

THE LEBANON CRISIS OF 1958

by William Stover

Center for International Conflict Studies
State University of New York at Buffalo

May, 1971

I. SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENT

The systemic environment during this crisis was bipolar, although perhaps not as tightly so as was the system a few years earlier. On the American side, the western alliance was divided over the 1956 Suez Crisis and the war in Algeria. On the Russian side, the idea of a Soviet monolith was beginning to fall into disrepute due to trouble in Hungary, East Germany, and Poland. Furthermore, the seeds of the Sino-Soviet split had been sewn even though that fact was not yet understood in the West.

Nevertheless, there were still only two superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union; and of course these must be considered the primary actors. Other major powers were Britain, France, and China, but these nations were qualitatively different from the big two.

One other factor in the system was important -- the rise of a large number of uncommitted, neutralist nations standing between the western and eastern camps. Nasser in Egypt, Sukarno in Indonesia, Nehru in India, Tito in Yugoslavia, as well as a number of African leaders, some in power, others waiting for independence refused to take a stand on behalf of one or the other protagonist in the cold war.

This had the advantage of further loosening the polarity of the two blocks by providing a number of nations in between with a spectrum of support or resistance on various issues. For example, the Russians were condemned for the intervention in Hungary while the Americans were condemned by certain neutral nations for refusing to stop nuclear testing on Soviet terms.

On the other hand, this uncommitted group provided a forum for further competition between the two blocks in economic as well as military matters.

The distribution of powers seems to have been well divided between the two giants with a slight strategic advantage going to the Americans. However, the

Russians may have projected the beginnings of superior technological capabilities with the launching of the first man-made satellite, "Sputnik". Both nations were concentrating on strategic nuclear development -- Bombers for the United States (with a planned change over to missiles) and Rockets for the Soviet Union. Both had made some cutbacks in conventional ground forces, although neither nation had fully completed the planned cutbacks before the crisis began.

Overall, Russian land armies were much larger than those of the United States, but their main purpose seems to have been defensive. They were immobile and would find it extremely difficult to strike quickly outside the Soviet Union.

Britain had little to add to the American superiority, and France was tied down in Algeria. China had an enormous army which the Americans thought would support any Russian adventure. While here aims were different from those of the Soviet Union and her independence from Moscow was already being asserted, the west tended to view the entire Communist world as a monolith.

Two international organizations played a major role throughout the Crisis. The United Nations was called on to evaluate the situation in Lebanon and later provide a means by which American troops could be withdrawn. Competition between the United States' and the Soviet Union made the United Nations rather ineffective however. Therefore the Arab League, an international organization which had no connection with the super powers was called upon to help settle the crisis.

The system was heterogenous, of course with three basic positions: Communism, Pro-Westernism (or Anti-Communism) and neutralism. Both Eisenhower and Dulles seem to have viewed the differences in black and white terms. The communists were atheistic, and evil, while the Americans based their system and philosophy on religious precepts. To use the words of Reinhold Niebuhr, any confrontation between the two was a confrontation between "the children of light and the children of darkness".

Russian opinion of the West was equally suspicious. Western intervention

in the Russian Civil War, Failure to recognize the new Soviet government, failure to open a second front during World War II, a "reinterpretation" of the Yalta Agreement (or so it must have seemed to the U.S.S.R.), the build up of an alliance system all around the Russian periphery, the rearming of Germany and finally Dulles' call for Liberation -- all of these factors must have confirmed Lenin's theory of aggressive imperialism to the Soviet policy makers. As Aron points out, this divergence of ideology leads to a system where the opponent is considered a mortal enemy, where the goal of conflict is the destruction of the opponent's government, his way of life.

The third ideology in the system is neutrality. This does not necessarily clash with either communist or western ideology; rather it provides an arena for competition between the two. It seems that the Russians viewed neutrality as a favorable factor in the system while the Americans opposed it. After all, how could any nation be neutral when the forces of good and evil were confronting each other in the world arena? To the United States, a neutral nation appeared to be a dupe of the Communists.

The domestic revolutionary situation in the system was seen by the United States as planned, directed and financed by the U.S.S.R. Eisenhower writes, "The Soviets were pushing everywhere, stirring up trouble in Venezuela, Indonesia, and Burma, not to mention the Middle East." Specifically in the Middle East, the revolutions were seen as instigated by the combined forces of the Soviet Union and Nasser who was according to Dulles being used by the Russians. The Revolt in Syria was perceived as communist inspired; the 1957 attempted coup in Jordan was instigated by communist elements, according to Dulles; Eisenhower felt that the Communists were behind the trouble in Lebanon. Finally, there was enough uncertainty about the coup d'etat in Iraq to see it as possibly inspired by the communists or Nasserites.

Military technology was highly advanced, nuclear. American production of

of the hydrogen bomb in late 1952 was matched by the Russians' accomplishment a year later. By 1955, it was believed that a relative balance in atomic strength had been reached; the United States was still ahead, it was thought, but the U.S.S.R. could inflict unacceptable nuclear damage upon Western Europe and the continental United States. In 1957, however, the belief in American superiority was shaken with the launching of the Russian "Sputnik."

The final systemic factor, Alliances played a rather important role in American strategy. However, since the Crisis involved neither the major alliances of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the South East Asia Treaty Organization, nor the major alliance of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, I will deal only with the specific alliances operative during the crisis in the next section.

II. BARGAINING SETTING

PARTIES TO THE CRISIS

In March 1957 the Middle East could be divided up as follows: Egypt and Syria took a positive neutral stand, opposing any American attempt to form a defensive alliance or a bi-lateral treaty. Syria might be considered to lean toward the Soviets in foreign policy, but it was by no means communist. In Jordan, the King wanted to cooperate with the West, but domestic pressures dictated that he declare himself neutral, nevertheless, he gravitated toward the West, especially Britain. Saudi Arabia proclaimed itself neutral but leaned toward the United States. Iraq was a western ally as a result of the Bagdad Pact. Finally, Lebanon sided with the Americans in her acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Russians supported any neutrality in the area while the United States (and to some extent, Britain) tried to win over governments to the western,

RECENT RELATIONS

Following a stated policy of peaceful coexistence, the U.S.S.R. in the years after Stalin's death made some moves to temper Soviet relations with the West. The Russians declared an end to the war with Germany and recognized the Adenauer government. They signed the Austrian State Treaty and promised to withdraw from Porkkala, Finland and Port Arthur, Manchuria. The Soviet Union undertook negotiations to end the war with Japan, and voted the admission of twelve new states to the United Nations which it had formerly opposed. Trade and travel restrictions were eased. Finally, there were cutbacks in Soviet armed forces.

However, when the United States admitted Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and allowed Bonn to build up its army, the Russians responded with the Warsaw Pact, and relations remained hostile.

The DeStalinization speech by Khrushchev seemed to signal liberalization. However, events in eastern Europe soon after made the Russians act more firmly. Troubles in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany caused the Russians to clamp down, and probably increased American suspicion of Soviet intentions. Dulles' call for liberation must have caused doubts about American goals as did the attempts to form western alliances in the Middle East; and the Russian offer to aid Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956 with volunteers and a rain of rockets on western cities left Americans fearful about Russian intentions in that area.

Competition sharpened between the two giants in a new field. "We hold that war is not needed for the victory of socialism," said Khrushchev in November 1957. "The world socialist system has powerful economic, political and military resources at its disposal." He went on:

We do have the ICBM, but I tell you in the name of myself and of the Communist Party we will never use it against the United States unless the United States starts things first, or if a United States satellite

nation attacks us.

We declare war upon you...in the peaceful field of trade. We challenge you to compete in peaceful things such as the production of radios and television and vacuum cleaners.

We declare such a war. We will win over the United States. The Threat to the United States is not the ICBM but in the field of peaceful production. We are relentless in this and it will prove the superiority of our system...

When we reach the highest level of production and material well-being of the working folk, people who visit us from the capitalist countries will say: so this is communism, so this is Soviet rule. How could we have been so naive not to realize this before. This is exactly what working people need.

With an eye toward winning some neutralist nations to the side of the Soviet Union, Bulganin and Khrushchev began visiting the underdeveloped countries and promised large amounts of aid, launching a third area of competition. Eisenhower picked up the gauntlet. The Communist imperialist regimes, he said,

have for some time been largely frustrated in their attempts at expansion based directly on force. As a result, they have begun to concentrate heavily on economic penetration particularly on newly developing countries as a preliminary to political domination.

This nonmilitary drive if underestimated could defeat the free world regardless of our military strength. This danger is all the greater precisely because many of us fail or refuse to recognize it. ...Let us not fail to recognize the serious impact of the Soviet economic offensive.

Therefore, the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. must be described in terms of competition in military economic and political matters-- competition designed to win security, prestige and followers.

Relations between the United States and the nations of the Middle East need to be viewed in light of Dulles' concept of containment. He felt it was necessary to build up an alliance system in the Middle East similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in western Europe or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the Far East. This started out as the Middle East Defense Organization plan but due to lack of interest, it was changed to the "Northern Tier" Concept of the Bagdad Pact. Dulles made this clear in a 1953 speech:

Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet Communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger.

The first stage in this Northern Tier defense was the Pakistan-Turkey Pact of 1954, replaced by the Turkey Iraq Pact of 1955. Britain saw the latter as a means by which it could retain influence in the area and set right its rather tattered relations with Iraq. So London signed the agreement quickly and the Bagdad Pact came into being. The United States did not wish to join the pact, but that did not prevent it from trying to get others to join. The State Department announced that our aid to Middle Eastern countries would be based in the future on regional defense rather than on country-by-country estimates of defense needs. This seemed to preclude aid to neutral nations who wished to protect themselves while remaining outside the western camp.

By January 1956 the Bagdad Pact was firmly established. Yet Iraq was on the defensive about it particularly in regard to its effects on relations with her Arab neighbors. Attacks on Iraqi membership increased from inside and outside the country as a result of the British, French, and Israeli military action against Egypt.

The withdrawal of Israeli troops (and subsequently British and French forces) settled the immediate problem. The United States had not felt compelled to join the Pact but she did feel more needed to be done to strengthen the Middle Eastern States. The Eisenhower Doctrine was the result. Presented in January 1957 by a special message to Congress, the doctrine authorized the President to use the armed forces of the United States to secure the independence of any nation or group of nations in the Middle East against overt aggression from any nation under the control of international communism; to extend military aid to any nation or group of nations requesting it; to cooperate with any nation or group of nations in building up economic strength to further the maintenance of independence.

Thus American relations in the area revolved around two ideas: collective security represented by the Bagdad Pact; and for those opposed to joining any formal military alliance, bilateral association with the United States in the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Of the states involved in the Crisis of 1957-1958, only Iraq joined the former while only Lebanon accepted the latter.

The Russian alignment on the side of Egypt and Syria (later Iraq) grew indirectly out of the American view of neutrality, that any nation which was not for us was against us. Dulles could not understand why Nasser should oppose any alliance or defense organization which would protect the middle east against Communism. In turn, Nasser could not understand Dulles' preoccupation with the Communists. The threat came not from the Russians, according to Nasser, but from Israel or from Britain and France. In any event, when the United States refused to provide military aid to Egypt, Nasser turned to the Russians, and aid of all kinds began to gush. As of 1958, Russian aid to Egypt and Syria totaled close to 800 million, five times the amount of American assistance.

This was not just military aid. When Anglo-American offers to help Egypt finance the Aswan Dam were withdrawn Egypt quickly retaliated by announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal to secure the revenue to finance the Aswan project. This action was quickly approved by the U.S.S.R. Without assurance of much support, it seems unlikely that Nasser would have taken so risky an action.

Anyway, the Russians now posed as the principal champion of Egyptian sovereignty over the canal, rejecting the Anglo-French plans for internationalization. Soviet river pilots supported Nasser's attempt to keep the canal open and the Soviet government warned that "any disturbance of peace in the Middle East cannot but effect the security and interests of the Soviet Union." No sooner had the invasion of Egypt begun than the U.S.S.R. warned Britain, France, and Israel of Soviet readiness to use force "to crush the aggressors." This action firmly planted the Soviet Union as the supporter of the Arabs against the West. And

shortly thereafter, the Russians agreed to aid Egypt in building the dam.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The American desire for a Middle Eastern Alliance system to link up NATO and SEATO and thereby expand the communist containment line from Norway to the Philippines has already been mentioned. Neutrality in the area was contrary to this goal. Thus the conflict was put into sharp focus: the United States wanted nations in the area (1) to adhere to the Bagdad Pact or (2) subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Both were incompatible with neutrality.

While Nasser desired to cooperate with the United States, he would join no western alliance. And when confronted with American desires to win converts Nasser became even a more active neutralist. He was convinced that the Americans would not respect his neutralism unless other Arab states imposed the same conditions on the United States. He thought his bargaining power was weak so long as other Arab governments could make end runs around him to Washington and that Egypt's positive neutrality was meaningless unless the same position were adopted by other Arab states.

To keep other Arab states from taking a pro-western position, Radio Cairo began beaming out anti-imperialist propaganda designed to make Arab people oppose actions by their governments which might lead to taking sides. Thus the Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine were both opposed by the Egyptian leader.

This seemed to confirm the position of Dulles that Nasser was a dupe of the communists. And in coming out against Nasser's propaganda, Dulles further convinced Nasser that he was against neutrality. The Egyptian leader believed that the Americans were encouraging Iraqi premier Nuri es-Said, King Hussein of Jordan and President Chamoun of Lebanon to adopt frankly anti-Nasser positions, and that American agents were actually planning a coup to install an

anti-Nasser government in Syria. Soon Eisenhower and Dulles began to look at Nasser as synonymous with the U.S.S.R.

WHAT PRECIPITATED THE CRISIS

The Crisis began in August 1957 with the American realization that Syria had joined the Communist Camp, or so it seemed to Eisenhower and Dulles. The actual events in Syria were not of earthshaking importance: the replacement of some military leaders by others and the signature of another treaty with the Soviet Union for arms and economic aid. They considered these acts the logical culmination of their policy carried out between 1955 and 1957. But the gradual Russian-Syrian rapprochement during those years seemed to have escaped Washington's attention, and the denouement of 1957 came as a great shock.

According to the Damascus newspaper Al Rai Al Am, the Syrian mission in Moscow had succeeded in reducing the amount Syria was supposed to pay for arms and other goods from Russia by 70 per cent. The reduction amounted to \$280 million out of a total of \$480 million. Such terms had never been given by Moscow to even its most loyal satellites; Syria must have been regarded as a good investment.

The treaty was followed by the announcement on August 12 of an American conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the Syrian government which led to the expulsion of three American diplomats from Damascus and in return the declaration of the Syrian Ambassador in the United States as persona non grata.

All these developments were probably less sensational than their description in the Western Press suggests. There had been no dramatic change in the domestic balance of power in Syria. That shift had occurred long before. All that happened in 1957 was a strengthening of the Ba'ath/Communist hold over the government through the expulsion of unreliable elements from the party and a new

and more favorable agreement with the U.S.S.R. This produced a near panic in Washington, however, and in the prowestern capitals of the Middle East.

From this event came the determination that any further loss of western influence in the area must be avoided, and any further Russian (or Nasserite) encroachment must be met with firm action.

THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE

The immediate issue was influence, American or Russian, in the Middle East and the swing toward the left first by Nasser, then by the Syrians. The United States felt that a communist regime in Syria would threaten their allies through subversion and infiltration. Thus something had to be done.

The actual landing of the United States troops in Lebanon was a result of the revolt in Iraq which put into power an anti-American Junta and knocked a huge hole in the Anglo-American arrangements for the defense of the Middle East. Though the new government did not immediately denounce the Bagdad Pact, its general attitude was not prowestern, and it was assumed that it would be only a matter of time before Iraq would pull out.

Particularly serious was the assumption that this revolt may have been planned and carried out by Nasserites and communists. This was the last straw, coming on top of the leftward swing in Syria, and the civil war in Lebanon.

RELATIVE VALUATION OF STAKES

On the American side, the loss of Iraq was a bitter pill to swallow since that country was the corner stone for defense plans in the area. Eisenhower writes, "This somber turn of events could, without vigorous response on our part result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East." If

the new regime in Iraq turned out to be communist, it meant that Russia had leapfrogged the "Northern Tier" of middle eastern states and set up a headquarters capable of subversion throughout the area. If Nasser were behind the revolt it meant he had succeeded in almost surrounding Jordan and Israel.

In the broader sense, American interests were vitally at stake. First, Communist control of the Middle East would place in constant jeopardy the West's supply of middle eastern oil, especially important to Britain and Western Europe.

If middle eastern supplies were cut off, the main burden of supplying Europe's oil needs would fall on the United States. This is what occurred during the Suez crisis of 1956 when the blockade of the Suez Canal by Egypt and sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline in Syria cost western Europe about 70 per cent of its normal supplies.

A prolonged deprivation of middle eastern oil would impose a huge financial drain on European treasuries since higher priced oil would have to be purchased from Venezuela or the United States. In the long run this deficit almost certainly would be transferred to the United States which in some form would have to advance loans to Europe to pay for western hemisphere oil. Finally, this transfer of American oil to Europe might deplete the strategic reserves of the United States to a degree considered unsafe by American defense planners.

Of course, United States economic interests in the Middle East are also important, a second factor. Americans owned 100 per cent of the oil producing company in Saudi Arabia, 50 per cent of the Kuwait Oil Company, close to 25 per cent of production in Iraq, 100 per cent of the Bahrein Petroleum Company, almost 25 per cent of production in Qatar, and 40 per cent of the International Consortium in Iran as well as interests in smaller operations elsewhere in the Middle East.

Third, Communist control of the area would threaten with political interruptions the trans-Suez trade which is vital to America's western allies, less

so then the United States itself since most of America's trade with Asia is carried on from the United States west coast or through the Panama Canal. Ways have now been discovered to circumvent the Suez Canal profitably, but that was not foreseen in 1958. Finally, Soviet conquest of Iran or Iraq whether directly or through subversion would afford the U.S.S.R. access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean thus turning the flank of the Indian sub-continent and Pakistan, an important geopolitical consideration to strategic planners.

Russian interest is equally vital in the area, and oil is a most important preoccupation of the Russians. Due to her isolation and her desire for economic self-sufficiency during the inter-war years, she did not join the rush by the West to obtain Middle East oil concessions. In 1944, however, Stalin demanded oil concessions in northern Iran and in 1947 he extracted the promise of them as his condition for withdrawing Soviet troops from Azerbaijan.

In the 1950's the U.S.S.R.'s future need for oil from the Middle East was recognized. Although the Soviet Union is the world's second largest producer of oil, she seemed not far from the point of being unable — or at least of finding it very difficult to satisfy all her needs from her own resources. The United States has established concession rights to vast oil resources elsewhere in the world, principally in Venezuela and the Middle East. For her own needs the United States has chosen to rely mainly on domestic production, in order both to protect her domestic petroleum industry and to avoid becoming dependent on outside supplies.

Russia has also been reluctant to depend on outside sources of oil. She seeks new discoveries in Siberia to keep pace with the growing internal oil market. There difficulties of climate and accessibility make it doubtful that the U.S.S.R. can keep ahead of demand for very long, so middle eastern supplies may have been considered as a possible source for future needs. As mentioned above, Europe depends heavily on middle eastern oil. Were the Soviet Union able to

turn on and off that supply, the political repercussions would be considerable.

Other factors are also important in Soviet thinking. The age old Russian desire for a warm water port cannot be ignored, nor the desire to counter American influence in the area.

Yet the Russians had less to lose than the Americans since the Soviet immediate goal was a neutral Middle East kept out of the western camp rather than client states or an alliance. Of course, if any middle eastern state declared itself a Soviet ally, fine, but the Russians would be satisfied with neutrality. Therefore, it was the Americans who had to win; the Russians could settle for a tie.

MILITARY CAPABILITY

Even though the United States emphasis had been upon massive retaliation and a build up of strategic nuclear weapons that nation was still prepared for the deployment of conventional forces as well. In the Mediterranean, a landing team consisting of seventeen hundred men (the Second Battalion of the Second Marine Regiment) could land shortly thereafter. The two army battle groups in Germany could be transferred to the Middle East by plane in only 12 hours. Finally, the 101st Airborne Division and the Second Marine Division as well as the 82nd Airborne Division could be airlifted overseas in a matter of a few days.

The Russians, capable strategically, had some problems in quick deployment of conventional forces. As a result of the expense of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the Russians sought to save money by a cut back of conventional forces. In 1955 and 1956 there was a sizeable reduction to 1947 levels. The Red Army was still massive but it was designed either for defensive purposes, or for a frontal assault in Western Europe rather than for deployment in various trouble spots around the world, like the Middle East.

In developing naval capabilities for offensive operations against the enemy, the Soviets have stressed two weapons systems (1) submarines with missile launchers for nuclear attack, and (2) missile launching cruisers. In so doing, Russian strategists have decided that large surface vessel-battleships, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers are obsolete in the nuclear era. Without the latter, it would be extremely difficult to land Russian troops in the Middle East and virtually impossible to supply and support them with air power.

So while the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union were in a balance of terror on a nuclear level and in Russian favor on the manpower level, the available force in the Middle East capable of quick deployment heavily favored the United States.

FEAR OF WAR

Both nations feared war due to its nature in the nuclear age. However, the United States felt the Russians would do nothing if it intervened in a limited way in the Middle East. Eisenhower writes:

We came to the conclusion that the Soviets would not, save under the most extreme provocation risk a global nuclear war. They might undertake as in the past probes that would alarm populations and some governments but would never carry such activities to the point where all-out retaliation would be the only response a self-respecting nation could take.

Aside from any rational fear over the effects of retaliation, an important factor, Eisenhower and Dulles gave two further reasons for the Russian propensity to avoid war:

Dictatorships by their nature always have a narrow base of popular support; in a political sense their vulnerability to modern destructive attack is greater than in the case of people occupying a large geographical area and practicing self-government. In the U.S.S.R. the entire Communist Party numbers only a few million out of over two hundred million and the Party's solidly authoritative heads are few. These leaders could not fail to fear that even a partial political paralysis under attack could easily cause mammoth casualties...possibly open revolution.

The other factor in the Soviet situation that seemed to us a deterrent to reckless action on their part was their feverish effort to attain maximum industrialization. Soviet leaders must have realized that the industrial complexes they were striving to develop...would be highly vulnerable to attack... Therefore we believed that in spite of Soviet bluster, boasts and often repeated threats, they would be reluctant to provoke global nuclear war.

Dulles further argued that the Russians would never risk war unless the strategic situation favored them. And the United States, he felt, was still far ahead.

The Russians therefore did not seem to want war over Lebanon, Jordan, or Iraq. Were Egypt or Syria involved (as had been the case in 1956) the Russians may have been less cautious due to higher stakes.

For example, in 1956 the Russians and the Chinese offered Egypt a large number of volunteers to help repel the invaders, Britain, France, and Israel. But the situation in 1957-1958 was quite different. Now the United States was involved and a nuclear confrontation would be more probable were the Russians to act. Moreover, in 1956, the effected states were neutral or mildly pro-Russian. Thus if they fell to a western invader, and a pro-American government were set up the Russians would have a great deal to lose. In 1958 the states involved were hardly neutral. Lebanon had subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine; and Jordan, professing neutrality, leaned heavily toward the British; Iraq was the cornerstone of the Bagdad Pact. Here, the Russians had little to lose. If any of those three nations could break away from the American camp, fine; if not, the situation was no worse than before. So the Russians were not directly involved at this point, and did not have to move, unless the Americans went into Egypt or Syria. The Americans perceived this and consequently had little fear of the Russians.

PRE-CRISIS COMMITMENTS

On the American side there were two commitments, one informal, the other formal. The informal commitment has already been discussed at some length: the

United States backed the Bagdad Pact but did not see the necessity of joining it herself.

Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador to Iraq during the negotiations which preceded the Bagdad Pact argues that the United States missed an important opportunity to signal the Russians of American intentions and determination by not joining. Two weeks after Turkey and Iraq signed their pact of mutual co-operation which was to become the Bagdad Pact, Gallman urged early American adherence upon the State Department for the following reasons:

1. The United States was the originator of the Northern Tier Concept and gave the encouragement and inspiration which led to the pact;

2. American as well as British adherence would give both the Middle East and the Soviet Union proof that the United States and Great Britain were standing firm in defense of the free world;

3. American membership would enhance the overall influence of the United States in the area.

Iraqi Premier Nuri also argued for American adherence to the pact. During a visit to Washington, he pointed out that American membership would show Moscow clearly how the United States felt about Soviet efforts to cause disruption in the Middle East; American participation would give encouragement to other states to join and a lift to those who already joined; finally, he told a congressman that United States adherence would not call for any real increase in commitment or material aid.

When Senator Green asked how Egypt would react to American membership Nuri discounted Nasser's reaction with the comment, "The Communist threat is the overriding, immediate issue. Every other consideration is secondary."

Despite this, Washington never made its position clear. Instead the United States added to the confusion by issuing statements several times a year, that while we were not prepared to join the Bagdad Pact at that particular time, we

did not rule out joining eventually. To compound the confusion we began joining the committees of the pact one by one. Ambassador Gallman feels that by our day-to-day improvisations we weakened the effects of the defense pact and put Iraq in a very difficult position at home and abroad. The commitment remained informal, possibly vague and must have been a source of confusion.

Our formal commitment in the area was the Eisenhower Doctrine. Early in 1957, the President went before Congress to request specific measures to protect the Middle East against the dangers of international communism. He proposed a three point legislative program authorizing the executive to:

1. Cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence;
2. Undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desire such aid;
3. Employ the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations in the area requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

The whole tone of Eisenhower's address was one of extreme urgency. He implied that the Middle East was in imminent danger of Communist armed attack, and that the United States must act immediately if the situation were to be salvaged.

However, instead of promoting American interests in the Middle East, the Eisenhower Doctrine set them back. It forced a polemical argument on the Arab world and afforded the Soviet Union greater opportunity to engage in anti-western and anti-American propaganda.

The Arabs felt strongly that they were in imminent and continuous danger from expansionist Zionism, or western imperialism, not from any nonevident troops of international communism. This old suspicion of western imperialism

was strongly reinforced by the British, French, and Israeli attack against Egypt in 1956. Hadn't Russia just demonstrated its support of the Arabs by espousing the Egyptian cause in the United Nations and by threatening to hail missiles on London and Paris if the aggression on Egypt did not stop? And the U.S.S.R. was continuing to show its friendliness to the Arabs by championing the Egyptian cause in the Suez Canal settlement at the United Nations. Why take a slap at a friendly nation? Why be drawn into the struggle between the great powers by becoming involved with the Eisenhower Doctrine?

In Arab eyes positive neutralism was the new formula for success, the tool for seeking support on the international scene for national objectives. And it was incompatible with the Eisenhower Doctrine, which took a rigid stand against the communist world.

Therefore public opinion was overwhelmingly against it. Like other Bagdad Pact members, Iraq had give it a nod of approval, but the British-oriented Premier Nuri made no attempt at closer identification. Syria and Egypt stood squarely against the doctrine and won over to their side Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Only Lebanon subscribed.

On March 16, 1957, a joint Lebanese-American communique was issued based on the Eisenhower Doctrine. It called for the extension of American economic and military aid to Lebanon to fortify it against the advance of international communism; and it authorized Lebanon to request the assistance of American armed forces to repel a communist attack.

Both Washington and Beirut felt a sense of accomplishment in issuing the joint communique. Yet both were on rather thin ice. Washington was intruding on regional politics; Beirut was splitting the nation.

ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES

In the Middle East, the Soviet Union is vulnerable in at least two respects:

inferiority to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Mediterranean fleets and vulnerability of its supply lines. Since the Sixth Fleet was fully capable of meeting any Soviet conventional threat, the U.S.S.R. could take no action in the area without risking a major confrontation with the United States.

The second point - the vulnerability of Soviet supply lines to the Mediterranean is closely connected with the fact that the Soviet Union has no direct control over her two points of access, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles. The Straits of Gibraltar are effectively under the control of two North Atlantic Treaty powers, with Britain still retaining a military base in Gibraltar and the United States maintaining a large naval base in Spain at Rota near Cadiz, some 50 miles west of the Straits. In the case of the Dardanelles, the Montreux Convention of 1936 confirmed the absolute sovereignty of Turkey over passage. As a result of this convention, the U.S.S.R. "May send capital ships through the Straits provided they pass singly and are not accompanied by more than two destroyers."

For the Soviet Union, this status must be particularly unsatisfactory. The Turkish Straits are too narrow to let any vessel pass unobserved, and their shallowness makes it impossible for submarines to pass through them submerged. The United States through Turkey, its NATO ally, can follow every movement made by the Soviet navy to and from the Black Sea, thereby judging exact Russian force levels in the Mediterranean at any given time. The Soviet Union has no such advantage.

Soviet valuation of the stakes was much higher during the early, Syrian phase of the crisis in the summer of 1957. The Russians had a great deal to lose if the United States, through Turkey or Iraq, attempted to overthrow the Syrian government or bring pressure against Nasser. Neutral or mildly pro-Russian governments were at stake.

The American goal has already been reported -- pro-western or anti-commu-

nist governments. Neutrality was not enough. We wanted active support for our policies in the area -- the Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. So during the later, Lebanon phase of the crisis, American valuations of the stakes were higher. The United States had already lost one pro-western government to neutralism (possibly Communism, Dulles thought) due to the coup d'etat in Iraq, and the Americans were not about to let that happen in Lebanon without some action.

Support of allies is less important in this bipolar crisis than in a multipolar one due to the overwhelming force of the two giants. Nevertheless, the United States sought support from Turkey and Iraq as well as Jordan and Saudi Arabia during the Syrian phase of the crisis. And during the Lebanon phase, the United States asked for and received support from Great Britain, as they airlifted troops to Jordan. In opposing United States action in Lebanon, Moscow was backed by Egypt and Syria, as well as most other neutral states. This support, both for the American and Russian positions seems to be more psychological than military, however. If the crisis escalated, both great powers had enough force to engage themselves without the help of allies. The extra military support from Britain or Turkey on the American side or from Egypt or Syria on the Russian side would not have made much difference.

INITIAL IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS

It seems that Dulles and Eisenhower gave the Russians a much larger role in the area than they actually had. The Americans felt it was inconceivable that nations would prefer not to side with either Moscow or Washington in the life and death struggle that was going on. If Nasser considered himself a neutral, he must be working at least indirectly for the Communists. He not only resisted joining the Bagdad Pact himself, but he made it difficult for others

to do so with his propaganda attacks. He had mortgaged his cotton crop to the Russians for many years to come in order to buy their weapons; he had allowed them a further inroad to the area by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Finally his latest propaganda blasts about the Eisenhower Doctrine were inexcusable. Eisenhower put it quite bluntly: "Nasser worked hard to aggravate the internal difficulties of his neighbors. If he was not a Communist, he certainly succeeded in making us very suspicious of him."

A second initial image was that of the Soviet Union, a government which would not get involved in the area. Both Dulles and Eisenhower felt that the U.S.S.R. would make a lot of noise if the United States went to the aid of Lebanon, but that it would do nothing militarily. Eisenhower wrote: "I had always discounted the probability of the Soviets doing anything as a reaction. Communists do little on impulse; rather their aggressive moves are invariably the result of deliberate planning." (IKE-282)

III. THE BARGAINING PROCESS

THE SYRIAN PHASE

The sudden Western panic over Syria in August 1957 points out the confusion of American Middle East policy. There had been a leftward shift in Syria over the past several years, but these developments had not been noticed in Washington. When the realization of what had happened there finally dawned, it came as a shock. American diplomats recognized in the summer of 1957 that Syria was the Arab state that had moved furthest from the West, further than even Nasser. It looked to American leaders that Syria was on the verge of moving into the Russian camp, as the Syrian communist party had become one of that nation's strongest political forces.

The story goes back to the overthrow of the Shishakli military dictatorship

in early 1954. All major political parties had been suppressed under Shishakli, but the Communists emerged stronger than before, because they alone had been able to preserve their cadres and activities in conditions of illegality.

During 1955 and 1956 political power gradually passed into the hands of a new coalition which included the Ba'ath Party (a pro-Nasser group), independents, nationalists, and communists. The army corps was mainly under Ba'ath influence although the communists were also important among some officers. Conservative, pro-western forces were gradually eliminated in purges and treason trials. In March 1966 all the major parties signed the National Pact in which they agreed on democratic reforms and a neutralist policy.

The two most powerful parties soon became the Communists and the Ba'ath. Little needs to be said about the Communists -- they were pro-Russian, and probably had strong connections with the Soviet Union. The Ba'ath party needs closer examination. They stood for a radical brand of national socialism in the Arab world and violently opposed traditional forces (feudal and clergy) and of course the West, which was believed responsible for most of what had gone wrong in the Arab world. There was nothing in the program of the Ba'ath that would have made a pro-Soviet orientation in world affairs inevitable, but in practice the extreme anti-westernism of the party brought it close to the Soviet position.

Throughout 1956 the rapprochement between Damascus and Moscow continued. Shepilov visited Syria in June and met the leading public figures. In August a cultural agreement was signed. More important was the Soviet arms supply to Syria, greatly stepped up during the latter part of the year. There was talk of Syria having become a Soviet military base and an "on-the-eve-of-the-revolution" atmosphere in Damascus was reported by western diplomats.

The internal shift of power was also important. In January 1957 a mass trial of 47 members of conservative, pro-western groups opened. The main charge was that they had tried to overthrow the government and to replace it with pro-western elements.

In August, a new purge was begun in the Syrian high command and the Civil Service. It is doubtful whether Moscow had anything to do with these show trials or even knew about them beforehand. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned they were unnecessary and perhaps harmful since it may have cast doubts on Russian goals and intentions in the Middle East. The Soviet Union seemed to be satisfied with the Syrian situation in early 1957. Western influence was at a minimum. For Damascus to become more pro-Russian would raise western concern about a Soviet satellite in the Middle East. Indeed, it seems that Eisenhower viewed this situation as a communist takeover of the Syrian Government. He writes:

Syrian radio blared forth an accusation that the United States was engaged in a plot to overthrow the Kuwatly regime and the three United States embassy and attache officials in Damascus were to be expelled for alleged subversive activities. A few days later the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, a political moderate, resigned his position and his post was taken over by an officer known to be pro-Moscow in sympathies.

According to Eisenhower, Syria's neighbors believed that the pendulum had swung far toward the danger point. Almost immediately he writes, the Middle East broke into a diplomatic furor approaching panic. There were meetings between the Turks and Iraqis; the Iraqis and the Jordanians; the Jordanians and the Turks. Lebanon asked the United States for formal assurances of support in the event Lebanon were attacked by Syria. Turkey claimed confidentially to hold a document which promised that the Soviets would back Syrian territorial expansion at the expense of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. Even President Kuwatly of Syria seemed shaken, Eisenhower reports

by the rapidity of the events in his own land; apparently fearful of his own future he hurried off to Egypt to consult with President Nasser. Although the suddenness of the Syrian action had apparently startled Nasser (it was reported that he regarded the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army as an out-and-out Communist) he still found it necessary to join publicly with Syria in denouncing the alleged United States plot to overthrow the Syrian regime.

Thus, at this point, Eisenhower felt it essential that the United States move.

He felt that the consequence of inaction would be "catastrophic to the Arabs and to the West." With Syria in Communist hands, he writes, other Arab nations could scarcely avoid a similar fate. Such a development "would confront Western Europe with difficulties that in the long run would lead to calamity for them and so much danger to the United States that we could not afford to sit idly by."

Two approaches were planned. The first was designed to bolster United States allies in the area. One move to accomplish this was a message sent to Premier Menderes of Turkey (and to the leaders of Iraq and Jordan who were in Istanbul for consultations) which gave assurances that if Syria's Moslem neighbors felt it necessary to take action against aggression by the Syrian government the United States would expedite arms shipments already committed to the middle eastern countries and would replace losses as quickly as possible. A second move was the visit of Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration to Amman where King Hussein of Jordan and the Crown Prince of Iraq, King Faisal and Premier Menderes were present. The main goal of this move seems to have been to obtain a consensus of these heads of state as to what might be done as well as to signal the other side.

The considerations and pressures producing the move were, of course the swing to the left in Syria, already discussed at some length. The decision making process leading up to the move is difficult to ascertain. Eisenhower writes in the first person indicating that all decisions were made by him alone. Of course this was not the case; his use of the first person is merely a convenient means by which to simplify a complex phenomena. The Dulles brothers, John and Allan, as well as the Defense Department, probably played as active a role here as they did later in the Lebanon phase of the crisis. But since the deliberations are not recorded, we can say nothing about them.

The intended effects of these two coercive communications moves were to

threaten Syria with retaliation if she attacked either Turkey or Iraq or Jordan. Eisenhower felt that the Syrians were planning such an attack and he thought that a unified, allied front would prevent Damascus from starting any aggressive action with her neighbors.

The moves did not commit the United States to any specific course of action, other than the supply and replacement of arms, and were vague enough to leave some doubt about what the United States herself would do in case of attack. Eisenhower further limited his commitment by indication that American assistance would be forthcoming only if the actions taken against Syria by Turkey or Iraq were "confined to logical and reasonable objectives and contained no purpose of permanently occupying Syrian territory."

The effects of these two moves on the United States allies were mixed. Eisenhower expected an overwhelmingly favorable reaction. And from Turkey, Israel, and Great Britain the reaction was positive. Premier Menderes of Turkey seemed relieved that the United States would support his government. Ben Gurion recognized the necessity of Israel's abstention from any participation to avoid other Arab states; but he expressed deep concern over events in Syria. He felt that Syria had already turned communist and wrote to Eisenhower, "It is impossible to distinguish between Syria and Russia." He was concerned that the Syrian arms buildup from the U.S.S.R. was directed against Israel. "The establishment of Syria as a base for international communism is one of the most dangerous events which has befallen the free world in our time," he concluded. Britain was also in favor of American desire to stop any planned Syrian aggression before it got started. MacMillan felt that this crisis might convince the Arabs once and for all that it was communism, rather than Israel or western imperialism that was the number one enemy, the primary threat to peace.

The Arabs weren't convinced. And the nations that needed to be won over to the American united front against Syria didn't see the situation as did

Eisenhower. King Hussein of Jordan wanted nothing to do with any move against Syria. He left for a vacation in Italy right at the height of the diplomatic activity. Eisenhower was "astonished" to find that King Saud, rather than addressing himself to the dangers of a communist Syria in the Middle East was still preoccupied with Israel and the slowness of American arms deliveries to his government. Iraq decided that it was not worth the risk to move against Syria since the Damascus government could order the blowing up of Iraq's pipeline across Syria. Thus the only Moslem government in the area which wanted to get involved was Turkey, a NATO ally which is hardly considered a middle eastern, Arab government. In any event, Turkey commenced a military buildup along the Syrian border while the other middle eastern states remained aloof.

While Eisenhower was attempting to bolster his friends in the area, he also sought to insure that the conflict remain local, his second approach to this phase of the crisis. Two nations had to be neutralized, Israel and the Soviet Union. Accomplishing the abstention of Israel was an easy matter. We were her major arms supplier, and in this case, she felt obliged to follow our wishes. Ben Gurion promised to abstain from using the current confusion as a chance of seizing territory for Israel.

The U.S.S.R. was another matter. Here, the United States needed to employ a number of coercive moves to insure that the U.S.S.R. would remain outside the local conflict. United States aircraft were sent from western Europe to the American base at Adana, Turkey to be available in case of need: the Sixth Fleet was ordered to the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Washington announced the speeded-up shipment of arms to Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, indicating that the United States was at least taking sides even if she may not become directly involved. Finally, the Strategic Air Command as well as troops in Europe and the United States were put on alert.

I can say little about the decision making process behind these coercive

communications moves for the same reasons mentioned earlier, lack of evidence on the deliberations. However, the intended effects are quite clear. The United States wanted to signal the U.S.S.R. that any aggression by Syria against her neighbors should remain a local action. The Soviet Union was not to become involved; otherwise the United States would also be drawn into the conflict, and a nuclear confrontation might be the result. This raised the stakes for both the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

It's unclear what effects either of these approaches had against the adversaries, perceived to be Syria and Russia. The first, bolstering of friends in the area was an admitted failure since only one state, Turkey, felt compelled to take preparatory action. It may be that Syria had intended no aggression, that she was too concerned with internal stability to get involved with external adventure. Eisenhower may not have been able to see this since he felt that a communist state was by nature aggressive, and after all Syria was now communist. The second approach was not needed if Syria had not planned an attack. In that case, it appeared to the U.S.S.R. and to Egypt that the United States was trying to find an excuse to get states in the area to oust the leftist government in Damascus. Therefore, the Soviet Union felt compelled to stop the United States from throwing out a friendly government or allowing a NATO ally, Turkey, to do so. Coersive communications moves, one by Egypt, one by the U.S.S.R., as well as a Soviet warning, were the responses. First, the Russians sent warships to visit Syrian ports. Second, Egypt landed troops at Latakia. Finally, the Russian government protested the troop buildup along the Turkish-Syrian border and told the United States and other western governments to remember the lesson of the Suez.

The decision making process behind these moves is impossible to ascertain due to lack of information on both the Russian and Egyptian procedure. However, the intended effect is clear. The Russians felt that their closest friend

in the area, Syria was threatened by the West, and wanted to insure that no invasion by Turkey or internal coup d'etat would upset that government. The above mentioned moves can be viewed as a package of coercive, communications moves indicating Soviet interest and friendship to the threatened Syrian government. They were designed to raise the stakes of any planned western invasion of Syria and vaguely indicated that the Russians would support Damascus. It was not a commitment, however, and the Russians were vague enough to allow themselves a way out if the need should arise.

The United States saw this as one further example of Soviet aggressive behavior. The protest over a troop buildup on the Turkish-Syrian border presented Washington with deep concern. Was Russia thinking of attacking Turkey?

Dulles' response was designed to make Khrushchev think that any action against the Turks would be considered action against the United States. He told Khrushchev that "he should be under no illusion that the United States, Turkey's friend and ally, takes lightly its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty or is not determined to carry out the national policy expressed in the Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East (the Eisenhower Doctrine). If there is an attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union, Dulles re-emphasized, it would not mean a purely defensive operation by the United States with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary from which to attack Turkey.

The Russians replied with what Eisenhower felt was a rather ominous statement. Accusing The United States of trying to stir up war over Syria, Khrushchev asserted that Secretary Henderson had been given specific instructions to that effect, and failed to get the unified cooperation of the Arab governments. Thus the Americans were trying to get Turkey herself to launch an attack. He warned, "If the rifles fire the rockets will start flying."

The final result of all these coercive communications moves, threats, and warnings was what appears to have been a stand off. If the U.S.S.R. promised

to back Syrian territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey, Iraq and Jordan as Dulles claimed, Russia became convinced that such a move was too risky. If Syria herself thought of attacking one of her neighbors, she seems to have been dissuaded partly by the Turkish military buildup, partly by American indications that she may become involved, partly by Soviet pressures for restraint. If the United States or Turkey wanted to overthrow the Syrian government and replace it with one that was pro-western (or at least less pro-Soviet), they did not dare to carry out that plan due to Russian warnings that things may get out of hand. So the Syrian government remained in power; and it seems that Russian offers of aid against the Turks and Americans gave the Syrian communists even more influence and power in Damascus, setting the stage for the next event in the crisis.

THE UNION OF EGYPT AND SYRIA

The next event in the crisis was the union of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958. This was quite unexpected; and the initiative came neither from the Russians nor from President Nasser. The Ba'ath leaders of Syria suddenly wanted a much closer tie with Egypt; and after two weeks negotiation in Cairo, they and their supporters in the Syrian army succeeded in winning over Nasser who had been somewhat lukewarm to the idea in the beginning.

Nasser certainly would have preferred a looser form of union, for there was a practical reason against a complete merger, the danger that a fusion of the two countries would impede rather than expedite the all-Arab union that was ultimately sought. Such a merger would set a pattern to which all other Arab countries would have to adhere in the future; and it could be anticipated that some Arab countries which might have been willing to join a federation would be more reluctant to become part of a complete union. The Syrian communists for

different reasons would also have preferred a federation; in Syria, communism had full freedom of action whereas conditions in Egypt were less favorable.

The union came as a surprise to Moscow, and there was no official comment for some time. Prior to 1957 the Soviet Union had given no support to the concept of a unified Arab state; instead Arab nationalism had been advocated. Arab unity was still somewhat suspect because of a lingering prejudice against the Arab League.

Questions of principle were not involved in Moscow. Rather, the practical side was what concerned the Soviet policy makers. It is easier to deal with separate Arab states rather than a united republic of some thirty or forty million people, so that was not encouraged.

Nevertheless, when Syria and Egypt decided upon union, the Russians went along. To criticize the new republic would have been tantamount to losing much of the prestige and good will the Soviet Union had earned in the Arab world in previous years, and so the United Arab Republic received Soviet blessing.

Opinions in the West were divided. Some journalists and scholars saw the union as a means to moderate the radical politics practiced in Damascus. However, since Nasser was still considered a dupe of Moscow by Dulles and Eisenhower the union was not welcomed in official circles. It was feared that this was the first step toward Nasser's goal of unifying the Arab world under neutralism, and that would play right into the Russians' hands, according to American leaders.

The proclamation of unity claimed to be a beginning of the unified Arab nation. Egypt and Syria declared, "we affirm that the door is open to participation by any Arab state desirous of joining them in union or federation for the purpose of protecting the Arab peoples from harm and evil and strengthening Arab sovereignty and safeguarding its existence." All other Arab states were invited to associate themselves with the new union forthwith. Nasser's rhetoric indicated this goal as well: "Our union shall bring together the whole Arab

nation whether the imperialists like it or not because this is the will of the Arab people on every spot of Arab land." In March, Yemen heeded the call for union and was the third Arab state to enter the fold.

Eisenhower viewed this with great anxiety: "Western concern about the apparently inexorable drift of Syria toward the communist orbit during 1957 was by no means lessened when President Nasser -- whose exact political leanings were still something of a mystery -- announced...the United Arab Republic."

Far from a communist or Nasserite plot, the union was carried out for Syrian domestic purposes. The Syrian communist party had gained considerable power over the Ba'ath group, probably due to the role they played during the threatened invasion from Turkey. It's not clear whether the U.S.S.R. approved of this gain of power or not. They had been satisfied with a neutral Middle East, and due to various American blunders in the area, many governments were actually pro-Russian in their foreign policy. Were the Syrian communists to take power away from the Ba'ath party in Damascus, Russian interests might be damaged, as neutral nations might feel that Moscow engineered the take-over. On the other hand, the Russians were in no position to tell the Syrian communists to retire from the political field.

Anyway the Ba'ath party probably decided that the best way to consolidate their domestic position in the face of communist gains was to unite with Nasser, who knew how to control the communists in Egypt and who had a great deal of clout with the Russians. Certainly Nasser could get the Russians to call off the communists if in fact Moscow were behind their local maneuvering for power. If not, Nasser was strong enough to hold them in check.

The United States didn't see it that way, however. Since the union was carried out by Nasser and since he was being used by the Russians, the union must be part of a communist plot; or the Russians would at least use the union to set back American interests. Two events seemed to confirm this. First cer-

tain other middle eastern governments which were concerned about the union decided to respond. The two Hashimi kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan ruled by cousins, Faisal II and Hussein decided to form their own federation in obvious rivalry to the United Arab Republic. Nasser's attack on this federation was immediate. In a series of mass rallies in Damascus, he launched public tirades against it. Crowds of Nasser's supporters streamed across the borders of Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan to attend the rallies; and it seemed to the United States that Nasser may have decided to send them back to combat the Hashimi federation either as quereles, organizers or propagandists. "It will be scattered like dry leaves before the wind," he said. Any assault against the federation was an attack against a pro-western government and a "true neutral", defined in Washington's dictionary as one that leaned toward the West. Thus Nasser's vicious propaganda attacks against this federation seemed sinister.

Even more ominous was the reaction of Saudi Arabia, which decided to bow to the pro-Nasser tide and renounce the role it had assumed as a defense against Arab radicalism. For several weeks after the Union of Syria and Egypt, the United Arab Republic's press and radio waged a campaign against King Saud, accusing him of having offered vast sums of money to have Nasser assassinated. Under increasing pressure at home from pro-Nasser factions as well as abroad from other Arab states, the King decided to retire from the active direction of Saudi affairs. On March 24 it was announced that the King's brother Crown Prince Faisal who had been Prime Minister and Foreign Minister would direct all Saudi internal, external and financial policy. Many in Washington expected that he would no longer follow a policy of opposition to Nasser.

Eisenhower considered Faisal pro-Nasser and felt that "a potential bulwark against communist expansion efforts in the Middle East...was at an end."

These two events, the propaganda attack against Iraq and Jordan as well as the retirement of King Saud seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union, if not in-

spired by Moscow, was certainly aiding Soviet interest. It seems that Eisenhower may have perceived this as a coercive, basic move, which changed the situation in the Middle East considerably. Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon were surrounded by a hostile Egypt and Syria. One of the most pro-western leaders in the area, King Saud of Saudi Arabia was gone and the Russians had made further inroads into the Middle East. The time was fast arriving when the United States would have to draw the line at how far Nasser and the communists could expand.

REVOLUTION IN LEBANON

Before the Americans could fully consider the significance of the new United Arab Republic and evaluate the exact consequences for American policy, the civil war in Lebanon broke out with rioting in Tripoli, followed by clashes in the north. In Beirut, the government's opposition, called the United National Opposition Front decreed the closing of all shops, and the press announced a three day general strike.

The purpose of the strike was to obtain the resignation of President Chamoun; and the strike would remain in force until he had actually left office. The President categorically refused to resign and charged that the troubles at home were inspired not by internal problems but by massive external interference in the affairs of Lebanon, calculated to destroy her independence and sovereignty. Specifically, he put the blame on the United Arab Republic and accused the opposition leaders as acting as agents for Nasser.

Included in the United National Opposition Front were groups from a wide spectrum, not just Nasserites. Former political leaders from many parties both left and center made their opposition known, and a large group of them actually belonged to and supported the aims of the front. Included were past and present

Chamber deputies as well as former prime ministers, a former Premier, and tribal or local government leaders.

Within Lebanon, the great majority of Muslims, constituting almost half the population sympathized with and supported the objectives of the revolution. The other half of the population, the Christians, were in favor of the regime and its pro-western position.

What troubled the United States was the support of the revolt from the Communist Party and the Ba'ath Socialist Party. The former was of course completely opposed to Chamoun's pro-western policy and adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, but the leadership of the United National Opposition Front disclaimed any connection with the communists. It seems that this small but well-organized party could only exploit public dissatisfaction and its role remained insignificant.

Of Syrian origin and leadership, the Ba'ath Socialist Party supported the revolution for other reasons -- they sought a union of the Arab world, further enlarging the united Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. They looked upon Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine as a step toward the alienation of Lebanon from the Arab world. This party became the object of the Lebanese government's accusations of "official interference" by the United Arab Republic. But this is a misleading term. There was no armed contingent of the Syrian Army which crossed into Lebanon to fight on the side of the rebels. However, arms, money, and men from Syria flowed into the neighboring areas of Lebanon held by the rebel factions. This obviously had the blessing if not the direct support of the authorities in Syria.

To Eisenhower, however, the civil war was predominantly inspired by Nasser. "Since the establishment of the United Arab Republic in February," he writes, "there had been increasing numbers of border crossings between Lebanon and Syria by Arab Nationalists, and it seemed likely that Lebanon occupied a place on Colonel Nasser's timetables as a nation to be brought under his influence."

Eisenhower's image of the situation may have been influenced by reports from Iraq on how that nation viewed the fighting in Lebanon. To Premier Nuri, the agitation appeared as the prelude to an invasion of Lebanon by Syria. He requested Eisenhower to speed up delivery of jet aircraft to discourage Syria from action against Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. And he reported that both Jordan and the United States deemed it necessary.

Thus it seems that Eisenhower saw this as a Nasserite move designed to increase United Arab Republic (and indirectly, Russian) influence in the Middle East at the expense of the United States. To the American leaders this was the beginning of a basic coercive move designed to destroy the only government which had subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Thus Eisenhower felt something must be done.

However, he realized the costs of intervention. There would be major reactions all over the Middle East. Dulles believed that the pipeline across Syria would be blown, the Suez canal might be blocked, and the wave of resentment among the Arab population could become so strong that it might be impractical for the governments of Iraq and Jordan to cooperate no matter how much they might desire to do so.

Also, Russian reaction had to be considered. This point did not worry Eisenhower excessively, however. "I believed the Soviets would not take action if the United States movement were decisively strong, particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in the operations."

The question became what could the United States do, since there was little hard evidence of direct communist involvement in the Lebanese disturbances. It would seem that the Eisenhower Doctrine was inoperative for that reason as well as the fact that no invasion had taken place. Dulles announced on May 20 that in the view of the Eisenhower Administration the language of the Middle East resolution would be deemed to authorize emergency assistance to Lebanon if an

appeal for help was received from the Lebanese government. Dulles went on to say that the terms of the resolution as enacted by Congress were sufficiently broad to cover a non-communist threat to Lebanese independence, not just one from a communist nation. So any threat from the United Arab Republic could be legally met, according to Dulles' interpretation.

In private, the Secretary of State recommended direct action immediately in the form of armed American intervention; but Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, took a more cautious view, urging a delay of at least twenty-four hours.

To Eisenhower, the only thing that required immediate action was the Chamoun inquiry as to what kind of aid he might receive upon receipt of an appropriate request from Lebanon's duly constituted government. Eisenhower decided to respond that the United States would reply favorably and strongly but with certain conditions. First he would not send United States troops to Lebanon for the purpose of achieving an additional term for the Lebanese president. Second, the request should have the concurrence of some other Arab nation. Third, the mission of the United States troops in Lebanon would be twofold: protection of the life and property of Americans as well as assistance to the legal Lebanese government.

With this in mind, Eisenhower directed a series of coercive communications moves including the movement of amphibious elements of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. Army airborne battle groups in Europe which had been earmarked for possible air transportation to the Middle East were put on alert. Police equipment, small arms, ammunition and tear gas, already promised to the Lebanese government were delivered ahead of schedule. Finally, the contingent of Marines attached to the Sixth Fleet was doubled. It was also rumored that Great Britain had alerted forces for a possible air lift to Jordan.

Eisenhower's principle advisors for these moves seem to have been the Dulles

brothers, although it's difficult to say who played the most influential role, and whether State or Defense Department officials were called into the consultations. The general purpose of these moves were clear: Eisenhower wanted to stop any infiltration coming into Lebanon from the United Arab Republic. To make sure Nasser got the message, both Great Britain and the United States sent a message to the Egyptian leader warning him to permit no further deterioration in a situation that touched so closely to American and British interests.

But the Americans failed to signal the rebels that American intervention, if necessary would not have been directed toward the maintenance of the Chamoun administration; since that condition was not mentioned publicly. Of course, Eisenhower probably didn't want to undercut the political maneuverings of his old friend, Chamoun, by such an announcement. Yet clear American intensions would have made the situation less unsettling for the rebels in Lebanon. However it seems doubtful that Eisenhower placed much credence to the argument that the revolt was truly domestic in character. He probably felt that the call for Chamoun's resignation was merely an issue upon which the communists and Nasserites were fomenting trouble.

Finally, the United States did not seem to be signaling the Soviet Union at this point, since none of the American strategic forces were put on alert. As mentioned earlier, the American President did not believe the Russians would become involved as long as action were limited to those states in the area which leaned toward or were allied with the American side.

This committed the United States to intervention if the situation became such that the independence of Lebanon were threatened. What effects this had on Nasser is difficult to ascertain. It was by no means certain that he was behind the infiltration of men and supplies across the Syrian-Lebanese border. While he was the Chief of State of the United Arab Republic, the Ba'ath party in Syria was by no means under his absolute control: the party could have direc-

ted that arms and supplies be sent into Lebanon without involving Nasser. And when the infiltration ceased, it's by no means sure that it was stopped by American pressure on Nasser rather than by the United Nations Observation team (which will be discussed shortly). In any event the infiltration and the civil war began to die down, and it was thought that American intervention would not be needed.

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

In the meantime, the Lebanese government had argued that the revolt was becoming more and more controlled by foreign agents. Chamoun finally claimed that he had "innumerable proofs, formal and irrefutable" that the United Arab Republic had interfered in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Thus on May 21 the Lebanese government submitted a complaint against the United Arab Republic to the Arab League Council and on May 27 it carried the same complaint to the United Nations Security Council. The charges were:

1. Intervention of the United Arab Republic in Lebanese affairs through infiltration of armed bands from Syria;
2. Destruction of Lebanese life and property through this intervention;
3. Participation in terrorism and rebellion;
4. The supply of arms to individuals in rebellion against the legal government of Lebanon;
5. Violent press and radio campaigns conducted by the United Arab Republic against the government of Lebanon.

By submitting its case against the United Arab Republic to the Arab League and the United Nations, the Lebanese government opted for a regional solution if possible rather than the introduction of American combat troops. However, voices within the opposition camp condemned this move, claiming that the crisis

was entirely domestic in character and that Nasser had nothing to do with it.

It was obvious, however, that the United Arab Republic was conducting a press and radio campaign against the Chamoun regime and against Lebanese foreign policy which it considered hostile to Cairo. It was inciting the rebels to topple the regime. But was aggression by propaganda to be considered a justifiable cause for action by a regional or international organization? If so, most of the members of both organizations stood in danger of being accused and censured for similar aggression, including the United States with her broadcasts over Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The problem was more complex than that. The propaganda was merely a manifestation of the internal struggle for power in Lebanon which had been joined through Lebanese foreign policy with the regional struggle between the Damascus-Cairo axis and the Bagdad-Amman entente. Over the past two years, Chamoun had followed a policy which had placed Lebanon firmly in the pro-western camp. Accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine was an anti-Arab position in the eyes of the regime charged the opposition with attempting to destroy Lebanon's traditional neutrality among its Arab neighbors by making it a satellite of Cairo. The civil war was, therefore domestic in nature with the Christians, pro-western sympathizers on one side and the Moslem, pro-Arab nationalists on the other side. The international part of the revolt was peripheral with the United States backing Chamoun's regime with aid and weapons, and the United Arab Republic backing the opposition with propaganda and possibly weapons, if the infiltration from Syria could be substantiated and traced all the way to Nasser.

The propaganda campaign against the Chamoun regime was continued by the Egyptian and Syrian radio and press while the United Arab Republic denied any direct involvement in the Lebanese revolution. When the Arab League Council met in early June, the Chamoun regime sought an official censure of the United Arab Republic intervention and received strong support from Iraq and Jordan.

The League didn't want to take so strong a stand against Nasser, however, so a compromise resolution that was conciliatory to the United Arab Republic was passed by Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iraq, and Jordan. Lebanon rejected it, and went to the United Nations Security Council for more satisfactory action. In the middle of June, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld set up an Observation Group in Lebanon at the direction of the Security Council to insure that there was no illegal infiltration of men or supplies across the Syrian-Lebanese border.

This Observation Group failed to agree with Chamoun that there was massive intervention by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon. In several reports to the United Nations Secretary General during July, August, and September, the Observation Group indicated that they were unable to detect the presence of Syrian or Egyptian infiltrators among the Lebanese rebels and could only concede the possibility of a limited smuggling of arms and supplies. Moreover, the group refused to implicate United Arab Republic authorities in the Lebanese revolution. Chamoun was furious. He accused the United Nations Observation group of making no attempt to discover the origin of rebel arms and of being incapable of determining the national character of rebel forces. The United Arab Republic while the opposition welcomed the United Nations report as proof of their claim that the revolt was purely domestic in character.

What had really happened? There had been a traffic in arms and ammunition across the Syrian-Lebanese border as well as an infiltration of Druze tribesmen and other Syrians. But most of this activity had taken place before the United Nations Observation Group arrived on the scene. The number on infiltrators was estimated at between 1000 and 3000, and these were joined by some Syrians with work permits in Lebanon who avoided deportation by taking up arms with the rebels. But the Syrians were indistinguishable from the Lebanese to visitors from outside the Arab world. Nevertheless, the infiltrators did not represent an official military intervention in legal terms and could not implicate the

United Arab Republic; nor could the arms smuggled from any one of numerous private sources. In any event, the presence of the United Nations team seemed to have a calming effect on the civil war since fighting gradually died down.

Russian reaction to these events was not spectacular. The Soviet government was not opposed to an Observation Group being sent to Lebanon. However they felt that no Security Council measures were really necessary because the disturbances in Lebanon were a purely internal matter. The important thing in the mind of Soviet delegate A. A. Sobolev was that certain western powers, which he said were "openly preparing armed intervention" should stop such "dangerous playing with fire." Most other delegations to the world organization felt that United Nations participation would reduce the likelihood that the United States would have to become involved under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Soviets could have vetoed this Security Council proposal. And had the United Arab Republic been actively seeking the overthrow of the Chamoun regime by subversion and infiltration, Nasser might have requested the Russians to cast one more "nyet". That was not necessary, however, since Syrian infiltration was minimal. Most of the trouble was domestic in nature.

Soviet allowance of the Observation Group proposal might be seen as an accommodative communications move. The Russians were trying to tell the United States that they were not involved in this adventure; indeed, even their Syrian and Egyptian friends were not involved. Therefore, there should be no reason for the United States to intervene under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

It seems that Eisenhower saw this as well as Nasser's failure to oppose an observation group as an accommodative communications move. He felt that it fit with certain indications that the United Arab Republic would be happy to see a temporary end to the struggle. Moreover, Nasser contacted the American Embassy in Cairo and offered to use his influence to end the Lebanese revolt. His conditions for doing this were not unreasonable, Eisenhower writes. They were that

of the Eisenhower Doctrine and a return to the neutrality to which Lebanon had so long been accustomed.

REVOLT IN IRAQ

The crisis seemed to be lessening when news arrived of the coup d'etat in Iraq. It was planned by a small group of officers assisted by a few civilians. While the coup had long been discussed and planned, the decision to strike on July 14 was taken suddenly and by only three or four members of the group.

Ambassador Dallman who was in Bagdad during the coup writes that Moscow had no hand in it; but during the early stages of confusion that followed the attack on the palace and the killing of the King and the Crown Prince, the closely knit band of local communists took over the direction of public demonstrations. The communists were joined almost immediately by pro-Nasser agitators, mostly from the Ba'ath Party. It is impossible to determine whether they were directed from Cairo, however.

These two elements encouraged and assisted by some of the younger officers generated the frenzied street scenes of the weeks following the coup. Support from the masses was not difficult to enlist; and the hatred for the former regime seemed to be bitter.

There seemed to be a great deal of confusion in Washington. Was the revolt Communist inspired? Nasser inspired? No one knew for sure, but the suspicions were aroused. The leader of the revolt, Brigadier General Abdel Karim al-Kassim disclaimed association with any international political movement and insisted that the revolution was directed only against Iraq's corrupt ruling class. On the other hand, General Kassim's principal associate, Colonel Abdel Salam Muhammad Arif was well known as a fervent admirer of Nasser and a leading exponent of Arab nationalism as practiced by the United Arab Republic. Nasser himself was

quick to hail the event as another victory for the Arab people and to promise the new republic full support. For all practical purposes, in one hour Iraq had abandoned its pro-western position and switched sides in the conflict which was dividing the Arab world.

For the United States which had been so engrossed in protecting the integrity of Lebanon, this sudden turn of events in a larger and more strategically located country was a stunning blow.

Allen Dulles explained the situation to Eisenhower: The coup, he said, was set up by pro-Nasser elements of the Iraqi army and the new government contained pro-Nasser people. Fifty officers of the Iraqi army were retired, including a large number with pro-western sympathies. Both King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri were presumed dead.

In Jordan, Allen Dulles continued, King Hussein was also the target of a plot, but the King seemed to be safe for the moment. Israel was alarmed. Prime Minister Ben Gurion might possibly be prodded into seizing that portion of Jordan west of the Jordan River. Kuwait could also be in the balance.

In Lebanon, he went on, the government of President Chamoun was alarmed and had officially requested through the American Ambassador that the United States and Britain intervene within forty-eight hours. President Chamoun was reported to be very bitter because the United States had not sent troops to support him.

King Saud of Saudi Arabia was worried and secretly demanded that the Bagdad Pact powers intervene in Iraq on pain of Saudi Arabia's having to go along with the United Arab Republic.

Apparently, the United States also believed that Lebanon would soon heat up again, the next target of an anti-American plot. United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the Security Council:

We learn now that with the outbreak of the revolt in Iraq...the infiltrations of arms and personnel into Lebanon from the United Arab Republic in an effort to subvert the legally constituted government have suddenly become much more alarming. This development, coupled with the persis-

tent efforts over the past months to subvert the government of Jordan must be a cause of grave concern to us all. They place in jeopardy both the independence of Lebanon and that of any middle eastern state which seeks to maintain its national integrity free from outside influence and pressures.

It seems that Eisenhower had three options at this point. An argument could have been made for direct intervention in Iraq by Anglo-American military forces in the hope of eliminating the revolutionary government and replacing it with one that would pursue Iraq's former pro-western course. However, this would have been difficult.

In the first place, the Anglo-American forces would have no doubt found themselves engaged in combat with the Iraqi army. The sight of western troops rolling over the army of an underdeveloped nation would have aroused a world furor equal to that of the Suez Crisis two years earlier. Second, the two Iraqi leaders upon whom any counter revolution might be based, King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri were both presumed dead.

Finally, reports from the American Embassy in Bagdad indicated mass popular support for the new regime. After all, it was a mob of citizens who did away with Prime Minister Nuri. He was trying to get to the American Embassy, disguised as an old woman when the mob recognized him, attacked, tore him limb from limb and dragged his mutilated corpse through the streets amid shouts of victory.

Eisenhower's second option was to do nothing and allow nature to take its course throughout the Arab world on the theory that if Nasser were permitted to triumph without opposition it might prove easier to work with him. Without American hindrance, Nasser would find no need to deal so closely with the Russians. This was rejected, however, for a number of reasons. In the first place, Eisenhower felt that there was a strong possibility that Nasser was being used, willingly or unwillingly by the Russians. Therefore, any cooperation with him would be playing into Soviet hands. Second, Eisenhower thought that he must

assert American power at this point. He did nothing when Syria swung to the left, nothing when Egypt and Syria joined forces to the detriment of American interests, nothing when the revolt in Lebanon almost took that country out of the western camp. Now, if he were to remain idle while Iraq fell, while Jordan and Lebanon were again threatened and while Saudi Arabia considered going over to Nasser's side due to American timidity, his resolve and will would be entirely discounted.

Eisenhower put it this way: In Lebanon the question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of nearly all of the Arab world and some of the rest of the free world or to do something worse -- which was to do nothing.

Therefore, Eisenhower chose to take a middle road: to ignore Iraq for the time being but make a maximum effort to shore up the shaky governments in Lebanon and Jordan, the former an American responsibility, the latter British.

So Eisenhower had made the decision to intervene. Afterward, he decided to weigh the risks, turning to Dulles, he said, "Foster, give us your analysis of an American intervention in Lebanon. What would the Russians do?" Dulles replied, "the Russians will probably make threatening gestures - toward Turkey and Iran especially - but will not act unless they believe the results of a general war would be favorable to them."

The cost in terms of world opinion and support was also discussed. Dulles felt that we could expect a very bad reaction from most Arab countries. The pipelines across Syria would probably be blown and use of the Suez canal either impeded or denied. King Saud despite his personal desire for us to move would probably do nothing to help.

Public opinion in western Europe and in Latin America was felt to be favorable toward an American move into Lebanon. Most of Asia, India, Ceylon and Africa would oppose it. Eisenhower discounted that opposition since he felt that many leaders in these latter areas would secretly applaud American action

but would be afraid to talk publicly.

Also the legal issue was considered, comparing our proposed action with the British and French move against Egypt in 1956. Eisenhower thought it was quite a different matter. American intervention would be a response to a proper request from a legally constituted government and in accordance with the principles stated in the Eisenhower Doctrine, at least as Dulles had recently interpreted it.

Domestic reaction was also discussed. But it did not affect the decision. Eisenhower and Dulles felt that there would be some opposition and sought to blunt it by meeting a bipartisan group of legislators for a full briefing. "The purpose of this meeting was of course only exploratory," Eisenhower writes. "On my part I wanted to probe the thinking of the leaders of Congress and to give them our latest intelligence and the lines of action under consideration." This was not a question of advice, or a question as to whether the leaders would support the administration in an armed intervention. Eisenhower explained, "the authority for such an operation lay so clearly within the responsibility of the Executive that no direct objection was voiced. In any event, the issue was clear to me - we had to go in."

Next, Eisenhower telephoned British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to explain the American action. He was completely in accord with the American decision. He also said that he had received a request from King Hussein for support in Jordan and had decided to act favorably on it. Therefore, on July 15, the American Marines landed in Lebanon; and two days later Britain sent two thousand paratroopers from Cyprus to bolster the shaky Hussein regime in Jordan.

These moves were accompanied by a series of reinforcing, lesser moves. The joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended the deployment of Air Force tankers to forward positions and an increased level of alertness for the Strategic Air Command, with more than eleven hundred aircraft armed and their crews ready.

This was a move of considerable size, impossible to conceal. General Twining remarked that it might create some misinterpretation of American intentions. Far from objecting to the tanker deployments becoming known, Eisenhower felt that this knowledge would be desirable, "as showing readiness and determination without implying any threat of aggression."

In addition to the three Marine battalions and the two army battle groups immediately set aside for the operation, several other preparatory actions were taken. The 101st Airborne Division and the Second Marine division were alerted for movement overseas and a part of the 82nd Airborne Division was readied for quick airlift to Europe.

Finally, Eisenhower approved a Joint Chiefs' recommendation for the sea-borne movement of a Marine Corps regimental combat team from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf, as well as the movement of a composite Air Strike Group from western Europe to the American base at Adana Turkey. These could be used for support operations, to guard against a possible Iraqi move into Kuwait, or be available in case of a threat to any other friendly government in the area.

All of these moves can be grouped into two separate entities, the first, the landing of troops in Lebanon and Jordan with measures to provide support, is a coercive communications move with certain "basic" characteristics. The decisional processes behind this has already been discussed. The point is that Eisenhower himself made the decision to take that step; then, almost as an afterthought he sought to weigh the gains against the costs and risks. The general purpose here was to display resolve and keep Jordan and Lebanon from falling to the Communists or Nasserites as well as to keep Saudi Arabia in the western camp. It also served a basic function as well, since after the landing, all governments in the area as well as the Soviet Union saw a new game - the need to get the American out and to get the Middle East back on the path of neutrality. The Americans sought guarantees for Lebanese sovereignty and independence, with

neutrality an accepted substitute for her former pro-western stance. I shall discuss this later.

The second entity - the alert of strategic air and ground forces - must be considered as a purely coercive communications move. The United States wanted to signal the Soviet Union that interference in Lebanon or Jordan would not be tolerated. As reported above in Eisenhower's conversation with Twining, the American President understood the effects these would have on the Soviet Government and desired that end. However, Eisenhower did not feel that the Strategic alert had changed his own alternatives or outcome. "In the state of tension then existing," he writes, "these measures would probably bring us no closer to general war than we were already.

Russian reaction was rather mild. There was a large demonstration in front of the American Embassy in Moscow which inflicted some damage to property but none to any person. An intense propoganda campaign was begun but there were no committments to any action and statements were very cautious. There were large military maneuvers in southern Russia, but these were well away from any border. Finally, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Israel were notified that "the use of territory and airspace for passage of invasion troops was intolerable."

These could hardly be called coersive moves. The only thing that came close was the military maneuvers in souther Russian, but since that was not close enough to Turkey, Iran or Afghanistan to cause any American alarm, it should not be taken too seriously. It seems that these perfunctory moves were merely designed to show Soviet disgust at American intervention for world opinion. The analysis of Eisenhower and Dulles, that the Russians would do nothing if we moved into Lebanon or Jordan seems to have been correct.

Nasser's move after the troop landing was a hasty visit to the Soviet Union. His aim in so doing may have been twofold, depending upon one's interpre-

tation. On the one hand, he may have sought assurances that the Russians would support him in case the Anglo-American aims were not limited to Lebanon and Jordan, but assumed the character of an anti-Nasser crusade in Iraq or the United Arab Republic itself. On the other hand, he may have wanted to keep the Russians from intervention if at all possible, especially if the Americans limited the aims of their action. The appearance of Soviet volunteers, offered during the Suez Crisis would not be in Nasser's interest any more than it would be in the interest of Britain or the United States. Nasser may have urged Khrushchev to avoid any drastic steps until the situation had clarified.

Of course, Nasser's quick visit to the Soviet Union confirmed the United States suspicion that their Middle East enemy was very close to the Russians. This made the action they took in Lebanon even more reasonable in their eyes.

Two other things should be mentioned before we leave this part of the crisis. After the Marines landed in Lebanon, an experienced diplomat, Robert Murphey, was assigned to coordinate the effort between United States troops and the government of Lebanon. Schelling sees this as an accommodative communication move, designed to show the Russians as well as Nasser that the United States was not interested in a solution based upon force alone, rather a negotiated settlement which would guarantee the independence and integrity of Lebanon.

Finally, our French allies wanted to show their support of the American invasion. The French government insisted on sending the cruiser De Grasse to Lebanese waters in order to show the flag. As much as the Americans appreciated this evidence of solidarity, it was not the time, Dulles felt, to stir up Muslim sympathizers for Algeria. Therefore the American Ambassador in Lebanon tactfully arranged to have the De Grasse under way before any of the Arab governments were aware of its existence.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION

At this point the goal of the United States was an international guarantee

for the independence and integrity of Jordan and Lebanon while the U.S.S.R. and the United Arab Republic wanted U.S. troops out of Lebanon as quickly as possible. The United States pursued its goal by seeking a transference of military responsibility to the United Nations. A draft resolution proposed by the United States envisaged the contribution and use of United Nations contingents to protect Lebanon and prevent illegal infiltration across the frontier. This won nine favorable votes in the Security Council but was defeated by a Soviet veto. Four days later, the Russians vetoed a milder Japanese resolution which omitted the reference to contingents but requested the Secretary General to arrange for such new measures as he considered necessary to stabilize the situation in Lebanon and make possible the withdrawal of American forces. Two other resolutions which failed to be adopted were a Soviet draft calling on Britain and the United States to withdraw their troops immediately and a Swedish proposal which was unacceptable to both sides. Of course, the United States refused to go along with the Russian draft since no guarantees would have been extended.

While these discussions were going on, Khrushchev called for a Summit Conference in a letter to Eisenhower which the Soviet leader simultaneously made public. The letter contained the usual calls for peace that the big powers often exchange. There was an attack against the commander of the Sixth Fleet for his inflammation of the situation and a boast of Soviet military capabilities. Then Khrushchev asserted that the world was "passing through one of the gravest moments in history," had been "brought to the brink of disaster," and could be saved only by "immediate measures to end the present military conflict." His solution to the problem was an immediate convocation of the heads of government from the Soviet Union, Britain, France and India "in order to adopt without delay measures for the cessation of the military conflict which has begun." Khrushchev further proposed that the meeting also consider the question of a cessation of delivery of arms to the countries of the Middle East. He suggested

that Secretary General Hammarskjöld participate in the meetings and that the recommendation resulting from the conference be then submitted to the United Nations Security Council for review, he suggested participation by representatives of the Arab countries.

On the surface, the call for a Summit Conference seems to be an accommodative communication move, signaling a Russian willingness to ease tension. Certain evidence indicates that it was not so planned. The forum of the United Nations was still open for quiet negotiations; and the glare of publicity which is associated with summit conferences is hardly conducive to profitable discussions. It seems that the Soviet Union, unable or unwilling to meet the American thrust into Lebanon by a counter thrust, had to be satisfied with embarrassing the United States by presenting a summit proposal which the Americans could not accept.

This is how Eisenhower viewed the proposal. As in the Suez crisis, the Russians' aim was to mobilize world opinion against the West, hoping that it might force the United States to abandon its goals in the Middle East. In this sense, the move might have been intended as basic. However, Eisenhower felt that the United Nations had not been given adequate time to come up with a plan to guarantee Lebanon's integrity, so he rejected Khrushchev's call for a summit conference and decided to follow up efforts at the United Nations. The two leaders corresponded with each other a number of times during this period with proposals and counterproposals, but things were getting nowhere.

Then, while on a visit to Red China Khrushchev issued a joint communique with Chairman Mao Tse-tung calling upon Britain and the United States to withdraw their troops. This may have been designed to bring more pressure upon the Americans by calling up the 1956 vision of Soviet and Chinese volunteers in the Middle East. As such it should be considered a coercive communications move.

Upon his return to Moscow the Russian leader sent Eisenhower a message that the United States were responsible for the fact that the two heads of government

could not get together for discussions. He decided to call a special session of the United Nations General Assembly. This was probably another move aimed at embarrassing the West rather than at finding a solution to the problem. In fact the British were uneasy as to what their rights were regarding their invasion of Jordan and expressed this concern to the United States.

At this point things were heating up as a result of the last two Russian moves and the United States seems to have believed that the Russians would do everything in their power to block any kind of effective United Nations guarantee for Lebanon and Jordan. There was also some concern as to whether the Russians might decide to do something foolish with the Chinese.

Apparently, both sides wanted to cool down the situation. On the one hand, the Soviet Union announced that she had no intention of sending volunteers unless the situation deteriorated. This was probably an accommodative communications move designed to tell the United States that the U.S.S.R. would not get involved if the Americans confined their activity to Lebanon and Jordan. And it probably signalled that the Russians were willing to talk about some kind of settlement.

The situation in Lebanon had returned to a state of relative calm, and the United States had far more troops there than were needed. Therefore Eisenhower decided to begin some withdrawals. This could have been a signal that the United States was not interested in any permanent occupation in Lebanon and was willing to withdraw quickly if the United Nations could reach a solution. It also was designed to blunt some of the adverse

world opinion which would be brought to bear once the General Assembly went into special session. Finally it would reassure Iraqi Premier Kassim who had expressed doubts about the sincerity of the United States to use our troops only for the security of Lebanon. To avoid the appearance of withdrawing troops on the demands of the Soviet Union after the General Assembly met, the forces were removed quickly before that body went into session. There is no evidence available on how these accommodative communications moves were decided upon by either side nor how they were perceived. While both sides may have seen each other as desirous of controlling the possibility of escalation, neither seemed to view the other as really ready for a settlement. Both sides maintained their former positions.

The Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic wanted unconditional withdrawal of American troops while the United States and Great Britain sought international guarantees for the integrity and independence of Lebanon and Jordan before any total withdrawal. All that the General Assembly seemed to accomplish was to bring the two sides together and let them haggle in public. While this stalemate continued, however, the Arab nations themselves met and came up with what served as a solution. That will be discussed in Section IV.

PROCESS CHECKLIST

A. Utility Models

There seems to be certain limits beyond which no agreement was possible in the crisis. The first was, a pro-Nasser Middle East with Lebanon and Jordan (possibly Saudi Arabia) going over to the side of the United Arab Republic. The United States considered this intollerable due to their suspicion that Nasser was being used by the Soviet Union. It was certain, at the least that the Egyptian leader was anti-American.

Second, the Russians were opposed to any sort of military alliance (the Bagdad Pact) or any bi-lateral agreement (the Eisenhower Doctrine) which would have covered the entire area, influence or threatening the integrity of the two states with which they were most closely associated-- Egypt and Syria.

The USSR was quite willing to settle for neutrality in the area. In fact, that should be considered her primary goal, since the establishment of satelites there seemed to have been rejected in the case of Syria. It was probably admitted in the Kremlin that any type of Eastern European arrangement in the Middle East was impossible due to the nature of the Muslim nationalism and Abdul Nasser, a true Arab nationalist. This neutrality was the only practical goal, and one that would keep the area out of the American alliance system.

The American goal in the Middle East was a large number of states which sided with the United States in the struggle against communism. Neutrality was shunned as a defeat of the American purpose. Thus the bargaining space seems to have been a trade-off of countries between the American camp on one side and the neutral camp on the other. In the latter catagory, neutrality

was considered almost as bad as an outright pro-Soviet position. He who was not for us was against us. At the beginning of the crisis Egypt and Syria were neutral. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia (and of course Israel) were either directly pro-American or neutral in name only with allegiance on the western side. As these states began, one after another to switch sides, the United States felt its hold lessening. First Syria turned extremely leftist; then Saudi Arabia seemed to become more neutral: then trouble erupted in as to what the United States could stand. Force was applied to show the Russians, Nasser and the rebels that Jordan and Lebanon must not be allowed to swing to the American camp.

Movement within the space seems to have been minimal. The United States simply admitted to itself that movement had occurred in favor of the USSR and learned to live with it. For example, nothing could be done to the Russian entente, about the coup d'etat in Iraq, finally about the Lebanon desire to renounce the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The main problem here is that Eisenhower and Dulles suspect that they were bargaining with Nasser and Khrushchev as a unit; and when in doubt, they proceeded under the assumption that Nasser was probably a tool of the Communists if not their agent. Actually, the United States was probably bargaining with domestic revolutionaries who were supported but not controlled by Nasser or the Russians. These rebels were not impressed by the American attempts to change Russian or Egyptian utilities or perception. In fact, the rebel interests may have been quite different from those of Moscow or Cairo, In Syria, for example, there is evidence which shows that the Russians may have tried to curb the leftward radical swing of the communists since it was counter to Russian support of Nasser, a moderate when compared to the Syrian extremists.

As mentioned earlier, the United States seems to have gone through a constant re-estimation of its own utilities. After every loss, Eisenhower rationalized it into an American victory. When Syria was discovered to be pro-communist Eisenhower pointed out the importance of the Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine and claimed that other states in the area will finally realize that communism rather than Zionism or Imperialism was the major threat to the peace. It seems that he almost expected every state in the area finally to decide that it must either join the Bagdad Pact or subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine immediately or be overthrown by the communists. To him that was a major victory. When Egypt and Syria joined forces, Eisenhower pointed out the union between Iraq and Jordan as an attempt to balance the power of the United Arab Republic. When Iraq pro-American government was overthrown troops landed in Lebanon to show American resolve and shore up the image of American firmness. He felt he was successful in influencing, both Nasser and the Russians when Lebanon rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine and became neutral, the American president sighted the fact that American resolve was at an all time high and that at least Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia while neutral had not turned communist due to that resolve. Thus the neutrality which the United States had sought to undermine at the beginning of the crisis was seen as a victory at the end. It seems that the United States could do no wrong, nor could she loose anything.

At one point in the crisis--the activation of the United Nations to aid in the withdrawal of American Troops--there seems to have been a search for mutually acceptable outcomes. The United States wanted assurances that Lebanon and Jordan would not be overthrown before it would agree to total

troop withdrawal, while the USSR and the United Arab Republic wanted the troops out unconditionally. Mediators, especially Hammarskjold sought a middle ground with little success; yet both the United States and the United Arab Republic seemed to have sought some compromise. Here, the Russians seemed content to blast away at propaganda and let the Americans and Arabs try to work out the compromise.

The bargaining range is confusing. The United States seemed to say that neutrality in the area is against its interest. This indicates an either /or proposition: either a state is pro-American or it is pro-Russian-Neutral. That attitude is indicative of one dimensional, zero sum range, Yet the Americans seem willing to live with neutralism, at least toward the end of the crisis. For example, Eisenhower reports late in the crisis that Nasser has finally realized that the Russians have no resolve and will not help him in a crisis. This supposedly pushes the Egyptian leader away from the USSR and toward a more neutral position, a considerable victory for American policy. When Nasser outlawed the Syrian Communist Party after the establishment of the United Arab Republic, another important American gain was supposedly scored. After the coup in Iraq, Robert Murphy tried to convince Kassim of the dangers of allowing in Soviet aid and the necessity of maintaining if not a pro-western stand , at least a neutral one. Finally, the United States made little protest when Lebanon divorced itself from the Eisenhower Doctrine, reasserting its neutrality. As a matter of fact, Washington offered an outright grant of \$10 million to this now neutral nation.

The United States found that it could live with a neutral Middle East; this was also a Russian goal. So there could have been a two dimensional range in which both great powers sought to guarantee that neutrality. The

problem was one of mutual trust. The United States could not believe that the Russians would not take advantage of the area's neutrality to overthrow regimes and replace them with the communists governments. This was no doubt generated by the image of the USSR held by western leaders of which will be said later.

No salient outcome presented itself to the parties. It seems that no outcomes in the Middle East are either salient or simple.

The players exhibited both characteristics of maximization and disaster avoidance. The USSR was trying to win something away from the United States but not necessarily claim it for itself, i.e. neutrality was a loss for Washington, a victory for Moscow and an expansion of Russian influence in the Area. The United States, on the other hand was as usual trying to hang on to a deteriorating status quo, supporting the weak and often the corrupt regimes of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The one point of maximization was the landing itself. Here, Eisenhower and Dulles felt they must go in regardless of the cost. Yet even there, they sought disaster avoidance by announcing that the action would be limited to Lebanon and Jordan and the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations could take over.

The Russians seemed to practice similar disaster avoidance. While claiming that the situation was grave and issuing a joint statement with Mao Tse-tung Khrushchev indicated that no volunteers would be sent to the area unless the situation should deteriorate. Moreover, the Russians took no action here other than staging internal troop movements well away from any border.

During the early, Syrian phase of the crisis both sides tried to avoid disaster, the Americans by restraining the Turks and Iraqis from moving into Syria, and possibly the Russians by urging the Syrians to avoid any trouble with pro-western powers. In both these periods the opponents seemed to

get together to avoid what could turn into mutual disaster.

B. Chicken Critical Risk Model

It's difficult to determine the critical risk levels of the parties in this crisis. On the American side, the decision to land troops effects were considered ex-post-facto. Eisenhower writes of the meeting which was called before that decision was officially made: "because of my long study of the problem, this was one meeting in which my mind was practically made up regarding the general lime of action we should take even before we met... We had to move into the Middle East, specifically into Lebanon to stop the trend toward chaos." He was sure that the Russians would do nothing militarily, that congress would be mildly negative, but support him on the whole, and that neutrals and other Arab states would oppose the action verbally while many would secretly support it. United States critical risk at that time in the crisis was rather low. During the arly Syrian phase of the crisis, the United States also had a low critical risk level due to valuation of the stakes. The leftward swing in Syria as well as the Union of that nation with Egypt affected American interest but not enough to make the United States risk a confrontation with the USSR. Afterall, both those states were neutral for some time , out of the American camp pro-Russian in their foreign policy at least as far as Washington was concerned. So a swing to the left or a union, while changing the situation somewhat, did not change the balance in the Middle East enough to warrant direct American action.

On the Russian side it's extremely difficult to determine any critical risk level due to lack of information on Soviet consideration of the problem.

One can only assume that the Russians considered Lebanon, Jordan and probably Iraq as part of the American sphere. Thus, they would do nothing if the United States limited intervention to those areas. However, had the Americans moved against Egypt or Syria during either the Syrian or Lebanese phases of the crisis, the Russians probably would have found it necessary to move against the west where her military capabilities were **strongest**. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union sent notes to the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Israel, protesting the use of their territory and air space for the passage of American and British troops. Also, pressure was brought against Turkey during the Syrian phase of the crisis. The Russian government may have been saying that any western action against friendly neutralist governments in the Middle East might be met by Soviet action in western Europe or Turkey. But by limiting the Americans to Lebanon and the British to Jordan, both client states, it seemed unlikely that the Russians would have to take any direct action, as the critical risk factor must have been rather low.

On the broader aspects of the crisis, there seems to have been no chicken game involved; rather it seems like a classical case of "Prisoner's Dilemma." As mentioned earlier, the Russians wanted neutrality in the area, and the United States could have lived with a truly neutral Middle East. The problem was lack of trust. How could the United States have confidence in the Russian claim to support neutrality? How could Eisenhower and Dulles be sure that the Russians would not use every opportunity to overthrow neutral governments and set up pro-soviet regimes? This can be seen in the following matrix: set up pro-Soviet regimes: This can be seen in the following matrix:

United States

		A	B
Soviet	A	Neutral Middle East	United States influence
Union	B	USSR Influence	Conflict

Cooperation could have been achieved by play A/A. But in that cell there was no confidence by either party that the other would remain there. The Russians could "defect", playing B and leaving the Americans with a B/A position in which the Middle East would become pro-Soviet. The United States could also "defect" by playing B and leaving the Russians in an A/B position, with a Middle East that belonged to the American defense establishment. Thus the Americans played B, trying to set up a defense organization as well as bilateral defense agreements with governments in the area. The Russians, on the other hand actively supported Nasser's neutrality and tried to channel it toward their interests, American policy made this an easy task, since the United States opposed neutrality in other Middle Eastern states. Conflict was the result.

There seems to be little exact estimates of Russian actions by Dulles or Eisenhower. The expected Soviet response was a function of Dulles philosophy rather than any data inherent in the situation. Communists never act, he felt, unless the global situation is in their favor. Since American strategic forces were overwhelming, the United States could discount any Russian counter move in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Lack of adequate information on the Soviet decision making apparatus during the crisis precludes any precise comments on their estimate of American action. It seems that they may have expected the United States to move into Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Iraq. In that case, their response was

Words rather than force. They may have considered the possibility of an American move (in the form of support for Turkey or Iraq or both) against Syria during the first phase of the crisis due to their troop movements and statements. However, it seems unlikely that they expected the Americans to attack either Syria or Egypt during the latter, Lebanese phase.

The Soviet Union seemed to attempt a manipulation of the American estimate of Russia's probable actions, at least during the earlier part of the crisis. At the time of the swing left in Syria, the Soviet Union tried to convince the United States that any action against Syria would be countered by Russian action somewhere, although the Soviet Government would not say specifically where. The Americans read this as a threat against Turkey and countered that any attack against that country would be an attack against a member of NATO and the United States would consider that intollerable. And, as mentioned above, the Soviet Union sought to convince the United States that while intervention in Lebanon and Jordan might be acceptably to the USSR, any extension of that activity into the United Arab Republic would be considered, grave.

It seems that there are few if any attempts to manipulate the Russian or Egyptian perceptions of United States utilities. The Americans wanted pro-western governments in the area. Opposed to neutrality from the start, Eisenhower and Dulles were not simply trying to hide their willingness to live with a neutral Middle East for bargaining purposes. The change in utility came as a result of the situation, i.e. American defeat in its attempt to set up pro-western allies , not as a function of perception manipulation.

One interpretation of the events indicates that there was some manipulation of the Arab's utilities by American action or threats. In earlier phase of the crisis, for example Syria may have been dissuaded from carrying out any military action against Turkey or Iraq by American commitment to back those governments in case of attack. Syria and Egypt may have been dissuaded from supplying arms to the Lebanese rebels by the United Nations Observation group as well as American commitments to Lebanon. Finally, local rebels in Lebanon could have been turned away from the revolt by the landing of American troops.

A second equally plausible mitigates this argument. The Syrian government never really sought to attack Turkey or Iraq, so she was not dissuaded from so doing by American action. All the talk about a planned invasion was merely a smokescreen set up by Turkey and Iraq as an excuse for overthrowing a leftist regime possibly as an example to leftists in their own countries and a way to pick up some territory cheaply. Syria and Egypt were not officially supplying arms to the rebels in Lebanon. Rather it was Ba'ath Party the communists in those countries who were doing so on a small scale. The presence of American troops but by a realignment of the balance of power in local politics by the retirement of President Chamoun, the election of a neutralist, and the disavowal of the Eisenhower Doctrine. There does not seem to be a great deal of risk manipulation during the crisis. Occurrences of this have already been mentioned, so I will merely list the different tactics that were used.

Threats

1. the first threat came during the Syrian phase of the crisis when Turkey and Iraq reported that the Syrians were planning on attacking them. The United States made it known to both the Russians and the Syrians that it would support its friends in the area in case of

attack,

2. When it was thought that the Russians might have plans to aid Syria by putting pressure against Turkey, the United States issued a second threat--that if the Russians should move against our North Atlantic Treaty ally, the United States would not permit the Soviet Union to remain a privileged sanctuary from attack.

Warnings

1. During the Syrian phases of the crisis, the Soviet Union warned the United States and the Western allies to "remember the lessons of Suez/
2. Later, during that same period, Khrushchev warned Turkey and Iraq (and of course the United States as well) that if "the rifles fire, the rockets will start flying".
3. During the Lebanese phase of the crisis, both the United States and Great Britain warned Nasser to permit no further deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan, "a situation that touched so closely to the interests of the west."
4. During the United Nations debate on whether an observation group should be assigned to Lebanon, the Russian delegate warned that certain western powers which were "openly preparing armed intervention" should stop such "dangerous playing with fire."
5. After the American troop landings, Khrushchev called for a summit conference and at the same time told Eisenhower that the world was "passing through one of the gravest moments in history," had been "brought to the brink of disaster," and could be saved only by "immediate measures to end the present military conflict."

6. In issuing a joing declaration with Mao Tse-tung, the Russian Premier may have been indirectly warning the United States of the possibility of joint Soviet-Chinese intervention in the form of volunteers. This was alas considered during the Suez Crisis.

Committments

1. Eisenhower writes that Dulles informed him of a document reportedly held by the Turks which promised that the Soviets would undertake to back Syrian territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan. Such a document would be considered a Russian Committment to Syria, but I have been unable to find it or any other reference to it in the literature. The Turks must have kept it well hidden if it ever existed.

2. The only firm committment in this crisis was the American committment to land troops in Lebanon as a result of the Eisenhower Doctrine to defend that country against aggression. That committment was both reinterpreted and hedged to fit the situation and to provide a means of backing out of it if necessary. First Dulles reinterpreted it to include subversion as well as agression, attack from a non-communist as well as, a communist state. Second, certain conditions were placed upon the committment that American troops would be used only to provide stability, not to support President Chamoun, that American troops would not be introduced until the United Nations had an opportunity to evaluate the situation in the form of the observation group, and that the request for troops would come from two Middle Eastern states.

The United States thus issued two threats, one warning and one committment while the Soviet Union issued no threats, five warnings and possibly one committment if we are to believe Dulles and the Turks.

There were nine conciliatory moves, and these also have already been dealt with. Therefore, I will just summarize them here and briefly indicate what response they aroused.

The first was the Russian statement that volunteers would not be sent to the Middle East during the Lebanese phase of the crisis if the situation did not deteriorate. There is no evidence which shows how the Americans viewed this statement, but one can surmise that it had little effect since Eisenhower and Dulles never believed that Russian or Chinese troops would be introduced.

Second, the Americans decided to withdraw some troops before the General Assembly began its special session. While this could be interpreted as a conciliatory move designed to soothe the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union, it was probably more a propaganda move to create favorable world opinion of the American cause.

The statement about a limited role for American troops in Lebanon was no doubt a conciliatory move designed to emphasize a limited objective as well as a desire to pull out as soon as the United Nations could either take over or guarantee the integrity of Lebanon and Jordan.

The assignment of Ambassador Murphy was also a move designed to show that our purposes were coordination with the duly constituted government rather than military occupation or conquest.

The offer by Nasser to mediate the civil war in Lebanon was also a conciliatory move, but it was not accepted as such by the Lebanese government. And the United States did not put too much faith in that move as it refused to put any pressure whatsoever upon President Chamoun to accept it.

Other minor moves include the Russian and Egyptian acceptance of a United Nations Observation group, which suprized the United States; the Egyptian espousal of the Arab League guarantee for the independence and integrity of all states in the area; and the stopping or at least slowing down of infiltration across the Syrian-Lebanese border. These have been discussed fully elsewhere.

Expanded Game Model

This model does not fit the case study.

D. Supergame Model

Eisenhower and Dulles may have perceived this crisis as a super game. The lefward swing in Syria, the Union of Egypt and Syria, the civil war in Lebanon and the Coup in Iraq-one event followed another, and Eisenhower was concerned that resolve be finally shown so that these events would not continue in the Middle East and possibly elsewhere.

However, the Soviet Union did not seem to view the crisis in these terms. Rather than manipulation events, the USSR just went along with the revolutionary tide, capitalizing on the resulting loss of American influence. There seems to be little connection among the event as of 1957-1958 in the Supger game sense.

E. Information Processing Model

This seems to be the most useful model to use in explaining the events of this crisis, for it is images and perceptions, rather than the

basic strategic situation important in both launching the crisis and determining the outcome. To better understand this American image, it might be helpful to recall Holsti's work.

In "The Belief System and National Images" he translated Dulle's statements about the USSR into 3584 evaluative assertions and placed them into one of four categories:

1. Soviet Policy: assessed on a friendship-hostility continuum
2. Soviet capabilities: assessed on a strength-weakness continuum
3. Soviet success: assessed on a satisfaction-frustration continuum
4. General evaluation of the Soviet Union: assessed on a good-bad continuum.

Dulle's image of the USSR was built on atheism, totalitarianism and communism and he believed that no government or social order could stand on such a foundation. For example, in 1950 he wrote: Soviet Communism starts with an anteistic, Godless premise. Everthing else flows from that premise. "

Content analysis of Dulles statements show that he attributed decreasing Soviet hostility to adversity rather than to any change of character. Quoting Bauer, Holsti writes that there is strong evidence that Dulles interpreted the very data that would lead one to change his model in such a way to preserve it. Contrary information (a general decrease in hostility or non-hostile acts such as non power cuts or favorable treaties) was explained by Dulles in terms of economic weakness or necessity, frustration or signs of interna weakness in the Soviet Union. So what ever the Russians did, they were dammed in Dulles eyes.

In the Middle East, another important factor is present--Dulles attitude toward neutrality. It seems that he viewed any neutral position between the communists and the west as either immoral or gignorant. Thus

Nasser was seen as either an agent of the USSR or a foolish dupe.

Eisenhower's position was similar to that of Dulles. As reported earlier, he saw the Soviets as atheistic, full of treachery. Regarding Nasser, Eisenhower wrote, "if he is not a communist, he has certainly succeeded in making us very suspicious of him."

The Americans went into this crisis with two misperceptions. First, Nasser was either working for or being actively used by the Communists. Therefore he must be avoided and shunned if possible. Second, any revolutionary trouble in the Middle East could be traced directly or indirectly to either Nasser or the communists.

Let me present some examples of this misperception. The leftward swing in Syria was seen as a direct assault of the Syrian communists supported by the Soviet Union and Egypt. To be sure, when the Egyptian government landed troops in Eatakia while the USSR sent warships to Syrian waters the link between the two was cemented in the minds of the American leaders.

The union of Syria and Egypt presented some difficulties for the American image since that union seemed to be against the communist interest in Syria. The party in that country was to be banned under the new union just as it had been banned from Egypt. On the other hand, the Union was seen as another attempt at expansion by Nasser; and when Yemen joined, the specter of a pro-Nasser, "neutral" Middle East was grave indeed. To the Americans, it seemed as though the Russians had rejected the local communist party in Syria to play ball with Nasser. Therefore Nasser must be their agent, possibly trying to subvert the Middle East through false neutrality, then hand over that area to the Russians.

Eisenhower recognized that certain domestic problems were involved in the civil war in Lebanon, but he refused to believe that these were primary. To him, it was pro-Nasser rebels who were stirring up the trouble. One word from Nasser and the rebellion could have been stopped.

The western leaders viewed the situation in the Middle East during this time in historical analogies. During the first phase of the crisis the British Prime Minister felt that the developments in Syria were not unlike those in Czechoslovakia when the Soviets took over in 1948. Remembering that the response of western Europe had been the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Macmillan was thinking about creation of improvement of Middle Eastern defense structures among friendly nations. Eisenhower writes that the British leader did not contemplate any countermoves involving a military defense structure as formal as NATO, but suggested a coordinated Muslim defense alignment, possibly a "Southern Tier Organization" to supplement the Bagdad Pact or simply a re-arrangement of Bagdad Pact powers.

One congressman who was brought in to discuss the domestic implications of the move into Lebanon, saw the Lebanon crisis in terms of the communist attempt to take over Greece in 1947. He reminded Eisenhower that the Soviets had claimed the Greek conflict to which the United States had committed so much material and advisory help was just a civil war. The situation in Lebanon it was thought was similar to the Greek situation with the Russians and Egyptians deeply involved.

Finally, Eisenhower's televised speech announcing the decision to land troops in Lebanon, he drew a parallel between the troubles in Lebanon and those which had faced the United States in Greece. He also called attention to the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the communist conquest

of the Chinese mainland in 1949, and their attempts to take over Korea and Indochina.

In other words, while the evidence seems to point toward a local rebellion in Lebanon with domestic political causes, the image of the American leaders seemed to filter out that evidence. The belief that Nasser and or the Russians directed everything in the area remained to color perception. Anything that was so much against American interest could not have been a chance or local occurrence, he without the control or direction of Nasser or the Russians.

When Nasser acts in a way which favored western interests, the information was either ignored or viewed as an enigma. For example, he did not oppose a United Nations Observer Group to check on arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese border during the revolt in Lebanon. Eisenhower considered that as puzzling as he saw Nasser's offer to use his influence to bring the civil war to a halt. And after the crisis, when it was apparent that Nasser and the Russians were not in agreement about everything, Eisenhower saw that divergence of positions as a result of American determination and Russian weakness during the crisis. According to Eisenhower, Nasser had finally seen the light: the Soviet Union was too weak in will power to aid the Egyptians while the Americans were strong enough to support their allies. Therefore, Nasser and other leftist leaders in the area finally realized that the Russians would take few risks to aid them, while the Americans could always be counted on for assistance. Eisenhower writes, "during 1959 the attitude of President Nasser seemed to become progressively less aggressive. Even Kassim (the new ruler of Iraq) seemed to recognize the communist danger to him and his regime and, possibly under pressure from the army or from colonel Nasser, began to curtail the status of...the communists."

Finally, the fact that Nasser outlawed the communist party in Egypt and in Syria after the United Arab Republic came into being is ignored. Perhaps

Dulles and Eisenhower thought this was just a trick to fool other Arab governments into thinking that the Egyptian was really neutral. In any event, this could have supported the image of Nasser as the agent or dupe of the Russians: if the Russians had so much faith in the leader of the United Arab Republic to support him even after he destroyed a loyal communist party, the Soviet Government must have considered him a safe investment.

Thus the image of Nasser as a puppet changed, but the change was not due to a realization that the initial image may have been faulty; rather it was due to "decisive, intelligent American action" as well as the lack of determination on the part of the USSR to confront the American with anything except words.

That initial image of Nasser as a dupe of the Russians seems to have been predominantly influenced by past events rather than the present crisis, although certain actions during the crisis reinforced that image. The most important event shaping the American image was the Russian sale of arms to Egypt in 1955, already mentioned. Second, Nasser's insistence upon neutrality and opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine confirmed the image. Finally, Russian support for Egypt during the Suez Crisis and increased arms shipments to Cairo sealed the American beliefs.

During the crisis, three events confirmed what the United States had thought. First, the Egyptians landed troops at Lakatia during the Syrian phase of the crisis, at the same time that Russian warships were visiting Syrian ports in a show of friendship. In this way, it seemed that the Egyptians may be providing ground support for Damascus while the Soviet Union provided sea, and air support as well as supplies. Second, Nasser's propaganda barrage against Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia during the crisis seemed to fit the pattern. Finally, the hurried trip to Moscow just after the American troops landed seemed to show that Nasser and Khrushchev were working closely together.

I wish that more data were available on the Russian image of American intension in the Middle East . With a lack of essential information, only the broadest picture can be drawn. It seems that the Russians felt that the United States was trying to encircle them. First the North Atlantic Treaty then the Southeast Asia Treaty; and when the Bagdad Pact was formed, it seemed that the Americans had carried their containment policy to the Middle East as well. The Eisenhower Doctrine was seen as one more way of getting neutral nations who did not wish to join a formal alliance to line up bilaterally against the USSR. With these the Russians could be totally encircled from Norway to the Phillipeans.

This Soviet image was rather accurate. Eisenhower spelled it out himself in the black and white terms he and Dulles so often used:

If we were to be helpful in transforming the cold war into something better than a temporary turrence, the firmness of our purpose to assist any free nation in defending itself against communist penetration should be understood throughout the world. Still another purpose of our global policy was the development of a ring of strong and binding alliances with other nations dedicated to freedom. This was necessary especially to protect the weaker nations around the Eurasian land mass that were directly exposed to the communists. As a result, NATO was extended to include West Germany; the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was established; and the Central Treaty Organization--CENTO previously the Bagdad Pact was created. Bilateral arrangements for mutual security were made with Japan, Korea, and Formosa (and of course Lebanon). The net result was that in the aggregate, these treaties committed the United States to support the defense of almost every free area that was directly facing the Sino-Soviet Complex."

Soviet ideology must have played a role in their image of the United States as an expansionist nation. Lennen had written that in order for capitalism to survive, it must run toward imperialism. Since the Middle East was so rich in one of the most important raw materials, oil, the United States could not risk neutrality in that area; she must strive for control. After all, virtually all the North Atlantic Treaty nations depended upon Middle Eastern oil for approximately 90 per cent of their supply, except Canada and the United States. Could that important an area be left

to go its own way? The Soviet Union would have no doubt sought firm control if her Eastern European allies depended so heavily upon Middle Eastern oil as did western Europe. Perhaps a mirror image is operating here.

Thus, the Soviet image of the United States was rather accurate when compared to the American image of the USSR as the masterful manipulator and controller of Nasser and the Arab leftists and rebels. Further study into this American image especially the view of neutrality may prove fruitful for the center's research.

F. Cataclysmic Model

The cataclysmic Model is not applicable to this case study.

G. Miscellaneous

Both parties seemed to observe certain rules and norms. For example both the Soviet Union and the United States expressed an interest in international organizations, especially the United Nations to promote or regulate a settlement. The Russians seemed less convinced about the ability of the United Nations to do anything, less willing to allow that body a role in the crisis; but they did recognize that international organization as a forum for debate and professed desire to work through it.

The United States expressed a desire for the United Nations to take an active part in the crisis. In his July 15 speech announcing the landing of American troops in Lebanon, Eisenhower preserve Lebanon's independence and "permit the early withdrawal of United States forces."

Also both sides seemed to be concerned with international law, at least as an excuse or justification for their actions. The United States wanted a legal basis for their intervention in Lebanon, and used Dulles' new interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which included subversion as well as

aggression for that purpose. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, used international law as an argument against United Nations guarantee for the independence and integrity of Lebanon. Since the civil war there was entirely domestic in nature with no outside aggression, the Security Council or General Assembly had no business interfering in the internal affairs of a member nation, said the Russian Delegate. With the same legal principle, the Russians argued against the American military intervention.

Both sides seemed to feel that their action took place on the world stage, with many onlookers judging that action normatively. Thus Khrushchev made a widely publicized appeal for a summit conference no doubt designed as much to influence world opinion as to obtain a settlement. And Eisenhower decided to withdraw some troops from Lebanon before the United Nations General Assembly met to influence their attitude toward American action.

Finally, both sides wanted to convey the idea that their aims were limited. Eisenhower pointed out that United States troops would be limited in geography to Lebanon and in purpose to restoring stability rather than propping up a regime. Khrushchev was sure to quell any rumors about Soviet or Chinese volunteers. This type of action was taken by both sides for two reasons. Most important, of course was the desire to avoid disaster, to limit aims and thereby limit the probability of direct confrontation with the opponent. Also, in line with the point about concern with world opinion, each side wanted to convince the onlookers that it was not concerned with taking over the world either by direct conquest or imperial influence.

The rationality of Eisenhower and Dulles is complex. Given their image of Nasser as being used by the Russians, they acted rationally to limit his expansion in the Arab world and limit the extent of neutralism in the area.

If one rejects this image, however, their rationality less certain. Behavior in this crisis seems to indicate that "objective" rationality depends upon one's **image**; that is, one can follow the logical rule of rational behavior and still commit irrational acts if his image of the world is distorted. In any event, there was no attempt to feign irrationality for bargaining purposes.

Most symbolic acts of the crisis have already been mentioned: therefore I will only list them here with a brief comment. During the early, Syrian phases of the crisis, the Soviet Navy visited Syrian waters, indicating a concern over the Turkish and Iraqi talk about doing away with the Syrian leftists. Moreover, the Russians dropped interest in the cultural exchange program which was being discussed with the United States, used rude and provocative language in their diplomatic notes, and stepped up the propaganda campaign against the United States and her Middle Eastern friends. Khrushchev boasted of **new** developments regarding Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, possibly to indicate that nuclear exchanges could take place if the Turks and Iraqis invaded Syria.)Finally notes were sent to the British labor party and the Socialist parties of France, Italy and other western European nations calling on them to demonstrate opposition against any possible attack on Syria)

Just after the troops landed in Lebanon Russian citizens demonstrated in **front** of the United States Embassy in Moscow; the Red Army held maneuvers in southern Russia; diplomatic notes of protest were sent to West Germany, Italy and Israel complaining of their aid in the American logistical effort; the mass media propaganda campaign was continued; and the Russians and Chinese issued a joint communique demanding the United States withdrawal of American troops.

On the American side, numerous military movements were carried out throughout this period, such as Strategic **Air** Command alerts, troop movements,

United States Information Agency propaganda and the exchange insults by both sides at the United Nations.

IV OUTCOME AND AFTERMATH

The final settlement of this crisis was worked out by the Arab League while the United States and the Soviet Union were haggling at the United Nations. As earlier reported, the USSR and Egypt wanted the American troops withdrawn unconditionally while the United States and Britain wanted guarantees for the integrity and independence of Lebanon and Jordan. Neither side would budge on this point, so the United Nations was at a stalemate.

While the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic bickered in the United Nations General Assembly about the conditions withdrawal should occur, the Arab states found a way to resolve the problem. All Arab nations had already made a solemn commitment to respect each other's systems of government and refrained from any attempt to change them, inherent in membership in the Arab League, this obligation had often been disregarded in the past; but it was now reaffirmed together with the principles of the United Nations as the starting point of an all Arab resolution. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was instructed "to make forthwith in consultation with the governments concerned...such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries." His general aim was to secure the agreement of the governments in the area to some kind of United Nations presence in the Middle East which would help them live up the pledges not to make trouble for each other.

The chief difficulty seemed to be in Jordan where King Hussein remained strongly opposed to the exchange of British protection for that of the United Nations. That monarch still feared the United Arab Republic which was continuing its propaganda campaign against the Jordan government and was maintaining an oil embargo of Jordan, with the assistance of the new government in Iraq.

However, in Lebanon, the violence had decreased and the situation was markedly improved. The United Nations Observation Group reported no significant infiltration and American troop withdrawals were continuing. General Chehab took over as president and announced the appointment of a peacemaker cabinet headed by Rashid Karami, a former premier who had been a leader of the opposition group in the civil war. He was neutral, not pro-western in his outlook, so it appeared as though Lebanon was on the way to a settlement and a return to her traditional neutrality.

Hammaraskjold's September 30 report to the General Assembly recommended the continued presence of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon as a practical arrangement facilitating the withdrawal of American troops. And he read a memorandum from Dulles which promised that the troops would be completely withdrawn by the end of October if the situation in Lebanon continued to improve. The United Kingdom was to begin withdrawing from Jordan in October and complete the evacuation as soon as the situation in the area allowed. There would be no United Nations troops or observer teams in that country, but there would be an official available to represent the Secretary General and to assist in implementing the Assembly resolution. The United Arab Republic and Iraq promised to lift their oil embargo of Jordan as soon as the troops were out.

The Russians declared that the Secretary General's solution was overly optimistic but went along with it. The final result of the United Nations action seemed to be a standoff. Moscow had failed to put the General Assembly on record as unconditionally demanding the withdrawal of the Anglo-American troops; Washington had failed to commit that body to any substantial guarantees against indirect aggression.

More serious from the American viewpoint, however was the destruction of her two basic approaches to defence in the Middle East. The Coup in Iraq meant that the new Damascus government would no longer be a member of the Bagdad Pact, and the Northern Tier Concept was cut in two. Lebanon's renunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine meant that the bilateral approach had also failed since the Chanoine government was the only one to subscribe to that approach. Soviet gains were considerable. The whole Middle East was neutral, if not pro Nasser with the possible exceptions of Iran and of course Israel.

Neither the crisis nor its settlement seemed to have much effect on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The same suspicion remained about the Russian intent. However, the United States felt it showed more resolve than did the USSR, and this was believed to change Nasser's mind about relying on the Russians for protection and support.

Finally, the International system was slightly modified in the sense that there was perhaps a greater respect for neutrality, especially in the American camp. It is doubtful that this came about from any basic consideration of Dulles' belief that neutrality was immoral in the fight against the democratic west and atheistic communism; rather, the United States, defeated in its attempt to turn the states of the Middle East into a pro-western alliance, could do no more than be thankful that most of these states had remained out of the Soviet camp.

V. CONCLUSION

Explanation of the Outcome.

There seems to be as many conclusions about the 1957-1958 Middle East Crisis as there were participants. Nasser certainly considered it a victory. Both Lebanon and Iraq had been torn away from the United States; Saudi Arabia had ceased to be a significant rival; Yemen had completely joined forces with Egypt as had Syria; and Jordan had been isolated. The unification of the Arabs from the "Atlantic to the Persian Gulf" no longer looked like a totally impossible dream.

The Russians could also claim to be victorious. The American goal of establishing a defense alliance or bilateral agreements to contain the Russians had been defeated. Eisenhower's proposals for United Nations action in the Middle East were getting nowhere. The plan for standby United Nations Peace Force had run into Arab opposition. Nothing had been done about the proposed monitoring system for inflammatory propaganda broadcasts. Finally, by showing support for Egypt and Syria during the crisis, the Soviets could again claim to be the champions of Arab nationalism.

On the other hand, numerous spokesmen in the western camp called the landing in Lebanon a victory for American strength and determination. Robert Murphey, for example reported a conversation in which Eisenhower said that sentiment had developed in the Middle East (especially in Egypt) that Americans were capable only of words and were afraid of Soviet

retaliation if the United States attempted military action. Eisenhower believed that the United States by landing in Lebanon "showed in a timely and practical way that Americans were capable of supporting their friends."

In his memoirs, Eisenhower wrote that the military operation in Lebanon demonstrated the ability of the United States to react swiftly with conventional armed forces to meet small scale or "brushfire" war situations. And Eisenhower further pointed out the change in attitude which Nasser underwent. He wrote:

The Suez incident, and our long negotiations to reach a satisfactory solution of all the problems arising out of it had led Nasser to ...error of doubting American firmness in carrying out her pledges. He seemed to believe that the United States Government was scarcely able by reason of the nation's democratic system to use our recognized strength to protect our vital interests. America's traditional devotion to negotiation in preference to military action for the settlement of international disputes reinforced his notion that under no circumstances would the United States ever resort to force to support its friends and its principles.

When Nasser heard about the landing in Lebanon, he was "in a near state of panic," according to Eisenhower. "Undoubtedly expecting Khrushchev to move violently and noisily in Egypt's favor, President Nasser was disappointed. In our action and the Kremlin's cautious reaction he found much food for thought it would appear. Presumably he concluded that he could not depend completely on Russia to help him in any Middle East struggle and he certainly had his complacency as to America's helplessness completely shattered." Ike's conclusion: "The peoples of the Middle East, inscrutable as always to the west have...remained outside the communist orbit."

In any event, the conclusion seems to have been determined by a combination of things. First, there was the desire of most states in the Middle East to be neutral. Iraq broke away from the Bagdad Pact, Lebanon

disavowed the Eisenhower Doctrine, and even Jordan found it necessary to come to terms with Nasser. While that neutrality was originally thought to be against American interests, the United States seemed able to live with it at the end of the crisis.

Second, United States leaders ~~would~~ like to believe that it was the troop landing which kept the area out of the communist camp. It is seen as a communications move designed to get the rebels to refrain from causing more trouble in Lebanon and Jordan. If Nasser wouldn't call an end to rebel activity, the United States would do so by force. And there is some evidence that the landing could have had an effect on the revolutionary leaders. Ambassador Gallman reports that a European diplomat called on Premier Kassim of Iraq, a few days after the landings. He asked Kassim whether he would have staged the coup on July 14 if the American Marines had been landed in Lebanon before that date. He promptly replied, "no."

However, this theory is most difficult to verify, since little is known about the effect of the landing on the guerrillas in Lebanon and Jordan. It is probably more likely that the easing of violence in Lebanon had more to do with the settlement of the domestic situation than the presence of American troops. When the Chamoun regime realized that there was not going to be either a coup d'etat or an invasion from Syria after the revolution in Iraq and when the opposition in turn understood that the United States had not come to impose a puppet government on them, both sides were ready to talk. The new government headed by Karame had two primary tasks: first, to re-establish the equilibrium between Lebanon's Christian and Muslim communities; second, to bring the country back to its traditional policy of neutrality among its Arab neighbors. The completion

of these two objectives are what stabilized the situation in Lebanon, not the United States forces.

Report on Hypotheses

A. Propositions Relating Systemic Environment to Choice of Tactics

Proposition: Bipolar crises are characterized by greater caution and moderation than crises in a multipolar system because of the greater costs of war.

Caution was exhibited by both sides in the sense that they made an attempt to convince each other that their aims were limited. The Americans were more cautious during the Syrian phase of the crisis, probably because they realized that Russian interests were more directly involved there than in the Lebanese phase. During the latter, the Americans felt that the Russians would do nothing if the military action were limited to Lebanon and Jordan.

Proposition: In a multipolar system the imperative of alliance cohesion exercises a greater effect on crisis bargaining tactics than in a bipolar system. Thus, in a multipolar system, states have less flexibility in their choice of tactics because of a need to accommodate the wishes of allies. In a bipolar world, great powers are less concerned about shaping tactics to suit allies because of their lesser dependence on allies; thus they can afford to be more flexible.

Allied were a minimum consideration. Eisenhower consulted the British during the Syrian and Lebanon parts of the crisis, but only because the British had a definite interest in Jordan. Assistance was not requested by the Americans in the Lebanese intervention, and it seems to have been Britain's idea to go into Jordan. France was actually discouraged from "showing the flag" during the troop landing by visiting Lebanese waters. It was thought that Arab resentment over Algeria might be called forth if it were thought that the French were actively supporting the Americans.

During the Syrian phase of the crisis, three American allies felt that the leftist government should be overthrown--Iraq, Turkey, and Israel. The United States apparently considered their wishes and rejected them,

discouraging the Turks and Iraqis from attacking Syria unless it were in self defense.

Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization were hardly mentioned during the crisis, except to inform the Soviet Union that Turkey belonged to the former and would be assisted in case of attack.

On the Russian side, the Warsaw Pact was never mentioned, and China was used only symbolically to issue a joint call for the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon. Egypt and Syria had a close relationship with the Soviets, but hardly dictated policy to the Russians. One interpretation of the Syrian phase of the crisis is that the Russians stopped the Syrians from invading Turkey and Iraq; and Eisenhower argues that Nasser wanted the Soviets to move quickly and with force after the Lebanon landing, but they refused.

Proposition: The preservation of alliances is larger component in the values at stake in a multipolar crisis than in a bipolar crisis.

In this crisis, the demise of one informal alliance (the Bagdad Pact) and the threat to a formal one (the Eisenhower Doctrine) were the very reasons for the United States sending in troops. However, the Americans did not attempt to restore Iraq to its pro-western stand, letting it resign from the military alliance. And as mentioned above, NATO and SEATO allies were hardly consulted or even considered. The Russians were also concerned with their alliance relationship with Syria during the earlier part of the crisis. However, this relationship was much less formal than other Soviet alliances, with the Warsaw Pact for example.

Proposition: Considerations of bargaining reputation and images of resolve are a larger component of the value of the stakes in a bipolar crisis than a multipolar one (for the superpowers at least) because (1) the adversary of the present is likely to be the adversary of the future, and (2) the adversaries are in conflict on a wider range of issues.

Both factors were present in the Middle East Crisis of 1957-1958. Eisenhower and Dulles saw no chance of the Russians becoming less aggressive or troublesome in the future so they would most certainly be the adversary for a long time. And the adversaries were in conflict over a wide range of issues from Berlin to China. Furthermore, the Americans felt that the resolve shown in this crisis would correct the neutral image of the United States as a strong nation which was afraid to move militarily.

Proposition: Exaggerating one's valuation of the stakes is a more common tactic in the nuclear than the pre-nuclear environment because of the greatly increased costs of war and the need, for the sake of credibility, to make interests seem commensurate with war costs.

It could be argued that American valuation of military alliances either organized or bilateral was exaggerated at the beginning of the crisis, since the United State was perfectly willing to live with neutrality at the end. However, it seems that the change came about through defeat, rather than bargaining tactics. There is very little evidence in this crisis to confirm or repudiate this hypothesis.

Proposition: In the pre-nuclear age, threatening declarations emphasize at least as heavily how one will fight--i.e., the resolve to use nuclear weapons or the possibility that a war will escalate to the nuclear level.

The primary example of this tactic is Khrushchev's statement, "If the rifles fire, the rockets will fly." In addition, boasts about Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capability and warnings that the world is passing through one of the darkest periods in history were designed to conjure up the specter of nuclear escalation. On the American side, Strategic Air Command alerts must be seen as an indication that the United States would be prepared to fight a nuclear war if necessary. Finally, Dulles's statement that if Turkey were attacked the Soviet Union would not be considered a privileged sanctuary seems to threaten an American attack

where and when Washington saw fit, bringing to mind Dulle's policy of Massive Retaliation.

Proposition: Threats are more crude, explicit and bellicose in the nuclear age than before--to compensate for the inherent incredibility of nuclear threats and their lack of support through experience of previous use. I.e., the lower the inherent credibility, the more explicit and fearsome the threat must be. Also, perhaps, to play upon fears of nuclear war was in mass public opinion.

The best example of this is Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower calling for a summit conference. In it, he calls the commander of the Sixth fleet either "a criminal or a person who has lost his mind." His boasts of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and his warnings about settling the issue with warlike means are both crude and bellicose. Finally, he also said that the "peoples of all continents are becoming excited, the popular masses are aroused, having understood that the conflagration of war, wherever it may start is liable to spread throughout the world."

Khrushchev's release of this letter publically also indicates that it was designed as much to arouse world public opinion as well as American fears as much as it was intended to obtain a settlement through a summit conference.

Proposition: Physical actions (below the level of violence) are relatively prominent as compared to verbal communications in nuclear age crisis; they were less prominent in the pre-nuclear age. (This follows in part from the notion that "use of force short of war" has become a substitute for war).

There were almost as many physical actions in this crisis as there were verbal communications: Strategic Air Command alerts, troop movements and naval maneuvers on both sides, and of course the landings in Lebanon and Jordan indicate an ability to move physically below the level of out-and-out attack during this nuclear crisis.

Proposition: Nuclear age crisis tend to be characterized by minor, subsidiary confrontations as tests of resolve; these are much less prominent in the pre-nuclear age.

The tests of resolve in this crisis were hardly minor--the defection of the Bagdad Pact, the primary pro-western alliance in the Middle East and the threat of revolution in the only nation which had subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine. On the Russian side, the possibility of the invasion of an ally, Syria by two pro-western governemnts, Turkey and Iraq apparently backed by the United States is hardly a subsidiary confrontation.

Proposition: In heterogeneous systems, threats and other declarations are more bellicose and explicit than in hemogeneous systems.

The same evidence used to support hypothesis 7 in this section is applicable in this heterogeneous system. In addition one can sight Khrushchev's statement about "the rockets flying if the rifles fire," and the Soviet United Nations Delegate's refering to the situation as grave, and telling the Americans to stop playing with fire. Fianlly, the propaganda attacks were crude and bellicose.

Proposition: Deliberately "increasing the shared risk of war" (shelling's "manipulation of risk") is not a very frequent tactic, but it is more common in nuclear age crises than in pre-nuclear ones.

The only case of increasing the shared risk of war came about during the Syrian phase of the crisis when the Russians declared that any attack on Syria would be countered by Russian action elsewhere. The United States interpreted this to mean that the Soviet Union might attack Turkey and declared that since that nation was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, she would receive American support. This raised the possibility of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union if either Turkey or Syria were attacked.

Proposition: In a multipolar crisis, the crucial uncertainty is the identity of the opponent is clear and the crucial uncertainty is the likely degree of escalation if war breaks out.

To Eisenhower and Dulles the identity or the opponent was not always clear; but they suspected that the adversary was either Nasser and the Russians acting as a team or at least Nasser being used by the Russians. In any event it seems that the United States based its policy on the premise that Nasser was either an agent or dupe of the Soviet Union. The probability of escalation was discounted by the Americans. The Soviet Union would not dare move if the United States intervened in Lebanon since the Americans had the strategic advantage, argued Dulles, and Eisenhower agreed. There seemed to be no uncertainty about it.

B. Propositions about Coercive tactics

Proposition: Absolutely irrevocable commitments are rare.

There are no irrevocable commitments in the case. The only certain commitment was Eisenhower's pledge to aid Lebanon and this was conditional "upon the judgements of the armistist team and the secretary general," according to Eisenhower's news conference of June 18. Earlier, the American president had told Chamoun that the intervention of United States troops would also depend upon the concurrence of some other Arab nation besides Lebanon. Of course either of these conditions could be side stepped if necessary. In a real crisis, Eisenhower told Chamoun privately the United States wouldn't have to wait for the concurrence of the secretary general. Eisenhower mentioned the United Nations so as not to impede the mission of the observation team which was just assigned to the area. And it would be certainly easy to get one other state to concur with Chamoun's request for troops if the United States wanted that concurrence. It seems that these conditions were introduced to give the Americans a hedge if they did not want to honor their commitment under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Proposition: Threats are usually ambiguous or "veiled" rather than explicit.

When the United States learned from Turkey and Iraq that Syria was reportedly planning military action against those countries, Eisenhower made it known that he would support allies in case of attack. The meaning here was rather vague since no mention was made of what kind of support; would be extended; however the rumor of United States troops being introduced was abroad.

The American response to statements indicating that the USSR might get involved was more specific. However, it was still rather ambiguous: there was no mention of when, where or how much force would be used to counter an attack on Turkey, but the implication was that the Soviet Union would not be a sanctuary. All the other exchanges must be considered as vague warnings since the sanctions to be employed if the demands were not met were left wide open.

Proposition: The severest, most explicit threats are usually made by and to (a) officials of medium or low status, and (b) private individuals. I.e., the higher the official status of the communicator or the recipient, the greater the ambiguity and moderation of communications.

The severest American threat issued during the crisis was made by Secretary of State Dulles when he told the Russians that, "if there is an attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union, it would not mean a purely defensive operation by the United States with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary..." While this threat was not explicit, it was quite severe, indicating the possibility of massive retaliation. The threat was made in a news conference rather than directly to a Soviet diplomat or leader.

Proposition: Coercive moves are often given a non-coercive rationale to minimize the element of duress and minimize the costs of retraction (e.g., closing the Autobahn for "technical reasons").

The landing of the troops in Lebanon was given a non-coercive meaning by Eisenhower when he explained that action to the American public:

In response to (an) appeal from the government of Lebanon the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as an act of war. They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon which we deem vital to the national interest and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance.

Proposition: Parties will attempt to create loopholes through which the opponent can back down.

It may be that Nasser went along with the Arab League resolution guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Lebanon and convinced the Russians to do likewise as a compromise loophole by which the United States could withdraw from Lebanon. However, there is no strong evidence that this is so, and I can find no other incidents which would support this hypothesis.

Proposition: In making threats and other moves, parties will try to leave themselves an avenue for retreat.

Eisenhower's position represented by Lodge's statement in the United Nations that American troops would be removed as soon as the United Nations could take over may be such a tactic. As mentioned earlier, Eisenhower's commitment to Lebanon was hedged by two factors: the concurrence of a need for American troops by another Arab state and the possible advice of the Secretary General (the latter was probably just a sign of support of the United Nations Mission). Finally, Khrushchev's statement that the Soviet Union would take no action unless the situation "deteriorated" might have been a device allowing him to do nothing yet remain as champion of the Arab cause.

Proposition: Nations make firm commitments and explicit threats only when they are clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation (e.g., relative fear of war, relative valuation of the stakes, relative capabilities).

The United States made the only firm commitment known to me in this crisis, the promise to come to the aid of Lebanon under the Eisenhower Doctrine. As set forth in the first section of this paper, the United States had overwhelming superiority in the area. The Russians had no amphibious paratroop capability to directly confront American troops in the Middle East, and the Sixth Fleet ruled the Mediterranean. Moreover, Eisenhower and Dulles felt they had superior strategic forces even though the Russians had demonstrated their technical capability with Sputnik and boasted about Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

Proposition: The process of commitment is usually progressive rather than "all-at-once".

The Soviet commitment to Syria came as a gradual build-up over the period from 1954 to 1957, and the beginning of this crisis. The Russian commitment to Egypt was also gradual, coming as a result of American aid cutoffs. On the American side, her commitment to Lebanon came about through the Eisenhower Doctrine more suddenly; but the actual commitment to introduce troops was a gradual one, which dragged out from the beginning of the Civil War to the coup in Iraq. The decision to move militarily came about suddenly, with the overthrow of the Nuri government.

Proposition: Tactics may be modulated in a crisis to keep in power, or bring to power a faction more favorable to oneself in the adversary state, or to maximize the internal influence of that faction.

The American decision to intervene in Lebanon actually hurt the pro-western government in that nation, and refueled the fires of those who argued that Lebanon must withdraw from its role of American ally under the Eisenhower Doctrine. It seems that the United States was either unaware

of the domestic Lebanese effect of an introduction of American troops or didn't care that the pro-western supporters would be set back. I suspect the former is more accurate. The United States didn't fully understand what the revolt was all about, and made no attempt to fit their tactics to aid those Lebanese politicians who argued for further cooperation with the West. Of course, it is possible that Eisenhower could do nothing else except send in troops but it appears that the domestic effects of this in Lebanon were not considered, and neither were any possible non-military moves to aid the Lebanese. After all, the landing was chosen more to reassert American determination than to aid Chamoun.

On the Soviet side, Moscow probably worked through the Communist Party in Syria, but its control of that party or the domestic situation in Syria was minimal.

Proposition: Public communications are usually more ambiguous than private ones.

The public commitment of the Eisenhower Doctrine was more ambiguous than the private understanding between Eisenhower and Chamoun in the sense that there were certain qualifications which were introduced in private that the public did not know. Other than this, there is little evidence to support or reject this hypothesis.

Proposition: Tactics of "risk manipulation" tend to be least likely and least frequent in the high-tension phase of a crisis.

During the earlier phase of the crisis, the Soviet Union attempted to manipulate risk by claiming that an attack on Syria may involve the great powers. The United States countered that an attack on Turkey would certainly involve the United States. This was a serious tension point of the crisis, yet the two sides attempted to increase the risks of confrontation to get each other to avoid starting anything. However, immediately

after the United States landing, when tensions were high, the Soviet Union avoided risk manipulation; instead, the Soviets spent most efforts trying to get the United States to withdraw. Therefore there is contradictory evidence.

Proposition: Moves in the early stages of a crisis will be relatively coercive and conflictful; in the later stages they will be more cooperative in nature.

The most coercive move in the long crisis came near the end with the landing of United States troops in Lebanon. After that, however, there seemed to be a tapering off of highly coercive moves, until the end, when all United States troops were withdrawn.

C. Propositions Relating Tactics to Responses

Proposition: Blatant, preemptory, openly aggressive demands and threats are more likely to be resisted than those presented in a "reasonable" tone.

No evidence.

Proposition: Threats may have a provocative effect (stiffening the other's resolve) which undermines or offsets their coercive effect.

The Soviet warning that if Syria were attacked, the Russians might get involved seemed to have a stiffening effect on the United States. It is at this time that Dulles responded by telling the Russians that they could not be immune to attack if they moved against Turkey, and that any attack would not necessarily be limited to a defensive operation.

Proposition: Less provocation is caused by attempts to change utilities and utility perceptions than by outright threats.

No evidence.

Proposition: If a "rule of the game" is broken, the other party's resolve is likely to increase.

No evidence.

Proposition: Decision-makers seldom think probabilistically, calculate "expected values" or "expected costs" of moves, etc.; moves tend to

be rejected because they are "too dangerous", or undertaken because they are "necessary", without much careful estimating of the probabilities of various adversary responses.

This seems to be what happened when Eisenhower considered what to do after the coup in Iraq. Moving into that country was rejected not because adverse Russian response was feared; rather because there were no political leaders alive upon which to build a counter revolution. Doing nothing was rejected because something had to be done to restore American credibility and resolve. The landing in Lebanon was chosen as a necessary compromise between the other two without regard for the probability of Russian response. That the Russians would do nothing was simply assumed.

Proposition: "Toughness" tends to breed toughness in the other; firm commitment generates firm counter-commitment; conciliation produces reciprocal conciliation.

No evidence.

Proposition: Compellent threats stiffen the opponent's will to resist; deterrent threats do not.

No evidence.

D. Propositions Relating Environment, Setting and Tactics to Outcomes

Proposition: When inherent bargaining power is relatively equal, salience will have maximum effect on the outcome; when there is inequality in bargaining power, bargaining power will overcome salience.

Bargaining power in this situation was in the hands of the United States. However, Eisenhower and Dulles were up against an opponent which seemed to have time on its side--Arab nationalism and the desire to maintain a position of neutrality outside the western and communist camps. All the power of the United States and Britain demonstrated in the landings in Jordan and Lebanon was not able to keep the area on the western side. Even though there was inequality in bargaining power, therefore, the situ-

ation itself seemed to find its own solution.

Proposition: Saliency has little effect on settlements, but more effect in limiting tactics and restricting escalation.

The intervention in Lebanon presented itself as a means to demonstrate resolve: the legal basis was there (the Eisenhower Doctrine) as was the invitation to go in from President Chamoun and the excuse to do so, the rebellion in Lebanon followed by the coup in Iraq. Thus, the tactic seemed to have just fit the need of the time, but the tactic had little if anything to do with the settlement, except to show the moderates in Lebanon, like Emile Bustani that neutrality rather than the Eisenhower Doctrine was in the best interest of Lebanon and to cause that nation to reject the policy upon which the landing was based.

Proposition: Asymmetries in the systemic environment and bargaining setting (i.e., inherent power) have more effect on outcomes than bargaining tactics (tactical power).

Neither had much effect in this situation if one thinks in terms of inherent military power. The overwhelming attraction of Pan-Arab neutrality had much more to do with the outcome than any threats, commitments or coercive moves by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Even though the United States had the advantage of overwhelming military force in the area and used it in Lebanon with the intervention, the Americans could not overcome the Lebanese desire for a break with past cold-war commitments to the United States and a return to traditional neutrality. That, as well as the revolutionary situation in the Middle East had more to do in determining the outcome than either inherent military power or bargaining tactics.

Proposition: Before the nuclear age, crises tended to be terminated by a formal settlement if they did not lead to war; now they tend to fade away, ending in tacit acceptance of a de facto state of affairs.

There was a formal settlement to this crisis in the sense that the

Arab states reaffirmed their commitment to the principle that all states in the area should remain independent. The subsequent guarantee for the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon and Jordan was basically what the United States had demanded in exchange for troop withdrawals. The Arab League Resolution was formally adopted by the General Assembly on August 21, 1958; it authorized the secretary general to put into operation the machinery which would facilitate United States withdrawal. On October 8, the United States announced the withdrawal of troops and pointed to United Nations action as a reason for that troop withdrawal.

Proposition: Miscalculation of others' intentions is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar system.

There seems to have been some miscalculation on the part of both sides in this crisis. The Soviet Union felt that the alliance system which the Americans were establishing in the Middle East was designed for aggressive purposes rather than for the "containment" of the Soviet Union. Nasser also felt that pro-western Arab governments were out to destroy his concept of an Arab nation, unified and neutral. Thus the Bagdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine were seen as aggressive in intent. On the American side, it was thought that the Soviet Union would not be content with neutral governments in the area, that they would seek to overthrow any neutral regime and replace it with a communist one at the earliest possible time. Therefore, when the swing to the left in Syria was recognized by the United States, it was considered a Soviet plot to make Syria another satellite. And when Turkey and Iraq expressed concern and took preliminary action to ward off a possible Syrian attack, the Soviet Union and Syria thought that the Americans were out to overthrow the leftist government. Thus, miscalculation of intentions abounded during the first phase of the crisis. During the second stage, the readings seemed to be more accurate. The Russians seemed to think the Americans were planning an intervention in Lebanon,

judging from their propaganda; and the United States correctly assumed that the Russians would not become involved if the intervention remained limited. So there is conflicting evidence about miscalculation at others' intentions.

E. Propositions about Connections Between Alliance Relationships and Adversary Bargaining

Proposition: Firm commitment increases bargaining power vis-a-vis the opponent but decreases bargaining power vis-a-vis the ally.

The United States was firmly committed to Lebanon with the Eisenhower Doctrine. Yet at one time during the crisis, the American president made it clear that it would not use United States troops to protect the Chamoun regime, even though that regime was the only voice in Lebanon calling for the maintenance of close ties to the West. Therefore, despite the firm commitment to Lebanon, the United States took a hard position with its ally. On the other hand, the United States refused to push Chamoun into accepting Nasser as a mediator during the civil war. There could be two reasons for this: First, Eisenhower may have felt that he did not have great bargaining power with his ally, that he could not force Chamoun to accept mediation; however, the United States commitment was not absolutely firm at this point-- American troops had not yet landed, so Eisenhower had something with which to bargain. The real reason Eisenhower did not push Chamoun to accept Nasser's offer was probably due to the president's suspicion of Nasser's motives. Aside from this rather weak point, I can find no real evidence in this case study to confirm or deny the hypothesis.

Proposition: Especially when the supporting ally values the stakes lower than the target ally, the supporting ally is likely to take a firmer position in communications with the opponent than in communications with the target ally. (This follows from the tension between the desire to deter the opponent and the desire to restrain the ally).

United States communications with Nasser and the Russians were more firm than communications between the Americans and their allies. In the

first phase of the crisis, American communications with Turkey and Iraq urged restraint and emphasized that support for an attack against Syria would come on the condition that the attack were defensive. Of course, in communication with the Soviet Union this was played down. In fact, Dulles told the Russians that Turkey was an independent government and the United States could not be responsible for her actions. During the second phase of the crisis, American communications with Lebanon were much less firm than those with the Soviet Union or the United Arab Republic.

Proposition: When allies value the stakes differently, the aggressor will modulate his demands to fall somewhere between the maximum concession point of the target country and the maximum concession point of the supporting ally.

Since the aggressor in this crisis must be considered as a group of rebels who are fully controlled by neither the Soviet Union nor the United Arab Republic, I can say nothing about this proposition.

Proposition: Proposals emanating from the ally of the aggressor state are likely to be more acceptable to the target country than those coming from the aggressor himself because (a) the ally's endorsement enhances the power behind the proposals, (b) to some extent the ally may be able to assume the pose of a disinterested third party, and (c) there is less humiliation in conceding to the aggressor's ally than to the aggressor himself.

No evidence.

Proposition: In a multipolar system there are likely to be greater differences in the allies' valuation of the immediate stakes than in a bipolar system but this may be offset in part by the greater value placed on alliance loyalty and alliance preservation in a multipolar system.

The United States placed a great deal of value on alliance loyalty and preservation in this crisis. Indeed, the reason for getting involved with military force was the defection of one western alliance member, Iraq, and the possibility of losing another alliance partner, Lebanon.

Proposition: If the protecting ally sees the issue as only part of a larger confrontation, his values at stake are more likely to approximate those of the target ally.

The United States saw this crisis as a test of wills, a chance to show Nasser and the Russians that the United States could use its strength to aid an ally. In that sense, the intervention which was to save Lebanon was only a small part of a bigger picture, one in which the United States must show its resolve for future confrontations. This may be why the values at stake for the United States seemed quite dissimilar to those of Lebanon; on the Soviet side, the values of the Russians and Egyptians during the Lebanon phase of the crisis were different. Eisenhower argues that Nasser expected that the Russians would move quickly and with force when the United States landed in Lebanon. According to the American president, Nasser was disappointed that the Russians displayed such caution. It seems that the Soviet Union had a different opinion about the risks involved in action as well as a different valuation of the stakes.

Proposition: In a multipolar crisis, as tension increases, commitments to allies tend to become firmer, for two reasons: (a) With rising tensions, countries become more fearful of losing allies; thus, allies tend to be supported rather than restrained. (b) A belief that the best way to preserve peace is to deter the adversary by a firm alliance front.

This was not a multipolar crisis.

Proposition: The less confident a country is of the loyalty of an ally, the more reluctant it will be to restrain the ally in a crisis (especially in a multipolar system).

The Turks and Iraqis might have been disappointed that the United States did not allow them to overthrow the leftist Syrian government either by direct attack or subversion, but there is no indication that the alliance suffered. After all, where else could those governments go? And there's no evidence that the Syrians became any less pro-Soviet as a result of Russian restraint against allowing them to attack Turkey or Iraq (assuming that they had such plans, as Turkey claims). In both cases, the confidence in the ally had little to do with the restraint. It was more a matter of

fear that any engagement between the Turks, Iraqis and Syrians might lead to a big power confrontation in this bipolar crisis.

Proposition: Collaboration between alliance leaders in a crisis tends to reduce cohesion in one or both alliances.

Collaboration between the United States and the USSR during the first phases of the crisis, doesn't seem to have reduced alliance cohesion. However, in Eisenhower's view, the alliance between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union suffered a set back after the landing in Lebanon. This may be due to American-Russian cooperation in avoiding any escalation; or it may be due to the fact that the USSR refused to take action during the crisis, as Eisenhower argues; finally it may be due to the fact that the Russians and Egyptians were never so close as the Americans suspected in the first place.

Proposition: Since alliance cohesion is less crucial in bipolarity, the easier it is for alliance leaders to restrain lesser allies and collaborate to de-fuse a crisis between their subordinates.

It seemed rather easy for the United States to restrain Turkey and Iraq from attacking Syria, even though Turkey had men and material deployed along the Syrian border. And the Russians seemed to have no trouble restraining the Syrians.

Proposition: Small powers are more likely to take risks than their big power allies.

Iraq, Turkey and Israel called for the downfall of the Syrian government, but perhaps they did not fully understand that any move against Syria would be met by a counter move by the Soviet Union, their ally. The United States understood the risks involved and sought to restrain her allies.

Proposition: Other things being equal, firmer commitments and stronger threats will be made by the more cohesive alliance.

The firmest commitment in this crisis was made to Lebanon by the United States, and the alliance involved in that situation was probably

more cohesive than the relationship between the Soviet Union, Syria and Egypt. Most threats were issued by the United States rather than the Soviet Union.

Proposition: The target country's will to resist will vary directly with its perception of its supporting ally's resolve.

This may have been the case in Lebanon. After Chamoun had requested American troops, and had taken his case before the United Nations, the Lebanese president was shocked to hear that Eisenhower said that "It (is) dependent on the judgments of the armistice team and the secretary general as to what we might have to do." Eisenhower assured Chamoun of American intent to protect Lebanon shortly after making that statement, but the Lebanese confidence was shaken. Shortly thereafter he announced his decision to leave office at the end of his term, a decision which aided considerably in reducing the violence. It is possible that Chamoun's personal will to resist was lessened by the American hedge on her commitment.

Proposition: It is easier for great powers to control small allies in a bipolar system than a multipolar system (in crisis as in other situations).

This seems to be true logically. In this bipolar system, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a high degree of control over their allies. On the American side, the Turks and Iraqis were dissuaded from confronting Syria; on the Russian side, the Syrians may have been restrained from provoking the Turks. However, the Soviet Union didn't maintain the kind of control over the United Arab Republic that the United States had assumed. Nasser was acting independently much if not all of the time.

F. Propositions About Perceptions and Images

Proposition: Actors tend to perceive what their images lead them to expect; incoming "signals" are interpreted to conform to the existing image.

Eisenhower and Dulles' image of Nasser was that of either a dupe or agent of the Soviet Union. The Egyptian leader's behavior was interpreted to fit this image or it was (1) presented as an enigma or (2) thought to be changed due to a new realization of American resolve.

Proposition: Historical experiences and traumas heavily condition images.

During the Syrian phases of the crisis, the British prime minister saw events in Damascus as a repeat of the 1948 Czechoslovakian coup d'etat. Since Russian expansion in that period was stopped through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Macmillan felt a similar arrangement might work in the Middle East. Eisenhower had a number of historical analogies to point out: the attempted coup in Greece in 1947, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Communist conquest of the Chinese mainland in 1949, and attempts to take over Korea and Indochina beginning in 1950. Dulles had argued that quick military action behind a firm commitment would have deterred the North Koreans from moving south; quick action now in Lebanon should save that country from a communist takeover, according to Eisenhower.

Proposition: Decision-makers tend to perceive adversaries as more hostile than they really are.

The United States perceived the Russians as seeking expansion in the Middle East, and felt that the Communists could not allow the area to be truly neutral. This may have been an over estimate of Russian hostility. For example it was thought in Washington that the Soviets would back up Syria in her attempt to expand at the expense of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. However, there is very little evidence to support this claim.

Nasser was seen as an expansionist, being pushed by the Soviet Union. Eisenhower and Dulles thought that the Egyptian president sought to destroy western influence in the Middle East and then hand over the area to the Russians rather than to form a viable Pan-Arabic neutral block to stand between both great powers.

Finally, it seems that the Russians perceived American intention as threatening in that alliances were being established against the Soviet Union. These alliances were aggressive in nature, the Russians may have felt, rather than defensive as the Americans claimed. Therefore, the Bagdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine were strongly resisted by the USSR.

Proposition: Decision-makers over-estimate the degree to which adversaries are motivated by aggressive aims and under-estimate the degree to which they are motivated by fear.

During the early phase of the crisis, both sides viewed the other as aggressive. Turkey and Iraq were sure that the Syrians would attack; and when Turkey began a troop buildup along the Syrian border, the Syrians and the Russians saw that as a sure sign that the western allies would attack. Both these suspicions were motivated in part by fear rather than aggressive aims. Even the American move into Lebanon may be seen to result from the fear that the entire area was going to fall to the Communists rather than aggressive aims on the part of the United States. However, the latter rather than the former was perceived by the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.

Proposition: Expectations are more influential than desires in the interpretation of incoming signals and communications.

No evidence.

Proposition: The greater the ambiguity of incoming information and communication, the less impact it will have on pre-established beliefs.

Eisenhower saw the establishment of the United Arab Republic as an

ambiguous event. He wasn't sure whether it was communist inspired; and it had little to do with his analysis of Nasser. Even though Nasser soon outlawed the Communist Party in Syria. Eisenhower did not change his opinion of the Egyptian president. He maintained his pre-established belief that Nasser was interested in expansion and would allow the Soviet Union to use him to make his expansion fit into their anti-western pattern.

Proposition: The higher the tension, the more rigid the images. Thus, the higher the tension in a crisis, the clearer one's communications must be in order to modify the adversary's image.

The images in this crisis seemed to remain constant throughout, no matter what the level of tension. Only at the end did Eisenhower and Dulles' image of Nasser change, and this was related to what the United States considered a successful intervention showing resolve rather than a drop in the level of tension.

Proposition: Statesmen tend to perceive their own alternatives as more restricted than the adversary's alternatives.

No evidence.

Proposition: The adversary usually appears as more monolithic, with greater singleness of purpose, than one's own state.

No evidence.

Proposition: The greater the stature and authority of the person making a declaration, the greater credibility will be attributed to it.

It seems that the United States didn't place much credibility in any of the Russian statements warning that the situation was grave or dark, no matter whether it was issued by the Soviet United Nations delegate or Khrushchev himself. Eisenhower and Dulles merely read all Russian statements as propaganda. There is no data available on the Russian reading of American statements.

Proposition: The resolve of statesmen in a crisis will be heavily influenced by their perceptions of the adversary's ultimate aims--whether they are limited or far-reaching.

Of course, the United States felt that the trouble in the Middle East was part of a global communist plan to establish some sort of world communist empire. And since neutrality played into the Soviet game plan, it must be fought. Therefore, resolve was high at the time of the Iraqi coup because the shift out of the western camp must be stopped. Iraq, Lebanon or Jordan were strategically important, but even more consequential was the need to thwart the communist global plan.

G. Propositions Relating Internal Decision-making
to Bargaining Tactics

Proposition: Difficulty of changing an agreed position within a government lends extra resolve to resist the opponent's demands.

No evidence.

Proposition: Lack of unity in a government increases the ambiguity of bargaining moves.

The evidence available doesn't shed much light on this proposition.

Eisenhower and Dulles had already made up their minds to intervene in Lebanon before they presented the situation either to the National Security Council or to members of Congress. There seemed to be agreement among Eisenhower's top advisors, both military and civilian, but there was some disagreement among members of Congress. Senator Fulbright and Speaker of the House Rayburn both had their doubts about the wisdom of this policy and expressed concern that we would become involved in what was strictly a civil war. Nevertheless, Eisenhower had already made up his mind, and there was only minor disagreement from members of the opposing party.

Proposition: The higher the tension, the greater the influence of emotion as compared to reasoned calculation.

Emotion played a very small part in this crisis, at least on the American side. Robert Cutler describes the deliberations leading to intervention in Lebanon as follows:

The interchange between these men was in so relaxed and low a key as to seem almost casual. There was no hurling of thunderbolts. Nor was there any uncertainty. Seeing the president thus in a crisis--calm, easy and objective--put his role as Commander in Chief into sharp focus. Eisenhower was dealing with something which he thoroughly understood. His unruffled confidence was apparent to all.

There is no evidence about Russian emotional reaction. Khrushchev's letter calling for a summit conference was no more or less emotional than most of his correspondence.

Nasser's trip to Moscow just after the troop landing was "in a state of panic" according to Eisenhower, but I don't know how much weight to place on that comment. In any event, Russian and Egyptian emotion may be as much a function of national character as crisis tension.

Proposition: Urgency and time pressure in a crisis inhibits the search for alternatives and favors the selection of traditional, habitual or already-planned moves.

This seems to be true. Just after the coup d'etat in Iraq, Eisenhower and Dulles felt that something had to be done immediately. Troop landings had been contingently planned and were easy to put into operation. In fact, General Twining said he could put the order to land troops into operation fifteen minutes after he returned to the Pentagon. Other moves which may have avoided the alienation of moderates in Lebanon and perhaps kept that country in the American camp and away from neutrality would have taken both imagination and time.

Proposition: The longer the duration of a crisis, or the lower its severity, the greater the influence of organizational roles on perceptions and evaluation of alternatives.

This was quite a long crisis, lasting for over one year, yet organizational roles seem to have played a minor role, at least on the side of the United States for which we have only scanty evidence. We have none on the Soviet Union. It was Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers who directed things during the crisis. Other actors are cast in supporting roles.

Proposition: The greater the involvement of public opinion, the less the government's flexibility; this will reduce the government's capacity for accommodation and compromise but strengthen its bargaining power behind the position it takes.

It seems that Eisenhower could have done almost anything he wanted. While public opinion was not greatly involved here, the personal magnetism and charisma of Eisenhower could be used no doubt to win majority support for either coercion or accommodation. During the crisis, the necessity of taking action was blamed on the communists, and that aroused support. After the crisis, when Lebanon renounced the Eisenhower Doctrine, that loss was covered over by pointing out that the Middle East had not gone communist. Thus, attraction for "Ike" as well as fear and hatred of Communism could be used to mold public opinion.

Proposition: Decision-makers in the crisis area generally prefer a tougher line than decision-makers at home.

During the Syrian phase of the crisis, Eisenhower's man on the scene, Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, thought that the Syrian regime must be overthrown if Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were to remain pro-western. Perhaps his conversations with the frightened Turks and Iraqis created this impression. In any event, Eisenhower was reluctant to move, preferring to wait and see whether Syria would display the aggressive face Henderson described.

Proposition: Military men generally prefer tougher tactics than civilian decision-makers.

Specific evidence is lacking here. Yet Eisenhower, a former military man rejected Dulles' call for intervention in Lebanon during the early part of the civil war and before the coup d'etat in Iraq. At this point it seemed that the Secretary of State was tougher than the Commander in Chief, a former general.

H. Propositions Relating Outcomes to Aftermaths

Proposition: Weakness in one crisis creates an expectation in the adversary that one will be weak in the next.

Eisenhower believed that Nasser felt the United States was weak because it had failed to use its military strength in the Middle East during the Suez Crisis and the Syrian phase of the 1957-1958 crisis. Thus, the American president wrote that Nasser was shocked to learn that the United States had used force in Lebanon. Eisenhower also argued that Russian weakness just after the Americans landed in Lebanon changed Nasser's image of the Soviet Union, causing the Egyptian leader to think the Russians would also be weak in the future.

Proposition: A show of weakness in one crisis stimulates a desire to correct this image by toughness in the next.

When the United States had refrained from action throughout the 1957-1958 crisis a show of weakness was put forward. During the Syrian swing to the left, the union of Egypt and Syria, the civil war in Lebanon, the United States government did nothing. Then, when the generals in Iraq overthrew Nuri, the Americans attempted to correct that image of weakness by moving into Lebanon in force.

Proposition: A demonstration of resolve in a crisis strengthens alliance cohesion; a show of weakness reduces cohesion.

Even though the United States showed strength in trying to win over Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and Iraq during the Syrian phase of the crisis, those governments seemed against any cohesive action. Hussein was disinterested in joint action against Syria and King Saud was still preoccupied with Israel rather than the communists. Iraq was too concerned with her oil pipelines across Syria to risk any cooperation against that leftist regime.

Finally, the massive show of strength in Lebanon seemed to destroy the Eisenhower Doctrine in that country as it drove many moderates and pro-western politicians over to the side of the neutralist opposition.

Proposition: In a multipolar system, a state's weakness in a crisis may stimulate a trend toward defection and realignment among its allies; firmer commitments to the allies may be necessary to counteract this trend.

No evidence.

Proposition: Some crises leave an aftermath of hostility between the parties (e.g. Germany and Austria after Bosnia, 1908); others result in increased friendship or detente (Fashoda and Cuba). Provisionally, we hypothesize that which result occurs will depend on the following: (a) The finality of the settlement, (b) The existence of another common adversary of the parties, (c) The provocativeness of tactics used in the crisis, (d) The degree of humiliation suffered by the defeated side.

The evidence of this crisis and the aftermath indicates that there was virtually no change in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Attitudes of hostility seemed constant on both sides. The relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic changed somewhat for the better, although I would hardly call that relationship friendly. Eisenhower seemed to realize that Nasser was no longer pro-Soviet since the Russians supposedly let him down when the United States intervened, and Nasser could afford to be less hostile in his attitude toward the United States for even though the Americans had used extremely provocative tactics from Nasser's point of view, the United Arab Republic had attained a considerable victory in the crisis--the downfall of both the Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Proposition: The defeated side in a crisis will attempt to rationalize its capitulation in a way which minimizes costs.

This is precisely what the United States seemed to do. Eisenhower lists his victories as follows: Iraq did not go communist but remained

neutral; Lebanon remained out of the Communist camp as did Jordan; and the United Arab Republic was less interested in her flirtations with the Soviet Union. Yet all these victories for American policy indicate a neutral Middle East, a concept the United States rejected in the beginning of the crisis.

Proposition: A strong show of resolve in a crisis enhances a state's attractiveness as a potential ally.

The United States' landing in Lebanon, a very strong show of resolve actually broke down the existing alliance relationship between Washington and Beirut rather than increasing the potential for more and stronger American allies in the area.

I. Propositions About Bidding Moves

Proposition: Concessions made in a crisis will be perceived as more costly than the same concession made in a non-crisis period because much of the cost of a concession made under duress is in terms of reputation for resolve. Thus concessions are less likely in a crisis than in "peaceful diplomacy."

The United States was forced to allow the neutrality of both Lebanon and Iraq as a result of the crisis. The former came about due to the unopposed coup d'etat; and the latter came about because of a combination of factors, but it was helped considerably by the American troop landing. Concessions were made during or just after the crisis that had been resisted before the period of confrontation.

Proposition: An actor can help himself to concede by asking a quid pro quo which is relatively costless to the other side but can be rationalized as substantial to his own constituency. (e.g., Khrushchev and the "no invasion" pledge in Cuba, 1962).

It seems that Eisenhower may have followed this line. He sought a condition for pulling out the troops from Lebanon--a guarantee from the United Nations that the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon and Jordan would be respected. Moreover, he wanted a Middle Eastern Economic

Development Fund and a monitoring of propaganda broadcasts. Realizing that Lebanon would take up the status of a neutral as soon as the American troops were withdrawn if not before, Eisenhower wanted some assurances that Nasser and the Russians would not seek to install a pro-communist government in Beirut. With these assurances (only part of which were forthcoming) Eisenhower found it easier to accept Lebanon's renunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and her return to neutrality.

Proposition: Losses from backing down to a challenge may be reduced by redefining one's vital interests (e.g., in the Berlin Wall crisis, saying our interests were limited to the integrity of West Berlin).

At the beginning of this crisis, a neutral state in the Middle East was considered to be an asset to the Soviet Union. Thus it was seen as detrimental to American interests for a state to leave the western camp and opt for neutrality. However, when the United States lost both Iraq and Lebanon to neutrality (and to the Russians if one maintains the pre-crisis calculation) a new method of counting the chips had to be devised. After the crisis, it was considered an American victory if states remained neutral, avoiding the communists. So Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon were counted as American assets just after the coup since they had not fallen to the communists.

Proposition: The higher the level of tension, the more likely that concessions will be interpreted by the adversary as a sign of weakness.

The following answer is somewhat beyond what the question asks, but it may shed some light on the proposition. Eisenhower argued that Nasser must have developed a changed attitude toward the Soviet Union as a result of their weakness. Just after the United States landed in Lebanon, the Egyptian president flew to Moscow and supposedly requested quick and massive Russian intervention, according to Eisenhower. When the Soviets conceded that Lebanon was an American ally and that the United States

could do what it pleased there as long as the intervention didn't spread to Egypt or Syria, Nasser was disappointed, and interpreted the Soviet action as a sign of weakness. It seems that in reporting this, Eisenhower himself considered it as weakness on the part of the Soviet Union.

Proposition: In a multipolar system, the maximum concession by the defending side will be the maximum acceptable to the most powerful supporting ally; in a bipolar system, it will be the maximum acceptable to the most interested ally.

No evidence.

Proposition: Concessions may first be offered in "sign language" to test the opponent's willingness to reciprocate; if no reciprocating signal is received, the first side will go back to its original position.

No evidence.

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