Center for International Conflict Studies

Crisis Bargaining Project

The Quemoy Crisis of 1958

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THE QUEMOY CRISIS, 1958

I. Systemic Environment

1. System structure

a. Number of major actors: Two, the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1958, when the Sino-Soviet split had not taken place, the international system was still bi-polar, although perhaps not as rigidly so as in the early 1950's.

b.Distribution of power: In 1958, the Soviet Union was narrowing the gap between its industrial and military potential and that of the United States in a highly visible manner. In August, 1957,

Tass, the Soviet news agency, announced that the USSR had successfully tested an intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket; 6n October 4 of that year Moscow announced the launching of its first earth satellite, and on November 3 the second. These developments were not

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 158-159.

balance of forces to a world congress of communist leaders in Moscow,

in which he said he perceived "the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces." While in fact the Soviet Union and the

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 160.

United States were in a rough power balance, with the advantage with the West, the Boviet Union's major ally did not so perceive the situation. "The incipient strategic differences between Peking and Moscow thus seemed to concern the level of risk that the Bloc could afford to run in the immediate future, the risks the West would run, the tactics to be employed by the Bloc, and the priorities to be attached to negotiations as opposed to direct revolutionary assaults in specified theaters which involved the risk of limited war."

Doid., p. 169. The degree of acutal friction between the USSA and Communist China in this period has been much debated, and its consequences for the course of the Quemov crisis, have been much debated (see below, Wature and firmness of alliance commitments). It may be said with fair certainty that the Western bloc was not aware of these differences, or minimized them, at the time.

Military Capabilities and

C.International organizations: The United Nations did not play an important role in the crisis. The Obinese Communists were not recresented to have the issues discussed in a body in which they were not recresented highly while the Nationalists were, and both Chinese governments were/sufficiently afried of a "Zwo Chines" solution such as conceivably might have gained support in the United Nations. There were diplomatic efforts by covernments not parties to the crisis to use the UN as a setting for Recretary of State Dulles in the distance and the United States/and Soviet navagagateixas and hassador Gromyko both made widely publicized speeches on the crisis in the length Agreebly, which was in session at that time. Nowever

at no time during the crisis did the UN play a major role, either as primary or bidding a medium for communication moves or as a peace-imposing instrumentality. World-wide concern over the crisis, which had a potential for uncontrollable escalation, was perhaps crystallized and publicized to a greater degree because the general Assembly was in session at triat time, and to that degree the United Nations may be judged to have opnstituted a gressure on the combatants to lower their level of risk-taking.

2. Ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity

- a. The Chinese Communists and their Joviet ally on the one hand, and the United States and the Resublic of China on the other, were of course dismetrically opposed along the entire spectrum of social and political questions. This had great relevance to the crisis because the parties tended even to magnify these differences, and to see the crisis to some extent as a symbolic battle in a continuous ideologically based war. Furthermore, the two Chinasa protagonists eached wished to impose their own social and ideological systems on the other, rather than to defend a status quo.
- b. The internal situation in Communist China has been linked by some analysts to the decision to initiate the offshore islands probe. The regime had resolved negatively to the consequences of the liberalization campaign of 1957, and had instituted a severe crackdown at the barinning of 1958. An economic crisis which took share in 1957 "Was being attacked by radical economic policies dealered to retrieve a

_/Oran A. Young, The Folitics of Force (Frinceton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 153-157.

Denate Situation." In 1958, the Chinese scrapped the Soviet Denate / S. Zegozia, Th. Sina Server Conflict, 1956-1961, Zegoria, cited above, p. 67.

first five-year plan as a model, and replaced it with one which maximized the use of labor power, at the same time that they began to downgrade the importance of modern weaponry. This was the "great leap forward", and the first formal order to organize people's communes was issued on August 29, 1958. This turmoil may have been related to tension in the Taiwen Straits, in that (1)signs of this disturbance may have made the Antionalists hopeful that the time for the attempt to return to the mainland had arrived, and the CPC in its turn aware of the Nationalist bopes, and (2)"both the military buildup in Fukisa province and the "liberate Taiwan" campaign launched by the CPA during July 1958 seem to have been related at least partially to the goals of deterring the Nationalists and reducing internal tension within the CPA by providing an external distraction."

O. C. K. Yours, 11. Politics of force.

The simplistic explanation sometimes advanced that dictatorial governments tend to stir up international crises to distract their populations will not, Nowsver, fit the facts in this instance.

The "liberate Taiwan" carpaign of July 1958 was abruptly terminated, and between August 22, the day before the shelling began, and September 7, "The Chinese domestic press and radio avoided all reference to the ossiblity of nuclear war, to the use of nuclear weekens in the Tievan Strait crisis, or the United States nuclear

build-up there." Also, the radio broadcasts which attracted the

__/ Alice Langley Haish, Communist Thina's Strategy in the Muclear Era/ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), gardes

attention of the H.S. State Department and the Taiwan government

Denates - W. Since Secretion 4.24, 1956-1961,

//Zagoria, cited above, p.210; Morton Halberin and Tang Tsou, "The
1958 Quemoy Grisis," in Morton Malberin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations
and Arms Control (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 275-277;

O. Young, cited above, p. 126.

were from the coastal stations, xxxxxxxxx not Peking, and were simed at foreign consumption, chiefly on Quemoy, and not at the mainland population. Unquestionably some linkage between the domestic mainland situation in/Ohina and the offshore islands probe did exist, perhaps in the predominance at that time of the left wing in the COP. "It is not that the Communists deliberately create foreign policy crises in order to conceal domestic difficulties, but rather that the dynamics of Communism are such that internal convulsions accompanied by factional disputes are likely to be reflected in the foreign policy arena."

Dineid S Me Smo-Smort Conflict Fit Fibl, Zagoria, cited above, p. 72-75.

These facts, and the fact that the probe had direct relevance for foreign policy goals of the CFA, and that its timing can be explained in terms of events in the interpational arena, indicate that the probe was not undertaken for dimestic purposes; xxxxxx insofar as there was the linkage/ between/dema-tic situation on the mainland and concurrent foreign policy moves, it was most upobably to be found

3. Military technology

a. nuclear or conventional

The Soviet Union and the United States possessed nuclear weapons; the Chinese People's Republic and the Wationalist Chinese did not (although each was afraid the other wight have them, or receive them from their ally, in the course of the conflict.)

b. Other relevant dotails

The significance of particular weapons and military techniques employed during the crisis will be discussed below, in the analyses of the bargaining setting and the bargaining process.

- 4. Alliances and alignments
- a. In the system as a whole there was a complex alliance structure radiating from the centers of the two super-powers.

 For purposes of this crisis, there were two important alliances:
 The Sino-Soviet alliance on the one hand and the United States-Republic of China alliance on the other.
 - b. Nature and firmess of alliance commitments.
- 1. The Soviet Union and the Chinese Peole's Republic had Article I a mutual assistance treaty (signed Pebruary 1950). Pobligated the two signatories, if one were attacked by Japan or states allied with her, to render immediately "military and other assistance with all means at its disposal." Article IV provided for mutual consultation in regard to all important problems." The treaty had

[/] Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Toviet Relations (Stanford, Cal: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Feace, Stanford University, 1968), p. 69-70.

never been tested in a situation where Teling's national objectives were the chief matter at issue.

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In the 1958 Quemoy crisis it was of course applicable, since the United States was an ally of Japan. How firm the Soviet commitment to the treaty in fact proved to be has been a matter for Sinooviet controversy virtually ever since 1958.

2. Elliance relations between the United States and the Republic of China were governed by a mutual defense treaty signed 🤫 and ratified in the spring of 1955. in 1954; in the midst of the earlier offshore islands crisis. In the treaty, the two powers pledged separately and jointly to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities", and they agreed that an armed attack on either of them would endanger the peace and safety of the other. The treaty stated that for purposes of those articles defining mutual defense commitments (II and V) "the terms territorial' and 'territories' shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores." However, while limiting the/scope of the agreement as it stood, the treaty specifically provided that it could be extended to other areas by the consent of both sides. Shortly after the treaty was signed, Secretary Dulles and Nationalist Foreign Minister George K.C. Yeh published an exchange of letters in reference to the use of force under the terms of the treaty. They stated that "In view of the. . . fact that the use of force from either of the ereas | under Chinese Mationalist control by either party affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense." The treaty was intended to guarantee United States support for the security of the Mationalists, While at the same time committing them to a pleage not to attect the mainland unilaterally.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Gerden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p.465-456; A. Doak Barnett, Communist Chine and Asia: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Magazzaz Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960); p. 41-411.

The United States had a further commitment to assist its Chinese ally. Under the terms of the Joint Congressional Resolution of January 28, 1955, the President was "authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formose and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now held in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Pormosa and the Pescadores." President Eisenhower, who had requested this Congressional authorization, declared that the purpose was to make United States intentions clear to/mainland Chinese so as to avoid war by miscalchiation, to dispel doubts among other allies that the United States would be soting on constitutional grounds, and to bolster Nationalist morals. He did not want to defend Quemoy and Matsu per se, but "Chinase/propa ganda constantly proclaimed that their purpose was to capture Formosa; the offshore islands were only incidental in their plans."

[/] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandata for Change, cited above, p. 468.

To sum up, at the time of the 1958 crisis, the United States and was firmly committed to the defense of Taiwan, provisionally committed to the defense of the offshore islands. The Nationalists wave pleaged which is according to the defense of the offshore islands.

II Bargaining Setting

1. The parties to the orisis

There were four major actors in the Quemoy/MMIMIX The United States, the Republic of China, the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could be excluded from this count on the ground that it made no basic moves, only three primary communication moves and no bidding moves. All the wilitary and most of the diplomatic moves actually took place in the triangular arena occupied by the other three powers. However, the role of the Soviet Union as Communist China's chief ally and as the United States' chief antegorist in the cold war was fundamental.

2. Recent pravious relations between the parties.

a. United States

1. InvisiationxizxidexSaniatxUnium, United States -- Soviet relations in the summer of 1958 were warked by the tensions surrounding the crisis in Lebanon and the introduction of United States troops there. At the same time, however, in the field of disermament favorable developments/were being negotiated by the two powers. Between August, when the crisis began, and October, when it was concluded, they negotiated arrangements for another conference on nuclear testing, which opened in Geneva on October 31, and for a conference on the specific problem of surprise attack, which opened in Geneva on November 10. Also, the two powers in conjunction with Britain agreed to a tacit moratorium on nuclear testing on October 31, and first signs of interest in coordinating the peaceful uses of outer speace appeared in the fall of 1958.

[/] Oran/Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p. 75.

"The alliance relationships between each Chinese participant and its superpower ally were far from monolithic so that the crisis never became a direct contest between two well-coordinated adversaries. Moreover, as the crisis unfolded, new ambiguities arose owing to the development of a triangular pattern of interaction involving the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese People's Republic, and the United States, a pattern superimposed on the continuing bilateral aspects of the confrontation."

Oran R. Young, the Politics of Force, cited above, p. 56.

2. The middle of 1958 was an "uncertain" period in Eding - Valler, and relations. The Ambassadorial Talks held in Geneva since 1955 had ended in acrimony in December 1957, the United States failing to appoint a new ambassador when Ambassador Johnson was transferred. Peking was angered by the evident decline in American interest in the talks, and "There followed during the first half of 1958 a series of exchanges about the continuation of the meetings that in fact resulted only in acrimonious disagreements." These culminated in a Chinese demand, on

_/ Ibid., p. 74.

June 30, that the United States appoint an ambassador within two weeks. The United States decided to reopen the talks but to ignore the ultimatum, and did not act until July 20. The Chinase then ignored the American overtures. It has been suggested that "One way to

[/] Remneth T. Yours, Nagotisting with the Chinese Communists: The United States Enserience, 1955-1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. for the Council on Porcian Relations, 1968), p.139-140.

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interpret the whole Quemoy crisis is in terms of the Communist aspiration to have these conversations continued." While this appears a gross over-weighting of

/ Charles McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, No. 3 (September 1962), p. 208.

this factor, the Peking government was undoubtedly hoping to go to re-opened negotiations in a stronger bargaining position than formerly as a result of a victory in the Straits.

3.United States relations with the Nationalist Chinese in 1958 had been close and friendly. In fact, the United States had upped the level of military supplies to Taiwan, so that it began to look in 1958 immixims as though the Nationalists, perhaps as a result of pressures exerted on the United States the privious year, were acquiring for the first time the ability to invade the mainland in force.

In May 1957, the United States and the Nationalists had signed an agreement for the emplacement on Taiwan of Matador missiles, surface-to-surface missiles with a range of about six hindred miles and capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads. By 1958 the "Forward Look," as it was called, reflected the greatly expanded American program of military aid to the Mationalists.

[/] Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1906), p. 257. 266-266

b. Soviet Union



- 1. Soviet-American relations are described above.
- 2. The Soviets had no relations with the Nationalist Chinese, whom they did not recognize.
- 3. Relations between Moscow and Peking during the year preceding the outbreak of the conflict were complicated. They had not, however, reached the point of public dissent.

c. Peking

- 1. Sino-Soviet relations are described above.
- 2. Peking's relations with the United States are described above.
- 3. Peking's relations with the Nationalists during 1958 were of course hostile. Feking/did not recognize Chiang's government, and repeatedly declared its intention to eventually relative. Formoss needs were government to eventually relative. Formoss needs were used to the mainland Chinese made various conciliatory evertures toward the Nationalists, such as offers of amnestyfor anyone who returned to the mainland; "the only criticisms he Chou made were of the U.S., not the Kuomintang . . . Similar invitations, friendly remerks about Chiang Kaishek, and perhaps specific unpublished proposels to the Kuomintang, continued into 1957." The Peking hoped to play

_/ For more detail, see above, Nature and firmness of alliance commitments, and below, relative military capabilities.

_/ Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, cited above.p. 264.

on Nationalist fears that the United States might make a deal/to their disadvantage, or fail to back them in some other way. There is no reason to believe that the Nationalists were seriously tempted, and in any case the ascendancy of the left wing in the mainland government during 1957-1958 made the atmosphere uncromising, but

the overtures to the Nationalists continued, anyway. In 1958, may have Peking/considered that in the light of the military build-up on Taiwan it was in some danger of M Nationalist attack; perhaps supported by American tactical nuclear warheads. Furthermore, the situation was "especially disturbing because it was known that the CPR was trying to develop nuclear weapons, which when acquired would make a Nationalist landing virtually impossible, but that it had not yet developed them. During this transitional period, the Nationalists' incentive to attack would be at a maximum."

- Nationalist China's relations with the three other powers are described above.

3. The conflict of interest which underlies the crisis.

The underlying conflict of interest in the crisis was, broadly speaking, the general "cold war" conflict of interest. The Communist bloc wanted to minimize American cower in the Western Pacific, while the United States wanted to maximize it. The Nationalists and the Peking government, in addition, were in conflict over control of Formosa, and in the Nationalist view, of the mainland. The struggle for control of China was perceived by all parties to be part of the contest larger bloc/straggle as well as a struggle in its own right.

4. What precipitated the crisis

a. A deliberate challenge; Fewing attempted to interdict the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, controlled by the Nationalists.

5. The immediate issue of the orisis

The immediate issue was control of the offshore islands.

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 265-266.

d. Nationalist China

6. The parties' relative valuation of the stakes at issue and the content of the Stakes.

4-1.

The two Chinese parties valued the immediate stakes much more highly then either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Of the two, the Nationalists' valuation was the higher; they had stationed one third of their ground effectives (about 100,000 men) on Quemoy and Matsu, and their loss would have had very serious consequences. To the Peking government, the islands were a thorn in their side, a constant reminder of their inability to defeat the Nationalists and a potential steppingstone to conquest of Formosa. However, they were better able to tolerate the Nationalist presence on the offshore islands than the Nationalists were able to tolerate the prospect of thier loss (after they had garrisoned them so heavily).

The superpowers had a somewhat different perspective on the stakes. (1) The United States did not consider the offshore islands to be of inherent strategic importance, and had counselled against the Nationalist troop build-up saxiham there. However, the United States was heavily committed to the defense of Formosa, through treaty, through perceived national interest and through having invested since 1949 about a billion dollars/in its economic and military strength.

_/ Tang Tsou, "The Queway Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States," <u>Western Political Quarterly</u>, XII, No. 4 (December 1959), p. 1082.

Also, the United States perceived the bombardment of the islands as possibly a Moscow-inspired test of Western resolve, and placed a high value on its own general image of resolve in the eyes of its communit opponents.

15.

(2) The Boviet Union, contrary to Washington's suspicions, most probably did not see much to gain in the situation. Relative to Peking's aspirations vis-a-vis Formosa, there was certainly no direct Soviet national interest, and furthermore the relations between the two powers were already sufficiently uneasy so that a growth in Chinese strength might not have appeared to be a gain for the Boviet Union. "The Boviet attitude toward the GpP.R.'s proclaimed objective of seizing the offshore islands and liberating Taiwan is a study in half-heartedness," Relative to the bi-polar struggle, the Boviets

[/] John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., 3ino-Toviet Military Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 132.

of course realized that a weak United States response would be a gain for the Communist bloc. Namewore The Soviet Union valued its image of resolve in the on-going struggle as highly as did the United States.

have been and if would/be primarily for this reasons that they encouraged the probe, or sequiesced in it, if they did so.

8. The sparties i relative inititary capabilities

3. Military termology

a. Muclear, or conventional.

A. The Soviet Union had advanced nuclear weaponry. The CPR did not have nuclear weapons of its own as yet. This fact was of considerable importance in the crisis. At the time of the November, 1957 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, the Chinese Communists "appear to have had high hopes of acquiring Soviet nuclear weapons assistance. These hopes were dashed in early 1958, at the very time that the Chinese were becoming acutely uneasy over the Soviet Union's sudden interest in exploring ways to lassen military tentions with the West."

_/ Harold P. Ford, "The Ernoption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60," Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Frederick A. Præger, 1966), p. 100.

In January 1958, the CPA proclaimed a new military training program, explicitly based on modern technology as learned from the Soviets, but another this program was not heard of again, and in April 1958/x new line was proclaimed, this time emphasizing that men are what count, not weapons, that Mao's guerilla was strategy was still the best military guide, and that it was "despicable" to rely on foreign countries.

In November 1957 an agreement with respect to "new technology for national defense" had been concluded between the Boviet Union and the OFR. While the crecise terms of this agreement have not been made nuclic,

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it appoints that the Chinese pressed for and got a substantial increase in the level of Soviet aid for their nuclear program. The Chinese, also they evidently requested the 'ransfer of finished nuclear weapons as a stopgap measure."

To rever, the Soviets were not prepared to give

_/ Harold C. Finton, "The Chinese Attitude," in Sino-Roviet Relations and Arms Control, cited above, p. 252x192x 177.

the Chinese actual nuclear weapons without retaining control over their disposition and use. They appear to have been torn between wanting to improve relationsixix with China and wanting to forestall Chinese nuclear development, or at any rate to retain as much control as possible over it. Thakkakiakiak hen the Chinese asked for finished nuclear

_/ Raywond L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Militery Relations, 1945--66," in Sino-Soviet Military Relations, cited above, p. 29.

weapons, the Soviets "evidently cosed as a precondition a counterdemand for the virtual integration of the Chinese armed forces with those of the Soviet Union under a relationship of the Warsaw Pact veriety, with the Soviet Union in effective control. The Chinese rejected this arrangement and gave up their demand for finished nuclear weapons, evidently in the apring of 1958,"

These demands and counter-offers

C. Communicist (Communicist)

C. Farold/Hinton, cited above, p. 177.

sopear to have taken class over a period of several months, between November 1957 and April 1958, with the Soviets preducily clarifying the degree of cotrol they would require if nuclear weapons were the bedselved on Chinese soil, and the Chinese conducting an internal debate

"It appears that he agreement led to Soviet assistance in the development of an indicenous Chinese weapon production capability and was related to Soviet aid to an indigenous Chinese capability for the production of missiles, as well parhaps as submarines and other delivery systems. . Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear program appears

to have continued until mid-1960 and resulted in substantial assistance to the construction of ax gaseous diffusion plant and several reactors, as well as the beginning of a missile production capability."

_/ Norton F. Halperin, "Sino-Rovist Nuclear Felations, 1957-1960," in Sino-Roviet Relations and Arms Control, cited above, p. 121.

on whether or not to accede to the Poviet demands for control in order to obtain the weapons. In the event, the GPC faction led by Mao, which won the debate, opposed accepting the Poviet controls, and the processals were rejected as "unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Poviet military control. In January 1958,

—— "Simo-Seriet Auction Relations, 1957-1960,"

—— Morton Halparin, cited above, p.130-131.

____ "Same Source Military Rolations, 1995-66,"
_/ Raymond Garthoff, cited above, p.90.

Between May and July, 1958, there was a critical debate between those elements in the CFR Army omaning for rapid development of Chinase nuclear capacity, a modern air force and so forth, and those agreeing with Map that/(1)it would be necessary to develop a solid infrastructura first, and (2) nuclear technology was not all-important, that "People's hearts, not technology, in the final analysis, decide victory or defeat in war."

D. 45 Zagoria, cited above, p. 191.

The outdome of the debate appears to have been a decision to bush economic development as rapidly as possible, and until it reached the necessary level not to allocate resources to a modern weapons race. Thus, for some years to come, "China would have little choice but to rely on Soviet deterrent power and to seek its goals in limited ventures that would not risk a massive nuclear response from the United States."

/ Ibid., p. 194.

By the summer of 1958, when the decision to make the offshore islands probe was taken, it was clear to the Soviets and the Crinese Communists that although they had a mutual defense treaty, they were ______aLoue____/ See below, p:000 Z-G

not able to agree on the terms and arrangements for bilateral military cooperation. "The critical question in Mao's mind must have been to what extent he could exploit Soviet deterrent power in his own behalf without Moscow's balking at some critical point," While "The Russians The Soviet Soviet, Conflict, 1956-1961,

Zagoria, cited above, p. 194

would. . . be more than usually sensitive about their ability or inability to control China's actions."

_/ Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Attitude," in Max Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, cited above, p. 214.

May also have calculated that Moscow might after all supply him for use by his own forces with tactical nuclears/in the course of the crisis. There were reports in the Polish press in August 1958 to the effect that Khrushchev had agreed to grant China atomic weapons and missiles. These reports, which are believed to have been planted by the have been Chinase and to/bs without foundation in fact, "succeeded in introducing an incalculable factor and another element of uncertainty into the situation." In fact, the Soviets seem to have given

Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, cited above, p. 123.

_/ Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, cited above, p. 208.

their ally minimal military assistance even of a conventional sort. Peking was The Chinese were dependent on the Soviets for jet fuel to fly their MIGs, and "it may have been unable to engage in large numbers of sorties during the crisis because of Soviet witholding of the necessary supplies."

_/ John. R. Thomas, "The Liwits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 121.

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did not have nuclear weapons, but they are named at the notes of the nationalist Chinese/were well provided with modern are named by their United States allies. They did not have nuclear weapons. Their air force, which was very well trained, was supplied with F-86 Sabrejets, and during the conflict the United States supplied Sidewinder missiles for the F-86's which were employed in an important air victory over the Teking forces. At first the Nationalist naval forces were not able to run the blockade of the offshore islands, but with United States methods and equipment they were eventually able to land unload supplies successfully.

In this operation, the LST's (landing ship, tank) would stop some distance off the Quemoy beach and the LVT's (amphibious tractors) on board, already loaded with supplies, would be launched and would go ashore. The LST's then would steam rapidly out of artillery range. The small size of the amphibious tractors, the use of different landing areas, and the different pattern of movement of the LVT's on different occasions nullified the effectiveness of the artillery bombardment. The convoy and the "small ship operation" conducted by the American Navy inhibited the use of torpedo boats by the Communists. The use of the Sidewinder missiles gave decisive superiority to the Nationalist air force which consequently was able to prevent Communist planes from strafing the landing crafts and also was able to make airdrops of supplies.

_/ Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles (Salt Lake City, Utah: Institute of International Affairs, University of Utah Press, 1959), p. 31.

In addition, towards the end of the crisis the United States placed 8" howitzers capable of firing tactical nuclears on the Quemov. offsharaxiskandar No nuclear shells were given to the Nationalists, but the emplacement of these howitzers on Quemoy "served as a further guarantee that Quemoy could not be effectively blockeded

in so far as artillery ammunition was concerned and could not be taken by amphibious assault, if the United States should decide to defend it by the use of tactical nuclear weapons."

/ Ibid., p. 31-32.

And nuclear weapons. In the area, the 7th Fleet, already the world's largest, was considerably strengthened during the course of the conflict. With "startling speed and decisiveness", the United States took actions that "were ultimately to make the Seventh Fleet the most powerful air-naval striking force in history," Before September

[/] Oran Young, The Folitios of Force, cited above, p. 188.

^{1,} President Eisenhower had ordered the Fleet positioned for a quick response to an attack on Formosa, had raised its carrier strength from 2 to +, placed all United States forces in the area on "readiness alert," and augmented the number of destroyers patrolling the Strait, as well as the United States Air Defense forces on Formosa, and the United States forces directed to be ready to escort Nationalist Chinese resup ly vessels to the minkn islands. As the orisis con-

tinued, so did the United States military build-up. "U.S. get fighters with instructions to fire at Communist sironaft escorted Nationalist transport planes in their first sir-dropping of supplies to Quemoy; U.S. technicians rushed completion of missile sites on Taiwan;

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reinforcements raised the U.S. Seventh Fleet strength to six carriers, three heavy cruisers, and forty destroyers in the Strait."

J Donald Zagoria, cited above, p. 215.

It was obvious during the crisis that the United States had the capability to use factical nuclear weapons if it so chose.

"American contingency plans for strikes at Chinese air bases (with low-yeald nuclear weapons) were carefully drawn to avoid civilian centers, but the United States was apparently willing to risk a war with the entire Soviet bloc if no way other than air attack could be found to protect Quemoy."

"the American government proceeded to formulate a series of relatively explicit contingency plans calling for responses to various possible Chinese Communist initiatives based on overt military actions."

President Eisenhower concluded that if the United States

/ Oran Young, The Politics of Porce, cited above, p. 188.

did intervens with major military force, it would have to get a victory, and to get it might have to use "small-yield atomic weapons against hostile wirfields", for the enemy bombers could attack all Nationalist targets, and "This immense geographical advantage, extremely difficult if not immensible to eliminate with conventional weapons, would have to be offset by our sheer power."

_/ George H. Quester, "The American Attitude," in Morton Habberin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, cited above, p.251.

[/] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Yeping Penon. 1856-1951. (Carden City, You York: Doubloday & Co., 1865), p. 295, 691-695.

To sum up, the United States and the Nationalist Chinese had a higher military capability than the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese. The Soviet Union and the United States & Adx shared the Peking's view that the overall strategic balance favored the Communist bloc; and in addition, the SovietsUnion were was conscious of United States military superiority in the actual region of the conflict. They/thussht the United States might choose to use tactical nuclears in the Straits, and they were not sure they had the strategic capability to deter that, even if they should choose to try. They knew the United States was seriously afraid it could not stave off a large-scale assault on the islands with conventional power, and "in the face of a heavy nuclear build-up, Soviet commentators scoffed at claims that the U.S. was deploying power necessary only for the defense of the offshore islands." The Sovietsstressed the magnitude of U.S. nuclear power, and the lack of matching conventional power in the particular area, for they "could not discount the possibility that the United States might act 'irrationally' by whow allowing military advantages to override political considerations."

_/ John R. Thomas, The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 121-122.

9. The parties' relative fear of war

a. The Nationalists appear not to have feared war at all, but to have welcomed the prospect. "In Chiang's calculations, his oft-proclaimed determination to return to the mainland would become a reality if the United States could be embroiled in a war with Communist China . . . He would confront the United State with the dilemna of either defending these islands by attacking the gun positions on the mainland believed to be nacessary or risking the loss of Formosa." Hence, the garrisoning of the offshere islands

_/ Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States," cited above, p. 1077-1079.

after the passage of the Joint Congressional Resolution on 1955

 \angle See above, p.8 ms. \angle 8.

and hence Chiang's repeated requests for permission to bombs the mainland.

b. The Chinese Communists also seem not to have feared war. They expected to be able to win the offshore islands in a military struggle with the Nationalists if the United States stood aside, and they believed that if the United States decided to attack the mainland the Soviet nuclear deterrent and world opinion would hold them back. Also, as the instinators, they knew they could retain some control over the level of violence by exercising the option of retreat.

- c. The United States feared war, although not to the same degree as
- d. The Soviet Union, which automissing on several occasions referred used to the dengars of secalation in the nuclear age, and which/book so range basic moves tending to increase the danger of war. This might not reflect a greater foor of war so such as a leaser national

interest in the outcome. Certailly both superpowers feared war did more than/the Chinese pressure powers.

10. Pre-crisis co-mitments

a. The Nationalists, by garrisoning the offshore islands with one-third of their ground forces, had committed themselves to holding the islands in a bridge-burning tactic that made the This tactic commitment highly credible. At also led, under the terms of the Joint Resolution, to an indirect and not fully explicit or unconditional but nonetheless important United States commitment to defend the offshore islands. "The treaty [of 1954] and the resolution turned out to be links in the chain with which Chiang dragged the United States toward a contest of strength with Communist China."

bloc, and in addition had a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union.

_/ Tang Tsqu, "The Quemoy Imbroglio," cited above, p. 1075-1076.

b. The United States, besides its commitments to the Nationalists, was committed to the defense of the entire "free world." It had alliance commitments in the Pacific (STATO, the tresty with Japan), and believed a failure to back up the Nationalists would have an with its Asian allies. adverse effect on its image of resolve and reliability, However, United States alliance commitments in Europe proved to be an offesting factor, since as the crisis developed there was little support in NATO countries for United States policy in the Straits. Thus the United States had to belance these various commitments. had verbelly itself c. The Peking povernment/www committed/xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx the eventual conquest of Formosa. Feking was of course a member of the communist

[/] See above, n. 000. 7-3

d. The Soviet Union, in a remainment parallel to remained the in a general way United States, position, was committed to the defense of the defense entire communist bloc, and Its/treaty with Pering was margarage a mutual commitment, but one of greater usefulness to Peking, as the weaker power; there was the possibility that Peking, in an encounter with the United States, might invoke the pact in a situation in which the Russians, considering their own self-interest, might not be willing to consider the pact operative. Yet, they

could not very well renege on the treaty without serious consequences for the alliance relationship.

11. Asymmetries between the parties

an advantage which Peking counted heavily upon.

a. Geographically, the crisis point was on Peking's doorstep, and

It was about 100 miles from Formosa, over water, and several thousand miles from the United States. The Soviet Union was also at a considerable distance, although not as great as the United States.

b. In terms of military capabilities, the United States and Nationalists combined had a definite superiority to the Peking forces in the area of the crisis point. The Nationalists proved to have air superiority in the Straits (although this was not definitely established before the crisis begain). In terms of available tectical nuclear weaponry, the advantage also lay with the Western allies, since Foking had none before the crisis began (nor did it acquire any). In terms of overall strategic power, including the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union, the two sides were fairly well balances.

John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 119.

11-21

c. The immediate stakes—the offshore islands—were/more valuable to the two Chinese opponents than they were to their respective allies.

nor) they the islands themselves very much, but Neither the Soviet Union/www. United States byth valued/the_international they both valued the international position and general strength of their respective Chinese allies, and did not wish to see them lose badly in a struggle which they considered important.

In addition, the Nationalists held that their very survival/was at stake, an argument that gained credibility from the presence of the very large Nationalist garrisons on the islands; the Peking government, on the other hand, did not tie its continued existence to conquest of the offshore islands.

d. In the event, the Nationalists received material as well as moral support from their United States ally, which while Peking received only moral support from the Soviet Union.

- 12. Initial "images" and " perceptions"
 - a. Paking
- (1) Peking's image of the Soviet Union was ambiguous. On the ohomed.
 (1) immediate interests and ultimate goals
 - (a) Relative to the Metionalists, Peking believed that the Nationalists had an immediate interest in maximizing the strength of their military posture in general, and on the offshore islands in particular, with the ultimate goal of trying to reconquer the mainland, with United States help. They believed Paking would try to involve the United States if war broke out.
 - (b) Relative to the United States, Peking believed that the United States had an immediate interest in strengthing Formosa and an ultimate goal of topoling the Communist

regime on the Chinese mainland mix through the vehicle of the Kuomintang.

(c) Relative to the Bovist Union, it is somewhat difficult to estimate Peking's perceptions of interests and goals at that time. Peking was suspicious of what it perceived as any Soviet efforts to dominate it, and suspicious of Soviet efforts to reach a detente with the West, which it feared wight prove to be at Peking's expense. At the same time and long-term Peking recognized that the Soviet Union had an immediate interest in preserving the Sino-Soviet alliance as part of the machinery of the communist bloc, and believed that it shared with the Soviet Union generalized long-range goals vis-a-vis the Western powers.

(2)intentions

(a)Relative to the Nationalists, Peking believed that the Nationalists would try to supply the islands even under bombardment, and would try to involve the United States. It is not possible to estimate to what degree fear of a Nationalist intention to attack the mainland may have prevailed in Peking in 1958.

_/ See above, previous relations between the parties, pp/ 12-13.

⁽b) Faking did not think it likely that the United States would make a vigorous response to a probe involving only the offshore islands.

in the summer of 1958 (c) Feking a haliefs about Soviet intentions/wh remain obscure. It is a matter for conjecture whether they counted on the Soviet diplomatic support in various contingencies which they acutally received whether

they believed Soviet intentions were to support them much more firmly than in the event they actually did, a deliberate or whether a testing of Soviet intentions was/part of the purpose of the probe.

(3) military capabilities

- (a) Paking probably parceived the Nationalists as even better armed than in fact they were. Paking may have been uncertain as to whether the United States had or had not given the Nationalists discretion in the use of tactical nuclears.
- (b) Peking must have perceived the very great United States military capability in the area of the Straits. However Peking believed that the United States was second to the Soviet Union in overall strategic power.
 - (c) Peking believed the Soviet Union had the greatest general strategic power in the world. Peking certainly believed the Soviet Union had the capability to back up their the proba if they so chose.

(4) fear of war

- (a) Peking probab'y perceived that the Nationalists did not fear war if they had United States support.
- (b) Paking believed that the United States would fear involvement in a general war, if seriously challenged.
- (c) Peking knew the Soviets feared general war but believed they were operating unders mistaken conception of the global strategic balance.

(5)degree of "resolve"

- (a) Feking perceived the Nationalists on Formosa as having a high degree of resolve. Fowever, they evidently believed the resolve of the <u>island gerrisons</u> would not withstand prolonged isolation.
 - (b) Peking believed that United States resolve was lower, in general and in relation to the Nationalists and the China question, than it actually was.
- (c) Peking's/ARREMENT of the Boviet Union's resolve, before the crisis began, is difficult to estimate precisely; it is part of the whole rather shrouded question of Sino-Boviet relations at that time. Feking may have believed that the Boviet Union's resolve was lower than it should have been, based on the Boviet performance in Middle Eastern crisis of summer 1958, and that success in the Straits probe would raise it once more.

b. Nationalist China

- (1) immediate interests and ultimate goals
 - (a) The Nationalists perceived the mainland Chinese as having an immediate interest in obtaining the offshore islands, and an ultimate interest in conquenting Formosa and bringing it under their control.
 - (b) The Nationalists' image of the United States interests and goels was probably a complex one. They probably perceived the United States as having more immediate interest in preserving the status quo in the Straits themselves (whereas they/would have preferred to upset it in their own favor). By garrisoning the offshore islands so heavily, and thus tying their own fate to them as closely

as possible, they had done all they could to identify the United States' immediate interests with their own. It is difficult to say to what degree the Nationalists' perceptions of the United States' long-range goals with respect to China were warped, by either by wishful thinking or undue apprepension.

(c)Data on Nationalist perceptions of Soviet interests and goals at that particular point are not available, but in general they tended to perceive the Soviet Union as a staunch supporter of their enemy in Peking, in reference to particular issues, and as bent on world domination in general.

(2)intentions

(a) What the Nationalists really thought Peking intended to do is difficult to determine from their official statements.

According to one source, "The Chinese Nationalists them-selves did not believe an invasion was imminent,"

_/ Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," cited above, p. 341.

but in their communications to the United States they declared themselves to be critically threatened. By the end of August, Chiang was winting frantically to Fresident Eisenhower, who was "puzzled by much of what he wrote,", since he himself believed the existing defense arrangements satisfactory. However, Shiang wanted a categorical statement that the United States would defend Quemoy and Matsu with full military power, would provide convoys all

the way to the beaches, would give the commander of the Taiwan Defense Command authority to employ United States forces to defeat any Communist attack without prior reference to Washington. "Much of the information on which he based his apprehensions differed markedly from that provided by our intelligence services," noted President Eisenhower. Some of this apprehension may

have been real, some of it was undoubtedly feigned.

- (b) That the Nationalists were not certain of United States intentions is evident from the pressure they continually put on Washington to make more categorical policy declarations. However, they had enough confidence in their image of the United States as dependable protector to stand firm in the initial stages of the crisis.
- (c) It is not known what image the Nationalists held of Soviet intentions in this particular crisis.

(3) Military capabilities

- (a) The Nationalists knew that Peking had the capability to interdict the offshore islands, xxxxxxxxx least temporarily. Whether they knew or did not know that xxxxxx did not have nuclear weapons is not certain; most probably they doubted it but could not be sure.
- (b) The Nationalists knew that the United States had very grant military capabilities, in general and in the Straits.
- (c) The Nationalist view of Soviet military power was probably that it was very great, but second in general to that of the United States and not present locally at All.

[/] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1956--1961, cited above, p.298

(4) Fear of war

- (a) The Nationalist image of Peking's fear of war is hard to establish. It seems probable that they realized that Peking was not afraid of a war just with them, since they had been fighting off and on for years. They may have realized that Peking would back off from a direct military confrontation with the United States, out of gear of the costs.
- (b) The United States seemed to the Nationalists to be unduly anxious about the consequences of actual engagements with the Peking forces.
- (c) It is not known what image the Nationalists held of the Soviet fear of war.

_ (5)Degree of "resolve"

- (a) The Nationalists no doubt perceived Peking was having a high degree of resolve, in relation to themselves.
- (b) The Nationalists were / afraid that United States resolve would not be high enough. (See above, Intentions)
- (c) It is not known what image the Nationalists held of the Soviet degree of "resolve."

c.United States

- (1) Immediate interests and ultimate goals
 - (a) The United States believed that Pering's immediate interest—

 closely

 the fall of the offshore islands—was/linked to its

 defeat of Chiang and the

 ultimate goal, the/conquest of Formosa. The United

 States further believed that Peking wished to push it

 out of the Western Pacific and Asia cutiraly.
 - (b) The Soviet Union was perceived by the United States

-11-28 35.

as having/zhm immediate interest in Peking's expansion in Asia and the ultimate goal of world domination.

The United States did not perceive Soviet and Chinese Communist interests as divergent in any way at this point.

(c) The United States image of Chinng's immediate interest

Was that he wanted to preserve the status quo in the

Straits; his ultimate goal was believed to be reconquest

of the mainland.

(2)Intentions

[/] While official American policy was not based on the assumption that Chiang had an interest in trying to involve the United States with the Chinese Communists, there were influential Americans (Walter Lippman, Dean Acheson) who were suspicious of this even in the early stage of the crisis. Acheson stated that Chiang's intention was "to embroil the United States with his enemies the /Chinese/ Communists," (New York Times, September 7, 1958), and Welter Lippman said that if Chiang were given permission to carry out air strikes against the mainland gun MARMA positions, the United States would have to finish the job for him. (New York Herald Tribune, September 23, 1958). This disagreement about China policy was a prominent feature of the crisis.

⁽a) The United States image of Peking's intentions was not a clear one. The United States appeared to believe that Peking had misjudged <u>United States</u> intentions, and was planning some risky moves on that besis. The United States appeared also to believe that Peking's intentions would alter, and lead to more cautious behavior in various contingencies, if the United States could alter the Peking's image of <u>United States</u> resolve.

⁽b) The United States was worried about Soviet intentions.

Which it saw as closely linked to Feking's. The United

States was afrigd Peking might have initiated the probe

at Soviet behest, and that the Soviets might give

Peking strong military support if it appeared to need it.

(c) The United States knew that Nationalist intentions included the possibility of air strikes at the mainland,
The
if the United States gave permission. / Nationalist intention
to stand firm and fight it out, whatever the evicumstances,
was perceived by the United States.

(3)Military capabilities

- (a) The United States perceived Peking's military capability

 However, the
 as vestly inferior to its own. / The United States may
 have feared them that the Chinese Communists had covertly
 acquired tactical nuclear weaponry for use in the Straits;
 and despite its sense of military superiority, the United
 States realized Peking would be a formidable enemy in a
 land war. The United States also perceived that Peking's
 military capabilities in the crisis were greatly
 heightened by the geographical location of the crisis point.
- (b) In 1958, the year following Sputnik and the Soviet acquisition of the ICPM, the United States perceived Soviet military capabilities as very high, although not so high as its own, either in general or in the area of the Straits.
- (c)The United States had an accurate perception of Nationalist military capabilities, for which it was largely responsible.

(4) Fear of war

(a) The United States perceived Peking as being unrealistically unafriga of war, possibly eager for it.

- (b) The United States image of Soviet fear of war was that the Soviets were afraid of large-scale war, but not too afraid to take some chances in local situations.
- (c) The Nationalists were perceived by the United States as not afraid of war.

(5)Degree of "resolve"

- (a) The United States believed that Peking had a high degree of resolve, but that it could be altered by United States policy changing Peking's perceptions of United States intentions.
 - (b) Soviet "resolve" was a complex question for the United States. In relation to this particular crisis, the United States initially perceived Soviet Resolve as substantially higher than it subsequently proved to be.
 - (c) The United States perceived that the $^{
 m N}$ ationalists had a high degree of resolve, particularly in relation to this crisis.

d.Soviet Union (Data generally hard to obtain)

- (1) Immediate interests and ultimate goals
 - (a) The Soviet Union appeared to perceive that the United States had an immediate interest in supporting its Chinese ally; the ultimate goal of the United States was perceived as maximum power in the Pacific and Asia.
 - (b) The Soviet Union probably perceived that the Nationalists had an immediate interest in holding on to the offshore islands, with the ultimate goal of return to the mainland.
 - (e) The Soviet Union undoubtedly was privy to Peking's thinking, and perceived that Peking's immediate interest was to try to take the offshore islands, in the process

testing United States intentions and resolve, while Peking's long-term goal was conquest of Formosa.

(2)Intentions

- (a) The Soviet Union appeared to perceive that United States intentions were to support its ally with whatever assistance became necessary. It is doubtful whether the Soviets believed the United States intended to purposefully use to crisis as a casus belli was with Peking, but they probably believed the United States would attack the mainland if it appeared necessary to save the offshore islands.
- (b) Soviet estimates of Nationalist intentions are somewhat obscure; the Soviets evidently perceived that Nationalist intentions included the aim of involving the United States with Peking, if possible, for Soviet sources claimed at one point that Chiang was planning to use planes with Chinese Communist markings to bomb United States ships.

[/] John R. Thomas, "The Limit's of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 136-137.

⁽c) The Soviets perceived that the Ent Chinese Communists had flexible intentions, did not wish a major confrontation with the United States and would back off if faced with firm opposition. They probably also were aware of them 2 Peking's intention to test them as an ally, as well.

They were afried the United States might choose to use tactical nuclears in the Straits, and they stressed the magnitude of United States nuclear power and the absence of matching conventional power.

(3) Military capabilities

(a) The Soviet Union perceived that the United States had overall military superiority. They were also aware of the great concentration of American strength in the area of the Straits.

1 Ibid, P.121.

- (b)Data is not available on/Soviet image of Nationalist military capability, but they most probably had a fairly accurate image.
- (c) The Soviets were well informed on Peking's military capabilities. Unlike Feking's opponents, they could be sure that Peking had no nuclear weapons. They knew that Peking had strong ground forces but a weak air force and navy.

(4)Fear of war

(a) The Soviets, following the crisis in Lebanon in the summer of 1958, may have perceived the United States as insufficiently afraid of war. While they probably thought the United States would act "rationally," following Lebanon the Soviets "could not discount the possibility that the United States might act "irrationally' by allowing military adventages to override political considerations."

/ Ibid.,=p.=121.

- (b) The Soviets probably perceived that the "ationalists did not fear war, parvided they had United States support.
- (c) The Soviets were eware that the Chinsse Communists believed the time was ripe for adventurous moves,

and that in general their fear of war was low. (5)Degree of "resolve"

- (a) The Soviets perceived that the United States degree of resolve was high, since it believed its general reputation for resolve was at stake.
- (2) Péking's resolve was perceived by the Soviets as relative to the force with which its probe was countered.
- (b) The Boviets undoubtedly perceived that the "atjoualists whad a high degree of resolve.

III. The Bargaining Process

The Quemoy crisis of 1958 began on August 23, When the Chinese Communists began heavy shelling of Quemoy and Mateu from shore batteries. They had built a complex of military airfields in Fukien province, so that it was possible for them to launch air attacks against Formosa as well as the offshore islands, and they had exconstructed extensive artillery emplacements almost ringing Quemoy. On August 23, they fired 20,000 rounds, and from them on

/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956--1961, cited above,p. 293.

continued to fire about 8,000 rounds a day.

/ Ibid., p.296.

_ Wha -I.-Considerations and Pressures Producing the Move

When Paking initiated the crisis, its motives were chiefly in relation to the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, but there were considerations relating to its ally the Soviet Union, to its enemy the United States and to the international situation at the time.

A. In relation to the United States:

- 1. Paking sought the removal of United States influence from the Western Pacific.
- 2. Weking sought to test the firmness of the United States' contituent to the Nationalist Chinese, "gain in relation to its view that at that time the Communist Bloc was more powerful than the Western Bloc in a global-strategic sense. Peking believed that the United States would place a low value on the offshore islands, and a high nagative cost of war, and that therefore the United States would have a low Critical

Duldence for

Risk; the probability of an active United States response,/

B) In relation to the Mationalist Chinese:

1. Peking sought, ultimately, the defeat of Chiang and the control of Taiwan.

The intensification of the bombardment of Quemoy and other offshore islands was a well-prepared move with a strictly limited combat objective—to impose a tight blockade of Quemoy leading to a surrender of the Nationalist garrison or its annihilation by a final assault. Obviously, the whole operation was planned on the assumption that the blockade could not be broken without the bombardment of the Communist gun emplacements by American forces. _/

_/ Tsou, Tang, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles Salt Lake City, Utah: Institute of International Affairs, University of Utah Press, 1959, p. 14.

- 3. The Nationalists' calculations were also that their greatest utility would result from standing firm. This was because:
 - a. Their costs from complying would be very high
 - b. On the basis of United States support, of which they unlike Peking were quite confident, they also expected

a military victory.

4. Thus each Chinese opponent was convinced that he stood to gain most, and the opponent to lose most, by standing firm

and fighting it out. This in fact was what they attempted to do.

C. In relation to the Soviet Union:

- 1. Peking had been disappointed not to receive more direct nuclear assistance from the Soveit Union, realized it would have to achieve its national objectives without a truly modern military force for some years to come, and wanted to test the value of the Soviet nuclear umbrella in a venture related to its own national interests rather than to those of the Soviet Union or of the bloc in general.
- 2. Peking believed that following the success of Sputnik and the Soviet acquisition of ICBMs, the Communist bloc held the balance of force. Peking may have wished to prove the validity of its theory that Khrushchev had been following too conciliatory a policy, notably in the Middle Eastern crisis of summer 1958,

whereas the time was actually propitious for aggressive probes.

3. Whether the Soviet Union opposed or supported the bombardment probe, and to what extent, is an unanswered question. On July 31, Khrushchev came to Peking for a three-day conference during which the plans for the probe, the reasons for it, and its relation to the current world situation, were most probably discussed at length. However, the final communique was singularly unrevealing. What we can be fairly certain of is that

of the probable United States response to the probe and its consequences, was at variance with Peking's. The following matrix-represents the Soviet opinion that the probability of the United States standing firm was higher than Peking believed.

It also shows the higher Soviet estimate of the cost of war for all parties. It demonstrates the basis of the Soviet policy of discouraging Peking from sustaining the conflict after subsequent United States moves tended to confirm the initial Soviet assumption.

For an analysis of the communique, see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 202. For varying analyses of the Sino-Soviet relationship at that juncture, see ibid., Ch. 7; Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in Morton Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 265-303; Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 97-130; John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 114-149.

		Soviet Calc	ulations	
		United St	ates: CR: .69	
		comply: 50%	stand firm: 50%	
Peking	comply: 80%	0,0	-5,5	
	stand firm:	40, -40	-60,-60	
This is not a Critical Risk table, properly speaking.				
It is a third party's calculations of the payoffs to two other parties, and itself (in the event of both parties' standing				
			merely as a means of between Soviet and Co	1
/	Chinese esti	mates of United	States intentions, an	d of the costs

Il. Intended effects of the move

of the offshore islands. Peking calculated further that if the United States stood aside and did not prevent the fall of the islands, the Nationalist regime would be greatly weakened and United States prestige and world position negatively affected. Peking would be in a much stronger position to break through her diplomatic isolation, and eventually to "liberate" Taiwan. If on the other hand the United States proved ready to bomb the mainland to break the blockade, Peking could expect American and world opinion to act as a "powerful restraint" at least on the use of nuclear weapons. If the United States tried to negotiate directly for the survival of the garrisons while the islands were being interdicted,

e reporte.

Peking would be in a strong bargaining position; and world opinion would press the United States to negotiate. The move was an "initiative that

_/ Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," Orbis, III, N. 3 (Fall 1959), p. 332-350.

forces the opponent to initiate," since the object was to cut the islands off from all possibilities of resupply on a nonviolent basis, so that the United States would have to choose between initiating violence or forcing the Nationalists to make concessions.

_/ Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 343.

suspended for some time prior to the crisis. In January 1958 the United States had failed to appoint another ambassadorial representative to the talks when Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was transferred to another post. During the spring of 1958, Washington seemed undecided as to whether to resume the talks or not, and this lapse "upset Peking considerably. . . . the government of the Chinese People's Republic showed real concern, anger and distress over what appeared to it to be Washington's de facto and indefinite suspension of the Talks." On June 30, Peking demanded

that the United States resume the talks within fifteen days, or it would consider that the United States had decided to break them off.

The United States decided "neither to accept the ultimatum nor suspend

[/] Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. for the the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968), p. 13.

the Talks." When the ultimatum arrived, Washington was in the process

/ Ibid., p. 139-140.

of formulating a proposal to re-open the Talks, but it decided to let the fifteen days lapse before transmitting it. On July 28, Peking was officially informed that Ambassador Beam had been appointed to continue the talks, but this time for more than a month Peking made no response. Meanwhile Peking made its basic move, on August 23.

On September 4, Secretary Dulles made a reference to resumption of the Talks in the course of a press conference devoted almost entirely to ____/ the crisis in the Straits. This public high-level invitation to resume

_/ For an analysis of this primary communication and bidding move, see below, p. 000.

the Talks, coming as it did at a moment when it appeared that Peking's interdiction would prove successful unless the United States intervened militarily, may well have been one of the primary intended effects of Peking's basic move.

TIII. Actual effects on the mover.

A, By initiating the bombardment, Peking became relatively more committed; costs of backing down would be higher.

B: For some time after the move, Peking's ally the Soviet Union made no overt responses of support, either militarily or diplomatically. It has been argued that Peking did not want vigorous or overt support from the Soviet Union at the time of the move, because the United States would be more apt to respond vigorously in that event. However, most analysts

_/ Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,", cited above, p. 287.

of Sino-Soviet relations believe that the lack of sufficient Soviet support led Peking to decide to agree to resume negotiations in Warsaw sooner than it otherwise would have done. "In making its offer less than forty-eight hours after the U.S. declaration, the C.P.R. appeared to be yielding to U.S. pressure. This admission of weakness could be expected to weaken its bargaining position. . . it seems unlikely that the C.P.R. chose freely to weaken its hand thus." In this view, one effect of the

move on the mover was to demonstrate to it the limits of the diplomatic __/ and military support it might expect from its ally.

The Nationalists' perceptions were not fundamentally altered by the move. After Khrushchev and Mao met in Peking at the beginning of August, hostilities were widely expected. "The system of airfields and communications which the Communists had been developing on the 'invasion coast' in Fukien province was by now virtually complete," and a state of emergency was declared in Taiwan as early as August 7. Preparations

_/ John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 127-128; see also footnote DDD, p. 5 this section.

_/ This conclusion is not inconsistent with the speculation that Peking sought to have the Warsaw talks reopened, and was gratified by Dulles' hint that the United States would also. It simply assumes that Peking would not have responded so quickly.

IV. Effects of perceptions of recipient

[/] Richard Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958 (New York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), p. 315.

were made for the dispersal of the civilian population, and in the

Straits air and naval engagements became more frequent. In the years

/ R. F. Wall, 'Formosa and the Chinese Offshore Islands," in G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs, 1956-1958 (London: Oxford, 1962), p. 567.

since the 1954-1955 crisis Chiang had placed approximately 100,000 men,

/ This crisis, which was similar in many respects to the 1958 crisis, led to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China and the Joint Congressional Resolution authorizing the President to commit American forces to the defense of the offshore islands if in his judgment an attack on them was a prelude to, or a part of, an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. See above, I. 4, Alliances and Alignments.

a third of his ground effectives, on Quemoy and Matsu; "he took the initiative to fulfill the conditions laid down in the Formosa Resolution under which the United States would defend the offshore islands."

_/ Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-Shek and the United States," Western Political Quarterly, XII, No. 4 (December 1959), p. 1078.

The Nationalists were undoubtedly aware that no invasion forces had been massed on the coast of the mainland; the repeated calls on the Nationalist garrisons to surrender, and the repeated threat of "imminent invasion" were simply designed to undermine the morale of the garrison.

"The Chinese Nationalists themselves did not believe an invasion was imminent." However, the Nationalists encouraged their ally the United

States to regard the bombardment as a serious threat, within the scope of the Formosa Resolution, and kept demanding United States permission

_/ Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," cited above, p. 341.

to use their air force against the mainland gun positions.

2. The United States was highly alarmed by Peking's move. It could not be sure whether the Soviets wished to restrain their Chinese ally, or whether they actively supported the probe, having "concluded that a recopening of the offshore island issue might divert the attention of the world from Lebanon to the Far East and show that the Communists were still on the offensive." The "massive retaliation" defense concept implied a

strong intrabloc commitment on both sides, and "this strengthened somewhat the American assumption of Russian intervention on behalf of the Chinese, while also perhaps increasing the incentive to test that assumption."

_/ George H. Quester, "The American Attitude," in Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, cited above, p. 246.

The United States believed that if the Chinese behaved aggressively, it was on Soviet orders, and "Russia would generate whatever military aid and activity seemed tailored to the tactical situation." Thus the

/ Ibid.

United States saw herself as fundamentally challenged by her chief opponent in the international system. This was not the effect on the recipient's perceptions that the move was intended to have.

V. Effects on strategic situation of recipient

A. The bombardment of the islands put the Nationalists in a difficult strategic situation. They were unable, unassisted, to convoy supplies to their garrisons on the islands, and they did not have United States

_/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), p. 293.

permission to bomb the gun emplacements. The garrisons would not collapse immediately but neither could they hold out indefinitely. Since the initiation of the shelling was the opening move in the crisis, it did not restructure a pre-existing choice of moves, but it did eliminate the alternative of making no move.

Before the shelling began the Nationalists had not had to make a choice of moves in order to retain the islands. After it began, they had to choose between (1) surrender of the garrisons, or evacuation, (2) attempts to run the blockade without widening the scope of hostilities, (3) attacks on the mainland, either (a) with or (b) without United States permission, or (4) an effort to involve the United States militarily.

The United States was faced with what appeared to be hard choices.

(1) It could pressure the Nationalists to evacuate the islands and abandon them; evacuation, even if it were politically possible, might not be physically practical under bombardment. (2) It could respond with a limited offensive military move, with all the accompanying hazards of escalation. (3) It could threaten major retaliation unless the bombardment stopped: "brinksmanship." (4) It could declare its intention to defend the islands if that became necessary, and meanwhile attempt to countermove against the blockade and break it without actually engaging in hostilities.

-VI. Effects on recipient's choice of moves

A. The Nationalists rejected the alternatives "surrender" and "proceed without United States permission", and proceeded with the other moves.

B. The United States, in its initial response, chose the fourth alternative; it declared its intention to help the Nationalists hold the islands, if they were not able to do so themselves and if the attack on

the islands appeared to be part of a projected attack on Formosa, and it initiated a series of moves designed to raise its credibility and to help the Nationalists break the blockade without actually engaging in hostilities itself.

VIL. Type of tactic

(It should be noted that the basic move made by Peking--initiation of heavy shelling of the offshore islands following the build-up of their coastal forces--was followed by closely related communication moves.

There were broadcasts from the coastal radio beamed at the garrisons on the islands, threatening imminent invasion and calling upon the garrisons to surrender. These broadcasts were not from Peking radio, and were not intended for domestic consumption on the mainland. According to several reliable sources, the broadcasts omitted reference to Taiwan and to the

possibility of nuclear war or the use of nuclear weapons in the Straits crisis. However, the United States responded as though Peking were in fact coupling the offshore islands with a projected assault on Taiwan.

_/ Tang Tsou, 'Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait, 'Orbis., III,
No. 3 (Fall 1959), p. 341; Harold Hinton, Communist China in World
Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 267; Donald S. Zagoria,
The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1962), p. 213.

Taiwan (Formosa) and the offshore islands are linked..." (Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1958 (New York: Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), p. 438.)

While the explanation for this seemingly inappropriate response is not clear, it could be interpreted as a calculated misreading for reasons of policy or as a nonrationally distorted interpretation. Or, to rely on another source, it may be that most of the broadcasts from the coastal radio did not link the offshore islands to Taiwan, but that one particularly notable one, on August 27, did link the two, and furthermore that while the Chinese in statements for foreign consumption were avoiding any reference to the possibility of nuclear war, or the use of nuclear weapons in the Straits, their internal broadcasts "indicated that Peking was focusing on the islands and possibly Taiwan, which strengthened the hand of the President and Dulles." This account, which has led us towards another

[/] Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 144-145.

primary move, has been included here because the broadcasts themselves, although not primary moves, were linked in time and purpose to the bombardment, and can best be considered alongside it in an analysis of tactics.)

a. The bombardment can be described as the "the initiative that forces the opponent to initiate." By successfully interdicting the offshore islands (no convoys were able to get through for the two-week period following the initiation of the shelling), Peking put the United States and the Nationalists in the position of having either to surrender or to initiate new moves.

b. The move fits the Jervis conceptualization of coercion moves in relation to chicken games. By initiating heavy shelling and by the

united States comply (surrender the islands) rather than stand firm in a chicken game. However, the broadcasts, which were intended to heighten the opponent's perceptions of Peking's resolve, or degree of commitment, were an unsuccessful tactic. That is, they did not accomplish their primary aim--surrender of the islands--and the heightened perception of Peking's resolve seemed to legitimize a firm stand by the opponents, rather than frighten them, as according to a purely rationalistic model it should have done.

- c. The bombardment can be described as a coercive basic move whose interdictive purpose succeeded for a time, but whose compellent purpose-surrender by the garrison--did not succeed. The broadcasts can be described as a compellent threat, which failed.
- d. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Moves to increase one's credibility

Change one's apparent utilities

1. Reduce cost of war: Peking attempted to do this by increasing its capabilities. There was no massing of enough troops for an assault on the islands, but "an estimated 200 to 500 gun emplacements had been constructed on the mainland and the island of Amoy," and while there was no heavy concentration of landing craft, there was a "sizeable force of torpedo and motor gunboats, estimated at between sixty and eighty."

_/ Tang Tsou, 'Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," cited above, p. 339.

b. Various verbal statements of the type "your ally will not support you", "your cause is hopeless," "we will win."

 Increase one's valuation of the stakes; Peking attempted to do this in a general way (see b. above), with negative results.

Increase the probability of firmness

the use of force

II. Moves to reduce the adversary's critical risk

- A. Increase his estimate of the costs of war
 - 1. Increase one's own capabilities; this Peking did (see above)
 - 2. Various verbal statements (see above)
- e. In relation to working papers #2 and #6, the initiation of the shelling did not carry an irrevocable commitment to the use of force vis-a-vis the offshore islands. Peking was well aware that its payoffs could change depending on the United States response, and in the unlikely (so Peking believed) event of a firm response from the United States Peking was prepared to re-compute its payoffs. The purpose of the move (an effort to alter the status quo in its own favor) was such that the losses from de-commitment would be supportable. Peking had (and has) a firm commitment to a final outcome in regard to the offshore islands, but this is outcome in a very long-term sense and does not imply irrevocable commitment to any particular tectical move.

During the period immediately following the shelling, the
United States made a series of basic moves, all related to one
directed towards strengthening
policy. These moves were taxsbraughau the United States military
position in the Straits, as well as the military posture of the
Nationalists. The decision to make these moves was based on the

_/ For details, see "Bargaining Setting," (p. 22-23.) 12

previous commitments of the United States, and its perceptions of the motives and capabilities of its ally and its opponents.

_/ See above, p. 14, 34-37. The Dulles-Eisenhower thinking is set out clearly in a "Memorandum Re Formosa Strait Situation" (See Appendix).

Supergame considerations played a large rae in this decision to make a show of force; Eisenhower and Dulles believed that the loss of the islands would be preliminary to the loss of Nationalist Formosa, and that loss would be followed by the gradual collapse of the entire United States position in Asia: "The consequences in the Far East would be even more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union."

They also believed that "If the Chicoms believe the

US would actively intervene to throw back an assault, perhaps using nuclear weapons, it is probable there would be no attempt to take Quemoy by assault and the situation might quiet down, as in 1955.

_/ "Memorandum Re Formosa Strait Situation," in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 692. See Appendix, this paper.

_/ Ibid.x

Thus Perceiving the immediate challenge to Quemoy and Matsu as a game of chicken, the United States policy-makers hastened to make their commitment clear. The intended effect was **wxdimzgaxada** not to deceive, but to convey a credible commitment; the United States hoped to raise its own credibility, and to lower the opponent's fritical Risk by altering his perceptions of his opponents intentions, so that he would re-estimate the likelihood and cost of firm opposition to his opening move.

The effect of these basic moves on the mover was to considerably increase United States commitment to its policy of standing firm; the costs of backing down were greatly increased. Another effect was to increase the United States' capabilities, with the probable result that the costs of war, if it came, would be reduced.

considerably. Even before the major United States communication move of September 4, there had been minor communication moves in line with the basic moves involving military build-up; on August 23, Dulles in an open letter to a Congressmen had stated that "it would be highly hazardous for appone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change this situation by force xm2...that could be a limited operation. It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area."

This combined verbal and pyshical reaction of the

_/ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX, No. 1002 (September 8, 1958), p. 379.

United States made **MPeking perceive that the United States would stand firm, and meanwhile the Nationalists made it apparent that the offshore defenses of the islands would not simply collapse without a fight.

A "reevaluation of the military situation and of United States

intentions appears to have taken place in Peking" in the early days of September. There was every indication that the Chinese and their

_/ Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p. 186-189.

Soviet allies reacted to the United States' moves with considerable E caution. In Critical Risk terms, the Chinese realized that they had misread the United States' payoffs, and in recalculating they accordingly regise raised their estimate of the United States' Critical Risk. For several days before September 6. Indiaxwwwxxx there was a noticeable lull in the shelling. However, the Chinese refused to abandon the probe even when their initial assumptions about the although they did nothing to raise the level of violence. United States proved incorrect, / Their initial move had raised their costs of backing downs so they began to develop a new "bargaining calculus" to justify a policy of continuing confrontation; they they hoped thatas began to rely more and more on the pressures of time. That is./the blockade xxxxxxxxxxxxx continued to work want the pressures of allied and domestic opinion would ultimately force the United States to make some concessions. "The new Chinese objective was to create a situation in which the position of their opponents would inevitably worsen unless they initiated the use of large-scale violence and in which the inhibitions restraining such a move would be great."

Feking's strategic situation was not immediately altered by the United States' basic moves, since they did not as yet involve any confrontation activity, and the blockade continued effective. However, Peking perceived the likelihood of ultimate United States action against it; if Peking had contemplated an eventual assault on the offshore islands, the plan was probably abandoned in the

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 191.

face of the United States moves.

Peking chose to continue its bombardment, and following the next important United States move it also chose to enter negotiations

_/ See below, p. -000. 1/1 -25.

with the United States.

Type of Tactic:

a. These basic moves made by the United States in the early stage of the crisis could be described in terms of Alexander George's concept of coercive diplomacy. That is, they constituted a use of force taxahaw aimed at demonstrating (1)the United States' resolve to protect certain well-defined interests, and (2)the credibility of the United States' determination to use more force, if necessary. This manipulation of force was linked to appropriate communications to the opponent, and as such had a signalling character. It was

_/ Ibid.

focused on affecting Peking's will rather than on negating its capabilities through the actual use of force.

In related to working papers #2 and #6 coercive basic moves b. 1 The moves could be described as/signalling commitment to an outcome—the safety of Formosamm. They were a threat, but implicit rather than explicit.

c. In relation to working paper #4:

Tuzing

I. Moves to increase one's credibility

Change one's apparent utilities

1. Reduce cost of war: the United States move was attempt to do this by increasing its capabilities in the crisis area, and increasing their readiness. The move was also an effort to signal tacitly that "The issue is so important to us that we are willing to fight over it."

_/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956--1961, cited above,p.297.

amounted to a threat which engaged United States prestige, honor and future bargaining reputation.

firmness without changing payoffs.

- The United States' basic moves increased the level
 of shared risk of anadvertent war, although not a great deal.
 The moves were a show of force.
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Oritical Risk

 Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war
 - 1. The moves had the effect of increasing the United States' capabilities and readiness

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

1. These moves did not devalue the stakes for the adversory.

On Beptember 4, Peking declared that its territorial waters twelve extended for/22 miles. A twelve-mile limit would of course include the offshore islands in Chinese Communist territory. This

ba primary communication move was intended as a deterrent threat to the Nationalists and the United States.

The actual effects of this move on the mover were not major, (1) and were in a negative direction. The United States response to the declaration was to simply continue to operate in the waters in question in such a way that Peking could not enforce its declaration without initiating the use of violence vis-a-vis the United States. Through the use of violence vis-a-vis the United States. Through the use of credibility.

_/ Chung-keo jen min wai chiao haueh hui, Oppose U.S. Military
Provocations in the Taiwan Straits Area: A Selection of
Important Documents (Peking; Foreign Languages Fress, 1958),p.14-15.

[/] Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p. 347.

⁽²⁾ The Soviet Union did not publicly support Peking's claim.

"On this score, their marked indifference to the stated interests of their major ally was especially revealing. The Russians had waged a vigorous campaign at the 1958 Geneva Conference to secure for themselves international recognition of the twelve-mile limit." Even after September 6, the Soviets denounced United States violations of the twelve-mile limit as bordering on aggression, but did not offer to help the Chinese repel them, and "The Russians' silence spoke louder than their words."

_/ John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 130-131.

Thus Peking received another lesson in the limits of its alliance, a lesson which may have been a factor in Peking's decision to make its next, conciliatory move.

The territorial waters declaration.

This move, while it theoretically was directed to the world at large, was primarily aimed at the United States. The effect on United States perceptions was probably not very great; the United States already perceived Peking as an aggressive, threatening power. However Peking's failure to respond when the United States ignored the declaration probably influenced the United States to perceive Peking as something of a"paper tiger." As noted above, Peking lost credibility, and, in Critical Risk terms, the United States may have estimated Peking's Critical Risk as somewhat lower than at the onset of the crisis, especially in the light of the Soviet failure to support the twelve-mile claim.

The United States' strategic situation was not significantly altered by Peking's move. The hazards attendant upon Seventh Fleet operations in the Straits had already been present.

The United States/EGGE to move as though the declaration had not been made. Several days later the United States begain convoying Quemoy. Nationalistý ships to within three miles of/thaxaffsharavirkandax

On September 9, in response to a reporter's question, Secretary Dulles stated that "We do not accept from the Chinese Communists or anybody else, for that matter, the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles. That is what you might call a "grab," Haxfreenexstatedxthatxunitxx

_/ Paul E. Zinner, ed., <u>Documents on American Foriegn Relations</u>, 1958, px cited above, p. 453-454.

Type of Tactic
relation to

a. In/xxxxxxx working paper #2, this move was a Type II threat,
one which modified the incentive structure of the threatener but
not enough to commit. It was a somewhat ambiguous threat--Peking
did not state that it would fire upon ships moving within the
twelve-mile limit, but merely declared that the limit existed.

by Premiers ChouxEn-lai
It took the form of an announcement/ and was public diplomacy,
as was most of the communication in this crisis.

- b. This move was an effort to make a threat credible through purely verbal means. The effort was not successful and was not backed by the use of force, or any basic move. relation to
- c. In/karmexaf working paper # 4;
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility

Change one's apparent utilities

- 1. Reduce tost of war: this move did not appear to reduce the cost of war for the mover
- 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes
 - a. This was threat was an attempt to engage Peking's prestige with a nationalistic claim.
 - b. It was also an invocation of "legal rights."

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

a. The declaration was intended to be perceived as increasing the level of shared risk of inadvertent war.

_/ Secretary Dulles' response (see above, p. 22), which will not be analyzed in detail, also fits in this category; he pretended not to have "heard" the other side's threats until he was required to comment.

- II. Tactics to feduce the adversary's Oritical Risk

 Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war
 - 1. The declaration was an effort to raise the United States' estimate of the likelihood of an armed clash with the Communist Chinese

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

- 1. Theoretically, if the Chinese declaration had been accepted by the United States and other members of the international system, the Nationalist position on the offshore islands would have become "illegal."
 In fact, there was no possibility of such an outcome.
- 2. The move was a challenge to the igm legality of the opponent's position.

The next major move in the crisis occurred on the same day--September 4--as Chou En-lai's twelve-mile limit announcement. On that day, the United States in the person of Secretary Dulles made a primary communications move. This move actually occurred in two parts; the first was a formal statement at a press conference, directly at Newport.

following a Dulles-Eisenhower consultation. This formal statement

was followed by an "unofficial comment for background," in which a "high administration official" clarified the formal statement.

The formal statement at Newport "stressed the olive branch of peace."

_/ This formal statement by Dulles is usually analyzed as the entire United States move; however, following Kenneth Young, (Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 148), we will treat it together with another statement issued the same day.

Ibid., p. 147; Maix U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX, No. 223xx 1004 (September 22, 1958), p. 445-446. Kikei In it, Dulles first reviewed the situation in the Straits. He noted that the United States was committed to its ally the Republic of China under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Congressional Resolution, which empowered the President of the United States to defend "related positions such as Quemoy and Matsu." Any attempt by the Chinese Communists to take those islands by force would be a "crude violation of the principles on which world order is based." He stated that Peking had been linking Taiwan and the offshore islands in their propaganda, but that it was still not clear whether the Chinese Communist would make an all-out effort to conquer the offshore islands and Taiwan, or whether xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx the Republic of China could defend itself, with United States logistical support. The President, Dulles said, would not besitate to act under the Joint Resolution if it looked necessary. The United States

and Communist China both recognized the increased interdependence of Taiwan and the offshore islands, and "Military dispositions have been made by the United States so that a Presidential determination, if made, would be followed by action both timely and effective."

Turning again to Eskingis the possibility of more aggressive action by Peking, Dulles said that "any such naked use of force would pose an issue far transcending the offshore islands and even the security of Taiwan," and would threaten peace everywhere.

Having thus committed the United States to the defense of its ally, but not to any specific actions, Secretary Dulles added will that the United States hoped that "Peiping/warld stop short of defying the will of mankind for peace. This would not require it to abandon its claims, however ill-founded we may deem them to be." The United States would like a mutual and reciprocal renunciation of the use of force, except in self-defense, "which, however, would be without prejudice to the pursuit of policies by peaceful means." He implied that he wished to move the crisis to the conference table through the Ambassadorial Talks.

The second statement, by the unnamed "high administration official," "asserted unequivocally that the United States would take strong action to defend the offshore islands if the Chinese Nationalists were unable to defend themselves. He implied that United States bombing of the Chinese mainland might become part of the defense of Taiwan itself. He did not mince his worlds in this 'unattributed' but obvious signal to Peking.



_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 148.

The considerations and pressures producing this move were fundamentally the same as those behind the saximaxufbuild-up of United States forces in the Straits. Dulles and Eisenhower had been planning their strategy for about a month, and had decided

_/ See Appendix, "Memorandum Re: Formosa Strait Situation."

to prevent the seizure of the offshore islands by force, and the keep the door open for negotation. The statement, which was work an announcement of this double policy, was intended among other things to prevent war as a result of miscalculation by Peking.

Dulles and Eisenhower wanted United States intentions to be as clear as possible, while some freedom of choice could be retained through deferring the actual decision to actively intervene.

Eisenhower notes the "difficulty of defining in advance—and

_/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, cited above,p. 296-298.

thus limiting—what we might do." The United States could not state that it would defend "every protruding rock," and yet if it specified which islands it would defend, it would be inviting the its opponents to occupy the others. Furthermore, Chiang was feeling uneasy, and "Under these circumstances a statement of unqualified support could encourage him to attack. A statement of expressing less would be harmful to him and helpful to the enemy." However, by September 4, Chiang was more insistent than ever and Dulles was also enxious to apply his basic maxim of avoiding war by miscalculation.

_/ Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, And at the Brinks John Foster Dulles' Command of merican REXICH Bower (NewxXXXX Gerden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 126.

The intended effects of the move were to convey the truth about opponent
United States intentions, and to deter the zammy of from expanding compel him to change the conflict and if possible definitions.

The Actual effects on the mover were to increase the firmness of his commitment to the outcome--the security of Formosa--and also his to kakakakak sharpen/kkakakakakakakakakakaka contingent commitment to the defense of the offshore islands. Costs of backing down were now higher for the United States.

The effects of this primary communication move on the perceptions of the recipient, was combined with the basic moves in the Straits area made by the United States, waxxis were considerable. Peking had to recalculate its bargaining position and strategy, since its

/ See above, p. III-17---III--18.

initial assumptions about United States intentions were being disconfirmed. Peking now also perceived the United States as ready

Peking's strategic situation was not fundamentally altered by this move

to reopen the Ambassadorial Talks despite the on-going conflict.

Peking's strategic situation was max fundamentally mixemminated by this move, combined with the United States' preceding basic moves. In relation to the United States, Peking upped its estimate of the United States' Critical Risk as it grew to perceive the actual value put on Quemoy and Matsu by the United States; and in relation to the Nationalists, Peking could no longer be sure its greatest value its own lay in standing firm, since its assumption of/victory in a military predicated confrontation was/beard on the absence of United States intervention.

Peking's choice of moves was two-fold. First, Peking decided to continue the bombardment, after several days' pause in early September. Secondly, Peking decided to rangesix rank indicate that it too would like to resume the Writzewx Tukk Ambassadorial Talks.

_/ See below, p. III--00.

Type of Tactic

- a. In relation to working paper #2;
 - I threat, equivalent to Schelling's warning, since the incentive to hold the offshore islands had really existed since the Korean War, been formalized in the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Resolution, and been strengthened by the United States' basic moves during the preceding several weeks. Or, we might classify high-level it as a Type III threat, since this open/statement of policy modified the United States' incentive structure considerably; Having by this time attached so much weight to the offshore islands, it would be most difficult to let them go by defablt. The move was certainly an effort to influence the other party's behavior at his next decision point, by changing his perceptions of consequences.
- 2.3. This move was in part a bidding move. The references to cease-fire, mutual renunciation of force and the Ambassadorial Talks, while they did not contain specific offers, held out hope that such

6. In relation to working paper = 6:
1.3. The threat was explicit rather than implicit, but still somewhat

ambiguous. The United States retained its freedom of choice to finally decided on military action as circumstances dictated.

The phrase "all but committed" appears in most commentaries on the move, although the statement by the unidentified high official appears to have been a definite commitment to subsequently defend the offshore islands regardless of their/perceived relationship, or lack of it, to Formosa. The personal status of the giver was very high; Secretary Dulles' word carried more weight than that of many Secretaries of State. Delivered publicly in a press conference, as a declaration, it was not officially directed or carried to a recipient; another example of the public diplomacy typical of this crisis.

- 2.Coupling was a prominent feature of this move. Quemoy and Matsu were coupled to Formosa, and Formosa in turn was coupled to the defense of the "free world", and the United States' global posture. The Chinese bombardment was coupled to broad principles concerning the use of force in international politics.
- c. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility

 Change one's apparent utilities
 - 1. Reduce the cost of war
 - a. Various verbal statements of the type "The issue is so important to us that we are willing to fight over it."
 - 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes
 - a. Threats made in this move engaged the prestige, honor and future bargaining reputation of the United States.
 - b. The issue of the offshore islands was coupled with larger issues.
 - 1. The "I know that your ultimate aims are unlimited" statement was implicit.

- 2. The United States position was tied to the moral principle that force should not be used to change the status quo.
- The United States' alliance obligations were invoked.

Increase apparent porbability of firmness without changing payoffs

- 1. The tactics subsumed under this heading ds were not a feature of this move
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

 Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war
 - 1. The move was an effort to increase Peking's estimate of the net costs of its war with the Nationalists by indicating the reliability of the Nationalists' ally.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

- 1. The references to the Ambassadorial Talks, and to interests which could be negotiated if the firing stopped, were an effort to permit the adversary to back down with minimum humiliation.
- 2. The community value of "peace," which a Communist Chinese cease-fire would bring about, was invoked.
- 3. The elements of duress or provocation were not stressed; the hope of not having to act militarily was more emphasized than the determination to do so in any event.
- 4. Common interests in settling the dispute and avoiding war * ("the will of manking for peace") were par emphasized.

The next/event in the crisis was/Chou En-lai's statement of September, in which he announced that his government was prepared to resume the Ambassadorial Talks batwarm with the United States.

_/ Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreden Relations 1958, cited above, p. 440--442.

The statement was made to the Supreme State Council, and was broadcast and published in the press. It was not actually transmitted to the United States through diplomatic channels, but Washington interpreted it as an official reply to the Dulles statements of September 4.

_/ Kenneth Young, <u>Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience</u>, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 149.

Chou stated hat! In this primary communication move, /REMANN, declared that it was "entirely China's internal affair for the Chinese people to exercise their sovereign right to liberate these areas." He-stated that Taiwan and the Pescadores had been Chinass territories "from ancient times." The United States' "direct occupation of Taiwan and the Penghu Ishands | Pescadores | by armed force constitute unlawful interference in China's internal affairs and infringement of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are in direct conflict with the United Nations Charter and all codes of international law." However, Chinaxxwhiek believed in the settlement of international disputes by the peaceful means of negotiation, China had repeatedly sought to resolve the tensions in the Taiwan wix area through negotiation. "In t'e Sino-American ambassadorial talks which started in August, 1955, the Chinese side has time and again proposed that the two parties should. . . issue a statement declaring their . intention to settle the dispute between China and the United States

in the Taiwan area . . . through peaceful negotiation and without resorting to the threat or use of force against each other. But contrary to Dulles' assertion in his September 4 statement, it is precisely the United States that has refused to issue such a statement and, moreover, has later suspended unilaterally the talks themselves. After the Chinese Government demanded in July this year that the talks be resumed within a set time limit, the United States Government did not make a timely reply, but it has ultimately designated a representative of ambassadorial rank. Now, the United States Government again indicates its desire to settle the Sino-American dispute in the Taiwan area through peaceful negotiation. To make a further effort to safeguard peace the Chinese Government is prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks between the two countries."

The promptness of Peking's waampt response to Dulles' overture was probably based on several considerations. Some analysts argue that resumption of the Talks was an important primary goal for Peking, one they had preferred to wait for until they had gained some bargaining advantage through the success of the blockade. Thus, the time now appeared propitious to them. In this view, Peking would have anticipated positive gains from the move. However, Peking's ally the Soviet Union had made no important supportive moves up to this time, and it may be conjectured that in the light of the American response to the bombardment the Soviets were putting pressure on the Chinese to agree quickly to negotiate. An analyst who stresses the importance of the Soviet position in Peking's decision to negotiate states that Peking was probably not happy about making the move without letting more time elepse. "...it was being forced to sue for negotiations, without having made any

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The move had several purposes. It was intended to heighten

Peking's reputation among the non-aligned countries, and counteract

the aggressive impression made by the bombardment. It was (possibly)

intended to satisfy the demands of Peking's ally the Soviet Union

also

By appearing "reasonable." Peking no doubt/hoped to increase the

the United States'

pressures of/ixx allies, of the neutrals, and of an important segment

of American opinion on the United States government not to escalate

the conflict, and perhaps to make some concessions to Peking.

Pelican

They predicted that the blockade would remain effective unless the

United States escalated the conflict militarily, and that time

would be on their side as the pressures on the Nationalists and the

United States coming from the blockade and from world opinion would

increase.

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negotiations a "peaceful gesture." The effects of the move on Peking might be summarized as follows: Peking's image as peaceable or non-belligerent was heightened with the the neutral countries, with the United States' allies and with United States domestic credibility opposition, which was a gain for Peking. Peking's/image as a forceful opponent was lowered for United States policy-makers, which was a loss for Peking.

The recipient of this move, the United States, which its perceptions of Peking's Erizian resolve. The move tended to confirm the United States' initial assumptions about Peking's response if the United States were to stand firm.

The United States' strategic situation was not really altered. It had now to develop a position for the Ambassadorial Talks; the position taken at the opening Talks, which was held on September 15 in Warsaw, was a reflection of Dulles' policy as set forth in his statement of September 4. The United States demanded a renunciation of the use of force, preceded by a cessation of hostilities, in a defacto or agreed-upon cease-fire.

The United States ESSEXES chose to respond favorably to Chou's statement issued by the move, In a communication move on the same day, a/White House said that "If the Chinese Communists are now prepared to respond to Secretary Dulles' statement of September 4 the United States welcomes that decision." The statement noted that the United States would not make any arrangement prejudicial to the Republic of China.

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1957, cited above, p. 160-161. For more information on the Talks, see welow, p. X-1-Y.

_/ Paul Zinner, ed., <u>Documents on American Foreign Relations 1958</u>, cited above, p. 442-443.

Type of Tactic

- a. In relation to working paper #2, this was a bidding move. The accusatory tone of the first part of the statement did not actually contain any threats. The bid was not specific, but its was a proposal for a means of settlement, and it was a concession (if we believe that in Peking would have preferred to make this move after a greater lapse of time) in response to the United States' strategic pressures.
- b. In relation to working paper #6, it was a "tactic of accommodation."c. In relation working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility
 Change one's apparent utilities
 - 1. Reduce the cost of war: this move contained no elements tending to reduce the apparent cost of war to Peking
 - 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes:
 - a. In the first part of the communication, Peking attempted to offset its apparent concession by citing the legitimacy of its position as the legal government of all of China, and by reference to a previous status quo in which Formosa and the Pescadores had been governed from the Chinese mainland. It invoked its legal right to conduct its "civil war."

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

- a. This move <u>decreased</u> Peking's apparent probability of firmness.
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's ECritical Risk

 Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war
 - a. This move <u>decreased</u> the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

a. The provide a loophole, Peking praised the United States for showing signs of wishing to settle the dispute peacefully.

b.Peking attempted to undermine the legitimacy/of the United

(States' position by stating that it, Peking, was legitimately
eggaged in a civil war in which the United States had no
right to interfere; "unlawful interference in China's
internal affairs and infringement of China's territorial
integrity and sovereignty, . . in direct conflict with the
United Nations Charter and all codes of international law."

The Soviet Union made the next major move in the crisis
The next major move in the orisis was made by the Soviet Union,
on the following day, September 7./ Throughout the entire crisis the
basic
Soviet Union made no/primrry moves and only three primary communication
moves. This was the first of these, and it took the form of a nine-page
During the first two weeks of the crisis, while tensions were mounting,
the Soviets gave the Chinese Communists a little propaganda support,
but of a most restrained sort, and they made no major high-level
moves at all. Indeed,

letter from Engalar Khrhshchev to President Eisenhower. Khrushchev

began by saying he was appealing to the United States government"to show sense, not to cermit steps which could entail irreparable consequences." The cause of the crisis, he stated, was United States

_/ Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Felations, 1958, cited above, p. 443-452; U.S. Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIX, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 498-503.

seizure of age-old Chinese territory (Formosa). Peking's effort to liberate Formosa were in his opinion entirely lawful. Thrushchev naval considered to United States / military build-up in the area of the Straits to be provocative, and a prelude to "nuclear blackmail," and we said that China had "true friends ready to go to its aid at any moment in case of aggression against China, since the interests of the security of People's China are inseparable from the interests of the security of the Soviet Union." However, this promise of support was

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but he added that in the light of modern weaponry, "these once threatening naval vessels are fit, in essence, only for paying courtesy visits, giving salutes, and can still serve as targets for appropriate types of missiles."

somewhat qualified by the statement that "we have not the slightest doubt that the Chinese people will give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor." After levelling many accusations of imperialism, intervention in the affairs of other states and so forth at the United States. Khrushchev acknowledged that his words might sound "harsh," but that he wished to make himself quite clear, and not hide his thoughts behind "outwardly polite diplomatic formulations." He repeated his support for the Soviet ally, stating that "An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. True to its duty, our country will do everything in order together with People's China to defend the security of both states, "thexintenestexofx bearexxiax hax wan Exetyxthaxintaractxsf2z2z2zz. He then insisted that the message was not an aira attempt to exaggerate, or in any way a threat: "We can make desire only to draw y ur attention to the situation from which no one can escape -- neither you nor we -- if in the Far East the fire of

war breaks out. We wish. . . to cease the present movement downward on the ingined slope."

Khrushchev then devoted long passages to the international stature of Communist China, accusing the United States of fostering international tensions by keeping China out of the United Nations. He declared that "China has the full legal right to take all necessary measures against the traitor Chiang Kai-shek. It is taking these measures on its own soil. . . .legitimate measures of self-defense." However, he did not offer other than verbal support for his Chinese ally in this respect.

In conclusion, Khrushchev asserted that American withdrawal from Formosa and the Far East would be a necessary prelude to a stable peace in that region. He assigned full responsibility for the further course of the conflict to the United States.

The considerations and pressures leading to Khrushchev's

decision to make this primary communication move were fairly
In relation to Peking,
complex./Khrushchev had to steer a middle course between keepingm
his alliance commitments on the one hand and not magizing the Chinese reason to believe they could escalate further on the
other. In relation to the United States, he wanted to deter the
United States from an attack on the Chinese mainland, but he did
not want to produce an over-reaction. The United States'acceptance
of Chou's offer to negotiate may have convinced him that the United
States was also afraid of war, and could to some extent be threatened.
Khrushchev by this time could see little to gain in the crisis, and
considerable risk. "Such a threat of retaliation might have partly
served to channel the crisis into the resort to diplomacy." It
alarmed the world, as well as Massaw Washington, and was a risk for

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Moscow but an "effective use of public diplomacy."

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1987, cited above, p. 155.

The intended effects of the move were to (1) produce in Peking a realistic appraisal of the support they could anticipate from the Soviet Union, (a) in support of their probe and (b) in case of attack upon them, and (2) produce in Washington a higher valuation of the Soviet Critical Risk, so that Washington would be more inclined to pause in the face of firm Soviet stand. These effects, the Soviets probably hoped, would in turn have the effect of channeling the crisis into the negotiations which were about to start.

The effect of the move on the Soviet Union was to increase its in some contingencies; commitment to the support of its ally/ failure to support China in the event of an attack on the Chinesemainland would be very costly for the Soviet image of resolve and credibility. At the same time, the move, by defining the offshore islands and Formosa as a political-geographical Chinese internal problem, drew the/limits of the Soviet commitment to China under the terms of their treaty. The treaty, which called for "autmostic" assistance, was not even mentioned in Khrushchev's letter.

The personal recipient of the move, President Eisenhower, was evidently angered by its tone. In his reply he rejected

Khrushchev's accusations about American policy, retorted that the
drisis was entirely the fault of the Chinese Communists, and noted
that to his knowledge Khrushchev had not urged moderation on his Chinese
stated
ally. He/zapantedxhis hope that the Peking would use negotiation to

_/ John/Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 137.

settle "the issues that tend to disturb the peace in the Formosa area." The President also declared that the Chinese Communists

U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 499; Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, cited above, p. 462-463.

were resorting to an illegitimate use of force to conquer an area which had never been under their control, and that "the Republic of China. . .is recognized by the majority of the sovereign nations of the world and its government has been and is exercising jurisdiction over the territory concerned."

The general effect on the perceptions of the recipient was to create some feelings of alarm. At that time it swas generally assumed that if Peking did not lift the blockade it might well be impossible to break it without attacking the Chinese mainland, Thus the Soviet commitment to support the Chinese in that event made it necessary for the United States to raise its estimate of the net cost of war to itself. However, the United States had assumed all along that the Soviets supported the probe and would provide at least local tactical assistance if necessary. Therefore United States perceptions were probably not greatly altered.

The letter had no particular consequences for the strategic situation of the United States.

The wnky next moves made by the United States had been planned before Khrushchev made his primary communication move. The only United States move that resulted directly from the letter was Eisenhower's reply to it.

[/]See above, p. 000

Type of Tactic

a. In relation to working paper #2, this was a primary communication move; it was had elements of a Type I threat. The Soviets already had an alliance commitment to the Communist Chinese, and a generalized incentive to defend the Communist Block and in the sense of Boholling's "warning," Khrushchev spoke of "the situation from which no one can escape. . . if the fire of war breaks out," and of the "slippery slope." It also had elements of a Type II threat; because the firmness of to assist China the Soviet commitment/was increased, and that's the/losses from backing down thereby also increased, so the Soviet incentive structure was thereby somewhat modified. However, it was not a Type III threat, because it did not creat a commitment that had not existed before. b. In relation to working paper #6, It was not really an explicit threat to do a specific thing. There was no promise of military assistance to Peking even in the event of an attack on the mainland; the statement that an attack on China was an attack on the Soviet Union was rather a generality. Also, although Khrushchev stated that the United States should get out of Asia and the Pacific, he Hid not indicate any steps that he would take if the United States did not comply. References to the Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles were not connected to specific plans to employ them. The status of the giver and receiver of this move were very high; they were both heads of state. Rather than in the form of a public announcement, as were most of the communication moves in this crisis, it was in the form of a direct written communication, but it still can be characterized as public diplomacy, simed at a broad sudience. c. The move can be described as a deterrent threat whose object was to raise the opponent's estimate of his net costs of war by altering his perceptions of the over's intentions.

- d. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility

Change one's apparent utilities 1. Reduce the cost of war:

the issue would be so important to him that he would be willing to fight over it.

- 2. Khrushchev stated, not about the Soviet Union but about Communist China, that the United States' opponent did not fear war, and would win. 1
- 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes:
 - a. The move was a threat which engaged Soviet prestige, honor and future bargaining reputation.
 - b.Khrushchev made claims for the legitimacy and legality of China's position vis-a-vis the Nationalists.
 - c. Khrushchev invoked his alliance obligations.
 - d. Khrushchev invoked historical tradition in a reference to the American struggle for independence.

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

- 1. The threat tended to increase the level of shared risk of inadvertent war; manipulation of risk.
- 2. Khrushchev emphasized the uncertainties in the situation.
 II.Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

- 1. Khrushchev verbally exaggerated his own capabilities.
- 2. Khrushchev stressed the danger of escalation.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

- 1. Khrushohev repeatedly invoked the shamed value of peace.
- 2. Khrushchev challenged the legality of the United States' position.

- 3. Khrushchev tried to minimize the element of duress or provocation in this threat by stating that it was not a threat, but a warning of objective consequences.

 He did not use "diplomatic language" but stated that he did not because he believed it was important to make himself clear and not in order to sound more threatening.
- 4. Khrushchev stressed the common interests in settling the dispute and avoiding war.

Several moves of major importance, clustered around the first week of September, and taken together they mark the end of the first part of the crisis, in which the challenge was delivered and the battle lines drawn, and the beginning of the second phase, in which the conclusion was finally reached after a number of communication moves and a test of military strength and skill executed through a number of basic moves.

_/ Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," cited above, p. 276-277.

the United States ships outside the three-mile limit were not struck by Communist artillery. A second convoy on September 7 was fired upon and driven away from the beach, and successive convoys were also failures until September 14. Meanwhile the Americans were

assisting the Nationalists to master various techniques of landing and unloading under fire, and to utilize United States-supplied

/ See Section II, p. 24 for details.

amphibious landing craft. The convoys began to succeed on September 14, were an obvious success by about September 21, and continued negularly until October 6.

Thaxiniandedxaffestxsfxtkinxman The considerations and pressures producing the move can be on Quemoy and Matsu summarized as follows: The Nationalist garrisons/could not be supplied without this United States assistance, and the islands would eventually fall unless they were supplied. The United States had determined not to permit this. Secondly, the United States chose the convoy operation as the most restrained way possible to help the Nationalists / The convoys were not / given a high probability of success, but the garrisons were well enough supplied to hold out for a while; whit was not necessary to take more drastic steps immediately. Of course the basic pressure producing the move was the bombardment from the mainland, which resumed after the brief pausa in the first week of September. "The Chinese Communists refrained from naval action but concentrated at least moderate artillery fire against Quemoy and against the convoys attempting to land. . . . This fire was never as intense as in late August."

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_/ Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," cited above, p. 276-277.

The intended effect of the move was to break the blockade without intensifying or widening the scope of hostilities.

The actual effect of the move on the mover was to commit the United States more credibly than before to the defense of the offshore islands. The United States' basic moves in late August and September strengthened the United States' military posture in the Straits area generally, but were not so directly related to Quemoy and Matsu as this move. Costs of backing down would now be greatly increased.

The recipient's perceptions of United States intentions were brought further into line with the reality of United States intentions. In Critical Risk terms, Peking realized when the convoys started that the United States would almost certainly commitment to its ally stand firm. United States paking administrations gained credibility as a result of the move.

Peking's strategic situation had by now changed considerably since August 23, although this was not immediately apparent since at first the convoys did not succeed in landing supplies. Militarily, Peking could have increased the artillery barrage; could have fired on United States ships, which were at times within range of the shore batteries; could have strafed or bombed the islands; could have tried to mount an invasion. The final alternative in

"The willingness of the United States to place escort vessels within the effective range of CFR artillery provided more telling evidence concerning the American position on the contingent use of force than any verbal threats."

_/ Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p. 128.

military-strategic terms was/not hold the bombardment at its existing level.

Peking chose the last alternative. As the crisis proceeded, Chinese Communists Their their moves became steadily more cautious. *The/did not try to intensify the blockade of Quemoy after the United States began convoying, and **anaximativa** and

Type of Tactic

_/ Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," cited above, p. 340.

_/ See above, p. III-19.

this

- b. In relation to working paper #2, was a marking basic move. Fartly, it had a deterrent purpose; the presence of the United States escort vessels might deter Paking from more aggressive military moves against the islands of the Nationalist convoys than those they were already making. In part, it was an effort to return the initiative to Paking, by breaking the blockade at the existing level of applied force. The move succeeded in both these purposes.
- c. In relation to working paper #6, the move was a manipulation of shared risk. The United States forces had orders to return fire if fired upon. This was also a form of arranging lack of final control in Washington.
- d. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility

Change one's apparent utilities

- 1. Reduce the apparent cost of war

 This move did not appear to reduce the cost of war
- 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes; the United States' apparent valuation of the offshore islands was significantly increased.

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

- 1.Decision-making authority (in the matter of whether to fire at Communist Chinese forces in specific instances) was devolved onto the local naval commanders.
- 2. The level of shared risk of inadverten war was raised.
- 3. It was a "minor" use of force.
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

1.United States capabilities and readiness in the immediate

area of the offshore islands were increased.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

1. This move did not devalue the stakes for Peking.

Between the 9th and the 28th of September the United States rejected to basic position in a series of communication moves.

No single one of these moves had a major effect, but taken as a whole they reinforced the effects of Dulles' statements of September 4. At a press conference on September 9, Dulles indicated

that the Nationalist build-up on the offshore islands had not been either supported or opposed by the United States; it was the sovereign decision of the Nationalists, and if the United States had attempted to prevent it "it would have weakened the defensive posture of the United States in the entire area. . . What is involved, and what is under threat, is the entire position of the United States and that of its free-world allies in the Western Pacific. . . . That is of vital interest to the United States. . . . We have to maintain good will and good relations and the morale of the governments that are our friends and allies in that part of the world. Those factors have to be taken into account and not purely military dispositions." the offshore islands as such were not covered by the Mutural Defense/ He repeated his earlier statement that windarx braximix Rassimizan, but that under the Joint Resolution the President would make a contingent decision to defend them, depending on whether an attack on them appeared to be related to an attack on Formosa. It was not possible to make this decision in advance of actual events, he said.

[/] Paul Zinner, ed., <u>Documents on American Foreign Relations 1958</u>, cited above, p. 452-455; U.S. Dempartment of State <u>Bulletin XXXIX</u>, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 485-493.

His statement of September 4 still stood as an expression of United States policy, he told the reporters.

Two days later President Eisenhower in a radio and television address articulated his reasoning to his listeners. He was expressed his strong hope that fruitful negotiations could take place, then gave an account of the bombardment: "Powerful dictatorships are attacking

-/ Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, cited above, p. 455-462; U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 498-503.

an exposed, but free area. What should we do?" He explicitly analogized

In regard to the Warsaw Talks, Dulles said that he looked for a them a cease-fire to produce a modus vivendi,/leading to the abandonment of force as an instrument to resolve issues: "If the issues themselves could be resolved, that would be a very good result, but that perhaps is too much to hope."

(Insect 504 here)

the situation to the Munich Pact, and added that the "Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union appear to be working hand in hand. . . . (they)

Phresh have decided to find out whether threatening war is a policy from which they can make big gains." He said that Peking was declaring that the operations against Quemoy were preliminary to an attack on Formosa; the Joint Resolution therefore applied, and he would make the decision to use American forces to defend Quemoy if it became necessary. "Now I assure you that no American boy will be asked by me to fight just for Quemoy. But . . . we stand ready to defend the principle that armed force shall not be used for aggressive purposes." Finally, in reference to the Warsaw Talks, he said that "diplomacy can and should find a way out.

Dulles rejected the opponents' claim that it was a question of civil war. There were elements of a civil war, he said, but also elements that could lead to an international war. The general situation was "almost an exact replica of the situation that existed about four years ago," and the vital interests of the United States and the principle of no change through the use of force were at stake.

There are measures that can and should be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace."

The next day, September 12, Eisenhower replied to Khrushchev's letter. He rejected Khrushchev's arguments and restated the general

_/ See above, p. III--40-41.

United States position on the conflict.

Assembly. He repeated the United States' version of the basis of the conflict, stressed United States opposition to the use of force to gain territory, rejected the minimum argument, as well as their argument that the offshore islands should belong to mainland China because of their proximity to the mainland, and again expressed hopes for the outcome of the Warsaw Talks.

_/ U.S. Department of States <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIX, No. 1006 (8@October 6, 1958), p. 525-526.

On September 20, Eisenhower/rejected"a second letter from

Khrushchev.xx "The White House instantly refused to accept Khrushchev's

For information on the letter,

A See below, p. -000. ZZZ -67

letter and instructed the embassy in Moscow to return the signed copy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry because its "abusive and intemperate" language and "inadmissible threats" xadm rendered it unacceptable under established interantional usage." In addition, the White House issued

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1957, cited above, p. 174.

an impersonal statement to refute and counteract Khrushchev's letter. stated

It/mmtmd that the Soviets supported the Chinese use of force to achieve "expansionist ends", while the United States was seeking a peacful solution in Warsaw, and that it "was not easy to negotiate under such threats as the Soviet Union now makes."

_/ U.S. Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIX, No. 1006 (October 6, 1958), p. 530-533.

Dulles next/Enaka on September 25. He said, ina widely publicized speech, that the United States would not agree to any arrangement in Warsaw that would prejudice the rights of the Nati nalists, but "would find acceptable any arrangement which; on the one hand, did not involve surrender to force or the threat of force, and, on the other hand, eliminated from the situation features that could reasonably be regarded as provocative." After this hint that the United States would be willing to see some changes occur in the status of the offshore islands, or at least in the size of the garrisons

there, he noted that so far threking and the Soviet Union had rejected any settlement involving a cease-fire, or dealing only with the offshore islands. He compared Quemoy to Berlin, and

_/ <u>Ibid.</u>, No. 1007 (October 1313, 1958), p. 565.

intimated that the United States was prepared to risk war for it.

_/ John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 139.

By
Et/this time, a "diplomatic impasse" had developed in Warsaw,
where
where two sides' initial positions had proved to be diametrically
opposed.

Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 180.

For more information on the Warsaw Talks, see Section V, p. 1-4. They have been analyzed in an explanation of the outcome of the crisis, because their failure did contribute to the outcome, but the communications moves which made up the Talks were not Eight very significant in the day-today course of the crisis.

The last w to be noted in this series of United States communication moves was a speech by the Secretary of the Air Force on September 27. With specific State Department approval, he that declared/the UnitedStates was prepared, if it proved necessary, to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Quemoy.

[/] Kenneth Young, Negotisting with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1957, cited above, p. 182; John R Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 139.

During this mid-crisis period, while the United States Conversi freeze repeatedly communicated that its basici position remained unchanged, the military situation in the Straits gradually reversed. September, the success of the convoy operation was highly doubtful, but between September 14, when the first www convoy to land successfully unloaded its supplies, and September 21, when convoys had landed successfully on each intervening day, the blockade was effectively broken. On Max September 27, the day the United States Secretary of the Air Force made his speech threatening the use of nuclear weapons, "The biggest convoy yet to reach Quemoy unloaded about 200 200 tons of supplies." The/initiative had been returned to Peking, which was no longer able to interdict the islands with the artillery bombardment alone. Secondly, in an air battle on September 24, the Nationalists dealt the Peking forces a decisive defeat. The Nationalists had been armed with Sidewinder missiles for their F-86 jets, but this battle demonstrated the poor quality of Peking's air force, "whose MIGs were outflown tactically by the outnumbered F-86 aircraft of the Chinese Nationalists even before the latter began using the Sidewinder."

_/ Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist Chinas Strategy in the Nuclear Erg, cited above, p. 130. For more detail on the air battle, see section II, p. 14.

Another event during this period which had implications for the military situation was the emplacement on Quemoy by the United States of 8" howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells. This basic move had extensive consequences for the outcome of the crisis,

although it did not receive wide attention immediately.

The considerations and presures producing the move were probably (1) at the time the decision was taken (early September) the outcome of the effort to break the blockade was uncertain, if and conventional power on the islands would km not have been sufficient to resist an invasion, should one be mounted, and (2) the presence of the guns would have a deterrent effect on Peking even if they were never used.

The actual effects of this move on the United States was to commit it more heavily than ever to the defense of Quemoy, and to raise the credibility of that commitment.

The recipient of this move altered his perceptions of United States' intentions in particular contingencies. He now perceived an even higher Criticial Risk for the United States. He also perceived the physical difficulties in his path, should be try there was a major change in his path, should be try to escalate his military effort. "We did not give the Nationalists any nuclear shells. But the were emplacement of eight-inch howitzers on Quemoy served as a dual warning. In the first place, their arrival broke the Communist blockade at one strike as far as artillery ammunition was concerned. A few nuclear shells flown in by plane would equal the power of thousands of conventional rounds, which had to be brought in by sea. In the second place, eight-inch nuclear shells, if fired to detonate above an invading fleety of amphibious vessels and small craft, would doom the invasion. The eight-inch howitzers discouraged by their were emplacement Communist ideas of conquest... this was one of the factors which induced Peiping to back away."

_/ Hanson Baldwin, "Limited War," The Atlantic, Vol. 203, No. 5 (May 1959), p. 35-43.

The Nationalists actually chose/a very cautious response, which was the same as their general response to the failure of the Blockade.

_/ See above, px3p. III-47.

Type of Tactic

a. In relation to working paper #2, this was a basic move which heightened further the United States commitment to the defense of the offshore islands, and effected a basic change in the nature of the game by introducing tactical nuclear weapons in a new location. It was not an irrevocable basic move, since the guns were never fired, and could have been removed at any point. Thus it appears by to be a nonverbal Threat of Type II, modifying the incentive structure of the threatener but note enough to make an interesting irrevocable commitment.

b. According to one analyst, "for the first time in history, *tactical nuclear weapons played the ancient role of the fleet in being."

c.In relation to working paper #6, this basic move was a nonverbal threat to inflict further harm on the opponent. It was fairly explicit, although the guns could fire either nuclear or conventional

_/ Hanson Baldwin, "Limited War," cited above, p. 41.

The placing of these weapons on the islands, which/were the focus of the crisis, was an exercise incoercive diplomacy. It was a use of force to show the United States' resolve to protect its interests, and to establish the credibility of its determination to use more force if necessary.

ammunition, and to that degree it was ambiguous. The threat was of used in circumstances/an ongoing hostilitées and considerable diplomatic tension. The medium was of course military hardware. It increased the United States commitment braken in general, but was not an irrevocable commitment to the use of tactical nuclears. As to lack of control, the United States did not actually give the Nationalists any nuclear shells, but it is not known whether Peking was aware of that, and in any event they could always be given to the Nationalists at a later time.

- d. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility
 Change one's apparent utilities
 - 1. Reduce the apparent cost of war
 - a. United States capabilities were increased by the move, and
 - b. The readiness of United States capabilities was also increased.
 - 2.Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes
 - a. The/transfer of these weapons from Okinawa to Quemoy underlined the United States' valuation of the stakes.

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

Decision-making authority was not actually maximized volved to lower levels in the command structure, since at least in the **x* instance of nuclear shells being fired, the American President officially retained the decisional prerogative. However, to Peking it may well have appeared that the United States had put nuclear shells in the hands of local commanders, or even in the hands of b. The Nationalists, a proxy state with a much greater

incentive to use them.

- c. The move increased the shared risk of inadvertent war.
- d. The move was a "show of force."
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk.

Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

a.By increasing its own capabilities and readiness the United States considerably increased its adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

a. This move did not devalue the stakes for the adversary.

While the blockade was being broken, the Nationalists continued to demand permission to bomb the mainland. The On September 15, the day the Warsaw Talks opened and the day after the first successful convoy to Quemoy, Chiang stated that the convoy system was "no solution," and on September 19 the Nationalist Ambassador to the United States siad that "air attacks would be justified by 'our inherent right of self-defense'." This appeared to be a threat to attack the mainland without United States authorization, using the self-defense clause in the Mutual Defense Treaty as justification.

As the breaking of the blockade became more and more evident, Nationalist pressure to escalate the fighting increased. On September 22, the Nationalists said they would be disposed to bomb the shore batteries unless the bombardment of Quemoy let up within two weeks,

[/] For the possible effect of this ultimatum on the outcome of the crisis, see below, p. V-4- 1/1-85, V-4-V-5.

and on September 29 Chiang "took the most uncompromising attitude which he had so far assumed." He said he not agree to a ceaseifire, and if Quemoy were seriously threatened he would act with our without United States backing. The United States, he said, placed no restriction on retaliatory bombing of the mainland. "It would seem that with the blockede in the processof being broken, he was making a last attempt to extend the war."

of United States policy," The United States perceived a real possibility of a Nationalist-Peking deal, if its support of the Nationalists was not thought sufficient, and "Having poured one billion dollars of military and economic aid into Taiwan since 1949 and aving committed herself to its defense by treaty, the United States would suffer a disastrous blow to her prestige, should such a deal take place."

Also during this period "reports had persisted that there had been unofficial contacts between Chiang Kai-shek's agents and the Chinese Communist regime to provide for the contingency of a change

^{/ &}lt;u>lbid.</u>, p. 1082.

The considerations and pressures affecting the Nationalists when they made these communication moves can be summarized briefly:
"It would seem that with the blockade in the process of being broken, he [Chiang] was making a last attempt to extend the war." The

/ Ibid., p. 1085.

Nationalists perceived that they would probably have to settle for the status quo, but they still hoped to alter it in their own and favor, if possible, by military means, did not mind of their ally that became involved but on the contrary realized that would be a necessary precondition. Another consideration was their wish to prevent any settlement being reached at Warsaw that could be to their disadvantage, Feelers to Petring combined with Pressures on the United States for permission to extend the war would tend to counteract any tendency on the part of the United States to compromise with Peking.

The intended effects of these moves, particularly the declarations of intent to bomb the mainland, was to stabilize the support of the United States, and (2) in the case of the ultimatum issued on August 22, possibly to bring the bombardment to an end by a threat to escalate directed at the opponent. In connection with the first objective, securing the continued support of the United States, there may have been annelement of deception; it was probably most unlikely that the Nationalists were seriously considering a if "deal" with Peking, even if the United States should disappoint them in some way, and it was also unlikely that the Nationalists would expand the war. However United States

The belligerent attitude of the Nationalists, and their commitment to defend their holdings and if possible regain control of the mainland or at least a foothold on it were already widely known. The Insofar as there was an effect, it was to heighten that commitment and increase the costs to the Nationalists of backing down from their position on the offshore islands.

The recipients of these communications—the United States and Peking,—perceived that Nationalist determination was as firm as ever, and that the risks of an expanded war were thereby heightened.

level of The effect on Peking's strategic situation was to raise the/risk involved in continuing the bombardment, or taking other military steps. The effect on the United States' strategic situation was to narrow the range of choice for United States policy vis—a-vis Peking. The effects on the recipients' choice of move are hard to identify precisely, but in the case of Peking the EMMISSAMA decision to back off from the conflict may have been influenced by these moves, and in the case of the United States the decision not to press Chiang very hard on the status of the offshore islands and the size of his installation on them mmyxhmamambash was probably in part at least connected to these Nationalist moves.

Type of Tactic

a. In relation to/wkxing paper #2, these moves were Type I threats.

The incentive to carry out the threat was pre-existing, and the

Nationalists verbalized their wish to act accordingly. The credibility

of the threat was, perhaps for that reason, fairly high; the ultimatum

of August 22 appears to have had high credibility in Peking.

b. In relation to working paper #6, these/tuerts, perticularly the ultimatum, were fairly specific and explicit. The personal status of the giver was high--either Chiang himself or himan ambassador or foreign minister delivered them. There were no individual instance recipients, since these were another/where of the "declaratory diplomacy" characteristic of the crisis. They were not irrevocable, although if beking had not declared a temporary cease-fire when the ultimatum expired it is possible that the Nationalists would have felt compelled to make their threat good.

- c. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility

 Change one's apparent utilities
 - 1. Reduce the apparent cost of war
 - a. Various verbal statements were made of the type and "We don't fear War,", "We can win," "The issue is so important to us that we are willing to fight over it," were made.
 - 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes
 - a. These threats, particularly the ultimatum, eggaged the Nationalists' prestige and honor and future credibility.
 - b. Indirectly, the United States' alliance obligations
 were invoked.

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

- 1. Exximuzarouse The ultimatum gave the next initiative to Beking.
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

 Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of War

- 1. The Nationalists tended to exaggerate their capabilities
- 2. The Nationalists indicated that they wanted to escalate. Devalue the stakes for the adversary
 - 1. These moves did not devalue the stakes for Peking.

Unions

The second of the Soviet, a three primary communication moves was a second letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, dated September 19. In the period between Khrushchev&s first letter to Eisenhower on September 7 and this second letter, the Soviets inxi had made several communications moves designed in on the one hand/deter raising United States' estimates of the probability of Soviet retaliation, and on the other hand to limit their commitment to Peking. The Soviets were faced with a dilemnax. While They were ready to support imm Peking's probe up to a point, or to save them utfrom disproportionate defeat; but to deter the United States, they had to impress the United States with the dangers of escalation, while on the other hand, "by strongly injecting themselves into the dispute, the Russians knd increased the possibility that the local conflict would bring about a general war. To made their threats credible, the Russians had to profess their staunch commitment to the defense of the G.P.R. Yet, to do so risked involvement all the more. . . The Russians did not resolve their Quemoy dilemna."

_/ John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisisof 1958," cited above, p. 124.

In hopes of directing the crisis into political channels, the Soviets tried to get it before the United Nations. Peking was opposed to this, so "the Russians appear to have resorted to the issue of C.P.R. membership as mea roundabout way of introducing the crisis into U.N. deliberations." When the General Assembly opened, on September 17, the Soviets argued for Peking's admission, perhaps in hopes that the debate would put political pressure on the United States to de-escalate. Also "Even after initiating their

subsequent campaign of threats, the Russians apparently wanted it understood that they preferred the crisis to end in negotiations, not war." Following his letter of September 7, Khrushchev made a

A speech on September 11 in which he modified some of his statements.

He said that the Soviets would "consider" an attack on main and China as an attack on itself; "This speech appeared to redefine the Soviet position as one in which considered judgment would determine the applicability of the Soviet commitment," and a subsequent declaration that Soviet aid would be rendered "if this is necessary" implied that the Soviets might see no need to intervene. Khrushchev also began to praise Chinese Communist competence, stating that they had "everything necessary to give a suitable rebuff" to any aggressor." There were

_ / <u>Ibid</u>.,p. 129.

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 128.

_/ <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 135.

also "clarifying" declarations. One week after September 7 they Soviets hinted, unofficially, that their involvement would apply only in the case of United States (not Nationalist) action against the They Chinese mainland. They also appeared to be warning the United States to keep a tight rein on Chiang, and not works permit with Peking. him to involve the United States in his conflict. Thus they may have been developing an excuse, if one were needed, "to avoid involvement in the event of limited U.S. action, such as an air strike against the C.P.R. coastal batteries."

The letter of September 19 was ximmaxis an effort to make a credible deterrent threat. This "nuclear retaliatory threat" appeared to be more ominous than the letter of September 7, which had accused the United States of "nuclear blackmail" but had not mentioned retaliation specifically. The letter also, for the first time in Soviet communications in the crisis, specifically referred to the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty. Still, the threat did not refer to retaliation against United States territory, or to the use of Soviet forces. "In retrospect, the interesting feature of Khrushchev's letter concerning the Warsaw Talks was not Moseow's threat of nuclear retaliation but its endorsement of Siplomacy."

Ibid., p. 136-137. We might note here that the Soviets and the United States appear to have been following strategies which in some respects were parallel. They tried to make their commitment to intervene militarily contingent on sparsific firm but particular (but imperfectly specified) future events; and they both indicated they did not plan to help their respective. Chinese allies to alter the status quo, but only to maintain it; and they both reserved the decision to act to themselves, rather than transferring it to their allies; and they both made efforts.

Kenneth Young, Magotiating with the Chinase Communists: The United States Expandence, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 22/172.

"Nevertheless, Khrushchev's letter did soften its threat of nuclear retaliation by carefully refraining from implying that the territory of the United States would be attacked. The letter avoided specifying the "aggressor" or the target area for such retaliation. It also did not indicate that Soviet-controlled atomic weapons and Soviet-manned means of delivery would be used, and permitted the logical inference that a nuclear exchange, if undertaken by Chinese forces, could only occur in the local threater of operations around Taiwan. Moscow retained the nuclear initiative xixxx vis-à-vis Peking.

In retrospect, the interesting feature of Khrushchev's letter. . . x was not Moscow's threat of nuclear retaliation but its endorsement of diplomacy. . . . The Soviet letter of September 19, despite its belligerent and insulting tone, put great emphasis on the use of diplomacy."

The considerations and pressures producing this move were that the United States had not swerved from its policy of assisting the Nationalists to break the blockade. The Soviets hoped to deter the United States from initiating or supporting the use of tactical nuclears in the Straits locality by threatening retaliation, at leaset locally. Secondly, ***two talks had already been held between the United States and Peking in Warsaw, and the Soviets hoped by stressing these talks and at the same time ***two takes had alterning escalation by the opponent they could move the crisis toward a diplomatic solution.

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 172.

The intended effect on the recipient was to get him to adopt a cautious military policy and to negotiate seriously. Moscov appeared

The actual effect on the mover was to commit him more definitely to the support his ally. mCosts of failing to support Peking in the event of an attack on the mainland would now be higher.

to be signalling Washington (1) not to attack the Chinese mainland, (2) not start in motion a chain of events which would lead to direct Soviet-United States military conflict, and (3) not to frustrate the Warsaw negotiations.

_/ Ibid.x

The effect of this move on the recipient's perceptions was counter-productive, from the Soviet point of view. The United States "officially rejected" the letter, an unusual measure in diplomacy, and subsequent statements by the United States until

_/ See above, p. III-52.

There were no particular effects on the United States' strategic situation. The United States chose to reject the latter, and increase the firmness of its posture.

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 175.

Type of Tactic

a. In relation to working paper #2, Khrushchev's letter was a Type I XX threat with elements with elements of Type II, as was his first letter to Eisenhower. That is, it was partly a communication of a pre-existing incentive structure, but the act of communication further modified the Soviet incentive structure. It was a primary communication move.

and explicit
b. In relation to working paper #6, This move was a more specific/

threat than the first letter, which had mentioned neither the

Sino-Soviet Treaty nor the possibility of nuclear reprisal, as such.

Again, the personal status of the giver and receiver were extremely

high; they were both heads of state. The commitment to support

Peking was contingent and not irrevocable, but quite strong nonetheless.

With its emphasis on negotiation, the letter was also meant partly

as a tactic of accomodation, but it was not perceived as such.

c. Again like Khrushchev's first letter, the move can be described as
a deterrent threat whose object was to raise the opponent's estimate

of his net costs of war by altering his perceptions of the mover's

d. In relation to working paper #4;

intentions.

- I. Tactics to increase credibility
 Change one's apparent utilities
 - 1. Reduce the apparent net cost of war
 - a. A colorful array of verbal statements in this move was were designed to reduce the apparent net cost of war to the Soviets
 - 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes
 - a. Khrushchev's threats, tied as they were to his treaty commitments, engaged his prestige, honor and future bargaining reputation.

b. The letter invoked alliance obligations.

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

- 1. The more specific threats in the letter tended to increase the level of shared risk of inadvertent war.
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

- 1. The letter, while it perhaps did not exaggerate Soviet and Chinese capabilities, certainly stressed them.
- 2. The danger of escalation was pointed out.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

- 1. Khrushchev attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the United States' position,
- 2.Stressed the legitimacy of Peking's position, and
- 3. Stressed the common interests in settling the dispute and avoiding war.

At some time during September, Peking may have made a communication (if it actually happened)
move which/could be categorized as a tactic of accommodation. Peking
"probably used diplomatic channels outside the Warsaw machinery
reportedly to try to convey a vague signal to Washington that an
interim basis might be found first to deal with the offshore islands
and then later, at some indefinite time, to take up the question of
United States withdrawal from Taiwan itself." This report was never

[/] Kenneth Young, Negotiation with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 184.

confirmed; the State Department denied it at the time, xxx but "On

the other hand, American correspondents and knowledgeable diplomatic sources insisted then and still maintain that some kind of "signal" was sent from Feking and was received in Washington." The Signal reportedly was sent informally via the Norwegian government. The immediate and total withdrawal of United States forces from Formosa was not/demanded, and it looked as though Peking was shifting its position. Whether the move actually was made or not, "it would not have contradicted other available indications that Peking had its own two-stage strategy for getting the offshore islands first and then moving on to Taiwan later."

_/ <u>Ibiā.</u>, p. 184-185.

the second part of September they realized the United States was breaking the blockade and was not going to negotiate the status of the islands at Warsaw. Peking would not have wanted to drop its demands for American withdrawal in Warsaw, because they were a basic part of its propaganda positions, but it might have reasoned that it could not lose face publicly if a private and informal bid for settlement were rejected. Peking's public posture vis-a-vis the United States was quite different: "After the third meting in Warsaw on September 22, 1958, Peking resorted to a well-known negotiating tactic of creating outside pressures on an opponent to strengthen one's position inside the conference room. Peking used its diplomatic channels with certain other countries, and briefings for the Communist news media, to circulate an aide-mémoire couched in threstening terms against the United States."

_/ Ibid., p. 132 179-189.

These moves on Peking's part came as the crisis was actually moving toward a status quo settlement. The Nationalists and held control of the airspace over the Straits; with the help of the Americans had broken the blockade, the initiative was returned to Peking, which refused the escalation option. It appears that the two major powers—the United States and the Soviet Union;—exercised a deterrent effect upon one another and a restraining effect on their Chinese allies. The period from September 30 to October 6 can be described as a sepapate, settlement phase of the conflict, or as the ending of Example the second major phase. In either case, it was characterized by the relative absence of threats, what by by the retrenchment of claims and/several bidding moves.

The first major move in this period of the crisis was a press conference held by Secretary Dulles on September 30.

_/ Paul Zinner, ed., <u>Documents on American Foreign Relations</u>, 1958, cited above, p.465-471; U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX, No. 1008 (October 20, 1958), p. 597-604.

Dulles waxxeekedxwha spoke of the return of the Nationalists to the mainland at a future date a "highly hypothetical matter."...I don't think that just by their own steam they are going to get there."

The possibility could not be excluded, but it Only in the event of unrest and an uprising on the mainland would the Nationalists have a viable opportunity to return, and image "There is no American the United States and the Nationalists commitment of any kind to aid in that. "...Neither of us/is free to use force from the areas of the treaty a ainst the mainland exception."

As for the offshore islands, Dulles said that "If there were a ceasefire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think
it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these islands.
We thought that it was rather foolish to put them there." He added
that a de facto cease-fire would be acceptable, if circumstances
could be so arranged that it would be distinctly to Peking's
disadvantage to violate it. It was not a question of the islands
themselves, but of the connection between the islands and Formosa,
a connection which he said the Peking kept making; "And when you have
the edge, the front edge, of a wedge that is driving in, and where
they say they are not going to stop at the first obstacle but to go
on, then you have to decide whether by allowing the wedge to gather
momentum and go on you are strengthening or weakening the defense of
the area you are committed to defend."

Dulles denied that the United States position on the renunciation of the use of force and on the large garrisons on the offshore islands had changed. He said the United States had always assumed the renunciation of the use of force should be reciprocal. While United States policy had not yet changed, there would be a possibility of important changes if there were some give on the Chinese Communist side. "Our policy is flexible. . . If the situation we have to meet changes, our policies change with it."

By the time that Dulles made these remarks, the military outcome of the crisis looked fairly certain. The bombardment had fallen off, the Chinese Communists were not mamakating initiating any other military roves, and the islands as matters stood could be held indefinitely. The considerations and pressures moving him to Americal innegation with its affect that the prevention

of another dangerous crisis over the offshore islands. The United probably
States hoped, if diplomatically possible, to remove the "thorn in the side of peace," without giving up any of the advantage it had gained through military victory. Meanwhile the Warsaw Talks were According to most analysts, the deadlocked, and no bargaining range was in evidence. The move was an effort to develop the basis for a bargaining range. Also, "if they the Chinese Communists had underestimated the difficulty of capturing the islands and were now looking for a way of retreat, the Secretary's remarks conveyed an indication that concessions on their side might be matched by concessions on the side of the United States and the Nationalists."

A minority interpretation of this

Dulles' remarks "appeared. . . to suggest a dramatic shift in his attitude toward the Taiwan issue and the Chinese People's Republic. . the most important, if elusive, comment Dulles made in his news conference was his indication that there was a possibility 'of some important changes' in United States policy, provided there was some 'response' from Peking."

move is that Dulles' statements were "essentially tactical shifts designed to give the United States an international image of responsiveness to world opinion on the assumption that neither of the two Chinas would have anything to do with a negotiated change affecting the status of the offshore islands alone. Specifically,

_/ Richard Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958 (New York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), p.326-327.

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 186-187.

he was quite careful to discuss possible American concessions in terms that the CFR would be certain to reject even in the event that the United States was willing to force the Nationalists into accepting them."

We may bring these interpretations together

/ Oran Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p.290.

with the view that hinting at future concessions was a move which would have no costs, since the United States had won a Pira military victory and was in a strong bargaining position. The gains from the move would be, at a minimum a better image with those and that sequente of demands of the States policy in the Straits, and at an unlikely maximum, a more stable arrangement in the Straits.

The actual effects on the mover were to de-commit it to some degree from its previous commitment to its mix ally's position on the offshore islands. The m Nationalists were keenly aware of this; on October 1, Chiang said he was "incredulous" at Dulles' statement. He declared it that it did not mean that Dulles expected him to reduce the garrison forces on the offshore islands, and even if it did, "it would only be a unilateral declaration and my government would be under no obligation to accept it."

[/] A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Folicy; (New York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960), p. 412.

The effects on Peking's perceptions are somewhat difficult to end a correspondive statement by Eisenbours determine. Peking made no direct response; Dulles' move, "did not move Peking any nearer to a resolution of the conflict. In fact, they may have helped to shut off the possibility of negotiations

on the offshore islands just as they might have gotten underway. In fact Peking now recoiled from further negotiations, except to seek Washington's capitulation a'though that had now become even more unlikely." Evidently the effect of this move on Peking's

perceptions, combined with the effect of a Soviet move of approximately acutely the same date, was to make Peking/apprehensive about a "Two Chinas"

 $\sqrt{\text{See below, p. -000}}$ $\frac{111-76}{\sqrt{11}}$

outcome to the crisis.

Peking's strategic situation was not materially altered by the move, withough except that the hope of material gains relative to publicly theoffshore islands through negotiation had been/held out to it.

Peking did not believe that that was a real hope, and considered the danger of a "Two Chinas" solution outweighed the possible advantages of a negotiated settlement. Peking chose to move away from, rather than toward, negotiation. On September 30, Chou En-lai made a speech in which he took a hard position against the United States, and meanwhile Peking's position hardened further at Warsaw.

Type of Tactic

Type of Tactic

a. In relation to working paper #2, this/move can best be defined as a primary communication move, rather than a bidding move. It

No TA

[/] Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 187.

_/ Kenneth Young, <u>Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967</u>, cited above, p. 188.

did not include specific offers or proposals for settlement, as would a bidding move; what rather it was designed to influence the other party's behavior at his next decision point, by modifying his expectations about the mover's incentive structure and probable behavior.

- b. In relation to working paper #6, it was a partial de-commitment, move tending to increase rather than a/commitment. Dulles hinted at the possibility of de-coupling the status of the offshore islands from that of Formosa.
- c. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility
 - A. This move was not designed to increase the mover's credibility. II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

MxIncrease the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

1. This move was not designed to alter the adversary's estimate of his costs of war

Defivalue the stakes for the adversary

- The move was an attempt to give Peking a loophole, or cover, for backing down from the confrontation.
 - 2.A guid pro quo was offered for a cease-fire, although not a specific one.
- A. The move implied the possibility of de-coupling the issue of the offshore islands from the issue of Formosa.

The Soviet Union had found that the United States' response to Khrushchev's deterrent threat of September 19 was not in the direction hoped for. "After President Eisenhower's reflection of

_/ See above, p. III--52, III-67.

Khrushchev's second letter as abusive and intemperate, Moscow Way have felt the need to restate its position so as to allay or forestall any feelings of desperation on the part of America that might prompt her to rash action." Pravda on September 25 contained Moscow's first reference during the crisis to the danger of accidental war:

The concentration of United States armed forces in the Strait area "has reached such a degree that a . . mad sally by some American generals can lead to a military catastrophe."

The Soviets delivered

[/] Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Muclear Era, cited above, p. 103.

no more threats, and subsequent statements tended After the air battle of September 24, Peking said 24 that American imperialism had used "guided missiles and atomic weapons," but the Soviets sidestepped Peking's effort to imply that they were being attacked by Americans, or with nuclear weapons. In their own comment, they referred only to the newest weapons, and said they had been used by the Nationalists, who tomorrow may decide to use the same missiles with atomic warheads."

Besides avoiding Peking's effort to involve them

_/ John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," cited above, p. 140.

diplomatically, the Soviets did not supply comparable air-te-air missiles to their Chinese allies. During the last days of September, the Soviets were playing down the whole crisis. On September 30,

the same day that Chou made a strong anti-United States speech in Peking, Hhrushchev made a major address in Moscow which contained no reference to the Taiwan crisis. At this point, with the interdiction effort a failure, "Peking really needed a Soviet nuclear shield and even Soviet nuclear weapons, in addition to other moral and material support," but "Moscow apparently denied such support to its ally and sought a compromise on both fronts, diplomacy and force."

The third and last Soviet major move came on October 5, when Khrushchev issued a "clarification" of the Soviet position on the Straits crisis. This "clarification" took the form of a reply to a question put by a Tass correspondent. Khrushchev noted that he had stated before that the Soviet Union would come to the defense of Communist China if it were attacked by the United States: "Does this contain the slightest hint that the USSR is, as President Eisenhower would have it, ready to take part in a civil war in China? No, we have already stated and do state something quite different; The USSR will come to the help of the CFR if it is attacked from without. . . we have not interfered in and do not intend to interfere in the civil war which the Chinese people are waging against the Chiang Kai-shek clique."

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 188.

_/ Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, cited above, p. 216.

This statement is generally interpreted as a modification of the previous Soviet position. It left open the possibility that United States military operations in defense of Taiwan and the offshore islands which did not involve action against the mainland might not be considered an attack requiring Soviet military response. "Nor did Khrushchev unequivocally state, inthe event of defensive action involving United States nuclear attacks on Chinese air bases, that the bloc's reaction would go beyond an intensive exploitation of the cold war aspects of the event." The United States could not count on bhat, because "There was bound to be a point at which the domestic prestige of the Chinese regime might be compromised to an extent that the Soviet Union would find intolerable. Moreover, a range of potential United States actions could be interpreted by Moscow, rightly or wrongly, as reflecting intentions to take further actions of a kind that Moscow could not tolerate. The Key factor, however, in any such determinations was that the Soviet Union, not the CPR, would be the one to make the crucial decision."

_/ Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Muclear Era, cited above, p. 127.

[&]quot;Notwithstanding the bombastic utterances of a few weeks before-made safely <u>after</u> the negotiations were started--the Soviet government
now appeared to be disengaging from the Taiwan matter."

_/ Kenneth Young, <u>Negotiating</u> with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 189.

The considerations and pressures influencing Moscow towards this move were complex. It has been interpreted as move made in

view, the Chinese would have been pleased by the statement, which "supported their own position and it is not inconceivable that they asked for it." The statement did describe the Nationalist-

Peking struggle as purely a civil war, but in other respects it is difficult to interpret it as being of assistance to Peking. It seems more probable that the Soviets decided to risk damaging their alliance relations, because other considerations weighed more heavily. These werem primarily, the dangers of Soviet-American military involvement, which seemed considerable in Moscow. When the probe proved a failure, and United States intentions proved to be to stand firm and risk war if necessary, the Soviets probably decided to de-commit themselves from the venture as far as possible, and put as they Askin could as much pressure on Peking/to discontinue its military activities.

The intended effects of the move most likely were to (1) counteract the negative reaction produced in Washington by Khrushchev's letter of September 19; if threats made Washington threaten in return, then conciliatory remarks might have a parallel effect, and (2) put pressure on Peking to stop the bombardment by withdrawing a measure of support from it.

The far effect of the move on the Soviet Union was to loosed its commitment to its ally, and to further limit the circumstances the commitment. In which it would apply. Costs of backing down would be lower than before the move was made.

The move had two recipients -- Peking and the United States.

The United States' perceptions of Soviet intentions were probably

_/ Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," cited above, p. 294.

altered in a reassuring direction. At the beginning of the crisis, the United States had perceived the Soviet Union as possibly the instigator and certainly the supporter of Peking, but by this point in the course of events anxiety about possible Soviet intervention was considerably lower. The impact on the United States' strategic situation could have been significant, but in fact the hostilities ceased the following day, and the United States did not need to make a choice of further moves.

In all probability this Soviet statement was delivered to Peking several days before it was made public. If, as is likely, Peking was already aware of receiving much less Soviet support than it would have liked to have had, the move would have confirmed Peking's doubts about the usefulness of its alliance with the Soviet Union. Peking would have also perceived a greater danger that a "Two Chinas" solution might be imposed if the crisis continued; "From any objective view this the Soviet disengagement would have had the effect of easing the Taiwan crisis into a "Two Chinas" solution, Peking's anathema."

Since the blockade had been pierced, Peking's objectives had switched from trying to gain an advantage over the Nationalists to trying to retreat with a minumum of humiliation while preventing an American and/or Nationalist attack on the mainland, preventing a "Two Chinas" outcome and if possible fomenting any division in the United States—Nationalist alliance. Peking's propaganda in the offshore islands this period linked/Taxxam and Formosa; the only change in the status

__/ Kenneth Young, <u>Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience</u>, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 189.

of the offshore islands that Peking could contemplate was its
own acquisition of them. During this time the shelling had been
decreasing in volume, probably as part of a strategy of very
gradually withdrawing from the confrontation. Now with the Soviet
aims of
commitment to the/probe explicitly denied, Peking's strategic
situation became very difficult.

Geking's sex choice of moves was rather dramatic. On the following day, Peking announced a cease-fire.

_/ See below, p. 600. 111 - 84.

Type of Tactic

a. In relation to working paper #2, Khrushchev's "clarification" was a primary communication move. It was not a bidding move--no one suggestions for settlement were made. The purpose was to undo any commitments to nuclear action against the United States that might have arisen from earlier communications moves, and by adopting a more moderate tone to undo the negative results of the blustering of September 19.

Another tone used in the letter // Ziskozkar purpose was to make clear to Peking the limits of Soviet support.

b. The relation to working paper #6, the personal status of the mover was very high—he was the head of state. The medium used was a printed interview with a reporter; the communication was not directed the United States (although it may have been to Peking) to/wxxxxxxxxxxx through diplomatic channels, and was yet another example of public diplomacy. This communication was an effort to exclude the "Chinese civil war" from the scope of the Sino—Soviet alliance, rather than to couple it to the general east—west confrontation, as the United States continued to do.

- c. In relation to working paper #6 #4:
 - I. Tactics to increase credibility

Change one's apparent utilities

- 1. Reduce the apparent net cost of war: this move did not reduce the apparent cost of war for the Soviet Union
- 2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes: While limiting his alliance commitment, Khrushchev was careful to emphasize his commitment to Peking in the event that the United States were to attack mainland China.

Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs This move did not increase the apparent probability of Soviet firmness, but on the contrary decreased it.

II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's Critical Risk

Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war

This move would tend to decrease the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war, and it was not made until the Soviets perceived the likelihood of an American attack as very low in any event.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

The rationale that the struggle in the Straits was a Chinese internal affair hypothetically provided the United States with a loophole, should it choose not to assist the Nationalists.

The final move in the crisis was made in Peking on October 6.

The Minister of Defense of the Peking government (Peng) issued an official statement innt to the effect that a one-week cease-fire was to go into effect immediately, provided the United States ceased escorting the Nationalist convoys. The statement began with an

appeal to "All compatriots, military and civilian, in Taiwan, Penghu [the Pescadores], Quemdy and Matsu", to remember that "We are all Chinese." Marshall Peng informed these compatriots that their leaders had been "far too wild," carrying out raids on the mainland and so forth; "Hence the firing of a few shells, just to call your attention." He emphasized Chinese unity; "opposition to a twoChina solution was the keynote of Peng's statement of October 6."

_/ Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1958, cited above, p. 474-473 476.

_/ Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, cited above, p. 127.

He also warned the Nationalists khaz not to rely on their alliance with the United States: "The day will certainly come when the Americans will leave you in the lurch. . . . Placed in your circumstances how can you help but feel dismayed? In the last analysis, the American imperialists are our common enemy." The bombardment was being suspended, he said, "out of humanitarian considerations," and he proposed that talks be held between Peking and the Nationalists to effect a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile, Peking would try in Warsaw to persuade the Americans to pull out of the Western Pacific.

The considerations and pressures leading to Peking's decision to call a temporary cease-fire were manifold. First, they had suffered a military defeat at the level of hostilities which they had choseny, xxxxxxxxx/the lack of firm Soviet support and the/firm United States opposition made it seem most inadvisable to escalate even supposing militarily,xkxx/they had ever seriously considered such a course. With the interdiction ineffective, continued bombardment served no real purpose, but it did keep international attention focused on the Straits. This was connected with the second reason for the cease-fire; Peking was growing increasinly afraid that a two-Chinas solution might be imposed, and wanted to deflect international from the area. attention, to-other problems. Stopping the hostilities would produce that result. Thirdly, Peking had decided to try to maximize tensions between the Nationalists and the United States, whereas the bombardment was tending to drive them closer together. particular date -- October 6 -- on which Peking made the announcement was probably chosen for several reasons. (1) It was precisely two weeks after the Nationals had delivered their two-week ultimatum;

_/ See above, p. III-58.

⁽²⁾Khrushchev's "clarification" was published just the day before, and perhaps was received in Peking a day or two earlier; and (3)

"The announcement of a cease-fire came just as a very large wellpublicized convoy was about to sail to Quemoy. By stopping When they did the Chinese Communists were able to disguise the total failure of the blockade."

Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," cited above, p. 265-303.

The intended effectsof the move war were (1) to "save face" by declaring the cease-fire temporary and province contingent on United States cooperation; Peking did not renounce the use of force in principle; (2)

- (1)to bring the military confrontation to an end for the time
- (3) to forestall the possibility of a "two Chinas" solution for the Straits problem, and (4) to try to woo the Nationalists away from the alliance with the United States.

The actual effect of the move on the mover was to de-commit him from the probe, and temporarily de-commit him from the objective of taking the offshore islands. It is doubtful whether the move had a negative effect on Peking's reputation for resolve vis-2-vis the Nationalists. The one-week cease-fire was followed by a two-week cease-fire, then by an announcement that Peking reserved to itself the right to shell the Nationalist garrisons on the odd-numbered days of the month. However, Peking had publicly lost; "Mao. having undertaken a venture on the basis of a calculation of the balance of power which was not shared by Khrushchev, was forced to make a public and humiliating withdrawal."

The recipients of this move--the Nationalists and the United States--did not alter their basic perceptions of Feking. The Nationalists considered that Peking had suffered a military defeat, but would probably try again under more propitious conditions.

They did not weaken their alliance with the United States but on

[/] Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, cited RESEX above, p. 217.

the contrary tried to tighten it. The United States perceived that for the time being there was no room for negotiation with Peking. The recipient's strategic situation was altered; there was no further need for the United States convoys, and the general strategic situation reverted to the status quo ante. The Nationalists chose to continue to supply the offshore islands and keep them heavily fortified and garrisoned, and the United States chose to stop the convoys and (presumably) disperse the some of the neval strength that had been gathered in the Straits area.

Type of Tactic

b.In relation to working paper #6, this was a tactic of accomodation. While conceding nothing verbally, Peking's basic move was a concession, and the communication move announcing it was conciliatory in tone towards the Nationalists. The personal status of the mover was high, and it was military rather than civil. The move was directed to an individual recipient in another government, but was apublic declaration of policy.

- c. In relation to working paper #4:
 - I. Tactics to Increase credibility

Change one's apparent utilities

1. Reduce the apparent net cost of war; even while backing away from the military confrontation, Peking & tried

to reduce its own apparent net cost of war with statements such as "Your ally will not support you," and "We will win."

2. Increase one's apparent valuation of the stakes

Peking's apparent valuation of the stakes was not raised by this move, although Marshal Peng tried to emphasize moral or "humanitarian" principles.

- Increase apparent probability of firmness without changing payoffs

 This move, which was fundamentally a concession to superior force, decreased the apparent probability of Peking's firmness.
- II. Tactics to reduce the adversary's critical risk
 - Increase the adversary's estimate of his net costs of war convince

 Peking tried to/sixassxis the Nationalists in of the ultimate unreliability of their American ally.

Devalue the stakes for the adversary

- 1.By stressing their common origin and their "common enemy,"
 Peking tried to give the Nationalists a face-saving basis
 for negotiating.
- 2. Peking thied to minimize the element of duress in the bombardment ("just to call your attention"), and maximize the generosity and friendliness of its motives in stopping the bombardment.
- 3. Peking tried to stress common interests with the Nationalists, vis-a-vis the United States.

IV. Outcome and Aftermath

1. Type of settlement; tacit. The Chinese Communists announced a one-week unilateral cease-fire on October 6, provided the United States ceased accompanying Nationalist convoys. The United States complied, and the same cease-fire was extended for a further two weeks. Ultimately the Chinese Communists did not renounce their right to use force agains t the Nationalists, and announced that they would fire on Nationalist convoys, if they so chose, on the oddnumbered days of the month. President Eisenhower, while saying nothing to Chiang, "expressed to our own military authorities the hops that he would continue to resupply on any day of his own choosing, to test the true intentions of the Communists." However, the United States would not engage in any convoying unless the Chinese Communists tried to interfere with the supply program on even-numbered days, in international waters. Finally, Eisenhower states, the Chinese Communists "gradually seemed to lose interest in Quemoy and Marsu and, except upon unusual or ceremonial occasions, ceased firing. The Nationalists reduced the size of their forces on the offshore islands, but not to the extent I thought desirable."

(According to another source, "In fact, the Nationalists proceeded to strengthen their defenses on the islands far beyond the level that had been achieved by 1958."

_/ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956--1961, cited above, p. 304.

^{2.} Payoff to each party

_/ Barold Minton, Communist China in World Politics, cited above,p.259.

2. Payoff to each party

a. Peking

The short-term outcome for Peking was largely negative.

Peking failed to take any of the islands, or to undermine the morale of the Taiwan regime, and "moreover, it suffered a public demonstration of its military inferiority, and its reputation among the nonaligned countries seems to have been somewhat damaged, at least temporarily."

/ Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p. 76.

There were some general and intangible benefits for Peking: its campaign to be recognized as a great power was probably assisted, and "although it had suffered some tactical defeats and humiliations, it had demonstrated its willingness to take preemptive action when it feared a hationalist attack. This demonstration was not without effect."

_/ Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, cited above,p. 269,

The United States had now concrete gains or losses. Its reputation for resolve was no doubt heightened, and it lost some good-will with

b. Nationalist China

concrete

Nationalist China made no/gains relative to its position before the

crisis. However, its military victory appeared to discourage the

uses of force against

Chinese Communists from further/nkicamiaxiaxiaka the offshore islands.

c. United States

non-aligned countries.

d. Soviet Union

The Soviet Union also had no concrete gains or losses.

3. Effect on relations between the parties

a. Reciprocal perceptions of resolve

Communist resolve was certainly not raised; it may well have been Peking's eventual lowered as a result of/the cautious retreat from the probe. Any change in United States perception of Soviet resolve was probably in the same direction. Feking's perception of United States resolve was definitely altered; Peking's initial assumption had been that United States resolve was considerably lower than in fact it was, and this impression was corrected during the crisis. Soviet perceptions were not so much altered, since the Soviets had assumed throughout that United States resolve was fairly high.

b. Alliance cohesion

(1) The Sino-Soviet alliance suffered considerably in the years following the crisis, and many analysts label the 1958 Quemoy crisis as one of the major events leading to its final dissolution.

Whatever the actual state of Sino-Soviet relations before the crisis began, the alleged Soviet failure to assist

_/ See footnote 000, 0.p. 5, Sample Analysis $\delta = -111 - 4$,

Peking sufficiently played a major role in their later polemics of estrangement. The outcome of the crisis clearly favored Khrushchev's position in the debate over the shifting strategic balance, it showed that it was impossible for China to achieve even local objectives

in the face of United States opposition/without Soviet backing, and it appears to have led to a direct decline in the political value attached to the Sino-Soviet defense treaty by the Chinese.

_/ Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force, cited above, p. 77.

Nationalist Chine suffered some less of United States support as an outgrowth of the crisis. Although The United States did not force nor to unilaterally renounce the use of force, the Nationalists to abaddon the offshore islands, but the United States verbal commitment to the Nationalist ambitions of regaining the mainland was much reduced. In a joint communique issued after talks held between Secretary Dulles and President Chiang in late October, government 1958, the Nationalists/reasserted that "the restoration of fraedom to its people on the mainland is its secred mission,", but went on to say that the "foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force."

It is not possible to identify any direct effects of this crisis, or its outcome, on the international system. There were no territorial formal informal changes in changes, changes a in treaty compitments or alignments.

[/]Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Poreign Relations, 1959), p. 482.

^{4.} Effects on the International System

V. Conclusion

A. Explanation of the Outcome

The status quo outcome in the 1958 Quemoy crisis was the result, in the first instance, of a successful military policy on the part of the United States. The convoys broke the blockede, the bombardment then came to serve no purpose, and it was stopped. Thus a military "victory" led to re-establishment of the status quo, which was the primary goal of the victor. The Nationalists played their part in this victory; they were evidently apt pupils and applied the United States-taught techniques of unloading under fire, using United States-supplied equipment, successfully. Had they not done so the outcome might have been very different.

The Nationalist air force also played a significant role. Equipped with Sidewinder missiles supplied by the United States, the Nationalists dealt the ChineseCommunists a decisive blow in an air battle on September 24, when the blockade was already broken, and thus kept control of the air over the Straits.

Nothing of importance was negotiated in Warsaw. The meetings scopened on September & with the two parties taking totally irreconcilable positions. Peking wanted United States forces to leave Taiwan and the Straits and the Nationalists to leave the offshore islands. The United States wanted the Chinese Communists to stop the bombardment and renounce the use of force. Peking rejected a preliminary cease-fire on principle, waying the contest for the offshore islands was China's internal affair, and the United States refused to negotiate under fire.

[/] Kenneth T. Young, Recotlating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1957, cited above, p.166-167.

The United States continued to try to probe for negotiable issues with Peking, but nothing developed. During four meetings in Warsaw the United States evidently elaborated a two-stage proposal in considerable detail; these proposals, for cease-fire followed by negotiations over the disposition of the offshore islands, were put forward either as separate options or in a packaged transaction. However, Peking did not respond to any of them. Peking also made

_/ <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 179.

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 183-184.

Communist Chinese fear of a "Two Chinas" solution was probably the principal reason for their rigid position. By the time of the sixth Talk, on October 4, Dulles was intimating important new changes,

[/] Ibid., p. 189-190.

[&]quot;cease-fire" and "Two Chinas" for the first time as United States plots; this significant linkage was evidence of a probable fear in Peking that the diplomatic and military tactics of Dulles, Khrushchev and various non-involved parties at the United Nations might combine to measurer Peking into treating the offshore islands and Taiwan separately. In other words, if Peking negotiated in two stages as the United States wanted, it might have gotten the offshore islands but made the future acquisition of Formosa more difficult. It would have been one thing to acquire the islands as a result of a military victory, quite another to enter diplomatic negotiations in which an ultimate solution of the intra-Chinese straggle might be proposed.

_/ <u>Ibid</u>., p. 191-192.

Another factor in the Status que outcome was the restraints put on the Nationalists by the United States, which refused to give them permission to bomb the mainland. The Nationalists would have preferred to use the crisis as a means of altering the status quo in their own favor, but they were not permitted to, and ultimately for their part decided not to defy their ally. The Mationalists/were, suspicious of which they denounced as futile. the Warsaw Talks, / They announced that they would not accept a "thinning out" of their forces on the offshore islands, or any Nationalists were just as afraid of a "Ewo Chinas" solution as Peking. Furthermore, while the Nationalists were afraid the United States and Peking would make an agreement to their disadvantage, the United States was afraid that if it was too conciliatory towards Peking the Nationalists would come to terms with Peking, with negative consequences for United States security in the Western Pacific. Thus there were ample reasons for the Palks to be unproductive.

The Soviet Union contributed to the status quo outcome by not materially assisting Peking to win its national objective, control of the offshore islands. The Soviet Mnium policy was to offer China support if she were invaded, but not to help her change the status quo.

cease-fire announcement was probably chosen for several reasons.
,precisely two weeks earlier,
(1)On September 22/the Nationalists had announced that they would bomb the shore batteries unless the bombardment of Quemoy let up issued a " on within two weeks. (2)Thrushchev/s clarification*gf %zwtambur/October 5, in which he further limited the Soviet commitment to Chinese policy. (3)"The announcement of a cease-fire came just as a very large well-publicized convoy was about to sail to Quemov. By stopping

Peking contributed to the status quo outcome by the way it handled its cease-fire. The day after the cease-fire announcement, October 7, Chou "warned the United States not to misinterpret the temporary cease-fire as weakness or as an equivalent to the United States proposal for a cease-fire," and on October 9, the Peking Foreign Ministry publicly rejected the notion of a permanent cease-fire. "Peking's messages and the brief resumption of the

bombardment at the time of Secretary Dulles, trip to Fromosa had the effects of discouraging any conciliatory policy by the U.S., of making it difficult for the American government to urge Nationalist China to make concessions, and of ensuring the deadlock of the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw."

_/ Kenneth Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967, cited above, p. 194.

_/ Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," cited above, p.347.

when trey did the Chinese Communists were able to disguise the total failure of the blockede."

In any event, under these

Morton H. Halpsrin and Tanz Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," cited above, p. 265-303.

combined pressures, Feling decided to ston the bombardment.

"The wording and structure of the message appear to have been hastily and even clumsily drafted, indicating that it may have been decided precipitately."

/ Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: the United States Experience, 1953-1957, cited above, p. 194.

In terms of the Critical Risk model, the Chinese Communists had re-drawn their original matrix, immunish which reflected their mistaken opinion that the United States would not consider the offshore islands worth much of a struggle. The United States strategy had successfully altered Peking's expectations about its adversery, so that Peking ultimately decided to comply rather than to stand firm.

through the use of a series of operators, In terms of the Crisis Management model, the United States,/
had brought the real situation into line with its minimal objective—
maintenance of the <u>status quo</u>. The United States probably hoped
for a more constructive settlement, since with the <u>status quo</u>
the crisis could erupt again at any time, but on October 14
Secretary Dulles said that nothing had given him any hope that it was
possible to "strike a bargain" with **the Peking in terms of just
the offshore islands; they were after bigger game. By early October,

_/ <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 197.

Peking's objectives had altered from obtaining the offshore islands pravention of (by then hopeless) to/mananting a "Two Chinas" solution. baing and refusal to negotiate --impusedx The operatorschosen--cessation of the bombardment/#brought about this outcome for Peking, since international interest in the China situation quickly subsided when the bowbardment stopped. The Nationalists' operators -- threats to act unilaterally against the mainland, standing firm militarily -- won them preservation of the status quo, their primary objective. The Boviets/ operators-verbal threats -- appear to have played some role in influencing United States decision-makers to choose as conservative operators as United States could prove consonant with/xxx objectives, and in minimizing the tha. Soul a tits alliance with negative impact on/Paking of its refusal to use any phayelcalmilitary operators.

The crisis was under the control of the parties but only to a limited degree. The Shinese Communists first persed the initiative to the Nationalists and the United States; One major limitation was that the Soviet Union and the United States, the parties whose interests were not served by the hostilities, will did not have complete control over their Chinese allies, and their Chinese allies each wanted to alter the status quo through military activitie Namina Another limitation on control was that during the period of the escorted convoys, there was constant danger that a United States ship would be struck by Chinese fire, would fire back and United States -- Chinese direct military confrontation would have extacly mic consequences. The United States delegated as little military authority as possible, but the Nationalists did command their own forces, and American field commanders had orders to return fire if fired upon. The Soviets appear to have limited the supply of jet fuel available to the Chinese air force, but again the

Chinese Communists, like their Nationalist counterparts, operated own independently within the limits of their equipment and forces.

The outcome was partly determined by a "given" in the bargaining setting—the geography of the Straits. The status duo outcome had salience; Schelling's discussion of Formosa's independence can also be applied to Quemoy and Matsu:

The Formosan Straits made it possible to stabilize a line between the Communist and National government forces of China, not solely because water favored the defender and inhibited attack, but because an island is an integral unit and water is a conspicuous boundary. The sacrifice of any part of the island would have made the resulting line unstable; the retention of any part of the mainland would have been similarly unstable. Except at the water's edge, all movement is a matter of degree; an attack across water is a declaration that the "agreement" has been terminated.

In another sense, however, the outcome was not salient. That is, the proximity of Quemoy and Matsu to mainland China would indicate that the salient solution would have been that the for Peking to obtain control over them. There was considerable support, internationally for the view that this would be the "fair" (or salient) colution, but it was not the one reached.

United States tactics had an important effect on the outcome.

Declarations that the United States would honor its treaty commitments to the Nationalists, combined with the show of force by the Seventh Fleet, helped persuade Peking not to escalate its effort; and the i convoy tactic was imminently successful in returning the initiative to Peking (which Peking declined).

_/ Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Fress, 1966 ?), p.76.

V-B. Report on checklist and hypotheses

- I. Checklist p.5-9, working pages 156)
- A. Utility models
- 1. No.
- 2. No.
 - a. There were numerous attempts to change opponent's utilities, but mostly they were unsuccessful.
 - b. Peking re-estimated its own utilities during the crisis .
 - c.Dulles tried to search for mutually acceptable outcomes.
- 3. No range was found.
 - a. Dulles searched for mutually beneficial moves, presumably
 - B. of greater benefit to the United States
- 4. Not relevant
- 5. In the beginning of the crisis, Peking acted like a Emaximizer,"
 but by the end of the crisis like a disaster-avoider. The reverse
 was true for the Nationalists. The United States and the Soviet
 Union acted like "disaster-avoiders" throughout.

B. The "chicken-critical risk" model

- Yes, but it is probably not possible to assign reliable numerical values.
- 2. The parties did try to estimate the probability of their opponent's actions. It cannot be determined whether they thought probabilistically, or in either-or terms.
- 3. There was considerable manipulation of the opponent's estimates of one's own probable acts.
- attempted

 4. There was also considerable/manipulation of the opponent's perception
 of one's own utilities, and of
- 5. The opponent's utilities.

- 6. There is manipulation of shared risk. See pages III-20, 23, 43,/
- 7. For specific tactics, see the "Type of Tactic" sections at the end of the analysis of each move in Section III
- 7. Verbal threats were quite frequent, sometimes effective and sometimes counter-productive. Basic moves, especially those increasing commitment and/or manipulating shared risk, were less numerous but more effective
- 9. Responses to threats
 - a. Resistance, stiffen resolve: See pages III-12-13, III-22, III-40-41, III-52, III-67. These were United States responses.
 - b. Compliance; resolve weakens: See pages III-18, III-28, III-56, III-61. These were Peking's responses.
- 10.--12, see the analyses of perceptual responses and choice of moves in response to moves made, in Section III.
- C. Expanded game models
- 1. Yes, as threats rather than actualities.
- 2. Yes, the Nationalist/United States side had the choices (1) capitulate, (2)try to break the blockade without attacking the opponent, (3)attack the opponent's installations.
- 3. Yes, if alternative (3) had been chosen escalation probably would have resulted.
- 4. Yes, Peking started out/waxx "tough," but became more and more cautious as the crisis progressed.
- 5. Yes, notably the United States' warning that it would use its own forces if necessary to protect the islands, and the Soviet warning that it would come to the defense of Peking if the mainland were attacked.

- 6. Yes, Dulles' press conference of September 30 hinted at inducements to Peking, and Peking tried to hint inducements to the Nationalists.
- 7. Yes, several. The use or non-use of tactical nuclears, the invasion or non-invasion of the offshore islands, the attack or non-attack on the Chinese mainland.
- 8. No, I think it remains chicken throughout.

D. Super-game model

- 1. Yes, implicitly. There had been a very similar crisis four years
- 2x earlier, and all parties anticipated that Peking's objectives vis-a-vis Formosa would not change, and that the cold war in general would continue.
- 2. Yes, that was Peking's aim.
- 3. Yes, especially on the Nationalist-United States side.
- 4. Yes, especially on the Nationalist-United States side.
- 5. Yes.
- 6. Yes.

E. Information processing model

- 1. The outcome was primarily determined by the basic strategic situation.
- 2. Peking misperceived/the global balance of power, and therefore
 United States resolve in general, and (2) United States' utilities
 relative to Formosa and the offshore islands.
- 3. In Peking's instance, a change in strategy resulted.
- 4 In Paking's case, a change in strategy resulted.
- 5. Data on the decision-making process for each actor is insufficient for this question.
- 6. Again, insufficient data.

- 7. Yes, Peking's expectations and images changed. (1) Their image of their Soviet ally became much less positive, and their expectations from the Soviets considerably lower, as a result of lukewarm Soviet support. (2) Their image of the United States probably did not change, but their expectations about United States behavior in the Western Pacific were altered by the series of major moves which the United States made. The other actors' images of one another's aims, intentions, strategy and general degree of resolve were more confirmed than altered by the events of the crisis.
- 8. Perceptions were influenced more by the other party's deliberate moves than by inadvertence.
- 9. The United States' self-image and Peking's image of it were not congruent at the beginning of the crisis, and this led to Peking's miscalculation x of United States response, a miscalculation that was the basis for the crisis.

F. Cataclysmic model

- 1. This model is not highly relevant to this crisis.
- 2. There were no automatic or semi-automatic linkages (except that United States forces had orders to return deliberate Chinese Communist fire).
- 3. There were no such decisions.
- 4. There was one statement that things might inadvertently get out of hand (see p. III-77), directed primarily to a domestic audience but also to the opponent.
- There were techniques for preserving control, such as
 a. ambiguous threats and commitments, and
 b. civilian control over the military

6. Control was never lost, in the event.

Miscellaneous

- 1. The parties observed several rules, or norms, for the conduct of hostilities. Peking tacitly established the norm that the conflict should be centered on Quemoy and Matsu, and the Nationalists and the United States did not extend the arena in a geographical unilaterally sense. Peking tried/to alter the norm of the 3-mile limit for territorial waters to a 12-mile limit; the other side did not respond, so both sides tacitly retained the 3-mile limit as a norm. Perhaps the most significant norm to be observed throughout the conflict was the avoidance of a direct Sino-American or, more significantly, Soviet-American military confrontation.
- 2. Rationality and irrationality
 - a. The initial Chinese Communist estimate of the Kuku global
 balance of power and of United States utilities and intentions
 could be considered "irrational," or "wishful thinking,"
 - b. The source of this misestimation cannot be documented.
 - c. There were no identifiable instances of feigned irrationality for bargaining advantage.
- 3. There were shifts in bargaining behavior between stages; although it is difficult to mark them off clearly. If we use Lockhart's four stages, the first or initiatory stage was identified by a provocative, challenging, threatening basic move; the second and communication moves stage by basic moves/designed to raise capabilities and x increase credibility of commitment; the third, or confrontation stage, by threats designed to deter escalation by the opponent, or to persuade him to de-escalate, and by basic moves designed to force him to concede; and the fourth stage by bidding moves, or communication

moves tending to de-commit and lower the costs of concession for the adversary, along with hair basic moves amounting to withdrawal from the conflict.

It is hard to be precise about the effect of rising tension on behavior. It seems to have led to more rigid overt responses, and to the use of a wider range of simultaneous "operators," during the more intense phases of the conflict.

- 4. It is more useful to think of the United States' massing of force in the Straits area, and convoying operations, as coercive diplomacy or as basic moves; these were not purely symbolic maxks acts or acts of harassment. The Soviet Union and Peking both and tried to use domestic propaganda campaigns/"tough" language to further their aims, but these moves were not very successful or significant.
- 5. Aspects of indirect communication
 - a/ There were no private or secret conferences.
 - b. Peking may have emplyed a neutral itermediary forms to transmit a communication (see pages III-69-70);
 - c. Yes, there was considerable flurry at the United Nations, and states such as India offered their good offices to mediate the conflict. None of these efforts had any real bearing on the outcome.
 - d. Yes, there were several such signals. Dulles signalled on September 4 that the United States would welcome resumption of the Anni ambassadorial Talks, and Peking gave a parallel signal two days later. Following Peking's hypothetical signal in mid-September (see above), Dulles signalled a further willingness to response towards the end off the conflict, on September 301

- II. Hypotheses (p.15-25, working paper #3)

 A. Hypotheses relating systemic environment to choice of tactics

 1. First of all, a theoretical problem is raised by the fact that this was a multi-polar crisis in a bi-polar system. This hypothesis would tend to be borne out by the case, because the super-powers, who saw it as a bi-polar crisis, acted with considerably more caution than did the two Chinese contestants, who thought more in multi-polar terms.
- 2. Alliance relationships excercised considerable restraint on choice of tactics in this case. The constraints were felt more keenly by the superpowers than by the two Chinese parties, but by all to some degree.
- 3. Same as two.
- 4. This hypothesis is particularly supported by United States reasoning and strategy in this crisis, to a lesser degree by Soviet as well.
- 5. The United States' valuation of the stakes the offshore islands -- tends to confirm this hypotheses.
- 6. Both types of declarations were characteristic of this crisis.
- 7. Khrushchev's letters to Bisenhower would confirm this hypothesus, but the United States used more moderate, diplomatic language.
- 8. The United States' basic moves involving strengthening of forces in-being and convoying were a prominent feature of the crisis.
- 9. This confrontation was partly a test of resolve, and was so intended.
- 10. No data for this hypothesis.
- 11. There were a number of instances of manipulation of risk in this crisis (see above, V-9).

- 12. If we consider this crisis as multi-polar but taking place in a bi-polar context, the hypothesis is confirmed.
- B. Propositions about coercive tactics
- 1. These were no irrevocable commitments in this crisis.
- 2. Almost all threats in this crisis were ambiguous or contingent.
- 3. In the instance of the United States' communication move of September 4, the more severe, explicit threats were made by the unidentified high official, not by the Secretary of State. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force and other officials made "tougher" statements than did the President of the Secretary of State.
- 4. No examples of this in this case
- 5. Especially towards the end of this crisis there were efforts to create loopholes for opponents.
- 6. There were a number of instances of this; notably the United States' pepeated reference to the Joint Resolution, calling for a contingent decision to intervene.
- 7. The United States and Nationalists threats became firmer and more explicit as they began to win the contest.
- 8. Yes.
- 9. Peking made some efforts to appeal to domestic opposition in the United States.
- 10. No data.
- ll. This crisis would disconfirm this hypothesis if we consider the first part of the second major phase (after September 6) as still a high-tension phase of the crisis. However there was less use of "manipulation of risk" in the first/chaseg, before negotiation had been agreed upon, and many analysts identify that phase as having the greatest degree of tension.

- 12. Yes. The final stage of this crisis (September 30--October 6) was characterized by relatively cooperative moves.
- C. Hypotheses relating tactics to responses.
- 1. The United States' response to Mhrushchev's letters would tend to confirm this hypothesis.
- 2. Yes, the same example.
- 3. Yes, the United States' efforts to alter Peking's utilities and utility perceptions seemed not to have provocative effects, at least not on the direct recipient.
- 4. No data.
- 5. Research into the decision-making process was not in sufficient depth to provide an answer.
- 6. A number of examples in this case would confirm this.
- D. Hypotheses relating environment, setting and tactics to outcomes
- 1. The failure of this crisis to have a "salient" outcome--acquisition of the offshore islands by Peking--can be accounted for by the stronger position and greater bargaining power of the United States-Nationalist side.
- 2. Yes. See p. V-12.
- 3. Yes, although tactics were important too.
- 4. This crisis did fade away into a de facto settlement.
- 5. Yes, Peking, one of the parties who made the crisis multi-polar, did miscalculate United States intentions, but the super-powers appear to have calculated one another correctly.

- E. Hypotheses about connections between alliance relationships and adversary bargaining
- 1. Yes. The United States and the Soviet Union utilized their alliance relationships with the Chinese to back up their threats and commitments vis-a-vis each other, but both were restricted in bargaining options vis-a-vis their allies.
- 2. Available data does not provide a firm answer, but the pattern of the crisis would tend to bear out the hypothesis.
- 3. In this case, the aggressor ultimately gave up all demands, so the hypothesis cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed.
- 4. No data from this case.
- 5. No data from this case.
- 6.Yes, this was true for the United States in this case (but less true for the Soviet Union),
- (although not seriously)
 7. a. As tension rose, the United States was concerned/lest the
 Nationalists should make a "deal" with Feking, and so
 supported their position on Quemoy and Matsu rather
 than tried to get them to evacuate. As tension subsided,
 this apprehension about the Nationalists increased, so the
 United States did not try is very vigorously to get them
 to decrease the garrisons, "foolish" though they may have been.
 b. Secretary Dulles was notable for this conviction.
- 8. Yes, the same as 7.a. above.
- 9. No such collaboration took place in this crisis. However, even the Warsaw talks had an abrasive effect on the Nationalist-Unied States alliance.
- 10. This crisis would not tend to particularly confirm this hypothesis.
- 11. Yes, the Chinese were much more willing risk-takers than the super-powers (and the Nationalists much more so than the Communists).

- 12. This <u>may</u> be borne out; The Western alliance was the more cohesive of the two, and it made firmer commitments and stronger threats.
- 13. This is confirmed. The Nationalists' will to resist was closely tied to their confidence in American support.
- 14. Not proven. The super-powers in this crisis certainly had some degree of difficulty in controlling their Chinese allies.

F. Hypotheses about perceptions and images

- 1. This case does not definitely confirm this, although the United States response to Peking's propaganda broadcasts and to Khrushchev's letters would be supportive evidence.
- 2. The Chinese parties' historical experience of one another certainly conditioned their mutual images; the United States' experience in the 1954-1955 Straits crisis certainly conditioned its image of Peking.
- 3. Again, the United States' response to Khrushchev would confirm thas.
- 4. The only definite data bearing on this hypothesis -- Peking's underestimation of United States resplve -- would tend to disconfirm.
- 5. No data.
- 6. No conclusive data.
- 7. No conclusive data.
- 8. No conclusive data.
- 9. Yes, the United States perceived the Peking-Moscow alliance as much firmer and more conflict-free than it actually was.
- 1.0. No definite data.
- ll.Yes, the United States' resolve was closely related to its view of Peking's and Moscow's ultimate aims, and the Nationalists' resolve by its view of Peking's ultimate aims.

- G. Hypotheses relating internal decision-making to bargaining tactics
- 1. Insuffichent data.
- 2. Yes, the strength of domestic opposition to the Dulles-Eisenhower policy was one constraint on an unconditional declaration of intention to defend Quemoy and Matsu.
- 3. Insufficient data.
- 4. Insufficient data.
- 5. Insufficient data.
- 6. MB a)Yes, see G-2 above; b)in this case, we since public opinion was partly in opposition, the government was pushed more towards accommodation and compromise than it would otherwise have been. The bargaining power behind its position was not strengthened but weakened by public opinion.
- 7. Insufficient data.
- 8. Insufficient data.

H. Hypotheses relating outcomes to aftermeths

- 1. The data in this case will not prove or disprove this.
- 2. Data also inadequate for this hypothesis.
- 3. Yes, the United States' resolve strengthened its alliance with the Nationalists, while the Soviets' lukewarm support weakened their alliance with Peking.
- 4. This hypothesis does not bear on this case.
- 5. This crisis left an aftermath of hostility a between the parties.
 - a. The settlement was not final
 - b. The parties did not have another common adversary.
 - c. Some of the tactics used between the Chinese were quite provocative.
 - d. Peking suffered a fair degree of humiliation.
- 6. Yes, Peking did this.
- 7. The United States believed it had strengtheded its ties with its

Pacific and Asian allies, but this would be difficult to prove.

I. Hypotheses about bidding moves

- 1. This would be borne out by this crisis, in which no important concessions were made at all. Secretary Dulles was convinced of the truth of this hypothesis, and indicated when the crisis was substantially over that he was then ready to consider consider concessions that would have been out of the question under duress.
- 2. Yes, when Peking finally declared its cease-fire, it made it contingent on the United States' ceasing to convoy the Nationalists.
- 3. Yes, when Peking declared its cease-fire it indicated that its vital interests no longer included the taking of the offshore islands by themselves, but only as part of the conquest of Formosa as well.
- 4. Insufficient data.
- 5. Not applicable; the defending side made no concessions.
- 6. Yes. If Peking did send a "secret feeler" to Washington in September, then revert to its original position in Warsaw when there was no reciprocal response, the hypothesis would tend to be confirmed.