

Research Report

THE FASHODA CRISIS

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THE FASHODA CRISIS

On the tenth of July 1898 a small advance party of French "emissaries of civilization," after having traversed untold miles of virtually uncharted Central Africa, found a spot in the valley of the Upper Nile that rather well fit the description of the place at which they and their cohorts a day behind them were to stop and do whatever it is that emissaries of civilization do do. Communications being what they were then, no one in the metropole knew for certain that the French representatives had reached the appointed area until the following September when the British ambassador at Paris informed the French Foreign Minister that the British military forces in the Sudan had recently discovered eight French officers and one hundred twenty native soldiers settled in at an abandoned fortress on the White Nile. This seemingly innocuous encounter between relatively small forces of two powers not then in a hostile state touched off a crisis whose implications far exceeded the asserted rights of both powers to be on the same plot.

I. Systemic Environment

So intense was the colonial rivalry aspect of balance-of-power politics of the late nineteenth century that even a minor incursion by one great power into the claimed territory of another could not go unnoticed. The major European powers--

Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia-- were thought to be well-balanced apropos one another. Any increment of power by one great power could only be viewed with alarm by the others. Outside the European continent, the United States and Japan, less so the latter, were emerging great powers. The Spanish-American War served as the United States' initiation into the club, while Japan's ticket of admission did not come until after her alliance with Britain and her success in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Needless to say, the international systemic structure in the year 1898 was multipolar-- even classically so.

Great Britain was not aligned with any major power-- she still basked in the touch-and-go policy of "splendid isolation." After the negotiation of the secret Military Convention of 1894, France and Russia were pledged to mobilize should any member of the Triple Alliance mobilize and to engage in war should certain, specific conditions relating to attack by Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary be fulfilled. There were no contingencies for attack by Britain. The alliance of signal importance of the period was the Triple Alliance of 1882. It provided most specifically that if France attacked Germany or Italy, the two remaining allies would come to the other's aid.

Great Britain was recognized as the leading power of the world in 1898-- at least as far as her naval power was concerned. At the time of the Fashoda crisis the British navy was the world's largest and best organized. The French, by

comparison, had neither workable plans for naval war nor a fleet capable of waging-- with even minimal hope for success-- such a war.¹

Although there were inefaceable animosities and resentments among all the great powers in general and between Britain and France in particular and even though the basic political structures of the great powers differed considerably-- ranging from the Russian autocracy to the British constitutional monarchy to the French republic, the systemic environment is best characterized (à la Raymond Aron) as homogeneous. There was general agreement on the rules of the balance-of-power game, including the conduct of diplomacy and the use of force.

II. Bargaining Setting

The British forces under General Sir Herbert Horatio Kitchener ostensibly completed the conquest of the Sudan when they defeated the Khalifa (commander of the Mahdist forces and ruler of the Mahdist dominions in the Sudan from 1885 to 1898) at Omdurman on September 2, 1898. The reasons for taking the Sudan are disputed. Generally they include avenging the death of General Gordon at Khartoum in 1885, securing Egypt's frontier, creating a diversion in behalf of the hard-pressed Italian troops in Abyssinia, protecting from or even pre-empting French encroachments on the Nile waters, insuring an uninterrupted communication and transportation route from the Cape to Cairo, and finally quieting German fears of an Anglo-French entente and thus guaranteeing against the dissolution of the Triple

Alliance and the subsequent formation of some new, less favorable alignments. The most likely reason was none of these alone but in a sense a combination of some of them that in turn reflected the strategic Mediterranean situation. After the formation of the Franco-Russian entente Britain had to plan for a possible war in which both France and Russia would have to be reckoned with. In a "Memorandum on Naval Policy, October 28, 1896" the Director of Naval Intelligence synthesized the necessity of Egypt for British naval strategy:

If the course of time is to see Russia in Asia Minor with a naval base in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean, France still in alliance with her, or herself established in Syria, there would be only one way in which England could not only maintain herself in the Mediterranean at all, but continue to hold India, and that is by holding Egypt against all comers and making Alexandria a naval base.

If England leaves Egypt she will not get back even now, and much less then, and notwithstanding what is said in these papers, the Suez Canal cannot be blocked unless it is guarded as well, nor can it be commanded by ships at the Suez end unless Suez is held, but all this can be done, and Europe defied if Egypt is strongly held and Alexandria, Malta, and Gibraltar are naval bases. This is England's policy of the future, to work for this end should be her aim-- to do nothing that can jeopardise it, but quietly mould events to accomplish it.²

Egypt, then, had become a vital link in British naval strategy.

The cornerstone of Egyptian life was the Nile: "The Nile is Egypt, and Egypt is the Nile."³ Because an essential part of the Nile river system-- the White Nile-- is in the Sudan, the Sudan in a Mackinderish sort of way is crucial to Egyptian security. Thus British predominance in the Upper Nile Valley was necessary for continued British occupation and predominance

in Egypt.

In January 1893 a French hydrologist, Victor Prompt, presented a paper to the Institut Egyptien, of which a section-- "Opérations dans le Haut-Nil dues à malveillance"-- illustrated how a series of dams constructed on the White Nile just below its confluence with the Sobat could literally wreak havoc on Egypt by drought or inundation.⁴ No doubt British scientists and politicians were equally aware of the formidable effects of such an enterprise.

In the spring of 1893, Théophile Delcassé, only recently installed as Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, planned an expedition to the Nile with Fashoda as the likely stopping point. The position of Fashoda fit the bill for a malicious operation-- it was a good site for occupation preparatory to the erection of a dam-- to say nothing of the fact that it was within a reasonable distance from Abyssinia and French and allied native troops. This project-- the Monteil Mission-- was ultimately an attempt to pressure Britain into opening the Egyptian question "by the implicit threat of . . . malicious interference with the Nile waters. . . ." ⁵

Monteil, in a memorandum to Lebon, the then Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Colonies, wrote on March 7, 1894 that the English, "enfin maîtres des bassins supérieur et moyen du Nil, ils pourront à leur gré, par quelques barrages, fertiliser ou stériliser les contrées du Nil inférieur."⁶ If the English could do it the French could at least threaten to do it. The

primary catch was getting there first.

Monteil's instructions were subsequently changed. He promised Foreign Minister Hanotaux in July 1894 "qu'il n'enverrait jamais une troupe ou même un homme dans le bassin du Nil" ⁷ Ostensibly, then, the Nile occupation had been eliminated as a purpose of that mission.

The next project with the Nile as its object was the Liotard Mission-- approved November 17, 1894. ⁸ The preparations for this endeavor were inadequate, so much so that "the facts do not forbid the speculation that by November 1894 Delcassé was thinking in terms of merely staking a claim on the Upper Nile basin before it was all occupied by the British, rather than of a dash for the Nile and the re-opening of the Egyptian question under the threat of 'opérations dues à malveillance.'" ⁹

The last attempt at reaching the Nile was the Marchand Mission-- approved November 30, 1894 by the Foreign Minister, Berthelot.

Après avoir ainsi assuré sa base d'opération, la mission, dépouillant tout caractère, pénétrerait dans le Bahr el Ghazal en nouant des relations pacifiques avec les populations et, autant que possible, avec les Derviches, et essaierait d'atteindre le Nil. La mission ne ferait pas acte d'occupation, elle ne chercherait même pas à passer des traités politiques, mais sa présence dans le Bahr el Ghazal nous permettrait d'intervenir utilement pour le règlement de la question du Soudan égyptien et pourrait avoir pour effet de hâter ce règlement. ¹⁰

By the time Marchand's instructions had been drafted in February 1896 the object of the mission was considerably modified.

Mais je [Guieysse] dois appeler tout spécialement votre [Liotard's] attention sur le prix qu'attache le Gouvernement à voir se réaliser le programme de M. Marchand, sinon dans son intégralité, au moins dans ses grandes lignes; et il tient essentiellement à ce que le «raid» qu'il avait l'intention de tenter soit exécuté. Vous aurez à apprécier le moment où cet effort décisif pourra être fait avec le plus de chances de succès et la route qui se trouvera la meilleure pour la mission.¹¹

Berthelot's instructions were virtually reversed in practice. What had been prohibited-- treaty-making and such political activities-- was done not so much in defiance of the Foreign Minister's orders but through the authorization of the Ministry of Colonies. Marchand's party began leaving for Africa in late April 1896. France had thus decided upon a direct challenge to the status quo being maintained by Britain.

When Marchand met Kitchener on September 19 there was no shoot out. Marchand had been instructed by his government to leave all negotiating moves to it alone-- his mission was but the instrument of confrontation, nothing more. Further, his forces were inadequate (eight officers and one hundred twenty Senegalese riflemen) to defeat the combined Anglo-Egyptian troops in the entire Sudan (over 40,000 men). Any hostile act on his part would have been quite rash and in all probability would have set off a war between England and France.

The French confrontation at Fashoda was intended as a demand for the termination of British predominance to the exclusion of other European powers in Egypt and the Upper Nile Valley. British reaction to the direct French challenge was resistance to change in the status quo in that area. Each

French move geared toward opening the Egyptian question for a solution by "Europe" had in fact been an unsuccessful attempt to confront Britain, to change the status quo.

Briefly, British and French relations concerning Egypt had gone from mildly bad to awful during the period between the construction of the Suez Canal (opened in November 1869) and the Fashoda incident. There were very few years in which Britain and France cooperated with regard to Egyptian affairs-- the most notable period of amicability being from 1876 (a year after Disraeli's purchase of some forty per cent of the Suez Canal shares gave Britain a considerable direct influence in Egypt) to 1882 (when France withdrew military forces, which together with similar British contingents, were intended to quash a nationalist rebellion). During this short span Britain and France pursued a system of dual control over Egyptian financial affairs. After 1882, however, the French government acquiesced in the British "temporary occupation." And "for the remainder of the nineteenth century the most constant aim of French diplomacy was to force England to honour her repeated pledge to end her occupation once order in Egypt had been restored."¹²

The occupation of Fashoda in 1898, however, could not be ignored by Britain with the self-assured facility she had employed in thwarting French diplomatic maneuvers-- a military outpost, after all, is not the same as a call to the green baize. The situation in the Nile Valley was modified by the

French penetration and base building there, thus creating a new status quo. For the purposes of analyzing the Fashoda incident as a crisis with its concomitant bidding and coercive processes it is useful (though it perhaps seems illogical) to reverse the positions of demander and resister. Britain now is the demander, that is, it is the British government that demands a change in the status quo-- the status quo now being French presence in the British-asserted sphere; France is the resister, that is, it is the French government that resists change in the new status quo without adequate compensation by Britain.

III. Bargaining Process

On September 9, 1898 General Sir Herbert Kitchener was informed by some wandering natives of the French occupation forces at Fashoda. He quickly telegraphed this information on to London and to Lord Salisbury who in turn hurriedly drafted a similar telegram to be presented to the French Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, by Sir Edmund Monson, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, the next day. And so, exactly two months to the day after Marchand's arrival at Fashoda the crisis of the same name was on. Salisbury's communication to the French Foreign Minister was the initial statement of the British crisis position: "by the military events of last week, all the territories which were subject to the Khalifa passed to the British and Egyptian Governments by right of conquest. Her Majesty's Government do not consider

that this right is open to discussion, but they would be prepared to deal in the manner suggested by his Excellency [Delcassé] with any territorial controversies now existing in regard to those regions which are not affected by this assertion."¹³

This position was not as rigid as it might have first appeared. In fact Salisbury left a considerable loophole-- after all, there were territories in the Upper Nile basin which had not been subject to the Khalifa and were therefore plausible subjects for future negotiation. Delcassé, however, did not take advantage of the obvious loophole; rather, he contended that the phrase, "territories subject to the Khalifa," was quite vague.¹⁴ His next move was an immediate play for time-- the last news of Marchand was dated in March, he said, and since he had no idea of the mission's whereabouts, he would not be willing nor could he act on rumor.¹⁵

That same day Delcassé asked the French diplomatic representative in St. Petersburg to obtain the reaction of the Russian Foreign Minister to a note given the Egyptian Foreign Minister by the British diplomatic agent in Cairo sometime before.¹⁶ The gist of that note was that the British were to have a "preponderant voice in all matters connected with the Soudan" and that the Egyptian and British flags should both be floated at Khartoum.¹⁷ On the twelfth the French Chargé d'affaires in Russia replied that: "Le Ministre [Count Mouravieff] m'a prie de vous donner de nouveau l'assurance que, dans cette affaire, comme dans toutes les questions relatives à l'Égypte, le Gou-

vernement impériale était résolu à marcher d'accord avec nous et à conformer son attitude à celle du Gouvernement français."¹⁸ France's Russian ally seemed assured in the fateful days ahead. The Czar even undertook to suggest that the Sultan, as nominal head of the empire of which Egypt was but a part, be consulted and prompted to pursue a resolution of the Egyptian question which would involve all the Great Powers.

In the course of the same day, that is, September 10, Delcassé received independent confirmation of the British proffered information evincing the presence of a French force at Fashoda.¹⁹ His problems were compounded-- he began to worry about the safety and activities of that small troop as well. If Kitchener had chosen to liquidate the French mission there was very little that Delcassé could have offered Marchand to support his mission. There could be but small hope that Marchand could defend Fashoda for long against the rather overwhelming Anglo-Egyptian odds. Kitchener could have conveniently mistaken the forces at Fashoda as remnants of the newly-defeated Dervish enemy, destroyed them, and apologized later.

Matters were beginning to look worse. Geoffray, French Chargé d'affaires at London, reported to Delcassé that the English press had taken a hard line anti-French position. Already there was public excitement about the French presence in the Nile basin.²⁰

The British were not sitting idle while Delcassé awaited a report from Marchand. Salisbury quickly disclosed harassing

tactics to be used against the French forces should they be found at Fashoda. In this regard Geoffroy wrote: "Le système, auquel on paraîtrait vouloir s'arrêter, consisterait à entourer cette localité et à y enfermer en quelque sorte le commandant Marchand, de façon à lui couper toute communication avec l'intérieur et toute possibilité de ravitaillement. On espérerait ainsi lui rendre la position intenable et l'amener à l'évacuer, sans avoir à recourir à une lutte armée."²¹

Actually Kitchener exercised considerable freedom of action in such matters: In anticipation of the conquest of Khartoum and obviously of the discovery of French forces in the Sudan, Salisbury had written Lord Cromer, Her Majesty's Diplomatic Agent at Cairo, the previous August that Kitchener was to deal with any French troops in the Nile Valley as he saw fit. As if to insure that he would be none too lenient, Kitchener had been given "the full and cordial support of Her Majesty's Government" in such endeavors.²² Salisbury's deed meant that he put direct control over, but not necessarily ultimate responsibility for, military events in the Sudan into the hands of a subordinate. Such freedom of action had been specifically denied Marchand-- in his case all decisions were to be made in Paris.²³

On September 18 Delcassé and Monson met once again-- despite the fact that neither had yet received any more recent information from the Sudan. Nonetheless Delcassé felt compelled to make known France's initial position regarding the Marchand Mission: His first point was that Fashoda was outside the area

claimed for Egypt in Salisbury's telegram of September 9:

"cette déclaration ne saurait s'appliquer à Fachoda, conquis de aveu des Anglais eux-mêmes sur les Mahdistes avant la prise de Khartoum par le Sirdar."²⁴ Delcassé's reasoning in rejecting Salisbury's argument is summarized in a minute to Salisbury's telegram: "Si Marchand est à Fachoda, ses 'droits' sont exactement de même sorte que ceux de Kitchener à Khartoum."²⁵

To this Monson retorted with what was to become the unalterable British response. Fashoda was a dependency of the Khalifate and hence passed into the hands of Great Britain and Egypt with the defeat of the Mahdist forces at Omdurman. Furthermore, France had been warned by the so-called Grey Declaration in March, 1895 against such an intrusion into the Nile Valley--it would be considered "an unfriendly act."²⁶ Monson was, in effect, reminding Delcassé of previous warnings to show that Britain was committed to the pre-Fashoda status quo and had no intention of backing down. Delcassé employed the same tactic-- Hanotaux, he said, had protested the Grey Declaration from the floor of the Senate: France had never recognized the alleged British sphere of influence in the Upper Nile region.

The second point in Delcassé's argument was that the Marchand Mission really did not exist. It was on the contrary part of the Liotard Mission which had been established before the Grey Declaration was ever formulated. Delcassé's reasoning about the Liotard-Marchand subordination was fairly specious and he knew it. In fact, Marchand himself did not consider

the relationship as being effective after January 1898.²⁷ Monson forthrightly stated that the situation on the Upper Nile was a dangerous one and that Her Majesty's Government were not about to consent to any compromise.²⁸

And so, after this second exchange, bargaining positions -- broadly conceived-- began to emerge. The British invoked a commitment to a prior warning given to France and France just as facilely asserted the warning had been disavowed. Thus far, within the crisis period, there had been no explicit or implicit threats. Britain had not formulated a demand for French withdrawal and France had not called for negotiations.

Soon after the second Delcassé-Monson conversation, Geoffray presented to Sir Thomas H. Sanderson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a reiteration of Delcassé's basic arguments. They were, however, stated somewhat more explicitly: Geoffray averred that Baron de Courcel, the French ambassador at London, had in April 1895 protested the Grey Declaration as had Hanotaux in the Senate, that France did not then and never had recognized the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, that the regions penetrated by the French were absolutely abandoned by Egypt, and that England occupied in her name alone Equatoria-- that is, there was no two-flag policy there.

At this point Geoffray advised Delcassé that the English press considered Marchand's presence at Fashoda as an outright provocation.²⁹

On September 25 Rennell Rodd, the British Acting Agent at

Cairo, dispatched to Salisbury a telegram Kitchener had sent regarding the French position at Fashoda.³⁰ Kitchener wrote in condescending tones: he implied that the French were short of supplies and ammunition and fervently desired to leave as soon as possible. Kitchener apprised the government of rules he had imposed that prohibited the transport of all war material on the Nile. These, he noted, were to be enforced rigidly by the detachment he was placing in the area. Kitchener was a virtual master at harassing and pressuring the French. Even at the personal level he tried to reduce French morale by turning the screw-- he gave Marchand several Paris newspapers containing articles on the Dreyfus Affair. Marchand said later that he and his fellow officers were so stunned by the bad news that they could hardly speak to one another for an entire day. Kitchener made certain that Marchand was aware of the British belief that the French were a nuisance and that they (the British) could not be responsible for any mishaps. He cavalierly assumed that Marchand would be withdrawn posthaste since the French had no business being there in the first place. To facilitate Marchand's retreat Kitchener volunteered to purchase the French boats and launch at a valuation-- as if the disposal of these items was a bar to French withdrawal.³¹

Salisbury had Monson relate Kitchener's report to Delcassé. The Prime Minister added that the British government entirely approved Kitchener's "proceedings and language."³² By doing so Salisbury was giving notice to the French that he had relinquished

control over local affairs to a subordinate. The situation at Fashoda was such that the responsibility for the outbreak of any hostile actions would automatically be ascribed to the French forces. This particular tactic-- an exploitation of risk-- was not itself extraordinary, for Kitchener had been under similar orders for some time. But, however, Salisbury's expressed intention that Delcassé be admonished of Her Majesty's Government's approval of future harassment and risk exploitation was a very real coercing tactic. No doubt Delcassé was aware of its implications. The next day he informed Geoffray what the British had told him.³³

On September 27 Delcassé made another plea for time-- a request bolstered by the full trappings of Cabinet consultation. He insisted that he could do nothing until he had heard from Marchand. Since it would take literally months to make contact with Marchand through the French communications setup, Delcassé solicited British help in forwarding a message from Cairo through the backcountry to Fashoda. Although it would be hard to deny such an entreaty-- based as it was on humanitarian grounds-- granting it would virtually preclude any further moves by Britain until Delcassé had received Marchand's report. Nonetheless the next day Salisbury assented to the French request, but not without expressing his utter contempt for the whole matter: "We cannot refuse to convey a message from the French Agent at Cairo to a French explorer who finds himself in a difficult position on the Upper Nile" ³⁴ Salisbury seemingly

could not help but further reprove Marchand and his little troop. Again His Lordship trotted out reminders to the already beleaguered French that the British could assume no responsibility for Marchand's health or safety that might result from a delay in his departure from Fashoda. Salisbury was becoming quite masterful at issuing statements that implied that there was considerable risk in Marchand's remaining where he was. Salisbury instigated new pressures-- he threatened to publish "the facts" unless the withdrawal of Marchand was announced. He did not say whether he thought the printing of a Blue Book on the Fashoda affair at that time would assuage the public uneasiness or intensify its desire for war. Without a doubt Delcassé was to draw his own conclusions.

In the same interview of September 27 with Delcassé, Monson inquired if this obvious temporizing meant that Marchand was not to be recalled immediately. Afterwards Monson wrote: "His Excellency after some few minutes' consideration said that he was ready, and he believed his colleagues would be ready, to make great concessions, but that if I asked him for the impossible, there would be but one answer. He would be ready to enter discussion, negotiation, or whatever it might be called without receiving the Report, but this was all he could do."³⁵ Monson categorically denied the possibility of discussion over Fashoda-- Salisbury's telegram of September left no room for compromise.³⁶ Monson seemed rather annoyed that Delcassé objected to the British analysis of the situation-- he just pooh-

poohed Delcassé's tender of logical argumentation and attempt at clarifying the issues: "Notre droit d'être à Fachoda comme les Anglais à Ouadelaï, les Belges à Lado, etc."³⁷

Delcassé then proffered a few of his own warnings to attest to the fact that he was committed to a settlement somewhat short of Monson's recommended capitulation: French public opinion was enraged; further British pressures and continued refusal to discuss the issues could mean a formal rupture.

The next day, September 28, Monson once again met with Delcassé. The British position was unchanged. So, too, was the French position. Delcassé appeared, however, more committed to his arguments. He reiterated them, repeated his warnings about outraged public opinion, and asseverated that a break in diplomatic relations was inevitable. The French Foreign Minister said he preferred an Anglo-French to a Franco-Russian alliance but Britain was not playing the game properly when she thwarted French attempts at increasing mutual understanding.³⁸ If Britain persisted in its present course, Delcassé remarked, he would be boxed in. He was effectually demanding that Britain assume the initiative in calming the situation. This was a thinly-disguised ultimatum.

Two days later, rather than giving the British ambassador the opportunity to deliver an ultimatum he mistakenly thought was forthcoming, Delcassé quickly took the lead in conversation. His was a noble attempt to prove absolutely that France was committed and could not accept the British terms, that is, withdrawal

before discussion.

Nous sommes à Fachoda comme vous êtes à Oudelaï et nous ne l'avons pris qu'à la barbarie à laquelle, deux mois après, vous avez arraché Khartoum. Nous demander de l'évacuer préalablement à toute discussion, ce serait, au fond, nous adresser un ultimatum. Eh bien! Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, la France, par ma voix, répond d'avance: non! Il ne faut pas que le Gouvernement de la Reine se méprenne sur mon désir d'entente avec l'Angleterre, dont vous avez vous-même reconnu la sincérité, ni sur mes sentiments conciliants; je ne les ai affirmés si librement que parce que je savais, parce que vous êtes sûr vous-même à présent, qu'ils ne m'entraîneront pas au-delà de la limite tracée par l'honneur national. Je puis faire à l'entente franco-anglaise le sacrifice d'intérêts matériels: dans mes mains l'honneur national restera intact. Nul autre, à cette place, ne vous tiendra un autre langage et peut-être n'y apporterait-il pas les mêmes dispositions.³⁹

Delcassé had already tried using the tactic of value involvement in the form of watered-down warnings of existing commitments, as, rejecting the Grey Declaration and asserting that the Marchand Mission was part of the Liotard Mission. This time he went a step or two further. Quite obviously Delcassé perceived that Britain was definitely committed, for he had thought that Monson had come to formulate an ultimatum.⁴⁰ There was, however, little way he could ascertain just how far Britain was actually committed-- to the forceable removal of Marchand, to the failure to ratify the June 14, 1898 Accord, to all-out war? Thus he had to convince the British that he was not going to back down even if it meant war. To support his position he summoned up those great undefinables-- national interest, national prestige, national honor. Monson replied with typical correctness (and by then rather repetitious monotony) "that Her Majesty's Govern-

ment had already through me signified their point of view, and that for my part I did not see how they could possibly retreat from it."⁴¹

At this point the bidding process is seen to have progressed very little-- the British still demanded unconditional withdrawal of Marchand; the French sought negotiation and no withdrawal but were willing to make great concessions such as the evacuation of Fashoda if they could have a guarantee of negotiations. Each side had by then at least adumbrated the initiation of hostilities of some sort unless the other side yielded.

Salisbury shifted his screw-turning from the diplomatic arena to Fashoda. On October 1 Her Majesty's Prime Minister ordered an intensification of the harassment tactics being employed against Marchand. All the prohibitions against transport of war material, broadly defined, on the Nile were to be enforced rigorously. And because Salisbury believed Kitchener's exaggerated reports about French lack of provisions to be an objective analysis of the situation, he surmised that cutting off food supplies would make Marchand's plight untenable and so he ordered it.⁴² (Actually Marchand had a rather decent vegetable garden.) If the French at Fashoda were to pick up and leave voluntarily Salisbury would have won his point and Delcassé would have had no alternative but to retreat-- the latter's casus belli having evaporated. Thus Salisbury had a great incentive to pressure Marchand as much as possible.

The next significant episode in the bidding process occurred October 5 as the focus of French diplomatic efforts switched from Delcassé-to-Salisbury-via-Monson to Delcassé-to-Salisbury-via-de Courcel. Monson was apparently immovable--refusing to budge even a fraction of an imperial inch. His response to any suggestion for the negotiating of Marchand's withdrawal was a reference to the Grey Declaration and Salisbury's September 9 telegram. Delcassé had on October 4 instructed de Courcel to obtain what was but a territorial sop in exchange for evacuating Fashoda.⁴³ The day before, Salisbury had expressly denied that his consent to the scheme providing telegraphic communication to Marchand had in any way modified the situation. He made it clear that the region in which Marchand had been discovered had never been without an owner. Marchand's expedition thereto had no political effect or significance.⁴⁴ Thus the British position remained firm on this one point, that is, that Fashoda belonged incontestably to Egypt. The French countered with an almost syllogistic argument: Territories formerly under Mahdist domination became Egyptian with the defeat of the Khalifa at Omdurman-- all right; but Fashoda was at that time not under Mahdist rule; hence Fashoda was not now subject to Egyptian domination and the French presence at Fashoda was not politically insignificant.

De Courcel did not open his talks with Salisbury according to Delcassé's detailed instructions. Instead he summarized the French claims and tried to point out the dubiety of the

British position. De Courcel asserted that "the country bordering the White Nile, though it was formerly under the Government of Egypt, had become res nullius by its abandonment on the part of the Egyptian Government; that the French had a right to a position on the Nile as much as the Germans or the Belgians; and that the French Government, by the reserves which they had uniformly made when the subject was mentioned, had retained for themselves the right to occupy the banks of the Nile when they thought fit."⁴⁵ The French reservations were the Hanotaux speech in the Senate and the de Courcel-Kimberley discussion of April 1, 1895.⁴⁶ Salisbury responded with the British position as he then interpreted it:

the Egyptian title to the banks of the Nile had certainly been rendered dormant by the military successes of the Mahdi; but that the amount of right, whatever it was, which by those events had been alienated from Egypt, had been entirely transferred to the conqueror. How much title remained to Egypt, and how much was transferred to the Mahdi and the Khalifa, was, of course, a question which could practically be only settled, as it was settled, on the fields of battle. But their controversy did not authorise a third party to claim the disputed land as derelict. There is no ground in international law for asserting that the dispute to title between them, which had been inclined one day by military superiority in one direction, and a few years later had been inclined in the other, could give any authority or title to another Power to come in and seize the disputed region as vacant or relinquished territory. For the last the power of the Dervishes was extended as far south as Bor, and their effective occupation did not cease till their title passed by the victory of Omdurman without diminution into the hands of the conquering armies.⁴⁷

The impact of de Courcel's argument was to make Salisbury's rather peculiar if not recondite line of reasoning look like a ruse. Salisbury was never one to forget the pressure that

could be exerted in the beleaguered French by a reference to Marchand's weak position. So he did just that and repeated the warnings he maintained France had been given on sundry occasions not to attempt to settle in the area. "If France," he said, "had throughout intended to challenge our claims, and to occupy a portion of this territory for herself, she was bound to have broken silence. At all events, if she thought fit to try, in face of these warnings, to establish a title over the vast territory to which they applied by a secret expedition of a handful of men, she must not be surprised that the claim would not be recognized by us."⁴⁸ Britain regarded the existing Fashoda status quo as abnormal-- that is, Britain could not tolerate Marchand at Fashoda-- and the pre-Fashoda status quo as something having a certain ring of legitimacy and sanctity to it. British commitment was resolute.

De Courcel said that France would withdraw Marchand but:

Où, en effet, M. Marchand devrait-il se retirer?
A quel point s'arrêterait sa marche? Où se limitaient
les prétentions de l'Angleterre soit pour elle-même,
soit pour l'Égypte?⁴⁹

De Courcel thought this question would be a good take-off point for an agreement. Both governments would announce that negotiations on delimiting the Nile Valley territories were underway. France would receive an area along the left bank of the Nile and Marchand would be withdrawn along a route similar to the one he took to get to Fashoda. Salisbury rejected the French arguments, refused to discuss points of geography, and suggested he would consult his colleagues in the Cabinet on

de Courcel's unofficial proposal.⁵⁰

The next day, October 7, Monson informed Salisbury that the French press was adamant in its allegations of French rights in the Sudan. The Foreign Ministry mouthpiece, Le Matin, tried to convince its readers that France was definitely committed to upholding the national honor by whatever means it had at its disposal.⁵¹ In the same dispatch Monson reported that Delcassé had on several occasions intimated that the Nile Valley question should be dealt with as an offshoot of the general Eastern question by Great Powers in addition to Britain and France. Monson noted: "I have little doubt but that M. Delcassé himself conceives that it would be difficult for England to oppose a negative to the combined expostulations of all the Powers with which she has so long acted in concert in South-Eastern Europe, in Armenia, and in the Levant" ⁵² Perhaps Delcassé saw this tactic-- changing the structure of proposed negotiations-- as a way to guarantee France's alleged rights in the Nile basin while providing Britain with a graceful way to make concessions. But unfortunately for France, Delcassé was in no position to shift the desired negotiations to "Europe." (When a similar suggestion was proposed later on Britain rejected it out of hand.)

On October 7 Salisbury again turned to harassing Marchand and exploiting the risk of war at Fashoda between the French and British forces. He reminded Kitchener to enforce strictly

his Nile transport prohibitions. To be sure that there was little doubt concerning the exploitative implications of this action, Salisbury wrote to Lord Cromer: "I should desire to avoid making any further communication to the French Government on the subject. They have been informed of the Sirdar's action and will understand what it implies."⁵³ Perhaps a free burial for Marchand?

De Courcel interpreted the tone of Salisbury's words during their talk on October 6 as "très amical et conciliant."⁵⁴ Delcassé must have taken this all quite seriously, for he noted in a personal letter that feeling between Britain and France seemed to be somewhat relaxed.⁵⁵ On October 8 Le Matin ran an article supposedly from London but thought by Monson to have been drafted at the Quai d'Orsay which alleged that the British press had changed its tone and thus discussion would be possible. Further, French policy was not to thwart British policy in the Nile Valley but to obtain a commercial outlet on the Nile for its Central African possessions.⁵⁶ The next day Monson reported that Le Matin had made a veritable volte-face-- the abandonment of Fashoda would be "'perfectly compatible with the preservation of the national honor"⁵⁷

Within the context of the bidding process France had moved from a position of demanding negotiation on the entire Egyptian question and not withdrawing Marchand to one of requesting an outlet on the Nile which, once granted, would lead to the evacuation of Fashoda. (Delcassé, however, did not

take this more limited position in his next talk with Monson; rather he reiterated his displeasure at what he thought was British intransigence.) The apparent turnabout in policy was most likely a signal by the French that they wished some minimal compromise. Monson and Salisbury most likely interpreted the situation in that light and set about building Delcassé "a golden bridge" for an eventual retreat.⁵⁸ Delcassé averred that he would have to resign unless he took a more militant stance vis-à-vis Britain and the almost assured unpleasant disposition of his successor toward Britain would certainly not help avoid a rupture.⁵⁹ Delcassé insisted he had to have something to prove to the Cabinet and the public that France was not being utterly humiliated.

On the twelfth of October de Courcel and Salisbury had another long conversation. Salisbury was indeed quite conciliatory-- at least in as much as Salisbury was ever conciliatory. He did not belabor the point about Marchand's untenable position too terribly long. De Courcel took it fairly calmly even though Salisbury assumed he was harassing the French. What Salisbury sought, of course, was Marchand's withdrawal. But where to? "Il devait donc demander que Marchand se retirât au-delà sur l'Oubangui, sauf à nous à faire les réserves de droit que nous jugerions utiles."⁶⁰ De Courcel agreed that Marchand would be withdrawn in return "pour les territoires français de Bassin du Congo la possession de leur débouché naturel sur le Nil, qui était la vallée du Bahr el Ghazal."⁶¹ Salisbury asked de Courcel to formulize these

demands and concessions to facilitate fruitful discussion and to eliminate future misunderstanding. For the first time Salisbury seemed willing to compromise; he had not rejected the French proposal straightaway.

De Courcel's demands were basically those drafted and sent to him by Delcassé on October 4.⁶²

Le territoire que le Gouvernement français a considéré depuis longtemps comme rentrant dans sa sphère, parce qu'il le regarde comme la continuation naturelle et le débouché nécessaire de ses possessions du Congo, comprend le pays qui s'étend au nord de la frontière du Congo belge jusqu'à sa rencontre avec le Nil, sur la rive gauche de ce fleuve. La limite pourrait en être arrêtée au nord, par voie de transaction, à l'embouchure du Bahr el Ghazal; elle suivrait ensuite le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à son confluent avec le Bahr el Arab, puis le Bahr el Arab jusqu'à la ligne de démarcation qui restera à fixer.⁶³

Salisbury's acknowledgement of receipt of de Courcel's letter, perhaps, foreshadowed the eventual rejection of its contents.

Without it I think I should have misunderstood the effect of the observations which you made during our conversation yesterday. The claim asserted in your instructions is quite new to me, and, as far as I know has never been officially made on behalf of the French Government.

It is not part of my duty to discuss it now, but in abstaining from doing so I am not in any degree admitting its validity. I only make this observation to prevent any possible misunderstanding.⁶⁴

The diplomatic encounters between France and Britain came to a virtual standstill as both sides anxiously awaited Marchand's report: Delcassé in order to get the French viewpoint on the local situation and Salisbury in order to see what the next French initiative would be. In the meanwhile, however, Delcassé did act to keep the Russian ally apprised of British

and French claims in the Nile Valley.⁶⁵ There is some doubt as to guarantees of Russian military support in a war against Britain. The Russian Foreign Minister, Count Mouravieff, sought rather to rely on a move to open the Egyptian question at a later date. Monson mistakenly reported that Russia was promising support in either case.⁶⁶

If the apparent French lining up of Russian support was useful in conveying a determination not to yield, that is, that France was truly committed to its position of no withdrawal before negotiation, the British moves to express commitment-- even if not so intended-- were extreme and unidirectional. On October 10 Salisbury published a Blue Book on the on-going crisis between Britain and France. This action in and of itself of course was not without precedent but its timing was rather extraordinary. After publication Salisbury really had no choice but to push for the extreme British position-- the unconditional withdrawal of Marchand. Members of both the Government and Opposition parties had a field day defending the British position and railing about the French demands.⁶⁷ There could be no doubt that Britain was not going to retreat from its position. Salisbury issued additional relevant documents later in October. This packet contained de Courcel's disingenuous claim of French rights in the Bahr al Ghazal and Salisbury's renunciation of the same. The English press fulminated about French activities and demands both in Paris and at Fashoda. By about the twentieth of

the month its tone had become a potent psychological preparation for war.⁶⁸

Salisbury had refrained from any extraordinary pressuring and harassing tactics on the diplomatic front in favor of manipulating events in the Sudan. Commitment to his policy vis-à-vis France was now made manifest by the order for mobilization of the British fleet. The French naval attaché in London reported to the Naval Chief of Staff on the sixteenth and eighteenth of October that orders which would permit the mobilization of the English fleet with considerable speed had been sent to British ports. Various programs for defending the coasts and supplying munitions and equipment to ships and areas to be defended had also been initiated. Shore leave passes for naval personnel were suspended indefinitely.⁶⁹ Monson notified Salisbury that France had mobilized its Toulon fleet on October 17.⁷⁰ The British mobilization began in earnest after October 24.⁷¹

British naval mobilization was intensified until the fleet was on complete war footing-- including the calling up of the reserve squadrons and preparations for strengthening the China squadron.⁷² It was not until sometime after negotiations between Britain and France had commenced in January 1899 that Britain began demobilization.⁷³

The public anxiety in England over a break between Britain and France increased when news of the naval mobilizations was rumored.⁷⁴ The impending defense of Britain could only exacer-

bate the psychological preparation for war that the politicians and the press had begun. Even the cool-headed Geoffray interpreted the turmoil in England and the blatant reminders of naval superiority as meaning but one thing-- war.⁷⁵

The report from Marchand that had provided Delcassé with an excuse for not presenting some new diplomatic initiative was telegraphed from Cairo on October 21 and 22. Marchand forwarded some thirteen dispatches which were nothing but the reports he had sent from time to time to Paris overland. The content of the telegrams was inane at best-- nothing startling except, perhaps, the revelation that Kitchener was a virtuoso at rhodomontade. The French Foreign Minister demanded that Marchand's assistant, Baratier, come from Egypt to fill in some large lacunae. Delcassé wrote in his journal on October 22 that the problem was how to combine the demands of honor with the necessity of averting a naval war which France could not wage successfully even with Russian aid.⁷⁶

On October 21 Delcassé related to Monson that "the French Government foresee that they will be unable to maintain their contention as regards M. Marchand, but that, until they can announce that negotiations have begun on their claims to the west of the Nile, they will decline to withdraw him."⁷⁷

Delcassé's bargaining position became simplified: "My line is decided upon, and I have let it be known-- 'Recognize an outlet for us on the Nile and I shall order Marchand's withdrawal.' This arrangement would be honorable, and would reach

the goal I assigned to myself when I first held the Colonial administration in 1893."⁷⁸ This was somewhat less than what had been demanded originally-- at least if Delcassé's instructions to de Courcel dated October 4 are taken to be the starting position. It was somewhat less complicated than de Courcel's proposition to Salisbury on October 12 as well.⁷⁹

The bidding process thus stood: The British demand was unchanged-- the unconditional withdrawal of Marchand; the French demand was immediate evacuation of Fashoda only at the price of a guarantee for a natural outlet on the Nile.⁸⁰ Even with this French concession the British did not budge.

Delcassé realized that he had no realistic alternative but to withdraw Marchand. Life among monkeys in the swamps was indeed untenable. On October 24 he confided to his diary:

The hapless Marchand still goes on asking for the relief he has so often, and always vainly, requested. He draws a vivid picture of his plight in the swamps and mud under endless rains and envisages his return through Egypt, his communications with our Congo possessions being cut. So my line is clear. If England does not accept my proposal, I publish Marchand's journal and recall the heroic little band. I will not murder them out there, with no gain to the country.⁸¹

De Courcel, who had been in France since October 13 returned to London on the twenty-fifth and immediately set about arranging an interview with Salisbury. The Prime Minister put him off-- through Sir Thomas Sanderson he related that he would have nothing to say until after a Cabinet meeting scheduled for October 27. De Courcel thought this delay "portended something in the nature of an ultimatum."⁸² He suggested to Salis-

bury through an intermediary that there be simultaneous "spontaneous" announcements of the withdrawal of Marchand and an invitation to discuss a frontier.⁸³ The requested outlet on the Nile was described as a commercial outlet in the valley of the Bahr al Ghazal.

Salisbury informed de Courcel on October 27 that Marchand had to be withdrawn-- there could be no negotiation while he remained and no guarantee of compromise once he had left.⁸⁴ Undoubtedly an intermediate position must have been struck in the Cabinet meeting-- between delivering the dreadful ultimatum and acceding to the French demand for a commercial outlet. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, was not averse to initiating a preventive war by which all outstanding Anglo-French problems would be settled once and for all. Likewise Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, pursued a policy of applying British muscle rather than just flexing it.⁸⁵ Salisbury, on the other hand, was probably in favor of granting a small concession. At a later date Chamberlain supposedly referred to Salisbury's policy in this instance as "peace at any price."⁸⁶

Even though no formal ultimatum was drafted, the fleet at this time was put on a war footing.⁸⁷ The day before, Sir Philip Currie, British ambassador at Rome, had telegraphed Salisbury that because of the apparent French mobilization at Toulon the Italian Foreign Minister was placing several naval ports in Italy on defense alert. At the same time Italy pronounced a policy of neutrality in the event of war between

France and Britain.⁸⁸

Lest there have been some unconscious oversight Sander-son quickly checked his files for anything resembling an ultimatum and then informed de Courcel that Britain had never made an official request for Marchand's withdrawal. The closest thing to such a demand was Salisbury's statement on October 27 that Marchand's presence at Fashoda "was an obstacle to negotiation or discussions"⁸⁹ De Courcel then began arranging an honorable withdrawal of Marchand.

At about the same time Delcassé was threatening not to take the Foreign Affairs portfolio in the government then being formed unless as a condition for withdrawal, Britain guaranteed a natural outlet. He tried to fix the blame for the crisis to British intransigence. He implied that Germany would come to France's aid because of British colonial policy. At this meeting with Monson Delcassé flashed before the eyes of Her Majesty's ambassador several dispatches promising Russian support in case of a conflict with Britain.⁹⁰

The next day Delcassé reasserted to Monson his commitment to resign rather than truckle to demands he thought humiliating to France and leading inevitably to war. Monson fished for an escape loophole for Delcassé-- deny that Marchand was carrying out a political mission, say he was a bit more zealous than anticipated and went to Fashoda all on his own. Delcassé would have none of this. Obviously he was making a last desperate attempt at compromise, for he knew he had a ready

reason for recalling Marchand-- that is, health and safety.

The French by then realized that the British were going to yield on nothing. The next question for bargaining became: Assuming Marchand is withdrawn and there is no guarantee of British concessions, what form will the discussions take? Delcassé wanted a set formula-- after what he had been through he did not desire to lose even this small point. He suggested to de Courcel on October 29 that Britain and France establish a joint commission to discuss and decide an outlet and boundaries as an addition to the Convention of June 14, 1898.⁹¹ This was a clever idea: Salisbury, if he agreed to it, could make a promise without breaking his no-guarantee demand. In France, too, it would be far more acceptable than outright capitulation. Delcassé instructed de Courcel to move ahead in this fashion but the next day, October 30, he (Delcassé) retracted these instructions and told de Courcel to sit tight.⁹² That same day Monson informed Salisbury that Delcassé was irretrievably committed to his position: "I presume that M. Delcassé's pertinacity is invincible, and that the best chance of a solution would be his retirement from office"⁹³

On November 1 de Courcel admonished Delcassé that the best time for ordering Marchand's withdrawal was immediately. He noted that England was armed to the teeth and the British were quite confident that they were ready for any eventuality. He insisted that the Fashoda question be separated from any general consideration of the overall Egyptian situation. This

latter concern should be left to all the Great Powers.⁹⁴ A move in the other direction would have been tactically unwise at this time. Isolating the withdrawal of Marchand from the general Egyptian question was required-- at least for the moment-- if British pressures on France were to be reduced. The British mobilization obviously convinced de Courcel that there would be absolutely no modification in Salisbury's position. Thus the French could not discount the possibility of war.

On November 2 Delcassé reinstated his instructions of October 30 to de Courcel and, with some relief, the French ambassador prepared to inform Salisbury that the order for Marchand's withdrawal was imminent.⁹⁵ That same day Delcassé expedited the order for evacuation of Fashoda to Lefèvre-Pontalis in Cairo.⁹⁶ The next day he directed de Courcel to notify Salisbury by means of a verbal communication that the order for Marchand's withdrawal had been given. Delcassé's reasoning was similar to the last chance strategy of a week before: "En présence des conditions précaires et de l'état sanitaire du personnel de la mission Marchand, le Gouvernement a décidé qu'elle quitterait Fachoda."⁹⁷

IV. Outcome

Immediately the small mission which had become a bug-bear in Anglo-French relations "ceased to have any political character and must henceforth be considered a simple in-offensive troop armed only for its own defence against native attack."⁹⁸ De Courcel emphasized that this decision was spontaneous and that in no way did it imply the abandonment of the principle of right claimed by France and as such was not to be interpreted as a concession.

The proposal for the establishment of a joint commission to draw the Nile Valley boundaries was shelved. Why should France and Britain-- only two Powers-- determine the boundaries of Egypt? This was instead a matter for "Europe,"⁹⁹ Salisbury put off any negotiations for the time being-- at least until the wild public excitement had abated.¹⁰⁰ De Courcel was not opposed to this, for he thought that Salisbury would make concessions in the Bahr al Ghazal but could not under the present circumstances, that is, the public temper and the demands of some Government and Opposition leaders would force Salisbury to play the cards in his Blue Book hand.

The Prime Minister announced the order for Marchand's withdrawal in a speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet honoring Kitchener. He alleged that only the cause for immediate confrontation had been removed-- the problems, however, still remained.

On November 10 de Courcel again inquired about starting

the negotiations. Salisbury declined-- saying that he could not do so until Marchand had actually left and until he (Salisbury) had obtained pertinent data on the geographical situation.¹⁰¹ Negotiations did not begin until January 1899 when the then French ambassador at London, Paul Cambon, suggested discussions commence.¹⁰²

After two months of tedious map reading and discussion, Salisbury and Cambon reached a territorial delimitation that was to be inserted into the Convention of June 14, 1898. By the declaration of March 21, 1899 the frontier between British and French spheres was set at the watershed between the Congo and Nile rivers. The French were not to acquire territory or political influence to the east of this line and the British were not to engage in such activities to the west of it. Thus the French agreed to stay out of the Nile Valley, including the Bahr al Ghazal. The British anxiety concerning any potential new French threat to the Sudan and hence Egypt was permanently removed.¹⁰³

The immediate crisis was over. Britain's stance in the final round in the bidding process was the same, basically, as it had been from the onset-- unconditional withdrawal of Marchand. The British assent to negotiations was almost peripheral since the determination of their subject matter was vague and since Britain had specifically denied even a minimal recognition of French demands. France had given in completely-- the confrontation resulting from the occupation

of Fashoda was less than successful. France's initial bargaining position had virtually been turned around-- resulting in withdrawal of Marchand and no guaranteed negotiation.

V. Aftermath

It has been said that the non-violent resolution of the Fashoda crisis paved the way for the Anglo-French entente of 1904. Perhaps, but not immediately. In fact there were at least four problems in addition to the delimitation of the Sudan frontier that strained Anglo-French relations in the year 1899 alone: (1) the dispute over French tariffs in Madagascar, (2) the sixty-year-old dispute concerning French fishing rights in Newfoundland, (3) French demands on China in regard to the extension of a concession at Shanghai to which Britain was opposed, and (4) British objection to the proposed lease to France of a coaling station by the Sultan of Muscat.¹⁰⁴ The outbreak of the Boer War in October 1899 did nothing to ease French fears of a British plot to war against her.

In Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale, Andrew relates that in an interview with a newspaper generally concerned with Anglo-French relations, Delcassé said:

I can see only one reason why the English might want to make war on us. In anticipation of a possible-and-formidable-coalition of European fleets, England must desire war in order to destroy our own fleet before it became even stronger than it is now. But such a war is not so easy to make as one imagines.

A war like that is never made without a pretext, and we shall never supply a pretext And there is another factor: on the subject of a maritime war with England, there exists a solidarity between all the states of Europe.¹⁰⁵

Thus Delcassé obviously took seriously the possibility of British action against the French fleet. His assertion that France alone would not be facing Britain but all of Europe stood as a warning to the British lest they undertake such a naval war. "By the autumn of 1899," Andrew concludes, "he [Delcassé] could have had no doubt than an Anglo-French entente was out of the question for the foreseeable future."¹⁰⁶

It was not until after the Boer War with its tremendous expenditure of men and treasure that Britain moved in the direction of cooperation with France. As Britain became increasingly anti-German she seems to have become increasingly friendly toward France.¹⁰⁷

In perspective, then, the aftermath of the Fashoda crisis was not speedy reconciliation of all Anglo-French problems. Even to say that Fashoda was a turning point in Anglo-French relations seems an exaggeration of the facts.

VI. Conclusion

A. Explanation of the outcome.

As the demander Britain was trying to compel France to accept a revision of the status quo in the Sudan. Specifically Britain sought a return to the pre-Fashoda status quo, that is, unquestioned British supremacy in the Sudan. This attempt at

compellence can be stated as: withdraw Marchand or accept a humiliating naval defeat.

Britain's job was to convince France of British commitment. The tactics employed to do this ranged from the fairly innocuous warning of prior commitments to the frightful mobilization of the planet's most redoubtable naval force. The warnings were numerous but sufficiently stern to evince a real value involvement. One would imagine that the Grey Declaration became almost a household word in both England and France. As the crisis moved into its second week, national honor, prestige, and public confidence were tied into the diplomatic dialogue as factors that could not be overlooked. French perceptions of these British intangibles showed Britain to be committed beyond mere verbalizations of nationalism.

Salisbury seems to have viewed the tactic of exploitation of risk as particularly valuable. He permitted Kitchener the exercise of extraordinary freedom in dealing with the French at Fashoda. Some of Salisbury's directives and Kitchener's interpretations and enforcements unnecessarily raised the chances for an outbreak of hostilities between England and France. Since Salisbury insisted that the French government know what was going on in this regard there is little doubt that he sincerely meant this as an exploitation of risk.

Closely related to these exploitative moves are the tactics of harassment and pressure. These more than any others were employed by the British both in the Sudan and on the Euro-

pean diplomatic front. At practically every conversation between the adversary representatives, both in London and Paris, the British reminded the French of the overwhelming odds opposing them at Fashoda. The mobilization of the British fleet three-quarters of the way through the crisis was the clincher. Other less formidable harassing techniques included castigating French leadership, especially that of Marchand-- the explorer who found himself in difficulties. Salisbury did this to lower French morale both in the métropole and at Fashoda. It was too unsophisticated an act to affect Delcassé very much. Salisbury, however, seemed to be making a supreme effort to send Marchand packing and thereby eliminate the problem. Thus lowering French morale at Fashoda could have had grave consequences.

The British will-to-victory and its blatant expression by Kitchener could not have but irritated Marchand and the French. Kitchener was decisive, forceful, and judging from the tone of some early French dispatches, not entirely predictable.

The British press during the crisis was a continual source of distaste for the French. Its self-righteous attitude, compounded with that of some Cabinet and Opposition members, was positively annoying to the French. From the press, the public utterances of various politicians, and personal observations the French became assured Britain was committed to her position.

The British also used, but very moderately, tactics con-

cerned with reducing the critical risk. The first statement of the British position contained a loophole wide enough that, if taken advantage of, Delcassé could have gained ground while conceding with considerable grace. Thereafter loopholes were eliminated quickly. Eventually the initial demand for the order for Marchand's withdrawal became an outright insistence for the actual evacuation of Fashoda.

Other tactics utilized by Britain added to assuring France of commitment. Thus, Salisbury invoked system variables to show that his range of possible behaviors was severely curtailed-- his Cabinet colleagues had to be consulted and they were not on the whole very conciliatory; press reactions to a compromise would show him as weak and set the public against him and ultimately threaten his removal from office. The British tried to exhibit forthrightness and clarity in their moves and thereby produce maximum credibility for their threat of war, which, though never delivered as a formal ultimatum, was sufficiently explicit in the mere fact of naval mobilization. Another effective tactic employed by the British was the use of a public commitment. The publication of a Blue Book before the crisis was terminated made compromise well-nigh impossible; thus implying that their position would be adhered to quite rigorously.

Taken together the tactics employed by Britain were successful in compelling France to retire from her original bidding position, in fact to capitulate utterly. No doubt, though,

Britain need not have pursued her harassing tactics with such a vengeance. Extending the crisis period a bit longer would not have made French claims to Fashoda any more valid than they were. The result of bargaining would certainly have been the same.

France's role in the crisis was that of resister, that is, the French government was resisting British attempts at coercion aimed at restoring the pre-Fashoda status quo. France sought to deter Britain from carrying out the threatened sanction— war— and attempted to prevent Britain from changing the crisis status quo.

French moves directed toward manifesting commitment were quite unsuccessful. Like Britain, France employed value-involving tactics. Commitment was implied by warnings in the form of the Hanotaux speech and the de Courcel-Kimberley discussion of 1895— both asserting rejection of the Grey Declaration. Similarly the invoking of the nation^{al} honor, prestige, future bargaining position, and confidence of the French public was an attempt to appear committed.

Harassing tactics were little available to the French. Use of the press for castigating British politicians and imperialists was a common but weak attempt at harassment. Perhaps the best pressuring device the French had was Marchand and his entourage at Fashoda. The French presence was indeed a considerable embarrassment and irritation to England. The mobilization of the Toulon fleet may have caused British con-

sternation but it was quickly overcome after the mobilization of the British fleet. France intimated that both countries had an interest in avoiding war— Britain for the simple reason that her colonies and hence commercial interests were vulnerable. Yes, but never for long unless France could build some overwhelming naval force or obtain the assistance of powerful allies. Even if France could have counted on Russian aid it alone would not have been sufficient to knock out the British fleet. And Germany and Italy were pledged to benevolent neutrality in case of war between France and England.

The most frequently used and nearly successful French tactic was the employment of counterthreats— not the ones intimating that peace could be preserved only if Great Britain conceded but rather the threats of resignation by Delcassé if negotiations were not begun. Even these were summarily discounted.

The French position was known to be flexible and was not exceedingly clear. As a matter of fact it changed full circle during the crisis. Such uncertainty weakened French attempts to appear resolved. Even the publication of a Livre Jaune during the crisis did not impress the British as showing French commitment to the proclaimed position.

France was not able to deter Britain unless she was prepared to go to war and then only if she could inflict unacceptable damage to British life and property. In sum, without the support of powerful allies which were not to be had,

the French threat was never credible, and the result of bluffing was that France was seen as "completely cowed . . . and the leading Power of the world to be . . . Britain."¹⁰⁸

B. Hypotheses.

(A.1) Bipolar crises are characterized by greater caution and moderation than crises in a multipolar system because of the greater potential costs of war.

To say that the British and French decision-makers in the Fashoda crisis were not cautious is a vitiation of the facts. Neither Salisbury nor Delcassé wanted war— Delcassé because he realized that after France's inevitable defeat she would most likely be relegated to a second-level power status, a fate worse than the diplomatic isolation following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 from which she had only recently emerged; Salisbury because he knew that— barring some catastrophe— Britain would win but at the same time would suffer considerable damage to her far-flung empire.

(A.2) In a multipolar system the imperative of alliance cohesion exercises a greater effect on crisis bargaining tactics than in a bipolar system. Thus, in a multipolar system, states have less flexibility in their choice of tactics because of a need to accommodate the wishes of allies. In a bipolar world, great powers are less concerned about shaping tactics to suit allies because of their lesser dependence on allies; thus they can afford to be more flexible.

There were few constraints operating ~~on~~ the antagonists

that could be linked to the imperatives of alliance cohesion. Britain had no explicit allies in Europe and the casus foederis of the Franco-Russian alliance did not include provision for an attack on France by Britain. Although France tried to assure Russian cooperation (at least naval) all such attempts were in vain. The sheer lack of war-making capabilities (exclusive of alliances) with their concomitant threat-potential more than any behavioral constraints imposed by the necessity of alliance cohesion determined the French retreat.

(A.3) The preservation of alliances is a larger component in the values at stake in a multipolar crisis than in a bipolar crisis.

Because there was no alliance whose casus foederis would be tripped in the event of war between Britain and France, the question of alliance preservation is relatively moot. However, Delcassé's overall aim for an Anglo-French understanding made retreat an easier pill to swallow— a less antagonistic attitude toward Britain in 1898, he thought, would be better in the long-run.

(A.4) Considerations of bargaining reputation and images of resolve are a larger component of the value of the stakes in a bipolar crisis than a multipolar one (for the super-powers at least) because (1) the adversary of the present is likely to be the adversary of the future, and (2) the adversaries are in conflict on a wider range of issues.

The British consideration of bargaining reputation and

image of resolve was not as great as the actual, tangible, physical elements were. "The Nile is Egypt, and Egypt is the Nile" was more than a clever phrase: Egypt was truly a vital link in British Mediterranean strategy. France, however, would be the likeliest prospect (if there were to be one) for another challenge regarding British predominance in Egypt. If Britain were perceived as adamant on Egyptian matters, then only a considerable accretion of power by France could alter the British-preferred, pre-Fashoda status quo.

The adversaries were in conflict over a number of issues but nowhere else was there such a naked confrontation as at Fashoda. The range of issues did not include changing the rules of the game: Both sides wished to continue operating within the context of a homogeneous international system.

(A.5) Exaggerating one's valuation of the stakes is a more common tactic in the nuclear than the pre-nuclear environment because of the greatly increased costs of war and the need, for the sake of credibility, to make interests seem commensurate with war costs.

If the confrontation at Fashoda had erupted into a war, it is exceedingly doubtful that France would have concluded that the costs of such a war both in terms of damage sustained and damage inflicted would have been worth a place in the Nile Valley. The French valuation of the stakes never seemed even remotely commensurate with war costs. The British did not inform the French of the value they placed on the stakes; thus

it is difficult to determine if the British exaggerated their own valuation of the stakes.

(A.6) In the pre-nuclear age, threatening declarations emphasized simply a willingness to fight; in the nuclear age they tend to emphasize at least as heavily how one will fight— i.e., the resolve to use nuclear weapons or the possibility that a war will escalate to the nuclear level.

In the Fashoda crisis neither Britain nor France issued ultimatums or even less formal, threatening declarations. The British fleet mobilization was interpreted by the French as a willingness to fight. The question as to how the adversaries would fight does not admit of much choice— it would have been naval. If the British had liquidated the French troops at Fashoda during the crisis period or after, France— if she wished to retain the respect of other states as well as her own self-respect— would have had little option but to fight. The war would not have been localized in the Sudan but would have been spread to the British colonies and commercial enterprises around the world.

(A.7) Threats are more crude, explicit and bellicose in the nuclear age than before— to compensate for the inherent incredibility of nuclear threats and their lack of support through experience of previous use. I.e., the lower the inherent credibility, the more explicit and fearsome the threat must be. Also, perhaps, to play upon fears of nuclear war in mass public opinion.

Neither France nor Britain made any threats that could be described as crude. British publication of a Blue Book during the crisis was extraordinary but was done only after the French had given permission to include certain documents for which approval for courtesy's sake was required. This Blue Book publication was a fairly explicit communications move by Britain— there would be no backing down.

The mobilization of the fleet was a bellicose act but not one which could be labelled an unnecessary exploitation of risk. It was at the same time the most explicit threat of the crisis.

French threats, as to leave Marchand at Fashoda, to fight, or Delcassé's threat of resignation were not unusual under the circumstances, were not crude, or especially explicit.

(A.8) Physical actions (below the level of violence) are relatively prominent as compared to verbal communications in nuclear age crises; they were less prominent in the pre-nuclear age. (This follows in part from the notion that "use of force short of war" has become a substitute for war.)

The most important communications during the Fashoda crisis were verbal. Physical actions— except for fleet mobilizations by both sides— were minimal: Delcassé's pained expressions and anger, Kitchener's harassing activities in the Sudan.

(A.9) Nuclear age crises tend to be characterized by minor,

subsidiary confrontations as tests of resolve; these are much less prominent in the pre-nuclear age.

The Fashoda crisis was not a subsidiary confrontation as a test of resolve. It was the result of a direct and explicit challenge by France to British predominance in Egypt—a signal element of British Mediterranean and indeed global strategy.

(A.10) In heterogeneous systems, threats and other declarations are more bellicose and explicit than in homogeneous systems.

See (A.7).

(A.11) Deliberately "increasing the shared risk of war" (Schelling's "manipulation of risk") is not a very frequent tactic, but it is more common in nuclear age crises than in pre-nuclear ones.

Salisbury can be said to have increased the shared risk of war, at least in the local Fashoda arena, by giving Kitchener tremendous freedom of action when it was known that Kitchener had a reputation for being reckless.

(A.12) In a multipolar crisis, the crucial uncertainty is the identity of one's opponents if war breaks out; in a bipolar crisis the identity of the opponent is clear and the crucial uncertainty is the likely degree of escalation if war breaks out.

The opponents in war would have been the adversaries alone — Britain and France. Russia was unwilling and unable to help

(her fleet was frozen in the Baltic after the beginning of November), Germany and Italy pledged neutrality. The uncertainty of opponents did not seem to enter British calculations to any noticeable degree— although the French would have wished otherwise. Thus the French assertion that Russian help was but a telegram away.

(B.1) Absolutely irrevocable commitments are rare.

There were no absolutely irrevocable ^{commitments} by either France or Britain during the Fashoda crisis. The closest such action was the publication of a Blue Book on the crisis by Britain. Because of its timing and content it was generally accepted by the British Cabinet and press that there could be no backing down by Britain. Some hedge or backdoor probably could have been found or created if it had been necessary.

(B.2) Threats are usually ambiguous or "veiled" rather than explicit.

The British made no explicit threats whatever. The more important veiled ones include, of course, the fleet mobilization as well as Salisbury's request of September 25 that Monson inform Delcassé that Her Majesty's Government approved of Kitchener's harassing actions in the Sudan and Salisbury's reaffirmation of this to Monson on October 7 with the added note that there was to be no further communication with the French government on the matter; after~~all~~, they knew the implications— Marchand and company were in a parlous situation.

Delcassé expected an explicit threat— an ultimatum, but

the British never issued one or anything resembling one. The Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Thomas Sanderson, carefully checked Foreign Office records and informed the French representative that Britain had only declared Marchand's presence at Fashoda an obstacle to negotiation.

French threats were even less explicit. Marchand at Fashoda was perceived by Britain as a threat to her predominance in Egypt; thus he had to go. Delcassé's hint of resignation was a threat but not labelled as such. He even predicted the kind of successor the British could expect— an Anglophobe.

(B.3) The severest, most explicit threats are usually made by and to (a) officials of medium or low status, and (b) private individuals. I.e., the higher the official status of the communicator or the recipient, the greater the ambiguity and moderation of communications.

All the important communications during the crisis were between high government officials or their representatives. Salisbury— Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary— and Delcassé— Foreign Minister— dealt with one another through their respective ambassadors at Paris and London. The British Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Thomas Sanderson, did transact some business with the French ambassador or chargé d'affaires but his was a relatively high office and he was, and it was known that he was, Salisbury's right-hand man as well.

The most severe British threats were not announced as such— they were instead, actions from which the French were to draw the proper inferences.

(B.4) Coercive moves are often given a non-coercive rationale to minimize the element of duress and minimize the costs of retraction

The British were able to dismiss complaints about the mobilization of the fleet as unwarranted. The naval maneuvers during the crisis could be excused as regularly scheduled annual exercises.

The British publication of a Blue Book was not ostensibly done as a threat but as a way of providing Parliament with information— a common method at that. The threatening nature of the publication— we will not back down no matter what the costs— was intended.¹⁰⁹

A coercive move which was not concealed was the insistence by Salisbury that the French be apprised that Kitchener's freedom of action in the Sudan met with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

None of the French attempts at coercive moves was successful— in the main because the British never interpreted them as serious.

(B.5) Parties will attempt to create loopholes through which the opponent can back down.

Whether intended as a loophole or not, Salisbury did give the French a chance to negotiate the delimitation of territories

in the Upper Nile basin. On the ninth of September he had Delcassé informed that the British would be willing to discuss territorial controversies in regard to the regions not subject to the Khalifa— and there were such areas in the Upper Nile basin.

The French did not attempt to exploit the loophole. Afterwards the British refused to discuss any matters relating to the Upper Nile basin. There was then no easy way out for the French.

(B.6) In making threats and other moves, parties will try to leave themselves an avenue for retreat.

After the publication of the Blue Book the British had no avenue for an honorable retreat unless, of course, Salisbury had been willing to engage in sustained tergiversation.

The mobilization of the fleet could easily have been modified or terminated without such an action appearing as an instance of British lack of resolve. (See B.4.)

Delcassé's most potent threat to the British was the continued presence of Marchand at Fashoda. Even for the British it would have seemed rather extreme to eliminate or even take prisoner the French officers and men. When Delcassé finally decided upon withdrawal it was for "sanitary reasons," not tactical ones. By exaggerating the climatic and topographical inclemency of the place, Delcassé was able to bring the French forces home— seemingly as the only truly humane thing to do.

(B.7) Nations make firm commitments and explicit threats

only when they are clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation (e.g. relative fear of war, relative valuation of the stakes, relative capabilities).

The firmest commitments and most explicit threats were indeed made by the side clearly favored by asymmetries in the situation. Britain had a higher relative value of the stakes both for strategic as well as bargaining-reputation reasons; had much greater war-making capability than France; and seemed more favorably disposed to war as well.

French threats were generally pooh-poohed because France was so obviously in an inferior position vis-à-vis Britain.

(B.8) The process of commitment is usually progressive rather than "all-at-once."

British commitment was not particularly graduated. There may have been second thoughts by Salisbury with regard to the area for future negotiations but never with respect to the necessity of withdrawing Marchand before any negotiations could commence. The mobilizations of the fleet and publication of the Blue Book only reaffirmed the basic British position.

The putative French commitment progressively eroded—until she was guaranteed neither the acceptance of Marchand at Fashoda nor negotiations on the Upper Nile basin.

(B.9) Tactics may be modulated in a crisis to keep in power, or bring to power, a faction more favorable to oneself in the adversary state, or to maximize the internal influence of that faction.

To what extent the British modified their tactics to retain Delcassé in office because he was probably more favorably disposed to them than any other prospective Foreign Minister is not readily apparent. When Monson, British ambassador at Paris, thought Delcassé immovable, he suggested that the solution to the crisis might come with Delcassé's resignation.

Delcassé had been Foreign Minister only since June 1898 and with the frequent ministerial crises of the Third Republic there was really little the British could do to be assured that Anglophiles remain in office. The British had no way of knowing that Delcassé would be Foreign Minister until 1905 and thus little reason to bring him credit in the autumn of 1898.

The French did react to Salisbury's policy in such a way that Salisbury could keep the (anti-French) hawks in his Cabinet caged. That the French so intended rests on evidence meager if at all.

(B.10) Public communications are usually more ambiguous than private ones.

The British made no important communications that could be labelled anything but private (and official). At the time of the Fashoda crisis the British press did not have impressive links with the Foreign Office. French newspaper statements reputedly of an official nature were generally inconsequential as far as resolution of the crisis was concerned.

(B.11) Tactics of "risk manipulation" tend to be least likely and least frequent in the high-tension phase of a crisis.

There was very little risk manipulation in the course of the crisis. Salisbury's relinquishing control to a subordinate— Kitchener— at Fashoda and environs had been done before the French were discovered and only reaffirmed afterwards. The French tried to avoid manipulating risk, especially locally in the Sudan because they did not feel able to accept the consequences, that is, probable annihilation.

(B.12) Moves in the early stages of a crisis will be relatively coercive and conflictful; in the later stages they will be more cooperative in nature.

Until the French announced in early November that Marchand would be withdrawn and thereby removed the major factor of contention, the British did generally employ tactics meant to convey resolve and coercion. They did, however, early on accede to the French request to use their communications links to Fashoda. Because the request was made for humanitarian reasons Salisbury agreed— though not enthusiastically.

Overall there seem to be no characteristic behavior patterns (cooperative versus conflictful) at particular stages of the Fashoda crisis.

(C.1) Blatant, peremptory, openly aggressive demands and threats are more likely to be resisted than those presented in a "reasonable" tone.

There were no demands or threats that could rightly be classified as blatant, peremptory, or openly aggressive. The British, for example, never officially demanded Marchand's re-

moval but said only that his continued presence was an obstacle to negotiation. Furthermore, in the context of the crisis, a British demand for Marchand's immediate withdrawal would not have been terribly unexpected— the British had been rather adamant about their predominance to the exclusion of other states in Egypt for more than a decade. In fact, Delcassé at one point thought an ultimatum was forthcoming.

(C.2) Threats may have a provocative effect (stiffening the other's resolve) which undermines or offsets their coercive effect.

The British threats qua threats did not produce a stiffening of French resolve. The provocative effect of British behavior is better analyzed under (C.6).

There is little evidence that the French threats— formal rupture, Franco-Russian alliance, Foreign Minister's resignation— were taken very seriously; hence it is difficult to link them with resultant British behavior.

(C.3) Less provocation is caused by attempts to change utilities and utility perceptions than by outright threats.

The French did make attempts at changing British utilities, as for example, trying to convince Britain of the value of future cooperation, a future alliance, but these were mainly discounted by the British. In other words, tactics to modify utilities were generally failures and not particularly enlightening one way or the other apropos provocativeness.

The British did not notably attempt to change French utilities.

(C.4) If a "rule of the game" is broken, the other party's resolve is likely to increase.

The Fashoda crisis took place within the confines of the rules of the game à la nineteenth century.

(C.5) Decision-makers seldom think probabilistically, calculate "expected values" or "expected costs" of moves, etc.; moves tend to be rejected because they are "too dangerous," or undertaken because they are "necessary," without much careful estimating of the probabilities of various adversary responses.

As far as Lord Salisbury and the British Cabinet are concerned, it would be correct to assert that there was little probabilistic calculation. On the other hand, Delcassé did consider the consequences of particular actions, especially those in the local Fashoda arena. He seemed all too aware that even a small misdeed—provoked or accidental—could result in war. The national honor would have to be upheld. There was, however, no careful estimating of probabilities of various adversary responses by either side.

(C.6) "Toughness" tends to breed toughness in the other; firm commitment generates firm counter-commitment; conciliation produces reciprocal conciliation.

French conciliatory moves did not produce reciprocal British behaviors. The British were not conciliatory.

One thing the French had in mind in setting up this direct confrontation was to challenge British toughness as shown since

the French left Egypt. On the diplomatic front, the initial French reaction was to stay in order to prove they could face up to the British. When viewed against the background of the French arguments, however, the matter of toughness is only minimally relevant. They know they were not capable of exerting real muscle when they suffered from, and Britain knew it, severe anemia.

(C.7) Compellent threats stiffen the opponent's will to resist; deterrent threats do not.

Although they never explicitly formulated a compellent threat, the British were understood by the French to mean the same thing when the former said that Marchand's continued presence at Fashoda was an obstacle to negotiation. The fact that the French were there— after no mean travail— did stiffen their will to resist. Packing up and leaving without a fight would be sheer humiliation.

(D.1) When inherent bargaining power is relatively equal, salience will have maximum effect on the outcome; when there is inequality in bargaining power, bargaining power will overcome salience.

There was considerable inequality of bargaining power— Britain having much more power than France. Had there been equality, it seems doubtful that the British could have dismissed the French arguments as they did— out-of-hand. In fact the British might well have had to accept the French claim to Fashoda as being no different from the Belgian claim to Lado

or the British claim to Ouadelai. Furthermore, the British might have had to terminate their "temporary occupation" of Egypt before they did (1956) had the French been equally powerful.

(D.2) Saliency has little effect on settlements, but more effect in limiting tactics and restricting escalation.

There is no evidence to indicate that saliency qua saliency had any effect in limiting tactics and restricting escalation.

(D.3) Asymmetries in the systemic environment and bargaining setting (i.e., inherent power) have more effect on outcomes than bargaining tactics (tactical power).

Apropos the Fashoda crisis, the bargaining tactics were minor when compared with the British capabilities and the French lack of reliable European allies. British power more than any tactic was the decisive factor.

(D.4) Before the nuclear age, crises tended to be terminated by a formal settlement if they did not lead to war; now they tend to fade away, ending in tacit acceptance of a de facto state of affairs.

The Fashoda crisis terminated with the French announcement that Marchand was to be withdrawn. This action was done verbally but according to the then extant diplomatic practice. The territorial delimitations that were negotiated later were drawn up and added to a previously-negotiated, written agreement—the Convention of June 14, 1898.

(D.5) Miscalculation of others' intentions is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar system.

The only miscalculation of an adversary's intentions was Delcassé's belief that the British were going to formulate an ultimatum. This was a misperception that resulted in behavior that might not have otherwise occurred— toughness— but bears no apparent relationship to systemic structure.

(E.1 through E.14) These hypotheses are not relevant to the Fashoda crisis. Neither France nor Britain had alliances whose casi foederis would come to play in action by one against the other. France did have an alliance with Russia but Russia was not immediately involved in the crisis.

(F.1) Actors tend to perceive what their images lead them to expect; incoming "signals" are interpreted to conform to the existing image.

On a general level, the British saw the French as determined to challenge British predominance in Egypt (as indeed they were). The British also had a self-image of strong-willed tenacity. Thus any French incursion for whatever reason into a zone the British asserted to be their own was interpreted as a challenge to their resolve.

On a more specific level, Delcassé, for instance, perceived the British as bellicose, so much so that he thought from a reading of the "signals" the next British move would be an ultimatum (September 30, 1898).

(F.2) Historical experiences and traumas heavily condition

images.

For Salisbury there seemed little uncertainty that the French would not back down. They were, after all, fairly weak, had a not terribly stable government, and were not entirely recovered from the humiliation of 1870. Thus when the French made attempts at threats they could be disregarded because a perceived weak power cannot be seen as being capable of seconding its threats with physical force.

The British activities in Egypt and the Sudan after 1882 were hardly convincing evidence that they actually planned on terminating the "temporary occupation." The French reactions to British predominance over increasingly vast areas was colored by the French experiences with the British earlier on. Thus the French could not expect a sweeping turnabout by the British but a concession or two was not out of the question.

(F.3) Decision-makers tend to perceive adversaries as more hostile than they really are.

The evidence from the Fashoda crisis would tend to confirm the notion that decision-makers see adversaries as more hostile than they really are. The French regarded the British as fairly hostile and from all accounts the British intended not only to convey such an image— will-to-victory, subordinate control, what have you— but were in fact hostile. The mobilization of the fleet, the screw-turning at Fashoda— these were not friendly actions by any means.

The French generally tried to be conciliatory but were re-

buked by the British. Perhaps, if the distribution of power between the two states had been more nearly that of equality, the French could have essayed hostile tactics.

(F.4) Decision-makers overestimate the degree to which adversaries are motivated by aggressive aims and underestimate the degree to which they are motivated by fear.

It is hard to separate out motives of fear and aggressive aims as perceived by British decision-makers apropos the French. The French presence at Fashoda was seen as an aggressive aim (rightly so). French fear had little to do with their being at Fashoda— only getting out. The French climb-down was, for the most part, a result of fear.

(F.5) Expectations are more influential than desires in the interpretation of incoming signals and communications.

Expectations were more influential than desires in the interpretation of incoming signals and communications. Delcassé would, of course, had preferred that the British back down, that they concede but he did not expect them to do so for no good reason. Rather he anticipated that the British would be hard-nosed and he behaved accordingly.

When Delcassé thought the British were about to formulate an ultimatum he could not interpret such an action in terms of what he desired. Instead he had to react in such a way that the expected ultimatum would be rejected before delivered and hence the resultant war would be Britain's, not France's doing.

(F.6) The greater the ambiguity of incoming information and communication, the less impact it will have on pre-established beliefs.

Most of the incoming information and communication was quite clear— when it was not, the other side would seek clarification; thus it is difficult to say what impact any given exchange of information had on pre-established beliefs.

(F.7) The higher the tension, the more rigid the images. Thus, the higher the tension in a crisis, the clearer one's communications must be in order to modify the adversary's image.

Perhaps the hypothesis that the greater the tension in a crisis, the clearer the communications accounts for the relative clarity of communications during the Fashoda crisis. (See F.6) From the onset in September until termination in November, the situation was tense— at least the French thought it so. An explosion at Fashoda— where incidentally Delcassé could be not be sure of Marchand's behavior— could have resulted in a different, probably violent, conclusion. The question of the rigidity of images does not seem too relevant.

(F.8) Statesmen tend to perceive their own alternatives as more restricted than the adversary's alternatives.

Delcassé obviously thought that Salisbury could concede and hence that the British alternatives were greater than the British thought. Such a statement, however, seems simplistic at best. Delcassé was no fool— surely he would have reacted

the same way as Salisbury had he been in the Prime Minister's boots. There were alternatives available but alternatives which were unacceptable. Likewise the French wanted to convince themselves that they could not retreat. All along they knew that withdrawal was an alternative even if they did not care to admit it— to themselves or to the British.

(F.9) The adversary usually appears as more monolithic, with greater singleness of purpose, than one's own state.

There was no noticeable difference between appearance and perception of monolithicity by either side.

(F.10) The greater the stature and authority of the person making a declaration, the greater will be the credibility attributed to it.

Important communications were not handled by low-level personnel. There was very little question as to the credibility of any official exchanges by either side.

(F.11) The resolve of statesmen in a crisis will be heavily influenced by their perceptions of the adversary's ultimate aims— whether they are limited or far-reaching.

The hawks in the British Cabinet were particularly concerned less a concession in the Sudan would be followed by larger, maybe even more legitimate, demands to end the "temporary occupation" of Egypt and resume cooperative decision-making with France in regard to Egyptian affairs. Salisbury was thought to be moderate and even willing to risk a concession without lessening his resolve.

(G.1) Difficulty of changing an agreed position within a government lends extra resolve to resist the opponent's demands.

The fact that Salisbury was faced with several hardliners in his Cabinet— Chamberlain and Goshen, in particular— probably affected his own predilection for moderation. (Cabinet meeting, October 27, 1898.) He had to pursue the Cabinet decision, itself a compromise, with resolution.

On the French side the data do not demonstrate that the other ministers of the Governments (two Governments, to be precise— since there was a ministerial crisis in October 1898) had much influence one way or the other on the Foreign Minister, Delcassé.

(G.2) Lack of unity in a government increases the ambiguity of bargaining moves.

In their positions vis-à-vis one another, both the French and British governments were not beset by lack of unity. In fact the unity of the British government probably increased the credibility of its commitment.

(G.3) The higher the tension, the greater the influence of emotion as compared to reasoned calculation.

Perhaps the moment of highest tension for the French occurred September 30 when Delcassé thought Monson had come to deliver an ultimatum. Anticipating this action, Delcassé took the lead in conversation. He gave a very impassioned statement in which he conjured up the national honor and national interest:

"in my hands the national honor will remain intact."

For the British there were no parallel situations—rather, cool-headed calculations by the Prime Minister.

(G.4) Urgency and time pressure in a crisis inhibits the search for alternatives and favors the selection of traditional, habitual or already-planned moves.

The aura of urgency and time constraint did not noticeably affect the perceived range of alternatives. The French had no planned moves— they were, in fact, surprised with the turn of events immediately prior to the onset of the crisis. Had the crisis been drawn out for another month or so there seems little evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that more alternatives would have been seen as available to the parties.

(G.5) The longer the duration of a crisis, or the lower its severity, the greater the influence of organizational roles on perceptions and evaluation of alternatives.

The Fashoda crisis was primarily a matter handled by two foreign ministers; thus the foreign-policy machinery was the most influential organization. On the British side, the naval decision-makers did view the crisis with regard to its effect on the navy and they planned accordingly. It is less easy to isolate the influence of organizational roles on perceptions and evaluation of alternatives for other leaders in either Britain or France, especially the latter where the Ministry of Colonies was itself a pretty much free-wheeling

outfit in an area generally thought to be within the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(G.6) The greater the involvement of public opinion, the less the government's flexibility; this will reduce the government's capacity for accommodation and compromise but strengthen its bargaining power behind the position it takes.

Salisbury recognized that the great public support in Britain made it impossible to make anything even remotely resembling a concession. After the French had agreed to withdraw Marchand, Salisbury suggested that it would be the wiser course to wait for public spirits to die down before commencing any negotiations.

French public opinion presents a somewhat more complicated problem. It was not unified behind Delcassé's ultimate decision to retreat. Neither, however, did it take a unified stand in the opposite direction. In other words the French public opinion qua press did not enhance Delcassé's bargaining strength.

(G.7) Decision-makers in the crisis area generally prefer a tougher line than decision-makers at home.

There is no evidence that the decision-makers in and near Fashoda preferred a tougher line for any reason other than personal ones. Kitchener had a reputation for being rough. Wingate, his assistant, was quite moderate. On the French side, Marchand definitely would have preferred that Delcassé had handled the matter differently, but Marchand was a man much concerned with his own reputation. The British and French

diplomatic representatives in Cairo did not seem anxious for a tougher policy.

(G.8) Military men generally prefer tougher tactics than civilian decision-makers.

There is no evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that military men generally prefer tougher tactics than civilian decision-makers. The most hard-line leader of all was probably the civilian Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain. In terms of the local Fashoda situation the military men may have preferred tougher tactics. (See G.7.)

(H.1) Weakness in one crisis creates an expectation in the adversary that one will be weak in the next.

Generally the British perceived that if they made a concession to the French they might well be opening themselves to similar demands in the future, not necessarily with regard to only France, but to Germany as well. Expectations of weakness now and later did not seem to be of capital importance for either party.

(H.2) A show of weakness in one crisis stimulates a desire to correct this image by toughness in the next.

The hypothesis relating a show of weakness in one crisis with a desire to be tough in the next is comparative and hence admits of no verification in the single instance.

(H.3 and H.4) not relevant.

(H.5) Some crises leave an aftermath of hostility between the parties (e.g. Germany and Austria after Bosnia, 1908);

others result in increased friendship or détente (Fashoda and Cuba). Provisionally, we hypothesize that which result occurs will depend on the following: (a) the finality of the settlement, (b) the existence of another common adversary of the parties, (c) the provocativeness of tactics used in the crisis, (d) the degree of humiliation suffered by the defeated side.

The Fashoda crisis cannot be said to be the major cause of the Anglo-French entente of 1904. The seeming British-French détente is most correctly viewed in light of (H.5.b) the existence of a common adversary of the parties, that is, Germany, especially after 1900. Germany had no direct role in the Fashoda crisis or its settlement.

(H.6) The defeated side in a crisis will attempt to rationalize its capitulation in a way which minimizes costs.

France withdrew from Fashoda officially because the health of the men there was in jeopardy, that is, for the want of proper sanitary conditions. This was a rationalization that did not too greatly diminish French prestige at home.

(H.7) A strong show of resolve in a crisis enhances a state's attractiveness as a potential ally.

Britain's show of resolve in the Fashoda crisis did enhance her reputation as a strong power—the strongest as a matter of fact—but did not apparently increase her attractiveness as an ally beyond what it was before.

(I.1) Concessions made in a crisis will be perceived as

more costly than the same concession made in a non-crisis period because much of the cost of a concession made under duress is in terms of reputation for resolve. Thus concessions are less likely in a crisis than in "peaceful diplomacy."

In the Fashoda crisis the French made the ultimate concession— they withdrew with no guarantee of anything beyond future talks about territorial delimitations. It would be speculative at best to evaluate the cost of the same concession under non-crisis circumstances.

The British made no concessions during the crisis.

Since the Fashoda crisis was resolved in a nonviolent fashion it was an example of peaceful diplomacy; thus the distinction between concessions under duress and concessions in the course of peaceful diplomacy does not seem relevant here.

(I.2) An actor can help himself to concede by asking a quid pro quo which is relatively costless to the other side but can be rationalized as substantial to his own constituency.

Delcassé asked the British for a concession he thought relatively costless to the British— negotiations— but unfortunately for him the British did not view the matter the same way. There was no truly costless quid pro quo.

(I.3) Losses from backing down to a challenge may be reduced by redefining one's vital interests.

Delcassé's given reason for ordering the withdrawal of Marchand was for "sanitary conditions," perhaps an excuse for

retreat rather than a redefinition of interests. It was the French who were doing the initial challenging so that technically they could not back down in face of a nonexistent challenge.

(I.4) The higher the level of tension, the more likely that concessions will be interpreted by the adversary as a sign of weakness.

The French capitulation was interpreted as weakness not just by the British but by the rest of Europe as well. However, there is not a significant relationship between the level of tension and the interpretation of concessions as evidence of weakness.

(I.5) Alliances not relevant.


(I.6) Concessions may first be offered in "sign language" to test the opponent's willingness to reciprocate; if no reciprocating signal is received, the first side will go back to its original position.

No important concessions were offered initially by means of "sign language." Asymmetries of the situation apropos power considerations did not permit France to propose and withdraw concessions. Britain was making certain demands, had no intention of making concessions, and thus forced the French to concede until the latter arrived at the British-preferred position.

C. Notes on bargaining models.

1. Utility models.

Diesing notes (WP #5:3) that the utility model is "an idealization." We can, however, determine at least vaguely what the bargaining range of the Fashoda crisis looked like—not necessarily to the then decision-makers but in an ex post facto sense.



The French were seeking to change the status quo in Egypt and the Sudan. Their realistic maximum can be stated as the termination of British occupation and predominance to the exclusion of all other states in Egypt. No doubt some officials

at the Ministry of Colonies would have preferred British withdrawal but such a position was unrealistic.

The French minimum demand as depicted above is basically what they eventually settled for. Because their power position vis-à-vis Britain was so unfavorable they might well have taken less— that is, utter capitulation, no mention of future talks regarding territorial delimitations.

Britain's minimum position was immediate withdrawal of Marchand from Fashoda. The solution of all outstanding colonial problems to Britain's advantage is, as a maximum, speculation. The so-called Cabinet hawks supposedly had this in mind.

The bargaining that took place was of the nature of reduction of demands by France, rather than concessions by Britain.

The attempts at changing the opponent's utilities were not carefully constructed moves geared to a specific goal. Thus Delcassé's threat of resigning as Foreign Minister was intended to modify British utilities since Delcassé was most likely to be succeeded by a person even less amicable toward Britain. Delcassé's long-range intentions apropos Britain were not yet apparent; hence he could be seen as just another French Foreign Minister. Britain was somewhat more successful in changing French utilities. Naked power, forcefulness, the untenable French position in the Sudan— all converged in such a way that France had to reassess her utilities.

France was primarily responsible for devising new outcomes and trying to make them acceptable to Britain. Thus after the

the British denial of any recognition of French occupation rights in the Sudan, the French sought a commercial outlet on the Nile, then access to an outlet, then territorial delimitations, and finally the prospect for talks at some undetermined time.

The British saw bargaining with the French as zero-sum while the French viewed it as variable-sum. The French thought their intimation of future amicability was enough to offset any territorial loss the British might perceive they were making.

The French sought to devise moves that would benefit them at what they perceived as small costs to the British. Unfortunately for the French, the British did not see the various schemes as cheap but beneficial.

To the British the only acceptable outcome was the one they saw as salient, that is, French withdrawal.

The French proffered outcomes were each perceived (by the French) as at least salient solutions. Thus, the logic of French rights at Fashoda was no different from Belgian rights at Lado or British rights at Ouadelai. Once the argument was shown as analogous what other solution, the French queried, was possible. The commercial outlet solution, the settling of borders— both were seen by the French as prominent solutions costing the British very little.

In the context of the Fashoda crisis the French decision-makers were initially "maximizers," that is, they sought to

gain as much as possible from the challenge to British predominance they had made. The French desired both territory and influence— acquiring the former at the expense of Britain would yield the latter.

The British were trying to restore the status quo existing before the French occupation of Fashoda. The new status quo was an immediate threat to the British position in the Sudan and a general threat to the future of British predominance in Egyptian affairs. If France could gain a stronghold in the Nile Valley Britain would have to face innumerable, complex, new problems requiring a revised strategy to deal with them. Once France was in, maybe other European states would plan similar entries. Thus the post occupation status quo was perceived by the British as dangerous both in terms of instability and precedent.

After the French recognized British resolve, their (the French) conduct is better characterized as disaster-avoidance. The French were aware of the results that armed hostilities would bring upon them. The British, too, can be said to have pursued a policy generally motivated by a desire to avoid a violent solution. The British, however, seemed much less willing to get together with the French than the French with the British. But then the degree of the threatened disaster was much greater for France than it was for Britain.

As far as the Fashoda crisis is concerned, utility models are not very productive in terms of interpreting the outcome;

less so in terms of explanation of that outcome. Utility models result in superficial analyses— dispositions and bargaining stances are ordered from one time to another, yes, but for no particular reasons. These reasons are too important to be overlooked.

2. The "chicken-critical risk" model.

The complexities of the Fashoda crisis, and probably most crises generally, admit of no simple, single explanation. The "chicken-critical risk" model, however, does go far in structuring the dynamics of the Fashoda crisis. In a fairly broad sense the "Bidding Process" section of this paper presents the narrative of the crisis and the bidding and communications moves in the context of the "chicken-critical risk" model.

Although the decision-makers in both Britain and France did not calculate the probabilities of the respective adversary's actions we can, in retrospect, roughly estimate the critical risk levels for France. Britain would settle for nothing less than French compliance. The French realization over time of this fact is what is most interesting.

The French are the defensive side for the reasons given earlier on— they wish to preserve the status quo established after their occupation at Fashoda. The British are the aggressors— they seek a modification of the French-desired status quo, that is, the old status quo they maintained before the French confrontation.

TABLE 1

FRANCE

		Comply	Stand firm
BRITAIN	Comply .50	0, 0	-5, 5
	Stand firm .50	10, -10	-20, -20

At the onset of the crisis the French perceived that the British might comply with French desires. If this were the case the French would believe it in their interests to resist. And so they did.

As the crisis became recognized as such and as the French began to grasp better British intentions their perceptions of British compliance changed.

TABLE 2

FRANCE

		Comply	Stand firm
BRITAIN	Comply .40	0, 0	-5, 5
	Stand firm .60	10, -10	-20, -20

Before British mobilization and publication of the Blue Book the French appeared indifferent between resisting and complying. This reflects a French reassessment of British utilities which the former recognize as increasingly unfavor-

able to themselves. But still the French critical risk at this point (Table 2) indicates further resistance as leading to losses no worse than those of compliance.

TABLE 3

FRANCE

		Comply	Stand firm
BRITAIN	Comply .30	0, 0	-5, 5
	Stand firm .70	10, -10	-20, -20

If there was a .70 chance that the British would stand firm the French estimate of their losses would exceed their loss for compliance and hence they should be willing to back down.

But still the French remained confident they would not have to back down entirely. But the British, rather than proffering a sop, made the French give in. At this point the French calculations of British utilities must have been as in Table 4.

The French decided to swerve: British commitment to stand firm proved convincing. The asymmetries of the situation meant a greater immediate loss for France than for Britain—a loss that France could ill afford.

The British won the day by artful manipulations of French estimates of British actions, British utilities, and French

TABLE 4

FRANCE

		Comply	Stand firm
BRITAIN	Comply .05	0, 0	-5, 5
	Stand firm .95	10, -10	-20, -20

utilities. Examples of manipulations of French estimates of probable British actions include relinquishing control to a subordinate in the field— Kitchener— who is known to be sometimes reckless and mobilization of the fleet— was it for annual exercises or preparation for war against France. The signal example of British manipulation of French estimates of British utilities must be the British refusal to consider French logic apropos Africa and the Great Powers. The more insistent Britain became in this matter the more France was to perceive the importance of the Nile for the British and consequently the less willing Britain would be to yield even a place like Fashoda. The British were successful in manipulating French estimates of French utilities; otherwise there seems little reason for the French climb-down: France came to realize that Fashoda was not worth a war in which she was certain to suffer defeat. France, too, tried to manipulate British estimates of British utilities. Delcassé's attempt to present France as a worthy ally— cooperate with us now and you will always appreciate it— was, however, unsuccessful

in changing British estimates of British utilities.

Manipulation of shared risk did not take on disproportionate dimensions and was not important to the resolution of the crisis. The local Fashoda area events did take on the character of manipulation of shared risk— either side could gravely harm the other while simultaneously suffering severe damage itself. Kitchener, though he might not have cared to admit it, was not in absolute control and was not immune to French bullets. Delcassé recognized the tense situation in the Sudan and sought to ameliorate it. France would be impelled to war if the French at Fashoda were harmed by the British troops there and Britain could not localize a war there either. National honor, prestige, amour propre would not allow such an insult.

There were no explicit threats, that is, threats intended and cited by the maker as threats. The British fleet mobilization is perhaps the closest action there is during the Fashoda crisis to an explicit threat.

British commitment after the publication of the Blue Book was virtually irrevocable. It was the culmination of a series of seemingly less resolute commitments but still had the characteristic of being all-at-once.

Both Salisbury and Delcassé pretended their respective Cabinets had severely limited their choices. There should be no doubt that the British and French Cabinets did exert pressure on their respective Prime Minister-Foreign Secretary and

Foreign Minister but neither Salisbury nor Delcassé ever had his hands bound.

Probably only a few tactics were really decisive— British fleet mobilization and Blue Book publication. Given the state of French power vis-à-vis the British, the British were almost predetermined to have their way. Once British resolve was fully appreciated by the French the latter had but two choices— both unfavorable, (1) to stand firm and be defeated or (2) to comply and be humiliated.

French resolve was in continuous decline. Initially it was stiffened: the intended confrontation, then the need to respond to British arrogance— France, too, had a national honor at stake. As the British asserted their power the French found more reasons for changing their position. The British resolve always remained firm: from the beginning the British took the attitude that the French certainly had their nerve; there could be no recognition of French claims.

The French response to British commitment was a climb-down— officially for reasons of health and sanitary conditions at Fashoda, not because of British commitment to stand firm.

There were no serious attempts at conciliation. France would have probably appreciated such moves by outside states but Britain would not have accepted. The British were in a position to negotiate from strength, that is, they could have their way. A conciliator would have weakened that position.

There was one loophole in the initial British position.

It may have been unintended. The French did not snap it up (at this point of the crisis calculations of critical risk result in levels well within the safe region) and the British did not propose it again. Had the loophole been taken up by France it would have facilitated her withdrawal— and probably with a better outcome than the one which obtained.

The "chicken-critical risk" model better explains the Fashoda crisis than do utility models. "Chicken-critical risk" orders the threats and commitments in a way which makes the resolution of the crisis seem logical.

FOOTNOTES

¹See note 71.

²"D.N.I. Memorandum on Naval Policy, October 28, 1896," presented in Appendix IV of Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), pp. 578-580.

³Lord Rosebery, speech at Perth, October 22, 1898, quoted in The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1898, New Series (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1899); also attributed to Lord Cromer who supposedly coined the expression.

⁴G.N. Sanderson, England, Europe & the Upper Nile, 1882-1899: A Study in the Partition of Africa (Edinburgh: University Press, 1965), p. 142.

⁵Ibid., p. 143.

⁶France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents diplomatiques français, 1871-1914, 1re série, XI (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1947), No. 65, Monteil to Lebon, 7 March 1894. (Hereafter cited as DDF, Vol. no., document no.)

⁷DDF, XI, No. 191, Delcassé to Monteil, 13 July 1894, footnote 2, minute by Hanotaux, 12 July 1894.

⁸DDF, XI, No. 285, Note du Ministre, sans date (17 November 1894).

⁹Sanderson, op. cit., p. 207.

¹⁰DDF, XII (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1951), No. 219, Berthelot to Guieysse, 30 November 1895.

¹¹DDF, XII, No. 312, Guieysse to Liotard (Commissaire du Gouvernement dans le Haut-Oubangui), 24 February 1896. Marchand's instructions were similar but have disappeared. On this see Sanderson, op. cit., p. 278.

¹²Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 22.

¹³G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. I: The End of British Isolation (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), No. 189, Salisbury to Monson, 9 September 1898. (Hereafter cited as BD, Vol. no., document no.)

¹⁴BD, I, No. 190, Monson to Salisbury, 10 September 1898.

¹⁵BD, I, No. 188, Monson to Salisbury, 8 September 1898; No. 190, Monson to Salisbury, 10 September 1898; DDF, XIV (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1957), No. 331, Delcassé to Representatives in London and Cairo, 8 September 1898; No. 334, Lefèvre-Pontalis to Delcassé, 8 September 1898.

¹⁶DDF, XIV, No. 342, Delcassé to Toutain, 10 September 1898.

¹⁷BD, I, No. 185, Salisbury to Cromer, 2 August 1898.

¹⁸DDF, XIV, No. 347, Toutain to Delcassé, 12 September 1898.

¹⁹DDF, XIV, No. 343, Lefèvre-Pontalis to Delcassé, 10 September 1898; No. 344, Delcassé to Lefèvre-Pontalis, 11 September 1898.

²⁰DDF, No. 348, Geoffray to Delcassé, 15 September 1898.

²¹DDF, XIV, No. 350, Geoffray to Delcassé, 15 September 1898.

²²BD, I, No. 185, Salisbury to Cromer, 2 August 1898.

²³DDF, XIV, No. 329, Delcassé to Trouillot, 7 September 1898; No. 352, Trouillot to Delcassé, 15 September 1898.

²⁴DDF, XIV, No. 358, Note du Ministre, 18 September 1898.

²⁵DDF, XIV, No. 338, Communication de l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne, Télégramme de Lord Salisbury, 9 September 1898.

²⁶Great Britain, 4 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), XXXII (1898), 405-407, quoted in Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, (eds.), Foundations of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966), pp. 502-504.

²⁷Sanderson, op. cit., p. 289.

²⁸BD, I, No. 191, Monson to Salisbury, 18 September 1898; DDF, XIV, No. 358, Note du Ministre, 18 September 1898.

²⁹DDF, XIV, No. 363, Geoffray to Delcassé, 21 September 1898.

- ³⁰BD, I, No. 193, Rodd to Salisbury, 25 September 1898.
- ³¹BD, I, No. 194, Rodd to Salisbury including telegram from Kitchener, 25 September 1898.
- ³²BD, I, No. 195 Salisbury to Monson, 25 September 1898.
- ³³DDF, XIV, No. 378, Delcassé to Geoffray, 26 September 1898.
- ³⁴BD, I, No. 197, Salisbury to Monson, 28 September 1898.
- ³⁵BD, I, No. 196, Monson to Salisbury, 27 September 1898.
- ³⁶DDF, XIV, No. 338, Communication de l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne, Télégramme de Lord Salisbury, 9 September 1898.
- ³⁷DDF, XIV, No. 384, Note du Ministre, 27 September 1898.
- ³⁸BD, I, No. 198, Monson to Salisbury, September 28, 1898.
- ³⁹DDF, XIV, No. 400, Note du Ministre, 30 September 1898.
- ⁴⁰Andrew, op. cit., pp. 98-99 with substantiating quotations from Delcassé MSS.
- ⁴¹BD, I, No. 200, Monson to Salisbury, 30 September 1898.
- ⁴²BD, I, No. 201, Salisbury to Rodd, 1 October 1898.
- ⁴³DDF, XIV, No. 412, Delcassé to de Courcel, 4 October 1898.
- ⁴⁴BD, I, No. 202, Salisbury to Monson, 3 October 1898; DDF, XIV, No. 410, Delcassé to de Courcel, 4 October 1898.
- ⁴⁵BD, I, No. 203, Salisbury to Monson, 6 October 1898.
- ⁴⁶Kimberley to Dufferin, No. 112 A, 1 April 1895, F.O. 27/3229. Quoted in Gooch and Penson, op. cit., pp. 504-505.
- ⁴⁷BD, I, No. 203, Salisbury to Monson, 6 October 1898.
- ⁴⁸Ibid.
- ⁴⁹DDF, XIV, No. 414, de Courcel to Delcassé, 6 October 1898.
- ⁵⁰Ibid.
- ⁵¹BD, I, No. 204, Monson to Salisbury, 7 October 1898.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³BD, I, No. 205, Salisbury to Cromer, 7 October 1898.

⁵⁴DDF, XIV, No. 414, de Courcel to Delcassé, 6 October 1898.

⁵⁵Andrew, op. cit., pp. 99-100, quoting Delcassé MSS.

⁵⁶BD, I, No. 206, Monson to Salisbury, 9 October 1898.

⁵⁷BD, I, No. 208, Monson to Salisbury, 10 October 1898.

⁵⁸BD, I, No. 209, Monson to Salisbury, 11 October 1898.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰DDF, XIV, No. 433, de Courcel to Delcassé, 13 October 1898.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²DDF, XIV, No. 412, Delcassé to de Courcel, 4 October 1898.

⁶³DDF, XIV, No. 443, Geoffray to Delcassé, Annexe I, 20 October 1898; BD, I, No. 210, de Courcel to Salisbury 12 October 1898.

⁶⁴BD, I, No. 211, Salisbury to de Courcel, 13 October 1898.

⁶⁵DDF, XIV, No. 438, Delcassé to Vauvineux, 16 October 1898.

⁶⁶BD, I, No. 213, Monson to Salisbury, 21 October 1898; No. 215, Monson to Salisbury, 25 October 1898; No. 218, Monson to Salisbury, 27 October 1898. Salisbury was not concerned with these expressions of support. "At no time during the crisis did the British government or people evince any concern over Russian help to France." Marder, op. cit., p. 323.

⁶⁷See especially, The Annual Register, 1898, pp. 162-168.

⁶⁸T.W. Riker, "A Survey of British Policy in the Fashoda Crisis," Political Science Quarterly XLIV (March, 1929), 54-78.

⁶⁹DDF, XIV, No. 440, Fiéron to Cavelier de Couverville, 16, 18 October 1898.

⁷⁰Marder, op. cit., p. 320.

⁷¹The British had available for service in the Mediterranean the Channel and Mediterranean fleets which comprised eighteen battleships of 239,450 tons and the coastguard and postguard reserves which comprised ten battleships of 102,290 tons. The French had fifteen battleships of 170,085 tons and a reserve of seven battleships of 51,799 tons. In addition the British had another fleet; the French were not in a similar fortunate position.

Russian naval aid which was not forthcoming for the French consisted of seventeen battleships. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 560. At least seven of these were not ready for service and would in any case be frozen in the Baltic after November 1. Marder, op. cit., p. 323.

Furthermore the French were without a plan for naval war and were hard put to devise one for their mixed bag of a fleet— "a flotte d'échantillons— a fleet of samples." Andrew, op. cit., p. 103.

And so Britain was practically guaranteed a quick defeat of the French in the Mediterranean.

⁷²Marder, op. cit., pp. 320-340.

⁷³Domestic crises in France may have added to the urgency of British war preparations. Sanderson, op. cit., implies that there may have been a connection between mobilization and the fear of a military coup d'état in Paris.

⁷⁴See Annual Register, 1898, pp. 169-170.

⁷⁵DDF, XIV, No. 443, Geoffray to Delcassé, 20 October 1898.

⁷⁶Andrew, op. cit., p. 102, quoting Delcassé MSS, 22 October 1898.

⁷⁷BD, I, No. 214, Monson to Salisbury, 21 October 1898.

⁷⁸André Maurois, The Edwardian Era, trans. Hamish Miles (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1933), p. 92, quoting Delcassé MSS, 23 October 1898.

⁷⁹DDF, XIV, No. 412, Delcassé to de Courcel, 4 October 1898; No. 433, de Courcel to Delcassé, 13 October 1898.

⁸⁰DDF, XIV, No. 449, Note du Ministre, 23 October 1898.

- ⁸¹Maurois, op. cit., p. 92, quoting Delcassé MSS, 24 October 1898.
- ⁸²BD, I, No. 216, Sanderson to Salisbury, 25 October 1898.
- ⁸³Sanderson, op. cit., p. 349.
- ⁸⁴DDF, XIV, No. 459, de Courcel to Delcassé, 28 October 1898.
- ⁸⁵J.L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. III: 1895-1900: Empire and World Policy (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1934), pp. 230-232.
- ⁸⁶Ibid., p. 232.
- ⁸⁷J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: the Close of the Nineteenth Century (London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1964), p. 229.
- ⁸⁸BD, I, No. 217, Currie to Salisbury, 26 October 1898.
- ⁸⁹BD, I, No. 220, Sanderson to de Courcel, 28 October 1898.
- ⁹⁰BD, I, No. 221, Monson to Salisbury, 28 October 1898.
- ⁹¹DDF, XIV, No. 464, Delcassé to de Courcel, 29 October 1898.
- ⁹²DDF, XIV, No. 469, Delcassé to de Courcel, 30 October 1898.
- ⁹³BD, I, No. 225, Monson to Salisbury, 30 October 1898.
- ⁹⁴DDF, XIV, No. 476, de Courcel to Delcassé, 1 November 1898.
- ⁹⁵DDF, XIV, No. 477, Delcassé to de Courcel, 2 November 1898.
- ⁹⁶DDF, XIV, No. 478, Delcassé to Lefèvre-Pontalis, 2 November 1898.
- ⁹⁷DDF, XIV, No. 480, Delcassé to de Courcel, 3 November 1898.
- ⁹⁸BD, I, No. 226, Monson to Salisbury, 3 November 1898.

⁹⁹ DDF, XIV, No. 485, Delcassé to de Courcel, 4 November 1898.

¹⁰⁰ DDF, XIV, No. 488, de Courcel to Delcassé, 4 November 1898.

¹⁰¹ DDF, XIV, No. 506, de Courcel to Delcassé, 10 November 1898.

¹⁰² BD, I, No. 240, Salisbury to Monson, 11 January 1899.

¹⁰³ DDF, XV, No. 122, Cambon to Delcassé, 21 March 1899.

¹⁰⁴ Andrew, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in ibid., pp. 117-118; "reprinted in the Paris press on 16 Dec. 1899."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁰⁷ See André Tardieu, France and the Alliances: The Struggle for the Balance of Power (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908).

¹⁰⁸ BD, I, No. 235, Plunkett to Salisbury, 27 November 1898.

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