Economic Strength in Cooperative Games

Technical Report
1998


William J. Willick

and
Wayne F. Bialas

The Paper (265K)

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Abstract

This paper revisits the concept of power indices to evaluate the economic strength of individual players in a characteristic function game. A strength index is axiomatically derived and is shown to be uniquely defined. The economic strength index satisfies individual rationality for all characteristic function games, including games which are not superadditive. Furthermore, a relationship between the index and the core solution concept is illustrated.

Key words: game theory, power index, cooperative games

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