

**Personal Identity and Purgatory**  
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## **Abstract**

If Purgatory involves just an immaterial soul undergoing a transformation between our death and resurrection, then, as Aquinas recognized, it won't be us in Purgatory. Drawing upon Parfit's ideas about identity not being what matters to us, we explore whether the soul's experience of Purgatory could still be beneficial to it as well as the deceased human who didn't experience the purging yet would possess the purged soul upon resurrection. We also investigate an alternative non-Thomistic hylomorphic account of Purgatory in which humans would survive during the period between death and resurrection in a bodiless form with a soul as their only proper part.

## **I. Introduction**

If we human beings are a hylomorphic composite of soul and matter, then we are each not identical to our soul. If Purgatory involves not an ensouled body but just the soul of the deceased undergoing a transformation between death and resurrection, then none of us shall ever endure Purgatory. If we do not experience Purgatory, can it still be a benefit to us if we are eventually resurrected with the soul that has been purged? Even if we can later reap the rewards from what happens to our soul when we didn't exist between death and resurrection, there arises the question of the fairness of Purgatory being experienced by a being that was not the human being responsible for the character in need of purging. In an attempt to answer this worry, we explore an analogue to Derek Parfit's materialist claim that what matters to a thinking individual is not that it survives into the future, but just that its psychology continues. Adapting Parfit's idea for our theological concerns, we explore the possibility that the soul can benefit from Purgatory

and be concerned with the well-being of the resurrected human being which will ‘inherit’ its purged psychology.

Much more problematic than explaining the soul’s interest in Purgatory and its aftermath, is the presence of a *thinking* soul to which each of us is not identical. This raises a hylomorphic version of what Sydney Shoemaker elsewhere labeled the ‘Problem of Too Many Minds’.<sup>1</sup> That is, if the soul can think without the human being, then prior to their separation at death, why couldn’t the soul think the same thoughts the composite human being was thinking? It is quite odd that the soul could be the subject of thought at one time in its existence, but not at another.

We also consider and express a preference for an alternative hylomorphic account where it is metaphysically possible for us to survive the loss of our body while remaining distinct from but intimately connected to our soul whose ontological status becomes that of being our only proper part. To make this position seem more plausible, we again borrow from a materialist metaphysics of identity. We claim that there is an analogue between our position and the spatial coincidence of two distinct objects that share all their parts. Just as a tree can lose all of its branches and become spatially coincident with but still remain distinct from the trunk despite there not being any physical difference between the two objects, so it is possible that the human being loses his body at death and thus is not *physically* distinguishable from the soul, yet remains distinct from though intimately connected to his soul.

In this paper we attempt to reconcile the Church’s teaching on Purgatory with the hylomorphic account of human beings that the Church traditionally embraces.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, we do discuss how two types of non-doctrinaire Catholics, Christian

materialists, and Cartesian Christians, can account for the metaphysics of Purgatory. We then conclude the paper with an explanation of how the hylomorphic account can co-opt any of the attractions of ‘Catholic materialism’.

## **II. The Orthodox Thomistic View: The Disembodied Soul**

According to the standard Thomistic hylomorphic account of the human being, we are composites of a soul and matter.<sup>3</sup> The soul is not a separate substance from a bodily substance as in the Cartesian account, but the soul informs or configures the matter resulting in a single substance which is a human being. The matter of the human being, construed along the lines of the hylomorphic account, cannot exist apart from the soul as in Cartesian dualism. Each of us is identical to a human being. We are not our souls nor can we become identical to our soul. What is sometimes overlooked in lay discussions of the afterlife is that we cannot depart from our bodies and survive as just a soul. This would involve us becoming identical to a part. The standard logic of identity doesn’t allow a thing to become identical to what was earlier just a part of it.<sup>4</sup> Aquinas realized this when he wrote *Anima mea non est ego* (I am not my soul).<sup>5</sup> With the resurrection of the body, the human being is restored as the soul is reunited with matter.

So if Purgatory occurs after death and prior to resurrection, it will not be you being purged. This follows from both the Catholic teaching on Purgatory and the Church’s statements on the hylomorphic nature of the human person put forth most notably by Aquinas. Purgatory is, in most cases, reserved for the souls of those who ‘die in God’s grace and friendship but (are) still imperfectly purified’.<sup>6</sup> Souls that are in need of purification undergo a period of transformation prior to their presentation before God. This purification is necessary due to transgressions against God during one’s earthly life.

Given that it is just a part of you that undergoes a process of purification or purgation for the sins committed by you, a human being, one question that arises is what good is it that a soul with which you are not identical is purged? If you are not your soul, as Aquinas wrote, why should you care about what happens to your soul? Any concern can't be standard prudential or altruistic concern. And if you do care, how are you benefited by what happens to a soul with which you are not identical? Anything the soul goes through in Purgatory, you do not.

Perhaps one could claim that the soul's experience of an existence free of the turmoil produced by one's body-based passions and drives can be a useful lesson to the later resurrected human being.<sup>7</sup> That is, awareness of what a purer and more virtuous existence could be like could function as an ideal to guide later behavior. But this awareness can't be recollection. The resurrected human being cannot recall the experiences of the soul because one cannot have some other entity's memories. One can only recall one's own memories.<sup>8</sup> So we have to instead speak of the resurrected person having quasi-memories as a result of possessing the soul. Quasi-memories, are memory-like experiences that don't entail the possessor is recalling his own experiences. The phenomenology of quasi-memories is that one is recalling one's past, but there is no logical necessity that it is the case. One's quasi-memories could come about by brainwashing, power of suggestion, futuristic surgical brain implants, the cerebrum transplants that philosophers of personal identity so often envisage, or the acquisition of a soul that had existed between one's death and resurrection. Quasi-memories were most famously employed in the personal identity literature by Parfit to explain away how one could have a recollection-like experience of something that one didn't actually earlier

experience.<sup>9</sup> For example, if the person's brain fissioned and each of the resulting hemispheres were planted in an empty skull of another body, the resulting persons would each think they did what the pre-fissioned person did though neither would be identical to the that earlier person. So the hylomorphic annexation of quasi-memories would involve a soul after resurrection, informing matter and the resulting human being quasi-recalling the peace and control it earlier experienced when free from 'bodily eruptions'.

This 'theologizing' of Parfit may have some appeal to the reader. But let's assume that Purgatory is not the most pleasant experience. It can be rather difficult to work through one's vices and guilt. And according to Aquinas, 'the purifying of the soul by the punishment of Purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory'.<sup>10</sup> Since the soul is not the subject or agent of those past experiences, the question of fairness arises. Why should one entity (the soul in Purgatory) be burdened as a result of the choices of another entity (the earlier living human being)? Nevertheless, perhaps we can borrow again from the materialist metaphysics of Parfit. The fissioning of the upper brain and transplant of the hemispheres will result in people that have the character of the earlier beings. So they will have the vices of the earlier person. While they do not *deserve* to suffer any trials on retributionist grounds, they could benefit if Purgatory is construed as being more akin to reform than retribution.

Not only can the soul benefit from the purging of traits it is not responsible for, but it can be concerned with its thinking descendent, the resurrected human being.<sup>11</sup> As Parfit argued, in ordinary survival what matters is that our psychology continues, even if we are not identical to the later subject of that psychology.<sup>12</sup> It isn't usually the case that what matters to us and our identity diverge; standardly, any being with one's memories,

desires, interests, beliefs in the future will be oneself. But Parfit maintains that one's psychology and one's identity can come apart in thought experiments - and perhaps in some extreme cases of trauma to the brain or even ordinary aging. Less psychological ties to the future, even if the degree is still sufficient to preserve identity, may render the future of less concern to us. That is, there is less in the future of what matters to us.

The Parfitian point can be seen most clearly in cases in which the prospect of fissioning doesn't seem to be as bad as death. Much of what one cares about will continue. To prime the reader for this conclusion, Parfit first asks his readers to consider the case where only one of their cerebral hemispheres survives into the future. Perhaps the other hemisphere suffered a debilitating stroke leaving the person with just one functional cerebral hemisphere, or it was so permeated by cancer that it had to be destroyed surgically to prevent the spread of the disease. The standard response to a situation so described is that if such things were to happen to oneself, one would not go out of existence with the loss of a cerebral hemisphere, but would survive in a maimed and diminished state. But now consider the case of the fissioning and transplantation of the cerebral hemispheres, that is, if both of the reader's two healthy cerebral hemispheres were separated and each placed in the skull of different living human beings that had recently been devoid of functioning cerebrums. Each of the resulting persons would have roughly half of your quasi-memories, beliefs, desires, interests etc. In such a scenario, just as much of your psychology is retained by each of the two resulting persons as would be the case in the previously described situation where one survived with a brain containing only a single functioning cerebrum. It is standardly argued that there is no reason to believe that you survive with one and not the other of the two hemispheres. To

insist that you would be one of the two resulting persons rather than the other is arbitrary given that they each have similar psychological and physical ties to the pre-fission person. One can't be identical to both of the resulting persons, if they are not identical to each other.<sup>13</sup> It appears that you would have fissioned out of existence but what matters, or at least much of what matters to us, our psychology, has gone on. Parfit reasons that such a state of affairs would be as good as, perhaps even preferable, to surviving with just a single hemisphere. (And hardly anyone finds the division to be as bad as death and the destruction of one's brain.) So Parfit concludes that identity is not what matters to us.

Parfit believes the same conclusion can be reached if it is not fission but the fusion of cerebral hemispheres that occurs with a new subject of thought resulting. Fusion is actually a better analogue of what will happen at resurrection.<sup>14</sup> One thinking entity, the soul, will 'transmit' its psychology to another thinking being, the resurrected human being that is composed of the soul and the matter it configures. If one accepts this Parfitian idea and our application of it to the hylomorphic context that is the concern of this paper, then one can account for why the living human being would care about its thinking soul in any subsequent Purgatory and, more importantly, why the soul would care about the human being that it would eventually survive in as just a part. Since our claims are not so much modifications that involve dropping Thomistic elements as providing support from another philosophical tradition, we call this 'The Reinforced Thomistic Account of Purgatory,' or, for short, 'The Reinforced Account'.

### **III. Problems with the Reinforced Account**

We don't believe that readers should settle for the Reinforced Account unless all the canvassed alternatives turn out to have some philosophical-theological problems that



we have not envisaged. But nor do we recommend returning to the original Thomistic account because the problems that we shall discuss with The Reinforced Account also plague the original Thomistic Account. We are somewhat skeptical of the Parfitian claim that identity doesn't matter but won't pursue that suspicion here.<sup>15</sup> The main problem that we want to bring attention to is that if the disembodied soul can think during Purgatory, then it seems that it should have been a thinking entity prior to detaching from the human being at death. The problem that then arises is there seems to be two subjects of thought, one thinker would be the soul and the second thinker would be the human being composed of the soul and the informed matter. This is the hylomorphic version of what Shoemaker has called the Problem of Too Many Minds.

Since the soul and the human being aren't clearly a case of spatially coincident entities, the hylomorphic version of the Problem of Too Many Minds – which we prefer to call the 'Problem of Too Many Thinkers' - is more akin to the problem of embedded thinking entities.<sup>16</sup> The materialist version of that problem is that if the human being can think, and there is an entity within the human being that is composed of all of its parts except say for the left foot, call this creature "*One Foot*," then it would seem *One Foot* should also be capable of thought. Likewise, if the human being can think in virtue of the brain, and the brain is distinct from the human being, why isn't the brain a second thinker? The hylomorphic version of this problem replaces *One Foot* or the brain with the soul. The human being, a composite of matter and soul, is a subject of thought and, at the same time the soul is also the subject of thought. That Aquinas is aware that it is the human being and not the soul that thinks when the soul is embodied is evident in his claim: 'We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more

correct to say that man understands through the soul.’<sup>17</sup> The problem is that Aquinas maintains that one’s soul will exist and think after one ceases to. That is why he claims that it is the soul of St. Peter, not actually St. Peter, that one prays to.

It is no solution to say that the human being thinks ‘in virtue of’ the soul. This is just relabeling the problem, not explaining it away. If the ‘in virtue’ relation is describing a part that couldn’t think on its own, as someone might describe the brainstem, then it might be tenable. But both the Thomistic and the Reinforced Thomistic hylomorphic approaches have the soul thinking in Purgatory.<sup>18</sup> Since the soul can think on its own after ceasing to inform the body, it is difficult to see why it couldn’t think when informing the body. The Thomist owes us an explanation of why its powers are diminished when informing matter. Any ‘solution’ will be further complicated by the Thomistic claim that some cognitive powers of the soul never supervene upon or are facilitated by the body. So it is hard to see how the body could prevent the soul from exercising these powers.<sup>19</sup>

It is no help to claim that the human being thinks derivatively the thoughts of the soul and thus the pair of thinkers is really as harmless as the fact that the car is derivatively noisy because its horn is or that the ball is touching the ground because part of it is.<sup>20</sup> One might maintain that just as there aren’t really two noisemakers, the horn and the car, there aren’t two thoughtmakers, the soul and the human being. One will perhaps just claim that the soul nonderivatively thinks ‘George W. Bush is the President’ and the human being thinks the same thought derivatively because it has a part that does. So just as the ball can have certain properties because its parts touch the ground, the human being can have certain mental properties because a part of it does. Unfortunately,

this move is very problematic. Consider the thought 'I am nonderivatively a human being'. That thought would be true for the human being that thinks it nonderivatively and false for the soul that thinks it derivatively. The same thought would thus be both true and false. Actually, it would have to be two different thoughts since the difference in truth value depends upon the first person pronoun referring differently. Two different referents mean two different contents and propositions and that indicates two different thoughts. The thought refers to the human being when thought by the human being, and refers to the soul when thought by the soul. So the appeal to a derivative thinking human being doesn't seem to avoid the Problem of Too Many Thinkers.

Furthermore, it is quite hard to understand how two self-referring entities, one the part of the other, can even be a coherent state of affairs. It appears that self-reference will be impossible. Anything the soul thinks about itself, the human being will also think about itself. Neither being can refer to just itself so the first person pronoun doesn't have any content for such creatures. And even if self-reference were possible, we don't think self-knowledge could be obtained. What reason would you have for thinking that you were the human being rather than the soul? It isn't possible for the soul to ever think it is the soul and the human being not to have that thought. So there will always be an entity in error even if self-reference occurs - and that seems like a good reason to believe it cannot. Even if it is possible for each entity to refer to itself by the same occurrence of thought, it doesn't seem possible for one to ever *know* whether one is a human being or a soul. So at best, there will self-reference without self-knowledge. A theory of the self that makes self-knowledge impossible is a theory that should be scrapped.

#### **IV. A Non-Thomistic Hylomorphic Account of Purgatory**

Given the above problems of a thinking soul existing in Purgatory after the human being ceases to exist at death, we should look elsewhere for a less counterintuitive hylomorphic ‘solution’ to the problem of Purgatory. Our non-Thomistic but still hylomorphic alternative is to claim that the human being and the soul coexist in Purgatory. That would mean that the human being can exist without a body. It would also mean that the human being has then only a single proper part, a soul. It is a standard mereological notion that something can’t have a single proper part. But we have a good reason to give up mereological assumptions here just as the materialist who believes in spatially coincident objects must give up the position that two things are identical if they have all the same proper parts.<sup>21</sup>

The hylomorphic thinker can analogically extend the materialist’s account of spatially coincident entities. Take Eli Hirsh’s example of the tree and its trunk. They are not identical. The trunk doesn’t have branches, the tree does. Someone could cut off all of the tree’s branches. The tree would survive but a consequence would be that there would not be any atom that was part of the tree that wasn’t also part of the trunk.<sup>22</sup> We expect that not only would most readers say that the tree survived, but they would also insist that the trunk did not go out of existence.<sup>23</sup> Nor would they consider the trunk to have become temporarily identical to the tree. The standard view is that the tree and the trunk are distinct but spatially coincident.<sup>24</sup>

So we are assuming that there can be two material things in the same place at the same time. This is not obviously contrary to Aquinas metaphysical principles; in his *Commentary on De Trinitate of Boethius*, Aquinas states that ‘one can at least mentally conceive of two bodies being in the same place’.<sup>25</sup> We recommend that the hylomorphic

theorist make an analogous move, though the coincidence won't be spatial since there is no matter to be shared. We maintain that the human being can survive the loss of its matter and be related to the soul but not identical to it in the afterlife. This means two distinct immaterial beings intimately related. How are we to construe this relationship? When discussing a Cartesian analogue, Olson says the mind boggles at this possibility and derides it as 'ontological double vision'.<sup>26</sup> But prior to the loss of the human being's matter it was a partly immaterial being standing in a whole/part relationship to a fully immaterial being, its soul. Thomists who extend doubts here that are similar to the dismay that Olson expressed should keep in mind they are committed to the partly material human being having some (free and abstract) thought occur to it in virtue of just its soul and without any contribution from its matter. Aquinas conceives of the soul as an immaterial part of the human being that has powers of thought which are not dependent on corporeal organs for their functions.<sup>27</sup> He insists that 'it is clear from what we have said that some activities of the soul are performed without a bodily organ, such as understanding and willing'.<sup>28</sup> So although the human being has material parts at this time, they are playing no role in such thought. The human being is thinking solely in virtue of its immaterial part. What is occurring is a precursor to Purgatory as we construe it: two beings intimately connected, one the immaterial part of the other, but only the latter thinking.

Readers bothered by our solution should ask themselves if what really is causing their worries is the nature of immaterial beings or the existence of only one proper part. But if so, these are not problems unique to our project. The former should not cause any Christians to abandon our proposal. If religious readers are still wondering how the two

immaterial beings could be linked in a causal manner, the problem may be no more troubling than how one immaterial being can communicate or otherwise causally interact with another. Since most readers of this journal already believe that an immaterial God can pick out an immaterial soul and cause changes in it, and that two immaterial angels can communicate with each other, they are already accepting of two non-spatial immaterial objects interacting.

Readers should not object to our account of Purgatory on the basis of the soul being the only proper part of the human being if they believe that the branchless tree can have the trunk as a proper part and yet possess no other proper part that isn't shared by the trunk. The branchless tree and trunk are atom for atom the same but are not the same object because they have different historical properties and modal properties. These properties are not possessed in virtue of some underlying physical property. It would be a mistake to think of these as dispositional properties like solubility. As E. J. Lowe explains:

Some of an object's modal properties arise not from its material constitution but from its persistence conditions, which determine what sorts of changes the object can and cannot survive – and that is a matter of what kind of object the object is...these modal properties in the objects in question are evidently not to be explained by reference to the properties and relations of the material particles which compose statues and lumps of bronze respectively. Such modal properties are not really empirical properties at all, but rather a priori ones that are grounded in categorical

distinctions of a metaphysical nature. It is an a priori truth that what is required for a lump of bronze to persist over time is for certain bronze particles to be united together for a period of time without any of them being separated from the rest or being replaced by any new particles. Equally, it is an a priori truth that what is required for a statue to persist over time is for sufficiently many material particles – but not necessarily the same material particles – to be united together for a period of time while constantly exhibiting a certain overall shape.<sup>29</sup>

There is no micro-physical difference between the statue and the lump of bronze, or the aggregate of atoms that is spatially coincident with the lump. Yet the aggregate can survive being scattered when that lump cannot. If these properties were to be reduced to or otherwise supervene upon underlying physical properties, then there would indeed be a mystery. But not all properties are so constituted. The aggregate has different properties than the lump in virtue of being an aggregate. It is just the nature of aggregates that is the case. So the trunk's nature is such that it can't become bigger with the addition of branches but the tree can increase its size. That is just the nature of trees and trunks.<sup>30</sup>

We maintain that an analogous story of brute properties and natures will account for the differences between the immaterial soul and the immaterial human being in Purgatory. The soul didn't have the property of acquiring the matter as a part. That was not its nature. The human being did have the property of possessing matter as a part. It could acquire more or less matter, and reacquire its body come resurrection. The human being has a property that the soul doesn't, it can acquire a body as a part, the soul can just

inform a body. The soul doesn't have this in virtue of any material parts. We are suggesting that the hylomorphic theorist should also be able to link two objects and differentiate them without doing so in virtue of their relationship to material dimensions possessed by one and not the other. Thus there aren't in principle new puzzles individuating the two immaterial beings that are coincident but not *spatially* coincident.

Let's now consider the benefits of our non-Thomistic solution. We have established that it is the deceased in Purgatory, not just a part of them. So there is no moral objection to any unpleasantness of Purgatory being deserved by one being and yet experienced by another. Nor do we have to base our argument on the claim that identity isn't what matters. We can keep the notion that identity is what matters to us. It is not just important that our psychology survives into the future, but that *we* survive into the future. Of course, if it is the case that identity doesn't matter, that doesn't hurt our claim that we human beings and our soul and psychology exist in the afterlife prior to the resurrection of our bodies. Finally, our solution avoids the problems of Too Many Thinkers that arise if the soul can think in the afterlife but the human being is a bona fide subject of thought prior to that.

### **V. Cartesian and Materialist Christians**

The Cartesian Catholic can make use of either of the positions of the two hylomorphic accounts discussed in this paper, or opt to defend a third approach. If the Cartesian understands the human being as a composite of two substances, soul and body, then the human being could survive death prior to resurrection as an entity with one proper part, a soul. Or the Cartesian analogue of Parfit's claim that it is not identity that matters to us could be used to explain what benefit it is for us to be resurrected with a



purged soul when it is only our soul that has been transformed in the interim period when we didn't exist. A third Cartesian alternative is to identify the person with the soul.<sup>31</sup> Then it is not at all metaphysically problematic for us to survive in the afterlife for one doesn't have to defend the prima facie puzzling position that there can be in Purgatory two immaterial entities, a human being and a soul, with the latter as the only proper part of the former. Nor does one have to worry about the problem of too many thinkers or the moral quandaries of a soul undergoing processes that are deserved of the human being.

The materialist Catholic, not an oxymoron but certainly not mainstream, needs resurrection to precede Purgatory.<sup>32</sup> Since such a position denies that we are ensouled, it obviously can't accept that we or one of our parts exist in an immaterial state. But there are certain considerations about Purgatory that might cause more trouble for the soul theorist than the materialist Catholic. For starters, the Nicene Creed states the Lord will return to judge the living and the dead. So there will be people alive when Jesus returns and they, we assume, will need to undergo the process of purgation. Since even the soul theorist is going to be committed to some people apparently experiencing Purgatory embodied, it doesn't seem an implausible conjecture that all of us do so.

A second consideration making the materialist Christian's account of post-resurrection more plausible is that much of our psychology that needs to be purified is a result of our bodily-based appetites. A bodiless experience of Purgatory seems not to be the best way to bring about the desired transformation. We have already explored some of these problems when we considered that Purgatory would not involve us but instead just our soul. But even if the matterless human being experiences Purgatory with a soul as its only proper part, there are similar worries about the purifying transformation

occurring without one's body undergoing the experience. So much of the need for Purgatory is a result of our physical drives. It is quite odd that the physical source of our vices is not present when we purge ourselves of these flaws. The classical conception of virtue is possession of the right amount of desire. This mean is acquired. The desires must exist to be appropriately modified. If Purgatory involves anything like the inculcation of virtue, then the body may be necessary.

Of course, there are many reasons why the Catholic will resist a materialist account of the human person. To what extent a materialist account of a Christian person can be defended or debunked is not our concern in this paper. But we do think it best to end by noting that if one finds the fore-mentioned features of a materialist Purgatory attractive, hylomorphic theorists can co-opt those advantages. There is nothing in the hylomorphic account that prohibits them from defending a post-resurrection account of Purgatory. The resurrected body can be informed by an immaterial soul and transformed by the experience of Purgatory. The inculcation of virtue (or however what happens in Purgatory should be described) need not occur without the body. And the body can be understood in the hylomorphic manner as matter configured by the soul.

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<sup>1</sup> Sydney Shoemaker 'Self, Body and Coincidence', *Aristotelian Society Supplement*, (1999), 287-306, at 291.

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<sup>2</sup> The Catechism tells us that ‘the union of body and soul is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the ‘form’ of the body: i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body. Spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united but rather their union forms a single nature.’ *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (New York: Random House, 1995), 365.

<sup>3</sup> See Aquinas *Being and Essence*, Ch. II; *Summa Theologica* I q. 75; q. 76.

<sup>4</sup> Perhaps people are misled by the materialist phenomena where people become smaller and composed of the same objects that earlier composed a part of them. But this should probably be interpreted as the person became spatially coincident with what was before a proper part. This is by no means the only description of the phenomena, but it is the most common and the one we endorse.

<sup>5</sup> *Commentary on St. Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians*, 15: 17-19, found in *Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings*, edited by Timothy McDermott, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 192-193.

<sup>6</sup> Pope John Paul II, in a General Audience of 1999, described Purgatory as a ‘state and not a place’ and so applies to the souls of the living as well as the dead.

<sup>7</sup> This idea was suggested to us by Todd Bindig.

<sup>8</sup> The conceptual ties between memory and identity was the basis of Butler’s critique of Locke’s memory criterion for identity. However, it has been claimed that philosophers wrongly resort to a ‘conventionalist sulk’ rather than admit that some recollections are not trustworthy. This charge has been leveled by Peter Geach *God and the Soul* (South Bend: Saint Augustine Press, 1969), 11.

<sup>9</sup> Derek Parfit *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 220.

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<sup>10</sup> Aquinas *Summa Theologica*, XP q. 71 a.6.

<sup>11</sup> This concern can be described as ‘quasi-prudential concern’ for the same reason earlier gave for quasi-memories.

<sup>12</sup> See Parfit *Reasons and Persons*, 282-306. For a more extensive and recent account of the thesis that it is not identity that matters to us, see Jeff McMahan *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>13</sup> One might manipulate the classical logic of identity and argue that the two post-transplant persons were once identical to each other, but are no longer. See Andre Gallois *Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change and Sameness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Or one might adopt a Lewisian account of two four-dimensional worms sharing a person stage prior to fissioning. A related and perhaps even more counterintuitive approach is to speak of a single short-lived person stage that is not part of a person worm but instead has two temporal counterparts. This approach can be found in Ted Sider *Four-Dimensionalism: The Ontology of Persistence and Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 188-208.

<sup>14</sup> Resurrection is not exactly analogous to Parfitian fusion. Resurrection doesn’t involve the soul ceasing to exist but becoming once again a part of a human being as that is a composite of soul and matter. Psychological fusion, on the other hands, involves two thinking beings going out of existence and a third emerging with the mental life produced by elements of both its precursors. Parfit conjectures that the combination of different desires, characteristics and different intentions might result in ‘Some of these being compatible. These can coexist in the one resulting person. Some will be incompatible.

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These, if of equal strength, can cancel out, and if of different strengths, the stronger can be made weaker.’ ‘Personal Identity’, *Philosophical Review*, 80, (1971), 3-27, at 18.

<sup>15</sup> For doubts about the Parfitian claim see Peter Unger *Identity, Consciousness and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 211-254.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Unger ‘The Mental Problems of the Many’, *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Aquinas, ST 1 q. 75 a.3

<sup>18</sup> The materialist might even deny that the whole brain (cerebrum, lower brain and brainstem) could ever think, i.e., be a subject of thought. Perhaps the materialist would argue that even if the rest of the body was cut away from the brain, it doesn’t think. Instead it constitutes a person who thinks. For such an account, see Lynne Rudder Baker *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The Thomist doesn’t have that luxury, denying thought to the soul as the materialist denies it to the brain, since he is committed to the disembodied soul thinking in the afterlife.

<sup>19</sup> See notes 27 and 28.

<sup>20</sup> These examples are respectively from Jeff McMahan’s *The Ethics of Killing* and Ingmar Persson ‘Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms’, *Dialogue* 38 (1999) 519-533. For a critique of McMahan and Persson, see David B. Hershenov ‘Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms’, *Theoria*, 71 ( 2005), 29-37.

<sup>21</sup> For an account of what mereological axioms must be given up see Judith Thomson ‘The Statue and the Clay’, *Nous*, 32, 1998,149-173, and Lynne Baker *Reasons and Persons*, 179-185.

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<sup>22</sup> We are ignoring the roots being part of the tree but not the trunk. If the reader is bothered by that he can always use an example of the car losing a bumper and coming to be spatially coincident with an object that was before but a proper part.

<sup>23</sup> The replacement of the trunk has been defended by Michael Burke ‘Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relationship Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals and Persistence Conditions’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LIV (1994), 591-624.

<sup>24</sup> Burke even labels the positing of spatially coincident entities the “standard account” given the popularity amongst philosophers. ‘Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account’, *Analysis*, 52 (1992), 12-17, at 12-13.

<sup>25</sup> Aquinas, St. Thomas (1986). *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, Questions I-IV of the Commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, trans. by Armand Maurer. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.) q. 4 a. 3. Aquinas has in mind the Biblical account of the resurrected Jesus passing through the wall of the upper room to greet the Apostles.

<sup>26</sup> Olson, Eric. In K. Corcoran (ed.) *Soul, Body, and Survival*, (Cornell University Press, 2001), 73-88.

<sup>27</sup> One reason for this claim is that the object of thought is immaterial, and so there must be an immaterial part to which the power of thought can be attributed. Aquinas writes: ‘If the intellect were corporeal, its activities would not reach beyond the order of bodies. So it would understand only bodies. But this is patently false. For we understand many things that are not bodies. Therefore the intellect is not corporeal.’ Aquinas *Summa Contra Gentiles* II 49. Because the intellect is incorporeal, the rational soul, of which the

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intellect is a power, is also said to be immaterial. So that means that the powers of the soul and the human being aren't all a result of matter being configured.

<sup>28</sup> Aquinas *Summa Theologica* I q. 77 a.5

<sup>29</sup> E. J. Lowe *A Survey of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 70.

<sup>30</sup> For a related discussion of brute natures and persistence conditions see Lynne Baker *Persons and Bodies* 187 and E.J. Lowe *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 174-189.

<sup>31</sup> There is some evidence that Descartes' official line is that the human being is identical to the soul and doesn't possess a body as a part but stands in an intimate relationship with the soul. But for reasons to interpret the human being as a composite see Eric Olson 'A Composite of Two Substances' at 73-74.

<sup>32</sup> Our materialist Christian is not denying the existence of immaterial beings, just denying that we are such creatures. For an example of a Christian materialist, see Peter van Inwagen 'Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?' *Faith and Philosophy*, 12 (1995) 475-488.