A Family of Values for
n-Person Cooperative Games


Technical Report
1998

Chien-Hsin Harris Yang
and
Wayne F. Bialas

The Paper (215K) May 31, 1998. (Revised March 22, 2001)

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Abstract

A family of solution values is derived for n-person, cooperative, transferable utility games by relaxing the Axiom of Efficiency for the Shapley value. The Shapley value is shown to always be a member of this collection. In a special case, a geometric relationship between this family and the Shapley value is presented. Also, income redistribution and the role of dummy players in cooperative games is examined.

Key words: game theory, cooperative games, Shapley value

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