Study Guide for the Second Examination

The second examination will last about 90 minutes. It will cover only the material since the first examination. It will consist of some mixture of (1) True/False questions, (2) multiple choice questions, (3) short answer questions, (5) longer questions in which I will ask you to explain and evaluate an argument that I present to you. You should distinguish, as before, between theories (for instance, the Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names) and arguments (for instance, the Argument from Variability of Mental Images). See the study guide for the first examination.

1. Define ‘Argument A is valid’ and ‘Argument A is sound’. Present an example of an argument that is valid but not sound (at least one of its premises should be obviously false). Present an argument that is invalid but has all obviously true premises.

2. Present the Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names (DT).

3. Present, explain, and evaluate (PEE) Kripke’s modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments against the DT. Define or otherwise explain the term ‘rigid designator’.

4. Present the Causal Theory of Reference for proper names. Discuss some apparent problems for it (e.g., ‘Madagascar’, ‘Santa Claus’, ‘Neptune’, ‘Newman-1’, names for abstract objects, such as the name ‘5’ for the number 5).

5. Present the Naive Theory of Meaning, and (briefly) present the Fregean objections to it. Discuss how the naive theorist might respond, given the seeming failure of descriptivist theories.

6. Define or otherwise explain the following terms: performative sentence, constative sentence. Give examples of the latter two.

7. Explain why Austin thought that performative sentences are neither true nor false.

8. Describe the ‘hereby’ test for distinguishing performative from constative sentences. Describe the problems that sentences of the form “Nay” and “I state that S” raise for this test.

9. Define or otherwise explain the following terms: locutionary act, illocutionary act, perlocutionary act. Give at least three examples each of the latter two types of act. Describe a few ways in which the latter two types of acts may be distinguished (e.g., one can perform a perlocutionary act without performing a locutionary act, but not so for an illocutionary act, and similar such matters.)

10. Define or otherwise define the terms ‘conventional illocutionary act’ and ‘communicative illocutionary act’. Describe the relation between the latter and expression of attitudes.

11. Give an example of a sentence of the form ‘I promise that I will do A’. Present a view according to which a person who utters this sentence typically performs (at least) two illocutionary acts, promising and stating. Describe the proposition that is promised and the proposition that is stated. Describe the conditions under which the stated proposition is true and point out their unusual feature (i.e., that the stated proposition is true in virtue of the its being stated with the
right intentions). Consider objections to this sort of analysis.

12. Consider an utterance of ‘I hereby state that I have never been a member of the Communist Party’ by someone who has been. Describe a view according to which this utterance is sufficient for two (illocutionary) acts of stating. Describe the propositions stated and their truth values. Describe how such a person might be guilty of perjury.

14. Define or otherwise explain the following terms: implicate, implicatum, implicature.

15. State the Cooperative Principle, and the four Maxims. Describe how Grice would explain the implicatures that occur in various examples.

16. Present Grice’s general schema for the sort of reasoning that a hearer undergoes in calculating an implicature. Present Grice’s analysis of conversational implicature. Give an example in which an implicature is canceled.

17. Describe the difference between generalized and particularized conversational implicatures. Give examples of each. Describe why someone might think that ‘and’ is ambiguous. (Use examples such as ‘John got up and put on his pants’, ‘All dogs are mammals and all snakes are reptiles’. ) Explain how Grice would use general conversational implicatures to argue against ambiguity.

18. Present Grice’s first analysis of speaker meaning. (That is, his first analysis of the form “S meant that p by uttering x iff: . . .”). Describe an example that seems to show that it is incorrect, and explain why. Do the same for Grice’s second analysis.

19. Present and explain Grice’s *final* analysis of speaker meaning. Present examples which seem to show that the analysis does not provide necessary conditions for speaker meaning, e.g., to show that no audience is necessary, or no intention to cause belief in an audience is necessary, and so on. Consider how Grice might respond to these counterexamples.

20. Present Grice’s analysis of expression meaning. Explain and discuss the issues that un-uttered sentences raise for this analysis.

21. State Lewis’s definitions of ‘truthful in language L’ and ‘trusting in language L’. Present Lewis’s analysis of ‘Language L is used by population P’. (You do not need to explain the notion of a convention.)

22. Let P be the population of students who are currently enrolled in Philosophy of Language at UR. Consider the following argument: “Most sentences of English are never uttered by members of P. So Lewis’s theory says that members of P are not truthful in English, and therefore his theory entails that English is not used by population P”. How would Lewis respond to this objection?

23. Are members of our class are trusting in Japanese? Why or why not?

24. Present an argument that (i) claims that members of our class are not trusting in English, and (ii) concludes that Lewis’s analysis is incorrect. Explain and evaluate it. Discuss how Lewis might respond (e.g., how he might criticize the argument or revise his theory).