A Puzzle about the Demands of Morality

How demanding is morality? Utilitarianism and many of its consequentialist cousins are frequently attacked for being morally too demanding. They would seem to command a financially comfortable individual in one of the developed countries to sacrifice most of his wealth to fight the life- threatening hunger and diseases of the denizens of the poorer nations. It is maintained by many people that any theory that reaches such a counterintuitive conclusion cannot be right. However, Peter Unger has put forth a non-utilitarian argument that our basic moral values are actually as morally demanding as the much criticized utilitarian implications.[1] Unger argues that once the distortional features that blind us to our basic moral values are removed, it turns out that our intuitive moral commitments are very demanding. Well crafted thought experiments can reveal that "deep down" we already believe that we must sacrifice most of our wealth for others who are less fortunate as they face disease, famine and early death. So it is not an implication of a theoretical commitment as with utilitarianism and its consequentialist kin, but our own "gut reactions," i.e., our pre-theoretical moral intuitions which reveal that we are morally compelled to sacrifice much of our wealth and probably much of our happiness in order to bring relief to those under the threat of death.

An Unger-like thought experiment will be presented in which a person must choose whether to sacrifice his entire life's savings to save just one life. Most readers will probably respond to the described situation that the person must abandon virtually all of the wealth he has earned over the years. Thus it would seem to follow that if a person must do so much to save just one life, then he certainly should do as much to save many more lives. Therefore, it would seem that Unger is right to insist that one must donate throughout one's money-making years most of one's earnings to lifesaving organizations like Unicef and Oxfam. We must be moral saints throughout our lives. However, this conclusion may be premature. It is possible to construct a second thought experiment, similar to the

first, where to save a single life one would have to work one's entire career earning merely enough to keep oneself physically and mentally healthy enough to continue to function in the lifesaving role. But this second scenario elicits the contrary intuition that morality doesn't demand great sacrifices. How can two thought experiments which allegedly involve the same morally relevant features elicit different responses? Are our responses inconsistent due to a distortional feature in one of the two thought experiments which blinds us from seeing that the scenario should be treated like the other? Perhaps not. The conclusion of this paper is that our divergent intuitions are defensible for there is a morally relevant feature that distinguishes the two scenarios. This has to do with whether equal deprivations of time, efforts and money occur in a person's past or future. These considerations will also enable us to make a case for morality being very demanding, much more so than commonsense morality maintains, but not as demanding as Unger and certain versions of consequentialism insist.

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The first thought experiment involves a man who has saved almost every penny he has earned from forty years of work beginning when he was twenty. He hates his tedious job, but since the pay is good, he will be able to save a lot of money. He has lived an ascetic life in order to accumulate such a nest egg. He has spent only the bare minimum on housing, food and clothing and other essentials. He has done all of this in order that he may have the most amazing retirement. After working forty years and becoming eligible for an early retirement at sixty, he boards a luxury liner with all his savings and sets sail for Europe where he intends to spend his retirement. Unfortunately, the boat sinks. But our man, let's call him "Smith," manages to get on the one and only surviving lifeboat with all his savings which are in the form of gold and silver coins, rare jewels, and bundles of cash and certificates exchangeable for currency but irreplaceable. Alone on the raft with all his life savings, Smith spots

someone drowning from a different shipwreck.[2] Alas, there is not room on the lifeboat for the drowning person and Smith's considerable life savings. If Smith saves the person in the water, he will have to drop overboard all the wealth he has accumulated in his life. The intuition of most people surveyed is that Smith must push his small fortune into the seas from which it will never be retrieved, and then pull the drowning man on board. It would be very wrong of Smith to let the man drown in order to preserve his wealth.

So morality demands that Smith sacrifice his lifetime of savings in order to save just one person. This means, in a sense, that Smith will have virtually worked for free his entire life. Remember, he spent just the bare minimum to keep himself dressed, healthy and housed in order that he would have the greatest of retirements. Also keep in mind that his wealth will be irreversibly lost. Some of it will be scattered by the currents, the paper part of it will be dissolved, while the valuable metals and jewels will sink to irretrievable depths. Furthermore, not a single thing that he has ever acquired is secured or insured by any financial institution. And this means that for the remainder of Smith's life, he will be restored to the ascetic living conditions he knew while saving for forty years, although now it wouldn't be by choice.[3] Readers should imagine that Smith is too old and unskilled in the ways of the new economy to land a good paying job. And the individual saved will not be able to compensate him for the rescued person is poor, already in debt, and without marketable talents. Despite this recognition of what a disaster it is for Smith, we still feel that he must sacrifice all to save just one life.[4]

So our reaction is that Smith must work, in a sense, for free his whole life and never enjoy a cent of his earnings just to save one life.[5] Now that is a demanding view of morality! But it seems to be the view of most of us. Or is it? The following thought experiment provokes the contrary response.

Imagine Jones who is the world's most talented surgeon. An obviously gravely ill person comes up to him and truthfully informs him that he has a condition that is fatal and that Jones is the only doctor who has the skill to perform the surgical procedures necessary to keep him alive for the next forty years. Not only is what he says true, but Jones can verify it: the pale, gaunt, sickly man beseeching him will definitely die without his help. But this lifesaving procedure is not a one day operation. In fact, this procedure has to be done everyday. And the time spent preparing for this procedure and the time it takes to do the procedure will take up the entire work day. If Jones, the surgeon, consents to these life saving operations, it will mean eight hours every day, five days a week, over fifty weeks a year for forty years he will be caring for this person and no other patients. But there is a point to the surgery for the patient will still have a life worth living because he sleeps during the 8 hour operation and miraculously lives a normal life during the rest of the day. As soon as the procedure ends, he can leave the hospital and spend the next sixteen hours with his family, friends or engage in virtually any other normally rewarding pursuit.

And since this is a thought experiment, we can stipulate some other features to make this example even more similar to Smith's dilemma in the lifeboat. The ill man in need of Jones' services is too poor to offer much remuneration. In fact, he can pay Jones no more than Smith spent his whole working life on minimal food, clothing and shelter. Also, the patient doesn't have any medical insurance to pay the normal fees for Jones' services. On top of all this, the government will not pick up his tab. And no one else in Jones' selfish society will offer any compensation for his efforts. Furthermore, it is impossible for Jones to teach anyone else how to perform this medical procedure. But since there is a surplus of doctors, if Jones' confines himself to treating just this one patient with his rare, in fact, unique life threatening condition, this would not lead to any loss of life due to other

people being deprived of Jones' more routine medical services. Jones knows all of this with about as much certainty as anyone can know anything empirically about their society. So Jones will be forced to live the rather ascetic life that Smith did without even accumulating a nest egg for his retirement.

But is Jones morally compelled to work forty years, virtually for free, in order to save this one patient? It doesn't seem so. One doesn't have to sacrifice for decades all of one's working hours and earnings to save a single life. It is unfortunate that the man will die, and Jones would be a saint if he did save him, but the ill person has no right which will be violated if Jones doesn't come to his aid. But what is the difference between the surgery case and that of Smith on the lifeboat? Both involve working forty years for (virtually) free to save just one life. Why is it that we intuitively demand the sacrifice in one case but not the other? More importantly, what is the morally relevant feature that determines whether we have the right to refuse to save one man or lack such an entitlement? It would appear that if morality demands Smith save the drowning person then it should also demand that Jones save the patient with his incomparable surgical skills. Likewise, if Jones is morally justified in refusing the life of daily surgery on the one impoverished man, then it should also be, contrary to our initial intuition, that Smith is entitled to let the man drown rather than sacrifice his life's earnings and dreams for retirement.

It seems there is a stalemate. How can readers hold onto their intuition in the case of Smith that morality is extremely demanding *and* preserve their intuition in the second thought experiment that morality does not demand such a sacrifice? Before offering a solution, five alleged distinctions between the two cases will be discussed. None of these rather plausible-seeming claims provide the sought after solution.

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1) It might be thought that the morally relevant difference between the sinking and the surgery involves the time and duration of the morally good deed. The surgeon's duty will last for years - all of his future working days while Smith's duty is just a few moments. But does this make a moral difference? It doesn't seem to, for although we are asking one man to be a saint for a much longer duration, the *burdens* of sainthood are just as time consuming. It is just that one suffers *while* he does what morality (perhaps) demands, while the other suffers as a *result* of what morality (perhaps) demands.

2) An additional factor that might be thought morally significant is that it seems more unfair to the surgeon than to Smith to have such a burden placed upon him and no one else. The reason for this is that Smith is in a situation where no one else can share his burden. Only he can save the drowning man and he has to do so by giving up all his savings. Yet despite the earlier stipulation that only one person could perform the operations, perhaps readers can't sincerely imagine that just a single doctor is capable of providing the lifesaving surgery. Thus they can't help but think it is unfair that no other surgeons make a sacrifice relieving the original surgeon (the reader) of some of his or her burdens. However, I believe we can vividly imagine this fact about an exclusive savior. I think that I have done so. Anyway, to offset this, just imagine that there are other people on *other* lifeboats which are not filled to capacity who are refusing for selfish reasons to pick up the drowner. Does this excuse Smith? Hardly. It may make it psychologically easier for Smith not to help, but it doesn't make it any more ethically acceptable. While in such cases it is certainly unfair that only Smith will have his interests set back, this does not permit him to refuse to provide the costly, life-saving aid. Most of us have the strongest intuition that he must still undertake the rescue.

3) But a different form of unfairness may still be affecting us. This unfairness is not due to the absence of other doctors sharing the workload, but is due to the fact that no one else will *financially compensate* the person who does such surgery. Despite the stipulation that insurers wouldn't reimburse such a burdened doctor, it is hard to believe that the government or the rest of society can't. Maybe many readers are harboring an implicit assumption that society can offset the surgeon's financial burdens. Although it was stipulated that the society wouldn't or couldn't, this may be hard to believe and truly take to heart.

Or even if it is taken to heart, perhaps the effects of the unshared, uncompensated duty still seem so unfair that they excuse one from performing such surgery. Readers may be assuming that a doctor shouldn't have to do so much more than anyone else. It might be that the intuitions operating here are somewhat like those behind a form of rule utilitarianism. Perhaps readers feel that everyone must do only as much as would be needed to save lives if everyone equally contributed to the lifesaving endeavors.[6] So if everyone did their fair share, each of us would only have to do so much. And thus the surgeon only has to contribute (in the sense of a financial loss) what would be an effective and fair share if everyone contributed. Since he is being asked to do much more than his fair share on the just-mentioned conception of justice, we don't condemn him for refusing.

However, I think that after some reflection, people would not (still) claim that such a view is morally justified - though a lingering feeling of unfairness might still exert a strong psychological pull. To see why such a view is unwarranted, consider the possibility that everyone (on land) could take up a collection and compensate Smith for what he lost at sea when he saved the other man. But let's also assume that while the public could and should do this, they won't. And Smith is well aware that everyone could and should share the costs of saving the innocent man, but wouldn't. Does this excuse

Smith from the lifesaving act? Not any more than he was excused by other people in life boats not coming to the aid of the drowning person. Most readers will probably still insist that he has to abandon his wealth in order to save the drowning man despite the unfairness of the situation. So it isn't likely that any of the above-mentioned considerations of fairness and "cooperative beneficence" can morally distinguish our reactions to the two thought experiments.

4) Then could it be that we just can imagine more *vividly* the plight and suffering of the drowning person than that of the ill person who needs Jones' surgical skills? If so, does our response when the needs and desperation of the drowner are so salient better reflect our deepest moral commitments? This is the argument that Peter Unger would make.[7] Should we alter our judgment in the surgery case and bring it in line with that of the drowning scenario in which the needs were allegedly more conspicuous? It seems doubtful. Remember, the patient personally pleads his case to Jones and was described as appearing pale, gaunt and gravely ill to the surgeon.

5) Is what distinguishes the cases that the surgeon knew he would never be compensated while Smith wasn't plagued with the same knowledge of the financial futility of his labor? Smith's ignorance of his future thus would make it psychologically easier for him than the surgeon to work without ever getting to enjoy any significant compensation. So since the psychological burden is greater for the surgeon, the two thought experiments are disanalogous and thus our divergent responses to them are justified. Hence, there is a reason to declare that it is morally permissible for the surgeon to refuse to devote his entire life to the poor patient but Smith, on the other hand, must give up his fortune to save a life.

However, this difference in misery can be offset by a slight variation of the lifeboat thought experiment. These alterations will enable readers to see that knowledge of the financial futility of the

labor doesn't possess the moral significance to distinguish the two cases. Imagine an illegal alien laborer who is exploited in the workplace all his life. He has a life worth living, just as does the surgeon treating the single patient, but no expectation whatsoever of a *good* life in the future which perhaps sustained Smith - and made his life appear more bearable to us than that of the surgeon. So the illegal alien is psychologically in the surgeon's situation. But after forty years of exploitation, laws change or become interpreted and enforced in a different way so that much to the surprise of the illegal alien, a class action lawsuit is brought against his exploitative employers. His bosses lose the lawsuit and he is given compensation equivalent to Smith's life savings; but as an illegal alien he must leave the country, which he was going to do anyway now that he is rich. He takes his small fortune and gets on a boat sailing for his homeland, but through bad luck finds himself in a scenario identical to Smith's, where he is on a small lifeboat with all his money and a drowning man nearby. Wouldn't most people's reactions here be the same as they were in Smith's case? It seems that the illegal alien must save the drowning man at the expense of the unexpected wealth he obtained as compensation for a lifetime of exploitation. So we can now see that even though Smith's self-denial wasn't as harsh an experience as that of Jones because the former expected throughout his working years to enjoy a wonderful retirement, this is not the reason why Smith must throw overboard a lifetime of earnings but Jones does not have to give up the same.

Maybe the truth of the matter is that each of the differences between the two cases was having a small effect on our responses. Although taken in isolation, none of the features distinguishing the two cases were compelling, but taken all together, they are not only psychologically decisive, but morally so. However, I just don't have much confidence in this hypothesis. But perhaps this should be expected for it is not the type of hypothesis that one can ever be very confident in because it depends upon

aggregating imperceptible or nearly imperceptible moral differences.

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Perhaps this stalemate reveals that the appeal to our intuitive responses to real and counterfactual scenarios is a poor way to do moral philosophy. I can't really defend the approach followed here in any detail. But let me just say now that the alternative is not clear. Do theorists who oppose this method instead believe we should appeal to normative theories like Kantianism or Consequentialism? But is their relative attractiveness independent of intuitions? Isn't it the counterintuitive consequences of consequentialism (punishing the innocent, taking organs from one to save five, the demands of being a full- time "do-gooder"etc.) that drive people from this theory? And isn't it the counterintuitive results of, for example, Kant's universal law formula of the Categorical Imperative (its formal structure allowing some intuitively immoral maxims to pass the test of the Categorical Imperative while prohibiting some intuitively amoral maxims) which most often undermines the approach in the eyes of its critics? Furthermore, don't those who favor either normative theory do so in good part because it meshes with most of their intuitions? Can an intuition-free appeal to the nature of man (Kantian or otherwise) help us with ethical dilemmas? Even if Kant's conception of man's Humanity and the respect that we are commanded to show rational beings is correct, while it may provide support for deontological constraints and shed some light on why killing is worse than letting die,[8] I don't think it is going to help in this paper's scenario where we are confronted with different reactions to a pair of cases in which the question is whether to let someone die. Complicating matters is that Kant discusses a duty to further the ends of those rational beings who are ends in themselves. It isn't clear how demanding this duty is.[9] What other aspects of philosophy that don't appeal to intuitions can we turn to? Will the proper resolution of debates about determinism or

personal identity help us here? It is doubtful. So it is not at all clear what the critics of appeals to the methods of cases and intuitions suggest we instead do to resolve this puzzle about the demands of morality.

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Perhaps a minority of readers will find some of the five factors discussed above to be morally and/or psychologically relevant in ways that were overlooked. If such readers do, one of the following pair of alternatives is likely to be their conclusion. First, it may be that a person has a duty to save both men in the two scenarios. This would mean that there were distortional features operating in the surgeon's case. Secondly, it may be held that people are permitted to choose to save neither. That is, it would be surperogatory if they did save the men, but it is not morally demanded of them. This result would suggest that the rest of us were misled by some morally irrelevant factor(s) in the lifeboat case. But most readers will probably not be sympathetic to either strategy. They would like an account that leaves their intuitive responses intact, i.e., one can allow the patient to die but must save the drowning man.

Could it be that what really motivates our different reactions is that we don't fully appreciate the suffering of Smith to be as great as that of Jones? Since the years of hard work are behind Smith, is it that we are not vicariously envisioning just what is at stake in saving the man by sacrificing so much money? If all the hard work is too far from the front of our minds when we react to Smith's dilemma, perhaps our *immediate* gut reaction should *not* be trusted. Maybe *this* failure of imagination is a morally irrelevant distortional feature and thus we are lured into believing one has a duty when in fact one doesn't. If this is indeed the case, then our intuitive response in the surgery thought experiment is the one that should be preserved and extended to Smith's situation.

On the other hand, perhaps a life with burdens in the past is not even experienced by the person who has led that life to be as bad as one with the same burdens experienced in the future. So even though there are two equal amounts of uncompensated labor, the disappointments would not be experienced by those living them as equally bad. This is the view that I will endorse to explain and justify our different intuitions. There is something worse about knowing that one's future labor will be financially fruitless than knowing that one's past labors have turned out to be financially all for nought. Thus the reason for the different reactions to the two thought experiments is not because of a failure on our part as observers to appreciate past burdens but is due to the fact that the past burdens, which in a sense go uncompensated because of the later loss in lifeboat-like scenarios, are really experienced by those who undergo them as *not* being as bad as future uncompensated burdens. There is an asymmetry not just in the readers' perceptions of others' suffering but in the very experience of the two people suffering. I suspect that the reason for the readers' responses is that they have put themselves in the places of Smith and Jones and have accurately determined that the latter's life, ceteris paribus, is worse. Human Psychology is such that the prospect of a bad future is worse than a futile past even though at the end of such lives there would have been an equal amount of years of unpaid labor.

Is it irrational to dislike one alternative more than the other? Is it a mistake to prefer to be Smith on the lifeboat than Jones in the hospital? Could it be that one's preference at the moment a choice is made to save someone is not a reliable guide to which is a worse life? A negative response to all three questions is justified if the asymmetrical reaction is the result of what is just a truth about our natures and our attitudes to well-being and time. The proper perspective to take to the two thought experiments is that of the person making the decision at that time. It is much more distressing to envision one's future labor being pointless (in terms of self-interest) than one's past. An unrewarding

future is worse than an unrewarding past even if the lack of rewards evens out across one's life. Perhaps this is just because people tend to envision future misery more vividly than past. Our minds are such that memories of past hardships fade and their going uncompensated is not as frustrating as the prospect of future hardships without compensation. We just have the capacity to imagine and feel more acutely the distress from the prospect of a futile future than from a past that has suddenly become pointless because of a loss as in the lifeboat scenario. A future of X number of years of hardships is more overwhelming than the recognition that the benefits from the same number of past years have been lost. This asymmetry is true even though in Smith's case the loss of past earnings makes his future bleak. Since this loss occurs later in his life, his bleak future will be shorter than Jones's. Thus Smith's lot in life is not as distressing as Jones's even though he and Jones both fail to enjoy the same fruits of the same number of years of labor.

So if the two lives with the same uncompensated labor are experienced as not equally burdensome, we have grounds for justifying our different reactions to the two thought experiments. Morality is extremely demanding at times. One has to give up all of one's lifesavings in emergencies. But since this is not experienced as harshly as giving up all of one's *future* earnings above the minimum necessary to sustain oneself, one doesn't have to do the latter. The latter undermines a person's well-being to a degree the former does not even though the two individuals are equally impoverished across their lives taken as a whole. So one must look at the lives from the "inside" to appreciate the asymmetry.

The principle that explains our diverging intuitive responses to the lifeboat and surgeon thought experiments is one that dictates that when weighing alternative outcomes, we should concentrate upon the affects a person's sacrifices would have on his future rather than take into account past burdens and

benefits *except* in so much as they make his future either more or less tolerable. While it is true that consequentialists would also make use of this principle when comparing alternative outcomes, they would insist that the doctor in the thought experiment must choose to lead an impoverished life in order to save another from death, thus earning in return for his medical services only enough to pay for the bare necessities without which his life would not be worth living. Such sacrifices would produce a better overall state of affairs than letting the patient die in order that the doctor may enjoy an affluent life. So the consequentialist would demand of the doctor what I do not, even though we both measure sacrifices in the same way, believing that uncompensated labor in the *future* would be psychologically experienced as a greater burden than that resulting from an action that deprives one of an equal amount of compensation that had been saved from *past* labors. Thus the use that I make of the temporal asymmetry principle in support of our intuitive responses to the pair of thought experiments differs from that of the consequentialist. Of course, the attitude of most consequentialists is that when intuitions diverge from theoretically satisfactory principles, so much the worse for the intuitions. However, I believe that a more compelling moral methodology, as well as a more effective defense of a very demanding ethic, is to be obtained by relying upon pre-theoretical, commonsense intuitions elicited by certain thought experiments, rather than the abstract and often intuitively unappealing, procedural principles of consequentialism.[10]

Although my methodology is similar to Unger's, our conclusions differ. While we both use lifeboat-like thought experiments in order to reveal that "deep down" most of our readers are committed to a very demanding morality, other intuitions elicited by carefully constructed thought experiments indicate that, pace Unger, people don't have to devote their entire lives to saving others. Therefore, from the fact that one might be morally compelled to give up one's life's savings in

lifeboat-like emergencies to prevent a single death, it does not follow that a person *throughout* his life must send amounts of money to life saving charities that, when totaled, equal that which was thrown off the lifeboat. Repeatedly giving to charity (virtually) all of one's earnings since one's last lifesaving gift would be analogous to Jones conducting years of (virtually) uncompensated surgery. If the arguments of this paper have been successful, there is a morally relevant difference between the demands asked of Jones in the hospital and those placed upon Smith in the lifeboat which enable us to preserve our different intuitive reactions to the two cases.

While we can rely upon commonsense intuitions in order to resist the conclusion of Unger and the consequentialists that many of us must live everyday as moral saints, we cannot appeal to similar commonsense intuitions to avoid recognizing a still very demanding duty to aid those throughout the world facing death and disease. Our commonsense (pre-theoretical) intuitions in the lifeboat scenario have a wider application than expected by most defenders of commonsense morality because much of the Third World finds itself everyday in a situation like that of the person drowning alongside the lifeboat. We must aid others, at least to the point where the psychological burden of doing so is equivalent to the toll taken on the rescuer in the lifeboat scenario. Such a duty should dramatically transform the comfortable middle class lives that most of us enjoy. And the fact that there are others (richer people and governments) who should aid the impoverished confronted by disease and death, doesn't excuse our not providing aid when they fail to, any more than did the inaction of others in the multiple lifeboats scenario mentioned earlier in the paper.[11]

1. Unger, Peter. *Living High and Letting Die.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

2.The reason the drowning man is from a different shipwreck is that this removes any claim the drowning person has to the lifeboat as a paying passenger of the cruise from which the life boat originates.

3. I am indebted here to an anonymous reviewer's call for clarification of Smith's post rescue predicament.

4.To emphasize how surprising this intuition is, notice that we wouldn't have condemned Smith for not giving away say even a quarter of all his earnings to Unicef and Oxfam even though they could have saved hundreds of lives with such a contribution. Yet we would condemn Smith if he does not sacrifice much more to save fewer lives, i.e., to "give up" all his money to save just one life. Peter Unger has investigated such incongruities in our thinking about morality in his recent *Living High and Letting Die.* Op Cit.

5. This thought experiment is very similar to and influenced by one that Peter Unger devised and labeled "Bob's Bugatti." Op. Cit. pp. 136-139.

6. For a defense of this intuition, see Liam Murphy's "The Demands of Beneficence." in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 22 No. 4 Fall 1998. pp. 267-292. He argues there "that the principles of beneficence should not demand more of agents as expected compliance by others decreases...Rather than an aim we each have as individuals,

beneficence could be understood as a cooperative project, where each of us aims to promote the good *together with others.* If so, it would be natural to resist taking on, in addition to one's own share of the burdens of this cooperative project, the shares of noncomplying agents." pp. 268-269. See also Derek Parfit's discussion in his *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 33-34 and Dan Brock's "Defending Moral Actions" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51 (1991) pp. 912-913.

7. See his discussion of *salience* in his *Living High and Letting Die* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 28-29, 55, 63, 73-77.

8.Quinn, Warren. "Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing" and his "Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect." Both are reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza 's *Ethics: Problems and Principles* (Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1992) pp. 155-158 and p.186-188. I actually don't believe that respect for men's humanity provides an account of why it is worse, to kill someone then to let someone dies.

9. Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.* tr. H.J. Paton. pp. 48-49.

10. I am indebted here to an anonymous reviewer who stressed the need to contrast my understanding and use of the temporal asymmetry principle and that of consequentialism.

11.Before one concludes that there is a morally relevant difference between the life boat and third world aid, read the second chapter of Unger's *Living High and Letting Die* in

which he discusses and compares the thought experiments of the *Envelope* and the *Vintage Sedan.* He may have already considered and provided a compelling response to any of your proposals.