congruent with this stable view. This rigidity in cognition is matched by a rigidity in evaluation. High ranking naval officers seemed to have difficulty in placing the political goals of the blockade above the generally subsidiary military goals (Abel, 1966, pp. 135-37; and Allison, 1969).

6. I cannot answer this question.

7. Here I want to take up briefly the change processes involved in the less rigid images of what I have been calling soft liners. The Cuban crisis started from a position of mutual misperception. I have outlined the specifics of this misperception, and Diesing has worked out the general dynamics. The challenge of the Soviet Union and the denial of the United States seem to have shocked the United States and the Soviet Union respectively out of this shadow relationship and

motivated them to communicate more effectively with one another. So, briefly shock, fear, and danger seem to have precipitated the altered images. These elements were signals that perceptions and expectations were wildly amiss. These individuals then were willing to interpret signals in different perspectives in order to determine what was going on. I suppose then that all four of the items listed under this question have some impact on image changes. The most important in the Cuban crisis for the United States were (b) and (c). (d) might be added for the Soviet Union.

Finally, I would like to apologize for the poor or nonexistent answers I have given questions 3, 5, 6, and 7 in this section. These questions are important. I have simply concentrated on other matters. It was my hope that someone else in the project would zero in on these. Diesing has, and I am indebted to him; perhaps others will follow.

8. Both deliberate bargaining moves and other elements of behavior not intended primarily for communication or bargaining seem to influence bargainers. That is, signals and indices--in Jervis' terms--are both important. For example, the blockade was a signal. Yet the invasion buildup which seems to have been important in the Soviet decision was not mentioned in communications with the Soviets. This then was an index which appeared in the perceptions of the receiver but not in the intentional signals of the source.

9. I think Diesing has been my sole source here. I think what he says about Berlin holds for Cuba as well, and I have nothing to add to his excellent analysis.

F. Cataclysmic model

1. Inasmuch as one of the aspects of losing control involves a mechanism which may be thought of in cataclysmic terms, the cataclysmic model is relevant as a feared contingency of escalation.

2. The air strike-invasion options tended to be collapsed into steps of a single option because it was felt that the air strike would leave matters unsatisfactorily resolved and only an invasion could resolve them after the air strike. In addition any escalation beyond this level seemed to lead inevitably through several mechanisms explained above to nuclear war.

3. There are such decisions, but they exist by virtue of preference functions. That is, according to Robert Kennedy, if the Soviets had not agreed to remove their strategic weapons on Sunday, the United States would have had to remove the bases with an air strike. This was partially because this was the only remaining method which in Kennedy's perceptions would gain the removal of the weapons and partially because the United States decision unit preferred the consequences of the air strike, bad as they might be, to the continuing presence of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba.

4. There are such statements. All three varieties described under this question occur. I have discussed these in connection with various meanings of losing control.

5. Both sides probably tried to supervise their military as closely as possible in order to retain control. Robert Kennedy seems to have been used as a special communication channel with Dobrynin during the tensest moments on Tuesday and Saturday evenings. The United

States did not hedge on its commitments or make them in an ambiguous fashion. The Soviet Union did not use ambiguity. Hedging might describe what the Soviets did. Lowering their aspirations, pulling back, withdrawing, retreating, or backing down come closer.

6. I have discussed this above in the dissertation part of the case study.

Before moving on to G., I want to discuss two points. The first relates to the various models in general. In the dissertation part of the case study I make use of expanded game, supergame, bounded rationality, and cataclysmic models. These are woven together rather implicitly in the verbal narrative. I do not use utility or "chicken-critical risk" models. I have tried to answer the specific questions relating to these models on the checklist. But I think I should add something about my reasons for pretty much ignoring these two models in the rest of the case study. The expanded game model comes into the Cuban crisis through the decisions about varying levels of escalation and through various characteristics of strategy. The cataclysmic model represents one aspect of the upper end of the escalation range. The supergame model enters in the assessment of issues and preferences. The bounded rationality model characterizes the basic problem solving nature of bargaining activity. It is the character of this activity and the appropriateness of this final model to which I basically attribute the inappropriateness of the utility and "chicken-critical risk" models. Essentially the activity of the Cuban crisis was the mutually shocking revelation that both sides were out of touch, an attempt to get back in touch or to delineate the precise nature of the problem or conflict, or issues, and an effort to

avoid the various dangerous and unacceptable outcomes which appeared from around every corner.

There is no doubt that the Cuban crisis can be pressed into the molds, so to speak, of either utility or "chicken-critical risk" models. My only question here is the relative appropriateness or congruence of the three models. I have chosen the one which I feel to be the most appropriate. The basic problem with the utility models is the nature of the bargaining space they portray and the tactics they suggest. I have at some length explained how outcomes involve discrete, independent, and conflicting consequences and how actions are chosen by avoiding one after another of a set of undesirable conditions. The utility model misses all of this in its summary, homogeneous utility measure. In addition, typical utility model tactics concentrate on manipulating the perceptions of the other fellow to one's own advantage--stating ridiculous opening positions and the like. These tactics are alien to the activity of the Cuban crisis. I think the utility models will be generally rather inappropriate for crisis cases.

The inappropriateness of the "chicken-critical risk" model may be peculiar. Basically I think this model is inappropriate because the vast majority of the threatening, coercive activity involved Type I threats or warnings, and these communications were so perceived. The various forms of manipulation involved in the activity of this model seem more relevant to Type II and Type III threats where there is some committal value to the communications. Also, this model seems to have more utility in crises which involve little physical action or escalation but rather consist largely of verbal communications. If my prejudices

here are correct, the "chicken-critical risk" model ought to be more appropriate in other crises.

The second point I want to discuss is the distinction between basic and communicative coercive moves. This is tangentally related to my argument about the appropriateness of the "chicken-critical risk" model in the escalation situations. All the coercive moves in the Cuban crisis were communicative moves regardless of whether or not they involved physical actions. The blockade was a signal. The difference between such physical moves and verbal communications is that it generally makes little sense to speak of their credibility which, of course, is the essence of the "chicken-critical risk" framework. I think this is the crucial distinction between these two types of coercive moves. I mentioned the same point earlier when discussing the Soviets choice of a fait accompli as a challenge device. Physical moves are credible. Some are reversible and in this sense may be worked upon by adversaries. But physical action seems firstly to be credible in its own right and secondly often increases the credibility of contemplated future actions--the air strike-invasion.

G. Miscellaneous

1. The formal rules of international law were used by each side in its case against the other. This took place primarily in the United Nations. Gerberding (1968) shows rather convincingly, however, that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union actually used international law as a guideline for action, but rather used international law as a propaganda front for selfish interest. Both states lived up

to their formal commitments to allies, but these were used for selfish purposes as well. The Latin American states were used for propaganda purposes through the OAS. The existence of NATO made it easy to falsely delegate the decision about removal of United States missiles in Turkey to NATO. The existence of a public commitment to defend Cuba from aggression gave the Soviet Union a reasonable cover story and a viable means for deescalating the crisis by trading the strategic weapons for a noninvasion pledge. Until the denial and confrontation stages for the United States and the Soviet Union respectively I think there were really no common rules or norms important to the crisis. This was characteristic of the shadow relationship of the two states. The shock of these provocations, however, seems to have provided minimally some feeling of empathy with which one decision unit could see dimly the other's position. Perhaps the most pervasive rule which resulted was a negative one--the common fear of crossing the threshold of violence. Khrushchev tried to interest Kennedy in reciprocity, but Kennedy was not interested.

2. In general I think I have said most of what I have to say about this topic. With respect to (b) irrationality was associated closely with the provocation of escalation--Khrushchev after the blockade announcement and mutual fears of further escalation. Two examples which might possibly be construed as feigned irrationality (c) were Kennedy's full retaliatory response threat in his blockade announcement and Dobrynin's delegation of responsibility ploy at the Soviet embassy reception.

3. I have covered this in the dissertation section of the case study.

4. This comes from Working Paper #4.

A. Symbolic acts

The only tactic from this list used by either party during the Cuban crisis would be (7). The military preparations which the United States undertook--particularly the invasion buildup--seem to have been quite convincing to the Soviets. I suppose that violations of the Monroe Doctrine by the Soviet Union and of freedom of the seas by the United States could be considered as violations of normal diplomatic courtesies (3), but this seems to be stretching things a bit.

B. Acts of harassment

1. Acts of economic reprisal were contemplated by the United States. The destruction of the Cuban economy by increasing the scope of the blockade was not, however, actually implemented.

4. There were apparently some demonstrations against United States embassies--Prague, for example. These demonstrations may have been spontaneous, however.

6. There were some relatively hostile propaganda statements made in the United Nations by both sides. In addition Khrushchev's early responses to the blockade were rather incensed.

7. The American press in general was pretty hostile to the Soviet Union during the crisis--Walter Lippmann was then an exception. As far as I know, however, this was not stimulated by the Kennedy administration. In any case the impact of the domestic press of both sides on the crisis was negligible.

Working Paper #6

G. Miscellaneous continued

5. The United Nations played a mediating role in the crisis. About the only accomplishment was the initiative of U Thant on Wednesday and then again on Thursday following United States prodding which allowed Khrushchev to appear as if he were following a United Nations suggestion rather than backing away from a confrontation at sea. Otherwise the United Nations was pretty ineffective. This was due partially to Castro's refusal to allow on-site inspection which would have been done through the auspices of the United Nations. The OAS, of course, supported the United States in the crisis. The importance of both these stances has been discussed above.

Turning now again to the questions in sections I and II of Working Paper #3 it appears that I have answered all of the questions in section II. Of the questions in section I 14 is missing; 3, 5, 7, 8,9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 have been answered in the course of this study; 4 is not applicable to an individual case; I think I have nothing to say about 20; and 1 and 2 have been handled rather informally--that is, I have not addressed all aspects of these questions specifically, but there is sufficient material relevant to them in the case study. This leaves 6, 12, and 13 about which I would like to say something here.

Working Paper #3

I. Some Fundamental Questions

6. The major activity relevant to this question is, of course, the United States implementation of its commitment to gain the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba. The commitment of the United States was quite firm. The problem was that various methods of implementing this commitment in one blow, so to speak, were either deemed ineffectual--bringing the Soviet Union to task in the United Nations--or dysfunctional in that they led inevitably to a disastrous escalation process. The problem then was precisely how to demonstrate this "firm commitment" and yet "preserve options". The manner in which this was done was to break down the total commitment and to implement it gradually. The blockade itself was credible, but it was not an adequate signal to get across the full nature of the United States commitment. Enough of the commitment had been credibly operationalized, however, to that, when on Saturday the United States threatened implementation of the rest, this threat was credible; whereas, it was considered to be ineffectual (Sorensen, 1965, p. 772) before the partial implementation in the form of the blockade.

12. This question is a tough and important one, and it relates to my earlier discussions of the nature of the distinction between basic and communicative coercive moves. Basically I think what I said there was correct, but I want to add a point or two with respect to the Cuban crisis. The point I made earlier is that physical moves are taken and there is no question as to their credibility which means that essentially

they have to be combated differently than verbal or communicative coercive moves which lend themselves more readily to the sort of preventive rather than curative tactics of "chicken-critical risk" or even utility models. A physical act once taken must be defeated by a compellent threat. And, this generally presents severer problems than implementing a deterrent threat. The blockade, as I indicated before, was credible largely because the Soviet Union could understand that, no matter how provoking this act was to them, it was not apt to be withdrawn because of the humiliation this would cause the United States. A potent query here would be why the Soviet deployment was any different than the United States blockade. I have hinted at the reasons before. There seem to be two elements. First, the Soviet deployment was not completed when the United States acted, so gaining its removal was at least in part--primarily the blockade--a deterrent rather than a compellent operation. Second, the United States was favored by an incredible and unusual number of asymmetries. These two considerations were, I think, crucial to the United States success in gaining the removal of the strategic weapons.

13. In general the signals in the Cuban crisis were credible--I have indicated the few exceptions earlier. I have already suggested why this was true in the Cuban crisis, and I will be interested to learn if there is any confirmation from the other case studies. To pull my thoughts together briefly here, the signals of the Cuban crisis were credible because they were warnings, and they were perceived as such. But this begs the question really. Why were they credible because they were perceived as warnings? One reason more important for the United

States was that the signals were physical actions. The blockade and the invasion buildup seem to have been the crucial signals. I have tried to explain above (12) why actual physical signals are more credible than verbal ones. A second reason more important for the Soviet Union was that its signals were limited to delineating sensitive areas which if attacked would cause great humiliation. Kennedy had considerable empathy for the desire not to be driven into a corner. Thus signals of this sort were generally credible.